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Kant s Ethic s
AND
Schopenhauer's Criticism
M-Kelly: m-a.,mji
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KANT'S Ethics
AND
SCHOPENHAUER'S CRITICISM
BY
M. KELLY, M.A., M.D.
Late Major, R.A.M.C.
T-TmJp23JO^^^
LONDON
SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & Co, LiM.
25 High Street, Bloomsbury, W.C,
1910
A.t 51-0 5^2.
PREFACE
Of Kant it may be said that what is good
and true in his philosophy would have been
buried with him, were it not for Schopenhauer,
and that- the false and the worthless still
4 PREFACE
VI
V Idea of Popular Philosophy-
The Highest Good .^
,
...
. . .
45
60
VII The Immortality of the Soul and the
Existence of God as Postulates
Pure Practical Reason .... of
70
CHAPTER I
CHAPTER II
will."
SCHOPENHAUER'S CRITICISM 31
Note.
CHAPTER III
of consideration.
The pretension that the moral law is not
determined by reason, but by a special sense,
according to which the consciousness of virtue
is associated with contentedness and pleasure,
and that of vice with uneasiness and pain,
makes everything depend on the longing for
happiness. More over, the wicked man^uld
not be tormented by the consciousness of his
crimei^ nor the virtuous^an delighted by the
consciousness of his moral actions, if the most
' If the will seeks the law of its action in the quality of any
object external to itself, the result is "heteronomy."
SCHOPENHAUER'S CRITICISM 39
CHAPTER IV
I
j
The universal popular idea proves that the will
is not regarded as good merely because of its
^ I
"4 yea.
-^^-^ ^ I
^ '
I--':'^
'^^ KANT'S ETHICS AND
"^•i^
]
-
from a sense of duty, his action has true moral
'
-fes^v^ value. The principle or maxim, apart from all
I ^ possible motives, is what gives the unconditioned
^'^-i^j'^'s value necessary to constitute a virtuous action.
1^
,
v;^ From this it follows that duty is the necessity
(5j
J
^^ Qf g^„ action from resgect for the law, respect
)J^
'
i being a feeling which we can only have for
whatjs connected^ mt.hJiy&.jm]X.a&j:aiiSS^jlQt.zs.
t ^-. T~^
^ -^ V c effect. For the latter we may have inclination
^s. ^* '^ or affection, but never respect. Thus, as an
c^
action from duty excludes the influence of
inclination and every object of willing, there
remains nothing for_Jh e determination of the
will but objectively the, laWj and subjectively
pure^respect, for the„ latter. In this sense must
be understood the command to "love God
above all, and thy neighbour as thyself."
Love of God, as inclination (pathological love),
is impossible, for He is not an object of the
CHAPTER V
IDEA OF POPULAR PHILOSOPHY
hecause^jhe__s}^££:nx.Q-X:^ is
SCHOPENHAUER'S CRItlCISM 49
nature."
To illustrate this, Kant divides the duties
into those that we owe to ourselves and to
others, and each of these into perfect and im-
perfect. For example :
SCHOPENHAUER'S CRITICISM 51
SCHOPENHAUER'S CRITICISM 55
necessary ?
We
have not maintained its truth here, nor
pretended to have a proof of it in our power.
We have only shown, through analysis of the
universally current idea of morality, that
autonorny of the will necessarily underlies it.
CHAPTER VI
I. Of Quantity.
Subjective, according to maxims (Pleasure of the individual).
Objective, according to principles.
Objective as well as Subjective k priori principles of
freedom (Laws).
IV. Modality.
The allowed and what is not allowed.
Duty and what is opposed to duty.
Perfect and imperfect duty.
CHAPTER VII
The Criticism
SCHOPENHAUER'S CRITICISM 79
CHAPTER I
SCHOPENHAUER'S CRitlCtSM ^3
fore
the ,
thejhing known, that
II, ,11 IIIIIIMM ^
first and the original in self consciousness,
11
will,
^ .-.
must be
'
devoid of a will.
is the truth.
to6 iCANT'S EtHICS AND
CHAPTER II
required,
SCHOPENHAUER'S CRITICISM 119
CHAPTER III
be utterly in vain
suppose a rule set to
to
the free actions of man without annexing to it
some enforcement of good and evil to determine
his will, we must, wherever we suppose a law,
suppose also some reward or punishment
annexed to that law."
Every shall is, accordingly, conditioned by
punishment a.nd reward, or, to yse Kant's
SCHOPENHAUER'S CRITICISM 123
CHAPTER IV
consequence.
Kant's definition of duty, the fundamental
idea of his Ethics, is :
" The necessity of an
action out of respect for the law."
The expression " necessity of an action " is
He says :
" Respect signifies simply the
subjection of my will to a law. The immediate
determination by the law, and the consciousness
of it, is respect." What respect, taken in this
sense, really means is obedience, and he has
obviously adopted the word for the purpose of
disguising the derivation of the imperative form
and idea of duty from theological Ethics.
" Necessity of an action " takes the place of
"shall," because the latter is the language of
the Decalogue. The definition, deprived of its
mask, would be :
" Duty an action which
is
And again :
" The principle of morality
is a thought which is founded on the in-
CHAPTER V
THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE, OR MAXIM, OF KANT's
ETHICS
CHAPTER VI
CHAPTER VII
anew.
The ascetic purposely
represses every
manifestation of the compels himself not
will,
35; Luke ix. 23, 24; xiv. 26, 27, 2^). The
Apostles prescribe loving one's neighbour as
much as one's self, charity, returning of love for
hatred, patience, meekness, bearing all possible
insults without opposition, abstinence in food,
complete resistance to the sexual instinct, when
that is possible. This tendency soon developed
itselfmore and more, and gave origin to the
penitents, hermits, and to monachism, which
was in itself pure and holy, but, for that very
very reason, unsuitable for the vast majority.
With the further cultivation of Christianity,
we find this germ unfolding to full bloom in
the writings of the Christian saints and mystics.
These preach, in addition to the purest love,
;;
is a second way
o£ leading to the same end
and it may be assumed tliat it is the suffering
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
The End