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Graeme Forbes
The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 134. (Jan., 1984), pp. 43-52.
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Mon Jun 4 08:33:17 2007
ne PhilosophiralQuanerlyVol. 34 No. 134
ISSN 0031-8094 $2.00
NOZICK ON SCEPTICISM
Gettier cases show that (3) and (4) are not what (1) and (2) need to be
supplemented with to obtain conditions sufficient for knowledge in general. If
the Transmission Principle is correct, they are not necessary either, as is
See E. Gettier, 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?', Analysis 23 (1963) pp. 121-123.
46 GRAEME FORBES
know that it is Judy because he does not know that Judy has a mole, since he
acquired the belief that she does as a result of a bump on the head. Once again,
it is the Transmission Principle which explains failure to know in a case of
inferential belief, a case beyond the powers of a counterfactual approach to
handle.
Finally, before turning to defence of Transmission, a caveat should be
entered. The most that could be concluded in favour of Nozick from the
discussion above is that (5) and a modified version of (6) are necessay for
non-inferential knowledge. We will not pursue the question of whether they
are sufficient here, other than to note that (5) and (6) are satisfied ifa hypnotist
induces in me a belief which in him is knowledge, a hypnotist with the
intention only to make me believe what he knows; but I find the idea that such
hypnotism transmits knowledge somewhat dubious.
For a theory of this distinction, see Peacocke,Holistic Explanation, Oxford 1979, Ch. 2.
NOZICK ON SCEPTICISM 51
the lever produces a vase hologram. So in each example, there is a sense in
which the subject is "close" to failure to acquire a beliefwhich is true (I do not
claim that the sense of 'close' is the same for both). The bystander in the Jesse
James case may be contrasted, for although it is true that if the mask had not
slipped then he would not have acquired his true belief about the identity of
the robber, he is not close to failure to acquire a true belief: our modification of
(6) to include the specificationthat evidence be held constant excludes a world
in which the mask does not slip from the class of worlds where failure to
acquire a true belief matters. The main problem here is to find a unified
account of inferential and non-inferential cases which explains why we do
think that failure to acquire a true belief in some worlds where the design of
the box is changed to allow non-vases to produce a vase hologram is relevant to
knowledge attributions. We have seen that counterfactuals will not produce
such a unification, but I will not pursue any alternatives in this paper.
It can now be seen that satisfaction of the Transmission Principle's con-
ditions is sufficient for acquisition of knowledge, because these conditions
function to rule out various ways in which it might be an accident that the
subject acquires a true belief, ways in which he might be close to failure to
acquire a true belief. Assuming the conditions are sufficiently comprehensive
(they could always be added to) this means that the only way in which an
element of the accidental can enter is through the machinery of inference
itself. But it is no accident that employment of this machinery in otherwise
favourable circumstances leads from truths to truths, since inference rules are
necessarily truth-preserving. Hence knowledge must be acquired from
deduction in situations meeting the prin~iple.~
If this defence of the Transmission Principle is correct, the Nozick's
extraordinary account of the formal properties of the operator 'K' (p. 227-
229) is as implausible as it intuitively appears to be, and must be set aside
along with the attempted refutation of scepticism it supports. So finally, how
should we respond to scepticism?If I can know that I am not a brain in a vat by
inference from other things I know, do I not then know that the sceptic's
hypothesis is false. Nozick justly remarks that such attempts to show that we
do know that sceptical hypotheses are false "strike us as suspicious, strike us
even as bad faith" (p. 201). However, it is consistent to hold both that we do
know these hypotheses are false, because we know such things as that these
are two hands, and that arguments exploiting Transmission to show that we
know it are without force if they have such premisses as that we know that
these are two hands; and it is the failure of such arguments to have any force
This claim is consistent with our verdict about the computer example, since there there is no
inference. In his "A Cognitive Cul-de-sac", Mind 91 (1982) pp. 109- 111, Fred Dretske gives an
example which he thinks defeats the Transmission Principle. I would simply deny that in his
example, the subject does not know the inferred proposition.
52 GRAEME FORBES
which accounts for our feeling that use of them is suspicious, or bad faith. The
trouble lies in the structure of the dialectical situation obtaining between the
sceptic and his opponent, which requires more for the refutation of sceptical
claims than the production of sound arguments that they are false. The
sceptic's claim, embedding a hypothesis within an epistemic modality, is, let us
say, that for all S knows, S is a brain in a vat being stimulated to have
experiences as of leading a normal life. The point of the claim is that if the
embedded hypothesis were true then none of S's empirical procedures for
arriving at beliefs would yield knowledge, which enables the sceptic to exploit
a dialectical principle which says that any knowledge S has acquired using
these procedures is subjudice or inadmissible in the dispute between S and the
sceptic; so S cannot use an argument beginning 'I know I have two hands'.
Someone who doubts that there is a principle of dialectics to this effect should
consider the analogous case of the creationist who believes that the world was
created circa 4,000 B.C. along with the evidence that it has existed longer. The
creationist need only say that for all we know, this belief of his is true; then
even though we know he is wrong because we know there are 10,000 year old
fossils, we cannot refute him with arguments citing this knowledge in their
premisses, since if his belief were true, then our empirical procedures such as
carbon dating would not be methods of acquiring knowledge. It is the
dialectical principle which makes this type of creationist position so
frustrating: in general, to know that an hypothesis is false is not to be in a
position to refute it.
On this interpretation of scepticism, then, we do know that the sceptic's
hypothesis is false, but we do not know how to refute scepticism, since a
refutation demands an argument with dialectical force. A demonstration of a
fallacy in the sceptic's own argument from 'S does not know not-H' to 'S
knows almost nothing' would have such force, but the Transmission Principle
relied on to work the argument is wholly unfallacious.
Tulane Universitj