© Academy of Management journal 109, Vol. 36, No. 3, 827-556. JUSTICE AS A MEDIATOR OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN METHODS OF MONITORING AND ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR BRIAN P. NIEHOFF Kansas State University ROBERT H. MOORMAN West Virginia University ‘This study examined relationships among three methods of leader mon- ing, employee perceptions of workplace justice, and employee citi- zenship behavior. We hypothesized that monitoring would negatively affect citizenship because close control may keep employees from per- forming duties seen as extra and perhaps not leading to rewards. How- ever, we also hypothesized that monitoring’s focus on gathering unbi- ased information would positively influence employees’ perceptions of fairness, which have been found to predict citizenship behavior. Re- sults of structural equations modeling used to test direct and indirect relationships among the variables indicated that the monitoring method of observation negatively influenced citizenship but also had a positive influence through its effect on perceptions of fairness. Recent evidence has shown performance monitoring to have a positive influence on subordinate performance and managerial effectiveness (Ko- maki, 1986; Komaki, Desselles, & Bowman, 1989; Larson & Callahan, 1990). Asa task-oriented behavior, monitoring allows managers to obtain informa- tion about the performance of subordinates (Komaki, Zlotnick, & Jensen, 1986). This information can be used as feedback to subordinates (Flamholtz, 1979) or as a way to discriminate between high and low performers, thus facilitating the administration of contingent rewards (Komaki, 1986). Mon- itoring also communicates to subordinates information concerning the im- portance of particular tasks (Larson & Callahan, 1990). Given its task orien- tation, monitoring should have a positive impact on subordinate perfor- mance, or in-role behaviors. The effective functioning of an organization, however, depends not only on subordinates’ in-role behaviors, but also on their extra-role, or citizenship behaviors (Organ, 1988a). Does frequent mon- itoring of employee performance also discourage employees’ motivation to go above and beyond their job descriptions, decreasing helping behaviors and other acts of employee citizenship? There is evidence of both negative and positive effects of monitoring on extra-role behaviors. Although specific research on the issue is sparse, the traditional human relations perspective would seem to equate managerial 527528 ‘Academy of Management Journal June monitoring behaviors to close supervision, which has been related to de- creased levels of employee motivation (e.g., Likert, 1961; McGregor, 1960). Seeking performance information suggests an authoritarian approach to management, in which an Orwellian “Big Brother” tries to watch and con- trol the behavior of each employee. Recent accounts of employee reactions to computer monitoring give testimony to the potential for monitoring to have a “dark side” (Hoerr, 1988; McCandless, 1988). On the other hand, Peters and Waterman's (1982) concept, “manage- ment by wandering around” (MBWA), suggests that managers’ keeping in touch with employees enhances communication between the two and may contribute to a “people-oriented” culture in an organization. Chalykoff and Kochan (1989) found that job satisfaction increased and intent to leave de- creased when employees perceived the use of computer monitoring to be “appropriate.” The gathering of accurate and unbiased information is one of the basic components of procedural fairness (Leventhal, 1980). Organiza- tional citizenship behavior (OCB) has been found to be related to satisfaction (Bateman & Organ, 1983; Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983) and workplace justice (Moorman, 1991). We would thus expect monitoring to have a positive in- fluence on extra-role behaviors when employees see it as appropriate or justified. Although research suggests a positive relationship between leader mon- itoring and subordinate in-role behaviors, theory seems to be equivocal con- cerning the relationship between monitoring and extra-role behaviors. The purpose of this study was to examine the latter relationship. The evidence cited above suggests employees may respond negatively to the controlling aspect of monitoring but may respond positively if they perceive the mon- itoring to be part of the managerial job of maintaining fairness. We proposed and tested a compensatory model in which three methods of leader moni- toring are hypothesized to have not only direct and negative effects on OCB, but also indirect and positive effects through the impact of leader monitoring on perceptions of fairness. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES Despite the large amount of extant leadership research, authors have given very little attention to the effects of leader monitoring behaviors; how- ever, they have generally included some form of monitoring in taxonomies of effective managerial behaviors (e.g., Komaki et al., 1986; Luthans, Hodgetts, & Rosenkrantz, 1988; Yukl, 1989). Komaki and her colleagues (Komaki, 1986; Komaki et al., 1986) developed a taxonomy of work-related supervisory behaviors as part of their Operant Supervisory Taxonomy and Index. They separated supervision into three categories: (1) performance antecedents (instruction, clarifying work), (2) performance monitors, and (3) performance consequences (evaluation, giving rewards). Performance mon- itors were defined as behaviors involved with gathering performance infor- mation and included four methods: (1) work sampling: observing subordi-1993 Niehoff and Moorman 529 nates or inspecting their work; (2) reading written reports: checking results found on production reports or other documents; (3) self-reports by subor- dinates: discussing performance directly with subordinates individually or as a group; and (4) secondary sources: discussing subordinate performance with relevant others. Komaki (1986) found that insurance managers rated as highly effective by their superiors spent more time monitoring than managers rated as mar- ginally effective, but the two types of managers did not seem to differ in time spent on antecedents and consequences. Specifically, she found work sam- pling to be the method of monitoring whose use most discriminated between effective and marginal managers. Komaki, Desselles, and Bowman (1989) found that boating teams whose leaders spent much time monitoring were more successful than teams whose leaders spent little time monitoring. Ko- maki (1986) explained her results from an operant perspective, noting that monitoring is necessary to assure that the rewards administered are contin- gent on performance. Larson and Callahan (1990) also supported the positive impact of monitoring on task performance in a laboratory study. They ex- plained the effect in terms of social information processing: a leader, through work sampling and observation, conveys information to subordinates about the value or importance of task performance. This added value motivates subordinates to focus their efforts on the task being monitored. In this article, methods of leader monitoring refer to two of Komaki’s four methods: work sampling and employee self-reports. We divided the method of using employee self-reports into formal meetings and informal discussions, considering this distinction necessary because the two types of discussion differ; formal meetings are scheduled and structured, whereas informal discussions are spontaneous and variable in structure. Our focus on only those categories resulted partly from the nature of our research setting and partly from our use of the survey method. The use of written reports was not a relevant method of monitoring because the workers studied were not responsible for writing status reports for their managers. The use of second- ary sources as a method of monitoring represented a set of behaviors not visible to each employee, which limited the employees’ ability to respond to survey questions concerning their manager's use of this method. We focused instead on the degrees to which leaders observed subordinates working and spent time discussing work problems and progress with them. Methods of Leader Monitoring and Organizational Citizenship Behavior Though positive relationships between monitoring and employee in- role performance have been found, monitoring may directly decrease organ- izational citizenship behavior (OCB), defined as extra-role behavior that is discretionary and not explicitly related to the formal reward system of an organization but is conducive to its effective functioning (Organ, 1988a). Examples of OCB include being helpful and conscientious, performing job duties to levels well beyond those normally expected, becoming involved in