Pappas - Berkeley and Scepticism

International Phenomenological Society
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Berkeley and Scepticism

Author(s): George Pappas
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Mar., 1999), pp. 133-149
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. LIX, No. 1, March 1999
Berkeley and Scepticism
GEORGE PAPPAS
Ohio State University
In both the Principles and the Three Dialogues, Berkeley claims that he wants to
uncover those principles which lead to scepticism; to refute those principles; and to
refute scepticism itself. This paper examines the principles Berkeley says have
scepticial consequences, and contends that only one of them implies scepticism. It is also
argued that Berkeley's attempted refutation of scepticism rests not on his acceptance of
the esse est percipi principle, but rather on the thesis that physical objects and their
sensible qualities are immediately perceived.
Among Berkeley's stated main goals in both the Principles and the Dialogues
is that of uncovering those doctrines or principles which somehow lead to
skepticism and atheism. He thinks he can specify which principles have these
consequences, an important matter unto itself since these principles were all
accepted by one or more of his predecessors. However, Berkeley also wants to
refute scepticism and atheism; he claims to vindicate commonsensical views
about knowledge and certainty and in the process establish the existence of
God, thereby discharging two tasks at one blow.
In this paper I will focus on Berkeley's treatment of scepticism rather than
atheism and free-thinking in religion. The paper has three targets: (1) to
understand just what Berkeley means by the term 'scepticism;' (2) to discover
which principles accepted by his competition are supposed to lead to scepti-
cism; and, (3) to explicate just what Berkeley' s answer to scepticism amounts
to. As we will see there is more than one way to interpret what Berkeley has
to say on the last of these three issues.
1. Types of Scepticism
In the beginning of the first Dialogue, Berkeley characterizes scepticism in
terms of doubtfulness. He has Hylas say that a sceptic is "...one that doubts
of everything."' Presumably the doctrine, as opposed to the person, would
then be that every proposition is doubtful. But this possibly self-refuting
The Works of George Berkeley, A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, ed. (London: Thomas
Nelson, 1948-57), Vol. 2, p. 173. Hereafter, references to this are made in the text as
Works, followed by the appropriate volume and page number.
BERKELEY AND SCEPTICISM 133
thesis is not what Berkeley takes scepticism to be. Following Hylas' admis-
sion that his initial statement of skepticism is in error, Hylas remarks:
What think you of distrusting the senses, of denying the real existence of sensible things, or
pretending to know nothing? Is this not sufficient to denominate a man a septic? ( Works, Vol.
2, 173)
Philonous accepts this suggestion. He says,
Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that denies the reality of sensible things, or pro-
fesses the greatest ignorance of them; since, if I take you rightly, he is to be esteemed the
greatest sceptic? (Ibid.)
These two passages actually suggest three distinct notions of scepticism
1. We do not gain knowledge by means of the senses, i.e., we do not
gain any perceptual knowledge.
2. There is no knowledge, i.e., no person knows any proposition.
3. There are no sensible things, i.e., no sensible qualities (shape, color,
and the like) or sensible objects (tables, chairs, and so on).
The first two notions are properly epistemic notions of scepticism, the first
being a local form pertaining just to perceptual knowledge and the latter
global, encompassing all putative knowledge. The third notion we may think
of as ontological scepticism, denying existence to a whole category of enti-
ties.
Ontological scepticism of this sort we may think of as derivatively a scep-
tical doctrine. Statement (3) is just a negative existential, making no claims
about knowledge. Still, it entails some important epistemic ideas. If there are
no sensible things or sensible qualities, then of course we have no knowledge
of such entities, nor do we acquire such knowledge in perception. In the first
instance, though, it is the denial of knowledge (or of justified belief) which is
the sceptical doctrine. Denial of the existence of some types of entities is a
sceptical thesis only insofar as it entails that there is no knowledge of such
entities.
While properly sceptical on any account, neither (1) nor (2) can be taken
as Berkeley's targets. Hylas pretty much represents the views of Berkeley's
opponents, principally Locke and Descartes, and neither of them denies that
we have knowledge of individually perceived ideas. So (1) does not express a
view that Berkeley's opponents accept and he denies. Nor, therefore, does (2).
Instead, it is skepticism regarding ordinary physical objects that is at issue, a
much more restricted doctrine than (2). Berkeley represents it in the preface to
the Dialogues this way:
134 GEORGE PAPPAS
Upon the common principles of philosophers, we are not assured of the existence of things
from their being perceived. And we are taught to distinguish their real nature from that which
falls under our senses. Hence arise skepticism and paradoxes. It is not enough, that we see and
feel, that we smell and taste a thing. Its true nature, its absolute external entity, is still
concealed. ( Works, Vol. 2, 167)
This suggests that we should amend the first two statements:
(1.1) We do not gain knowledge, by means of perception, of either the
nature or the existence of ordinary physical objects.
(2.1) We do not know any propositions concerning the nature or existence
of ordinary physical objects.
Berkeley also talks about certainty in our beliefs about physical objects.
For instance, in another exchange with Hylas, Philonous says,
I...assert that I am as certain as of my own being, that there are bodies or corporeal sub-
stances (meaning the things I perceive by my senses), and that granting this, the bulk of
mankind will take no thought about, nor think themselves at all concerned in the fate of those
unknown natures, and philosophical quiddities, which some men are so fond of. ( Works, Vol.
2, 238)
Armed with such an idea we could amend (1.1) to talk of certain perceptual
knowledge, and change (2.1) so that it concerns certain knowledge of ordinary
physical objects. That Berkeley has such theses in mind is indicated by his
allegation that on his views, one does have such certain knowledge and that it
is gained in perception. Still, there are important differences to be observed.
First, and most obviously, the two scepticisms with respect to certain
knowledge are very narrow, much more so than (1.1) and (2.1). They are, as
well, much more difficult to refute, since one would then have to show that
we do have certain knowledge in this domain. Perhaps most important, (1.1)
and (2.1) express sceptical theses that Berkeley's opponents might want to
reject, while the amended versions concerning certain knowledge of physical
objects they would surely accept. Berkeley then needs to be seen as maintain-
ing that his opponents are committed to holding (1.1) and (2.1), not that they
openly do so. Scepticism about certain knowledge of physical objects, how-
ever, they would accept outright.2
2 There are some complications here. Descartes does maintain in the sixth Meditation that
we have knowledge of the general truth that there are physical objects and that they have
the primary qualities. But he concedes that even with God's help in the best of circum-
stances, we do sometimes fall into error with respect to individual physical object propo-
sitions. So, perhaps Descartes would be willing to allow acceptance of (1.1) and (2.1),
restricted to individual propositions, while he would reject both taken in full generality.
Locke's rejection of (1.1) and (2.1) comes in his account of sensitive knowledge in
Bk. IV of the Essay. I take sensitive knowledge, for Locke, to qualify as genuine knowl-
2. Berkeley's Project
Berkeley has three aims with regard to skepticism: First, to uncover those
principles or doctrines which lead to scepticism; second, to refute those prin-
ciples; and, third, to refute scepticism itself. Regarding the first point he
says,
My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those principles are, which have intro-
duced all that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions into the sev-
eral sects of philosophy. (Intro. to Principles, 4, in Works, Vol. 2, 26).
In the same passage he addresses the second point:
...there may be some grounds to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which stay and embar-
rass the mind in its search after truth, do not spring from any darkness and intricacy in the
objects, or natural defect in the understanding, so much from false principles which have been
insisted on, and might have been avoided. (Ibid.)
As for the third part of his project, he says,
If the principles, which I here endeavor to propagate, are admitted for true; the consequences
which, I think, evidently flow from thence, are, that atheism and skepticism will be utterly
destroyed, many intricate points made plain, great difficulties solved, several useless parts of
science retrenched, speculation referred to practice, and men reduced from paradox to com-
mon sense. (Preface to Three Dialogues, in Works, Vol. 2, 168)
In part 1 of the project, Berkeley says there are four main principles which
lead to scepticism: (A) the thesis that there are abstract ideas; (M) the thesis
that objects consist in material substance with inherent sensible qualities;
(RE) that is, realism regarding the existence of ordinary physical objects and
at least some of their qualities, which is the denial of the esse est percipi doc-
trine; and, (RR) the theory which we would call the representative realist
theory of perception.3 Each is worth some consideration.
In the Introduction to the Principles, Berkeley says that he will take notice
of
edge, despite the fact that it falls short of the certainty attending intuitive and demonstra-
tive knowledge.
The matter of certain knowledge is also complex. If we understand the notion of
certainty as ruling out the possibility of error, as both Descartes and Locke do, then of
course they would both be sceptical about certain knowledge. But then in this sense of
certainty, even Berkeley would be sceptical about such knowledge. However, Berkeley
utilizes a much weaker notion of certainty, one which requires merely the absence of
actual grounds for doubt. In this sense, while Berkeley can claim to be certain of the
existence of physical objects and their qualities, it might be that Descartes and Locke
could make the same claim.
For principle A see the introduction to the Principles, section 6, as well as Principles 97
and De Motu 43. For principle M see the first of the Three Dialogues in Works, Vol. 2,
172, and for RE see Principles 88. For principle RR see Principles 8 and 18-20.
136 GEORGE PAPPAS
... what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate and perplexed, and to
have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties in almost all parts of knowledge. And that
is the opinion that the mind hath a power of framing abstract ideas or notions of things.
Works, Vol. 2, 27)
This passage comes on the heels of one, quoted above, in which Berkeley
tells us that his aim is to uncover those principles which lead to scepticism.
So, part of what he means by saying that the abstract ideas thesis makes
speculation difficult and leads to errors is that the thesis engenders scepticism.
How is this supposed to come about?
I assume that Berkeley cannot mean merely that if there are abstract ideas,
it would be difficult to have much knowledge about them. For that, by itself,
contributes nothing to the sceptical doctrines noted earlier. To see what he
might have in mind, consider what he says about time.
Beside the external existence of the objects of perception, another great source of errors and
difficulties, with regard to ideal knowledge, is the doctrine of abstract ideas, such as hath been
set forth in the Introduction. The plainest things in the world, those we are most intimately
acquainted with, and perfectly know, when they are considered in an abstract way, appear
strangely difficult and incomprehensible. Time, place, and motion, ... are what everybody
knows; but having passed through the hands of a metaphysician, they become too abstract and
fine, to be apprehended by men of ordinary sense. ( Principles 97, in Works, Vol. 2, 83)
Now there is no doubt that Berkeley holds that the external existence of
objects of perception is a principle which leads to scepticism (we discuss this
below). So, in coupling the abstract ideas thesis with that concerning external
objects, his point is to implicate them in the same "error." But I think
Berkeley is making a fairly subtle mistake on this point.
To see this, consider how he completes the passages just partly quoted:
Bid your servant meet you at such a time, in such a place, and he shall never stay to deliberate
on the meaning of those words: in conceiving that particular time and place, or the motion by
which he is to get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But if time be taken, exclusive of all
those particular actions and ideas that diversify the day, merely for the continuation of exis-
tence or duration in the abstract, then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend
it. ( Works, Vol. 2, 83)
What the servant would fail to know, given what Berkeley says, is the correct
analysis of the concept of time. In this respect, the servant would not know
what time is and neither, perhaps, would even the best philosophers. But this
is not scepticism, or if it is it is not the sort that Berkeley officially aims to
attack. For ignorance concerning the correct analysis of the concept of time is
perfectly consistent with one having all manner of knowledge of propositions
which temporally locate physical objects. Thus, one might know that the
refrigerator was in this room yesterday, despite being in the dark about the
correct analysis of time. So, the thesis of abstract ideas does not lead to scep-
ticism in the way that Berkeley claims.
The thesis that physical objects consist in material substance in which
qualities inhere, or M, is also supposed to lead to scepticism. Hylas points
out that he has heard rumors that Philonous denies the existence of matter,
something Hylas regards as extravagant. Philonous agrees that the rumors are
correct, but he denies that scepticism results. To this, Hylas says:
What! Can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant to common sense, or a more manifest
piece of scepticism, than to believe that there is no such thing as matter?
And Philonous responds:
What if I should prove, that you who hold there is, are by virtue of that opinion a greater
sceptic, and maintain more paradoxes and repugnancies to common sense, than I who believe
no such thing? ( Works, Vol. 2, 172; see also Principles, Section 92)
We know that for Berkeley the notion of matter is supposed to be incoher-
ent or at least to make no sense. Moreover, Berkeley holds that the notion of
qualities inhering in matter is unintelligible. So, as with abstract ideas, the
supposition of matter has the result that no person would know the correct
analysis of the concept of an object. In this respect, Berkeley is right to say
that given matter and inherence, nobody would know the nature of objects,
perhaps not even the essential natures of objects.4 But the material substance
thesis does not rule out knowing many other things about objects. It does not
rule out, for an example, knowing that there is a chair in the corner, that it
has a certain shape, that it is made of wood, nor even that it has a brown
color. The assumption of matter, by itself, does not rule out knowledge of
any of these things, nor even rule out that such knowledge is gained by
means of perception of the object. In this respect, one can perceptually
acquire a great deal of knowledge about the nature of objects even if the mate-
rial substance and inherent qualities thesis is true.
One might think that if sensible qualities inhere in a material substance,
then these qualities would not be perceivable, and hence we would not have
any means of acquiring knowledge of them. Thus, skepticism of precisely the
sort which concerns Berkeley would result after all from the thesis of matter
and inherent qualities. However, this line of reasoning, too, is not quite right.
To see why, notice that the material substance and inherent qualities thesis
is consistent with a naive form of direct realism, according to which perceived
sensible qualities actually exist on or in the objects, and the objects are
immediately perceived by immediate perception of some of their sensible
qualities. On such a view, sensible qualities are perfectly perceivable, despite
their being inherent in matter. And again, although we would know nothing
For discussion of this sort of sceptical doctrine see Margaret Atherton, Berkeley's Revo-
lution in Vision (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 238.
138 GEORGE PAPPAS
about matter itself or about the mysterious relation of inherence, we would
know plenty about objects.'
Of course, direct realism of any sort is not an option any philosopher took
very seriously (perhaps excepting Arnauld) before Thomas Reid, and certainly
Berkeley never entertains the position as a viable one. So we could argue as
follows in Berkeley's behalf: The view that objects consist in material sub-
stances with inherent sensible qualities, tacitly conjoined with the assump-
tion that no form of direct realism is correct, implies that objects are not
immediately perceivable, and neither are any of their sensible qualities. This
position, Berkeley would urge, surely does imply scepticism regarding
objects. On this point Berkeley is on firmer ground, we may assume, at least
if we grant Berkeley that inferences from propositions about immediately per-
ceived entities to propositions about objects are suspect. But notice what
carries the inference to the sceptical result. It is not the supposition of matter
and inherent qualities by itself that does this work. Instead, it is the denial of
direct realism regarding objects and their qualities (together with the assump-
tion that the inductive inferences needed for inferential knowledge of objects
are not cogent) which has the unwanted sceptical consequence.
Yet maybe there is still something to be said in support of the claim that
the material substance thesis leads to skepticism. For that thesis implies that
objects exist unperceived, or have what Berkeley calls a real absolute exis-
tence. The supposition of matter, in other words, implies the third of the four
principles which Berkeley thinks lead to scepticism. If this third principle,
which is just the denial of the esse est percipi doctrine favored by Berkeley,
implies scepticism, then so does the material substance thesis. And indeed,
this is just how Berkeley thinks of the matter. Here is a representative pas-
sage:
So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking things, distinct from their being per-
ceived, it is not only impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real unthinking
thing, but even that it exists. (Principles 88, in Works, Vol. 2, 79)
Moreover, we know that Berkeley holds that the material substance thesis
implies that objects exist unperceived. He says,
But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material substratum or sup-
port of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose they have an exis-
tence without the mind? And is not this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?
(Principles 17, in Works, Vol. 2, 35)
Compare the remarks by C. M. Turbayne in his edition of the Three Dialogues
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1954), p. XIII, particularly what he there calls the "first
version of materialism."
In fact, with these materials at hand, Berkeley can easily reply to the com-
ments made earlier about abstract ideas and skepticism. At Principles 5 he
says:
If we thoroughly examine this tenet, it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doc-
trine of abstract ideas. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the exis-
tence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unper-
ceived? (Works, Vol. 2, 42)
If we take this passage to contain the claim that if there are abstract ideas,
then the esse est percipi thesis is false, then it is easy to see why Berkeley
thinks that abstract ideas lead to skepticism. The denial of the esse est percipi
thesis has this consequence, and the abstract ideas thesis implies the denial of
esse est percipi.6
Seen in this way, both the material substance thesis and the abstract ideas
thesis imply skepticism and for the same reason: each individually implies
that esse est percipi is false, and the latter, Berkeley assures us, leads directly
to the sceptical consequences noted earlier.
While I think these comments accurately reflect Berkeley's reasoning, we
should also ask whether the reasoning is correct. One reason to think it is not
was already supplied regarding matter and can be noted again: all forms of
direct realism are perfectly consistent with the denial of the esse est percipi
thesis; indeed, direct realism incorporates that denial. But on a direct realist
theory, physical objects and their qualities are typically immediately per-
ceived, and this fact eliminates Berkeley's reason for holding that we would
lack knowledge of such objects if we granted that they exist unperceived. For,
being immediately perceivable, physical objects and their qualities would
qualify as things about which immediate knowledge can be had. As before, it
would only be by tacitly assuming that direct realism is not an option that
skepticism results. Rejecting direct realism but accepting that objects exist
unperceived leads straight to indirect realism, which under Locke's influence
Berkeley treats as representative realism, and it is this which would have
sceptical consequences. Hence, Berkeley is wrong: neither the abstract ideas
thesis, nor the material substance thesis, nor indeed the denial of esse est
percipi, taken alone, implies skepticism. Each needs to be conjoined with
another premise in which direct realism and thus the immediate perception of
physical objects, is ruled out.
Even so, we should remind ourselves that Berkeley never seriously consid-
ers the option of direct realism since, as he might put it, it is "agreed on all
hands" that direct realism is false. So there is a good sense in which he is not
guilty of any error. Nevertheless, in no case is the inference an immediate one
6 I discuss these matters more fully in "Abstract Ideas and the Esse Est Percipi Thesis,"
Hermathena, CXXXIX, 1985; reprinted in W. Doney, ed., Abstraction and Abstract Ideas
(New York: Garland, 1988).
140 GEORGE PAPPAS
as Berkeley's texts would have us believe, and so none of the first three puta-
tive scepticism-producing principles unearthed by Berkeley by itself implies
that we lack knowledge of physical objects.?
There can be little doubt that Berkeley thinks that representative realism
leads to skepticism. Here is how Philonous characterizes Hylas' views:
It is your opinion, the ideas we perceive by our senses are not real things, but images, or copies
of them. Our knowledge therefore is no farther real, than as our ideas are the true representa-
tions of those originals. But as these supposed originals are in themselves unknown, it is impos-
sible to know how far our ideas resemble them; or whether they resemble them at all. (Works,
Vol. 2, 246; see also Principles 18-20)
The problem Berkeley sees for this view is straightforward: one never imme-
diately perceives physical objects, but only ideas, some of which represent
the objects and some of their qualities. In order to know whether one is in the
perceptual presence of an object one has to be able to compare the object's
qualities with the manifest qualities of the immediately perceived ideas. But
given the theory, one can never accomplish this; Hence, given the theory,
one has no means of gaining perceptual knowledge of objects or their quali-
ties, which is (2.1), and presumably from this it follows that one has no
knowledge of objects (=(1.1)). Of course, if one has no knowledge of objects,
one also has no certain knowledge of them; so, the amended versions of scep-
ticism earlier referred to would likewise follow from this fourth principle.8
Is this argument sound? Certainly a great many philosophers from
Berkeley's time to our own have supposed that it is. We can readily see why
once we note that Berkeley's argument is an instance of a more general argu-
ment he gives elsewhere: if physical objects and their qualities are not imme-
diately perceived, then they are not entities about which one gains immediate
knowledge. If this is so, then any perceptual knowledge one has of physical
objects and their qualities is inferential, and thus would be based upon what-
ever immediate perceptual knowledge one has. The latter is restricted to
immediately perceived ideas. However, neither deductive nor inductive infer-
ences from propositions about immediately perceived ideas to propositions
about physical objects or their qualities are successful. Hence, there is no
7 But what of that comment in Principles 86 where Berkeley says that if objects exist
unperceived, how would we know that they are when unperceived as they are when
perceived? This suggests that even if direct realism were true, Berkeley would urge that
skepticism threatens. In this he would perhaps be anticipating Hume's similar ideas in the
section "Of Scepticism Regarding the Senses" in the Treatise. On this view, it would be
realism per se and not indirect perception, which would lead to scepticism, and it would
have this result because it allows objects to exist unperceived. Although relevant to the
questions of scepticism here considered, it is clear that even if correct, the sceptical doc-
trines supported by this line of reasoning fall short of (1.1) and (2.1). That is, the claim
that we do not know what objects are like when they are not perceived does nothing to
show that we lack knowledge of perceived objects.
8 See Principles 87 for this argument.
inferential perceptual knowledge of physical objects, and thus no perceptual
knowledge of them at all. Since there is no non-perceptual knowledge of such
objects, we reach the fully general sceptical result that there is no knowledge
of physical objects, given the truth of any form of indirect realism.
Though there are elements in this argument that are open to question, for
present purposes we will assume that it is sound. We may accordingly sum-
marize the results reached thus far: Of the four doctrines Berkeley singles out,
only the last-indirect representative realism-has skeptical consequences.
The other three doctrines-abstract ideas, material substance, and metaphys-
ical realism-taken individually or jointly do not imply skepticism.
Why, then, is Berkeley so confident that skepticism does follow from
these theses? The correct answer, I think, is the same for each thesis.
Berkeley thinks that each implies indirect or representative realism and it, as
we have noted, implies scepticism. The thesis of abstract ideas, he seems to
hold, implies the denial of the esse est percipi thesis, as does the supposition
of material substance. The denial of the esse est percipi thesis is just the
affirmation of metaphysical realism, the view that physical objects and some
of their qualities exist unperceived. Now Berkeley, along with nearly every
other philosopher in the period, takes for granted the theory of ideas. In his
hands, this amounts to the view that in every perceptual experience, some
ideas are immediately perceived (= thesis I). Hence, if physical objects and
their qualities are perceived at all, they are indirect perceived. Whence scepti-
cism about the objects and their qualities. But it is clear that the assumption
of thesis I does major work in Berkeley's argument. It is this thesis which
effectively rules out direct realism.9
3. Rejecting the Principles
As we noted earlier, Berkeley's second aim is to refute the principles which
he thinks lead to scepticism. This means refuting the four principles exam-
ined above. What is not clear is what Berkeley infers from the (supposed)
refutation of these several principles.
The case against abstract ideas rests on two points: first, that some
abstract ideas are logically inconsistent, and so cannot exist; and second, that
we cannot engage in the process of abstraction necessary to acquire other
abstract ideas because this process requires us to separate in thought qualities
which cannot be separated in reality, something which, Berkeley thinks
everyone will agree, cannot be done. These arguments imply that there are no
abstract general ideas, and so imply what I will call P, viz., that all ideas are
One can hold the theory of ideas in some form and still hold on to direct realism. The
trick is to interpret ideas so that they are not perceived entities, even though they are
constituent elements in every perceptual experience. Arnauld seems to have held such a
view. For illuminating detailed discussion, see Steven Nadler, Arnauld and Cartesian
Philosophy of Ideas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
142 GEORGE PAPPAS
particular-which is the rejection of one of Hylas' principles and the accep-
tance of an alternatives
The main argument against the real independent existence of physical
objects, or metaphysical realism, relies on what has been called the "master
argument", according to which one cannot conceive an object or a sensible
quality existing unperceived. Hence, Berkeley concludes, no such entity does
exist unperceived. This is the esse estpercipi thesis (hereafter EEP).1' As for
matter and inherent sensible qualities, that is ruled out on the grounds that
such qualities cannot inhere in matter since that would imply that some non-
perceiving thing, viz., matter, exists unperceived, contrary to what he had
already established with the esse est percipi thesis.'2 Ordinary objects can thus
be nothing but collections of sensible qualities (= C). By the arguments of
the first Dialogue, each sensible quality is a sensible idea. Hence, thesis C
really reduces to the thesis that each physical object is a "collection" of sen-
sible ideas.
Finally, the representative realist theory is rejected on the grounds that it
runs afoul of the likeness principle, i.e., the principle which asserts that an
idea can be like nothing but another idea. Hence, the representational element
of Hylas' theory cannot hold, and so the theory collapses.'3 With matter
rejected, objects must consist merely of collections of qualities, or for
Berkeley, ideas. And with the rejection of representational realism, and again
the tacit rejection of direct realism, the story of our perceptual access to
objects must be told along phenomenalist lines. For reasons given below, I
take this to mean that Berkeley accepts the view (here dubbed IPO) that ordi-
nary physical objects are immediately perceived, since in many cases the
10 Berkeley's main arguments against abstract ideas and the process of abstraction occur in
the Introduction to the Principles. Also relevant, for somewhat different points, is the
early draft of the introduction to the Principles, contained in The Works of George
Berkeley, ed. A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop (London: Thomas Nelson, 1948-57), Vol. 2.
The principal text for the master argument is Principles, 22-24. The term 'master argu-
ment' derives from Andre Gallois, "Berkeley's Master Argument," Philosophical
Review, 83 (1974). Evidence that Berkeley himself regarded the master argument as
primary is found in the first dialogue where Philonous says: "But (to pass by all that hath
been hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it so) I am content to put the
whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible for any mixture or combination of
qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it
actually to be so." (Works, Vol. 2, 200)
12 So, when Berkeley claims that the concept of matter is inconsistent, he should be taken as
maintaining that it is inconsistent with an established truth (EEP), not that it is inconsistent
in itself. A good statement of this primary argument against matter occurs in Principles
91.
13 The likeness argument is given in Principles 8. Note that the likeness argument does not
depend in any way on the truth of EEP. That is, the likeness argument is supposed to work
even if metaphysical realism regarding objects is correct. It is worth asking whether
Berkeley has any arguments, similarly independent of the EEP thesis, against non-repre-
sentative versions of indirect realism.
immediate perception of some sensible ideas is (or is sufficient for) the
immediate perception of some physical object.
4. Refuting Scepticism?
What follows, according to Berkeley, from the rejection of the four principles
which lead to scepticism? Sometimes he writes as though he thinks that
rejection of the four principles which he thinks lead to skepticism is itself
sufficient to refute skepticism. For instance, speaking of how the denial of
esse estpercipi has led to scepticism, he says:
But all this doubtfulness, which so bewilders and confounds the mind, and makes philosophers
ridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes if we annex a meaning to our words, and do not
amuse ourselves with the terms absolute, external, exist, and such like... (YPrinciples, 88, in
Works, Vol. 2, 79)
On one reading of this passage Berkeley is saying that rejection of the
independent existence of physical objects suffices to refute skepticism. And if
we generalize on this, assuming that he would reason in the same way regard-
ing the other principles which allegedly lead to skepticism, we get this argu-
ment:
Principles A, M, RE and RR, which we have noted lead to scepti-
cism, have all been shown to be false. So, scepticism is false as
well.
Though there are passages, such as that lately quoted which suggest this
argument, it is hardly satisfactory, since it contains an obvious elementary
blunder. But we need not interpret Berkeley in this uncharitable manner. A
more sympathetic interpretation would yield this argument as Berkeley's:
Principles A, M, RE and RR, which we have noted lead to scepti-
cism, have all been shown to be false. So, skepticism has no sup-
port; the arguments for skepticism collapse, and we have no reason
to accept it.
This more conservative account of Berkeley's conclusion regarding scepti-
cism, though according nicely with many texts, does not completely square
with everything he says. For he wants to go beyond merely refuting the prin-
ciples on which skepticism depends; he claims to have arguments which
refute skepticism outright. Recall how Berkeley writes in the Preface to the
Three Dialogues:
If the principles, which I here endeavor to propagate, are admitted for true; the consequences
which, I think, evidently flow from thence, are, that atheism and scepticism will be utterly
destroyed, many intricate points made plain, great difficulties solved, several useless parts of
144 GEORGE PAPPAS
science retrenched, speculation referred to practice, and men reduced from paradox to com-
mon sense. (Works, Vol. 2, 168)
Which principles does Berkeley think serve to refute skepticism?
Berkeley writes as though it is EEP, the esse est percipi principles,
which establishes the falsity of skepticism. He says:
I can as well doubt of my own being, as of the being of those things which I actually perceive
by my senses: it being a manifest contradiction, that any sensible object should be immediately
perceived by sight or touch, and at the same time have no existence in Nature, since the very
existence of an unthinking thing consists in being perceived. (Principles 88; Works, Vol. 2, 79)
We could then represent the argument Berkeley has in mind in this way:
1. EEP is true.
2. If EEP is true, then we have knowledge of physical objects which
we get via perception.
3. If we have such perceptual knowledge of physical objects, then scep-
ticism regarding such objects is false.
4. So, skepticism regarding physical objects is false. 14
In this context we are not questioning premise (1); and, clearly (3) is true.
But what reasons could there be to accept (2) Perhaps one reason is given in
this passage:
Colour, figure, motion, extension and the like, considered only as so many sensations in the
mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in them which is not perceived. (Principles, 87,
in Works, Vol. 2, 78)
Sensible qualities, this passage tells us, are entities which exist only in the
mind; that is, they come within the scope of EEP. So, a specific sensible
quality such as a color exists only within the mind, and so every aspect of
that color is thereby perceived. Generalizing on this to all entities which exist
only within the mind, we would get:
If X exists only within the mind (and so comes within the scope of
EEP), then X has all and only those (non-relational) qualities it is
perceived to have.
This principle needs to be supplemented with an additional premise indicated
by the last-quoted passage, namely,
14 For an interpretation of this sort, see R. Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism, (San
Diego: Austin Hill, 1980), especially pp. 309-11.
If X has all and only those (non-relational) qualities it is perceived to
have, then X is perfectly known.
Now we can discern an argument for premise (2). It utilizes these two princi-
ples, both seemingly anchored textually by Principles 87, together with
something EEP implies, namely that each physical object exists if and only
if it is perceived, and we then conclude that premise (2) is true.
There is, though, a good reason to resist attributing this line of reasoning
to Berkeley. The text we have lately noted, Principles 87, does not endorse
the first of our two principles in full generality. Thus, Berkeley will not
likely endorse the second in the form in which we have stated it. Recall how
Berkeley words his point: he speaks of colors and other sensible qualities
"...considered only as so many sensations..." So, he is being careful to speak
only of individually perceived sensible qualities; he makes no mention of all
sensible objects, including physical objects. And of course, there is a good
reason why Berkeley would be careful here. A perceived individual sensible
quality he takes to be a perceived individual sensible idea, and such an idea
exists, then, wholly within that perceivers mind. Not so for a perceived phys-
ical object; when it is perceived, it is not true that it exists, then, wholly
within that perceivers mind, even though it is true that it exists if and only if
it is perceived. Accordingly, for physical objects, it will not be true that they
are perfectly known when they are perceived, even if something less than per-
fect knowledge is thereby gained."5
If EEP does not do all of the needed work, at least not by itself, maybe
Berkeley has something else in mind. In fact, I believe he does, something
we can begin to see by considering these passages:
I do assert... that I am as certain as of my own being, that there are bodies or corporeal sub-
stances (meaning the things I perceive by my senses).... (Works, Vol. 2, 238)
and,
I see this cherry, I feel it, taste it: and I am sure nothing cannot be seen or felt or tasted; it is
therefore real. Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, tartness, and you take
away the cherry...a cherry, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions or ideas
perceived by various senses.. .When I see, and feel, and taste, in sundry matters, I am sure the
cherry exists or is real. (Works, Vol. 2, 249)
These passages emphasize two things: (1) that we gain knowledge of objects
by means of perception; and, (2) that physical objects are immediately per-
ceived. Indeed, they seem to emphasize that (1) is true in virtue of the truth of
15 For a different account of these two principles, see P. Cummins, "Berkeley's Manifest
Qualities Thesis," in R. Muehlmann, ed., Berkeley's Metaphysics (University Park: Penn
State University Press, 1995).
146 GEORGE PAPPAS
(2). In terms of the abbreviations introduced earlier, his point seems to be
that it is IPO which allows us to have knowledge of physical objects.
We also know, however, that Berkeley stresses repeatedly that sensible
ideas and only sensible ideas are immediately perceived. So, how can he also
hold that physical objects are themselves immediately perceived? The answer,
I think, is to be found in C, the thesis that physical objects are to be thought
of as collections of sensible qualities. In Berkeley's hands this collapses into
the thesis that each physical object is a collection of sensible ideas; we need
only note what he says, above, about the cherry. Given such a metaphysical
view about objects, Berkeley will feel entitled to claim that IPO holds, since
his view would be that immediately perceiving some of the sensible ideas
which are constituents of the relevant collections which make up a physical
object is sufficient for immediately perceiving that object. Immediately per-
ceiving some of the sensible ideas which go to make up the cherry, for
example, suffices for it to be true that one immediately perceives the cherry
itself. It is this, I believe, that Berkeley relies on when he tells us that on his
principles we do indeed have knowledge of physical objects, and that we get it
by means of perception.
On this reading, what does the work in refuting scepticism is C, EEP and
IPO, especially the first and third of these. This interpretation has some
advantages: it accords with all of those texts, some of which we have noted,
in which Berkeley lays stress on immediate perception being the avenue by
which one gains knowledge of the existence and nature of physical objects;
and it does not require Berkeley to make the error of resting all of the weight
for the refutation of skepticism on EEP.
However, one might object that it is really EEP which is at work in
Berkeley's argument, for that principle implies IPO. Hence, it is really EEP
which Berkeley utilizes in refuting scepticism. The mistake in this argument,
one which I think is easy to make, is that EEP has no such implication. To
see this, we need only note that EEP is consistent with a form of indirect
perception as regards physical objects. Think of the perception of an object,
which consists in a group of ideas, as indirect, and based upon the immediate
perception of a few elements of the group. In other words, EEP needs to be
supplemented with a non-trivial premise, such as this principle which links
immediate perception of some member ideas in a group to immediate percep-
tion of the object which is the group:
By immediately perceiving some ideas which are constituents in the
group of ideas which make up an object, one thereby immediately
perceives that object.
Without this additional premise, Berkeley cannot move from C and EEP to
IPO; nor, lacking this premise, would Berkeley have any real support for
IPO.
In fact, Berkeley's argument in refutation of skepticism is structurally
similar to his treatment of the principles which he thinks lead to skepticism.
In our earlier discussion in section 2, we noticed that Berkeley thinks that
each of the four principles elicited leads to scepticism. We found, however,
that this was not so: it is only the fourth of those principles, representative
(indirect) realism which has a sceptical implication. The other three principles
do not imply representative realism, unless one adds to them the non-trivial
premise that no form of direct realism is correct. Similarly here, principles C
and EEP and P do not individually or collectively imply that scepticism is
incorrect nor do they imply, individually or collectively, that IPO is true.
Again a non-trivial premise is needed, this time regarding immediate percep-
tion of a group of ideas based upon immediate perception of some elements
in the group. It is this latter non-trivial principle, I think, which Berkeley's
argument against skepticism needs and which he takes for granted.16
However, what we have identified as the needed premise also requires that
Berkeley's concept of immediate perception be non-epistemic, in the sense
that if a person S immediately perceives object X, it does not follow from
this alone that S gains any knowledge or justified belief, nor even any belief
at all, about X. For any epistemic notion of immediate perception will rule
out the sort of inference Berkeley's refutation of skepticism requires: that is,
it will rule out our saying that by immediately perceiving sensible ideas so,
S2'... sn, each of which is a constituent of the cherry, I thereby immediately
perceive the cherry. And as we have seen, Berkeley needs to be able to make
the latter inference.17
Even so, this interpretation comes at what some might see as a cost. If
'immediately perceives' is non-epistemic in the sense just indicated, and
describes a purely factual relationship between a person and a perceived entity,
why think that immediately perceiving something yields knowledge, indeed
as Berkeley says, certain knowledge? And in the case of an individual idea i,
16 If this account of Berkeley's refutation of scepticism is accurate, then Pitcher's view of
Berkeley on the perception of objects is dubious. Pitcher holds that Berkeley does not
really accept IPO, but only writes as though he does when he is speaking with the vulgar.
See G. Pitcher, "Berkeley on the Perception of Objects," Journal of the History of Philos-
ophy, Vol. 24 (January, 1986). For additional criticism of Pitcher's view, see my
"Berkeley and Common Sense Realism," History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 8,
(January, 1991).
17 Actually, if Berkeley's notion of immediate perception were equivalent to the Russellian
notion of acquaintance, then the additional premise needed in the refutation of scepticism
could be epistemic. But, I can find no textual support for interpreting Berkeley's notion of
immediate perception in this manner. For further details on the notion of immediate per-
ception, see my "Berkeley and Immediate Perception," in E. Sosa, ed., Essays on the
Philosophy of George Berkeley (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1987).
148 GEORGE PAPPAS
why think that immediate perception of i rules out even the logical possibil-
ity of mistaken belief, something Berkeley claims when he says
The objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have
an idea which I have not. ( Introduction to Principles, in Works, Vol. 2, 39)
We can only give a partial answer to these questions, especially given the
very little that Berkeley says pertaining to them. The case for individual ideas
that are immediately perceived is helped by noting that each such idea has all
and only those non-relational properties it is perceived to have, a point we
noted above. It is this claim which underwrites the view that individually per-
ceived sensible ideas are perfectly known and objects of incorrigible belief.
Matters are different with physical objects, as we have noted, because even
when they are immediately perceived, not all of their non-relational properties
are also immediately perceived. I think the most we can say is this: By the
standards any of Berkeley's contemporaries would have found acceptable, if
one's theory allows for immediate perception of physical objects, then that
theory also provides for knowledge of such objects being gained by means of
perception. Measured by these criteria then, Berkeley's refutation of scepti-
cism would count as a success, whatever we might say of it when judging it
by our lights.18' 19
18 But what are our lights? It is plausible to think that any account of knowledge and epis-
temically justified belief will have to countenance base principles whose antecedents
make use of purely non-epistemic concepts, and whose consequents attribute some epis-
temic property. If so, then perhaps more can be said in Berkeley's defense than I have
here indicated.
19 An earlier version this paper was a winner of the Ailsa and Colin Turbayne Prize, 1993.
Earlier versions of this paper were read at University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, the Uni-
versity of Rochester, Monash University, University of Thessaloniki, and the meetings of
the Canadian Philosophical Association. I have benefited from suggestions from Margaret
Atherton, William Wainwright, Ralf Meerbote, Earl Conee, Robert Muehlmann and Tom
Lennon. Criticism and suggestions from anonymous referees have also been very useful.

Pappas - Berkeley and Scepticism

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International Phenomenological Society

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Berkeley and Scepticism

Vol. LIX, No. 1, March 1999

Berkeley and Scepticism

Ohio State University

sensible qualities are immediately perceived.

is that of uncovering those doctrines or principles which somehow lead to

accepted by one or more of his predecessors. However, Berkeley also wants to

refute scepticism and atheism; he claims to vindicate commonsensical views

God, thereby discharging two tasks at one blow.

In this paper I will focus on Berkeley's treatment of scepticism rather than

which principles accepted by his competition are supposed to lead to scepti-

to say on the last of these three issues.

In the beginning of the first Dialogue, Berkeley characterizes scepticism in

of everything."' Presumably the doctrine, as opposed to the person, would

then be that every proposition is doubtful. But this possibly self-refuting

Works, followed by the appropriate volume and page number.

BERKELEY AND SCEPTICISM 133

sion that his initial statement of skepticism is in error, Hylas remarks:

Philonous accepts this suggestion. He says,

greatest sceptic? (Ibid.)

These two passages actually suggest three distinct notions of scepticism

1. We do not gain knowledge by means of the senses, i.e., we do not

gain any perceptual knowledge.

2. There is no knowledge, i.e., no person knows any proposition.

3. There are no sensible things, i.e., no sensible qualities (shape, color,

and the like) or sensible objects (tables, chairs, and so on).

of as ontological scepticism, denying existence to a whole category of enti-

Ontological scepticism of this sort we may think of as derivatively a scep-

tical doctrine. Statement (3) is just a negative existential, making no claims

no sensible things or sensible qualities, then of course we have no knowledge

of such entities, nor do we acquire such knowledge in perception. In the first

instance, though, it is the denial of knowledge (or of justified belief) which is

the sceptical doctrine. Denial of the existence of some types of entities is a

sceptical thesis only insofar as it entails that there is no knowledge of such

as Berkeley's targets. Hylas pretty much represents the views of Berkeley's

we have knowledge of individually perceived ideas. So (1) does not express a

Instead, it is skepticism regarding ordinary physical objects that is at issue, a

the Dialogues this way:

134 GEORGE PAPPAS

concealed. ( Works, Vol. 2, 167)

This suggests that we should amend the first two statements:

(1.1) We do not gain knowledge, by means of perception, of either the

nature or the existence of ordinary physical objects.

(2.1) We do not know any propositions concerning the nature or existence

of ordinary physical objects.

For instance, in another exchange with Hylas, Philonous says,

knowledge, and change (2.1) so that it concerns certain knowledge of ordinary

is gained in perception. Still, there are important differences to be observed.

we do have certain knowledge in this domain. Perhaps most important, (1.1)

reject, while the amended versions concerning certain knowledge of physical

openly do so. Scepticism about certain knowledge of physical objects, how-

ever, they would accept outright.2

BERKELEY AND SCEPTICISM 135

principles or doctrines which lead to scepticism; second, to refute those prin-

eral sects of philosophy. (Intro. to Principles, 4, in Works, Vol. 2, 26).

In the same passage he addresses the second point:

insisted on, and might have been avoided. (Ibid.)

As for the third part of his project, he says,

mon sense. (Preface to Three Dialogues, in Works, Vol. 2, 168)

that objects consist in material substance with inherent sensible qualities;