I PROCEDURAL JUSTICE:

1 AN INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS OF P E R S O N N E L
' SYSTEMS

Robert Folger and Jerald Greenberg

INTRODUCTION
I The concept o f justice is prevalent i n personnel research and practice. Pervasive
attention to matters o f justice is evidenced b y the importance placed o n making
"fair" employee selection decisions (Arvey. 1979). settling l a h r disputes "justly"
(Walton & McKersie, 1965). and negotiating "equitable" wage settlements
(Mahoney. 1975). to name just a few areas involving human resources man-
agement. Empirical and theoretical work within the broader psychological lit-
erature has also had much t o say about justice. q

Most o f what we know about justice i n organizations concerns what is referred '

to as distributive justice (Ho~nans, 1961); that is, the manner i n which organi-
zational resources are distributed among personnel (for a review, see Freedman
& Montanari. 1980). and o n employees' reactions to those resource distributions
(for a review, see Greenberg, 1982). Research inspired by equity theory (Adams,-
1963. 1965)-mostly popular i n the 1960s ( f o r reviews. see Goodman & Fried-
i man, 197 1; Pritchard. 1969), although still currently i n evidence (e.g., Greenberg
& Ornslein, I983)--as well as more recent conceptualizations o f justice i n
I organizations (e.g.. Bies. 1983; Dalton & Ttdor, 1985, ftruses primarily on
!
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 ROBERT FOI-GER and JliRA1.D GREENIII:Rc,
Incontrast to Thibaut and Walker's orientation toward prcxcdural justice as
a consideration i n the dispute-resolution process, 1-eventha1 (1976. 1080) con-
ceive.(\ of prtxedural justice (what he has called "prcx-edural faimess") as a
neglected aspect o f reward alltration. Initially described i n 1976. LeventhalTs
o f procedural justice is more fully developed i n two subsequent
publications (Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal. Kanrza. & Fry, 1980).
he essence elf [evcnthal's conceptualization is that various procedural ele-
nients are used to form evaluations o f fairness. Specifically, seven different
r c ~ c d u r ae!_cm_en_ts
I-'--. l
sidcrcd ;evaluating
are identified. each representing a p r t ~ e d u r a aspect
l
the fairness of alltxations. These elements arc as follows:
con-
I. selection (4 agenrs-procedures for determining who makes allwation
decisions;
7. set tin^ ground rules-prclcedures for determining and evaluating p t c r l t i a l
rewards, and the behaviors necessary to attain them;
3. ~ u r h e r i n ginfurmurion-procedures for obtaining and using information
about reward recipients;
4. ~lecisionstruc.ture-procedures for defining the structure o f the allocative
decision process (c.g.. the successive ordering o f individual and group
decisions);
5 . trpp'~~(rIs-procedures for seeking redress against unsatisfactory decisions;
6. .~cl/r~rtc~rd.~-proceduresfor ensuring that the decision-making h t d y does
not abuse its power; and
d ~ ~ s allocation practices to he altered.
7. & r n ~ e m e ~ l u m i . ~ m . r - - p r t ~ ~enabling
Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry (1980) postulated that the @@mation gathered 7
about each of these seven prtlcedural elements (when available) is
..used
. to evaluate
~ ~~
the fairness o f the procedure itself. The fairness o f the prc~eduresmay he
-
evaluated according to each o f six proredurn1 rult-s. These rules arc as follows: -
I. conrirnncy ride-allocation procedures should be consistent across persons
2.
and over time;
bias supprcs..~ionrule--personal self-interest in the allocation process should
be prevented;
3. accuracy rule--decisions must be based o n accurate information;
4. correctahilil?, rrtle--opportunities must exist to enable decisions to he
mcdilied;
5, rppresenrutiveness rrtle-the allocation process must represent the concerns
o f all recipients; and
6. erh;culiQ rule-allocations must k based o n prevailing moral and ethical
standards.
'The weighting of t h c v:irious~ nllcs i n d c t c r ~ ~ ~ i nfi~irnsss
ing is ;111othc.~
c.ctnce1.n
of Lrvcnthal's. Hc as.~l~lllle(I Itlilt i n c l i ~ i ~ l ~;~pl)ly
~ ; ~ l stlic r~rlcssclcctivcly, giving
certain ones different weights ;it various tirnes. S p c i h r predictions ahout the
wcighrinp o f these procctl~lr:ll nllcs. howcvcr, ;lrc not offcrcd. Thcrc i s solne
from f ~ l l o w - u presei~rchhv Fry ant1 I,cventh;ll (1079) th;~t inconsis-
tency i n the setting of ground n ~ l e sis given the greatest weight i n JuLlping the
u n f ; ~ i r no~f ~prt~edures.
~ Ilowcver. i n thc ahuencc of any addition;~lc ~ ~ ~ p i r i ~ ; ~ I
investigations into Levcnthal's conccptuali7ation. t h ~ sfinding must hconsitlcred
_ tentative. Despite the pallcity of empirical valitl;~tiono f Levcnthal's framework,
we w i l l show i t to provide many uscl'ul insights into personnel mnnagenlcnt
procctlures i n the sccontl half o f this pirpcr
I
I
Recause Leventhal's approach is aiorc structural. an<l Thihatct and Walker's
approach is more process-oricntctl, dircct comparisons h t w c c n them are d i f l i c l ~ l t
to make. There are, however. a few impnrtant issues about which the theorists
agree. as well as some apparent disagrcemcnts. -
One especially important area o f tlisagrc.ement concerns the relationship be-
I tween procedural and distrihutive justice. Lcventhal (1976) argued that "pro-
cedural fairness is a necessary precondition for the establishment and maintenance !
:
o f distrihutive fairness" (p. 2.10). Furlhcrmorc, he added, "Unless procedural
faimess exists, distrihutive fairness is sure to he violated" (Levcnthal, 1976, p.
230). I n contrast, Thihaut and Walker (1975) asserted that procedural justice
and distributive justice can he independent. I n this regard they claimed that,
"Although procedural justice may often lead to and prtwluce distributive justice,
it is possible for distrihutive justice to he achieved without the application o f
any special procedure" (p. 3).
Leventhal (1980) also argued that distrihutive outcomes are seen as a more - I
important determinant o f fairness than the procedures used to determine them,
I primarily because procedures are usually well-established routines and are gen-
I erally not fully understorxl hy recipients. Only when a new distributive system '
is being developed or an existing one is being changed. or when an influential--
1 recipient is dissatisfied, are procedural systems likely to become perceptually
figural. One thrust apparent i n Thihaut and Walker's (1975) work, however, has
been their desire to emphasize the key role that procedures can often play i n
! -
I individuals' assessments of distributive Justice. That is. although these authors '
insist on the conceptual independence o f distributive and procedural justice i n
principle (as noted above, where we distinguished between their stance and
Leventhal's postulation o f the conceptual necessity o f procedural justice as a
Prerequisite for distrihutive justice), they also asserted that i n actual situations
there can be a significant form o f pc.rc.eptuul overlap regarding these two forms
ofjustice. This perceptual overlap can he conceptualized as a t y p o f halo effect
 ROBERT FO1,GER and J1'RAI.D GREENBERG

i n which evaluations o f prtrcdural justice influence ev;lluations o f distrihulivc-

iusticc-the fairer the procedure used to detcnnine outcomes. the tnorc psycho. ,
logically ncceptahlc those olltcomes are likcly t o hc ti.e.. the nlorc they are
likely t o k evaluated as k i n g distrihutively just). l ' h ~ s r, i ~ t h ethan
i supp)rting The Inclt.pcndcnt I n l p i ~ < .ot f I ' r o c c d ~ ~ r and
r s Outconles
Lrventhirl's p s i t i o n that distributive concerns have a predominant impact on I ~ h question
c o f whctllcr p r t ~ c t l u r e sc;111h;~vcan 1111pi1cton perccivc(i f:lirncs5i,
ovcrall evaluations of a situation and that procedural conccrns are salicnt only
th;lt i s indcpendcnt of c)utcon~cshas hccn of' ron\idcrahle intcrcst to p l i t i c r r I
tinder special circulnstanccs. Thihaut and Walker's approach is more C o n ~ p a t i h l ~
with predictions that horh procedural and distributive concerns w i l l ordinarily !. scicn!ist~. Kefcrring to a focus on p r c ~ c d u r c s;IS "process politics" (Optr~ll.;,--
he mmifestcd. Moreover, the evidence gathered h y Thihaut and Walker (to he
reviewcd below) actually suggests that i n a sense procedural matters are more
1 1977), political scientists have cn~phasizctlthat i n the cases o f such cheriqhcd
nlcchanis~lls as the jrltlicial prwcss i ~ n dthe procedures for conducting clcctions,
the prcwcdurcs thclnselves contrihute to citi7ens' perceptions o f faimcss Inore
ligural than distributive. Specifically, thcy consistently found main effects of-
than the outcomes of thcsc prtwcdurcs (I'dclman. 1964; Scheingold, 1974).
prcxredural factors o n ratings o f distributive justice (along with main effects of
Tyler and Folgcr (1980) conductetl ;I survey study that examined the rel:~.
distributive factors o n those ratings), hut they did not find corresponding effect,
tionship hetween outcomes and p r c ~ c d u r c si n the context o f police-citizen en-
ol' distributive factors (i.e.. the fairness o f received outcomes) o n ratings (11
counters. Questioning citizens who c;~llcd the police themselves and those w h o
procedural justice (although procedural factors d i d significantly influence such
ratings).
i were stopped b y the policc for an alleged driving violation, they found that the
outcome o f the encounter (i.e.. whether or not the problem was satisfactorily
Despite these differences, both conceptualizations share a common concern‘.^
resolved and whether o r not the citizen was cited for a viol;ltion) d i d not influence
for identifying control over procedures (dispute-resolution procedures i n Thihaut _
judgments regarding the overall fairness o f treatment. Instead, how fairly subjects
and Walker's case and resource-distribution procedures i n Leventhal's casc) as
helieved they werc treated by thc police officer depended on the officer's pro-
a central aspect o f procedural justice. Indeed, each o f Leventhal's p r t ~ e d u r a l
elements may be viewed as defining more precisely specific aspects o f process ; cedural behaviors during the cncountcr. Citizens are satisfied with police officers
control described b y Thibaut and Walker. Both perspectives agree, then. that who follow appropriate procedures, such as filling out a thorough report o f a
crime, even if doing so fails t o uncover evidence leading to the arrest o f 3 suspect
procedures providing the involved parties (be they litigants i n a courtrtwm, or
reward recipients i n an organization) some control over the procedures affecting (Parks, 1976). Apparently, the procedures followed, and not the outcomes, are<'
their outcomes are essential to procedural justice. The importance o f procedural more likely t o influence overall judgments o f fairness. -
I n a series o f studies. Tyler and Cainc (1981) extcnded examination o f this
control i n b t h allocation procedures and dispute-resolution procedures has been
issue to the domain o f leadership endorsen~cnt. Specifically, they sought t o
the focus o f a considerable amount o f research that we w i l l review i n the ncxt
determine whether satisfaction with leaders was hased o n the procedures used
section o f this paper.
to allocate outcomes. independently o f thc outcome levels themselves. I n their
first study, undergraduate student subjects rcad and suhsequently evaluated sccn-
LESSONS FROM PROCEDURAL JUSTICE arios depicting a student enrolled i n a course i n which the grades were awarded
RESEARCH following a fair o r an unfair procedure, and i n which the grade received was
A s we have noted. Thihaut and Walker (1975) and Leventhal(1976, 1980) have , either less than. greater than. o r equal t o the grade the student actually deserved.
Interestingly, i t was found that subjects rated the teacher more positively along
expressed dissenting opinions ahout the interrelationship between the fairness of
a number o f dimensions when the teacher followed fair as opposed t o unfair
decision outcomes and the procedures used i n determining those o u t c o m e 5
Procedures. O f even greater importance was the finding that the actual grade
However, they also both have stressed the importance of giving affected persons
given b y the teacher d i d not significantly influence ratings o f overall fairness.
control over the decision-making procedures affecting them, although they d o
I although the grading procedures did. Extending these findings to a naturalistic
so with respect t o different decision domains. Each o f these issues-the in&-
pendence o f procedures and outcomes, and the importance o f process control-
I Setting, the authors also conducted a questionnaire study to determine the extent
has generated a considerable amount o f w e n t r e r a r c h that w i l l he reviewed ' to which actual teacher evaluations are influenced b y outcomes and procedures.
This study found that students' perceptions o f the fairness o f the grading pro-
here. W e d o not mean t o imply that these represent the only foci o f procedural
justice research (although they certainly appear to be the most popular concerns). cedures o f courses they recently took accounted for more variance i n their teacher
evaluations and ratings o f teacher fairness than the grades they received. I n fact,
hut that they are both most representative o f existing lines o f investigation and
 ROBERT FOLGER and 1ERAI.D C R E E N R E ~ ~
emulate legal conditions (Brett, 1973-74). i t provides US with an interesting and
reliable set of findings about the inllucnces o f prcress control.
Several studies have shown that s:itisfaction with the adversary prcedurc 1.s.--:j
greater than satisfaction with the inquisitorial procedure. One o f the first expcr- ,
iments to find this result was cond~~cted by Walker. LaTour, Lind, and .rhibaut~-
(1974). Their subjects played the role o f either litigants in, or observers of,
trial in which either an adversary procedure or an inquisitorial procedure was
used. I n the adversary procedure condition. subjects were ahle to select attorneys
10 represent their sides; i n the inquisitorial prtredure condition. a single repre-
sentative was expected to represent both sides. Not surprisingly, fiivomble out-
comes (i.e.. innocent verdicts) were preferred to unfavorable outcomes (i.e.,
guilty verdicts). However, an independent effect o f procedures was found that
was particularly interesting: both trial participants and observers preferred the
adversary procedure. Compared to subjects who either experienced or observed
the inquisitorial procedure. those i n the adversary procedure condition were more
satisfied with the procedures and believed them to be fairer. These effects were
subsequently replicated by Lind. Kurtz. Musante. Walker, and Thihaut (1980).
who found that adversary procedures were preferred to nonadversary procedures.
m e former process was considered to be more satisfying, accurate, and unbiased.
Corroborating evidence has also been reported by Lind. Lissak, and Conlon
(1983). and by Walker. Lind. and Thibaut (1979).
I t i s tempting to explain these results i n terms o f a cultural bias that the subject$-1
in these investigations might have had i n favor o f the adversary procedure. That-
is, having grown up with the adversary procedure, American students are cer-
tainly more accustomed to, and familiar with. the adversary procedure than the
inquisitorial procedure, and may be expected to favor it. This explanation, how-
ever, is inconsistent with evidence gathered by Lind, Erickson. Friedland, and
Dickensberger (1978). who compared preferences for various legal systems among
groups of students i n the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Ger-
many. Although the inquisitorial procedure is used i n France and West Germany.
subjects in these countries reported disliking the inquisitorial systems as much
as those from the United States and Great Britain, who were less familiar with_-
i t . The adversary system was preferred by subjects from all nations. suggesting
that a preference for procedures offering process control is not the result of -
cultural bias (see also Lind, 1982a).
11 is important to note that the trial and procedures employed also influenced !
perceptions o f the resulting verdicts. Not only were adversary procedures PE-
ferred to nonadversary ones, but they also appeared to encourage greater satic*
faction with the verdicts and the belief that these verdicts were fair (LaTour.
1978; Walker et al.. 1974). I t makes sense to interpret these results as further
evidence o f the positive reaction to control-giving, adversary procedures. Con-
sider. i n this regard, that the greater satisfaction with the outcomes of advercaq
prtredures occurred even when the litigants believed their case was favored by
1 R
rl ,.l i l l r ~ /~tst;ie
l
nonadvers;~ryprwetlures (L.intl et al.. IOXO). Morcc,ver, the prcfcrcncr I;)r
procedures (e.g., more positivc attituclcs tow;hrO I;~wycrs, prc;lter silt-
isfaction with thc evijcnce prcsentetl) was cvcn found hc./hrc the vcrtlict w;is
anno~~n~ed.
The iniportancc o!' prnccss control illso h:~s heell dcnlonstrated recently in
a
of dispute-resoliltion procedures in nonlegal settings. I n one such inves-
.oation, Lind. LissaL. ant1 Conlon ( 1983) exnmincd the effects o f process control
(1,
inthe context o f an organizational hearing in which the outcomes were either
binding or nonhindirig. Regardless o f whether or not the outcomes were believed--'
hinding, prtrcdures that afforded tlisputants greater prcress control were
prceived to be fairer than those in which less prtxcss control was available.
similarly, Musank, Gilbert, ancl T h i b a ~ ~ (IYX3)
t f o ~ ~that
~ i ddecision makers i n .-;
hr;lring evalu;~tzdthe outconics ;~ndthe prt~(.tluresmore favorably when they i
'
were given an o p ~ ) r t u n i t yto chcu)sc the ;~pplicahlcdecision rule than when they
could not do so. /.
To summarize. the research on dispute-resolution procedures, whether i n legal
or nonlegal settings, clearly indicates that proceclures giving disputing parties
over the resolution process are preferrctl to those that do not offer any
such process contrc~l.Greater satisfi~ctionwith the prwcdures, as well as with
thc resulting outcomes, is protluccd hy process control-giving proceclures.
Partly because interest in procedural issues has a long and cherished tr;ldition
in dispute-resolution contexts (Hazard. 1Y63), ;~ntlkc;luse interest i n reward
distribution has been guided primarily by the tradition of equity thcory ( I x v -
enthal. 1976), i t is not surprising that theoretical intercst i n proceclural justice
emerged in the area o f dispute resolution before i t did i n the area of reward
allocation. Nevertheless, parallels between the dispute-resolution context and
the reward-distribution context have led to sevcr;~l stutlies explicitly exnniining
w e d u r a l effects i n the latter.
Rewards are equitably distributed when the relationship between (a) the amount
' of rewards a person receives and (b) the extent o f a prson's qualilications on
- wine appropriate entitlement dimension (e.g.. amount o f work performed) is
the same across people-that is, i n Adanis's ( 1965) terms, when the outcome1
input ratio is equivalent. A n equitable outcome in a reward-distribution context
1s analogous to the outcome an innocent defendant receives i n a trial when a
verdict o f "innocent" is handed down. Just as such a defendant is likely to be
about that verdict regardless of the courtrtwni prcrcdure used, so-it is
masonable to expect that satisfaction with eqi~iluhlcoutcomes i n a reward-dis-
hhution context w i l l not vary greatly as a f u ~ ~ c t i oonf p r ( ~ e d ~ ~differences
r;~l
(i.e.. a ceiling effect could easily preclutlc evitlence o f p r t ~ e d u r aimpact).
l On
lhe other hand, there is evidence that an innocent person found guilty will react
 ROBERT FOLGER and JFRA1.D C R E E N R E R ~
quite differently depending on the perceived fairness o f the procetlure responsible
for that vertlict (I*nTour. 1978). For this reason. we will f ~ c u son re;lctions
ir~cqrtirtrhleoutcomes in reviewing reward-distribution studies.
Folger ( 1977) condi~ctedan early laboratory investigation of procedural cffecls
i n a reward-distribution context. Male subjects ("workers") performed a t;,k
during I 0 work peritds and were notified o f their earnings on I 0 COITcsp,nding
"pay peritd" c~casions.These earnings were allegedly determined by a
who received money from the experimenter (the amount received being the sanlc
for each pay period), and who was responsible for deciding each time how much
o f that amount to keep for himself and how much to give to the worker (in
actuality, the announced division was controlled by the experimenter). The sit-
uation had been described i n a manner encouraging the workers to believe that
an equal share between worker and decision maker would be equitable, and the
predominant response of workers-when asked i n advance to indicate on a card
what their "fair" share per pay period should be-was an endorsement of equal
shares (the few exceptions deviating only slight1y from equality).
Several sets of experimental conditions were examined i n this study, and one
o f these yielded an effect that has come to be the most common finding i n reward-
distribution contexts. I n this set o f conditions (labeled "inequitable-constant"),
workers learned o n each o f the first two pay periods that the decision maker had
purportedly elected to keep two-thirds for himself and to give the worker only
one-third o f the arnount available. The procedure manipulation was introduced
at this p i n t , when the experimenter met briefly with each worker after the
second pay period announcement. I n the "mute" procedure condition, the worker
was given n o opportunity to influence the decision maker, and the supposed
purpose of the experimenter's visit was only to see i f there were any questions
about the task. B y contrast, workers i n the "voice" procedure condition exercised
an opportunity to influence the decision maker: after asking for questions, the
experimenter took the worker's "Fair Payment Card" and said i t would be
shown to the decision maker. (The term voice was coined by Hirschman. 1970,
as a generic description for oppdrtunities to influence decision making; it is thus
analogous to process control i n dispute-resolution contexts. but without the
connotations o f "control" inherent i n the latter term.)
Regardless of procedure, the workers' payments remained constant thereafter;
that is, the decision maker continued to keep two-thirds o f the available amount
on each o f the subsequent pay periods, so that the cumulative amounts for worker
and decision maker were highly inequitable at the end o f the 10 pay periods. I n
response to a questionnaire item asking about the perceived fairness o f those
totals, however, "voice" workers reacted significantly more favorably than their
"mute" counterparts. This type o f result has been referred to as a "fair process
effect" (e.g., Greenberg & Folger, 1983). Such an effect involves a situation
i n which the same outcome is produced by either o f two procedures that differ
in,,prceived fairness. with the orltcorllc itselt' k i n g pcrccivctl SI; faircl (nlc,rc '
satisfyir~g,acceptable, etc.) when a s ~ c ~ i i ~ with t c t l IIICI;~ircrprcwcdirrc.
Ancjthcr set o f conditions ("rncqt~il;~hlc-i~~iprovc") in t1lC l.olger ( 10.77) ex-
Frilllent fount! evidence for ;In opp)site type of rcsult, which has heen cnllcd
a .sfnls~ra~ic)n effect. " I n these conditions, the workcr ;~~nounts for the first two
pay peritds wcre even Irlore highly incqtlit;lhlc thiln in the conditions dcscrikd
above (i.e.. ;~pproxinlattlyonly 10 percent of what was available). Again the
m u t e - v e r s ~ ~ - ~manipulation
oic~ was introducctl after the second pay pericd. I n
contrast to the schedult- (?fpaynients used for the inequitable-constant conditions,
however, the subsequent worker amounts in these inequitable-improve conditions
increased. 'The c u n i ~ l i ~ t i vamounts
c i~ftcrI0 pay periods were -identical
across conditions (viz,. the workcr reccivctl one-third o f the total. and the decision
Ill;~kcr t w o - t h i r d s t y c t within the inequitable-improve conditions, the fairness7
ratings regarding these amounts wcre significantly higher from "mute" workers
than f r o ~ "voice"
~i wwkers. Several possible explanations of this effect have
k e n proposed (e.g.. see decarufel & Schopler. 1979). some o f which we w i l l
touch upon later. For the moment, however, we simply note that although similar
results can bc fount! i n some earlier studies (e.g., Thibaut. 1950; Thibaut.
Friedland, 8i Walker. 1973). subsequent research (e.g., Folgcr. Rosenfield,
Grove, & Corkran. 1979) hassuggested that the frustration o f having influenced-'
a decision maker "coo late" (the experience o f the voice-improve workers&
such that the restc~rationo f equity is only partial-is likely to he manifested only
under a reslriclrrl set o f circ~~mstanccs (see Greenberg & Folger, 1983).
A series of recent studies by Tylcr. Rasinski. and S p d i c k ( 1985) have followed
up on Folger's studies o f the voice-induced fair process effect. I n their one
experimental study, these investigators created scenarios in which leaders allo-
cated resoilrces, nianipulating the degree o f process control and decision control.
It was found that even when decisions could not he controlled directly, procedures
giving people a voice were perceived as bcing more prtwredurally fair and led
to more positive evaluations of the a l l t ~ a t i n gdecision niakers than were pro-
cedures i n which voice could not be exercised. Analogous findings were obtained
In their two questionnaire studies correlating procedural justice judgments and
leadership endorsement with prceived degree o f process control+jne studying
defendants' reactions to legal cases and one studying students' reactions to grades
they received. I n both surveys, greater degrees o f prceived control over t h f
Prtress were associated with heightened feelings o f procedural justice and more '
positive attitudes toward the reward allocator (the judge or the instructor).
The effects o f voice-giving procedures has also been demonstrated i n a series
of studies by Lissak ( 1983) in a variety o f allocation settings. Lissak's first study
was a laboratory simulation study in the tradition o f Thibaut and Walker's
paradigm. Subjects played the role o f adveriising exccutivcs involved i n com-
Petition for a contract from a sponsor and had prepared a hid in an attempt to
156 ROBERT FOLGER and JERALD G R E E N B E R ~
secure that contract. The manipulation of h o w much input. o r voice, the subjects
had i n presenting information ahout their ideas (in an atten~ptto secure
contracl) was very influential in determining their reactions l o the pr()cedure.
Those who were able t o present information on their hehalf were more satisfied--;
with the procedure and k l i e v e d i t t o be fairer than those w h o only had a limited
voice i n influencing the sponsor's decision. I t is interesting l o nole that subjects
w h o had a voice i n the decision rated the procedures more positively than thoseL
w h o had n o such voice. even before the sponsor's decision was made. These
findings are analogous t o those o f Lind et al. (19801, w h o found the same thing
w i t h respect t o the presentation o f evidence i n a legal setting.
Additional 'studies by Lissak (1983) demonstrated similar effects i n the ques-
tionnaire responses o f actual organizational employees-specifically, members
o f the Canadian Forces. One o f the field studies compared the enlisted menas
reactions t o t w o personnel evaluation procedures: one i n which they had "no
input concerning the behaviors and activities that they were rated on." and one
i n which they were permitted t o "provide a written statement o n their duties
and noteworthy accomplishments" (p. 5 1). Consistent with the previously noted
findings, respondents w h o were given the opportunity t o provide input into their
evaluations reacted to the performance appraisal procedure more positively. A)
second field study found analogous results when the procedural manipulation of
interest was input into the procedure by which transfers to different bases were
made. Once again, those w h o had input into the (personnel) allocation procedures.
expressed greater satisfaction w i t h them.
T o ~ p m a r i z ? ,studies o f reward allocation procedures have clearly demon?
strated the prevalence of enhanced outcome-acceptance effects and greater per-
ceived procedural fairness associated with procedures that give people process
control i n the f o r m o f "voice." These tindings lend support to both Thibaut and
Walker's ( 1975) and Leventhal's ( 1976, 1980) conceptualizations o f procedural
justice.
N o w that we have reviewed the conceptual background o f procedural justice
and the research findings bearing o n it, the stage is set for our attempts t o apply
this work t o various personnel procedures. Specifically, we w i l l focus on four
varieties o f personnel systems-performance evaluation systems, compensation
systems, participatory decision-making systems, and dispute-resolution sys-
t e r n s - e a c h o f which contains procedures analyzable i n terms o f ~ r c r e d u r a l
justice.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEMS
W e believe that performance appraisal situations represent an especially fertile
field in which to examine the implications o f research and theory o n procedural
justice. I n fact. t w o studies b y Landy and his associates deal directly with the
fairness o f performance appraisal procedures, although they do hot couch their
work i n p r t ~ e d u r ajustice
l terms. I n the fiisl_mcly. I.andy. Harncs, and Murphy
(1978) questionecl over 700 rll;~nagcrial ;111dprolsstoo;rl c r ~ ~ p l o y c cosf a large
,,lanufacturing company ahout the ni~turc01' tlrcir pcrlor11l;rnc.e cv;~luationsand
,heir reactions to t h e ~ l l .I2;!ntly et ;I!. hound th;~t e111ployccs' pcrccptiolrs o f the-;
f;limcss o f cv;~luation systcr~lswas signifir;lntly pohitivcly re1;ucd to " p r c ~ e s s
vnriahles," srlch as the freq!rcncy o f evaluations, the rater's familiarity with the'
ratees, and the opportunity 10 cxpress feelings. l'hcse findings were successfully
cross-validiited. and thcy were replicated i n ;In identical follow-up-study hy
Landy, Barnes-Farrcll, ant! Cleveland (1980). Furthermore, this follow-up i n - -
vestigation found that percrptions o f fairness were not related to the respondents' !
own performance ratings, therchy discounting the possibility that the outcomes
of the rating prtress inll\rcnced the fairness ratings. These findings are perfectly
consistent with those o f Tyler and Caine (19HI) ohtaincd i n educational and--
pc)litical settings. showing that perceived fairness is more strongly rclatcd to the
process by which the ouicolnes are ohtaincd than t o the outcomes themselves..
They are a150 consistent with the organizationally based findings o f Alexander
1
1 and Rudernlan (1983) showing the dominance o f p r t ~ c d u r a justice
tributive justice and their statistically independent impact.
l
Having established that reactions to performance evaluations depend more on
over dis:
the procedures by which they%areconducted than on what the evaluation outcomes
may be, we have set the stage for a more tlctailed examination o f reactions to
s p c i f i c procedures that may form the hasis o f these reactions. Four aspects o f
performance evaluation procedures w i l l be analyzed: procedures allowing worker
input into the evaluation; self-appraisal procedures; appraisal interview p r t r e -
dures; and rccord-kecpi~tgprcredurcs (see (;rcenhcrg. i n press).
I I n p u t In E v a l u a t i o n Procedures
As part o f his dissertation, Robin Lissak (1983. Field Study I ) examined the
impact o f input into performance evaluation prmcdurcs i n the Can:ldian Forces
on enlisted men's reactions to these procedures. Distinguishing between eval-
uation prtredures i n which the soldiers could and could not explain their per-
formance to their supervisory raters ( i n the form o f written narra~ives). Lissak
found significantly more Fivorable reactions 'to high-input procedures than t<
low-input procedures. Specifically. suhjects who had input into their evaluation:
procedure rated that procedure higher o n a p r c ~ e d u r aFairness
l index (composed
of highly intercorrelated items assessing satisfaction with. fi~irncssof. and trust
and acceptance o f the evaluation system) than those who had no such input.
Similar results have been reported i n ;I field study by Diphoye and de Pontbraind
(198 1 ). Thcse investig;ltors fcouncl that clnployccs' opinions o f their ;~ppraisal
system were more favorable to the extent that thcy helicved they had an oppor-
tunity to express their o w n viewpoints.
In addition to this work, a recent experiment h y Kanfer, Sawyer, Early, and
 procedures, for exanlplc. ni;ly bc th;~t the I;~ttcrrcllcctc nlorc th:ln thc fonllcr ;I
Lind (1083) further supported the role o f input in the performance evaluntion
dcgrec of trust in. and rc.g;~rd for (rc5pct v i s - i v i \ the opinions ot). those who
process as a deterniinant o f prtwredural justice. Undergradu;~te stuclcnts serving
;Ire given voice. This i~nldicitrecognition 01- sonic potcntiill value i n the voice-
SI; subjects i n this laboratory investigation perk)nned a task for which they were
rccipicnt's views may constitute a psychologically signilicant "outcollle" i n
evaluated by a supervisor. Manipulated were (a) subjects' opportunities to offer
itself. and thc positive al'fcct thcrcby asstri;lted with k i n g given a voice may
information ahout their performance to their supervisor and (b) the presence or
gcnerali7e to wh;~tevcrother outcolncs ;Ire obtaincd from the evaluation.
ahsence o f information provided by the supervisor regarding the evaluation cri-
teria. Kanfer et al. found that subjects performed at the highest level when high
I n light o f this dual nature o f procedures, it is important to note that two -
different kinds of favorable reactions involving perfomlance appraisal systems
input opportunities were combined with an explicit statement about prforniance
have been obtaincd in the studies rcviewcd hove, and that these reactions
criteria. Additionally. high input into the appraisal led suhjects to perceive the
correspond to two different types of me;lsllres i~sstwriatedwith prc~eduraljustice
appraisal procedure as k i n g fairer than when opportunities for input were denied.
research in general. reaction is to the performance a p p ~ i . y l system itself 1
The high-input procedures also were found to enhance satisfaction with per-
(high-input
-- systems k i n g evaluated more f;~vor;lbly thi"low-input systems).
formance outcomes as well as satisfaction with the supervisors. These laboratory
and the obtained effect is comparhle to the strong preference for adversary
results are consistent with the findings o f held questionnaires ( L l i p b y e & de
rather than inquisitori;rl legal systems that has been so thoroughly docunlented
Ponthraind, 1981; Lissak, 1983). which also reported favorable re;rctions to the
feedback from evaluation procedures that provided opportunities for input hy
by Thibaut and Walker (1975) and their associates. The second --.. type o f reaction r.
involves f+gs_~hout the feedba.ck_received from performance appraisals. and
thc evaluated worker.
the findings reported to date (Dipboye & de Pontbraind, 1981; Lissak, 1983;
These findings not only invite comparison with Folger's (1977; Folgcr et al.,
Kanfcr et al., 1983) are consistent with the fair process effect i n reward-distri-
1979) studies o f "voice," but can be explained i n terms o f the same mechanisms.
bution studies. Nevertheless, given the occasional presence o f a frustration effect
Indeed, they reveal further instances o f the "fair process effect" (e.g., Greenberg
in the latter context, we would car~tionthat reactions to the outcome o f a per-
& Folger. 1983) described earlier in this paper (i.e.. the tendency for greater
outcome satisfaction to result from voice-giving procedures than from mute
fonnance appraisal n ~ y - b.g~fun-ti!)-n~jf-twththe appraisal system used (e.g., <,
high versus low input) and the actual appraisal received (c.g., its relationship
procedures). A likely expl;~nation for the effect, particularly in the context of
to the appraisal that was expected or considered to k deserved).
perfomlance appraisals. is that voice-giving (high-input) procedures allow par-
Although conducted i n a reward-distribution context, the Folger (1977) ex-
ticipants to ensure that the evaluator has more complete, accurate inforn~ation
periment can be used to illustrate the distinction between reactions to a pro-
to consider i n making his or her evaluations than mute (low-input) procedures
cedure and reactions to its consequences, as well as to illustrate the
(cf. Folger el al.. 1979; Thibaut & Walker, 1978). This notion is consistent with
circumstances under which frustration effects might arise. Subjects i n that ex-
Leventhal's ( 1980) procedural elements o f "setting ground rules'' and "gathering
periment provided t p t y p e s o f questionnaire responses: ratings o f prtwredural
information," ones subsequently shown to c;rrry the greatest weight i n judg~iients
fairness a@ ratings o f outcome fairness. I n the inequitable-constant condi-
of fairness (Fry & Cheney, 1981; Fry & Leventhal. 1979).
tions. voice workers gave more positive ratings to both items than did mute
At the same time. however. we must emphasize that the effects o f procedures
workers. I n the inequitable-improve conditions, however, the pattern o f re-
are twofold, and that predictions regarding the impact o f procedures must take
sponses differed hetween the two items. As noted earlier, the voice workers i n
their dual nature into account. Specifically, while procedures are inevitably;
these latter conditions gave more nexafir,e ratings o f outcome fairness than did
instrumental i n character (i.e.. they constitute the means for accomplishing someJ
the mute workers (the frustration effect). Nevertheless, the voice conditions
end result. such as when performance appraisal procedures are used to generate
produced more posirive ratings o f prtredural fairness than did the mute con-
evaluations upon which such outcomes as salary increases. bonuses, and pro-
ditions. Together, these results show that positive reactions regarding a pro-?
motions are based), reactions to a given procedure may also at times reflect an-.?
cedure do not_a_leys spill over to reactions regarding the outcomes ohtained i
assessment of that procedure as an md-in-ifself. Part o f the favorable reaction .:, --
as a consequence o f that procedure.
to voice and enhanced process-control procedures, as suggested above. is prob-
The caveat suggested hy the possibility of a frustration effect is that in pro-
ably due to their being perceived as an efficient-a_nd accurate -- -. means
- .
. for accu-
viding the opportunity for expression of one's opinions, voice procedures may
mulating the information most relevant to a decision or judgment. o n t h e other
-- - also raise one's hopes and expectations ahout the prospects o f influence. Indeed.
-
hand, another part o f such reactions may stem from aspects of these p c e d u r s
considered to be desirahle. regardless o f the particular decision they yield on a
whereas mute-improve workers were no tloubt plc;~santlysurprised by the upward
turn i n their fortunes, voice-improve workers prcsu~nablythought their gradually
given occasion. A n important aspect o f the contrast between mute and voice --
lfrl ROGER FOLGER A N D JERALD GREENHERc,
(tlistributive justice) as contributors to pay satisfaction. I n a somewhat strongcr
vein, Mahoney and Weit7,el (1978) suggest that impersonal referents. such as
the compnsation system itself, rather than personal referents, such as interper-
sonal wage comparisons, provide the basis o f satisfaction.
Both the findings from studies o f open pay systems and the above conjectures
are consistent with leventhal's (1980) analysis o f the elements of prwedural
justice. Specifically. open pay systems assure those covered hy them that pro-
cedures are in place for ensuring against i~buseso f power by decision-making
bodies-leventhal's (1980) procedural element, "safeguards." Indeed, the very
transparency o f the system discourages abuse and favoritism, thereby promoting
procedural fairness based on "consistency" and "bias suppression." Thus,
although open pay systems do not provide assurances o f procedural justice based
on the opportunity to exert direct control over the payment process, opportunitir\
to openly monitor that process's operation are likely to make workers feel con-
fident that the procedures w i l l not be abused, thereby resulting i n consistent and
unbiased (i.e., procedurally fair) decisions.
Before concluding this section, we would like to comment on a law that has.
since September 2. 1974, acted to ensure procedural justice i n the area o f fringe
benefit administration, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
The intent o f this law was to set up procedures ensuring that participants in
benefit plans know what they are entitled to and to guarantee that they get it.
The law distinguishes among (a) information regarding benefit programs that
must be communicated to workers, (h) information that must be provided by the
employer upon request by the worker, and (c) information that the employer
must make available for examination (see Fleming. 1975). We believe ERISA's
stipulations help ensure that procedural justice will be accomplished i n niuch
the same way as open pay systems. That is, by assuring access to inforn~ation.
the law protects employees from procedures that might deny them an opportunity
to receive the benefits coming to them.
Cafeteria-Style Benefit Plans
Cafeteria-style benefit plans, also referred to as flexible benefit plans, represent
another type of compensation system analyzable from the perspective o f pm-
cedural justice. These plans allow employees to "determine the relative mix of
their fringe benefits and wage package" (Werther, 1976, pp. 41-42). Social
conditions leading to changing demographics o f the work force (Milkovich &
Delaney, 1975) and changes i n American income tax regulations (Treacy &
Tane. 1982) have contributed to the growing popularity o f cafeteria-style benefit
plans (Lawson, 1982). leading one industry analyst to refer to them as the
"buzzword o f the 'NOS" ("Social Changes." 1981). Although such plans have
met with economic success i n many o f the companies using them, such as
American Can Company. TRW, and the Educational Testing Service ("Em-
I
,,li)yees Satisfied." IOH3). and have h c c ~;~ssociatrd
i with [he satisfaction of tllcir
t.rllployees, sonie prohlcriis h;~vc k c n reportrd with rvspcct to unforscen ex-
pnditures (Dlitzer, I O H I ). diffic~~lticsin adr~iini\tration she;^, IYXI), and en,-
ployces' not making their decisiol~srcspt~nsihly(Schlacht~neyer& Bog;lrt, 1970)
Still, because flexihlc benefit plans have k e n seen as a virtual condition of
empIoy~ncnti n some cases (Harris. 1975) and as a motivational t(n,I (Cole,
108.3). interest i n such plans has remained high enough to encourage personnel
administrator^ to devise ci~refulsystclns designed to avoid the sllortcomings
(Werther. 1976).
Th:~t cafeteria-style benefit plans are so well-received by employees is not
particularly surprising from the sti~ndpointo f prt~eduraljustice. Using Thibaut
;~ndWalker's (1978) terminology. such pl;~nsgive employees decision c o n t r o ~ .
( i . ~ . ,the opportunity to make decisions concerning their outcomes). I n writing
earlier on this topic (Greenberg & Folger, 1983). wc have identified such direct
decisions as those involving "choice." to distinguish them from those more
indirect decisions involving "voice" (or process control). According to o u r ,
analysis, there i s nothing particularly surprising about the increased satisfaction
resulting from choice-giving procedures, such as cafeteria-style benefit plans. J
After all, allowing people to chtwse what benefits they want increases their
chances o f receiving highly desired outcomcs, relative to a system ill which the
employer makes the choice for all elnployccs.
We helieve. however. that the psychological mechanisms underlying the ben--~
eficial effects o f choice lie beyond this s~~pcrficialsimplicity. The crucial question
concerning the effects o f choice is whether individuals are happier with the
outcomes they have selected than with the same outcomes selected for them.
Several experiments suggest that the act of making a choice is i n itself incre-
mentally responsible for outcomc satisfnction. Greenkrg (1983). for example,
had subjects i n a marketing-prefercnce study sample desirable-tasting or unde-
sirable-tasting breakfast cereals that they were either given a choice. or had no
choice, i n selecting. It was fount1 that the chosen cereal was nrore liked by^;
subjects than the nonchosen one. whether or not it was desirable tasting. Sim-
ilarly, in an experiment mentioned earlier. Musante, Gilbert, and Thibaut (1983)
found that subjects i n a hearing were niore sati.ficd with outcomes when they
chose the decision rule that governcd the outcomes o f the hearing than when no
choice was available. Unfortunately, no comparable studies have been conducted
-
regarding choice o f fringe benefits. Indeed. i t would be very difficult to find
matched pairs o f subjects containing one member who selected his or her own
benefits and another for whom the same benefit package was chosen by another.
Generalizing from the experiments conducted i n other contexts, however, we2
suggest that the satisfaction resulting from choice-giving procedures goes beyond
simply assuring that the choosers get what they want.
A likely explanation for the increased satisfaction resulting froni choice i s ?
that. according to cognitive dissonance theory (e .g., Insko, Worchel. Folgcr. Kr _/
170 ROBERT FO1,GER and JERALD GREENBERG
than whcn the lack o f support for a suggestion is unaninlous. I n terms of our
social influcncc explanation o f the fair prcxcssefl2ct (Gwenhcrg & I;olgcr, 1 9 ~ 3 ) ~
unanimously rcjccted suggestions are analogous to the voice-constant condition
of 1:olger's (1977) experiment (in which a fair process cffect was obtained). That
is, aftcr the suggestion has k c n submittcd (a voiced request). subsequent acticJns
show that the validity o f the suggestion has heen denied (outcomes remain
unchanged). I n the Folger ( 1977) experiment. the prsuasivencss o f those actions
(the cxtcnt to which the sincerity of the decision maker was "augmented" by
his having so emphatically denied the request) may have k e n enhanced hecause
the worker had n o source o f social support for his o w n viewpoint. as would he
the case i n the unanimous committee rejection. Other research is consistent i n
showing the strong social influence o f a unanimous majority (e.g., Asch. 1952)
and the tendency toward accepting a decision when social support for a dissentinF
opinion is absent (Folger et al.. 1979; Michener & Lyons. 1972; Michener &
Tausig. 1971 ). O n the other hand, a splil opinion i n the suggestion con~mittec
offers partial support for the validity o f the suggestion, a condition that leads to
less acceptance o f decisions (Folger et al., 1979) and to the reduced influence
o f majorities (Asch, 1952).
Thc situation is also particularly problematic when several employees submit
the same g d suggestion at the samc time and some hybrid suggestion is enacted
(Sandell, 1979). Possible problems may result from workers' believing that their
credit (recognition and monetary reward) was unfairly diluted b y another's seem-
ingly inferior suggestion, or perhaps the fear that the ideas was stolen b y another
(Reuter. 1977). One proposed;olution to this problem is that bonuses be dis-
tributed o n a companywide basis rather than o n an individual basis (Olsen, 1976).
~ l t h o u g hi t would be inappropriate herc for us to debate the merits o f shared
versus individual incentive systems, we should note that shared incentivcs for
suggestions may he expected to alleviate some o f the dissatisfaction expected to
result from partial acceptance o f one's decisions.
Fair Administration of thc Plnn .
A second reason why the benefits o f suggestion systems may not be realized '
is that they may lack appropriate procedurally fair elements. Indeed. several - The term "organizational due process" procedures refers to procedures ex--i
recommendations for the implementation and administration of suggestion sys-
tems coincide with the procedural elements identified b y Leventhal (1980). For
example. i t has been recommended that the suggestion committee, which eval-
uates suggestions and sets policies concerning the system's operation, be corn-
posed o f representatives o f the various departments o f an organization (Gunter
.
& George, 1975). This advice i s congruent with Leventhal's hypothesis that the --
selection o f appropriately representative decision-making agents contributes to
procedural fairness. Another recommendation is that suggestion systems be based
o n "clear. publicized politics." thereby avoiding dissatisfaction resulting f n ~ m _
S,,spctcd parti;~litv(Rcutrr. 1977. p. 8x1. .l'hill i\.tilt .'tirscihron htnrct~lre,"
1 c,,enlhal's tcm?inology, nccds to he dcli~~c.tl.
Probably the nlost ilnpc~rtnnt rcc.o~nn~cnd;~tion. I~C'~;IIISCit htlS the preatc,,
,-,,,tentiili for callsing probiellls. i s ti1:11 "A11 v f ' ~ c c t i ~CL)SI
e S Y S ~ C ~ll~Is~, avilil --
able as a prr~rr(llll.rilf I() upon which to h;rsc tin: v;,lue o f a,l
.fair ~r@rrllrrllion
award" (Reuter. 1977. p. 8H. emphasis i ~ d d ~ dThis ) . advice is inkeeping wit\l
~ ~ ~ ~ n (l')XO) t h a l idc;~
' ~ o f "scltin&! ~roirnclrules" (i.e., creating prtx.cdurcs
cletem~iningand cv:~lu;llinl: potential rcw;irtls and the hhaviors lleressary I,,
att;lin them). The advice is prc)hicnri~tic,howcvcr, i n that (a) there are oftcl,
a n l b i g u i t i ~inhcrcnl
~ i n the ;~ccourlling systcms used to dctcnninc an illca\
linancial worlh l o the company (hence the s~~ggcstcr's share) and (h) the saving5
rcsuiting from inlplcmenting the plan aftcr thc first year are 1y1iic;~lly not con-
~idcredwhcn the amount of an individual award is dctcrmincd, despite the
company's continued benefits (Olscn. 1976). As a result, drtennining awards
in a procedurally fair manncr miry bc tliflicult to accomplish. I n view of the
[rustrating effects likely to result f r o n ~thc irnplc~ncntationo f unfair p r t ~ e d u ~ e s .
our analysis furthcr undcrscorcs the reco~~~rncndations noted here.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS
If we were to idcntiSy any onc area o f personnel work as traditionally being most
l d to be the area o f organizational disputc
concerned with procedures. i t w o ~ ~have
resolution. Because many organizational dispute-resolution procedures may hc
viewed as private, intraorganizational lcpal systems. it should not he surprising
that they share an interest i n prcretlural matters with the external legal systems
within which they are based (Evan. 1962). B y setting u p their o w n dispute-
resolution systems, organizations h o p to avoid the acrimony and costs o f formal
litigation through the legal system (Coulson, 1978). Our analysis o f the proce-
dures used i n these systems w i l l distinguish between traditional organizational
due process systems and some much morc rccent approaches that have been
advanced.
T r a d i t i o n a l D u e Process Procedures
isling within organizations that attcnlpt to provide an opportunity for employer- :
employee dispu~esto be resolved internally, without relying on formal litigation
through the court system (Aram & Salipante, 1981). Fueled b y a widening -.
recognition o f the need to extend the application o f constitutional rights to
employees o n the job (Ewing, 1977a), sevcral types o f due process mechanisms
have become popular. Specifically, survey studies (e.g., Ewing, 1977b; Scott
1965) have reported thc existence o f due process procedures ranging from ex-"r
ecutive open door policies to appeals systcms. corporate ombudsmen, and man- :