4 Italy: Missiles, Mafia and Militari- zation In late 1979, the and the Communists were being pushed back into the opposition after three years of supporting the government from the outside. ‘The profound cause of th o period of ‘national unity’ was coming to an end, United States governing circles, was brought toa brutal end in early 1978 when the Red Brigades kidnapped and murdered Aldo Moro, the Christian Democrat negotiator ofthe ‘historic compromise’. By that time, under the leadership of general secretary Enrico Berlinguer, the, Ct had endorsed NATO, asserted its independence from Moscow, and one by one met all the conditions of compromise ies. The Pot tion throughout this period the popular move- of government was ized by the disintegrating cliects of economic jonand terrorism, ‘he Christian Democrats’ and their partners have had good Ualy: Missiles, Mofia And Militarizatiom 137 ir own to maintain undivided control of the country’s ils system, and to keep at bay a party with the best record of local government whose third of the te probably ity of the most productive and culturally active part doubtful whether they could some forty years without the automatic ir gre ing bearing the name ‘com mmunists has not only ent national government, on the pr involved close cooperation betweer gence services to protect security, to check up on Communists. fifties the unions were split and an attack was mounted on the f General Confederation of Labour (CGIL), on the grounds tha tories with strong Communist-led unions would not be eligible for US offshore procurement contracts. In the mid sevent ion seemed to wander. Bi ry bases in Europe in the vigilance and control. ¢ Italian government was the first to gi le deployment. The main reason for this hast rivalry between the government parties, esp. Democrats and Party led by Bettino Cr: favours of Washington. This rivalry peaked in early 198 1, 28 Sod ists and Christian Democrats jostled each other in hopes of anoint ‘ment by the newly installed Reagan administration. Because of his smaller share of the ;, American the decision to strengthen its ics was a sign of renewed interest, socialist label, C Giovanni Agn ‘Washington appreciates him because without the It Party the missiles would not have gone through.’ Italian Parties Seek Friends Abroad 1978 wasa heavy blow tothediscreetly autonom: had been developing during the Italian industrialists looking for new mar and investment areas138 welcomed the opportunity to take advantage of the PCt’s long- standing intemational contacts with the Arab world and the new leftist Aftican regimes, as well as with Eastern Europe. The ambi ities of the Carter foreign policy left room for Europ in the world outside Europe. But the reaction quickly b United States itself: Europe had to be called to order as a ‘re ‘was returning from Washington evaluation of the internal and inter- national situation’ ruled out direct Communist Party participat an Italian governmeni In December 1978 Prime Minister Giulio Andreout ostentatiously ignored Communist demands that Italy should negotiate favourable terms for membership in the European Monetary System and demand a guid pro quo from the Germans in return for tying the lira to the mark, On 26 January 1979, faced with the brutal realities, Berlin. guer took note of his party's growing isolation and withdrew support 's government. However, although this offidally p the weight of the and regional governm: ig I i € Prosperous centre of the country, has kept it firmly ‘engaged in the day-to-day practice of compromise and the search for accommodation with the other parties. Coalition seems to come more easily than opposition, ‘The main theme of the Italian Communist Party congress held in wing April was the search for new fiends abroad temnationalism’, after halfa century of betrayals, had he war between Communist S . Berlinguer called for a “new i which acceptance of diversity between parties and nations would be the basis for peace and development. Berlinguer noted that foreign Missiles, Mofia And Mititarization 159 factor among Italian parties, and that ly displayed in the well-attended foreign delegates gallery) could be an asset not only to Italy but to Europe as a whole. Two months before the first European Par issuing a tacit invitation to Willy Brandt's Socialist International in particular, and European progressive forces in general, to work together in tackling major international problems, especially hhird Worl this point the Euromissiles came along to shatter prospects of an independent European approach to world affairs, if only by reorien= ting foreign policy debate around the pros and cons of somebody els ea Tn the autumn of ment signal theatre nuclear f only European country to do so. Britain, as a nudear power, was not in a comparable position, and Belgium and the Netherlands were both holding back. Full pressure was thus brought to bear o the weeks preceding the NATO decision in Brustels. If Italy said yes, then Germany would agree and the deployment could go ahead. If Italy said no, the whole plan was in de Of course there was never might have found the nerve to say Benelux countries. ‘This was, in fact, what the parliamentary debate on 4 December on the Italian government to ask NATO to to build and deploy Pershing-2 and cruise months, and to use the time to sound out the wrms reduction in the European theatre, A invitation to the USSR to suspend construction and deployment of $8-20 missles, and for an immediate postpone the decisi 1¢ new weapons “would start a process which would be extremely difficult to stop’ and would ‘i cl :mosphere of distrust, division and sharper ‘The government majority parties, Democrats, Republicans and Liber by ‘restoring the balance of forces0 datedétente, persuade Moscow tonegotiate,and provide thenecessary “reagsurances’ forthe US Se rt dl parliament, the Radical Party and the Democratic Party of Proletarian Unity (PDUP), rejected the NATO missile deployment more categorically than the PCI. The Italian Socialist Party, however, was in a delicate position. Craxi wanted to please the Americans, but in the last months of the Carter administration the way to do so was perhaps not totaly clear. Healso to please the German Social Democrats. But which ones? not approaching the high level of inner contradiction and fard ambiguity of the SPD, the [talian Socialists were neither istoric leaders, veterans of anti- would have liked to wait and try for influential daily La Repubblica and spokesman for the Northern Italian ‘enlightened bourgeoisie’ that backed the ‘historic compromise’. ‘Coming from the largest Western Communist party, the proposal 1 of exceptional importance, which dissociates the PC! from flatly pro-Soviet positions ... and offers all Italian and, European democratic forces a reasonable platform, for agreement La Repubblice stated in an editorial, A group of prominent I to move together to stop bot xi from the left, ame up ‘be tacked onto Italy's agreement, such that the in the event of successful ‘This was in line with the Belgian governm and with the thinking of many northern European Soci clause into a mere ‘Christian Democrat resolution hanistan, PCI ‘and held lively explanatory sessions in all eleven thousand local party branches throughout the country. ourg, Italian Communist representatives helped dr Healy: Mafia And Militariation 141 Christian Democrats both call isolate the PC The I in their German counterparts tohelp in February longer Kobi changed the mood of the gathering. “In ou party leader told the congress, ever belore that a party whose 5 brutal invaders of Afghanistan, as the oppressors of Eastern Europe should participate with a Christian Moscow, it began to be condemn Democrats demanded the ery in the co: jo Lagorio gave full satisfaction to Pentagon planners, iy increased defence budget! and agreeing to ranean, In August Sicily had been chosen for cruise missiles with nudear bers of pa jould vote for unconditional acceptance of ‘as part of a motion approving government thould have consulted the party's policy-making when last heard from, had preferred to link the missile decision to arms negotiations, along the lines of other European socialist parties. In protest, six Socialist deputies