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Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

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The Hybrid Terrorist Organization:

Hezbollah as a Case Study
a
Eitan Azani
a
International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), The
Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel
Accepted author version posted online: 25 Aug 2013.Published
online: 11 Oct 2013.

To cite this article: Eitan Azani (2013) The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study,
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36:11, 899-916, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2013.832113

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 Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36:899–916, 2013
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online
DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2013.832113

The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah

as a Case Study

EITAN AZANI
International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT)
The Interdisciplinary Center (IDC)
Herzliya, Israel
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Since 1982, Hezbollah has evolved from a “revolutionary vanguard” terrorist organi-
zation bent on violently overthrowing the Lebanese government to a hybrid terrorist
organization that uses legitimate political tools to the same end. Today Hezbollah
operates on the civilian plane of da’wa, social welfare, and religious education; the
military–Resistance plane (jihad); and the political plane. In its drive to dominate
Shi’ite society, Hezbollah overcame its chief rival, Amal, and now plays a decisive role
in Lebanon’s political system and the Middle East. Understanding Hezbollah’s emer-
gence as a prototypical hybrid terrorist organization is key to understanding global and
local jihad movements.

In recent years, military establishments and researchers have begun to debate the nature of
future warfare.1 One aspect of this debate has been the conceptualization and characteriza-
tion of potential threats. Researchers agree that these are not clear-cut, but rather will be
complex, multifaceted, influenced by globalization and the spread of advanced technology,
and affected by the presence of both global and local jihadist terrorist organizations, and
by the co-existence of state and non-state actors. For these reasons, military analysts have
begun to conceive of future conflicts as conflicts that will be “multi-modal” or “multi-
variant”2—something they have also termed “hybrid warfare.” However, since the study
of hybrid warfare is still in its infancy, terminology is inconsistent, and researchers—even
those functioning within a given security establishment—have yet to reach consensus. For
example, the United States Department of Defense defines hybrid warfare as “a blend of
conventional and irregular warfare approaches, across the full spectrum of conflict.”3 The
hybrid threat has also been deemed “. . . [a]n adversary that simultaneously and adaptively
employs some fused combination of political, military, economic, social and information
means, and conventional, irregular, terrorism and disruptive/criminal conflict methods. It
may include as well a combination of state and non-state actors.”4 According to Frank
Hoffman,5 the hybrid threat will “incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare
including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including
indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.”

Received 9 April 2013; accepted 23 June 2013.

Address correspondence to Dr. Eitan Azani, Deputy Executive Director, International Institute
for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), The Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, P.O. Box 167, Herzliya
46150, Israel. E-mail: eazani@idc.ac.il

899
 900 E. Azani

In Hoffman’s eyes, Hezbollah’s strategy of action during the Second Lebanon War
provides a paradigmatic example of the essence of the hybrid threat: Within a mere
34 days of asymmetric warfare against Israel, Hezbollah simultaneously displayed or-
ganizational flexibility, a capacity for survival, and the use of multiple, innovative forms of
firepower. In so doing, Hoffman claims, Hezbollah proved “the ability of non-state actors to
study and deconstruct the vulnerabilities of Western-style militaries and devise appropriate
countermeasures.”6
Boaz Ganor has added to the mapping of non-state actors with his identification and
definition of what he calls the “hybrid terrorist organization”—a new type of entity, which
appears to be playing an ever-greater role in the increasingly complex “hybrid warfare”
that Hoffman described. According to Ganor,

A hybrid terrorist organization is one that stands on two or, in many cases,
three legs. The first leg is that of the classic terrorist organization: a military or
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paramilitary organization that engages in terrorism, committing those atrocities

we refer to as terrorist acts to operate and “win” in both the illegitimate arena
of terrorism and the legitimate one of the media, the hybrid terrorist organi-
zation extends a second leg, that of a political organization. A hybrid terrorist
organization’s political branch may merely represent its ideology, or it may
compete in legitimate, free, and democratic campaigns and elections. Further,
to be able to engage in warfare against a state—an entity whose legitimacy is
presumably well established—the hybrid terrorist organization has extended
a leg into the realm of legitimate, usually state-sponsored services, through
affiliated organizations that provide welfare services to a potential or actual
constituency.7

This article will demonstrate that Hezbollah—with its social, political, and military
wings—fits this definition.

The Emergence of Hybrid Terrorist Organizations in the Middle East

The first appearance of a hybrid terrorist organization in the Middle East can be dated
to 1928, with the establishment in Egypt of the Muslim Brotherhood. The fundamental
idea behind the Muslim Brotherhood was to integrate da’wa [missionary work], social
infrastructure, and jihad, and to leverage the three to gain political power. From its inception,
the Brotherhood worked to establish Sharia [Islamic law] in Egypt, adopting the slogan:
“Islam is the solution.”8
During the first decade of its existence, the Muslim Brotherhood established a social-
organization infrastructure with the aim of creating the conditions for its expansion through
da’wa, “from the ground up.” It was not until the early 1940s that the Muslim Brotherhood
adopted jihad as a “secret mechanism” for imposing Sharia by force. At that time, the
Brotherhood’s success in recruiting hundreds of thousands of people to its ranks posed a
genuine threat to the Egyptian regime. In the 1950s, the Egyptian government outlawed the
Muslim Brotherhood and arrested thousands of its members, many of whom it tortured or
executed. Thus chastened and with the growth of its political power suppressed, the Muslim
Brotherhood decided to forego jihad. For the next five decades, under the watchful eye of
the Egyptian regime, the Brotherhood concentrated on da’wa, biding its time until the right
moment arose for it to return to the forefront. That moment came during the so-called “Arab
Spring” revolution of 2011.
 Hybrid Terrorist Organizations 901

Concurrently, one of the most prominent members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid
Qutb, was defining the philosophy and ethos he felt should guide the organization. Ac-
cording to Qutb, Egyptian society was heretical, and more similar to the societies of the
jaihiliya [meaning ignorance; refers to the period pre-dating Islam] than to the ideal Islamic
society. For this reason, Qutb felt the Brotherhood must “secede,” planting the seeds for an
Islamic society through small “vanguard resistance groups” on the margins of mainstream
society; these would then use jihad to uproot the existing heretical regime and fundamen-
tally change the political situation.9 It is this idea that guided extremist groups to break
away from the Muslim Brotherhood, which they saw as watered-down and not sufficiently
“pure,” Islamically.
The Muslim Brotherhood thus gave rise to two organizational concepts, whose traces
are evident in the development of Islamism during the twenty-first century: that of the
hybrid terrorist organization, and that of the vanguard resistance group. Depending on the
political climate and nature of the society within which they function, Muslim “innovators”
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choose one or the other, or a combination of the two. For example, global jihad, which has
evolved in part thanks to globalization, subsumes elements of both of these concepts.
This article will address the establishment and formation of Hezbollah during the
1980s.10 It will examine how Hezbollah confronted the challenges that faced it at that time,
and that led it to decide, in the early 1990s, to work from within the Lebanese political
system.

The Evolution of Hezbollah: Is It Really a Hybrid Terrorist Organization?

In February 1985, more than two years after Hezbollah’s founding, its then-spokesman
Ibrahim Al-Amin called a press conference, during which he revealed for the first time,
publicly and officially, Hezbollah’s platform, ideology, and goals. At a Shi’ite mosque
in Beirut, Lebanon, Ibrahim Al-Amin read aloud Hezbollah’s seminal document, which
included details of its identity, the identity of its enemies, its ties to the supreme leader
of Iran, its organizational strategy, and the nature of its organizational structure. This
document, known as “the open letter,” was published widely in the Lebanese press. Since
then, it has constituted Hezbollah’s founding manifesto, with key policy points and additions
to its platform being published occasionally over the years.11
The first paragraph of the “open letter” clarifies the organizational structure to which
Hezbollah has aspired since its inception, and which combines elements of the “hybrid
model” and the “vanguard model.”12 The letter begins by stating that Hezbollah is part of
the Muslim Nation [umma], and so intends to act far beyond the borders of Lebanon. At the
same time, Hezbollah emphasizes its role as a “revolutionary vanguard.” From Hezbollah’s
perspective, this combination of commitment to the umma and being at the vanguard of
Islamism is what brought about the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran, which it hoped
and still hopes to emulate.

We are often asked: Who are we, Hizballah, and what is our identity? We are
the sons of the umma [Muslim Nation]—the party of God [lit. hizb Allah]—the
vanguard of which was made victorious by God in Iran. There the vanguard
succeeded in laying the foundation of a Muslim state which plays a central role
in the world. (emphasis added)13

The second component of Hezbollah’s organizational identity, structure, and character grew
out of the idea that it is part of the Muslim umma—that is, not solely a Shi’ite party in
 902 E. Azani

Lebanon. Its behavior may thus be seen as an outgrowth of the common denominator of
religion, not of conditions in the Lebanese political system, in which it was not, initially,
involved. Interestingly, this motif has been preserved, even now that Hezbollah is a dominant
player in the Lebanese political system, acting simultaneously within and outside of that
system:

By virtue of the above, we do not constitute an organized and closed party

in Lebanon nor are we a tight political cadre. We are an umma linked to the
Muslims of the whole world by the solid doctrinal and religious connection of
Islam.14

The letter then states that Hezbollah sees its military activity as inseparable from its popular
social infrastructure and activities. In essence, these components of the organization have
always fed into and influenced one another, and continue to do so. “No one can imagine
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the importance of our military potential as our military apparatus is not separate from our
overall social fabric. Each of us is a fighting soldier.”15
Hezbollah’s development from a fragile coalition of Islamic groups on the margins of
Shi’ite society into an organization that dominates the coalition governing Lebanon is the
result in part of the interrelationships among the players inside and outside the Lebanese
arena, beginning in the mid-1990s. It is also a result of Hezbollah’s having developed as a
hybrid terrorist organization.
Hezbollah has transformed itself from a simple terrorist group into a sophisticated
hybrid terrorist organization by consecutively developing and deepening its commitment to
three complementary, related areas of activity: da’wa and social welfare, military resistance
(jihad), and political activity. More precisely, Hezbollah has used da’wa and jihad as a
springboard to real political power, and in so doing has evolved from leading the “resistance”
against Israel in Lebanon to heading Lebanon’s governing coalition—and without often
having to wield political violence (which exceeds the boundaries of the Lebanese political
game). It is this that makes Hezbollah a veritable “prototype” of what Ganor calls a hybrid
terrorist organization, and why it illustrates so clearly, as Hoffman notes, the challenge of
the hybrid threat.

The Growth of Hezbollah: From Pre-Organizational Infrastructure

to Hybrid Terrorist Organization
One of the chief conditions for the creation of a resistance group is the existence of an orga-
nizational seedbed—that is, social networks based on clan, religion, sect, or ethnic origin,16
which devise a pre-organizational infrastructure composed of social, community, religious,
educational, and charitable institutions. When confronted with changes in society, a crisis,
or a common enemy, such institutions tend to aggregate; taken together, they allow for the
establishment of a large organization or movement.17 During the 1970s, pre-organizational
infrastructure with a radical-religious orientation began to develop in Lebanon, centering
on clerics of Lebanese origin. It was at that time that activist education began for thousands
of Lebanese Shi’ite students at Islamic colleges. One Lebanese researcher claims that the
Islamic revolution in Lebanon took place in two consecutive waves: one prior to the Ira-
nian revolution, and one subsequent to it.18 In fact, according to Abu Yasser, the head of
Hezbollah’s political “bureau” in 1990, Hezbollah existed ideologically and culturally even
before the Iranian revolution, as an agglomeration of groups that sought a way to execute
their ideas.19
 Hybrid Terrorist Organizations 903

Specifically, a system of religious institutions was the basis for disseminating the
Islamic message to all of Shi’ite society, from the youngest children, through pupils at
schools and students at Islamic colleges [madrassas] and universities, to adults involved
in traditional community frameworks such as mosques and charitable associations. For
example, the reputed spiritual father of Hezbollah, Sheikh Hassan Fadlallah, established
hassaniyyat al-huda20 in Beirut, where he trained students in religious studies. Some of his
students became teachers who continued to spread his message in the schools and Islamic
colleges that dotted every Shi’ite population center in Lebanon. Alongside religious studies,
these colleges taught military tactics and strategy. Their goal was to train young Shi’ites to
serve as agents of change, bearers of a revolutionary message whose purpose was to further
widen the circle of support for Hezbollah and increase its recruits. This process is embodied
in the biography of Sheikh Ragheb Harb of Jibshit. A venerable cleric, Harb gathered a
cadre of young Shi’ites around him, teaching them a combination of religious scholarship
and military tactics until he was killed in February 1984. After his death, Ragheb Harb
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became a symbol of sacrifice and resistance to the Israeli occupation, a role model for young
Shi’ites and new clerics, whose motivation for military action in and outside Lebanon rose
with his death.21
Thus the seeds of Hezbollah as a hybrid terrorist organization were planted from the
first, when it was established as an umbrella framework for pro-Iranian Islamic organizations
in Lebanon that shared a belief in obedience to the supreme leader Khomeini [wilayat faqih],
and a desire to ultimately establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon based on the Iranian
model.22 The groups that comprised Hezbollah evinced its hybrid nature: ulama’ [religious
scholars], who formed the backbone of Hezbollah’s leadership; former members of militia
groups such as the Shi’ite Amal, who would swell its military/terrorist ranks;23 and groups
devoted to da’wa and education, which formed its poplar social infrastructure.24 Hezbollah
was officially founded in the Bekaa Valley during the summer of 1982. Within a few months
of its founding, its activities began spreading to other Shi’ite population centers throughout
southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and in Beirut. Again and again, it was a combination
of clerics and their institutions, representatives of Iran, and young enthusiasts who formed
the core cadre of supporters. Their spiritual commitment and willingness to sacrifice were
soon bolstered by money, which was needed to engender revolutionary change.25
It is important to reiterate, however, that during the initial phase of Hezbollah’s crys-
tallization as an organization, in the 1980s, it did not have a political wing. This was
due in part to the chaotic conditions that then characterized Lebanon, at least until the
Taif Accord26 of 1989, and in part to the “revolutionary vanguard” component of Hezbol-
lah’s approach, which was dominant at that time. This approach, which was far more
“raw” than the one Hezbollah would come to adopt, favored jihad as a means of evict-
ing foreigners, eliminating the existing regime, and implementing Sharia. The need to
effect change by cementing political power would not develop until a decade later, during
the 1990s, concurrent with changes in Lebanon and the region, and spurred by Iran and
Syria.
Hezbollah’s organizational development from an amalgam of pre-movement groups
into a hybrid terrorist organization is also evident in its organizational structure. Hezbollah
explained its structure for the first time in March 1989: Topping the Hezbollah “pyramid”
was a seven-member Iranian-backed Shura Council, which controlled Hezbollah’s activities
through functional committees that addressed ideology, finances, policy, military affairs,
social affairs, and legal affairs; and through regional councils governing the Bekaa Valley,
greater Beirut, and southern Lebanon. Each of these regional councils also subsumed
functional committees, identical in purview to those serving under the Shura Council.27
 904 E. Azani

As Hezbollah developed a hybrid pattern of behavior, its structure also changed. In

1989, Lebanese ulama’ asked that a Lebanese secretary-general be appointed to head the
Shura Council, rather than the Iranians who had headed it until then. When Hezbollah
decided to enter the political arena in the early 1990s, it further adapted its organizational
structure, establishing a political council, a jihad council and the Loyalty to the Resistance
parliamentary bloc to meet the demands of involvement in government.28
As Hezbollah began to be affected by its involvement in politics, it was required to
maintain organizational flexibility and the ability to swiftly adapt to both sudden challenges
and gradually changing circumstances. An operational committee, foreign affairs commit-
tee, internal security and military affairs mechanism, and various resistance groups were
all added to the Shura Council’s “brief” during the 1990s, in response to the dictates of
political involvement. Careful review of items published in the Hezbollah organ Al-’Ahad
between 1988 and 2002 reveals that Hezbollah has consistently and gradually shifted its
shape, from a small, tightly organized group in the early 1980s to today’s extensive but no
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less well-organized hybrid organization.29

The Components of Hezbollah’s Establishment

Hezbollah developed the first two components of its structure as a hybrid terrorist
organization—da’wa and military infrastructure—both successively and simultaneously.
It was the interaction of these that later led Hezbollah to enter Lebanese politics.

Da’wa and Social Activities

The economic situation and living conditions of the Shi’ites, particularly the Shi’ite immi-
grants who settled on the outskirts of Lebanon’s cities beginning in the 1970s, was poor,
and was exacerbated by the government’s inability to provide needed services. The absence
of appropriate or sufficient government services created a vacuum, which was filled by
Islamists. With monies from Iran and various philanthropists, the Islamic organizations
that were beginning to organize in the 1980s established and ran a labyrinthine network
of religious, charitable, and education institutions, through which they expanded their in-
fluence on Shi’ite society. This process began prior to the establishment of Hezbollah, but
gathered speed with its advent; many of the institutions that sprouted up had an affinity
for or a formal affiliation with Hezbollah or Iran. Hezbollah, in particular, used the pro-
vision of social, religious, and educational services as an engine for recruiting people to
its ranks and as a means of disseminating its fundamentalist Islamist platform. In addition,
Hezbollah’s desire to garner the support of the Shi’ite population, both to redress past
injustices against it and eat away at rivals such as the Amal Militia,30 also contributed to its
decision to devise an organizational strategy that included substantial investment in social
infrastructure.
Hezbollah employed four strategies for providing services, all of which were meant to
reach individual, nuclear families, directly or indirectly.

1. The first of these strategies was to provide financial aid to families in distress,
including a pension for the families of someone who had died fighting for Hezbollah;
medical care and schooling, including vocational training; free or subsidized cultural
enrichment activities; and employment.31 As noted, this aid was subsidized by, or
 Hybrid Terrorist Organizations 905

provided through, Iranian institutions, Hezbollah’s institutions, and independent

institutions with ties to Hezbollah.32
2. The second strategy involved the actual provision of medical care through a system
established by Hezbollah during the 1980s, which subsumes two hospitals, in the
Bekaa Valley and in Beirut; 17 medical centers; pharmacies; and dental clinics.33
As noted, for individual members of Hezbollah, the families of fallen Hezbollah
operatives, and needy Shi’ite families, this medical care was heavily subsidized or
even free.34
3. The third strategy involved the provision of education—and indoctrination—
through both Islamic and secular institutions. Even prior to the establishment of
Hezbollah, investment in education was the basis for recruitment and the dissem-
ination of the Islamic message, and the message of resistance. Students at Islamic
colleges combined religious studies with military training; upon graduation, many
of them joined the cadre of Hezbollah’s core activists. After its establishment,
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Hezbollah expanded its educational activity, targeting people and institutions with
“recruitment potential” through conferences, seminars, and student union activities
organized by its “Recruitment and Culture Committees.” Particularly promising
students earned scholarships for continued study in Iran and elsewhere.35 When
Hezbollah felt confident in its control of a particular institution or in a given region,
it would even dictate an Islamic curriculum.36 Subsequently, Hezbollah expanded
its educational activity to include adolescents and very young children, building
or renovating preschools and elementary schools and imbuing them with its spirit.
The children who attended these frameworks had all of their needs met—for trans-
portation, a hot lunch, schoolbooks. Those who excelled, were given scholarships
for continued study at religious colleges.37 This “education project” was heavily
financed by Iran. Data published by Hezbollah in 1987 indicate that in that year
alone, Iran invested some $1,600,000 in the education of Lebanon’s Shi’ites. More
than 68,000 elementary school pupils and 91,000 secondary and post-secondary
school students benefitted from Hezbollah’s attention to their formal education.38
In addition, Hezbollah expanded to provide informal “education” through youth
brigades and Muslim scout troops, which combined competitive sports activities
with Islamist indoctrination and Hezbollah propaganda. Youth group members also
participated in parades, marches and ceremonies alongside fighters from Hezbol-
lah’s military units. Some of them even underwent basic military training at annual
summer camps in the Bekaa Valley.
4. The fourth strategy, which was an outgrowth of the third, involved the dedicated
use of media channels to indoctrinate various target populations, including fami-
lies. To this end, Hezbollah used two main channels of communication: a tradi-
tional channel, and a more innovative channel. The former was based on a net-
work of mosques and religious centers, where emissaries of Hezbollah openly
engaged in recruitment.39 The second, more modern channel, included Al-’Ahad, a
Hezbollah newspaper, published weekly beginning in 1984; the radio stations Sawt
Al-Musta’adafin, Sawt Al-Islam and, from 1991, Radio Nur; and a television sta-
tion, Al-Manar, which began broadcasting in 1989. These media reported news
and carried Islamic programs, political commentary, current events, and programs
on resistance to Israel. They “marketed” and promoted Hezbollah’s principles and
goals, perfected and disseminated its messages, formulated Islamist culture, and
generated symbols and myths associated with Hezbollah.40
 906 E. Azani

Military and Terrorist Activities

As noted, Hezbollah’s strategy was geared from the first to extend its influence to all
sectors of Shi’ite society. This included, in addition to providing social welfare services
and religious education, initiating and leading operations designed to achieve goals shared
by the entire Shi’ite community.41 Like social and religious services, these, too, served as
a means of recruiting support for Hezbollah.
In 1980s Lebanon, conditions were ripe to accommodate this second component of
Hezbollah. First, as noted, organized and semi-organized groups of Islamic “activists” were
already extant. Second, many politically minded individuals were open to the message of
radical Islam, and were ready to engage in collective action to promote Islamist goals.
Third, Iran was willing and able to provide funding and guidance—in part to spread its
own revolution. Fourth, lingering civil conflict and the presence of foreigners in Lebanon
created a violent environment, with which Hezbollah’s actions were wholly congruent.
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Thus, as part of the “National Lebanese Resistance Front,” Hezbollah joined the fight
against the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in 1983, and also targeted the United Nations
Multinational Force in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s terrorist attacks were surprising in their
innovativeness, and in the determination and willingness to sacrifice that they reflected.
In suicide and bomb attacks against the American Embassy (April 1983) and bases of the
Multinational Forces in Beirut (October 1983), Hezbollah caused the UN Multinational
Forces in Lebanon multiple losses.42 In fact, they had the immediate effect of inducing the
Multinational Forces to leave Beirut in early 1984. Interestingly, although Hezbollah did
not take direct responsibility for these attacks, it was widely known to be responsible for
them; among the Lebanese public, the attacks lent further validity to Hezbollah’s claims
that jihad, resolve, and willingness to sacrifice were the key to evicting foreigners from
Lebanon.43
In February 1985, just prior to the IDF’s withdrawal from Beirut to the edge of the
so-called “security zone,” Hezbollah cannily published its founding manifesto, which has
come to be known as the “open letter” (see above). It also appropriated the IDF’s decision
to withdraw, claiming responsibility for this “success.” In this way, Hezbollah exploited
Shi’ite rage and frustration to expand its influence and cement its hold on southern Lebanon.
Hezbollah then consolidated its activities against the IDF forces that remained in
Lebanon by assigning Abbas Al-Musawi, a founding leader who was chosen in the mid-
1980s to organize Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in southern Lebanon, to establish
a new organizational framework called the “Islamic Resistance.”44 In a 1987 interview,
Abbas Al-Musawi described the nature, goals, and activities of the Islamic Resistance. His
comments indicate that the Resistance attempted three efforts at once. For one, it used its
successful attacks to recruit men, imbue its activists with a fighting spirit, and strengthen
their resolve and willingness for self-sacrifice. For another, it defused Israeli deterrence
by portraying the Israeli soldier as both a cruel oppressor and a vulnerable incompetent.
For yet another, it promoted the population’s affiliation with Hezbollah. And in fact, as
Al-Musawi boasted, the Resistance had made notable gains, its popular base had broadened,
and Hezbollah’s recruiting efforts had borne fruit. In Al-Musawi’s terms, although the goal
of an engaged, aggressively revolutionary society had yet to be reached—due to misguided
education—change was beginning. The Shi’ites had realized that Israel was their chief
enemy. Al-Musawi ascribed this change to the efforts of activist religious scholars and to
the persuasive arguments of the Resistance, which had succeeded in convincing the Muslim
Nation [umma] that it was able to confront Israel.45
 Hybrid Terrorist Organizations 907

In confronting Israel, Hezbollah emphasized operational innovation and high-quality

attacks that resounded abroad, and which it could and did exploit as propaganda, further ex-
panding its hold on the south.46 In a May 1987 interview, prominent Hezbollah leader Subhi
Al-Tawfili projected confidence that “The Islamic Resistance is a growing phenomenon,”
stronger than it ever had been.47 This was seconded by Abbas Al-Musawi in October 1987,
who said that, thanks to increased men, equipment, experience and popular support, the
Islamic Resistance could survive any difficulty.48
A prime example of Hezbollah’s daring, of its talent for innovation, was its abduction
of foreigners and locals, beginning during the Lebanese civil war in the 1980s, as a means of
bargaining on its behalf and that of Iran. Despite its unique advantages, abduction remained
controversial, and often brought Hezbollah into conflict with the Syrians and others in
Lebanon.49 A key opponent of abduction was Sheikh Hassan Fadlallah, who claimed that it
discredited Hezbollah. Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s leadership supported abduction, insisting
that it promoted pan-Islamic goals.50
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It also accomplished the more prosaic goals of releasing terrorists and Hezbollah
activists, and publicizing Islamist demands—the price Hezbollah exacted for the safe
release of its Western captives. Moreover, abduction mocked and shamed the superpowers,
which proved remarkably spineless in the face of Hezbollah’s demands, as well as unable to
ensure the safety and security of their citizens. Abduction paralyzed the West into inaction,
for fear that Hezbollah would harm Western hostages.51 The relative ease of using this
“tactic,” its success, and its strategic influence helped to make it popular in Lebanon.
Between 1989 and 1990 alone, more than 100 foreign citizens were kidnapped there.
Nevertheless, Hezbollah ceased abducting foreigners in the early 1990s, at which time
it also released the last of its Western hostages and those who had been held by its more
radical Shi’ite affiliates.52 One reason for this was the growing dominance of the approach
of the influential Hassan Fadlallah, who held that abduction did far more harm to Hezbollah
than good.53
Another, perhaps more pressing reason that Hezbollah relinquished abducting for-
eigners was that this strategy ultimately did not improve its standing among the Shi’ites.
Although it initially contributed to Hezbollah’s aura—both because it was inventive and
because it gained the release of Shi’ites who had been imprisoned in Israel—over time,
abduction came to be perceived as a means of promoting Iranian interests internationally.
Syria, in particular, opposed Hezbollah’s use of abduction, and took military steps to hem
in Hezbollah in Lebanon. This upset Shi’ite confidence in Hezbollah, especially in Beirut
and the Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah’s image was further damaged by its being treated as a
terrorist organization internationally and even regionally.
As Hezbollah’s leadership became aware of the negative impact abduction was having
on its standing among the Shi’ites, it began to evade responsibility for the abductions
perpetrated with its blessing, and to deny any connection with the kidnappers. It ceased
mediating hostage releases, lest its role as mediator be used to tie it to the act of abduction.
In particular, Hezbollah disallowed any tie to abductions, claiming that the groups doing the
kidnapping did not fall under its purview; if the groups were not affiliated with Hezbollah in
any way, Hezbollah could disavow responsibility for their actions.54 Some might argue that
Hezbollah dissociated itself from the so-called “kidnapping brief” due to new developments
in Lebanon (e.g., the Taif Accord), and used its entry into the political system and its
promotion of Iranian interests to close this “brief.”
Overall, however, Hezbollah’s operational successes, its innovations in terrorism, its
providing an umbrella framework for smaller groups, and its extension of its military activity
 908 E. Azani

from Beirut through the Bekaa Valley to the south all served to spread its influence—as
planned—and to advance it.55
It is also important to note the contribution of changes in the Islamic Resistance to
the evolving hybrid nature of Hezbollah. What began as decentralized terrorist activity
has become a key to Hezbollah’s ethos and operation as a hybrid entity. In the 1980s,
local leaders recruited young people to commit tactical strikes against the IDF in Lebanon,
and to participate in strategic operations emanating from Hezbollah’s leadership, such as
the suicide attacks and abduction of foreigners overseen by Imad Mughniya during that
decade. The Islamic Resistance, established in 1985, would eventually become Hezbollah’s
operational arm, recruiting and training young Shi’ites to perpetrate attacks against the IDF
and its proxy, the South Lebanon Army, and organizing Shi’ite villagers into semi-militias.
In this way, the Islamic Resistance used the Shi’ite population of southern Lebanon as
an additional layer of defense, deterrence—and offense.56 Furthermore, during the late
1990s, Hezbollah employed the same logic to establish the Lebanese Resistance Brigades.
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Composed of volunteers who were not Shi’ites, these brigades attacked the IDF, and formed
an additional component of what Hezbollah hoped would be a society totally devoted to
Resistance.57
The seminal idea informing Hezbollah’s strategic plan and underlying these
developments-the brainchild of Abbas Al-Musawi and Hassan Nasrallah—was to create a
“society of resistance” utterly devoted to deflecting and defending against Israeli aggres-
sion. Molding society in this way assumed, and depended on, synergy between Hezbollah’s
social and military components. Although the “society of resistance” has never been fully
realized, it has remained an important constituent of Hezbollah’s hybrid activities.58

Establishing Popular Infrastructure as Part of a Struggle to Control the Shi’ite

Population
Before remarking on Hezbollah’s entry into the Lebanese political system, it is important
to note that it did not develop its da’wa and military structures in a vacuum. A priori,
Hezbollah faced a struggle with a preexisting, strong rival within the Shi’ite community:
Amal.
One of the main issues confronting the leaders of Hezbollah during the 1980s was how
to expand its social infrastructure and solidify its standing as a broad popular movement,
which would outflank Amal,59 the strongest Shi’ite movement at that time. As described
in the preceding sections, the organizational strategy chosen by Hezbollah to accomplish
this was to initiate (a) ideological-religious activities as a means of enlisting support
and inculcating religious activism and a readiness for personal sacrifice on behalf of the
collective; (b) social activities to redress discrimination and injustice against the Shi’ites
and improve their living conditions; and (c) military activities, to evict all foreigners from
Lebanon and expand recruitment to Hezbollah’s ranks. This choice dictated the nature of
Hezbollah from the day of its inception.
The weakness of the Lebanese regime during the 1980s and the effects of Israel’s
Operation Peace for the Galilee (the First Lebanon War), begun in 1982 and resulting in a
protracted Israeli presence in Lebanon, helped Hezbollah use these three types of activity
to expand its influence within the Shi’ite community and erode the foundation of Amal, its
principal rival. In particular, Operation Peace for the Galilee changed the balance of power
inside Lebanon. Initially, Amal, headed by Nabih Beri, became the strongest of the Muslim
militias.60 With Iran’s help, Hezbollah waged a propaganda campaign aimed at causing
key people to defect from Amal to its ranks.61 Hezbollah’s numerous terrorist activities
 Hybrid Terrorist Organizations 909

earned it broad coverage in the Lebanese press, which discussed its ideology, its political
goals, its organizational policy and its leaders. An analysis of interviews conducted in
1986–1987 with Hezbollah activists reveals that Lebanese journalists understood even then
that Hezbollah was growing and gaining influence with the Shi’ite population, at Amal’s
expense.62
By 1987, Hezbollah’s presence in southern Lebanon was a fait accompli.63 An out-
standing expression of this was its ability to rally an increasingly large number of Shi’ites to
participate in conferences, protests, and commemorative ceremonies. If at first Hezbollah
could raise a few hundred supporters, by the end of the 1980s it was massing over 20,000
for each of its events.64
The struggle for control of the Shi’ite community reached its peak between 1988 and
1991. During that time, Hezbollah and Amal fought a violent and bitter battle akin to a
“civil war,” in which thousands of Shi’ites were wounded. This struggle shaped Hezbollah’s
sphere of influence, actions, and behavior during the decade to come.
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Throughout this period and after, Hezbollah remained exquisitely sensitive to Shi’ite
public opinion. As violence escalated in southern Lebanon, the personal and financial
security of the Shi’ites there could not help but be affected. From time to time, Hezbollah
was blamed for stoking this violence, without considering the suffering of the residents of
the south. When so accused, Hezbollah would counter that it was indeed concerned for the
safety and security of the southern Lebanese, as witnessed by its launching missiles at Israel
in retaliation for the latter’s aggression against the south.65 Hezbollah’s leaders were careful
to hold missile launchings and other military activity in abeyance whenever the fields of the
south needed tending; they would then trumpet their restraint as indicative of their concern
for their southern constituents. Moreover, Hezbollah repaired homes damaged in Israel’s
strikes.66 In this way, Hezbollah was able to co-opt the residents of southern Lebanon to its
“society of resistance,” preserve its advantage over Amal, and continue caring for Shi’ite
society even as it made it a part of its Islamic Resistance.

Hezbollah Enters the Political Arena

As behooves a hybrid organization that relies simultaneously on establishing a social welfare
system, implementing military tactics, and establishing a political presence, Hezbollah
entered the Lebanese political system beginning in 1992. Hezbollah outlined the functioning
of its political wing as follows: It would act within the boundaries of the Lebanese political
system and in accordance with its rules—in parliament, in the government, in the municipal
system, and in the civil service. At the same time, it would preserve its independence, and
would act outside the boundaries of the political system when necessary, achieving its aims
by alternately creating political crises and weaving political alliances. Lastly, it would use
political violence (e.g., the assassination of opponents and street clashes, or the threat of
these) and even use its military forces to change political decisions in its favor or reach its
goals.
Hezbollah’s entry into the political system began with its participation in the 1992
Lebanese parliamentary elections, in which its Kotelet Al-Wafa lil-Muqawama [Loyalty to
the Resistance Bloc] won a huge victory: Eight of its members were elected.67 This success
rounded out Hezbollah’s “portfolio” and increased its power and influence, enabling it to
make optimal use of the synergy of its military and social infrastructure. Hezbollah’s entry
into parliament signaled the start of its implementation of a long-range plan to take over
Lebanon’s political system, by exploiting the advantages of working inside and outside
that system at once. In an interview published in Hezbollah’s newspaper Al-’Ahad in
 910 E. Azani

August 1992, Naim Qassem, its deputy emir, highlighted this plan, which was based on the
boundary-crossing infrastructure of the Islamic Resistance, as a “pioneering” vanguard:

Hezbollah has decided that it must . . . grant representation to the faction that
is fighting the Israeli enemy, which is a pioneering force of the Resistance to
the Israeli occupation. [It will] unite around it all those fighting the Zionist
enemy. . . .68

Hezbollah’s political role during the 1990s was founded in the extensive social welfare,
Islamic education, and civilian aid infrastructure that it had begun establishing in the 1980s.
Having vanquished Amal, Hezbollah “branded” itself as the representative of the Shi’ite
population, and worked to eliminate longstanding ethno-religious discrimination by re-
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allocating public benefits and bearing the burden of the Resistance to Israeli occupation,
including maintaining security in the south. Hezbollah was wise enough to create synergy
among these spheres of activity, and use that synergy to become the most dominant entity
in Lebanon politically, socially, and militarily.
The decision to participate in the election, against the background of the Taif Accord,
aroused dissent within Hezbollah. The group’s more radical elements, led by Sheikh Subhi
Tawfili who was its emir until 1991, believed that Hezbollah should concentrate on its
revolutionary efforts on toppling the Lebanese government from outside the boundaries
of the political system. Hezbollah’s more pragmatic elements, led by Abbas Al-Musawi
and Hassan Nasrallah, were in favor of entering the political arena while maintaining the
independence of the Islamic Resistance. In an attempt to resolve this crisis and adjust
Hezbollah’s policy accordingly, a special internal committee was established to examine
the implications of joining parliament: whether doing so would be efficacious, what re-
sponsibilities would devolve onto Hezbollah if its representatives were elected, the relative
advantages and disadvantages of membership in parliament, and its implications for the
Resistance.
The committee’s “ruling” was decisive: By a majority vote of ten to two, it deter-
mined that Hezbollah should indeed participate in parliamentary elections. According to
the committee, Hezbollah’s presence in Lebanon’s parliament would grant the Islamic Re-
sistance legal validity, and would advance Hezbollah’s struggle against certain elements
in the Lebanese political system. The committee also claimed that a presence in parlia-
ment would enable Hezbollah to mitigate for improved health and welfare services for its
constituents. Furthermore, it would present Hezbollah with a platform for inter-ethnic and
inter-religious collaboration. The only disadvantage that the committee could see was that
Lebanon’s parliament was not Islamic; for this and other reasons, Hezbollah was likely to
encounter opposition from other factions in parliament.69
Despite this one reservation, the decision of the committee—along with the “green
light” signaled by the supreme leader in Iran—provided Hezbollah with a sufficiently solid
foundation from which to announce its participation in the election.70 In 1992, with the
encouragement of Iran and Syria, Hassan Nasrallah declared that Hezbollah would be
promoting implementation of the Taif Accord by running for parliamentary election. As
noted, this decision was staunchly opposed by the group’s first secretary-general Subhi
Tawfili and his allies. Despite his harsh criticisms, Tawfili initially continued to serve as a
senior member of Hezbollah. However, far from abating, his protestation reached its apex in
1997, when he decided to “secede” from Hezbollah and establish a new movement. Called
 Hybrid Terrorist Organizations 911

“The Revolution of the Hungry,” Tawfili’s group stuck by Hezbollah’s erstwhile aspiration
to violently overthrow the Lebanese government from without.71

Conclusion
Hezbollah has traveled a long road since its establishment in 1982. It transformed itself
from a “revolutionary vanguard” terrorist organization bent on overthrowing the Lebanese
government in a violent act of rebellion from without, into a terrorist organization that
strives to achieve the same goal by using legitimate political tools from within.
What Hezbollah has grown into is a hybrid terrorist organization, which operates
on three planes: the civilian plane of da’wa, social welfare and religious education; the
military–Resistance plane (jihad); and the political plane. The three are interconnected
and interdependent, supporting and complementing one another, each of them serving as a
springboard to further influence and power without having to exceed or defy the “rules of
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the game” too frequently.

Hezbollah’s evolution into a hybrid terrorist organization was not deterministic, how-
ever, and should not to be taken for granted. It has been influenced by Hezbollah’s ideology,
its popular base of support, its leadership, and the society from which it sprang. As this
article has attempted to show, Hezbollah’s development into a hybrid organization was
gradual, and required it to mollify internal dissenters and vanquish external rivals. Dur-
ing its first decade, Hezbollah developed along the axis of jihad (Resistance) and da’wa
(social welfare). Its internal cohesion despite the chaotic surrounding environment, and
the support it received from Iran and, eventually, Syria, enabled Hezbollah to take root,
perfect its modus operandi, expand, and establish an enthusiastic base of support among the
Shi’ite community, at the expense of its rival Amal. Initially following the organizational
model of a “revolutionary vanguard”—that is, of decentralized, somewhat isolated small
groups and networks that pursued idiosyncratic goals—Hezbollah grew into an empire of
da’wa, which could and did use its extensive social welfare and education infrastructure to
mobilize and constantly expand its base of support. It was only when it entered Lebanese
politics in 1992 that the resulting internal dissension required Hezbollah to enlist external
support from Iran and Syria to ensure its success.
Keenly aware of this reality on the eve of elections, in August 1992 Hassan Nasrallah
publicized Hezbollah’s election platform, which presents the decision to participate in the
elections as a necessity. With the blessing of the supreme Iranian leader Hamenai, Hezbollah
would liberate Lebanon from the Zionist occupation and eradicate “ethnic politics” (which
would prevent it from overtaking the Lebanese political system from within). Nasrallah
promised that, once in parliament, Hezbollah would advance the Islamic Resistance, build
a “resilient and resistant society,” and secure the state’s support for families that had lost a
breadwinner in the fight against Israel.72
Throughout the campaign for this election, and in subsequent elections throughout the
1990s, Hezbollah’s leadership would continue to justify their decision to enter parliament.
For example, Naim Qassem attempted to reassure voters that while Hezbollah may have
changed its tactics, it had not abandoned its strategy, and that “entering parliament is not
our ultimate end . . . it does not erase Hezbollah’s strategy, but rather gains [for us] political
capabilities that will help us reach our goals.”73
In October 1994, Nasrallah claimed that “the Al-Wafa Party has become the mouthpiece
of the Resistance in Lebanon’s parliament and beyond.”74 By November 1995, Nasrallah
was claiming that Hezbollah had achieved the goals it had set itself when it entered
parliament in 1992:
 912 E. Azani

For the first time the Resistance has gained a place in parliament and taken a
decisive stand against Israeli aggression. This is the first parliament to oppose
the US and defend the Resistance . . . regarding our second goal, parliament
has eliminated misunderstandings between Hezbollah and other segments of
the Lebanese people. Today, Hezbollah is fully present in Lebanese politics
. . . our parliamentary representatives work tirelessly. Regarding our third goal,
Hezbollah’s representatives serve on many parliamentary committees, they
contribute to parliamentary debates, and block oppressive laws. Regarding our
fourth goal, our representatives have been very active in ratifying the budget.
. . . Today we are satisfied with our presence in parliament.75

In a sense, Nasrallah seems in this statement to be advocating for the synergy among
component parts that is essential to the hybrid organization. At the same time, he seems
to be attempting to quell then-persistent internal criticism by demonstrating the tangible
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advantages of involvement in the political arena.

It is important to stress that Hezbollah’s decision to continue to practice jihad, da’wa,
and politics, and its development into a hybrid organization as presented in this article,
is not unique. As described herein, this pattern was first developed by Egypt’s Muslim
Brotherhood during the early twentieth century. Rather, the uniqueness of Hezbollah lies
in its particular flexibility, and in the rapidity with which it has been able, repeatedly and
over time, to adapt to the constantly changing, volatile Lebanese environment.
Unlike Hezbollah, global jihad organizations persist in functioning as “revolutionary
vanguard” terrorist organizations that favor jihad above all. At the same time, and thanks to
the model presented by Hezbollah and other hybrid organizations, they are learning to use
other means available to them—such as da’wa, financial aid, education, medical care—to
win the hearts and minds of their target population. To this end, in territories controlled
by global jihad organizations, unique agencies such as Ansar Al-Sharia in Yemen are
increasingly being established to care for the local population. Their ultimate aim, in
lending that population a feeling of security and attending to its distress, is to expand their
influence, enabling them to recruit more people to their cause, thereby further entrenching
themselves and ensuring their success.
Yet not all global jihadist groups behave in this way. It is inherently difficult to
pinpoint and identify the behavior of these groups—as hybrid, revolutionary vanguard, or
some combination of the two—most of which persist in following a semi-decentralized
pattern of organization, function in multiple and varied arenas, and may or may not wield
control over a swath of territory. Nevertheless, the ideological discourse of global jihad
and the metamorphoses of certain arenas of jihad may provide clues as to the direction in
which most global jihad organizations will develop. Clearly, a closer examination of these
groups, which is beyond the scope of this article, is necessary to an understanding of them
that will promote efforts to counter them.
In seeking to determine whether the model presented by Hezbollah is being repli-
cated, however, the best example of a “copycat” organization (in the Middle East) is
Hamas. Founded on the same principles as Hezbollah, Hamas is a hybrid terrorist organi-
zation no less than is Hezbollah.76 Similar patterns of behavior may also be identified in
Islamic organizations in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Kashmir, Egypt, Libya, Nige-
ria, and Mali. Understanding the hybrid terrorism model and its variants—one of which is
Hezbollah—provides a blueprint for understanding developments within local and global
jihad organizations, and enhances our ability to formulate better strategies to counter these
organizations.
 Hybrid Terrorist Organizations 913

Notes
1. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Hybrid Warfare” (briefing to the Sub-
committee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, 10 September 2010). GAO-10-1036-R. Available at http://www.gao.gov
/assets/100/97053.pdf (accessed 10 November 2010); Dr. Russell W. Glenn, “Thoughts on
‘Hybrid’ Conflict,” Small Wars Journal (2009). Available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog
/journal/docs-temp/188-glenn.pdf (accessed 30 March 2009); Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid vs. Com-
pound War. The Janus Choice: Defining Today’s Multifaceted Conflict,” Armed Forces Journal
(2009). Available at http://.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/10/4198658/ (accessed 5 November 2009);
Lieutenant General James N. Mattis, USMC, and Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman, USMCR (Ret.),
“Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” US Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine 132 (2005).
Available at http://milnewstbay.pbworks.com/f/MattisFourBlockWarUSNINov2005.pdf (accessed 13
January 2006).
2. “Multi-modal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but
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are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to
achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict.” Frank Hoff-
man, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009). Available at
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jfqhoffman.pdf (accessed 15 November 2009).
3. GAO, “Hybrid Warfare”; Jim Kouri, “War on Terrorism: Defining ‘Hybrid War-
fare,”’ Canada Free Press, 16 September 2010. Available at http://www.canadafreepress.com
/index.php/article/27758 (accessed 17 September 2010).
4. GAO, “Hybrid Warfare.”
5. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges.”
6. Ibid.
7. Boaz Ganor, “The Hybrid Terrorist Organization and Incitement,” Jerusalem Cen-
ter for Public Affairs (JCPA), 1 November 2012. Available at http://jcpa.org/article/the-hybrid
-terrorist-organization-and-incitement/ (accessed 15 November 2012).
8. For additional information on the Muslim Brotherhood, please see: Richard Mitchell, The
Society of the Muslim Brothers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb
and the Origins of Radical Islamism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); and Lorenzo
Vidino, The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
9. Sayyid Qutb and A. B. Al-Mehri (eds.), Milestones: Ma’alim fi’lTareeq (Birmingham, Eng-
land: Maktabah Booksellers and Publishers, 2006). Available at http://www.kalamullah.com/Books
/Milestones%20Special%20Edition.pdf (accessed 13 June 2009).
10. Eitan Azani, Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God; From Revolution to Institutional-
ization (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
11. “An Open Letter: The Hezbollah Program,” The Jerusalem Quarterly, 48 (Fall 1988).
Available at http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/4/Default.aspx (accessed 25 September
2011).
12. Traditionally, the vanguard are those who are placed in leading battlefield positions.
13. “An Open Letter.”
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Doug McAdam and David A. Snow, “Conditions of Organization: Facilitative Contexts,” in
Social Movements, ed. Doug McAdam and David A. Snow (Oxford: Roxbury Publishing Company,
1997), p. 80.
17. Ibid., pp. 90–91.
18. Wadah Sharara, Dawlat Hizb Allah, Lubnan Mujtami’an Islamiyyan (Beirut, 1998), 13–19.
Sharara quotes Amir Tahiri regarding the centrality of religious institutions in the dissemination of
the Islamic message.
19. Al-Diyar, 6 November 1990.
20. A hassaniyya is an Islamic institution for the study of religion. Sharara, Dawlat Hizb Allah,
Lubnan Mujtami’an Islamiyyan, pp. 85–92; 129–135.
 914 E. Azani

21. Sharara notes that many of the 250 religious seminary graduates of 1986 became involved
in military activities in Lebanon and elsewhere. Ibid., pp. 134; 154–155; 162–165.
22. Isan Al-A’zi, Hezbollah: Min Alhilm Alideology Ila Wakai’a Alsiasia (Beirut, 1998),
pp. 21–25; and Sharara, Dawlat Hizb Allah, Lubnan Mujtami’an Islamiyyan, pp. 1–8.
23. Al-Watan, 26 October 1984.
24. Sharara, Dawlat Hizb Allah, Lubnan Mujtami’an Islamiyyan, pp. 195–198; Martin Kramer,
ed., The Islamism Debate (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1997), pp. 33–34; Judith Harik, The Public
and the Social Services of the Lebanese Militias (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, September
1994), p. 24.
25. Al-A’zi, Hezbollah, pp. 53–63.
26. The Taif Accord was meant to end the Lebanese civil war; it outlined changes in the
Lebanese political system and Lebanon–Syria relations.
27. Al-Shara, 17 March 1986. Cited in Shimon Shapira, “Iranian Policy in Lebanon 1959–1989,”
unpublished doctoral thesis, 1994.
28. Nicolas Blanford, Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty Year Struggle Against Israel
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(New York: Random House, 2011), pp. 100–101.

29. Nizar A. Hamze, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press,
2004), pp. 44–74.
30. Azani, Hezbollah, p. 55.
31. From an interview with Abu Habib, the head of the Al-Shahid Association in Lebanon,
Al-’Ahad, 17 February 1987.
32. Harik, The Public and the Social Services of the Lebanese Militias, pp. 25–26; Kramer, ed.,
The Islamism Debate, pp. 26–27; 61.
33. See an announcement of the Islamic Health Authority from Al-’Ahad, 1 August 1989,
in Nizar Hamze, “Lebanon’s Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommoda-
tion,” Third World Quarterly 14(2) (1993), p. 239; Sharara, Dawlat Hizb Allah, Lubnan Mujtami’an
Islamiyyan, p. 343.
34. Al-’Ahad, 10 October 1987.
35. Al-Safir, 4 October 1987; Al-Hakika, 4 September 1987.
36. Al-Safir, 24 September 1987; Al-Masira, 19 September 1987. See also the appeal of a
school principal to the Lebanese Ministry of Education and the Ministry’s response, that the principal
must follow Hezbollah’s dictates (e.g., find separate structures for boys and girls), Al-Nahar Al-Arabi
wal-Dawli, 12 October 1987.
37. In this context, see the opening ceremony of the Al-Iman [“Faith”] School in the town of
Brital in the Bekaa Valley, which was attended by Hezbollah leaders and the Iranian ambassador. The
school, run by Hezbollah, was built with Iranian funds Al-Nahar, 13 October 1987.
38. Al-’Ahad, 23 December 1987 and Al-Nahar, 14 January 1988. Cited in Shapira, “Iranian
Policy in Lebanon 1959–1989.”
39. Sharara notes that lessons were held for young Islamists on political and military topics in
the hassaniyyas adjacent to mosques, while religious classes were held at the mosques. Community
announcements were broadcast over mosque loudspeakers. Hezbollah’s flag was flown over the
mosques affiliated with it. Sharara, Dawlat Hizb Allah, Lubnan Mujtami’an Islamiyyan, pp. 203–205;
233–234.
40. Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press,
1997), p. 42. Sharara expanded on this, claiming that the ideological organ of the Lebanese Mus-
lim Student Union, Al-Muntalaq, and other newspapers such as Lebanon’s Al-Mujahid and Iran’s
Al-Wahda Al-Islamiyya and Kihan Al-Arabi, were part of the written communications system that
served Hezbollah and the Iranians. Sharara, Dawlat Hizb Allah, Lubnan Mujtami’an Islamiyyan,
pp. 241–246.
41. Evicting foreigners from Lebanon and redressing the oppression of Shi’ites were goals
promoted by Hezbollah that won broad consensus from the Shi’ite community. In fact, Hezbollah
was no different from its Shi’ite rivals (Amal, and traditional political actors) in this regard. However,
Hezbollah chose a strategy of resistance—that is, the use of violence—to achieve these goals and, as
early as 1984, claimed the withdrawal of the Multinational Force from Beirut as a success.
 Hybrid Terrorist Organizations 915

42. Edgar O’Ballance, Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism, 1979–1995: The Iranian Connection
(New York: New York University Press, 1997), pp. 64–68; Kramer, ed., The Islamism Debate,
pp. 36–38.
43. O’Ballance, Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism, 1979–1995, p. 71.
44. For an interview with Musawi see Al-’Ahad, 19 October 1987. See also Magnus Ranstorp’s
comment that in the late 1980s, the Islamic Resistance numbered 300–400 “hard core” activists and an
additional 1,500 armed sympathizers. The Islamic Resistance was orchestrated by local commanders,
headed by Abbas Musawi, with Iranian assistance. Ranstorp, Hizb’Allah in Lebanon (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1997), pp. 66–67.
45. See an interview with Abbas Al-Musawi in Al-Wahda Al-Islamiyya, 4 December 1987.
46. See also an interview with the person responsible for the Islamic Resistance in Jabal Amal
after an attack on an IDF outpost in Alman, Al-’Ahad, 2 May 1987. Regarding Hezbollah’s efforts
to create a territorial continuum between the Bekaa Valley and the south, see Al-Nahar, 13 August
1987.
47. For the full interview with Al-Tawfali, see Al-I’lam, 16 May 1987.
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48. See the interview with Al-Musawi, Al-’Ahad, 19 October 1987.

49. For more information on the conflict between Hezbollah and Syria surrounding the abduction
of French hostages, see Al-Kabas, 31 August 1985. For the debacle between the late Syrian President
Hafez Al-Assad and Hezbollah regarding the release of American hostages, see Al-Nahar (Lebanon),
7 July 1985.
50. Kramer, ed., The Islamism Debate, p. 64. For an interview with Hussein Al-Musawi, founder
of Amal Al-Islami (one of Hezbollah’s sub-groups at that time), see Al-Majala, 20 November 1985.
For an interview in which Fadlallah claims that Islamists do not see abduction as a policy tool, see
Radio Beirut, 26 January 1985 and Al-Nahar Al-Arabi wal-Dawli, 1 July 1987.
51. See Islamic Jihad’s warning to the Reagan government not to embark on any military
operation, Al-Nahar, 7 July 1987. The kidnappers pressured governments by appealing to the
families of the hostages; for example, see an appeal to the families of the American hostages
in the Washington Report. Available at http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/052785/
850527008.html (accessed 14 September 2010).
52. Ranstorp, Hizb’Allah in Lebanon, p. 1.
53. Amal’s criticism of the abductions are voiced by Nabih Beri in an interview with La Soyeuz,
quoted in Al-Nahar, 24 August 1987. Fadlallah’s position is explicated in Kramer, ed., The Islamism
Debate, pp. 64–68.
54. For an example of Hezbollah’s denial of its involvement in abductions alongside its refusal
to mediate hostage releases, see La Rue du Liban, 7–14 March 1987. See also Al-Nahar Al-Arabi
wal-Dawli, 21 December 1987, and an interview with Hussein Al-Mussawi in Kihan Al-Arabi, 23
May 1987.
55. As noted, Hezbollah flourished at the expense of its chief Shi’ite rival, the secular group
Amal.
56. Blanford, Warriors of God, pp. 78–80.
57. Hamze, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 78.
58. Blanford, Warriors of God, pp. 79–86.
59. Founded in 1975 by Musa Al-Sadr, Amal differed ideologically, in certain respects, from
Hezbollah. For a full discussion of the movement’s struggle with Hezbollah, see Azani, Hezbollah,
p. 76 ff.
60. Al-Watan Al-Arabi, 26 October 1984; Al-Nahar Al-Arabi wal-Dawli, 31 August 1987.
61. See Al-Dustour, 4 May 1986. See also an interview with Hassan Hashem, Monday Morning,
30 March 1987.
62. See an interview with Fadlallah, Al-Mustaqbal, 22 March 1986; an interview with Hussein
Al-Musawi in Kihan Al-Arabi, 19 August 1986; Al-Halij, 1 March 1987; Al-Masira, 19 September
1987; and an interview with Daoud Daoud in Al-Nahar Al-Arabi wal-Dawli, 28 April 1987.
63. See the interview with Daoud Daoud in Al-Nahar Al-Arabi wal-Dawli, 28 April 1987; see
also Al-Shara’a, 20 July 1987.
 916 E. Azani

64. For example, on World Jerusalem Day. Sharara, Dawlat Hizb Allah, Lubnan Mujtami’an
Islamiyyan, p. 454; Al-Nahar, 16 May 1985; Monday Morning, 20 July 1986. For an interview with
Sheikh Hassan Fadlallah, see La Rue du Liban, 14 March 1987. See also a report in Al-’Ahad on
hundreds of thousands of participants in the ‘ashura procession organized by Hezbollah in Beirut in
1987. Even if Al-’Ahad’s report is tendentious, and an exaggeration, it faithfully captures the growing
influence of Hezbollah among the Shi’ites.
65. Blanford, Warriors of God, pp. 132–133.
66. Ibid., p. 81; Eitan Azani, “Hezbollah: From Revolutionary and Pan-Islamism to Pragmatism
and Lebanonization,” unpublished doctoral thesis, 2005, pp. 182–192.
67. Hamze, “Lebanon’s Hizbullah,” pp. 321–337; Al-Safir, 15 November 1997.
68. See the interview with Naim Qassem, Al-’Ahad, 7 August 1992.
69. Naim Qassem, Hezbollah—Al-Manhag Al-Tajriba Al-Mustakbal (Beirut: Dar Al Hadi,
2002), pp. 267–273.
70. Blanford, Warriors of God, pp. 100–101.
71. Hamze, In the Path of Hizbullah, pp. 108–112.
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72. Radio Nur Beirut, 5 August 1992. Cited in Shimon Shapira, “Iranian Policy in Lebanon
1959–1989.”
73. Naim Qassem, Reuters, 21 August 1992.
74. Interview with Hassan Nasrallah, Al-Balad, 22 October 1994.
75. Interview with Hassan Nasrallah, Al-Tila’at, 29 November 1995.
76. With the exception of minor differences arising from its arena of action and its relationship
with the players in that arena.