KAGAWADS   JOSE   G.   MENDOZA,   ROSARIO   B.   ESPINO,   TERESITA   S.

MENDOZA, JORGE BANAL, Chairman of the Special Investigation Committee on
Administrative   Cases   Against   Elected   Barangay   Officials   of   the   Quezon   City
Council   and   ISMAEL   A.   MATHAY,   JR.,   City   Mayor   of   Quezon   City,
petitioners, vs. BARANGAY CAPTAIN MANUEL D. LAXINA, SR., respondent.
G.R. No. 146875. July 14, 2003. *

DOCTRINE:
An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office; It is only when the public 
officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his right to enter into the position becomes 
plenary and complete; Pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin him 
from assuming office or from discharging his functions.—To be sure, an oath of office is a 
qualifying requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to the full investiture with the 
office. It is only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his right 
to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete. However, once proclaimed and 
duly sworn in office, a public officer is entitled to assume office and to exercise the functions
thereof. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin him from 
assuming office or from discharging his functions. Unless his election is annulled by a final 
and executory decision, or a valid execution of an order unseating him pending appeal is 
issued, he has the lawful right to assume and perform the duties of the office to which he 
has been elected.

FACTS:
Manuel Laxina took his oath and assumed office as the duly
proclaimed and elected barangay captain. Meanwhile, his rival
candidate, Fermo, filed an election protest and the latter was declared
as the winner by the trial court. Laxina filed a petition with the
COMELEC questioning the order and COMELEC annulled the order on
the ground that there were no good reasons to justify it. On October 27,
1999, a writ was issued ordering Fermo to vacate said position. He
refused. However, this did not stop respondent Laxina from the
discharge of his duties as the duly elected baranggay captain. Laxina
he held office in the SK-Hall and appointed two people to become his
secretary and treasurer.

COMELEC issued an alias writ of execution against Fermo but this was
still unsatisfied. Laxina was able to take his oath (again) on November
16, 1999. It was only on the following day that Fermo turned over all
the assets and properties of the barangay. On November 20, 1999, the
appointments of Laxina’s secretary and treasurer were ratified to
reflect the appointment date of November 1, 1999. Fermo's appointees
objected to this but they eventually agreed only if they were paid for
their services from November 1-7, 1999.

Sometime in 2000, Mendoza and other baranggay councillors filed a

complaint for violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices against
Laxina’s appointees. They contended that defendants made it appear
in the payroll that he and his appointees rendered services starting
November 8, 1999 when, in truth, they commenced to serve only on
November 17, 1999 after respondent took his oath and assumed the
office of barangay chairman.
Defendants claimed that the taking anew of the oath of office as
barangay chairman was a mere formality and was not a requirement
before respondent can validly discharge the duties of his office.

The Special Investigation Committee on Administrative Cases of the

City ruled that respondent had no power to make appointments prior to
his oath taking on November 16, 1999. It found respondent guilty of
grave misconduct and recommended the penalty of 2 months
suspension. The Quezon City Council adopted the findings and
recommendations of the Committee. Laxina then appealed the case to
the RTC. A summary judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor
of respondent. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Is the re-taking of an oath of office by a duly proclaimed but
subsequently unseated local elective official a condition sine qua non
to the validity of his re-assumption in office? (In other words, is the re-
taking of the oath a requirement before Laxina could do his duties as
barangay captain?)

HELD:
NO.

In the case at bar, respondent was proclaimed as the winner in the

1997 Barangay Elections in Batasan Hills, Quezon City; he took his
oath on May 27, 1997 and thereafter assumed office. He is therefore
vested with all the rights to discharge the functions of his office. An
oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office; a
prerequisite to the full investiture with the office. It is only when the
public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his right to
enter into the position becomes plenary and complete. However, once
proclaimed and duly sworn in office, a public officer is entitled to
assume office and to exercise the functions thereof. When the
COMELEC nullified the trial court’s decision, the last actual peaceful
uncontested situation preceding the controversy was restored which
referred to the stage when Laxina was occupying the office of
Barangay Captain and discharging its functions. The retaking of his
oath of office was a mere formality.
EDWARD THOMAS F. JOSON, petitioner, vs. THE OFFICE OF THE 
OMBUDSMAN, GOV. AURELIO M. UMALI, ALEJANDRO R. ABESAMIS, 
EDILBERTO M. PANCHO, MA. CHRISTINA G. ROXAS, and FERDINAND R. 
ABESAMIS, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 210220­21. April 6, 2016.*

DOCTRINE:
All public officers and employees from the highest to the lowest rank are required to take an 
oath of office which marks their assumption to duty; Those who have rendered services with 
the government, without occupying a public office or without having been elected or 
appointed as a public officer evidenced by a written appointment and recorded with the 
Civil Service Commission (CSC), did so outside the concept of government service.—The 
Court notes that Ferdinand did not take an oath of office prior to his rendition of 
consultancy services for the Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija. All public officers and 
employees from the highest to the lowest rank are required to take an oath of office which 
marks their assumption to duty. It is well­settled that an oath of office is a qualifying 
requirement for public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office. Ferdinand 
was not required to take an oath of office because he rendered consultancy services for the 
provincial government not by virtue of an appointment or election to a specific public office 
or position but by a contractual engagement. In fine, those who have rendered services with
the government, without occupying a public office or without having been elected or 
appointed as a public officer evidenced by a written appointment and recorded with the 
Civil Service Commission, did so outside the concept of government service.

FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Thomas F. Joson (Joson) filed his Affidavit­Complaint,3 dated
April   21,   2008,   before   the   Ombudsman   charging   the   respondents   —   Governor
Aurelio M. Umali (Governor Umali), Provincial Administrator Atty. Alejandro R.
Abesamis   (Alejandro),   Consultant   Atty.   Ferdinand   R.   Abesamis   (Ferdinand),
Provincial   Treasurer   Edilberto   M.   Pancho   (Pancho),   and   Officer­in­Charge   Ma.
Cristina   G.   Roxas   (Roxas)   of   the   Office   of   the   Provincial   Accountant,   all   of   the
Province of Nueva Ecija, with the criminal offenses of Violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic   Act   (R.A.)   No.   3019,   otherwise   known   as   the   Anti­Graft   and   Corrupt
Practices Act, and Unlawful Appointment, defined and penalized under Article 244
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), docketed as OMB­L­C­08­0315­D, and offense of
Grave Misconduct, docketed as OMB­L­A­08­0245­D.
The   filing   of   the   above   charges   stemmed   from   the   alleged   appointment   of
Ferdinand as Consultant­Technical Assistant in the Office of the Governor of Nueva
Ecija.
In his affidavit­complaint, Joson alleged that on July 2, 2007, the Province of
Nueva Ecija, represented by Governor Umali, entered into a contract of consultancy
with   Ferdinand   wherein   the   latter   was   appointed   or   employed   as   Consultant­
Technical Assistant in the Office of the Governor. On February 28, 2008, Governor
Umali and Ferdinand entered into another contract of consultancy on February 28,
2008, wherein the former, representing the Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija,
again appointed or reemployed the latter in the same position. Joson asserted that
Governor   Umali   appointed   Ferdinand   despite   his   knowledge   of   the   latter’s
disqualification for appointment or reemployment in any government position. He
claimed that Ferdinand was dismissed from the service as Senior State Prosecutor
of   the   Department   of   Justice   for   “conduct   prejudicial   to   the   best   interest   of   the
service” pursuant to Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 14, dated August 27, 1998;
and that such penalty of dismissal carried with it his perpetual disqualification for
reemployment in the government service. According to Joson, because Ferdinand
was meted out the penalty of dismissal from service with all accessory penalties
attached   to   it   and   that   he   was   never   granted   any   executive   clemency,   his
appointment as legal consultant was unlawful, illegal and invalid being in violation
of   the   Administrative   Code   of   1987   and   the   Civil   Service   Law,   Rules   and
Regulations. Joson added that for the same reason as above, the twin contracts of
consultancy were likewise invalid and unlawful.
Joson further averred that the execution of the contract of consultancy, dated
February 28, 2008, was legally defective because its effectivity was made to retroact
to January 2, 2008 in violation of the rule that “[i]n no case shall an appointment
take   effect   earlier   than   the   date   of   its   issuance.”4 He   argued   that   because   no
consultancy contract existed from January 2, 2008 to February 28, 2008, Ferdinand
should not
have been paid any honorarium for his alleged services rendered during the said
period. With respect to the rest of the respondents, Joson asserted that they should
be held liable for the above charges considering that they processed the payment of
honoraria   to   Ferdinand   arising   out   of   the   illegal   and   invalid   contracts   of
consultancy.
Joson   also   contended   that   the   appointment   of   Ferdinand   as   consultant   by
Governor Umali in spite of being disqualified to hold public office, and the payment
of his  monthly  honorarium  from  the coffers  of  the  provincial  government  by  the
other respondents, were done with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, giving unwarranted benefit to Ferdinand and causing great
and irreparable damage and prejudice to the taxpayers of the Province of Nueva
Ecija. In view of this, Joson submitted that the private respondents should be made
liable   for   violation   of   Section   3(e)   of   R.A.   No.   3019.   Joson   added   that   Governor
Umali   should   also   be   held   liable   for   violation   of   Article   244   of   the   RPC   for
knowingly extending appointments to Ferdinand as legal consultant regardless of
the latter’s lack of legal qualification to the said position. Lastly, Joson asserted
that   Governor   Umali’s   act   of   illegally   and   unlawfully   hiring   the   services   of
Ferdinand could be reasonably viewed as gross misconduct in office because such
act involved the transgression of some established and definite rules.
In his Counter­Affidavit,5 Governor Umali responded that, the legal arguments
advanced by Joson in his affidavit­complaint were fatally defective and had no basis
in fact and in law. He averred that the consultancy services rendered by Ferdinand
could not be considered as government service within the contemplation of law and,
hence, not governed by the Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations. He pointed
out that under the twin contracts of consultancy, Ferdinand had been engaged to
render Jump sum consultancy services for a short duration of six (6) months on a
daily   basis   and   had   not   been   paid   any   salary   or   given   any   benefits   enjoyed   by
government employees such as PERA, COLA and RATA, but merely paid honoraria
as stipulated in the contracts.
 Governor Umali argued that if Ferdinand was indeed appointed or reemployed
by the provincial government, as erroneously perceived by Joson, then there would
be no need for him to execute the second consultancy contract which was merely a
renewal of his previous contract of July 2, 2007. He submitted that the consultancy
contracts   were   mere   agreements   to   render   service   and   could   not   in   themselves
create public office to which the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and other
Personnel   Actions   would   apply.   To   bolster   his   claim,   Governor   Umali   cited   the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Opinion No. 72, Series of
2004,   dated   August   23,   20046 and   DILG   Opinion   No.   100,   Series   of   2004,   dated
October   14,   2004,7 wherein   then   DILG   Secretary   Angelo   T.   Reyes   opined   that   a
consultancy service was not covered by the phrase “any office in the government.”
Governor Umali alleged that he could not be adjudged guilty of gross misconduct
because prior to his signing of the subject consultancy contracts, he sought the legal
opinion8 of the Provincial Legal Office which assured him that there was no legal
impediment in engaging the services of Ferdinand. He merely relied in good faith on
its   advice,   which   he   presumed   to   be   in   accordance   with   law   and   existing
jurisprudence.
Governor Umali averred that the true and actual date of the execution of the
second consultancy contract was January 2, 2008 as clearly shown by the effectivity
of the engagement of Ferdinand stated in paragraph 1 thereof. The said contract
was   a   renewal   of   the   earlier   contract,   dated   July   2,   2007,   which   expired   on
December 31, 2007. He explained that the date of execution of the second contract
was inadvertently left blank and the secretary of the notary public, Mary Grace
Cauzon, mistakenly stamped the date of the notarial act, February 28, 2008, on the
said blank space on the first page of the contract supposedly pertaining to its date of
execution.
Ferdinand, on the other hand, posited in his Counter­Affidavit, 9 dated June 16,
2008, that although his dismissal from government service was not yet final as his
motion for reconsideration had not yet been resolved by the Office of the President
at the time of his appointment, there was no way that his service contract with the
Provincial   Government   of   Nueva   Ecija   could   be   construed   as   to   create   a   public
office. He alleged that his engagements squarely fell within the ambit of contracts of
service/job   orders   under   Section   2(a),   Rule   XI   of   the   Civil   Service   Commission
Circular No. 40, Series of 1998. He insisted that he was not a government employee
and the specifics of his contracts were governed by the Commission on Audit (COA).
He adopted Governor Umali’s explanation anent the true date of execution of the
second consultancy contract.
In   their   Joint   Counter­Affidavit,10 Alejandro,   Pancho   and   Roxas   stressed   that
they committed no infraction of the law in affixing their respective signatures in the
obligation requests and disbursement vouchers which authorized the payment of
honoraria   in   favor   of   Ferdinand   for   the   consultancy   services   he   rendered.   They
explained that the signing of the obligation requests and disbursement vouchers
were done in the ordinary course of business and in the normal processing of the
said   documents.   They   added   that   the   charges   against   them   were   premature
considering that the payment of honoraria to Ferdinand had not yet been subjected
to post audit by the COA which had the sole authority and jurisdiction to suspend
or disallow disbursements of public funds.
On July 17, 2008, Joson filed his Reply­Affidavit 11 in amplification of his contentions
and arguments in his affidavit­complaint. He further argued that by entering in the
subject consultancy contracts, Ferdinand became a government employee and a 
public officer because he was holding a noncareer service position in accordance 
with Section 9, Chapter 2, Title I, Book V of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the 
Administrative Code of 1987).

ISSUE:
 G.R. No. 164978. October 13, 2005. *

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., EDGARDO J. ANGARA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
LUISA P. EJERCITO­ESTRADA, JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, PANFILO M. LACSON,
ALFREDO   S.   LIM,   JAMBY   A.S.   MADRIGAL,   and   SERGIO   R.   OSMEÑA   III,
petitioners, vs. EXEC.   SECRETARY   EDUARDO   R.   ERMITA,   FLORENCIO   B.
ABAD, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, JOSEPH H. DURANO,
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, ALBERTO G. ROMULO, RENE C. VILLA, and ARTHUR C.
YAP, respondents.

Doctrine:
Constitutional   Law; Appointments; Executive   Department;Congress; The   power   to
appoint  is essentially executive in nature,  and the legislature may not  interfere  with the
exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly
allows  it   to  interfere.—The   power  to  appoint   is   essentially   executive  in  nature,   and   the
legislature   may   not   interfere   with   the   exercise   of   this   executive   power   except   in   those
instances   when   the   Constitution   expressly   allows   it   to   interfere.   Limitations   on   the
executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the
legislature’s   interference   in   the   executive’s   power   to   appoint   is   limited   to   the   power   to
prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an
office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose
on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.

Same; Same; Commission on Appointments; Even if the Commission on Appointments
is   composed   of   members   of   Congress,   the   exercise   of   its   powers   is   executive   and   not
legislative.—Even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress,
the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments
does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential
appointments.   Thus:   x   x   x   The   Commission   on   Appointments   is   a   creature   of   the
Constitution.   Although   its   membership   is   confined   to   members   of   Congress,   said
Commission is independent of Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come from
Congress, but emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress.
In fact, the functions of the Commissioner are purely executive in nature. x x x
Same; Same; Same; Considering the independence of the Commission on Appointments
from Congress, it is error for petitioners to claim standing in the present case as members of
Congress.—Considering   the   independence   of   the   Commission   on   Appointments   from
Congress, it is error for petitioners to claim standing in the present case as members of
Congress. President Arroyo’s issuance of acting appointments while Congress is in session
impairs no power of Congress. Among the petitioners, only the following are members of the
Commission   on   Appointments   of   the   13th   Congress:   Senator   Enrile   as   Minority   Floor
Leader, Senator Lacson as Assistant Minority Floor Leader, and Senator Angara, Senator
Ejercito­Estrada,   and   Senator   Osmeña   as   members.   Thus,   on   the   impairment   of   the
prerogatives   of   members   of   the   Commission   on   Appointments,   only   Senators   Enrile,
Lacson, Angara, Ejercito­Estrada, and Osmeña have standing in the present petition. This
is in contrast to Senators Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal, who, though vigilant in
protecting their perceived prerogatives as members of Congress, possess no standing in the
present petition.
Same; Same; Same; Congress,   through   a   law,   cannot   impose   on   the   President   the
obligation   to   appoint   automatically   the   undersecretary   as   her   temporary   alter   ego.—The
essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop­gap
measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent
occupant   to   the   office.   In   case   of   vacancy   in   an   office   occupied   by   an alter   ego of   the
President,   such   as   the   office   of   a   department   secretary,   the   President   must   necessarily
appoint an alter
ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could 
assume office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to 
appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether 
temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the 
guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter
ego should be.
Same; Same; Same; Ad   interim   appointments   are   extended   only   during   recess   of
Congress   and   are   submitted   to   the   Commission   on   Appointments   for   confirmation   or
rejection, whereas appointments in an acting capacity may be extended any time there is a
vacancy and are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments.—In distinguishing ad
interim appointments from appointments in an acting capacity, a noted textbook writer on
constitutional   law   has   observed: Ad   interim appointments   must   be   distinguished   from
appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad
interimappointments   are   extended   only   during   a   recess   of   Congress,   whereas   acting
appointments   may   be   extended   any   time   there   is   a   vacancy.   Moreover ad
interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation
or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments.
Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they
can   also   be   a   way   of   circumventing   the   need   for   confirmation   by   the   Commission   on
Appointments.

FACTS:
While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their
respective departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint
against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make
such appointment without the consent of the Commission on Appointment; that,
in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292,
only the undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in
an acting capacity and not anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the
president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to
issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session.
Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary designation to an
officer in the civil service provided that the temporary designation shall not
exceed one year.
During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad
interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting
capacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.
HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself
provided the safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the
provision that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In this case,
in less than a year after the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the
Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim appointments – this also
proves that the president was in good faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president.
The choice is the president’s to make and the president normally appoints those
whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained to choose the
undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary
or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the
guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President
who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in
session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the
acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s
confidence. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but
practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be
the permanent appointee.
Anent the issue that GMA appointed “outsiders”, such is allowed. EO 292 also
provides that the president “may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of
an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an
acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the
President deems that person competent.