llllllSECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 139405. March 13, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ARTURO F.

PACIFICADOR, respondent.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution[1] dated February 3, 1999 of
the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) granting the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution[2] dated October 20, 1998 denying herein respondents Motion to Dismiss the
Information in Criminal Case No. 13044 and the Resolution[3] dated July 23, 1999 which denied
petitioners urgent motion for reconsideration.
On October 27, 1988, herein respondent, Arturo Pacificador y Fullon, and his erstwhile co-
accused, Jose T. Marcelo,[4] were charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of violation
of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, in an Information[5] that reads:
That on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, in
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said
accused, Arturo Pacificador, then Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard and
Steel Corporation, a government-owned corporation, and therefore, a public officer,
and Jose T. Marcelo, Jr., then President of the Philippine Smelters Corporation, a
private corporation, conspiring and confederating with one another and with other
individuals, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly, and with evident
bad faith promote, facilitate, effect and cause the sale, transfer and conveyance by the
National Shipyard and Steel Corporation of its ownership and all its titles, rights and
interests over parcels of land in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte where the Jose
Panganiban Smelting Plant is located including all the reclaimed and foreshore areas
of about 50 hectares to the Philippine Smelters Corporation by virtue of a contract, the
terms and conditions of which are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
Government as the consideration thereof is only P85,144.50 while the fair market
value thereof at that time was P862,150.00, thereby giving the Philippine Smelters
Corporation unwarranted benefits, advantages and profits and causing undue injury,
damage and prejudice to the government in the amount of P777,005.50.
After his arraignment, the respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information in Criminal
Case No. 13044 on July 15, 1998 on the following grounds:
 1) The court has no jurisdiction since the crime charged had been extinguished by prescription;
and
2) The information does not charge an offense in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in
the case of San Mauricio Mining Corporation, et al., vs. Hon. Constante A. Ancheta, et al.,
G.R. No. L-47859 and L-57132 dated July 10, 1981.
On August 21, 1998 the petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.
On November 10, 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the Motion to
Dismiss the Information ruling that:
The information in this case, dated October 19, 1988, was filed with the
Sandiganbayan on October 27, 1988 on which date the existing jurisprudence on
matters of prescription of the offense was the ruling enunciated in Francisco v. Court
of Appeals (May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 538) to the effect that the filing of the
complaint with the fiscals office also interrupts the period of prescription of the
offense.
The offense charged was allegedly committed from December 16, 1975 to January 6,
1976. The running of the period of prescription of the offense may have started on
January 6, 1976 but was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the appropriate
investigating body. In the case at bench, We find in the record no proof, or even an
allegation, of the precise date of filing of the complaint with the appropriate
investigating body which investigated this case,to enable us to determine with
certainty if the offense charged have (sic) indeed prescribed.
The second ground submitted by the accused-movant is precipitate at this stage of the
proceedings, as it involves a matter of defense.
Thereupon, on December 7, 1998, respondent Pacificador moved for the reconsideration of
the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his Motion to Dismiss, contending that:
1) The prosecution of the crime charged is time-barred by prescription as shown by facts and
circumstances on record and of judicial notice; and
2) It is not precipitate for the Honorable Court to consider the Supreme Court ruling in San
Mauricio Mining Co. vs. Hon. Constante A. Ancheta, et al., declaring the basic deed of sale
as not illegal and with justly adequate consideration.
On February 3, 1999, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its Resolution of November 10, 1998
and dismissed the Information in Criminal Case No. 139405 against the respondent on the
ground of prescription. It ruled thus:
In Our resolution denying accused Pacificadors Motion to Dismiss, We applied
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code and the doctrine laid down in Francisco vs. CA
(122 SCRA 538) to the effect that the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office or
investigating body interrupts the running of the period of prescription. This is where
We committed an oversight. Instead of applying Act No. 3326, as amended, xxx, We
utilized Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
In this case, as the offense involved is the violation of R.A. 3019, a special law, it
follows that in computing the prescriptive period of the offense, it is not the provision
contained in the Revised Penal Code that should govern but that of Act No. 3326. xxx
In Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr., (211 SCRA 277), the Supreme Court, in a clear language,
held that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 are judicial
proceedings and do not include administrative proceedings. xxx
The offense imputed on accused was allegedly committed from December 6, 1975 to
January 6, 1976. The offense prescribed on January 3, 1986, or ten years from January
6, 1976.
The Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the Sandiganbayan on
July 23, 1999.
Hence, the petition.
In its Brief,[6] the petitioner contends that, contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, the
provision of Act No. 3326[7] on prescription of offenses punishable under special laws is not
applicable to the instant criminal case for the reason that Republic Act No. 3019 provides for its
own prescriptive period. Section 11 thereof provides that offenses committed and punishable
under the said law shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. However, inasmuch as Republic Act No.
3019 does not state exactly when the fifteen-year prescriptive period begins to run, Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code should be applied suppletorily.[8] Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
which adopts the discovery rule for the prescription of offenses, provides:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.- The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago.
Petitioner also contends that the crime, subject of this case should be deemed as discovered
only on May 13, 1987 when a complaint was filed with the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) by the then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez. Hence, the filing of the
information on October 27, 1988 with the Sandiganbayan was well within the prescriptive
period.
Additionally, petitioner contends that the ordinary principles of prescription do not apply in
this case for the reason that the respondent effectively concealed his criminal acts which
prevented the discovery of the offense until May 13, 1987. Even on the assumption that the
registration of the Deed of Sale was on December 29, 1975 when that document was executed by
the parties, and thus, amounted to a constructive notice to the whole world of the existence of the
said Deed of Sale, the registration thereof could not have given notice of fraudulent acts of the
parties to the sale. The situation prevailing at that time, that is, during the authoritarian regime of
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, did not permit the investigative and prosecuting arms of the
government to institute complaints against him, his wife and his cronies.
In his Comment,[9] respondent Arturo Pacificador argued that Act No. 3326 governs the
prescription of offenses punishable under special laws; that the registration of the Deed of Sale in
question is the correct reckoning or starting point for prescription inasmuch as the fact of
registration of said Deed of Sale in effect gave notice to the whole world not only of its existence
but also of all the facts contained therein; that, aside from the ground of prescription, the
Information in Criminal Case No. 13044 should be dismissed on the ground that it does not
charge an offense inasmuch as the issue of whether or not the contract of sale was
disadvantageous to the government had long been settled in the case of San Mauricio Mining Co.
v. Hon. Constante A. Ancheta, et al.,[10] and that the dismissal of the criminal case against him by
the Sandiganbayan on the ground of prescription is tantamount to acquittal which bars
prosecution of the respondent for the same offense under Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
It has been settled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the computation of prescription of
offenses defined and penalized by special laws. In the case of People v. Sandiganbayan,[11] this
Court ruled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 was correctly applied by the anti-graft court in
determining the reckoning period for prescription in a case involving the crime of violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. In the fairly recent case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,[12] we categorically ruled that:
Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive
period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription should begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. (Emphasis ours)
The prescription shall be interrupted when the proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons
not constituting double jeopardy.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive
period shall commence to run on the day it was committed.
It can be gleaned from the Information in this case that respondent Pacificador allegedly
committed the crime charged on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to
January 6, 1976. Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, provides that the
offenses committed under the said statute shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. It appears
however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which
was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said
statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided
in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the
reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the accused (herein private
respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence, the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986
or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976.
The petitioner, however, vehemently denies having any knowledge of the crime at the time
it was allegedly committed by the respondent. It claims that the crime charged in the Information
should be deemed as discovered only on May 13, 1987 when the then Solicitor General,
Francisco Chavez, filed a complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) against the respondent, for violation of the provision of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We are not convinced. This Court takes notice of the fact that the subject Deed of Sale dated
December 29, 1975 relative to the sale of the parcels of land by the National Steel Corporation to
the Philippine Smelters Corporation, was registered shortly thereafter in the Registry of Deeds of
the Province of Camarines Norte. Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title No. 0440 in the
name of the National Steel Corporation was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 13060 was issued in the name of the vendee Philippine Smelters Corporation. On
February 28, 1977, the Philippine Smelters Corporation even filed an action for quieting of title
with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, docketed therein as Civil Case No.
2882,[13] which case forms the basis for the Sandiganbayan to deduce that the subject Deed of
Sale may be deemed registered on the said date, at the latest.[14]
While petitioner may not have knowledge of the alleged crime at the time of its commission,
the registration of the subject Deed of Sale with the Registry of Deeds constitutes constructive
notice thereof to the whole world inlcuding the petitioner. Well entrenched is the jurisprudential
rule that registration of deeds in the public real estate registry is a notice thereof to the whole
world. The registration is a constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and
equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it
contains.[15] Hence, even if the period of prescription is reckoned from February 28, 1977, the
crime had already prescribed when the Information in this case was filed with the Sandiganbayan
on October 27, 1988.
It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the interpretation of the law on
prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted.[16] The said
legal principle takes into account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes which is an act
of amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender. In the case of People v.
Moran,[17] this Court amply discussed the nature of the statute of limitations in criminal cases, as
follows:
The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty,
declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that the offender shall
be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from
henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are
blotted out. Hence, it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the
defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and
grace, but because the very existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the
legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to
it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.
 The instant case should be distinguished from the cases of People v.
Duque[18] and Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto[19] wherein we upheld the view that the prescriptive period started to run only upon the
discovery of the illegal nature of the acts constituting the offense. The first case involves the
crime of illegal recruitment where the accused, Napoleon Duque, was found to have
misrepresented himself to several job applicants as a registered employment agent duly
recognized by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). Due to the said
misrepresentation of the accused, the applicable prescriptive period began to run not from the
time of recruitment of job applicants by the accused but from the time his recruitment activities
were ascertained by the complainants and the POEA to have been carried out without any license
or authority from the government. The second, or Desierto case, which was decided by this
Court on October 25, 1999, involves the grant of alleged behest loans by certain government-
owned and controlled financial institutions to several individuals and corporations closely
associated with the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his relatives. It was alleged that the
public officials concerned, who were charged in the corresponding Informations, connived or
conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans in covering up the anomalous transactions. Under
the circumstances, it was impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the
violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made. The prescriptive
period started to run only upon discovery of the alleged illegality of the transactions after the
investigations thereon were conducted.
In the case at bar, the petitioner contends that respondent concealed his criminal acts that
effectively prevented discovery thereof. The records of this case do not specifically show how
the respondent allegedly employed acts that could prevent the discovery of any illegality in the
transaction other than the bare assertion of the petitioner. There is also no allegation that the
government officials involved in the transactions connived or conspired with respondent
Pacificador. The said government officials were not even charged in the instant Information. On
the other hand, it was never disputed by the petitioner that the subject Deed of Sale was duly
registered with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Camarines Norte and that the
corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13060 was subsequently issued to the vendee,
Philippine Smelters Corporation.[20]
In view of the foregoing, we do not find it necessary to discuss the other points raised by the
respondent in his Comment as additional grounds for the denial of the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

[1]
Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 23-28. (Penned by Justice Minita Chico-Nazario and conurred in by Associate
Justices Edilberto Sandoval and Ma. Cristina Cortez-Estrada).
[2]
Petition, Annex O, Rollo, pp. 76-81.
[3]
Petition, Annex B, Rollo, pp. 29-34.
[4]
Accused Jose T. Marcelo was discharged from the information pursuant to the Immunity Agreement with the
Government dated January 30, 1991 which was approved by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated April
10, 1991.
[5]
Petition, Annex M, Rollo, pp. 61-63.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 8-21.
[7]
Entitled: An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide when Prescription Shall Begin to Run.
[8]
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code Provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to
such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 107-116.
[10]
105 SCRA 371 (1981).
[11]
211 SCRA 241, 246 (1992).
[12]
317 SCRA 272, 296 (1999).
[13]
San Mauricio Mining Corporation v. Ancheta, supra, pp. 376-377.
[14]
Petition, Annex B, supra, p. 31.
[15]
People v. Reyes, 175 SCRA 597, 604 (1989) citing Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915); Garcia v.
Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 380 (1980), Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Pauli, et al., 161 SCRA
634 (1988).
[16]
People v. Parel, 44 Phil. 437, 445 (1923); People v. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. 725, 728 (1956).
[17]
44 Phil. 389, 405 (1923).
[18]
212 SCRA 607 (1992).

sc.judiciary.gov.ph

Synopsis/Syllabi

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 130140. October 25, 1999]

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS represented by MAGTANGGOL C.

GUNIGUNDO, PCGG Chairman and ORLANDO C. SALVADOR, as Consultant, Technical Working Group of
the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, petitioners, vs. HON. ANIANO A.
DESIERTO as Ombudsman; JOSE Z. OSIAS; PACIFICO E. MARCOS; EDUARDO V. ROMUALDEZ; FERNANDO
C. ORDOVEZA; and JUANITO ORDOVEZA, Members of the Board of Directors of Philippine Seeds, Inc.;
CONCERNED MEMBERS OF THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

The core issue in this special civil action for certiorari is whether public respondent Ombudsman Aniano
A. Desierto (hereafter OMBUDSMAN) committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the offenses
with which the other respondents were charged in OMB-0-96-0968 had already prescribed.

This case originated as G.R. No. 129763, the docket number given to the Motion for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Review filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).[1] The
motion was granted. However, what was filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, with the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
(hereafter COMMITTEE) as petitioner. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 130140. Accordingly, G.R.
No. 129763 is now deemed functus officio.

Initially, the Court dismissed the petition in this case on technical grounds. But, upon petitioners motion
for reconsideration, the petition was reinstated, and the respondents were required to comment on the
petition.

In its Manifestation (In Lieu of Comment),[2] the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) manifested
that it would rel[y] on the evaluation and exercise of the discretionary power conferred on Petitioner in
the prosecution of the instant petition.

In its Manifestation and Motion[3] of 16 February 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
informed the Court that it could not represent the OMBUDSMAN for the following reasons: (a) the
Solicitor General is the Vice-Chairman of petitioner COMMITTEE; (b) being an agency of the
Government, the COMMITTEE is entitled to be represented by the OSG; and (c) the petition was signed
by Associate Solicitor Salvador C. Guevarra, who is presently on detail with the PCGG, and by
Commissioner Herminio A. Mendoza of the PCGG, which is also a client of the OSG. The Court then
required the OMBUDSMAN to file his own comment, which he did on 11 June 1998.[4]

Copies of the resolution requiring comment on the petition sent to the other respondents were
returned to sender because the said respondents had MOVED. Since the challenged resolution and
order of the OMBUDSMAN were issued before said other respondents were even required to submit
their counter-affidavits, impleading them in this case is not necessary; hence, this case can be resolved
without their inclusion as respondents.

As culled from the initiatory pleadings and MEMORANDA of the COMMITTEE and the OMBUDSMAN, the
undisputed facts are as follows:

On 8 October 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13, creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, with the Chairman of the PCGG as
Chairman; the Solicitor General as Vice Chairman; and one representative each from the Office of the
Executive Secretary, Department of Finance, Department of Justice, Development Bank of the
Philippines, Philippine National Bank, Asset Privatization Trust, Government Corporate Counsel, and the
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation as members. The Committee was directed to
perform the following functions:

1. Inventory all behest loans; identify the lenders and borrowers, including the principal officers and
stockholders of the borrowing firms, as well as the persons responsible for granting the loans or who
influenced the grant thereof;

2. Identify the borrowers who were granted friendly waivers, as well as the government officials who
granted these waivers; determine the validity of these waivers.

3. Determine the courses of action that the government should take to recover those loans, and to
recommend appropriate actions to the Office of the President within sixty (60) days from the date
hereof.

On 9 November 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 directing the COMMITTEE to
include in its investigation, inventory, and study all non-performing loans which shall embrace both
behest and non-behest loans. It likewise provided for the following criteria which might be utilized as a
frame of reference in determining a behest loan, to wit:

a. It is undercollateralized.

b. The borrower corporation is undercapitalized.

c. Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes.

d. Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies.

e. Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended.

f. Use of corporate layering.

g. Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought.

h. Extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made.

xxx

Moreover, a behest loan may be distinguished from a non-behest loan in that while both may involve
civil liability for non-payment or non-recovery, the former may likewise entail criminal liability.

In its FOURTEENTH (14TH) REPORT ON BEHEST LOANS to President Ramos, dated 15 July 1993,[5] the
COMMITTEE reported that the Philippine Seeds, Inc., (hereafter PSI) of which the respondents in OMB-
0-96-0968 were the Directors, was one of the twenty-one corporations which obtained behest loans.

In his instructions handwritten on the cover of the aforementioned Report, President Ramos directed
COMMITTEE Chairman Magtanggol C. Gunigundo to, inter alia, proceed with administrative and judicial
actions against the twenty-one firms (out of 21) in this batch with positive findings ASAP.[6]
On 2 March 1996, the COMMITTEE through Orlando O. Salvador, the PCGG consultant detailed with the
COMMITTEE, filed with the OMBUDSMAN a sworn complaint[7] against the Directors of PSI namely, Jose
Z. Osias, Pacifico E. Marcos, Eduardo V. Romualdez, Fernando C. Ordoveza, and Juanito Ordoveza; and
the Directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines who approved the loans for violation of
paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, which read:

Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

...

e. Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.

...

g. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

The complaint, later docketed as OMB-0-96-0968, alleged as follows:

4. The evidence submitted to us show that:

a) Philippine Seeds, Inc. (PSI) obtained its initial loan guarantee on April 17, 1969 under B/R 2805 (Annex
1, Evidence 3) with an aggregate amount of $3,452,535. or P13,568,463. (P3.93 to $1) . . . .

Based on the foregoing DBP approved Guarantee Loans, PSI still had a collateral deficiency of
P5,444,432, and likewise DBP infused the amount of P3,824,911 as against the corporations paid-up
capital of P2,225,000 only.

b) Subsequent loans/guarantees were extended by DBP for the benefit and/or advantage of PSI under
the following Board Resolutions:

1) B/R 3353 dated August 13, 1975 (Annex 2, Evidence 4) for the following purposes:

(a) DBP to extend a loan of P215,000 at 12% interest per annum for repairs & rehabilitation of the PSI
plant within a period of four (4) months from the full release of the amount.

(b) DBP to extend a short term of P6 million at 12% interest per annum for its working capital.

(c) DBP to assume PSI loans with commercial banks.

(d) DBP to restructure PSI existing obligations if after 6 months of trial period, operations proved
profitable and viable.

(e) DDBP to suspend foreclosure for 10 months.

2) B/R 883 series 1978, (Annex 3, Evidence 9) DBP Board approved a P2.9 million loan for the following
purposes:

(a) P1.9 million to liquidate PSIs obligation with other creditors.

(b) P1.0 million to finance PSIs special projects.

(c) DBP initiated PSI foreclosures starting March 1975 but it was not implemented by virtue of then
President Marcos marginal notes dated April 1975 (Annex 4, Evidence 6) and June 1995 (Annex 5,
Evidence 7).

(d) Pacifico Marcos and Eduardo Romualdez, relatives of the late President Marcos, were the principal
stockholders and officers of the subject firm.

5. As a private entity, Philippine Seeds, Inc., did not deserve the concessions given it without sufficient
collateral for the loan and adequate capital to ensure not only the viability of its operations but its ability
to repay all its loans.

In the resolution[8] dated 14 May 1996 and approved on 9 June 1996, the OMBUDSMAN dismissed the
complaint in OMB-0-96-0968 on the ground of prescription. Relying on People v. Dinsay,[9] a case
decided by the Court of Appeals, he ratiocinated that since the questioned transactions were evidenced
by public instruments and were thus open for the perusal of the public, the prescriptive period
commenced to run from the time of the commission of the crime, not from the discovery thereof.
Reckoning the prescriptive period from 1969, 1970, 1975, and 1978, when the disputed transactions
were entered into, the OMBUDSMAN ruled that the offenses with which respondents were charged had
already prescribed.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the OMBUDSMAN in the Order[10] of 19 May
1997, the COMMITTEE filed this case raising this sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN
HOLDING THAT THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD IN THIS CASE SHOULD BE COUNTED FROM THE DATE OF THE
GRANT OF THE BEHEST LOANS INVOLVED, AND NOT FROM THE DATE OF DISCOVERY OF THE SAME BY
THE COMMITTEE.

The COMMITTEE argues that the right of the Republic of the Philippines to recover behest loans as ill-
gotten wealth is imprescriptible pursuant to the mandate of Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution,
which provides:

The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from
them or from their nominees as transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
Behest loans are part of the ill-gotten wealth which former President Marcos and his cronies
accumulated and which the Government through the PCGG seeks to recover. Besides, even assuming ex
gratia that the right to file criminal charges against the respondents is prescriptible, the prescriptive
period should be counted from the discovery of the crimes charged, and not from the date of their
commission. The ruling in Dinsay is not applicable to the case at bar. First, it is a decision of the Court of
Appeals; hence, it does not establish a doctrine and can only have a persuasive value. Second, it
involved a prosecution for estafa in that the accused disposed of his property claiming that it was free
from any lien or encumbrance despite the fact that a notice of lis pendens was registered with the
Registry of Deeds. The sale, cancellation of the accuseds title, and issuance of a new title to the buyer
could not have been concealed from the offended parties or their lawyers because these transactions
took place when the civil case involving the said property and the offended parties was in progress.
Third, Dinsay involved private parties, while the instant case involves the Government and public
officers. Fourth, the ruling is not absolute, since no less than this Court in People vs. Monteiro[11] said:

[T]he period of prescription for the offense of failure to register with the SSS shall begin from the day of
the discovery of the violation if this was not shown at the time of its commission. A contrary view would
be dangerous as the successful concealment of an offense during the period fixed for its prescription
would be the very means by which the offender may escape punishment. (Emphasis supplied)

Also, in People v. Duque,[12] which involved a prosecution for illegal recruitment under Article 38 of the
Labor Code, this Court held:

Even if it be assumed arguendo that ordinary prudence required that a person seeking overseas
employment ought to check the authority or status of persons pretending to be authorized or to speak
for a recruitment or placement agency, the offended parties failure to do so did not start the running of
the prescriptive period. In the nature of things, acts made criminal by special laws are frequently not
immoral or obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason, the applicable statute requires that if the
violation of the special law is not known at that time, the prescription begins to run only from the
discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts. (Emphasis
supplied)

Finally, the COMMITTEE asserts that even assuming that the discovery rule does not apply, still, because
of the principle of equitable tolling, prescription has not yet set in for the offenses with which
respondents in OMB-0-96-0960 were charged. This principle is based on the doctrine contra non
valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio, i.e., no prescription shall run against a person unable to bring
an action. The COMMITTEE was unable to bring the action, for the cause therefor was not known or
reasonably known to it owing to the fact that (1) the loans, being behest, were concealed; (2) both
parties to the loan transactions were in conspiracy to perpetrate the fraud against the State; and (3) the
loans were granted at the time then President Marcos was at the threshold of his authority when no one
dared question, much less investigate, any of his orders.

The OMBUDSMAN takes a different view. For one, he asserts that Section 15 of Article XI of the
Constitution is not applicable, since what the COMMITTEE seeks in OMB-0-96-0968 is not to recover the
unlawfully acquired wealth from the respondents therein but to hold them criminally liable for violation
of R.A. No. 3019. The dismissal of the case is not a bar to the institution of forfeiture proceedings against
the concerned former government officials and cronies.

For another, the OMBUDSMAN insists that the offenses with which the respondents were charged had
already prescribed. As a matter of fact it prescribed in ten years pursuant to the original provision of
Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, which fixed the prescriptive period at ten years. B.P. Blg. 195, which
increased the prescriptive period to fifteen years, became effective only on 16 March 1982 and cannot
be given retroactive effect; hence, the offenses which might have arisen from the grant of the assailed
loans in 1969, 1975 and 1978 prescribed in 1979, 1985 and 1988, respectively.

The OMBUDSMAN points to Section 2 of Act No. 3326, which governs prescription of crimes under
special laws and which reads as follows:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof . . .

According to him, the computation of the prescriptive period from the date of discovery would only be
resorted to if the commission of the crime be not known at the day of the commission. The phrase if the
same be not known does not mean lack of actual knowledge, but that the crime is not reasonably
knowable by reason of the nature of the crime or the environmental circumstances thereof. In the case
filed by the COMMITTEE, the crimes alleged to have been committed were reasonably knowable
because the transactions were never conducted clandestinely ... [but] carried out in the open, leaving a
trail of public instruments/documents accessible and susceptible to evaluation. Moreover, as can be
drawn from the allegation in the COMMITTEEs complaint that the DBP initiated PSI foreclosures starting
March 1975, the corresponding mortgages were executed and registered. Hence, the doctrine laid down
in Dinsay is applicable. Likewise, in People v. Sandiganbayan,[13] this Court ruled that the prescriptive
period for the violation of R.A. No. 3019, which was allegedly committed by Paredes by misrepresenting
in an application for land patent that the subject land was disposable, started to run from the date of
the filing of the application. Yet, in said case the falsity of Paredes representation regarding the
disposability of the land was not capable of being drawn from the application alone; nevertheless, this
Court was not deterred from holding that prescription started to run from the filing of the application.

Finally, the OMBUDSMAN maintains that any confidential relationship between the former strongman
and the respondents DBP officials ceased altogether after the February 1986 EDSA revolution. Even
assuming then that the running of the 10-year period of prescription was suspended by reason of the
said confidential relationship, the same re-started in February 1986 and went on to lapse in February
1996. However, the complaint of the COMMITTEE in OMB-0-96-0968 was filed only on 2 March 1996.

We agree with the OMBUDSMAN that Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution applies only to civil
actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases, such as the complaint against the
respondents in OMB-0-96-0968. This is clear from the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission of
1986.
What is now Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution was originally Section 13 of the proposed Article
on Accountability of Public Officers in Committee Report No. 17 submitted to the Constitutional
Commission by its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers,[14] viz:

The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees shall not
be barred by prescription.

At the plenary session, Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., succeeded in having that Section amended.
Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE. Would the proponent accept some amendments?

MR MAAMBONG. Gladly.

MR. DAVIDE. The amendment of Section 13 will consist of the following: On line 25, after the word
employees, add the following: OR THEIR CO-PRINCIPALS, ACCOMPLICES OR ACCESSORIES OR TO
PROSECUTE OFFENSES IN CONNECTION THEREWITH; then on line 25, after the word prescription, add a
comma (,) and the words LACHES OR ESTOPPEL. So the entire Section 13 will read as follows: The right of
the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees OR THEIR CO-
PRINCIPALS, ACCOMPLICES OR ACCESSORIES OR TO PROSECUTE OFFENSES IN CONNECTION THEREWITH
shall not be barred by prescription, LACHES OR ESTOPPEL.

...

MR. DAVIDE. I would like to insist on my proposal for the plain and simple reason that the republic act
on forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth would cover only the civil aspect. As a matter of fact, any prosecution
for the criminal aspect of that will have to be taken under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. That
is why it is necessary to include here, specifically, the criminal action and the imprescriptibility of the
criminal action. Besides, what is stated in the law on ill-gotten wealth and recovery thereof would refer
to prescription or statute of limitations. We know for a fact that there are two other concepts in Civil
Law.We have laches and estoppel. Laches, for instance, is a concept entirely different from prescription.
While an action may not prescribe, it may be barred by laches and while an action may not prescribe or
may not be barred by laches, it may also be a limitation because of estoppel. So, if we really want to
strengthen this particular concept, we should be very specific in having it related to both criminal and
civil actions. In addition to prescription, we should also include laches and estoppel.

...

THE PRESIDENT. Is it accepted by the Committee?

MR. NOLLEDO. After consultations, the Committee is happy to announce that we are accepting the
amendment.

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Madam President; I also thank the members of the Committee.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved.[15]
(Emphasis supplied).

As shown, the amendment made the provision applicable as well to criminal actions arising from,
relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth.

However, on motion for reconsideration by Commissioner Christian Monsod, who explained that the
intention of the Committee was to limit the proposed Section 13 to civil actions, and without objection
on the part of Commissioner Davide, the motion for reconsideration was granted. As a consequence, the
amendment of Commissioner Davide regarding the applicability of the Section to criminal actions was
deleted. After further proceedings the Section was further amended by the insertion of the phrase from
them or from their transferees. Thus:

MR. BENGZON. There is just one loose thread hanging in the Article on Accountability of Public Officers
and I would like to get this out of the way. May I suggest that Commissioner Monsod be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. de los Reyes). Commissioner Monsod is recognized.

MR. MONSOD. We circulated to the Commissioners a memorandum that was unanimously endorsed by
the members of the committee, except for one member who [was] absent. In this memorandum, we
suggested the deletion of a phrase which we consider redundant in the context of the intent of the
committee.We wanted to ask the body for any comment it may have on it because we feel we do not
need to reopen the article if the body agrees with us that it is not a substantial change, but a change to
reflect the intention of the body and the committee on this matter.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). On what article is that, Commissioner Monsod?

MR. MONSOD. It is on the Article on Accountability of Public Officers which was circulated a couple of
days ago.

On Section 13, lines 7 and 8, we propose to delete the phrase or to prosecute offenses in connection
therewith. The committee considers this phrase redundant with its intent on the recovery of property
illegally acquired. The action contemplated by the committee is a civil action. However, since
jurisprudence considers such action for recovery as partaking of a criminal action, we believe that it is
not necessary to mention or to prosecute offenses in connection therewith. Hence, we ask the body if
there is any objection to delete that phrase.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). Commissioner Monsod, what is the phrase sought to be
deleted?

MR. MONSOD. The phrase or to prosecute offenses in connection therewith.

...

MR. MONSOD. May we ask Commissioner Davide, the proponent of some of these amendments, on this
article?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes) Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

After deeper reflection on the consequences of the amendments which I introduced and which are now
sought to be deleted, and taking into account the massive consensus of opinions on the part of the
committee which is now seeking for its reconsideration, I would have no objection to it. However, there
is a point to be taken up and I understand that Commissioner Regalado has also a point to take up on
this.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). Commissioner Regalado is recognized.

MR. REGALADO. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I move for the deletion of the phrase co-principals, accomplices or accessories, because what is
contemplated in that amendment is a civil action. The phrase co-principals, accomplices and accessories
is proper only in a criminal action. So, I have asked the committee to delete those words.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). So, how will the section now read?

MR. MONSOD. The section as amended by deletion will now read: Sec. 13. The right of the State to
recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees shall not be barred by
prescription, laches or estoppel.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). So for the information of the Members of the Commission,
what phrases are deleted?

MR. MONSOD. The phrases that are deleted are as follows: or to prosecute offenses in connection
therewith and or their co-principals, accomplices or accessories.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). So, in effect, the Commissioner is asking for a
reconsideration.

MR. MONSOD. It has been suggested that that would be appropriate in order to make sure that this is
properly regularized.

RECONSIDERATION OF APPROVAL

OF PROPOSED RESOLUTION NO. 456

(Article on the Accountability of Public Officers)

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). As many as are in favor of reconsidering Section 13, please
raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hand.)

As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand).

The results show 27 votes in favor and 1 against; the reconsideration is approved.[16]
Commissioner Monsod is again recognized.

MR MONSOD. I propose that we delete the phrases: or their co-principals, accomplices or accessories
and or to prosecute offenses in connection therewith. So, the entire article will now read: The right of
the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees shall not be barred
by prescription, laches or estoppel.

...

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). Is there any objection to the amendment of Commissioner
Monsod?

Commissioner Azcuna is recognized.

MR AZCUNA. Mr. Presiding Officer, the phrase co-principals, accomplices and accessories refers to
criminal cases. So I propose to insert the phrase OR THEIR TRANSFEREES IN BAD FAITH in order to be
able to recover these properties even from transferees of the public officers if they are done in bad
faith. Hence, the amended section will read: The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully
acquired by public officials or employees OR THEIR TRANSFEREES IN BAD FAITH.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). What does Commissioner Monsod say?

MR. MONSOD. We have no objection to that, but I understand there is a comment on this matter.

...

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). Commissioner Monsod is recognized.

MR MONSOD. In order to clarify the intent of the amendment, we suggest that the amendment be
stated this way: FROM THEM OR FROM THEIR TRANSFEREES. So, the entire section will read: The right of
the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees FROM THEM OR
FROM THEIR TRANSFEREES shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). Commissioner Azcuna is recognized.

MR AZCUNA. I accept the amendment.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). Commissioner Maambong is recognized.

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I recall I presented an amendment precisely on this provision. I
gave way to Commissioner Davide at that time because the imprescriptibility provision was supposed to
cover both criminal and civil actions. I just want to clarify this from Commissioner Monsod or from
Commissioner Davide if in the present formulation, what is covered is only imprescriptibility of civil
action and not of criminal action. Commissioner Davide can probably answer that.

MR. MONSOD. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). Commissioner Monsod is recognized.

MR. MONSOD. Yes, it is just the imprescriptibility of the civil action.

MR. MAAMBONG. If only civil action, it does not cover imprescriptibility of criminal action.

MR. MONSOD. Yes, that is right.

MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). Is the Commission now prepared to vote on the issue?

MR. RAMA. Yes.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. de los Reyes). Is there any objection to the amendment of Commissioner
Monsod? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved.[17] (Emphasis supplied).

Then, on motion of the Committee on Style, the Section 13 which became Section 15, was approved;
thus:

MR. RODRIGO. In Section 15, we inserted: FROM THEM OR FROM THEIR NOMINEES OR TRANSFEREES
and we deleted co-principals, accomplices or accessories or to prosecute offenses in connection
therewith. So, Section 15 reads: The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by
public officials or employees, FROM THEM OR FROM THEIR NOMINEES OR TRANSFEREES shall not be
barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.

I move for its approval.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Is there any objection? (Silence). The Chair hears none; the
amendment is approved.[18]

The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or
incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution may
be barred by prescription.

Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2
of Act No. 3326,[19] as amended, which provides:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence
to run on the day it was committed.

In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the
violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the
public officials concerned connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, we agree with
the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-
0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the
day of such commission.

The assertion by the OMBUDSMAN that the phrase if the same be not known in Section 2 of Act No.
3326 does not mean lack of knowledge but that the crime is not reasonably knowable is unacceptable,
as it provides an interpretation that defeats or negates the intent of the law, which is written in a clear
and unambiguous language and thus provides no room for interpretation but only application.

The OMBUDSMANs reliance on Dinsay is misplaced. The estafa committed by the accused was known to
the offended party from the very start; hence, it could even be said that the commission and the
discovery of the offense were simultaneous.[20] Neither is People v. Sandiganbayan[21] of any help to
OMBUDSMAN. We ruled therein that the prescriptive period commenced to run from the filing of the
application for the following reasons:

The theory of the prosecution that the prescriptive period should not commence upon the filing of
Paredes application because no one could have known about it except Paredes and Lands Inspector
Luison, is not correct for, as the Sandiganbayan pointedly observed: it is not only the Lands Inspector
who passes upon the disposability of public land x x x other public officials pass upon the application for
a free patent including the location of the land and, therefore, the disposable character thereof (p. 30,
Rollo). Indeed, practically all the department personnel, who had a hand in processing and approving
the application, namely: (1) the lands inspector who inspected the land to ascertain its location and
occupancy; (2) the surveyor who prepared its technical description; (3) the regional director who
assessed the application and determined the land classification; (4) the Director of Lands who prepared
the free patent; and (5) the Department Secretary who signed it, could... have helped discovering that
the subject of the application was non disposable public agricultural land.

There was no showing that Paredes had connived with all the department personnel, who had a hand in
processing and approving the application of Paredes. Consequently, such personnel could have easily
discovered the falsity in Paredes claim and denounced it. It would have been entirely different if the
public officials concerned conspired with him, in which case, they would have hidden the misdeed to
escape culpability.

People v. Duque[22] is more in point, and what was stated there stands reiteration: In the nature of
things, acts made criminal by special laws are frequently not immoral or obviously criminal in
themselves; for this reason, the applicable statute requires that if the violation of the special law is not
known at the time, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the
unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
In the case at bar the OMBUDSMAN forthwith dismissed the complaint in Case No. OMB-0-96-0968
without even requiring the respondents to submit their counter-affidavits and solely on the basis of the
dates the alleged behest loans were granted, or the dates of the commission of the alleged offense was
committed.

Since the computation of the prescriptive period for the filing of the criminal action should commence
from the discovery of the offense, the OMBUDSMAN clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing outright Case No. OMB-0-96-0968. It should have first received the evidence from the
complainant and the respondents to resolve the case on its merits and on the issue of the date of
discovery of the offense.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition, and SETTING
ASIDE the resolution of 14 May 1996 and the Order of 19 May 1997 of the public respondent
OMBUDSMAN in Case No. OMB-0-96-0968.

The OMBUDSMAN is hereby directed to proceed with the preliminary investigation of the case OMB-0-
96-0968 taking into account the foregoing disquisitions.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Melo, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.

Puno, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.

Vitug, J., see concurring opinion.

Bellosillo, J., joins J. Melo in his concurring and dissenting opinion.

Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., joins J. Puno in his concurring and dissenting opinion.

[1] Rollo, G.R. No. 129763, 2-3.

[2] Rollo, G.R. No. 130140, 170-171. Henceforth, references to rollo shall mean the rollo in this case.

[3] Id., 186-188.

[4] Rollo, 203-214.

[5] Annex F of Petition: Rollo, 40, et seq.

[6] Id., 40.

[7] Annex G of Petition; Rollo, 78-81.

[8] Annex C of Petition; Rollo, 55-58. This was signed by Atty. Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde, Graft
Investigation Officer II; recommended for approval by Angel C. Mayoralgo, Jr., Director of the Evaluation
and Preliminary Investigation Bureau; and reviewed by Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., Asst. Ombudsman, PACPO,
OIC, EIO.

[9] C.A., 40 O.G., 12th Supp., 50

[10] Annex A of Petition; Rollo, 24-26.

[11] 192 SCRA 548 [1990].

[12] 212 SCRA 607 [1992].

[13] 211 SCRA 243 [1992].

[14] 2 Record of the Constitutional Commission, 263-264.

[15] 2 Record of the Constitutional Commission, 346-348.

[16] 4 Record of the Constitutional Commission, 40-41.

[17] 4 Record of the Constitutional Commission, 41-44.

[18] 5 Record of the Constitutional Commission, 801-802.

[19] Entitled An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run.

[20] People v. Monteiro, supra note 11, at 553.

[21] Supra note 13, at 246-247.

[22] Supra note 12, at 613-614.

Jadewell Parking vs. Lidua

Facts:
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate
and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized
under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle... immobile by placing its wheels in a
clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan and
Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on
May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang,... Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe
dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure
with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and [left]
unattended at a Loading and Unloading
Zone.
Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan alleged in
their affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein respondents
Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2)
John Does forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933,
belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then considered illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed
parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell... personnel.
Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997.
Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia,... Jeffrey Walan, and
three (3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-
Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003.
A preliminary investigation took place on May
28, 2003.
Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell president... with Usurpation of
Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.
respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. He admitted that he removed the
clamp restricting the wheel of his car since he alleged that the placing... of a clamp on the wheel of the
vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp not to steal it but to remove the
vehicle from its clamp so that he and his family could continue using the car.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City
dated July 25, 2003, stating:
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to
Quash and dismissed the cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10, 2004
Order[11] to argue among other points that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the period of prescription
of offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. While it may be true that the
Informations in these cases have been... filed only on October 2, 2003, the private complainant has,
however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well within the prescribed period
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on one of the ground [sic] for
the motion to quash, which is that the criminal action has been extinguished on grounds of prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged violations of City
Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R.
No. 102342, July 3, 1992, En Banc).
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act
No. 3326 or "AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR
VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE
WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN"
Petitioner contended further that:
[the] filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of
the criminal information before this Honorable Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not
the criminal action in these cases had... prescribed.
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor
stopped the running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses charged have not
prescribed.
In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge
Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held that, since
cases of city ordinance violations may only be commenced by the... filing of an Information, then the two-
month prescription period may only be interrupted by the filing of Informations (for violation of City
Ordinance 003-2000) against the respondents in court. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7,
ruled in favor of the... respondents and upheld the respondent judge's Order dated February 10, 2004 and
the Resolution dated April 16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial
Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.
Issues:
The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations on the following
grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state
facts... that charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one
offense.
The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged
against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."
Ruling:
The Petition is denied.
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural rules
governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as
amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for... the violation of special laws
and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does
not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,[27] this Court defined the parameters of prescription:
[I]n resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the
period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3)
the time the prescriptive period was... interrupted.[28] (Citation omitted)
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from
the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or... information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to him.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the
prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was
correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly
in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree
that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting... a preliminary investigation if he
wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the
prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the... date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had
already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal
of the case against respondents.

Francisco vs. CA
FACTS:

Pablo Francisco was accused of multiple grave oral defamation by his employees. The Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati sentenced him of prision correccional in its minimum period in each crime committed on each date of each
case. Francisco then elevated the case to the RTC in which they sentenced him only of eight straight months for
appreciating mitigating circumstances.

Francisco failed to make an appeal on the RTC’s decision making it final. The MTC issued a warrant of arrest, but
before Francisco was to be arrested, he filed an application for probation which the MTC denied. He went to the Court
of Appeals on certiorari which was also denied.

ISSUE: Whether Pablo Francisco is still qualified to avail of probation.

RULING:

No. Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation. First, Francisco violated Sec.4 of the Probation Law in which no
application for probation shall be entertained after the judgement is final.

Second, Francisco misunderstood when he thought that his prison sentence held by the MTC was not qualified for
probation. Multiple prison terms should not be added up. Consequently, Francisco lost his right to probation when he
appealed the MTC decision to the RTC. The law considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.

Third, Francisco’s appeal to the RTC was not for reducing his penalties but for his assertion of his innocence. The
Probation Law prevent opportunism when petitioners apply for probation when their appeal was dismissed.

Lastly, the application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law.

G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008

Michael Padua, petitioner
vs. People of the Philippines, respondent
Ponente: Quisumbing

Facts:

June 16, 2003, Padua and Edgar Ubalde were charged before the RTC Pasig of
violation of R.A. No. 9165 [Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs act of 2002] for
selling dangerous drugs. When arraigned, Padua assisted by counsel de officio
entered a plea of not guilty. During the pre-trial, Padua’s counsel de
officio manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not
guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail the benefits granted to 1 st time
offenders. The prosecutor interposed no objection, thus the not guilty plea
was withdrawn, Padua re-arraigned and pleaded guilty.

Padua then filed a petition for probation alleging that he is a minor and a
1st time offender, and that he possess all qualifications and none of the
disqualifications of the probation law. RTC ordered for the post-sentenced
investigation and recommendation and comment of the probation office and the
city prosecutor relatively.

Pasana, the chief probation and parole officer recommended Padua to be placed
on probation. However, Judge Reyes-Carpio issued an order denying the
 petition for probation on the ground that under R.A. No. 9165, any person
convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation Law.

Padua filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. He filed
for a petition for certiorari, but the CA dismissed his petition.

Issue: Whether Padua can avail the benefits of the Probation Law.

Held:
(1) CA did not err in dismissing Padua’s petition for certiorari. The
requisites for the certiorari must occur: (1) the writ is directed against a
tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

“Without jurisdiction” means that the court acted with absolute lack of
authority. There is “excess of jurisdiction” when the court transcends its
power or acts without any statutory authority. “Grave abuse of discretion”
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

(2) Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the
penalty imposed, can not avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law
or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when
the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning
must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken
to mean exactly what it says. If a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba
legis. It is expressed in the maxim,index animi sermo, or speech is the
index of intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

(3) Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the “Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006” was violated. Nor can he argue that Section
32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the “Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law” has application in this case. Section 68 of Rep. Act
No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of
sentence and not probation.

Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could no
longer be considered a child for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus,
the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his
case is concerned.

Bala vs Martinez
260 Phil. 488

SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner by this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order seeks the reversal of the order dated
April 2, 1984 of the then Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC),
of Manila, Branch XX.[1] The decretal portion of the assailed order reads:
WHEREFORE, for the reasons above-stated, the motion to dismiss and/or
strike out motion to revoke probation, filed by Manuel Bala, thru counsel,
should be, as it is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit.
Let the motion be set for continuation of hearing on April 25 & 27, at 8:30
o'clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner had been indicted for removing and substituting the picture
of Maria Eloisa Criss Diazen which had been attached to her United States
of America passport, with that of Florencia Notarte, in effect falsifying a
genuine public or official document. On January 3, 1978, the trial court
adjudged petitioner Manuel Bala in Criminal Case No. 24443, guilty of the
crime of falsification of a public document. The dispositive portion of the
judgment states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
Manuel Bala y Valdellon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
falsification of a public or official document defined and penalized under
article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of not less than ONE (1) YEAR AND
ONE (1) DAY and not exceeding THREE (3) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS &
TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS of prision correcional, to pay a fine of P1,800.00
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of P8.00 for
each day, and to pay the cost. He shall be credited with the period of
preventive imprisonment that he may have undergone in accordance with
law.
The petitioner seasonably appealed, but the Court of Appeals, on April 9,
1980, affirmed in toto the lower court's decision.
After the case had been remanded to the court of origin for execution of
judgment,[2] the petitioner applied for and was granted probation by the
respondent judge in his order dated August 11, 1982. The petitioner was
then placed under probation for a period of one (1) year, subject to the
terms and conditions enumerated therein.
On September 23, 1982, the probationer (petitioner) asked his supervising
probation officer for permission to transfer his residence from BF Homes to
Phil-Am Life Subdivision in Las Piñas, specifically 33 Jingco Street. The
probation officer verbally granted the probationer's request as he found
nothing objectionable to it.
By the terms of the petitioner's probation, it should have expired on August
10, 1983,[3] one year after the order granting the same was issued. But, the
order of final discharge could not be issued because the respondent
probation officer had not yet submitted his final report on the conduct of
his charge.
On December 8, 1983, respondent People of the Philippines, through
Assistant City Fiscal Jose D. Cajucom of Manila, filed a motion to revoke
the probation of the petitioner before Branch XX of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, presided over by the respondent judge.[4] The
motion alleged that the petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of
his probation.
On January 4, 1984, the petitioner filed his opposition to the motion on the
ground that he was no longer under probation,[5] his probation period
having terminated on August 10, 1983, as previously adverted to. As such,
no valid reason existed to revoke the same, he contended.
As if to confirm the Manila Assistant City Fiscal's motion to revoke the
petitioner's probation, the respondent probation officer filed on January 6,
1984, a motion to terminate Manuel Bala's probation, at the same time
attaching his progress report on supervision dated January 5, 1984.[6] The
same motion, however, became the subject of a "Manifestation," dated
January 30, 1984, which stated that the probation officer was not pursuing
the motion to terminate dated January 6, 1984; instead, he was submitting
a supplemental report[7] which recommended the revocation of probation
"in the light of new facts, information, and evidences."
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and/or strike out the
motion to revoke probation, questioning the jurisdiction of the court over
his case inasmuch as his probation period had already expired. Moreover,
his change or residence automatically transferred the venue of the case
from the RTC of Manila to the Executive Judge or the RTC of Makati which
latter court includes under its jurisdiction the Municipality of Las Piñas, the
probationer's place of residence, invoking Section 13, P.D. No. 968, which
provides:
Sec. 13. Control and Supervision of Probationer. x x x
Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place under the
jurisdiction of another court, control over him shall be transferred to the
Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of that place, and in such a
case, a copy of the probation order, the investigation report and other
pertinent records shall be furnished to said Executive Judge. Thereafter,
the Executive Judge to whom jurisdiction over the probationer is
transferred shall have the power with respect to him that was previously
possessed by the court which granted the probation.
As stated at the outset, the respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss
for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
The present law on probation, Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1990, which
amends section 4 of P.D. 968, clearly states that "no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction."
However, in the case at bar, P.D. 1990 is inapplicable. P.D. 1990 which
went in force on January 15, 1985 can not be given retroactive effect
because it would be prejudicial to the accused.
It is worthy to note, that what was actually resolved and denied was the
motion to dismiss and/or strike out the motion to revoke probation which
disposed of only the issue of the petitioner's transfer of residence. The
motion did not touch on the issue of the timeliness to revoke probation. The
respondent judge has not yet heard and received evidence, much less acted
on the matter. Accordingly, the Solicitor General submits that the present
petition is premature.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
Probation is revocable before the final discharge of the probationer by the
court, contrary to the petitioner's submission.
Section 16 of PD 968[8] is clear on this score:
Sec. 16. Termination of Probation. After the period of probation and upon
consideration of the report and recommendation of the probation officer,
the court may order the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that
he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon the
case is deemed terminated.
Thus, the expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically
terminate probation. Nowhere is the ipso facto termination of probation
found in the provisions of the probation law. Probation is not co-terminous
with its period. There must first be issued by the court of an order of final
discharge based on the report and recommendation of the probation
officer. Only from such issuance can the case of the probationer be deemed
terminated.
The period of probation may either be shortened or made longer, but not to
exceed the period set in the law. This is so because the period of probation,
like the period of incarceration, is deemed the appropriate period for the
rehabilitation of the probationer. In the instant case, a review of the records
compels a revocation or the probation without the need of further
proceedings in the trial court which, after all, would only be an exercise in
futility. If we render justice now, why should we allow the petitioner to
further delay it. Probationer Manuel Bala failed to reunite with responsible
society. Precisely he was granted probation an order to give him a chance to
return to the main stream, to give him hope hope for self-respect and a
better life. Unfortunately, he has continued to shun the straight and narrow
path. He thus wrecked his chance. He has not reformed.
A major role is played by the probation officer in the release of the
probationer because he (probation officer) is in the best position to report
all information relative to the conduct and mental and physical condition of
the probationer in his environment, and the existing institutional and
community resources that he may avail himself of when necessary. Indeed,
it is the probation officer who primarily undertakes the supervision and
reform of the probationer through a personalized, individualized, and
community-based rehabilitation program for a specific period of time. On
the basis of his final report, the court can determine whether or not the
probationer may be released from probation.
We find it reprehensible that the respondent probation officer had
neglected to submit his report and recommendation. For, as earlier
discussed, without this report, the trial court could not issue the order of
final discharge of the probationer. And it is this order of final discharge
which would restore the probationer's suspended civil rights. In the
absence of the order of final discharge, the probation would still subsist,
unless otherwise revoked for cause and that is precisely what we are going
to do. We are revoking his probation for cause.
The petitioner, by applying for probation and getting it, consented to be
emancipated from the yoke if not stigma of a prison sentence, pledging to
faithfully comply with the conditions of his probation, among which are:
 xxx
4. To be gainfully employed and be a productive member of society;
xxx
6. To cooperate fully with his program of supervision and rehabilitation
that will be prescribed by the Probation Officer."[9]
These conditions, as the records show, were not complied with. This non-
compliance has defeated the very purposes of the probation law, to wit:
(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing
him with individualized treatment;
(b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which
might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and
(c) prevent the commission of offenses.[10]
By his actuations, probationer-petitioner Manuel V. Bala has ridiculed the
probation program. Instead of utilizing his temporary liberty to rehabilitate
and reintegrate himself as a productive, law abiding, and socially
responsible member of society, he continued in his wayward ways falsifying
public or official documents.
Specifically, on April 30, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch XXX, convicted the petitioner, along with
two other persons, Lorenzo Rolo y Punzalan and Efren Faderanga y
Fesalbon, for falsification of public and/or official documents (U.S.
Passports), under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, of the Revised Penal
Code, in five separate informations, in Criminal Cases Nos. 29100, 29101,
29102, 29103, and 29107. The trial court imposed upon each of them in all
five (5) cases a prison term of "two (2) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to four (4) years also of prision correccional, as maximum, to
pay a fine of P2,000, the accessory penalties thereof, and to pay the costs."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the RTC with
modification by granting restitution of the amounts they collected from the
offended private parties. The judgment has since become final. As a matter
of fact, for failure of the petitioner to appear for execution of judgment
despite notice, the trial court ordered the arrest of Manuel Bala on July 10,
1989. A warrant of arrest against Bala was issued on July 12, 1989 and this
warrant has not yet been implemented because Bala absconded. These facts
are evident and constitute violations of the conditions of his probation.
Thus, the revocation of his probation is compelling.
At any time during probation, the court may issue a warrant for the arrest
of a probationer for violation of any of the conditions of probation. The
probationer, once arrested and detained, shall immediately be brought
before the court for a hearing which may be informal and summary, of the
violation charged. x x x If the violation is established, the court may revoke
or continue his probation and modify the conditions thereof. If revoked, the
court shall order the probationer to serve the sentence originally
imposed. An order revoking the grant of probation or modifying the terms
and conditions thereof shall not be appealable.[11]
(Emphasis supplied.)
The probation having been revoked, it is imperative that the probationer be
arrested so that he can serve the sentence originally imposed. The
expiration of the probation period of one year is of no moment, there being
no order of final discharge as yet, as we stressed earlier. Neither can there
be a deduction of the one year probation period from the penalty of one
year and one day to three years, six months, and twenty-one days of
imprisonment because an order placing the defendant on "probation" is not
a "sentence," but is in effect a suspensionof the imposition of the
sentence.[12] It is not a final judgment but an "interlocutory judgment" in
the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the
supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final
judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with,
or by a final judgment if the conditions are violated."[13]
Lastly, probation is a mere privilege. Privilege is a peculiar benefit or
immunity conferred by law on a person or group of persons, not enjoyed by
others or by all; special enjoyment of a good or exemption from an evil; it is
a special prerogative granted by law to some persons.[14] Accordingly, the
grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court. This
discretion is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society,
and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.[15] If the probationer
has proven to be unrepentant, as in the case of the petitioner, the State is
not barred from revoking such a privilege. Otherwise, the seriousness of the
offense is lessened if probation is not revoked.
On the second assigned error, the petitioner argues that his transfer of
residence automatically transferred jurisdiction over his probation from the
Manila Regional Trial Court to the same court in his new address.
We disagree.
In criminal cases, venue is an element of jurisdiction.[16] Such being the
case, the Manila RTC would not be deprived of its jurisdiction over the
probation case. To uphold the petitioner's contention would mean a
depreciation of the Manila court's power to grant probation in the first
place. It is to be remembered that when the petitioner-accused applied for
probation in the then CFI of Manila, he was a resident of Las Piñas, as he is
up to now, although in a different subdivision. As pointed out earlier, he
merely moved from BF Homes to Philam Life Subdivision, 33 Jingco
Street, also in Las Piñas.[17] On the other hand, pursuing the petitioner's
argument on this score to the limits of its logic would mean that his
probation was null and void in the first place, because then the Manila CFI
was without jurisdiction to grant him probation as he was a resident of Las
Piñas.
It is therefore incorrect to assume that the petitioner's change of abode
compels change of venue, and necessarily, control over the petitioner, to the
Executive Judge of the RTC of his new residence. Thus, in the
apportionment of the regional trial courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Las Piñas is
one among the municipalities included in the National Capital Judicial
Region (Metro Manila) with a seat at Makati.[18] Needless to say, the
Regional Trial Court in Makati, like the Manila Regional Trial Court, forms
part of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Region.[19] Accordingly, the various branches of the regional trial courts of
Makati or Manila under the National Capital Region, are coordinate and co-
equal courts, the totality of which is only one Regional Trial Court.
Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. In other words, the
case does not attach to the branch or judge.[20] Therefore, in this case, RTC
Branch XX of Manila, which granted the probation, has not lost control and
supervision over the probation of the petitioner.
The petitioner also claims that he had verbally obtained permission to
transfer residence from his probation officer. This would not suffice; the
law is very explicit in its requirement of a prior court approval in writing
Section 10 of PD 968 categorically decrees that the probationer must
***
(j) reside at premises approved by it (court) and not to change his residence
without its prior written approval;
***
Further, such written approval is required by the[21] probation order of
August 11, 1982 as one of the conditions of probation, to wit:
(3) To reside in BF Homes, Las Piñas and not to change said address nor
leave the territorial jurisdiction of Metro Manila for more than twenty-four
(24) hours without first securing prior written approval of his Probation
Officer.
In the light of all the foregoing and in the interest of the expeditious
administration of justice, we revoke the probation of the petitioner for
violations of the conditions of his probation, instead of remanding the case
to the trial court and having the parties start all over again in needless
protracted proceedings.[22]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the probation of the
petitioner is hereby REVOKED. Further, the trial court is ORDERED to
issue a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner and for him to serve
the sentence originally imposed without any deduction. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

[1] Judge Antonio M. Martinez, presiding.

[2] Rollo, 3.
[3] Id., 8.
[4] Id., 156.
[5] Id., 156.
[6] Id., 127.
[7] Id., 89.
[8] P.D. 968 (1976), Section 8.
[9] Order, Crim. Case No. 24443, dated August 11, 1982, rollo, 24.
[10] P.D. No. 968, sec. 2.
[11] Id., sec. 15.
[12] Baclayon v. Mutia, G.R. No. 59298, April 30, 1984, 129 SCRA 148.
[13] Supra, 154.
[14] WORDS AND PHRASES, Vol. 33, p. 734.
[15] Tolentino v. Alconcel, G.R. No. 63400, March 18, 1983, 121 SCRA 92.
[16] Ragpala v. Tubod, G.R. No. 15375, 109 Phil. 373.
[17] Rollo, 29.
[18] BP 129, sections 13 and 14.
[19] Id., section 13.
Bacalso vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, October 26, 1967, 21 SCRA
[20]

519, 524.
[21] Rollo, 137.
Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. C.A., G.R. No. L-37783, January 28,
[22]

1988, 157 SCRA 357.

G.R. No. 188191 March 12, 2014

ENRIQUE ALMERO y ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MIRASOL BARTOLOME, CLARITA P. MATIAS, ROSENDO P. MATIAS, and
ANTONIO P. MATIAS, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by Enrique Almero y Alcantara from
the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 26 September 2008 and Resolution dated 29 May 2009 in CA-G.R.
SP. No. 103030.1
THE MTC RULING IN CRIMINAL CASE No. 96-6531
Petitioner is the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-6531 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and multiple
physical injuries. After private respondents reserved the right to institute a separate action for damages, trial ensued.
On 8 January 2007, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Labo, Camarines Norte found petitioner guilty and sentenced
him to suffer prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Petitioner filed an Application for Probation on 7 September 2007, reasoning that he was informed of his conviction
only upon being served the warrant for his arrest.2 Prosecutor Analie Velarde opposed his application on the ground
that he was known to be uncooperative, habitually absent, and had even neglected to inform the court of his change
of address. On 22 February 2007, the MTC denied his application, prompting petitioner to file a special civil action
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). While his first Petition raised the sole issue of the denial of his application for
probation, he filed a Supplemental Petition,3 which a) assailed the validity of the promulgation of the 8 January 2007
judgment; and b) impleaded private complainants Mirasol Bartolome, Clarita P. Matias, Rosendo P. Matias and
Antonio P. Matias.
THE RTC RULING IN SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 07-0012
In his supplemental Petition, petitioner stated that upon close scrutiny, he discovered that the judgment itself was
premature and flawed, because the MTC never ruled upon his Formal Offer of Exhibits.4 The RTC found that the MTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering judgment without first ruling on his Formal Offer of Exhibits since,
technically, petitioner had not yet rested his case. It also ruled that the promulgation of judgment was similarly tainted
with grave abuse of discretion, because petitioner was not present at the time, in violation of Section 6, Rule 120 of
the Rules of Court. Without addressing the issue of probation, the dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The judgment
promulgated on 22 February, 2007 is hereby SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED and the case is remanded to the
Municipal Trial Court of Labo, Camarines Norte for further proceedings.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City or any person acting in his behalf to release immediately
petitioner ENRIQUE ALMERO Y ALCANTARA from detention by virtue of the property bond posted by him for his
provisional liberty in Criminal Case No. 96-6531, unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause or causes.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.5
THE CA RULING
The CA ruled that the RTC should have confined itself to determining whether or not the MTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for probation. Since no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law is available against the denial of probation, a Rule 65 petition is clearly the
appropriate remedy. However, the trial court erred in taking cognizance of supplemental grounds assailing the
judgment of conviction, because an application for probation is a waiver of the right to appeal from the judgment of
conviction and effectively renders the same final. The CA ruled that even assuming petitioner failed to be present at
the promulgation of judgment, he had no one but himself to blame for failing to inform the MTC of his change of
address.6
On the argument that private respondents possessed no legal personality to represent the State in a criminal case,
the CA held that petitioner himself impleaded them in the certiorari petition before the RTC. The CA also found that
petitioner filed his application for probation only on 7 September 2007, or more than one month after he received
notice of the judgment of conviction. Inasmuch as the grant of probation rests solely on the discretion of the court, the
denial thereof cannot be considered grave abuse, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the trial court’s appealed January 28, 2008 Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered ordering the DISMISSAL of appellee’s petition for certiorari. 7
Petitioner comes before this Court, assigning the following errors:
I. The Court of Appeals committed an error of law in ruling that private complainants have personality to
appeal the 28 January 2008 Decision of the RTC.
II. The Court of Appeals committed an error of law in ruling that the RTC reversibly erred in nullifying
petitioner’s judgment of conviction.
III. The Court of Appeals committed an error of law in ruling that petitioner is not entitled to probation. 8
OUR RULING
The Petition lacks merit.
Anent the first issue, petitioner argues that in criminal cases, the offended party is the State, and that private
complainants’ interest is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Petitioner's application for probation purportedly
did not involve the civil aspect of the case. Heirs of the Late Francisco Abueg v. Court of Appeals cited by the CA
allegedly cannot apply, since it does not even discuss the right of private complainants to interpose an appeal.
In the Comment9 it filed, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) reiterated that what petitioner filed with the RTC
was a petition for certiorari, which is a special civil action. It cannot be considered an appeal in a criminal case over
which only the State has an interest, but an appeal in a civil action from which private persons can appeal in the
event of an adverse outcome. Private respondents, in their Comment,10 argued that the CA correctly applied Abueg,
which is on all fours with the present case. In Abueg, the accused was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property for crashing against and killing Francisco Abueg. Instead of filing an appeal, the
accused applied for probation. After the CA affirmed the grant of probation, the Supreme Court entertained and acted
upon the petition for certiorari filed by the victims’ heirs. 11
We agree with the submission of the respondents. While the present petition originated from a criminal proceeding,
what petitioner filed with the RTC was a special civil action, in which he himself impleaded private respondents. He
cannot now belatedly change his stance to the prejudice of private respondents, who would otherwise be deprived of
recourse in a civil action they did not initiate. In any case, this Court has consistently ruled that private parties may be
clothed with sufficient personality if the facts show that the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and if
the issues in the action could be determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner.
In Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz,12 citing People v. Calo, Jr.,13 the Supreme Court ruled:
While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or the State in criminal proceeding pending in this Court and
the Court of Appeals, the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and the issues in this action could be
determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition at bar. As an offended party
in a criminal case, private petitioner has sufficient personality and a valid grievance against Judge Adao’s order
granting bail to the alleged murderers of his (private petitioner’s) father.14 (Citations omitted.)
Furthermore, in Paredes v. Gopengco, it was held that parties in criminal cases have sufficient personality as
"person(s) aggrieved" to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in
line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the rules, to wit:
Furthermore, as offended parties in the pending criminal case before petitioner judge, it cannot be gainsaid that
respondents have sufficient interest and personality as ‘person(s) aggrieved’ by petitioner judge’s ruling on his non-
disqualification to file the special civil action under sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65. Recently in line with the underlying
spirit of a liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object, as against the literal application of
Rule 110, section 2, we held, overruling the implication of an earlier case, that a widow possesses the right as an
offended party to file a criminal complaint for the murder of her deceased husband. 15
Petitioner’s second and third arguments are brought by an erroneous understanding of the nature of probation and
shall be discussed jointly.
Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred by the State, and may be
granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of
the court. It is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the
accused.16
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects appeals and
encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the state of time, effort and
expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction
before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on
the result of his appeal — that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal… he now applies for probation as an
"escape hatch" thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction. 17
Aside from the goals of according expediency and liberality to the accused, the rationale for the treatment of appeal
and probation as mutually exclusive remedies is that they rest on diametrically opposed legal positions. An accused
applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the judgment. The application for probation is an admission of
guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led to the judgment of conviction.18 This was the reason why the
Probation Law was amended: precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction – even
if the sentence is probationable – for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for the probation only if the
accused fails in his bid.19
Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment, or apply for
probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. 20 While he did not file an appeal before
applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the
denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to
make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
The assignment of errors in the Petition before us reflects the diametrically opposed positions taken by accused
petitioner. On the one hand, he bewails the defects committed by the trial court during the promulgation of the
judgment, thus casting doubt on the judgment itself. Yet in the same breath, he persists in his application for
probation, despite the waiver and admission of guilt implicit in any procedure for probation – precisely the unhealthy
wager the law seeks to prevent.
Petitioner applied for probation beyond the reglementary period, yet the trial court still allowed the filing before
ultimately denying it for lack of merit. Regarding this delay and the other defects imputed by petitioner to the RTC, we
concur with the findings of the CA:
(W)e find that public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying appellee’s application for
probation. Granted that appellee had not received the notice of the January 8, 2007 decision rendered in Criminal
Case No. 06-6531, it appears from the record that appellee had no one but himself to blame for the procedural
quagmire he subsequently found himself in. In denying appellee’s motion for reconsideration of the September 18,
2007 denial of the application for probation, public respondent distinctly ruled as follows:
x x x. (T)he application has been filed out of time as accused himself admitted in the motion. He blames Atty. Evan
1âwphi1

D. Dizon, his former counsel, for not notifying the court of his change of address but Atty. Dizon himself had been
trying to contact accused since 2001 even before he filed his formal offer of evidence since all notices sent to the
accused’s given address have been returned to this court since 2001. If it is true that he moved to Cavite only in
2003, why were said notices returned with notations ‘unknown,’ ‘unclaimed,’ or ‘moved’? 21
This Court will not countenance pleas for liberality in adverse outcomes caused by the negligence and evasiveness of
the parties themselves.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision
and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 103030 dated 26 September 2008 and 29 May 2009 are hereby AFFIRMED,
respectively.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 31-46 Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and concurred in by Associate
Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Ricardo R. Rosario.
2
Id. at 33.
3
Id. at 67; Dated 28 December 2007.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 64-70; Penned by Presiding Judge Erwin Virgilio P. Ferrer and dated 28 January 2008.
6
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, sec. 6, par. 3 and 4 states: "The proper clerk of court shall give notice to
the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the
promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from
prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address.
"In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite
notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and
serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or through his counsel."
7
Rollo, p. 45.
8
Id. at 17.
9
Id. at 118-131.
10
Id. at 104-117.
11
G.R. No. 96803, 17 February 1993, 219 SCRA 78.
12
385 Phil. 208 (2000).
 13
264 Phil. 1007 (1990).
14
Supra note 12 at 222.
15
Paredes v. Gopengco, 140 Phil. 81 (1969).

G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). Hazing was pre-
requisite in joining for which Lenny was one of few who had undergone the process. After the initiation,
Lenny’s condition worsened due to the blows he received, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital.
Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35 Aquilans. Four of the accused
(Tecson, et. al.) were found to be guilty of homicide by the trial court but was reduced to crime of slight
physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor by the Court of Appeals. However, upon
appeal to the Supreme Court by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Supreme Court ruled that they
should be liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide instead.

In Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, Tecson et. al. clarified the effect of the decision of the
Supreme Court to their criminal liability. According to Tecson et. al., they immediately applied for
probation after the CA rendered its Decision lowering their criminal liability from the crime of homicide,
which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical injuries, which carries a probationable
sentence. Hence, they have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against
them closed and terminated by virtue of their granted Applications for Probation for which the terms
therein are already been complied with.

ISSUE:
Whether Tecson et. al. can be covered by the Probation Law despite their appeal of conviction?

HELD:

Yes. First, the Court in resolving this issue ruled that the RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the
probation applications of Tecson et. al. for the law requires that an application for probation be filed
with the trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of origin (Branch
121). Hence, its grant of probation with Tecson et. al. is void.

However, the Court abandoning its previous stance on ineligibility of those who have appealed their
conviction to probation, citing the then recent case of Colinares vs. People that the Probation Law never
intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. Had the RTC done what was
right and imposed the correct penalty, he would have had the right to apply for probation. Moreover,
the Court was quick to clarify that it remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction,
when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.

G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 154954
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL
ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO
RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI,
VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO
SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG,
JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 155101
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and
ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa due to fraternity hazing.
While there is nothing new in the arguments raised by the parties in their respective Motions for Clarification or
Reconsideration, we find a few remaining matters needing to be clarified and resobed. Sorne oJ' these matters
include the effect of our Decision on the finality of the Court of Appeals judgments insofar as respondents Antonio
Mariano A!meda (Almeda), June] Anthony D. Arna (Arna), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
are concerned; the question of who are eligible to seek probation; and the issue of the validity of the probation
proceedings and the concomitant orders of a court that allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.
Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed by petitioners People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa (Villa); and by respondents
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.) concerning the Decision of this Court dated 1
February 2012.1 The Court modified the assailed judgments2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520
and found respondents Fidelito Dizon (Dizon), Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The modification had the effect of lowering the criminal
liability of Dizon from the crime of homicide, while aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al. from slight physical
injuries. The CA Decision itself had modified the Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch
121 finding all of the accused therein guilty of the crime of homicide. 3
Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate but related case docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153
and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Manuel
Escalona II (Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
on the ground that their right to speedy trial was violated. Reproduced below is the dispositive portion of our
Decision:5
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is
hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 – finding Antonio Mariano
Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries – is
also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama,
Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused
are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 50,000,
and moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from
the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction. Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed
Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R.
No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and
TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for
possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence
of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the
applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding the present case: 6
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their
intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel
"Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy,
Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the
lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to
the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites.
The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation
rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in
Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the Aquilans. As soon
as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the
Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan
"initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel
rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit
on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran
over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the
Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being
hit with fist blows on their arms or withknee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round,"
in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the
neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to present comic plays and to
play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever
they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived
the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were
subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation
for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal
(Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially
refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members,
including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain.
Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes
heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny
could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was
officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially,
1avvphi1

Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though,
that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped
him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital.
Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
 17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried. On the other hand, the trial
against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that
had to be resolved first.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal
Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.
On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal
Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation.
Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants– Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman,
Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and
Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were acquitted,as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and
Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuriesand sentenced to
20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱30,000
as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito Dizonand Artemio Villareal– were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision
mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs
of Lenny Villa in the sum of ₱50,000 and to pay the additional amount of ₱1,000,000 by way of moral
damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused Concepcion on
the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005,
the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. On 25
October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed the
criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought before this Court.
(Citations omitted)
Motion for Partial Reconsideration
filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration 7 in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
(Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case
against Escalona, Ramos,Saruca, and Adriano (collectively, Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and
Resolution.8 Villa reiterates her previous arguments that the right to speedy trial of the accused was not violated,
since they had failed to assert that right within a reasonable period of time. She stresses that, unlike their co-accused
Reynaldo Concepcion, respondents Escalona et al.did not timely invoke their right to speedy trial during the time that
the original records and pieces of evidence were unavailable. She again emphasizes that the prosecution cannot be
faulted entirely for the lapse of 12 years from the arraignment until the initial trial, as there were a number of incidents
attributable to the accused themselves that caused the delay of the proceedings. She then insists that we apply the
balancing test in determining whether the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated.
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration9 of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither the felonious intent
to kill (animus interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure (animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it concedes that the
mode in which the accused committed the crime was through fault (culpa). However, it contends that the penalty
imposed should have been equivalent to that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal
Code. It argues that the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to the accused was so gross
that it shattered the fine distinction between dolo and culpaby considering the act as one committed with malicious
intent. It maintains that the accused conducted the initiation rites in such a malevolent and merciless manner that it
clearly endangered the lives of the initiates and was thus equivalent to malice aforethought.
With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts that their acquittal may also be reversed
despite the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed
Decision (CA-G.R. No. 15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et al. should have been similarly convicted like their
other co-accused Dizon, Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since the former also participated in the hazing of Lenny
Villa, and their actions contributed to his death.
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.
Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals). They essentially seek a clarification as to the effect of our Decision insofar as their criminal liability and
service of sentence are concerned. According to respondents, they immediately applied for probation after the CA
rendered its Decision (CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal liability from the crime of homicide, which carries a
non-probationable sentence, to slight physical injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et al.contend
that, as a result, they have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against them closed
and terminated. This outcome was supposedly by virtue of their Applications for Probation on various dates in
January 200211 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known as the Probation Law. They
argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already granted their respective Applications
for Probation on 11 October 200212 and, upon their completion of the terms and conditions thereof, discharged them
from probation and declared the criminal case against them terminated on various dates in April 2003. 13
To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified true copies of their respective Applications for Probation and
the RTC Orders granting these applications, discharging them from probation, and declaring the criminal case against
them terminated. Thus, they maintain that the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 had already lapsed into finality, insofar
as they were concerned, whenthey waived their right to appeal and applied for probation.
ISSUES
I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation of their right to speedy trial
II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded to that for intentional felonies
III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their probation discharged them
from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases against them DISCUSSION
Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and legal assertions raised by petitioner Villa in
her Motion for Partial Reconsideration concerning G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 have already been thoroughly
considered and passed uponin our deliberations, which led to our Decision dated 1 February 2012. We emphasize
that in light of the finding of violation of the right of Escalona et al. to speedy trial, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal
case against them amounted to an acquittal,15 and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a
violation of their right against double jeopardy.16 Though we have recognized that the acquittal of the accused may be
challenged where there has been a grave abuse of discretion,17 certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that
the CA’s Decision dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed judgment constitutes "a patent and gross abuse of discretion
amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or toact in
contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or
a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense
justice."18 Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated
the facts and the evidence.19
We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioner’s arguments and found no basis to
rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion in concluding that the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated.
Its findings were sufficiently supported by the records of the case and grounded in law. Thus, we deny the motion of
petitioner Villa with finality.
Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG with respect to G.R. Nos. 155101
(Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). Many of the arguments raised therein are essentially a
mere rehash of the earlier grounds alleged in its original Petition for Certiorari.
Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG’s theory that even if the act complained of was born of imprudence or
negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated on account of the gravity of the actions of the accused. We
emphasize that the finding of a felony committed by means of culpa is legally inconsistent with that committed by
means of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs done as a result of an act performed without malice or criminal
design. The Revised Penal Code expresses thusly:
ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum
period toprisión correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform
suchact, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be
caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. (Emphases supplied)
On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a deliberate malicious intent to do an unlawful
act is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion on the matter: 20 Our Revised Penal Code belongs tothe classical
school of thought. x x x The identity of mens rea– defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal
intent – is the predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits. In order for an
intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of doloor "malice."
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent. x x x x The
element of intent – on which this Court shall focus – is described as the state of mind accompanying an act,
especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.It does
not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intentconcerns the result of the act. While motive is the
"moving power" that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to
produce the result. On the other hand, the term "felonious"means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding
from an evil heart or purpose.With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must
refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated
otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus– that the act or omission be done "willfully,"
"maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea– a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. As is
required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
 xxxx
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing the commission
of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo
immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill – or animus interficendi– cannot and
should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death
must not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed without
malice or criminal intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the act must be qualified as
reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.
xxxx
In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the
employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of
malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis
consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, incase of
physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to
do wrong against the physical integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain
bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting
physical injuries per semerely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The
commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absentmalicious intent, does
not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony.x x x.
xxxx
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity members are
ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of
fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence,
lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an immediate
personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the
part of the person committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor. In
contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material
damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the
danger is not openly visible.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in
the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution
against the mischievous resultsof the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of precaution and
diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved. If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger
of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is
bound to be very careful, inorder to prevent or avoid damage or injury. In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much
care is required. It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of
an individual, "from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort." The duty of the person to employ more or
less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. (Emphases supplied, citations
omitted)
We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent or dolus
malus before an accused can be adjudged liable for committing an intentional felony.
Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we cannot agree with the argument of
the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for intentional felony can also be applied to the present case on the
ground that the nature of the imprudence or negligence of the accused was so gross that the felony already
amounted to malice. The Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the imposable penalties as regards felonies
committed by means of culpaon the one hand and felonies committed by means of doloon the other in the context of
the distinctions it has drawn between them. The penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are
mandatorily applied if the death of a person occurs as a result of the imprudence or negligence of another.
Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles 246 to 261 (Destruction of Life) are automatically invoked if the death
was a result of the commission of a forbidden act accompanied by a malicious intent. These imposable penalties are
statutory, mandatory, and not subjectto the discretion of the court. We have already resolved – and the OSG agrees
– that the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical
pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is what is applicable to the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration
filed by Tecson et al.
We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of respondents Tecson et al. vis-à-vis G.R. No.
154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).
The finality of a CA decision will not
bar the state from seeking the
annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.
In their separate motions,21 respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA finding them guilty of slight physical
injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result of their respective availments of the probation program and their
ultimate discharge therefrom. Hence, they argue that they can no longer be convicted of the heavier offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.22 Respondents allude to our Decision in Tan v. People 23 to support their
contention that the CA judgment can no longer be reversed or annulled even by this Court.
The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not have attained finality, as the former had timely filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65 petition is analogous to an appeal, or a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, in that a petition for certiorarialso prevents the case from becoming final and executory until after the
matter is ultimately resolved.
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once the accused applies for
probation, viz:
SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of convictionmay, upon motion of the accused, be modified or
set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a
judgment becomes finalafter the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or whenthe sentence has been partially
or totally satisfied or served, or when the accusedhas waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for
probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied)
Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1 of Rule 122,26 it can be culled from the foregoing provisions that
only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the relief being sought is the
correction or review of the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order to give life to the constitutional
edict27against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It is beyond contention that the
accused would be exposed to double jeopardy if the state appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an
acquittal or even to increase criminal liability. Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as when applying for
probation – makes the criminal judgment immediately final and executory. Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is
worth reiterating:28
Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the government has
already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s culpability; after failing to persuade
the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple
trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the defendant’s already established innocence at the
first trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences
of a second trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State.
Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed another opportunity to
persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial,
all in a process where the government’s power and resources are once again employed against the defendant’s
individual means. That the second opportunity comesvia an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by
the standards of reason, justice and conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer blanket
invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not
absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that
issued the criminal judgment.29 The reasoning behind the exception is articulated in Nazareno, from which we quote: 30
In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in an appeal, actually takes
place; the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per sevoid on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the
verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the
question of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question of the decision’s error or
correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden — a very heavy one — is on the
shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted) While
this Court’s Decision in Tan may have created an impression of the unassailability of a criminal judgment as soon as
the accused applies for probation, we point out that what the state filed therein was a mere motion for the
modification of the penalty, and not a Rule 65 petition. A petition for certiorari is a special civil action that is distinct
and separate from the main case. While in the main case, the core issue is whether the accused is innocent or guilty
of the crime charged, the crux of a Rule 65 petition is whether the court acted (a) without or in excess of its
jurisdiction; or (b) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly speaking,
there is nomodification of judgment in a petition for certiorari, whose resolution does not call for a re-evaluation of the
merits of the case in order to determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the accused. In a Rule 65 petition, any
resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence of the finding of lack of jurisdiction.
In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must be that it is inapplicable and
irrelevant where the court’s jurisdiction is being assailed through a Rule 65 petition. Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the
modification of a criminal judgment only if the appeal brought before the court is in the nature of a regular appeal
under Rule 41, or an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, and if that appeal would put the accused in double jeopardy.
As it is, we find no irregularity in the partial annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its finality,
as the judgment therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The orders of Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.
First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part and parcel of our criminal justice
system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate and decide the case before it. Jurisdiction refers to the
power and capacity of the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a particular case or matter before it.31 That power and
capacity includes the competence to pronounce a judgment, impose a punishment, 32 and enforce or suspend33 the
execution of a sentencein accordance with law.
The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of Tecson et al. before Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not have competence to take cognizance of the applications,
considering that it was not the court of origin of the criminal case. The OSG points out that the trial court that
originally rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) was Branch 121 of the Caloocan City RTC.
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for reference:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an
appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted
if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)
It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for probation be filed withthe trial
court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of origin. Here, the trial court that originally
convicted and sentenced Tecson et al.of the crime of homicide was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 – of the Caloocan
City RTC.35 Neither the judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor Tecson et al.in their pleadings have presented any
explanation or shown any special authority that would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been filed
with or taken cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC Branch 121. While we take note that in a previous case, the CA
issued a Decision ordering the inhibition of Branch 121 Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from hearing and deciding
Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), the ruling was made specifically applicable to the trial of petitioners therein, i.e.
accused Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez. 36
Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications with Caloocan City RTC Branch
130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that applicants are not at liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek
probation, as the requirement under Section 4 of the Probation law is substantive and not merely procedural.
Considering, therefore, that the probation proceedings were premised on an unwarranted exercise of authority, we
find that Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 never acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 granted the probation
applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court in which the criminal action has been properly
instituted.37 If a party appeals the trial court’s judgment or final order,38 jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court.
The execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing party is concerned. 39 The court of origin then
loses jurisdiction over the entire case the moment the other party’s time to appeal has expired. 40 Any residual
jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease – including the authority to order execution pending appeal – the moment
the complete records of the case are transmitted to the appellate court.41 Consequently, it is the appellate court that
shall have the authority to wield the power to hear, try, and decide the case before it, as well as to enforce its
decisions and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and authority shall remain with the appellate court until it
finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident
would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.
According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final
judgment." A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the accused of the offense charged becomes final under
any of the following conditions among others:42 after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal; when the
accused waives the right to appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal ofan appeal; when the sentence has already been
partially or totally satisfied or served; or when the accused applies for probation. When the decision attains finality,
the judgment or final order is entered in the book of entries of judgments.43 If the case was previously appealed to the
CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or final order must be attached to the original record, which shall then be
remanded to the clerk of the court from which the appeal was taken. 44 The court of origin then reacquires jurisdiction
over the case for appropriate action. It is during this time that the court of origin may settle the matter of the execution
of penalty or the suspension of the execution thereof, 45 including the convicts’ applications for probation.46
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction over the case when
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that the
accused filed their respective applications 47 while a motion for reconsideration was still pending before the CA 48 and
the records were still with that court.49 The CA settled the motion only upon issuing the Resolution dated 30 August
2002 denying it, or about seven months after Tecson et al. had filed their applications with the trial court.50 In
September 2002, or almost a month before the promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October 2002 granting the
probation applications,51 the OSG had filed Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for Certiorari with the CA 52 and this
Court.53 Ultimately, the OSG assailed the CA judgments by filing before this Court a Petition for Certiorari on 25
November 2002.54 We noted the petition and then required respondents to file a comment thereon. 55 After their
submission of further pleadings and motions, we eventually required all parties to file their consolidated
memoranda.56 The records of the case remained with the CA until they were elevated to this Court in 2008. 57
For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the probation applications of
Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to suspend their sentence, place them on probation, order
their final discharge, and eventually declare the case against them terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux pasis a
clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the law oran underhanded one-upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130
or Tecson et al., or both – to which this Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.
In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied for it. Probation 58 is a special
privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce
their right to appeal. In view of their acceptance of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the state affords them a
chance to avoid the stigma of an incarceration recordby making them undergo rehabilitation outside of prison. Some
of the major purposes of the law are to help offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self
respecting individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration with the community.
It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an act of grace orclemency
conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,59 this Court explained thus:
It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly,
the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of
organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. The Probation Law should not therefore be
permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter’s prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the
intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law
who is not clearly within them. (Emphases supplied)
The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et al. 60 It points out that when they
appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the RTC, they thereby made themselves ineligible to seek probation
pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the Probation Law).
We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law as follows:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an
appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted
if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for
probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied)
Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have appealed the conviction. 61 In the
2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,62 this Court was faced with the issue of whether a convict may still apply for
probation even after the trial court has imposed a non probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on lowers the
original penalty to a sentence within the probationable limit. In that case, the trial court sentenced the accused to a
maximum term of eight years of prisión mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only
became eligible for probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1 year, 8 months
and 21 days of prisión correccional.
In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the accused was ineligiblefor
probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In Francisco, we emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation
Law offers no ambiguity and does not provide for any distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clearis that all
offenders who previously appealed their cases, regardless of their reason for appealing, are disqualified by the law
from seeking probation. Accordingly, this Court enunciated in Lagrosathat the accused are disallowed from availing
themselves of the benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for probation only on appeal as a
result of the downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable to probationable.
While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 issued its various Orders
discharging Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in Lagrosa, however, was a mere reiteration of the reasoning of
this Court since the 1989 case Llamado v. Court of Appeals 63 and Francisco. The Applications for Probation of
Tecson et al., therefore, should not have been granted by RTC Branch 130, as they had appealed their conviction to
the CA. We recall that respondents were originally found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8
months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later downgraded their conviction
to slight physical injuries and sentenced them to 20 days of arresto menor, which made the sentence fall within
probationable limits for the first time, the RTC should have nonetheless found them ineligible for probation at the time.
The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use of authority, so gross that it
divested the court of its very power to dispense justice. As a consequence, the RTC Orders granting the Applications
for Probation of Tecson et al. and thereafter discharging them from their criminal liability must be deemed to have
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, we declare
all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation applications of
Tecson et al. null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz:
A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be
attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All
acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis supplied)
The ultimate discharge of Tecson et
al. from probation did not totally
extinguish their criminal liability.
Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been extinguished as a result of their
discharge from probation and the eventual termination of the criminal case against them by Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130. To support his argument, he cites the following provision of the Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence.
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
4. By absolute pardon.
5. By prescription of the crime.
6. By prescription of the penalty.
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally speaking, it is as if no judgment
had been rendered at all. Considering our annulment of the Orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to
the probation proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits that technically do not exist.
In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we find it inapplicable to this case.
One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to "suspend the execution of the sentence," 66 and not to
replace the original sentence with another, as we pointed out in our discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia: 67
An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a suspension of the imposition of
sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an "interlocutory judgment"in the nature of a conditional order placing
the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of
discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are
violated. (Emphases supplied)
Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains.
In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
may now reapply for probation.
Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68 we revisited our ruling in Franciscoand modified our pronouncements insofar
as the eligibility for probation of those who appeal their conviction is concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the
Court En Bancin effect abandoned Lagrosaand settled the following once and for all: 69
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of conviction" is
disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have
been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court,now set aside; and, two,
a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the probation law on Arnel based on
the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that
such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter
penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court’s judgment — even if this has been found in error. And, worse,
Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for
probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where
is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would dilute the ruling
of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appealsthat the probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed
his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between Franciscoand this
case.
xxxx
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not
have a choice between appeal and probation. Hewas not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to
apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that
would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling
in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for
probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
xxxx
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is
an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from
the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and
four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The underlying
philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and
stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the
Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he
comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be
applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.
xxxx
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two
years and four months maximum, he would havehad the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty
that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC doneright by him. The idea may not even have crossed
his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for probation when the
1âwphi 1

new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to
probation? (Emphases supplied)
In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et al.ultimately liable for the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense is
punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period (from 4 months and 1 day to 6 months) to prisión correccional in
its medium period (from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Considering that the new ruling in
Colinares is more favorable to Tecson et al., we rule that they are now eligible to apply for probation. Since Fidelito
Dizon (Dizon) was convicted of the same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is also eligible for probation.
While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which granted the Applications for
Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have fulfilled the terms and conditions of their previous
probation program and have eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for probation, the trial
court may, at its discretion, consider their antecedent probation service in resolving whether to place them under
probation at this time and in determining the terms, conditions, and period thereof.
Final clarificatory matters
We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical error in the minimum term of the penalty
imposed on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While this issue was not raised by any of the parties before us, this
Court deems it proper to discuss the matter ex proprio motuin the interest of justice. In the first paragraph of the
dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012, the fourth sentence reads as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum.
As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the "penalty next lower" than that prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, in accordance with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL),70 the phrase "and one (1) day," which had been inadvertently added, must be
removed. Consequently, in the first paragraph of the dispositive portion, the fourth sentence should now read as
follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum. In this instance, we further find it important to
clarify the accessory penalties inherent to the principal penalty imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al.
By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding accessory penalty automatically
attaches every time a court lays down a principal penalty outlined in Articles 25 and 27 thereof. 71 The applicable
accessory penalty is determined by using as reference the principal penaltyimposed by the court before the prison
sentence is computed in accordance with the ISL.72 This determination is made in spite of the two classes ofpenalties
mentioned in an indeterminate sentence. It must be emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory
penalties specifically allude to the actual "penalty" 73 imposed, not to the "prison sentence"74 set by a court. We believe
that the ISL did not intend to have the effect of imposing on the convict two distinct sets of accessory penalties for the
same offense.75 The two penalties are only relevant insofar as setting the minimum imprisonment period is concerned,
after which the convict may apply for parole and eventually seek the shortening of the prison term. 76
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccionalin its medium period. As this provision grants
courts the discretion tolay down a penalty without regard to the presence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, the imposable penaltymust also be within the aforementioned range. 77 Hence, before applying the ISL,
we ultimately imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al. the actual (straight) penalty 78 of four years and two months of
prisión correccional.79 Pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisión correccional
automatically carries with it80 the following accessory penalties: ARTICLE 43. Prisión Correccional— Its accessory
penalties. — The penalty of prisión correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right
tofollow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration
of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this
article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon.
The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal penalty sans the ISL; that is, for four
years and two months81 or until they have served their sentence in accordance with law. Their suspension takes effect
immediately, once the judgment of conviction becomes final. 82
We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they shall furthermore suffer a
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. Under Article 32 of the RevisedPenal Code, if this
accessory penalty attaches, it shall forever deprive them of the exercise of their right (a) to vote in any popular
election for any public office; (b) to be elected to that office; and (c) to hold any public office. 83 Any public office that
they may be holding becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment. 84 The aforementioned accessory penalties can
only be wiped out if expressly remitted in a pardon. 85
Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant of probation, shouldthe trial court
find them eligible therefor. As we explained in Baclayon, 86 the grant of probation suspends the execution of the
principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory penalties. We have reiterated this point in Moreno
v. Commission on Elections:87
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather,
in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the
imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public
office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from
continuing with her teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno
were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public
office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation.
x x x x. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but
is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda H. Villa in
connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby DENIED. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954 is also DENIED.
The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna,
Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise DENIED. In light of the finding that Caloocan City Regional Trial
Court Branch 130 acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the aforementioned
Applications for Probation, we hereby ANNUL the entire probation proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders,
resolutions, or judgments issued in connection thereto. We, however, CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible to apply or reapply for probation
in view of our recent ruling in Colinares v. People of the Philippines,88 without prejudice to their remaining civil liability,
if any.
Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012 and hereby
delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the fourth sentence of the first paragraph thereof. The sentence shall
now read as follows: "They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisi6n correccional, as maximum."
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.* JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Designated additional member in lieu of Assocciate Justice Arturo D. Brion per S.O. No. 1888 dated 28
November 2014.
1
Villareal v. People, G.R. Nos. 151258, 154954, 155101, 178057 & 178080, 1 February 2012, 664 SCRA
519.
2
CA Decision (People v. Dizon, CA-G.R. CR No. 15520, 10 January 2002), rollo(G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I),
pp. 221-249; CA Resolution (People v. Dizon, CA-G.R. CR No. 15520, 30 August 2002), rollo (G.R. No.
154954, Vol. I), pp. 209-218. Both the Decision and the Resolution of the CA were penned by Associate
Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Eliezer R. de los
Santos (with Concurring Opinion).
3
RTC Decision (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340[91], 8 November 1993), rollo (G.R. No.
154954, Vol. I), pp. 273-340. The Decision of the RTC was penned by Judge Adoracion G. Angeles.
4
CA Decision (Escalona v. Regional Trial Court, CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153, 25 October 2006), rollo
(G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080), pp. 12-51. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P.
Punzalan Castillo and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
5
Villareal v. People, supra note 1, at 598-599.
6
Id. at 530-535.
7
Motion for Partial Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda H. Villa (posted on 6 March 2012), rollo (G.R. Nos.
178057 & 178080), pp. 1607-1660.
8
CA Decision dated 25 October 2006 (Escalona v. Regional Trial Court), supra note 4; CA Resolution
(Escalona v. Regional Trial Court, CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153, 17 May 2007), rollo (G.R. Nos.
178057 & 178080), pp. 53-58.
9
Motion for Reconsideration of OSG (posted on 7 March 2012), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 2085-2117.
Manifestation and Motion for Clarification of Almeda (filed on 2 March 2012), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp.
10

1843-1860; Motion for Reconsideration of Ama (filed on 5 March 2012), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1883-
1896; Motion for Clarification of Bantug (filed on 6 March 2012), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1953-1966; and
Motion for Clarification of Tecson (filed on 6 March 2012), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1930-1941.
11
Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1861, 1897, 1942, & 1967.
RTC Order (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340, 11 October 2002), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp.
12

1872-1873, 1904-1905, 1950-1951, 1977-1978.

RTC Order (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340, 29 April 2003), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), p. 1875;
13

RTC Order (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340, 10 April 2003), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1906,
1952; RTC Order (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340, 3 April 2003), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), p.
1979.
14
Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1861-1875, 1897-1906, 1942-1952, 1967-1979.
Villareal v. People, supra note 1, at 545 (citing People v. Hernandez, 531 Phil. 289 [2006]; People v.
15

Tampal, 314 Phil. 35 [1995]; Philippine Savings Bank v. Bermoy, 508 Phil. 96 [2005]; People v. Bans, 239
SCRA 48 [1994]; People v. Declaro, 252 Phil. 139 [1989]; and People v. Quizada, 243 Phil. 658 [1988]).
16
See: People v. Hernandez, supra.
17
Villareal v. People, supra note 1, at 550 (citing People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, 545 Phil. 278
[2007]; People v. Serrano, 374 Phil. 302 [1999]; and People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009,
588 SCRA 550).
Villareal v. People, supra note 1, at 551 (citingPeople v. De Grano, supra note 17; and People v.
18

Maquiling, 368 Phil. 169 [1999]).

Villareal v. People, supra note 1, at 552 (citingPeople v. Maquiling, supra; and Teknika Skills and Trade
19

Services v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 339 Phil. 218 [1997]).

20
Villareal v. People, supra note 1, at 556-593.
21
Supra note 10.
22
In the annulled CA Decision (supra note 2), Tecson et al. were sentenced to suffer the penalty of 20 days
of arresto menor. On the other hand, in the Decision of this Court (supra note 1), they were sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum.
23
430 Phil. 685 (2002). The accused was found guilty ofbigamy by the trial court, and was sentenced to
suffer a prison term of prisión correccional. He thereafter applied for probation, as the sentence imposed on
him was probationable. Subsequently however, the trial court withheld the order of release from probation in
view of the filing by the prosecution of a motion for modification of the penalty. The prosecution pointed out
that the trial court erred inimposing the sentence on the accused, as the legally imposable penalty under the
Revised Penal Code was prisión mayor, which is non-probationable. The trial court reconsidered its order
and amended the sentence from a maximum period of 4 years and 2 months to the maximum period of 8
years and 1 day, which had the effect of disqualifying accused from applying for probation. This Court set
aside the amendatory judgment of the trial court and reinstated its original decision, and ruled that the trial
court judgment canno longer be reversed, annulled, reconsidered, or amended, as it has already lapsed into
finality. It was then reiterated that the accused’s waiver of appeal brought about by his application for
probation amounted to a voluntary compliance with the decision and wrote finisto the jurisdiction of the trial
court over the judgment.
24
Reply of OSG dated 25 November 2004, rollo(G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), pp. 1098-1132.
25
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted
or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded
to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information. (Emphasis supplied)
26
Rules of Court, Rule 122, provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Who may appeal. — Any party may appealfrom a judgment or final order, unless the
accused will be placed in double jeopardy. (2a) (Emphases supplied)
27
1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 21.
28
G.R. No. 168982, 5 August 2009, 595 SCRA 438, 450.
People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 17 (citingPeople v. Serrano, supra note 17, at 306; and
29

People v. De Grano, supra note 17).

30
Supra note 28, at 451.
31
People v. Mariano, 163 Phil. 625 (1976).
32
Id.; and Antiporda v. Garchitorena, 378 Phil. 1166 (1999).
33
See: Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the Probation Law, Sec. 4.
34
Reply of OSG dated 25 November 2004, rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), pp. 1098-1132.
35
See: RTC Decision (People v. Dizon), supra note 3.
36
Concepcion v. Judge Angeles, CA-G.R. SP No. 32793 (CA, decided on 15 June 1994), slip. op., at 16.
37
See Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), Sec. 20,
for the applicable law on which court has subject-matter jurisdiction over criminal cases; and Rule 110, Sec.
15, for the applicable rule on where the criminal action must be instituted.
38
Rule 122, Sec. 1; Rule 121, Sec. 7.
39
Rule 122, Sec. 11(c).
40
Rule 41, Sec. 9 in relation to Rule 122, Sec. 6.
41
Rule 41, Sec. 9 in relation to Rule 122, Secs. 8 and 11(c).
42
Rule 120, Sec. 7; Rule 122, Sec. 12.
43
Rule 120, Sec. 8 in relation to Rule 36, Sec. 2; Rule 124, Sec. 17.
44
Rule 124, Sec. 17.
Revised Penal Code, Arts. 78 to 88 (in relation to Rule 124, Sec. 17; Rule 121, Sec. 8; Rule 36, Sec. 2;
45

Rule 39, Sec. 1)

46
Probation Law, Sec. 4.
 Tecson et al. filed their applications on various dates in January 2002. See: rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp.
47

1861-1863, 1897-1901, 1942-1944, & 1967-1969.

48
See: CA Resolution dated 30 August 2002, supra note 2 at 6, rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), p. 214.
49
See: CA Resolution (People v. Dizon, CA-G.R. CR No. 15520, 14 February 2002), rollo (G.R. No.
155101), p. 1972. In the Resolution, the CA stated that "the records of this case cannot be remanded at this
stage considering the motions for reconsideration filed hereto." See also: Letter of Presiding Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles, CA rolloVol. II, pp. 2686-2688; Transmittal Letter from the CA dated 19 February
2008, rollo(G.R. No. 155101), p. 918.
50
CA Resolution dated 30 August 2002, supra note 2 at 6, rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), p. 214.
RTC Order (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340, 11 October 2002), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp.
51

1872-1873, 1904-1905, 1950-1951, 1977-1978.

CA Resolution (People v. Dizon, CA-G.R. CR No. 15520, 29 October 2002), CA rolloVolume II, pp. 2724-
52

2725.
53
Supreme Court Resolution dated 25 November 2002, rollo(G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), p. 10-A.
The Supreme Court granted the Motion for Extension filed by the OSG. See: Supreme Court Resolution
54

dated 13 October 2003, rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), p. 675.
55
Supreme Court Resolution dated 13 October 2003, rollo(G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), p. 675.
56
Supreme Court Resolution dated 21 October 2009, rollo(G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1156-1160.
57
Transmittal Letter from the CA dated 19 February 2008, rollo(G.R. No. 155101), p. 918; See also Letter of
Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, Caloocan City RTC Branch 121, CA rolloVol. II, pp. 2686-2688.
Judge Angeles informed the CAthat the records of the case had not yet been remanded to Branch 121, thus
preventing her from complying with the CA Resolution to release the cash bond posted by one of the
accused. The CA Third Division received the letter on 22 October 2002 – or 11 days after RTC Branch 130
granted the probation applications.
58
Probation Law; Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 313 Phil. 241 (1995); and Baclayon v. Mutia, 214 Phil. 126
(1984). See: Del Rosario v. Rosero, 211 Phil. 406 (1983).
59
Id. at 254-255.
60
Reply of OSG dated 25 November 2004, rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), pp. 1098-1132.
61
Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, 453 Phil. 270 (2003); and Francisco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 58.
62
Supra. See also: Francisco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 58.
63
256 Phil. 328 (1989).
64
228 Phil. 42, 90 (1986). E.g., People v. Jardin, 209 Phil. 134, 140 (1983) (citing Gomez v. Concepcion, 47
Phil. 717 [1925]; Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 133 Phil. 661 [1968]; Paredes v. Moya, 158 Phil. 1150,
[1974]).
65
Motion for Clarification of Bantug, supra note 10.
66
Probation Law, Sec. 4.
67
Supra note 58, at 132.
68
G.R. No. 182748, 13 December 2011, 662 SCRA 266.
69
Id. at 279-282.
See, e.g.: People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, 17 December 2008, 574 SCRA 258; People v. Gabres,
70

335 Phil. 242 (1997); and People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109 (1933).
71
Revised Penal Code, Art. 73. People v. Silvallana, 61 Phil. 636, 644 (1935). According to Silvallana: "It is
therefore unnecessary to express the accessory penalties in the sentence."
72
See, e.g.: Moreno v. Commission on Elections, 530 Phil. 279 (2006); Baclayon v. Mutia, supra note 58.
Article 73 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "Presumption in Regard to the Imposition of Accessory
73

Penalties. — Whenever the courts shall imposea penalty which, by provision of law, carries with it other
penalties, according to the provisions of articles 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 of this Code, it must be
understood that the accessory penalties are also imposed upon the convict."
 74
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, provides: "Hereafter, in imposing a prison
sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence
the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; x x
x."
The law should not apply if its application would be unfavorable to the accused. See generally RAMON C.
75

AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE – VOL. 1, 720-721 (1987).

76
See ISL, Sec. 5; RAMON C. AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE – VOL. 1, 718-720 (1987).
Article 365 provides: "In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion,
77

without regard to the rules prescribed in article sixty-four."

People v. Temporada, supra note 70; People v. Ducosin, supra. See, e.g.: Bongalon v. People, G.R. No.
78

169533, 20 March 2013, 694 SCRA 12; Guinhawa v. People, 505 Phil. 383 (2005); People v. Dy, 425 Phil
608 (2002); People v. Darilay, 465 Phil. 747 (2004); People v. Bustamante, 445 Phil. 345 (2003); People v.
Catuiran, 397 Phil. 325 (2000); People v. Barro, 392 Phil. 857 (2000); Austria v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil.
408 (2000); Ladino v. People, 333 Phil. 254 (1996); People v. Parohinog, 185 Phil. 266 (1980); People v.
Dimalanta, 92 Phil. 239 (1952).
79
People v. Temporada, supra note 70. The case explained the difference between a "prescribed penalty,"
"imposable penalty," and "penalty actually imposed."
80
See: Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 193237 and 193536, 9 October 2012, 683 SCRA
1;Aratea v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012, 683 SCRA 105; and People v.
Silvallana, supra note 71.
81
SeeArt. 27 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: "Prisión correccional, suspensión, and destierro.
— The duration of the penalties of prisión correccional, suspensión, and destierro shall be from six
months and one day to six years, except when the suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty,
in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty" and Art. 33, which states: "Effects
of the Penalties of cont.
Suspension from Any Public Office, Profession or Calling, or the Right of Suffrage. — The
suspension from public office, profession or calling, and the exercise of the right of suffrage shall
disqualify the offender from holding such office or exercising such profession or calling or right of
suffrage during the term of the sentence. The person suspended from holding public office shall not
hold another having similar functions during the period of his suspension." (Emphases supplied).
Cf:Lacuna v. Abes, 133 Phil. 770 (1968). The Court En Banc explained therein that then Mayor-
elect Benjamin Abes was released from confinement on 7 April 1959 by virtue of a conditional
pardon granted by the President of the Philippines, remitting only the unexpired portion of the
prison term and fine. It then clarified that without the pardon, his maximum sentence would have
been served on 13 October 1961. Accordingly, the Court said that the accessory penalty of
temporary absolute disqualification would have barred him for seeking public office and for
exercising his right to vote until 13 October 1961.
82
Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, supra note 80.
See: Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, supra note 80 (citing Lacuna v. Abes, supra); Aratea v.
83

Commission on Elections, supra note 80; People v. Silvallana, supra note 71.
84
Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, supra note 80.
Revised Penal Code, Art. 36. See: Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205033, 18 June 2013,
85

698 SCRA 742; Monsanto v. Factoran, 252 Phil. 192 (1989); Lacuna v. Abes, supra note 81.
86
Supra note 58.
87
Supra note 72.
88
Supra note 68.

G.R. No. 202124

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
IRENEO JUGUETA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 03252. The CA affirmed the judgments of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, finding
accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Double Murder in Criminal Case No.
7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya,
Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a caliber.22 firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said firearm Mary
Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old, who suffered the following:
"Gunshot wound -
Point of Entry – lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm. from the level of the umbilicus, directed
upward toward the left upper abdomen."
and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years of age, who suffered the following:
"Gunshot wound -
Point of Entry - 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm. diameter
Point of Exit - 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;"
which directly caused their instant death.
That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the attack and the
accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.
Contrary to law.2
In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was charged with
Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of
Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with short firearms of
undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the
house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder,
directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of some
cause or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is, the occupants Norberto Divina, his
wife Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina, both elementary pupils and who are minors,
were not hit.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At said proceedings, one Danilo
Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement stating that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and
Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm while the other two had no
participation in the shooting incident. Fajarillo further stated that Roger San Miguel was not present at the crime
scene. Based on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found no prima facie case against Gilbert
Estores and Roger San Miguel.4 Thus, upon motion of the prosecution, the case for Attempted Murder against Gilbert
Estores and Roger San Miguel was dismissed, and trial proceeded only as to appellant. 5
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr. Lourdes Taguinod who
executed the Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the children of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace and
Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Dr. Taguinod noted that the trajectory of the bullet wounds showed that the
victims were at a higher location than the shooter, but she could not tell what kind of ammunitions were used. 6
Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening of June 6, 2002, as his
entire family lay down on the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep, the "sack" walling of their hut was suddenly
stripped off, and only the supporting bamboo (fences) remained. With the covering of the wall gone, the three (3) men
responsible for the deed came into view. Norberto clearly saw their faces which were illuminated by the light of a gas
lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto identified the 3 men as appellant, Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.
The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so. The men then uttered,
"Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon." Norberto pleaded with them, saying, "Maawa kayo sa amin, matanda
na ako at marami akong anak. Anong kasalanan ko sa inyo?" Despite such plea for mercy, a gunshot was fired, and
Norberto immediately threw his body over his children and wife in an attempt to protect them from being hit.
Thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being fired in the direction where his family huddled together in their hut. 7
When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that his two (2) young daughters were
wounded. His wife went out of their house to ask for help from neighbors, while he and his older daughter carried the
two (2) wounded children out to the street. His daughter Mary Grace died on the way to the hospital, while Claudine
expired at the hospital despite the doctors' attempts to revive her. 8
In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto replied that he had a
previous altercation with appellant who was angered by the fact that he (Norberto) filed a case against appellant's two
other brothers for molesting his daughter.9
On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his defense. Appellant's testimony, along
with those of Gilbert Estores, Roger San Miguel, Isidro San Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that he (appellant) was
just watching TV at the house of Isidro San Miguel, where he had been living for several years, at the time the
shooting incident occurred. However, he and the other witnesses admitted that said house was a mere five-minute
walk away from the crime scene.10
Finding appellant’s defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of Norberto, the trial court
ruled that the evidence clearly established that appellant, together with two other assailants, conspired to shoot and
kill the family of Norberto. Appellant was then convicted of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple
Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for Double Murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced
to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Mary Grace Divina and to indemnify her heirs in the amount of
Php50,000.00 and another to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Claudine Divina and accused is further
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the sum of Php50,000.00. In addition, he is hereby ordered to
pay the heirs of the victims actual damages in the amount of Php16,150.00 and to pay for the costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7702-G, reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for Multiple Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised
Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision
Correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as maximum for each of the
offended parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. Further, accused is ordered
to pay for the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.12
Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On January 30, 2012, the CA rendered a
Decision affirming appellant's conviction for the crimes charged. 13
Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. On July 30, 2012, the Court issued a
Resolution14 notifying the parties that they may submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Both parties manifested
that they will no longer submit supplemental briefs since they had exhaustively discussed their positions before the
CA.15
The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, such as his
failure to state from the beginning that all three assailants had guns, and to categorically identify appellant as the one
holding the gun used to kill Norberto’s children.
The appeal is unmeritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses
and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the
highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court will not recalibrate and re-examine evidence that had been analyzed and
ruled upon by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.16
The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, that appellant acted in
concert with two other individuals, all three of them carrying firearms and simultaneously firing at Norberto and his
family, killing his two young daughters. Norberto clearly saw all of the three assailants with their firearms as there is
illumination coming from a lamp inside their house that had been laid bare after its walling was stripped off, to wit:
Q: When the wall of your house was stripped off by these three persons at the same time, do you have light in your
house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of light was there?
A: A gas lamp.
Q: Where was the gas lamp placed at that time?
A: In the middle of our house.
xxxx
Q: when did they fire a shot?
A: On the same night, when they had stripped off the wallings.
Q: How many gunshots did you hear?
A: Only one.
Q: Do you know the sound of a gunshot? A firearm?
A: Yes, sir, it is loud? (sic)
xxxx
Q: After the first shot, was there any second shot?
A: After that, successive fire shot (sic) followed and my youngest and eldest daughters were hit.
xxxx
Q: How many of the three were holding guns at that time?
A: All of them.
Q: You mean to tell the honorable court that these three persons were
having one firearm each?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And they fired shots at the same time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: To what direction these three persons fired (sic) their firearms during that night?
A: To the place where we were.
Q: When those three persons were firing their respective firearms, what was your position then?
A: I ordered my children to lie down.
Q: How about you, what was your position when you were ordering your children to lie down?
A: (witness demonstrated his position as if covering his children with his body and ordering them to line (sic) down
face down)
Q: Mr. Witness, for how long did these three persons fire shots at your house?
A: Less than five minutes, sir.
Q: After they fired their shots, they left your house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when these persons left your house, you inspected your children to see what happened to them?
A: Yes, sir, they were hit.
x x x17
Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto's daughters because, as
ruled by the trial court, they clearly conspired to kill Norberto's family. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement regarding the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of a prior meeting
between the perpetrators to discuss the commission of the crime is not necessary as long as their concerted acts
reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is the act of all.18 Here, the three men
undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of Norberto together, each with his own firearm. It is,
therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that it is the bullet particularly fired from appellant's firearm that
killed the children.
Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person, which is not
parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation.19 The presence of any
one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a killing as murder. 20 The trial
court correctly ruled that appellant is liable for murder because treachery attended the killing of Norberto’s two
children, thus:
x x x Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying down side by side about to sleep on
June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, when suddenly their wall made of sack was stripped off by
[appellant] Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San Miguel and Gilberto Alegre (sic) [Gilbert Estores]. They ordered him to go out
of their house and when he refused despite his plea for mercy, they fired at them having hit and killed his two (2)
daughters. The family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and his children were at very tender ages. Mary Grace
Divina and Claudine who were shot and killed were 13 years old and 3 ½ years old respectively. In this case, the
victims were defenseless and manifestly overpowered by armed assailants when they were gunned down. There was
clear showing that the attack was made suddenly and unexpectedly as to render the victims helpless and unable to
defend themselves. Norberto and his wife and his children could have already been asleep at that time of the night. x
x x 21
Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to murder. As held in People v.
Fallorina,22 the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the
slightest provocation on his part. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a
defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.
As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code states that a
felony is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance. In Esqueda v. People,23 the Court held:
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either consummated physical
injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or
attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b)
the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted
on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) the words uttered by the offender at the time the
injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.
In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant as shown by the use of
firearms, the words uttered24during, as well as the manner of, the commission of the crime. The Court thus quotes
with approval the trial court’s finding that appellant is liable for attempted murder, viz.:
In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of murder first by suddenly stripping
off the wall of their house, followed by successive firing at the intended victims when Norberto Divina refused to go
out of the house as ordered by them. If only there were good in aiming their target, not only Mary Grace and Claudine
had been killed but surely all the rest of the family would surely have died. Hence, perpetrators were liable for Murder
of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina but for Multiple Attempted Murder for Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina,
Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the only one charged in this case, he
alone is liable for the crime committed.25
Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he failed to state from the very beginning
that all three assailants were carrying firearms, and that it was the shots from appellant’s firearm that killed the
children, are too trivial and inconsequential to put a dent on said witness's credibility. An examination of Norberto's
testimony would show that there are no real inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled in People v. Cabtalan,26 "[m]inor
inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as well as their
positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime." 27 Both the trial court and the CA found
Norberto's candid and straightforward testimony to be worthy of belief and this Court sees no reason why it should
not conform to the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. People28 that:
 Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court
overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that would justify altering or revising such
findings and evaluation. This is because the trial court's determination proceeds from its first-hand
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling examination,
thereby placing the trial court in unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their
truthfulness, honesty and candor x x x.29
The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding or exceptional
circumstance to justify a deviation from such long-standing principle. There is no cogent reason to overturn the trial
court's ruling that the prosecution evidence, particularly the testimony of Norberto Divina identifying appellant as one
of the assailants, is worthy of belief. Thus, the prosecution evidence established beyond any reasonable doubt that
appellant is one of the perpetrators of the crime.
However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial court to identify the crimes for
which appellant was penalized. There is some confusion caused by the trial court's use of the terms "Double Murder"
and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in convicting appellant, and yet imposing penalties which nevertheless show that the
trial court meant to penalize appellant for two (2) separate counts of Murder and four (4) counts of Attempted Murder.
The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show that appellant
is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was not the result of a
single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the
crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that
the Informations in this case failed to comply with the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court that an information must charge only one offense.
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. The
reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao
Station, et al.,30 thus:
The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the necessary
knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not
heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule
is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed
waived.
However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the quashal of the
Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. Section 9 of Rule 117 provides that "[t]he
failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information,
either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver
of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of
this Rule."
It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused
fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose
upon him the proper penalty for each offense.31
Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and
7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven during trial.
Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida,32 the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as defined in Article 4833 of
the Revised Penal Code, thus:
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in the conscience
of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex
crime. The first is known as a compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies while the other is known as a complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more
persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the
doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shot, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. 34
Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two others, in firing successive
and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but
his entire family. When several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of people, it
shows their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one crime. What appellant and
his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because as held in People v. Nelmida,35 "each act by
each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons
constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime."36
Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account dwelling as an ordinary,
aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G contain
sufficient allegations to that effect, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:
That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the attack and
the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense. 37
Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:
x x x the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with
short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the
said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime
of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason
of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused x x x 38
In People v. Agcanas,39 the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is aggravating
because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt
him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere." Dwelling aggravates a felony where the
crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation
therefor.40The testimony of Norberto established the fact that the group of appellant violated the victims' home by
destroying the same and attacking his entire family therein, without provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the
trial court should have appreciated dwelling as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties imposed on
appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating circumstance of
dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of murder.41 However, pursuant to Republic Act
(RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should
be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility for parole. With regard to the four (4)
counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for each count is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating
circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum penalty should be from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, while the
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods, or
anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. This Court finds it apt to impose on appellant the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder.
Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as regards criminal cases
where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of criminal cases, there are
three kinds of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary damages. Likewise,
actual damages may be awarded or temperate damages in some instances.
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in the amount
authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to
actual or compensatory damages in civil law.42 This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC which states, "Every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court
when appropriate.43 Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos,
even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall
be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court,
unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no
earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who
is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand
support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be
fixed by the court;
 (3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation
to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the
civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of
imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution.
Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity,
which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot
be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the
present circumstance warrants it.44
The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in nature. Del
Mundo v. Court of Appeals45 expounded on the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.:
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical
suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. These
damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to
compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the
court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must
have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 221946 and Article 222047 of the Civil Code. x x x.
Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory damages awarded for mental
pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong."48 They may also be considered and allowed "for
resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her
assailant's conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the reasonableness of the force used, the attendant
humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental distress." 49
The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon: "[T]he award of
moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it
must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted." 50
Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222051 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be
awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended
party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the
award of civil indemnity.52
Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary damages, thus:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and
shall be paid to the offended party.
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a
deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an
injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used
interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account
for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that
has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted,53 the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused
by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant – associated with such circumstances as willfulness,
wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud 54 – that intensifies
the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in
good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future. 55
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public
as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is
addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional
damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the
criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to
be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be
of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the
case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 56
The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 57 requires aggravating circumstances,
whether ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or information. It is in order not to trample on the
constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the alleged offense that he or she has committed. A
criminal complaint or information should basically contain the elements of the crime, as well as its qualifying and
ordinary aggravating circumstances, for the court to effectively determine the proper penalty it should impose. This,
however, is not similar in the recovery of civil liability. In the civil aspect, the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, even if not alleged in the information but proven during trial would entitle the victim to an award of
exemplary damages.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only due to the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous
conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages
may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v.
Matrimonio,58 the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant
sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal,59 the Court awarded
exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually
assaulting a pregnant married woman. In People v. Cañada,60 People v. Neverio61 and People v. Layco, Sr.,62 the
Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt
the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at ₱30,000.00,63 despite the lack of any aggravating
circumstance. The Court finds it proper to increase the amount to ₱50,000.00 in order to deter similar conduct.
If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be imposed because of the provisions of R.A.
No. 9346, prevailing jurisprudence64 sets the amount of ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Before awarding any of the above mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first consider the penalty imposed
by law. Under RA 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that
Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC and special penal laws
were amended to impose the death penalty under certain circumstances. 65 Under the same law, the following crimes
are punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in general,66 mutiny on the high seas,67 and simple rape.68 For the
following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: qualified piracy;69 qualified bribery
under certain circumstances;70 parricide;71 murder;72 infanticide, except when committed by the mother of the child for
the purpose of concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal grandparents for the same purpose; 73kidnapping and
serious illegal detention under certain circumstances;74 robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under
certain circumstances;75 destructive arson, except when death results as a consequence of the commission of any of
the acts penalized under the article;76 attempted or frustrated rape, when a homicide is committed by reason or on
occasion thereof; plunder;77 and carnapping, when the driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or
raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. 78 Finally, RA 7659 imposes the
death penalty on the following crimes:
(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift or present.
(b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; (ii) when the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention; (iii) when the victim is raped, subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts.
(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under
Article 320, death results.
(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane or homicide is
committed; (ii) when committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: (1) when the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim;
(2) when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities; (3) when the rape is committed
in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity; (4) when the victim is a religious or a child below seven years old; (5) when the offender
knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease; (6) when committed
by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law
enforcement agency; and (7) when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation.
From these heinous crimes, where the imposable penalties consist of two (2) indivisible penalties or single indivisible
penalty, all of them must be taken in relation to Article 63 of the RPC, which provides:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be
observed in the application thereof:
1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater
penalty shall be applied.
2. when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the
lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts shall
reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the
purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such
compensation. (Revised Penal Code, Art. 63)
Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the court has the duty to
ascertain the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, in crimes where the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court can impose either reclusion perpetua or death, depending on the
mitigating or aggravating circumstances present.
But with the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the
imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.79
As a result, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have to impose reclusion perpetua. Despite
this, the principal consideration for the award of damages, following the ruling in People v. Salome80 and People v.
Quiachon,81 is "the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public
penalty actually imposed on the offender."82
When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the death penalty were it not for RA
9346, the Court has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v. Victor,83 that the award of civil indemnity for the crime
of rape when punishable by death should be ₱75,000.00 We reasoned that "[t]his is not only a reaction to the
apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the
displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity." 84 Such reasoning also applies to all
heinous crimes found in RA 7659. The amount was later increased to ₱100,000.00. 85
In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Arizapa,86 ₱50,000.00 was awarded as
moral damages without need of pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it is recognized that the victim's injury is
concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral
damages.87 Subsequently, the amount was increased to ₱75,000.00 in People v. Soriano88 and P100,000.00
in People v. Gambao.89
Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346, the imposable penalty as
provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be used as the basis for awarding damages
and not the actual penalty imposed. 1avv phi 1

Again, for crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an ordinary aggravating
circumstance but due to the prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua,
the latest jurisprudence90 pegs the amount of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱100,0000.00 as moral damages.
For the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary aggravating circumstances present, the amount of
₱100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity and moral damages. Regardless of the
attendance of qualifying aggravating circumstance, the exemplary damages shall be fixed at ₱100,000.00. "[T]his is
not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time, but
also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes x x x." 91
When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there being no
ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that the proper amounts should be ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱75,000.00 exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying
aggravating circumstances present.
When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done by the offender caused several
crimes, the fact that those were the result of a single design, the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages will
depend on the penalty and the number of victims. For each of the victims, the heirs should be properly compensated.
If it is multiple murder without any ordinary aggravating circumstance but merely a qualifying aggravating
circumstance, but the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein the maximum penalty shall be
imposed,92 then, for every victim who dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In case of a special complex crime, which is different from a complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC, the following
doctrines are noteworthy:
In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog,93 this Court ruled that special complex crime, or more properly, a
composite crime, has its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice
Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case of People v. Barros,94 explained that composite crimes are "neither of
the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since
they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies [compound crimes] nor do
they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex crime proper]. However, just like the
regular complex crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is
imposed for each of such composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses."95
In People v. De Leon,96 we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide
perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of
human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without
reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the
crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless
imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be
consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the
victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation,
or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that
the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is
committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies
committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with
homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and
infanticide.97
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood in its generic sense, and
includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape. 98 Hence, even if any or
all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information
have been duly established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime
committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating
circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v.
Macabales:99
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating circumstance of treachery is
present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes against property. However, we
find that the trial court in this case correctly characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying,
circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending himself when his arms were held by two of
the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales, as their other companions surrounded
them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code.
There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part
of the circumstances proven concerning the actual commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the
homicide to murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be imposed. 100
Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is death but it cannot be imposed due to RA
9346 and what is actually imposed is the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity and moral damages will be
₱100,000.00 each, and another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of the heinousness of the crime and to
set an example. If there is another composite crime included in a special complex crime and the penalty imposed is
death, an additional ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 moral damages and ₱100,000.00 exemplary
damages shall be awarded for each composite crime committed.
For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide 101 wherein three (3) people died as a consequence of the crime, the
heirs of the victims shall be entitled to the award of damages as discussed earlier. This is true, however, only if those
who were killed were the victims of the robbery or mere bystanders and not when those who died were the
perpetrators or robbers themselves because the crime of robbery with homicide may still be committed even if one of
the robbers dies.102 This is also applicable in robbery with rape where there is more than one victim of rape.
In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine the stage in which the crime was
committed and proven during the trial. Article 6 of the RPC provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies, as well as those which are
frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it
is frustrated when an offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence
but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.
As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty imposed is death but reduced
to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each
be ₱100,000.00 and another ₱100,000.00 for exemplary damages or when the circumstances of the crime call for the
imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the civil indemnity and moral damages should be ₱75,000.00 each, as well as
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00. If, however, the crime proven is in its frustrated stage, the civil
indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be ₱50,000.00, and an award of ₱25,000.00 civil
indemnity and ₱25,000.00 moral damages when the crime proven is in its attempted stage. The difference in the
amounts awarded for the stages is mainly due to the disparity in the outcome of the crime committed, in the same
way that the imposable penalty varies for each stage of the crime. The said amounts of civil indemnity and moral
damages awarded in cases of felonies in their frustrated or attempted stages shall be the bases when the crimes
committed constitute complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC. For example, in a crime of murder with attempted
murder, the amount of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is ₱100,000.00 each, while in the
attempted murder, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is ₱25,000.00 each.
In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide, several victims (except the robbers)
sustained injuries, they shall likewise be indemnified. It must be remembered that in a special complex crime, unlike
in a complex crime, the component crimes have no attempted or frustrated stages because the intention of the
offender/s is to commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the process of committing the said crime, another
crime is committed. For example, if on the occasion of a robbery with homicide, other victims sustained injuries,
regardless of the severity, the crime committed is still robbery with homicide as the injuries become part of the crime,
"Homicide", in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, is understood in its generic sense and now forms
part of the essential element of robbery,103 which is the use of violence or the use of force upon anything. Hence, the
nature and severity of the injuries sustained by the victims must still be determined for the purpose of awarding civil
indemnity and damages. If a victim suffered mortal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical
intervention, the victim should be awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages equivalent to the
damages awarded in a frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered injuries that are not fatal, an award of civil indemnity,
moral damages and exemplary damages should likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages awarded in an
attempted stage.
In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, like homicide,
death under tumultuous affray, reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of
the victim shall be ₱50,000.00 and ₱50,000.00 moral damages without exemplary damages being awarded.
However, an award of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages in a crime of homicide shall be added if there is an
aggravating circumstance present that has been proven but not alleged in the information.
Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain cases. The award of
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral
expenses is presented in the trial court.104 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be
recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was
not proved.105 In this case, the Court now increases the amount to be awarded as temperate damages to ₱50,000.00.
In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders committed were further made atrocious
by the fact that the victims are innocent, defenseless minors – one is a mere 3½-year-old toddler, and the other a 13-
year-old girl. The increase in the amount of awards for damages is befitting to show not only the Court's, but all of
society's outrage over such crimes and wastage of lives.
In summary:
I. For those crimes106 like, Murder,107 Parricide,108 Serious Intentional Mutilation,109 Infanticide,110 and other
crimes involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
ii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages111 – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted: 112
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:
 a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death, injuries, or sexual abuse
results, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages will depend on the penalty, extent of
violence and sexual abuse; and the number of victims where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime committed. In other
complex crimes where death does not result, like in Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil
indemnity, moral and exemplary damages depend on the prescribed penalty and the penalty
imposed, as the case may be.
IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide,113 Robbery with Rape,114 Robbery with
Intentional Mutilation,115 Robbery with
Arson,116 Rape with Homicide,117 Kidnapping with Murder,118 Carnapping with Homicide119 or Carnapping with
Rape,120 Highway Robbery with Homicide,121 Qualified Piracy,122 Arson with Homicide,123 Hazing with Death,
Rape, Sodomy or Mutilation124 and other crimes with death, injuries, and sexual abuse as the composite
crimes, where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the
penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua although death did not occur.
1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds 125 and could have died if not for a timely
medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.
 2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical
intervention, the following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
In Robbery with Physical Injuries,126 the amount of damages shall likewise be dependent on the
nature/severity of the wounds sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.
The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the robber/s or
perpetrator/s are themselves killed or injured in the incident.
1âwphi 1

Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply, and that for every
additional rape committed, whether against the same victim or other victims, the victims shall be
entitled to the same damages unless the other crimes of rape are treated as separate crimes, in
which case, the damages awarded to simple rape/qualified rape shall apply.
V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, i.e.,
Homicide, Death under Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of the offender, 127 Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and Unintentional Abortion, etc.:
1.1 Where the crime was consummated:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes where there are no
stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and Death under tumultuous affray:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱30,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱30,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱20,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱20,000.00
If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not alleged in the
Information,128 in addition to the above mentioned amounts as civil indemnity and moral
damages, the amount of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages for consummated; ₱30,000.00
for frustrated; and ₱20,000.00 for attempted, shall be awarded.
VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua and death occurs in the
course of the rebellion, the heirs of those who died are entitled to the following: 129
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00130
B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the rebellion and could have
died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
 b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented
in court, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded.
To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity is
P3,000.00, but does not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount cannot be changed, increasing the
amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants
it.131
Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended by the ordinary aggravating circumstance
of dwelling, appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the following damages: (1) ₱100,000.00 as
civil indemnity for each of the two children who died; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages for each of the two victims;
(3) another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the two victims; and (4) temperate damages in the
amount of ₱50,000.00 for each of the two deceased. For the four (4) counts of Attempted Murder, appellant should
pay ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of
the four victims. In addition, the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages
payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
decision until fully paid.132
Lastly, this Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal of the charges against Gilberto Estores
and Roger San Miguel who had been identified by Norberto Divina as the companions of appellant on the night the
shooting occurred. Norberto had been very straightforward and unwavering in his identification of Estores and San
Miguel as the two other people who fired the gunshots at his family. More significantly, as noted by the prosecutor,
the testimonies of Estores and San Miguel, who insisted they were not at the crime scene, tended to conflict with the
sworn statement of Danilo Fajarillo, which was the basis for the Provincial Prosecutor's ruling that he finds no
probable cause against the two. Danilo Fajarillo's sworn statement said that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a
certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm and the
two other people with him had no participation in the shooting incident. Said circumstances bolster the credibility of
Norberto Divina's testimony that Estores and San Miguel may have been involved in the killing of his two young
daughters.
After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy because the same only
attaches if the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached before the second; (2) the first
jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. In turn, a first
jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a
valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.133 In this case, the case against Estores and San Miguel was
dismissed before they were arraigned. Thus, there can be no double jeopardy to speak of. Let true justice be served
by reinvestigating the real participation, if any, of Estores and San Miguel in the killing of Mary Grace and Claudine
Divina.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 30, 2012 in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of murder defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and hereby sentences him to suffer two (2)
terms of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole under R.A. 9346. He is ORDERED to PAY the heirs
of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina the following amounts for each of the two victims: (a)
₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; (c) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and (d) ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of attempted murder defined and penalized under Article
248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling, and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder. He is ORDERED to PAY moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00, civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of PS0,000.00 to each of the four
victims, namely, Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina.
(3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil indemnity, moral
damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages.
 (4) Let the Office of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of Justice, be FURNISHED a copy of
this Decision. The Prosecutor General is DIRECTED to immediately conduct a REINVESTIGATION on the
possible criminal liability of Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel regarding this case. Likewise, let a copy of
this Decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice for his information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

On leave
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

No part
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
*
On leave .
**
No part.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora T. Lantion, with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Rodil
V. Zalameda, concurring; rollo. pp. 2-21.
2
Record, Vol. 1, pp. 2-3.
3
Record, Vol. II., p. 2.
4
Order of the Provincial Prosecutor, Record, Vol. I, pp. 12-14.
5
RTC Order, Record, Vol. II, pp. 66-67.
6
TSN, February 5, 2004, Folder of TSN's.
7
TSN, March 3, 2004, Folder of TSN's.
8
Id.
9
TSN, June 28, 2004, Folder of TSN's.
10
TSN's, February 10, 2005, April 7, 2005, February 15, 2006, August 3, 2006, September 6, 2006 and June
7, 2006.
11
Record, Vol, I, pp. 293-294.
12
Record, Vol. II, p. 131.
13
Supra note 1.
14
Rollo, p. 27.
15
Rollo, pp. 33-34.
16
People of the Philippines v. Renandang Mamaruncas, 680 Phil. 192, 211 (2012).
17
TSN, July 14, 2004, pp. 6-8.
18
People v. Nazareno, 698 Phil. 187, 193 (2012).
19
People v. Adviento, et al., 684 Phil. 507, 519 (2012)
Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall
20

be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or
assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the
use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging
or scoffing at his person or corpse.
21
Supra note 11, at 287.
468 Phil. 816, 840 (2004), citing People v. Bustamante; 445 Phil. 345, 363-364 (2003); People v. Magno,
22

379 Phil. 531, 554 (2000).

23
607 Phil. 480, 505 (2009).
24
"Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon."
25
Supra note 12, at 128-129.
26
682 Phil. 164 (2012).
27
People v. Cabtalan, supra, at 168.
28
G.R. No. 161308, January 15, 2014, 713 SCRA 311.
29
Medina, Jr. v. People, supra, at 320.
30
G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015.
31
People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al., supra.
32
694 Phil. 529, 581 (2012).
33
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
34
People v. Nelmida, supra note 32, at 569-570. (Emphasis omitted)
35
Supra note 32.
36
People v. Nelmida, supra, at 570.
37
Supra note 2.
38
Supra note 3.
39
674 Phil. 626, 635 (2011).1
40
People v. Evangelio, 672 Phil. 229, 248-249 (2011).
Revised Penal Code, Art. 63, par. (1), provides, in part, that when the penalty consists of two (2) indivisible
41

penalties and is attended by one or more aggravating circumstances, the greater penalty shall be applied,
and in this case, the death penalty shall be imposed.
42
People v. Combate, 653 Phil. 487, 504 (2010), citing People v. Victor, 354 Phil. 195, 209 (1998).
43
Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014, 724 SCRA 1, 57.
44
Id. at 58-59.
45
G.R. No. 104576, January 20, 1995, 240 SCRA 348, 356-357.
46
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1)A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article,
may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brother and sisters may bring the action mentioned in
No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
47
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should
find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Bagumbayan Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-66274, September 30, 1984, 132 SCRA 441,
48

446.
49
6A C.J.S. Assault § 68.
50
G.R. No. 160709, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 285, 296.
51
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should
find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
52
Lito Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, supra note 43, at 59.
53
People v. Dalisay, 620 Phil. 831, 844 (2009), citing People v. Catubig, 416 Phil. 102, 119 (2001),
citing American Cent. Corp. v. Stevens Van Lines, Inc., 103 Mich App 507, 303 NW2d 234; Morris v.
Duncan, 126 Ga 467, 54 SE 1045; Faircloth v. Greiner, 174 Ga app 845, 332 SE 2d 905; §731, 22 Am Jur
2d, p. 784; American Surety Co. v. Gold, 375 F 2d 523, 20 ALR 3d 335; Erwin v. Michigan, 188 Ark 658, 67
SW 2d 592.
54
§762, 22 Am Jur 2d pp. 817-818.
55
§733, 22 Am Jur 2d, p. 785; Symposium: Punitive Damages, 56 So Cal LR 1, November 1982.
56
People v. Catubig, supra note 53, at 119-120.
57
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusations. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable
a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
(Emphasis supplied)
58
G.R. Nos. 82223-24, November 13, 1992, 215 SCRA 613, 634.
59
322 Phil. 551 (1996).
60
617 Phil. 587 (2009).
61
613 Phil. 507 (2009).
62
605 Phil. 877 (2009).
63
People v. Abellera, 553 Phil. 307 (2007).
64
People v. Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, 706 SCRA 508, 533-534.
65
People v. Combate, supra note 41, at 509.
66
Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or
seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of
the cargo of said vessel, its equipment or passengers. The same penalty shall be inflicted in case of mutiny
on the high seas or in Philippine waters.
67
Id.
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
68

under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion temporal. x x x
Art. 123. Qualified piracy. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon those who
69

commit any of the crimes referred to in the preceding article, under any of the following circumstances:
1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same;
2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of saving themselves or;
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries or rape.
70
Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. - If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from
arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or
death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which
was not prosecuted. x x x
71
Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
72
Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall
be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or
assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any
other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging
or scoffing at his person or corpse.
Art. 255. Infanticide. - The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for murder in Article 248 shall
73

be imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less than three days of age.
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
74

another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained;
or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.
xxxx
75
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied
by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
x x x x.
Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any
76

person who shall burn:

1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of
simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people
usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental
function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and conferences,
or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient
dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of whether the offender had
knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and
regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or
conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are devoted
to the service of public utilities.
 5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of
another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to
collect from insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed
by two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is merely
to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the commission or
another violation of law.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordnance,
storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.
xxxx
77
Republic Act No. 7080 (1991), Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any public officer
who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In
the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall
declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the
properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.
78
Republic Act No. 6539 (1972), Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty of
carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle
taken, be punished by x x x the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner,
driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
79
RA 9346, Sec. 2.
80
532 Phil. 368, 385 (2006).
81
532 Phil. 414, 428 (2006).
82
See People v. Sarcia, 615 Phil. 97 (2009).
83
Supra note 41.
84
People v. Victor, supra, at 210.
85
People v. Gambao, supra note 64, at 533.
86
384 Phil. 766 (2000).
87
People v. Arizapa, supra.
88
436 Phil. 719 (2002).
89
Supra note 64.
90
People v. Gambao, supra note 64.
91
People v. Victor, supra note 42, at 210.
92
ARTICLE 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
93
674 Phil. 444 (2011).
94
315 Phil. 314 (1995).
95
Id. at 338.
96
608 Phil. 701 (2009).
 People v. De Leon, supra, at 716-717, citing People v. Salazar, 342 Phil. 745, 765 (1997); People v.
97

Abuyen, G.R. No. 77285, September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 569, 582; People v. Ponciano, G.R. No. 86453,
December 5, 1991, 204 SCRA 627, 639 and People v. Mangulabnan, et al., 99 Phil. 992, 999 (1956).
People v. Nanas, 415 Phil. 683 (2001), citing People v. Penillos, G.R. No. 65673, January 30, 1992, 205
98

SCRA 546, 564 and People v. Sequiño, 332 Phil. 90 (1996).

99
400 Phil. 1221 (2000).
People v. Macabales, supra, at 1236-1237, citing People v. Vivas, G.R. No. 100914, May 6, 1994, 232
100

SCRA 238, 242.

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. — Any person guilty of
101

robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed.
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua when the robbery
shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or if by reason or on occasion of
such robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263 shall have been
inflicted; Provided, however, that when the robbery accompanied with rape is committed with a use
of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death (As
amended by PD No. 767).
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, any of the
physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph, shall have been inflicted.
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, if
the violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery shall have been carried to a
degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or when the course of its execution,
the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the
physical injuries covered by sub-divisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263. (As amended by R.A. 18)
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period
in other cases. (As amended by R. A. 18).
102
People v. De Leon, supra note 96; People v. Ebet, 649 Phil. 181 (2010).
Revised Penal Code, Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. - Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take
103

any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or
using force upon anything, shall be guilty of robbery.
104
People v. Tagudar, 600 Phil. 565, 590 (2009), citing People v. Dacillo, 471 Phil. 497, 510 (2004).
105
Id., citing People v. Surongon, 554 Phil. 448, 458 (2007).
106
Article 255, RTC.
107
Article 248, RTC.
108
Article 246, RTC.
109
Article 262, RTC.
110
Note that if the crime penalized in Article 255 [Infanticide] was committed by the mother of the child for the
purpose of concealing her dishonor, she shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and
maximum periods, and if said crime was committed for the same purpose by the maternal grandparents or
either of them, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal. (As amended by R.A. 7659). Hence, the damages to
be awarded should be the same as in Roman Numeral Number Five (V) of the summary, i.e., In other
crimes that result in the death of the victim and the penalty consists of divisible, because the prescribed
penalties are divisible.
Exemplary damages in rape cases are awarded for the inherent bestiality of the act committed even if no
111

aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime.

112
There is no frustrated stage in the crime of rape.
113
Art. 294 (1), RPC.
114
Id.
115
Id.
 116
Id.
117
Art. 266-A, RPC as amended by RA 8353.
118
Art. 267, RPC.
119
RA No. 6539.
120
Id.
121
P.D. 532.
122
Art. 123, RPC.
123
Art. 320, RPC.
124
RA No. 8049.
This is so because there are no stages of the component crime in special complex crimes but the victims
125

must be compensated as if the component crimes were separately committed.

126
Art. 294 (3), RPC.
If the crime of infanticide in Art. 255 of the RPC was committed by the mother of the child or by the
127

maternal grandparent/s in order to conceal her dishonor, the penalties against them are divisible, i.e., prision
mayor in its medium and maximum periods, and reclusion temporal, respectively.
128
See People v. Catubig, supra note 53.
Although the penalty prescribed by law is reclusion perpetua, the damages awarded should be the same
129

as those where the penalty is death due to the gravity of the offense and the manner of committing the
same.
In order to deter the commission of the crime of rebellion and serve as an example, exemplary damages
130

should be awarded.
131
Supra note 38.
See Dario Nacar v. Gallery Frames and/or Felipe Bordey, Jr., G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703
132

SCRA 439, 459.

133
Quiambao v. People, G.R. No. 185267, September 17, 2014, 735 SCRA 345, 356-357.

G.R. No. L-4160 July 29, 1952

ANITA TAN, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
STANDARD VACUUM OIL CO., JULITO STO DOMINGO, IGMIDIO RICO, and RURAL TRANSIT CO.,defendants-
appellees.
Alberto R. de Joya for appellant.
Ross, Selph, Carrascoso and Janda for appellees Standard Vacuum Oil Company, Sto. Domingo and Rico.
Arnaldo J. Guzman for appellee Rural Transit Co.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Anita Tan is the owner of the house of strong materials based in the City of Manila, Philippines. On May 3, 1949, the
Standard Vacuum Oil Company ordered the delivery to the Rural Transit Company at its garage at Rizal Avenue
Extension, City of Manila, of 1,925 gallons of gasoline using a gasoline tank-truck trailer. The truck was driven by
Julito Sto. Domingo, who was helped Igmidio Rico. While the gasoline was being discharged to the underground
tank, it caught fire, whereupon Julito Sto. Domingo drove the truck across the Rizal Avenue Extension and upon
reaching the middle of the street he abondoned the truck with continued moving to the opposite side of the first street
causing the buildings on that side to be burned and detroyed. The house of Anita Tan was among those destroyed
and for its repair she spent P12,000.
As an aftermath of the fire, Julito Sto. Domingo and Imigidio Rico were charged with arson through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Manila where, after trial, both were acquitted, the court holding that their
negligence was not proven and the fire was due to an unfortunate accident.
Anita Tan then brought the action against the Standard Vacuum Oil Company and the Rural Transit Company;,
including the two employees, seeking to recover the damages she has suffered for the destruction of her house.
Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss alleging in substance that (a) plaintiff's action is barred by prior
judgment and (b) plaintiff's complaint states no cause of action; and this motion having been sustained, plaintiff
elevated the case to this Court imputing eight errors to the court a quo.
The record discloses that the lower court dismissed this case in view of the acquittal of the two employees of
defendant Standard Vacuum Oil Company who were charged with arson through reckless imprudence in the Court of
First Instance of Manila. In concluding that accused were not guilty of the acts charged because of the fire was
accidental, the court made the following findings: "the accused Imigidio Rico cannot in any manner be held
responsible for the fire to the three houses and goods therein above mentioned. He was not the cause of it, and he
took all the necessary precautions against such contingency as he was confronted with. The evidence throws no light
on the cause of fire. The witnesses for the prosecution and for the defense testified that they did not know what
caused the fire. It was unfortunate accident for which the accused Iigmidio Rico cannot be held responsible." And a
similar finding was made with respect to the other accused that the information filed against the accused by the Fiscal
contains an itemized statement of the damages suffered by the victims, including the one suffered by Anita Tan,
thereby indicating the intention of the prosecution to demand indemnity from the accused in the same action, but that
notwithstanding this statement with respect to damages, Anita Tan did not make any reservation of her right to file a
separate civil action against the accused as required by the Rules of Court Rule 107, section 1-(a). As Anita Tan
failed to make reservation, and the accused were acquitted, the lower court ruled that she is now barred from filing
this action against the defendants.
This ruling is so far as defendants Julio Sto. Domingo and Imigidio Rico are concerned is correct. The rule is that
"extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from the
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist" (Rule 107, section 1-d, Rules
of Court). This provision means that the acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily
extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might
arise and did not exist. Here it is true that Julito Sto. Domingo and Igmidio Rico were acquitted, the court holding that
they were not responsible for the fire that destroyed the house of the plaintiff,—which as a rule will not necessarily
extinguish their civil liability,—but the court went further by stating that the evidence throws no light on the cause of
fire and that it was an unfortunate accident for which the accused cannot be held responsible. In our opinion, this
declaration fits well into the exception of the rule which exempts the two accused from civil liability. When the court
acquitted the accused because the fire was due to an unfortunate accident it actually said that the fire was due to a
fortuitous event for which the accused are not to blame. It actually exonerated them from civil liability.
But the case takes a different aspect with respect to the other defendants. For one thing, the principle of res
judicata cannot apply to them for the simple reason that they were not included as co-accused in the criminal case.
Not having been included in the criminal case they cannot enjoy the benefit resulting from the acquittal of the
accused. This benefit can only be claimed by the accused if a subsequent action is later taken against them under
the Revised Penal Code. And this action can only be maintained if proper reservation is made and there is no
express declaration that the basis of the civil action has not existed. It is, therefore, an error for the lower court to
dismiss the case against these two defendants more so when their civil liability is predicated or facts other than those
attributed to the two employees in the criminal case.
Take, for instance, of the Standard Vacuum Oil Company. this company is sued not precisely because of supposed
negligent acts of its two employees Julito Sto. Domingo and Igmidio Rico but because of acts of its own which might
have contributed to the fire that destroyed the house of the plaintiff. The complaint contains definite allegations of
negligent acts properly attributable to the company which proven and not refuted may serve as basis of its civil
liability. Thus, in paragraph 5 of the first cause of action, it is expressly alleged that this company, through its
employees, failed to take the necessary precautions or measures to insure safety and avoid harm to person and
damage to property as well as to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demanded, thereby causing the gasoline they were unloading to catch fire. the precautions or measures which
this company has allegedly failed to take to prevent fire are not clearly stated, but they are matters of evidence which
need not now be determined. Suffice it to say that such allegation furnishes enough basis for a cause of action
against this company. There is no need for the plaintiff to make a reservation of her right to file a separate civil action,
for as this court already held in a number of cases, such reservation is not necessary when the civil action
contemplated is not derived from the criminal liability but one based on culpa aquiliana under the Old Civil Code
(articles 1902 to 1910). These two acts are separate and distinct and should not be confused one with the other.
Plaintiff can choose either (Asuncion Parker vs. Hon. A.J Panlilio supra, p. 1.)
The case of the Rural Transit Co. is even more different as it is predicated on a special provisions of the Revised
Penal Code. Thus, article 101, Rule 2, of said Code provides:
 Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability established in
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules:
xxx xxx xxx
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been
prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they have received.
And on this point, the complaint contains the following averments:
3. That after the corresponding trial the said defendants were acquitted and defendant Julio Sto. Domingo
was acquitted, on the ground that he so acted causing damage to another in order to avoid a greater evil or
injury, under article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as shown by the pertinent portion of the
decision of this Honorable Court in said case, dated October 28, 1949, which reads as follows:
Under the foregoing facts, there can be no doubt that had the accused Julito Sto. Domingo not taken the
gasoline tank-truck trailer out in the street, a bigger conflagration would have occurred in Rizal Avenue
Extension, and, perhaps, there might have been several deaths and bearing in mind the provisions of Article
11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code the accused Julito Sto. Domingo incurred no criminal liability.
4. That it was consequently the defendant Rural Transit Co., from whose premises the burning gasoline
tank-truck trailer was driven out by defendant Julito Sto. Domingo in order to avoid a greater evil or injury, for
whose benefit the harm has been prevented under article 101, second subsection of the Revised Penal
Code.
Considering the above quoted law and facts, the cause of action against the Rural Transit Company can hardly be
disputed, it appearing that the damage caused to the plaintiff was brought about mainly because of the desire of
driver Julito Sto. Domingo to avoid greater evil or harm, which would have been the case had he not brought the
tank-truck trailer to the middle of the street, for then the fire would have caused the explosion of the gasoline deposit
of the company which would have resulted in a conflagration of much greater proportion and consequences to the
houses nearby or surrounding it. It cannot be denied that this company is one of those for whose benefit a greater
harm has been prevented, and as such it comes within the purview of said penal provision. The acquittal of the
accused cannot, therefore, be deemed a bar to a civil action against this company because its civil liability is
completely divorced from the criminal liability of the accused. The rule regarding reservation of the right to file a
separate civil action does not apply to it.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby modified as follows: it is affirmed with regard to defendants Julito Sto.
Domingo and Igmidio Rico; but it is reserved with regard to defendants Standard Vacuum Oil Company and Rural
Transit Company, with costs.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. 192123 March 10, 2014

DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has been pronounced guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA). He had been
part of the team of anesthesiologists during the surgical pull-through operation conducted on a three-year old patient
born with an imperforate anus.1
The antecedents are as follows:
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 2 with an imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald
underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out through the abdominal
wall,3 enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body. 4
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through
operation.5Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Luceño, Dr.
Donatella Valeña and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and
petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum).6 During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, 7 and went into
a coma.8His coma lasted for two weeks,9 but he regained consciousness only after a month.10 He could no longer see,
hear or move.11
Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against the attending
physicians.12
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office filed an information solely against Dr.
Solidum,13alleging: –
That on or about May 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then an anesthesiologist at
the Ospital ng Maynila, Malate, this City, and as such was tasked to administer the anesthesia on three-year old baby
boy GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO, represented by his mother, MA. LUZ GERCAYO, the former having been born
with an imperforate anus [no anal opening] and was to undergo an operation for anal opening [pull through
operation], did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and neglect to use the care and diligence as the
best of his judgment would dictate under said circumstance, by failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of
anesthesia administered to said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic
medications, causing as a consequence of his said carelessness and negligence, said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO
suffered a cardiac arrest and consequently a defect called hypoxic encephalopathy meaning insufficient oxygen
supply in the brain, thereby rendering said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO incapable of moving his body, seeing,
speaking or hearing, to his damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.14
The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, but was transferred to the RTC pursuant to
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997), 15 where it was docketed as Criminal Case No.
01-190889.
Judgment of the RTC
On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries,16 decreeing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor as minimum to ONE (1) YEAR, ONE (1) MONTH and TEN
(10) DAYS of prision correccional as maximum and to indemnify, jointly and severally with the Ospital ng Maynila, Dr.
Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella, private complainant Luz Gercayo, the amount of ₱500,000.00 as moral damages
and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.17
Upon motion of Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella to reconsider their solidary liability, 18 the RTC excluded them
from solidary liability as to the damages, modifying its decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Dr. Fernando Solidum, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principal of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year, one (1) month and ten (10) days of prision correccional as
maximum and to indemnify jointly and severally with Ospital ng Maynila, private complainant Luz Gercayo the amount
of ₱500,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled.19
Decision of the CA
On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum, 20 pertinently stating and ruling:
The case appears to be a textbook example of res ipsa loquitur.
xxxx
x x x [P]rior to the operation, the child was evaluated and found fit to undergo a major operation. As noted by the
OSG, the accused himself testified that pre-operation tests were conducted to ensure that the child could withstand
the surgery. Except for his imperforate anus, the child was healthy. The tests and other procedures failed to reveal
that he was suffering from any known ailment or disability that could turn into a significant risk. There was not a hint
that the nature of the operation itself was a causative factor in the events that finally led to hypoxia.
In short, the lower court has been left with no reasonable hypothesis except to attribute the accident to a failure in the
proper administration of anesthesia, the gravamen of the charge in this case. The High Court elucidates in Ramos vs.
Court of Appeals 321 SCRA 584 –
In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper
proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge
can determine the proper standard of care.
Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due
care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it
occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or
omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without
need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed
because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury
suffered by him.
The lower court has found that such a nexus exists between the act complained of and the injury sustained, and in
line with the hornbook rules on evidence, we will afford the factual findings of a trial court the respect they deserve in
the absence of a showing of arbitrariness or disregard of material facts that might affect the disposition of the case.
People v. Paraiso 349 SCRA 335.
The res ipsa loquitur test has been known to be applied in criminal cases. Although it creates a presumption of
negligence, it need not offend due process, as long as the accused is afforded the opportunity to go forward with his
own evidence and prove that he has no criminal intent. It is in this light not inconsistent with the constitutional
presumption of innocence of an accused.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the modified decision of the lower court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.21
Dr. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion on May 7, 2010. 22
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
Dr. Solidum avers that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER
COURT IN UPHOLDING THE PETITIONER’S CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON
THE TRIAL COURT’S OPINION, AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF THE FACTS ESTABLISHED DURING THE
TRIAL. ALSO, THERE IS A CLEAR MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS WHICH IF CORRECTED, WILL
RESULT TO THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PETITIONER. FURTHER, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE SAID DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT, AS THIS BREACHES THE CRIMINAL LAW
PRINCIPLE THAT THE PROSECUTION MUST PROVE THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE INFORMATION
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF ITS PRESUMPTIVE CONCLUSION.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITOR (sic) WHEN THE DEFENSE WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT THERE IS NO NEGLIGENCE ON
THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AND NO OVERDOSING IN THE APPLICATION OF THE ANESTHETIC
AGENT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO 100% HALOTHANE ADMINISTERED TO THE CHILD, BUT ONLY
ONE (1%) PERCENT AND THE APPLICATION THEREOF, WAS REGULATED BY AN ANESTHESIA
MACHINE. THUS, THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR (sic)
CONTRADICTED THE ESTABLISHED FACTS AND THE LAW APPLICABLE IN THE CASE.
III.
THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IS NOT JUSTIFIED THERE BEING
NO NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER. ASSUMING THAT THE CHILD IS ENTITLED TO
FINANCIAL CONSIDERATION, IT SHOULD BE ONLY AS A FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, BECAUSE
THERE WAS NO NEGLIGENCE, AND NO OVERDOSING OF ANESTHETIC AGENT AND AS SUCH, THE
AWARD IS SO EXCESSIVE, AND NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS.23
To simplify, the following are the issues for resolution, namely: (a) whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
applicable herein; and (b) whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence.
 Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Applicability of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." The doctrine res ipsa loquitur
means that "where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from
want of care."24 It is simply "a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the
very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who
controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged
with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such
experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.
Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge." 25
Jarcia, Jr. v. People26 has underscored that the doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or
a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a given case, is not
meant to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence against the party charged. It
merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof, and helps the plaintiff in proving a
breach of the duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct
evidence is absent and not readily available.27
The applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases was significantly and exhaustively
explained in Ramos v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court said –
Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur has been applied
when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of
negligence as the cause of that harm. The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a
question of law since it is a judicial function to determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of
law, permit a given inference.
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a
negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the
proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such
matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of
mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill
and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable
degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external
appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses.
Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon
proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common
knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a
resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence
may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is
ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all
that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury
sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical
testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way,
under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations: leaving of a foreign object in
the body of the patient after an operation, injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not under, or in
the area, of treatment, removal of the wrong part of the body when another part was intended, knocking out a tooth
while a patient’s jaw was under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff
was under the influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation for appendicitis, among others.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been measurably enlarged, it does not
automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to
show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be
perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally
restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and
observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due
care had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of
something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of
those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no
application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific
treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not
correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not
available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not
accomplished. The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary
incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of
customary professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the
average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. If there was such extraneous
intervention, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain the matter,
by evidence of exculpation, if he could.
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must first be satisfied, to wit: (1)
the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or
agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must
not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured. 29
The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inappropriate. Although it should be
conceded without difficulty that the second and third elements were present, considering that the anesthetic agent
and the instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient, being then unconscious
during the operation, could not have been guilty of contributory negligence, the first element was undeniably wanting.
Luz delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians for a pull-through operation. Except for the
imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound body and mind at the time of his submission to the physicians. Yet, he
experienced bradycardia during the operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him immobile. Hypoxia, or
the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically termed as
bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through operation, or during the administration of
anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did not prove that the negligence of any of his attending physicians,
including the anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in
the course of the operation that the lack of oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting
them to administer atropine to the patient.30
This conclusion is not unprecedented. It was similarly reached in Swanson v. Brigham, 31 relevant portions of the
decision therein being as follows:
On January 7, 1973, Dr. Brigham admitted 15-year-old Randall Swanson to a hospital for the treatment of infectious
mononucleosis. The patient's symptoms had included a swollen throat and some breathing difficulty. Early in the
morning of January 9 the patient was restless, and at 1:30 a.m. Dr. Brigham examined the patient. His inspection of
the patient's air passage revealed that it was in satisfactory condition. At 4:15 a.m. Dr. Brigham received a telephone
call from the hospital, advising him that the patient was having respiratory difficulty. The doctor ordered that oxygen
be administered and he prepared to leave for the hospital. Ten minutes later, 4:25 a.m., the hospital called a second
time to advise the doctor that the patient was not responding. The doctor ordered that a medicine be administered,
and he departed for the hospital. When he arrived, the physician who had been on call at the hospital had begun
attempts to revive the patient. Dr. Brigham joined him in the effort, but the patient died.
The doctor who performed the autopsy concluded that the patient died between 4:25 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. of asphyxia,
as a result of a sudden, acute closing of the air passage. He also found that the air passage had been adequate to
maintain life up to 2 or 3 minutes prior to death. He did not know what caused the air passage to suddenly close.
xxxx
It is a rare occurrence when someone admitted to a hospital for the treatment of infectious mononucleosis dies of
asphyxiation. But that is not sufficient to invoke res ipsa loquitur. The fact that the injury rarely occurs does not in
itself prove that the injury was probably caused by someone's negligence. Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wn. App. 298, 474
P.2d 909 (1970). Nor is a bad result by itself enough to warrant the application of the doctrine. Nelson v. Murphy, 42
Wn.2d 737, 258 P.2d 472 (1953). See 2 S. Speiser, The Negligence Case – Res Ipsa Loquitur § 24:10 (1972). The
evidence presented is insufficient to establish the first element necessary for application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
The acute closing of the patient’s air passage and his resultant asphyxiation took place over a very short period of
time. Under these circumstances it would not be reasonable to infer that the physician was negligent. There was no
palpably negligent act. The common experience of mankind does not suggest that death would not be expected
without negligence. And there is no expert medical testimony to create an inference that negligence caused the
injury.
Negligence of Dr. Solidum
In view of the inapplicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court next determines whether the CA correctly
affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum for criminal negligence.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.32Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act
from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act.33
Dr. Solidum’s conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure to monitor and properly regulate the level of
anesthetic agent administered on Gerald by overdosing at 100% halothane. In affirming the conviction, the CA
observed:
On the witness stand, Dr. Vertido made a significant turnaround. He affirmed the findings and conclusions in his
report except for an observation which, to all intents and purposes, has become the storm center of this dispute. He
wanted to correct one piece of information regarding the dosage of the anesthetic agent administered to the child. He
declared that he made a mistake in reporting a 100% halothane and said that based on the records it should have
been 100% oxygen.
The records he was relying on, as he explains, are the following:
(a) the anesthesia record – A portion of the chart in the record was marked as Exhibit 1-A and 1-B to
indicate the administration at intervals of the anesthetic agent.
(b) the clinical abstract – A portion of this record that reads as follows was marked Exhibit 3A. 3B –
Approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes through the operation, patient was noted to have bradycardia (CR =
70) and ATSO4 0.2 mg was immediately administered. However, the bradycardia persisted, the inhalational
agent was shut off, and the patient was ventilated with 100% oxygen and another dose of ATSO4 0.2 mg
was given. However, the patient did not respond until no cardiac rate can be auscultated and the surgeons
were immediately told to stop the operation. The patient was put on a supine position and CPR was initiated.
Patient was given 1 amp of epinephrine initially while continuously doing cardiac massage – still with no
cardiac rate appreciated; another ampule of epinephrine was given and after 45 secs, patient’s vital signs
returned to normal. The entire resuscitation lasted approximately 3-5 mins. The surgeons were then told to
proceed to the closure and the child’s vital signs throughout and until the end of surgery were: BP = 110/70;
CR = 116/min and RR = 20-22 cycles/min (on assisted ventilation).
Dr. Vertido points to the crucial passage in the clinical abstract that the patient was ventilated with 100% oxygen and
another dose of ATSO4 when the bradycardia persisted, but for one reason or another, he read it as 100%
halothane. He was asked to read the anesthesia record on the percentage of the dosage indicated, but he could only
sheepishly note I can’t understand the number. There are no clues in the clinical abstract on the quantity of the
anesthetic agent used. It only contains the information that the anesthetic plan was to put the patient under general
anesthesia using a nonrebreathing system with halothane as the sole anesthetic agent and that 1 hour and 45
minutes after the operation began, bradycardia occurred after which the inhalational agent was shut off and the
patient administered with 100% oxygen. It would be apparent that the 100% oxygen that Dr. Vertido said should be
read in lieu of 100% halothane was the pure oxygen introduced after something went amiss in the operation and the
halothane itself was reduced or shut off.
The key question remains – what was the quantity of halothane used before bradycardia set in?
The implication of Dr. Vertido’s admission is that there was no overdose of the anesthetic agent, and the accused Dr.
Solidum stakes his liberty and reputation on this conclusion. He made the assurance that he gave his patient the
utmost medical care, never leaving the operating room except for a few minutes to answer the call of nature but
leaving behind the other members of his team Drs. Abella and Razon to monitor the operation. He insisted that he
administered only a point 1% not 100% halothane, receiving corroboration from Dr. Abella whose initial MA in the
record should be enough to show that she assisted in the operation and was therefore conversant of the things that
happened. She revealed that they were using a machine that closely monitored the concentration of the agent during
the operation.
But most compelling is Dr. Solidum’s interpretation of the anesthesia record itself, as he takes the bull by the horns,
so to speak. In his affidavit, he says, reading from the record, that the quantity of halothane used in the operation is
one percent (1%) delivered at time intervals of 15 minutes. He studiedly mentions – the concentration of halothane as
reflected in the anesthesia record (Annex D of the complaint-affidavit) is only one percent (1%) – The numbers
indicated in 15 minute increments for halothane is an indication that only 1% halothane is being delivered to the
patient Gerard Gercayo for his entire operation; The amount of halothane delivered in this case which is only one
percent cannot be summated because halothane is constantly being rapidly eliminated by the body during the entire
operation.
xxxx
In finding the accused guilty, despite these explanations, the RTC argued that the volte-face of Dr. Vertido on the
question of the dosage of the anesthetic used on the child would not really validate the non-guilt of the
anesthesiologist. Led to agree that the halothane used was not 100% as initially believed, he was nonetheless
unaware of the implications of the change in his testimony. The court observed that Dr. Vertido had described the
condition of the child as hypoxia which is deprivation of oxygen, a diagnosis supported by the results of the CT Scan.
All the symptoms attributed to a failing central nervous system such as stupor, loss of consciousness, decrease in
heart rate, loss of usual acuity and abnormal motor function, are manifestations of this condition or syndrome. But
why would there be deprivation of oxygen if 100% oxygen to 1% halothane was used? Ultimately, to the court,
whether oxygen or halothane was the object of mistake, the detrimental effects of the operation are incontestable,
and they can only be led to one conclusion – if the application of anesthesia was really closely monitored, the event
could not have happened.34
The Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence beyond reasonable doubt because the
circumstances cited by the CA were insufficient to establish that Dr. Solidum had been guilty of inexcusable lack of
precaution in monitoring the administration of the anesthetic agent to Gerald. The Court aptly explained in Cruz v.
Court of Appeals35 that:
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be
determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under
similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present
state of medical science. In the recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et. al., this Court stated
that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by
physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of
his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent
doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that
expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the physician's
conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved
in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert
testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.
xxxx
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a
reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a
causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient. In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital, Inc.,
where the attending physician was absolved of liability for the death of the complainant’s wife and newborn baby, this
Court held that:
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is
sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury
must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a
right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is
that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’"
An action upon medical negligence – whether criminal, civil or administrative – calls for the plaintiff to prove by
competent evidence each of the following four elements, namely: (a) the duty owed by the physician to the patient, as
created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in accordance with the specific norms or standards established by
his profession; (b) the breach of the duty by the physician’s failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard of
care; (3) the causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably close and causal connection between the negligent act or
omission and the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the patient. 36
In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the patient against unreasonable risk, commonly
referred to as standards of care, set the duty of the physician to act in respect of the patient. Unfortunately, no clear
definition of the duty of a particular physician in a particular case exists. Because most medical malpractice cases are
highly technical, witnesses with special medical qualifications must provide guidance by giving the knowledge
necessary to render a fair and just verdict. As a result, the standard of medical care of a prudent physician must be
determined from expert testimony in most cases; and in the case of a specialist (like an anesthesiologist), the
standard of care by which the specialist is judged is the care and skill commonly possessed and exercised by similar
specialists under similar circumstances. The specialty standard of care may be higher than that required of the
general practitioner.37
The standard of care is an objective standard by which the conduct of a physician sued for negligence or malpractice
may be measured, and it does not depend, therefore, on any individual physician’s own knowledge either. In
attempting to fix a standard by which a court may determine whether the physician has properly performed the
requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is required. The
judge, as the trier of fact, ultimately determines the standard of care, after listening to the testimony of all medical
experts.38
Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical qualifications in anesthesia to provide guidance to
the trial court on what standard of care was applicable. It would consequently be truly difficult, if not impossible, to
determine whether the first three elements of a negligence and malpractice action were attendant.
Although the Prosecution presented Dr. Benigno Sulit, Jr., an anesthesiologist himself who served as the Chairman
of the Committee on Ethics and Malpractice of the Philippine Society of Anesthesiologists that investigated the
complaint against Dr. Solidum, his testimony mainly focused on how his Committee had conducted the
investigation.39 Even then, the report of his Committee was favorable to Dr. Solidum, 40 to wit:
Presented for review by this committee is the case of a 3 year old male who underwent a pull-thru operation and was
administered general anesthesia by a team of anesthesia residents. The patient, at the time when the surgeons was
manipulating the recto-sigmoid and pulling it down in preparation for the anastomosis, had bradycardia. The
anesthesiologists, sensing that the cause thereof was the triggering of the vago-vagal reflex, administered atropine to
block it but despite the administration of the drug in two doses, cardiac arrest ensued. As the records show, prompt
resuscitative measures were administered and spontaneous cardiac function re-established in less than five (5)
minutes and that oxygen was continuously being administered throughout, unfortunately, as later become manifest,
patient suffered permanent irreversible brain damage.
In view of the actuations of the anaesthesiologists and the administration of anaesthesia, the committee find that the
same were all in accordance with the universally accepted standards of medical care and there is no evidence of any
fault or negligence on the part of the anaesthesiologists.
Dr. Antonio Vertido, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, was also presented as a
Prosecution witness, but his testimony concentrated on the results of the physical examination he had conducted on
Gerald, as borne out by the following portions of his direct examination, to wit:
FISCAL CABARON Doctor, what do you mean by General Anesthetic Agent?
WITNESS General Anesthetic Agent is a substance used in the conduction of Anesthesia and in this case, halothane
was used as a sole anesthetic agent.
xxxx
Q Now under paragraph two of page 1 of your report you mentioned that after one hour and 45 minutes after the
operation, the patient experienced a bradycardia or slowing of heart rate, now as a doctor, would you be able to tell
this Honorable Court as to what cause of the slowing of heart rate as to Gerald Gercayo?
WITNESS Well honestly sir, I cannot give you the reason why there was a bradycardia of time because is some
reason one way or another that might caused bradycardia.
FISCAL CABARON What could be the possible reason?
A Well bradycardia can be caused by anesthetic agent itself and that is a possibility, we’re talking about possibility
here.
Q What other possibility do you have in mind, doctor?
A Well, because it was an operation, anything can happen within that situation.
FISCAL CABARON Now, this representation would like to ask you about the slowing of heart rate, now what is the
immediate cause of the slowing of the heart rate of a person?
WITNESS Well, one of the more practical reason why there is slowing of the heart rate is when you do a vagal reflex
in the neck wherein the vagal receptors are located at the lateral part of the neck, when you press that, you produce
the slowing of the heart rate that produce bradycardia.
Q I am pro[p]ounding to you another question doctor, what about the deficiency in the supply of oxygen by the
patient, would that also cause the slowing of the heart rate?
A Well that is a possibility sir, I mean not as slowing of the heart rate, if there is a hypoxia or there is a low oxygen
level in the blood, the normal thing for the heart is to pump or to do not a bradycardia but a … to counter act the
Hypoxia that is being experienced by the patient
(sic).
xxxx
Q Now, you made mention also doctor that the use of general anesthesia using 100% halothane and other anesthetic
medications probably were contributory to the production of hypoxia.
A Yes, sir in general sir.41
On cross-examination, Dr. Vertido expounded more specifically on his interpretation of the anesthesia record and the
factors that could have caused Gerald to experience bradycardia, viz:
ATTY. COMIA I noticed in, may I see your report Doctor, page 3, will you kindly read to this Honorable court your last
paragraph and if you will affirm that as if it is correct?
A "The use of General Anesthesia, that is using 100% Halothane probably will be contributory to the production of
Hypoxia and - - - -"
ATTY COMIA And do you affirm the figure you mentioned in this Court Doctor?
WITNESS Based on the records, I know the - - -
Q 100%?
A 100% based on the records.
Q I will show you doctor a clinical record. I am a lawyer I am not a doctor but will you kindly look at this and tell me
where is 100%, the word "one hundred" or 1-0-0, will you kindly look at this Doctor, this Xerox copy if you can show to
this Honorable Court and even to this representation the word "one hundred" or 1-0-0 and then call me.
xxxx
ATTY. COMIA Doctor tell this Honorable Court where is that 100, 1-0-0 and if there is, you just call me and even the
attention of the Presiding Judge of this Court. Okay, you read one by one.
WITNESS Well, are you only asking 100%, sir?
ATTY. COMIA I’m asking you, just answer my question, did you see there 100% and 100 figures, tell me, yes or no?
WITNESS I’m trying to look at the 100%, there is no 100% there sir.
ATTY. COMIA Okay, that was good, so you Honor please, may we request also temporarily, because this is just a
xerox copy presented by the fiscal, that the percentage here that the Halothane administered by Dr. Solidum to the
patient is 1% only so may we request that this portion, temporarily your Honor, we are marking this anesthesia record
as our Exhibit 1 and then this 1% Halothane also be bracketed and the same be marked as our Exhibit "1-A".
xxxx
ATTY. COMIA Doctor, my attention was called also when you said that there are so many factors that contributed to
Hypoxia is that correct?
WITNESS Yes, sir.
Q I remember doctor, according to you there are so many factors that contributed to what you call hypoxia and
according to you, when this Gerald suffered hypoxia, there are other factors that might lead to this Hypoxia at the
time of this operation is that correct?
WITNESS The possibility is there, sir.
Q And according to you, it might also be the result of such other, some or it might be due to operations being
conducted by the doctor at the time when the operation is being done might also contribute to that hypoxia is that
correct?
A That is a possibility also.
xxxx
ATTY. COMIA How will you classify now the operation conducted to this Gerald, Doctor?
WITNESS Well, that is a major operation sir.
Q In other words, when you say major operation conducted to this Gerald, there is a possibility that this Gerald might
[be] exposed to some risk is that correct?
A That is a possibility sir.
Q And which according to you that Gerald suffered hypoxia is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that is one of the risk of that major operation is that correct?
A That is the risk sir.42
At the continuation of his cross-examination, Dr. Vertido maintained that Gerald’s operation for his imperforate anus,
considered a major operation, had exposed him to the risk of suffering the same condition. 43 He then corrected his
earlier finding that 100% halothane had been administered on Gerald by saying that it should be 100% oxygen. 44
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered
to said Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications." 45However, the foregoing
circumstances, taken together, did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly
imprudent in administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertido’s findings did not preclude the
probability that other factors related to Gerald’s major operation, which could or could not necessarily be attributed to
the administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and had then led Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr.
Vertido revealingly concluded in his report, instead, that "although the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine
and precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did occur." 46
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has engendered in the mind of the Court a
reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidum’s guilt, and moves us to acquit him of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
to serious physical injuries. "A reasonable doubt of guilt," according to United States v. Youthsey: 47
x x x is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a captious doubt; not a doubt
engendered merely by sympathy for the unfortunate position of the defendant, or a dislike to accept the responsibility
of convicting a fellow man. If, having weighed the evidence on both sides, you reach the conclusion that the
defendant is guilty, to that degree of certainty as would lead you to act on the faith of it in the most important and
crucial affairs of your life, you may properly convict him. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to a
mathematical demonstration. It is not proof beyond the possibility of mistake.
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him from civil liability. But we
1âw phi 1

cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because the circumstances that have been established here do not
present the factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There
was really no firm and competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner of
administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the
bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the
cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent
evidence.
Liability of Ospital ng Maynila
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we have to address the unusual decree of the
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr.
Solidum. The decree was flawed in logic and in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal
action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. 48 It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could
have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious
fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts
thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the
product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns that the RTC and the CA overlooked. We deem it
important, then, to express the following observations for the instruction of the Bench and Bar.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was
not respected from the outset. The R TC and the CA should have been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no
person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a
rule would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable
pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions
for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of industry."
The term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or business, especially one that employs labor
and capital, and is engaged in industry.49 However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in
industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and humanitarian work. 50 Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng
Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila
acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a
consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee
(which did not happen here), the execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES AND SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on January 20, 2010; ACQUITS Dr. Fernando P. Solidum of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
to serious physical injuries; and MAKES no pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Imperforate anus is a defect that is present from birth (congenital) in which the opening to the anus is
missing or blocked. The anus is the opening to the rectum through which stools leave the body.
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlinepluslencylarticlelOOI I 47.html. Visited on March 3, 2014.
2
Rollo, p. 55.
3
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ostomy.html. Visited on March 3, 2014.
4
Rollo, p. 10.
5
Id. at 53.
6
Id. at p. 10.
7
Bradycardia is an abnormally slow heart rate of less than 60 beats per minute. A normal heartbeat is
between 60 and 100 beats per minute. http://www.intelihealth.com/IH/ihtIH/c/9339/23653.html. Visited on
March 3, 2014.
8
Rollo, p. 55.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 11.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 51A-52.
14
Id. at 51A.
15
Id. at 53.
16
Id. at 53-81.
17
Records, p. 539.
18
Id. at 551-554.
19
Id. at 561.
 Rollo, pp. 10-21; penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III (retired), with Associate Justice
20

Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante concurring.

21
Id. at 12-21.
22
Id. at 22.
23
Id. at 30-31.
24
Jarcia, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 187926, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 336, 351.
25
Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999, 321 SCRA 584, 599.
26
Supra note 24, at 352.
27
Id.
28
Supra note 25, at 600-603.
29
Reyes v. Sisters of Mercy Hospital, G.R. No. 130547, October 3, 2000, 341 SCRA 760, 771.
30
Records, p. 110.
31
571 P.2d 217, 18 Wash. App. 647; Wash. Ct. App. 1917.
32
Gaid v. People, G.R. No. 171636, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 489, 497.
33
Id. at 495.
34
Rollo, pp. 87-91.
35
G.R. No. 122445, November 18, 1997, 282 SCRA 188, 200-202.
Flamm, Martin B., Medical Malpractice and the Physician Defendant, Chapter 11, Legal Medicine, Fourth
36

Edition (1998), pp. 123-124, American College of Legal Medicine, Mosby, Inc., St. Louis, Missouri.
37
Id. at 123-124.
38
Id. at 124.
39
TSN of December 1, 1999.
40
Records, p. 110.
41
TSN of November 11, 1997, pp. 16-31.
42
TSN of November 11, 1997, pp. 44-53.
43
TSN of December 10, 1997, pp. 2-3.
44
Id. at 5-10.
45
Rollo, p. 51.
46
TSN of December 10, 1997, p. 13.
47
91 Fed. Rep. 864, 868.
48
Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court.
49
Regalado, Criminal Law Conspectus, First Edition (2000), National Book Store, Inc., p. 263.
50
Id. at 264.

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Show opinions
DIVISION
[ GR Nos. 212656-57, Nov 23, 2016 ]
MAYOR AMADO CORPUZ v. PEOPLE +
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] and
Resolution[2] of the Sandiganbayan (SB) in Criminal Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0171 and SB-12-CRM-0172
dated 27 February 2014 and 23 May 2014, respectively, finding petitioner Mayor Amado. Corpuz, Jr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Falsification of Public Document under Article 171, paragraph
4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

Petitioner, in his official capacity as the Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, was indicted for two (2)
counts of the abovementioned criminal offense. The accusatory portions of the two (2) separate Informations
filed against him before the SB are as follows:
CRIM. CASE NO. SB-12-CRM-0171

That on 28 October 2009 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [petitioner], a public officer, being the
Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, acting in relation to his office and taking advantage of his official
position, did there and then deliberately, willfully and feloniously, falsify the Certificate of Marriage of Manny
Asuncion and Dina Lumanlan by certifying therein that it was he who solemnized their marriage when in
truth and in fact, he was not the one who solemnized the same but rather Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., Local Civil
Registrar (of) Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, to the damage and prejudice of the said couple and of public interest.

CRIM. CASE NO. SB-12-CRM-0172

That on 18 December 2009 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [petitioner], a public officer, being the
Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, acting in relation to his office and taking advantage of his official
position, did there and then deliberately, willfully and feloniously, falsify the Certificate of Marriage of Alex
Pascual and Esperanza Arizabal by certifying therein that it was he who solemnized their marriage when in
truth and in fact, he was not the one who solemnized the same but rather Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., Local Civil
Registrar (of) Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, to the damage and prejudice of the said couple and of public interest.[3]
As petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges, trial ensued with the prosecution presenting five (5)
witnesses, and the defense presenting three (3) witnesses, inclusive of documentary evidence admitted
therein, in order to resolve the jointly proposed issue of "who among the parties the complainant on the one
hand, [and] the married couples and the sponsors who attest to the fact that it was the accused who
solemnized the said marriage is telling the truth?"

At the trial, the prosecution presented complainant Arsenio Flores, a retired government employee who
testified that being one of the wedding sponsors of Alex Pascual and Esperanza Arizabal, he attended and
witnessed the actual ceremony of their wedding which was solemnized by Thelmo Corpuz, Sr., the
Municipal Registrar, and not petitioner, at the Municipal Registrar's Office where it was held; that with the
knowledge that said Municipal Registrar was not authorized to solemnize marriage, he did not sign as a
witness their marriage certificate, and thereafter searched for documents, including pictures and invitation
cards, in order to establish such illegal acts; that based on the documents he gathered, it was made to
appear that petitioner was the one who solemnized said marriages because of his signature appearing on
the corresponding marriage certificates; and that he could not explain why the subject marriage certificate
was already signed by petitioner when in fact he was not around during the ceremony, and was immediately
given to them on the same day.[4] His testimony was corroborated by Honorato M. Tolentino, the brother-in-
law of Alex Pascual, who testified that he rendered his services for free as a photographer during said
wedding, and witnessed the actual ceremony, with the observation that it was Thelmo Corpuz, Sr. who
solemnized the same.[5]

As to the marriage ceremony of Manny Asuncion and Dina Lumanlan, Jorge N. Lazaro, a freelance
photographer and pilot, testified that the latter and her mother engaged his services as a photographer, and
even requested his live-in partner, Tessie Atayde, to stand as one of the principal sponsors; that while taking
photos for the event, he naturally witnessed the actual ceremony which was held at the Senior Citizen
Building (now called Multi-Purpose Building); and that it was Thelmo Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal Registrar of
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, who actually solemnized said marriage.[6]

Lastly, the prosecution presented as rebuttal witness, Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., who testified that complainant
Arsenio Flores filed a case for usurpation of official functions against him before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) in connection with the marriages of the couples, which he allegedly solemnized; that he changed his
plea of NOT GUILTY to that of GUILTY, in order to have a peace of mind and to reveal the truth that it was
actually him who solemnized said marriages; that it was actually him who was standing in front of both
couples as shown by the pictures presented as evidence; that after pleading guilty, he immediately filed a
Petition for Probation before the same court; that he did not execute any affidavit of desistance to that effect;
and that his son Thelmo Corpuz III was already separated from the government service, and that in the
recent local elections, the latter sided with the political rival of petitioner.[7] The above narration was
corroborated and attested to by witness Felicisima D. Almonte, Clerk of Court of the MTC, with the
stipulation of the parties on the authenticity and due execution of its 15 July 2013 Decision. On cross-
examination, she affirmed that as part of the records of the case, that there was a counter--affidavit attached
therewith by Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., but without an affidavit of recantation against his previous counter-
affidavit denying such accusations against him; and that during the last local election, both Thelmo O.
Corpuz, Sr., and his son, Thelmo Corpuz, Jr., persuaded her to vote for petitioner's opponent.[8]

In his defense, petitioner himself testified. He insisted that he actually solemnized at his office the marriage
of spouses Pascual and that of spouses Asuncion; that spouses Asuncion executed a joint affidavit of
cohabitation based on Article 34 of the Family Code making them exempted from securing a marriage
license as appearing in their marriage contract; that complainant Arsenio Flores was not present at the
mayor's office when the wedding of spouses Pascual took place; that in the subject weddings, all signatures
appearing on the marriage certificates were actually signed in his presence; that as a mayor for eighteen (
18) years, he knew that the power to solemnize marriage cannot be delegated; and that he is aware that a
case for usurpation of official function was filed against Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., but has no knowledge about
his change of plea. The above testimonies were further bolstered by no other than the parties themselves of
said marriage ceremonies. Both Alex Y. Pascual and Manny M. Asuncion appeared and testified that
petitioner was indeed the one who solemnized their respective marriage; that their respective marriage is
valid and legal; that both ceremonies were held at the mayor's office; and that, as reflected in the pictures
shown by the prosecution, they appeared before Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr. only to receive marriage counseling
and to be taught on how to act during the actual ceremony, before they went to the mayor's office for the
actual solemnization by petitioner.[9]

From the foregoing testimonial and documentary evidence, including the stipulations between the parties,
the facts, as taken and appreciated by the SB, are presented as follows:
At the time material to the Informations, the [petitioner] was the incumbent Mayor of the Municipality of
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, while Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr. was the Municipal Civil Registrar until his retirement from
the service in 2011.

As set forth on the invitation for the Asuncion-Lumanlan Nuptials, the couple was united in matrimony on
October 28, 2009 at around 9:30 in the morning at Cuyapo Town Hall, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. Jorge N.
Lazaro attended the occasion along with his live-in partner Tessie Atayde, who was one of the principal
sponsors. Lazaro was hired as photographer for the event and was able to capture the actual ceremony. A
marriage certificate was then issued to Spouses Asuncion, duly signed by the [petitioner] as the solemnizing
officer.

Another wedding which took place at the Municipal Hall of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija on December 18, 2009 at
around 9:00 o'clock in the morning was that of Alex Pascual and Esperanza Arizabal. Among those present
was Arsenio Flores who stood as one of the principal sponsors. The ceremony was similarly witnessed by
Honorato M. Tolentino, a brother-in-law of the groom who was also hired as photographer for the said
wedding. As proof of the wedding, a marriage certificate bearing the signature of the [petitioner] as
solemnizing officer was thereafter issued to spouses Pascual.
Displeased with what transpired during the wedding ceremony of Alez and Esperanza, Arsenio Flores came
up with a complaint-affidavit, dated February 8, 2010, setting forth the violations committed by the
[petitioner] and that of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., the former as mere signatory of the marriage certificates, and
the latter acting as the solemnizing officer on behalf of the mayor. Flores' declaration with respect to the
Pascual-Arizabal nuptial was corroborated by the affidavit, dated March 22, 2010, of Honorato M. Tolentino,
Sr., who covered the said wedding. Flores included in his affidavit other nuptials specifically that of Manny
and Dina which was held on October 28, 2009 and which was also solemnized by Thelma Corpuz, Sr. His
statement was supported by Jorge Lazaro's affidavit, dated March 22, 2010, inclusive of snapshots he
personally took on that day. In view of Thelma O. Corpuz's entry of plea of guilty for two (2) counts of
usurpation of official functions filed against him before the Municipal Trial Court of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, the
court, in its Decision dated July 15, 2013, duly considered his plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance,
and imposed on him the straight penalty of one (1) year imprisonment for each case.

DISCUSSION

In his memorandum, the [petitioner] maintains his innocence as he questions the trustworthiness and
reliability of the prosecution's witnesses. According to him, the presumption of authenticity of public
documents, the marriage certificates in these cases, should prevail over the inconsistent testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution that it was not him who officiated these ceremonies. According to him also, the
couples themselves through Alex and Manny, who are definitely in the best position to attest that it was the
[petitioner] himself who solemnized their marriage, did so in open court and expressed such fact in their
Joint Affidavits. Further, the rebuttal evidence of the prosecution sans the affidavit of recantation of Thelmo
O. Corpuz, Sr., did not alter his previous declaration that he did not solemnize the subject weddings but the
herein [petitioner] who rightfully certified his deed in the marriage certificates. With these, the defense avers
that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the [petitioner] beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore,
the [petitioner] should be acquitted.

On the other hand, in its memorandum, the prosecution asserts that from the pieces of evidence presented
and the testimonies of its witnesses, it has proven all the elements of the offense charged based on the
quantum of evidence required by law. The accused clearly committed falsification of public documents by
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts when, by taking advantage of his official function, he
certified in the marriage certificates of spouses Asuncion and spouses Pascual that as the Municipal Mayor,
he personally solemnized their marriage when it was Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal Civil Registrar,
who did so on his behalf. Thus, for this false declaration, the [petitioner] should be held criminally liable.[10]
The Ruling of the Sandiganhayan

In the assailed Decision dated 27 February 2014, the SB found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the said crimes, the dispositive portion of which is stated hereunder for ready reference, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Court finds [petitioner] Amado R. Corpuz, Jr. GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of Falsification of Public Document, defined and penalized under Article
171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00 for each case,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.[11]
It ruled that with the prosecution's pieces of evidence taken together, all the elements of the crime of
falsification of public documents, by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, were adequately
established. The SB further explained that being a local chief executive and duly authorized officer to
solemnize marriage, petitioner was duty-bound to observe his solemn affirmation on the marriage
certificates. More so, by taking advantage of his official position, petitioner certified the particulars of an
event, the subject marriages, despite full knowledge that he did not personally solemnize the exchange of
marital vows of spouses Pascual and spouses Asuncion. In other words, what he certified was absolutely
false and for such reason, petitioner's guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt. By way of conclusion,
the court stressed that in falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present
the idea of gain or intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of public document, what is
being punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed.[12]

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof and his supplemental thereto were likewise denied for lack of
merit in the 23 May 2014 Resolution.

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter through a petition for review on certiorari before this Court
asserting the following errors, grounds or arguments:
1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (RESPONDENT COURT FOR BREVITY) COMMITTED SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN WITHOUT ANY JUSTIFICATION IT ADMITTED MERE PHOTOCOPIES OF
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE, I.E., (1) INVITATION CARDS AND (2) PICTURES OVER THE OBJECTION
OF THE DEFENSE -

1.1
WORSENED BY THE ALLOWANCE OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE (AS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE
IN ITS ADMISSION) WITHOUT COMPLIANCE WITH THE RUDIMENTS ON SECONDARY EVIDENCE;
AND
1.2
SERIOUS MISAPPRECIATJON OF FACT UPON ITS FAlLURE AND/OR OMISSION TO CONSIDER
GLARING DISPARITIES BETWEEN PROSECUTION'S VERY OWN EVIDENCE, I.E., (SAID) INVITATION
CARDS AND ITS OWN WITNESSES' STATEMENT AS TO THE PLACE OR VENUE OF SOLEMNIZATION
WHICH ON MATTERS OF CREDIBILITY MORE SO, BY THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES IN
HERE, TOUCHES ON THE VERY ISSUE OF COMPETENCY OF THE WITNESS AND THE STRICT RULE
ON ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE AGAINST THE STATE AND'LIBERAL FOR THE ACCUSED. THIS
RULE WAS SADLY IGNORED. WE TAKE THIS TO NOTE AS NO TRIVIAL ASPECT AS THE
RESPONDENT COURT PUT IT.

2. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND MATTERS OF

SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH CASE LAW WHEN IT CONSIDERED FACTS NOT OFFERED IN
EVIDENCE AND TOTALLY OUT OF THE RECORDS - HOLDING DEFENSE TWO (2) WITNESSES, THE
SPOUSES HUSBANDS, ALEX PASCUAL, AND MANNY ASUNCION, WERE ALLEGEDLY INDEBTED OF
GRATITUDE TO THE ACCUSED FOR BEING ALLEGEDLY EMPLOYED BY THE LATTER; HENCE,
DEBUNKING CREDIBILITY OF THEIR TESTIMONIES.

3. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND

MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS ON MATTERS AND SUBSTANCE SO MATERIAL POINTING TO THE
DEFENSE AS ALLEGEDLY THE ONE WHO SAID THAT THE BEST PERSONS WHO COULD ATTEST
WHO THE SOLEMNIZER WAS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE WEDDINGS WERE THE COUPLES
TliEMSELVES WHICH CORRECT PRONOUNCEMENT AND ACCURATE OBSERVATION, WAS IN FACT,
MADE BY ONE OF THE HONORABLE JUSTICES, THE HONORABLE RODOLFO PONFERRADA, IN
OPEN COURT NOT THE ACCUSED WHICH OBSERVATION WE NOT ONLY SUPPORT BUT
TREASURE SO MUCH.

4. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND

MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE WHEN IT AGAIN MADE ANOTHER
PRONOUNCEMENT DECLARING THAT "ACCUSED ONLY RELIED ON DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION
OF REGULARITY WITHOUT PRESENTING ANY OTHER EVIDENCE NOT TO DOUBT HIS PERSONAL
APPEARANCE ON THOSE DATES AND THAT HE SIGNED THESE DOCUMENTS AFTER ACTUALLY
SOLEMNIZING THE SAID MARRIAGES."

5. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND MISAPPRECIATION

OF FACTS - WHEN IT DECLARED TIIE PRESENCE OF ALL THE ELEMENTS OF FALSIFICATION
UNDER ARTICLE 171 [OF THE] REVISED PENAL CODE, AGORAVATED BY THE MISAPPLICATION OF
THE DICTUM IN ITS CITED GALEOS VS. PEOPLE.

6. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR OF LAW AND MISAPPRECIATION OF

FACTS WHICH ARE MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH CASE LAW ADOPTING TWO
(2) STANDARDS OF APPLICATION OF LAW OVER TWO (2) OPPOSSING DOCUMENTS, I.E., (1) THE
TWO SETS OF MARRIAGE CERTIFICATES ON ONE HAND, AND (2) THE ADMITTEDLY FALSIFIED
THREE (3) AFFIDAVITS OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES, HONORATO TOLENTINO, JORGE
LAZARO AND THELMO CORPUZ, THEREBY GROSSLY MISAPPLIED ART. 171 [OF THE] REVISED
PENAL CODE AS CITED IN GALEOS VS. PEOPLE, WHEN IT TURNED DOWN THE TWO (2)
CERTIFICATE OF MARRIAGES IGNORING THE DECIDENDI IN THE CITED CASE - WHILE CASUALLY
DOWNPLAYED THE FALSIFIED 3 WITNESSES AFFIDAVITS, ITS LEGAL AND NECESSARY
CONSEQUENCES.

7. OVER ALL CONSIDERATIONS, THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED THE MOST SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS IN CLINGING TO ITS JUDGMENT
OF CONVICTION INSTEAD OF ACQUITTAL ON THE BASIS OF THE OPPOSING EVIDENCE
RESPECTIVELY PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION ON ONE HAND - AND - THE DEFENSE ON THE
OTHER HEREAFTER PRESENTED IN GRAPHIC FORM.[13]
It is the contention of petitioner that none of the five (5) witnesses presented by the prosecution was
competent to testify on accused's actual solemnization of and presence during the subject marriages.
Neither did any of the documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution establish beyond reasonable
doubt that petitioner was not the one who solemnized the same. Thus, in his defense, petitioner believes
that he is innocent considering that he was able to present the husbands of the subject marriages, who
appeared before him during the actual solemnizations, and both testified in his favor, supported by various
documentary evidence, such as the subject marriage certificates, including the joint affidavit of cohabitation
and joint affidavit of confirmation issued by the couples, and also the counter-affidavit issued by Thelmo O.
Corpuz, Sr., the person alleged to have actually conducted the said solemnization of the subject marriages;
who initially denied being the one who acted as a solemnizing officer to any marriage ceremony.

Respondents, through its Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed on 28 April 2015 its Comment[14] to the
instant petition, and counters that the SB acted in accord with law and jurisprudence on the basis of the
evidence on record when it found petitioner guilty of the felonies charged; that petitioner raised questions of
fact contrary to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; that the equipoise doctrine is inapplicable in the case of
petitioner; that petitioner was correctly convicted of the crimes of falsification of public document since all the
elements to establish the same were proven beyond reasonable doubt; and that the other issues and
arguments raised by petitioner do not constitute reversible error on the part of the SB.

The Issue

Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public documents.

The Ruling of the Court

At the outset, the Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The prosecution cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness ofthe defense's evidence for
it has the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused - ei incumbit probatio qui elicit, non que
negat - he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.[15]

In other words, the burden of such proof rests with the prosecution, which must rely on the strength of its
case rather than on the weakness of the case for the defense. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that
quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of
those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.[16]
Worthy to mention that in every criminal onviction, the prosecution is required to prove two thinss beyond
reasonable doubt: first, the fact of the commission of the crime charged, or the presence of all the elements
of the offense; and second, the fact that the accused was the perpetrator of the crime.[17]

In the instant case, petitioner was charged with violation of Article 171, paragraph 4 of the RPC, which
provides:
ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastical minister. - The penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or
notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the
following acts:

xxxx
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts; x x x
It bears emphasis that what is punished in falsification of a public document is the violation of the public faith
and the destruction of the truth as solemnly proclaimed in it.[18] Generally, the elements of Article 171 are:
(1) the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; (2) he takes advantage of his official position;
and (3) that he falsifies a document by committing any of the ways it is done.[19]

Specifically, paragraph 4 of the said Article requires that: (a) the offender makes in a public document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the
facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false.[20]

In addition to the aforecited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or employee had taken
advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is
considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or
otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document
which he falsifies.[21]

In the case at bench, and as correctly found by the SB, it is undisputed that petitioner was a public officer,
being the Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, duly authorized by law to solemnize marriages, at the
time such alleged criminal offense was committed. Likewise, in issuing marriage certificates, being a public
document issued by the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, petitioner had the legal duty to prepare said
document, and not only to attest to the truth of what he had given account of but more importantly, to
warrant the truth of the facts narrated by him thereon.[22] Undoubtedly, these factual circumstances were
clearly established since petitioner himself admits the same. Accordingly; we are now left with one final
matter to determine, i.e. whether or not the facts narrated by petitioner on the subject marriage certificates
were absolutely false. If answered in the affirmative, then petitioner is indeed guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of falsification of public documents. Otherwise, he shall be exonerated.

Relevant thereto, the initial query to be resolved is whose evidence between the prosecution and defense is
credible in order to determine the guilt of the accused in a criminal action.

For ready reference, we find the necessity of reproducing hereunder the actual pertinent portion declared by
petitioner in his official capacity as a solemnizing officer, common to the subject marriage certificates, which
reads:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT BEFORE ME, on the date and place above written, personally appeared the
above-mentioned parties, with their mutual consent, lawfully joined together in marriage which was
solemnized by me in the presence of the witnesses named below, all of legal age.

xxxx
(Signed)
HON. AMADOR. CORPUS, JR.
MUNICIPAL MAYOR
CUYAPO, NUEVA ECIJA[23]
From the above-quoted statement, petitioner categorically expresses that, in both marriages, all parties
(referring to spouses Pascual and spouses Asuncion), personally appeared before him, as their solemnizing
officer, in the presence of other witnesses.

In ruling that petitioner was not the one who solemnized the subject marriages, the SB relied heavily on the
testimonial evidence of the prosecution's witnesses, particularly on the common fact that they all witnessed
an alleged ceremony conducted on said dates wherein Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal Registrar, was
the one who acted as the solemnizing officer, and not petitioner. It further considered the photos and
photocopies of the invitations presented and offered as additional proofs to establish the aforesaid incidents
which show spouses Pascual and spouses Asuncion standing in front of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr. Moreover,
the testimony of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., being a rebuttal evidence to the claims of Alex Y. Pascual and
Manny M. Asuncion that it was petitioner who solemnized their respective marriages, was vastly recognized
as acceptable and damaging to petitioner's defense since the principle of res inter alios acta (the rights of a
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or mission of another) does not apply in this case.

We are not unaware that settled is the rule that factual findings of the SB are conclusive upon this Court.
However, there are exceptions to said rule, to wit: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly an error or founded on a mistake;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the
findings of fact are premised on a want of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record; and (6) said
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based.[24]

A perusal of the offered and admitted evidence, testimonial and documentary, reveals some misappreciation
of facts of which if considered· may result in a different conclusion. In other words, there were findings
grounded entirely on speculation and/or premised on want of evidence that are needed to be resolved in the
case before us. Hence, we rule to reverse the SB's ruling of conviction against petitioner.

First, none of the testimonial and documentary evidence offered by the prosecution was able to dispute the
presumption of regularity of an official function and authenticity and due execution of the public instruments
issued by petitioner as the Municipal Mayor, which may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts provided by the trial court, there is no showing
that an actual appearance by the concerned parties (spouses Pascual and spouses Asuncion) before
petitioner as their solemnizing officer did not occur or happen. Looking into the evidence presented, the only
patent conclusion that can be derived from the prosecution's evidence, as admitted by the witnesses for the
defense, is that both couples appeared before. Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., for the sole purpose of recetvmg
marriage counseling and/or marriage rehearsals, nothing more.

Second, as mentioned in the assailed Decision, the SB expressed that the testimonies of the defense's
witnesses appear biased considering that they "owe their current employment with the accused as these
narrations rang no truth and sounded to have been well-coached;" hence, they found the testimonies of the
prosecution's witnesses more credible. Unfortunately, we find this declaration quite odd considering that
there was no iota of evidence to show that both Alex Y. Pascual and. Manny M. Asuncion owe debts of
gratitude to petitioner. Indeed even it is taken as true that the defense witnesses who are the husbands in
the questioned marriages owe their employment to the accused such fact can rightfully be construed as
itself the reason why these witnesses would truly want their respective·marriages officiated by the accused.
As a matter of fact, it was the prosecution's witnesses who have manifested some tainted credibility in their
testimonies when it was declared, among others, that: (a) all the judicial affidavits were prepared by the
complainant Arsenio A. Flores and were given to them for their signatures; (b) Thelma Corpuz III, the son of
Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., was separated from the government service, and that in the recent local election, he
sided with petitioner's political rival; and (c) Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr. and his son, Thelmo Corpuz, Jr.,
persuaded Felicisima D. Almonte to vote for the petitioner's opponent during the local election. Clearly
therefore, if there were any doubts as to the credibility of the witnesses in this case, it is those of the
prosecution who should be considered guilty of potential political motivations.

Third, as to the testimony of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., we do not find the same damaging on the part of
petitioner considering that his admission of conducting his own ceremony in the capacity of a solemnizing
officer simply confirms his criminal liability in the case of usurpation of authority as his conviction was
already pronounced by the MTC. Such testimony does not necessarily result in the falsity of petitioner's
declaration that he nonetheless conducted his own solemnization of the subject marriages. The fact remains
that, as testified to by Alex Y. Pascual and Manny M. Asuncion, it was petitioner who solemnized their
marriages on said date and at said office.

Fourth, the burden of proof in estabiishing that petitioner made an untruthful statement in the marriage
certificate in order to be convicted of the crime of falsification of public instrument solely lies on the
prosecution.

If only to stress the merit of this petition, we repeat the axioms that the Bill of Rights guarantees the right of
an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. In order to overcome the presumption of
innocence, the prosecution is required to adduce against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable
doubt. If the prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the accused to be
freed, it becomes the Court's constitutional duty to acquit him.[25]

Lastly, considering that the subject public instrument in this case refers to the marriage certificate, we find it
apropos to point out that the validity of marriage cannot be collaterally attacked since under existing laws
and jurisprudence, the same may be questioned only in a direct action. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. In declaring that the one who solemnized the subject
marriages had no authority to do so would indirectly result in the declaration that said marriages are void.
This is what our jurisdiction intends to prevent.[26]

By way of reiteration, it is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus probandi
in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei
incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove,[27] and as a means of respecting the presumption of innocence in favor of the man or woman on the
dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof to show: (1) the correct identification of the
author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the commission of the offense with the participation of the accused.
All these facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and
without solace from the weakness of the defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be weak is
inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to discharge the onus of his identity and culpability.
The presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the· prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not for the
accused to establish innocence.[28] Indeed, the accused, being presumed innocent, carries no burden of
proof on his or her shoulders.

Furthermore, it has been consistently ruled that "[c]ourts must judge the guilt or innocence of the accused
based on facts and not on mere conjectures, presumptions, or suspicions."[29] It is iniquitous to base
petitioner's guilt on the presumptions of the prosecution's witnesses for the Court has, time and again,
declared that if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one of
which being consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other or others consistent with his guilt,
then the evidence in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence has not fulfilled the test of moral
certainty and is thus insufficient to support a conviction.[30]

In sum, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution in this case failed to pass the test of moral
certainty necessary to warrant petitioner's conviction. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.[31] Not only
that, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations or
interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with
his guilt, then the evidence does not meet or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for conviction.[32]
Accordingly, the prosecution failed to establish the elements of falsification of public documents. With the
prosecution having failed to discharge its burden of establishing petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
this Court is constrained, as is its bounden duty when reasonable doubt persists, to acquit him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-12-
CRM-0171 and SB-12-CRM-0172 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Amado Corpuz, Jr. is hereby
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Peralta, J., on wellness leave.

December 9, 2016

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs / Mesdames:

Please take notice that on November 23, 2016 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the
Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on December 9,
2016 at 10:45 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN

Division Clerk of Court

[1] Rollo, pp. 90-110; Penned by Associate Justice Efren N. Dela Cruz with Associate Justices Rodolfo A.
Ponferrada and Rafael R. Lagos concurring.

[2] Id. at 194-201.

[3] Id. at 90-91.

[4] Id. at 94-95.

[5] Id. at 95-96.

[6] Id. at 92-93.

[7] Id. at 97-98.

[8] Id. at 96.

[9] Id. at 98-100.

[10] Id. at 100-102.

[11] Id. at 109.

[12] Id. at 108-109.

[13] Id. at 16-20.

[14] Id. at 778-808.

[15] People v. Masalihit, 360 Phil. 332, 343 (1998).

[16] People v. Villanueva, 427 Phil. 102, 128 (2002).

[17] People v. Santos, 388 Phil. 993, 1004 (2000).

[18] Lastrilla v. Granda, 516 Phil. 667, 699 (2006) citing Lumancas v. Intas, 400 Phil. 785, 798 (2000) further
citing People v. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913, 918 (1955).

[19] Regidor, Jr. v. People, 598 Phil. 714, 732 (2009).

[20] Delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado, et al. v. People, 685 Phil. 149, 161-162 (2012) citing Galeos v. People,
657 Phil. 500, 520 (2011 ). See also Santos v. Sandiganbayan, 400 Phil. 1175, 1216-1217 (2000).

[21] Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law (Fourteenth Edition, Revised 1998), Book Two,
Arts. 114-367, p. 216, citing People v. Uy, 101 Phil. 159, 163 (1957) and United States v. Inosanto, 20 Phil
376, 378 ( 1911 ); Adaza v. Sandiganbayan, 502 Phil. 702, 720 (2005).

[22] Rollo, pp. 103-105.

[23] Id. at 261 and 266.

[24] Cadiao-Palacios v. People, 601 Phil. 695, 704 (2009).

[25] People v. Wagas, 717 Phil. 224, 242 (2013).

[26] See Republic v. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, 10 February 2014, 715 SCRA 605, 616.
 [27] People v. Subingsubing, G.R. Nos. 104942-43, 25 November 1993, 228 SCRA 168, 174.

[28] People v. Arapok, 400 Phil. 1277, 1301 (2000).

[29] People v. Anabe, 644 Phil. 261, 281 (2010).

[30] People v. Timtiman, G.R. No. 101663, 4 November 1992, 215 SCRA 364 373 citing People v.
Remorosa, 277 Phil. 400, 411 (1991) also cited in Franco v. People, G.R. No. 191185, 1 February 2016.

[31] See People v. Manambit, 338 Phil. 57 ( 1997).

[32] Atienza v. People, G.R. No. 183694, 12 February 2014, 716 SCRA 84, 104-105.

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996]

CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; CONSTRUED WITH
REFERENCE TO THE INTENDED SCOPE AND PURPOSE. - Time and
again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the
purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in
construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind
and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope
and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute,
where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or
would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
2. ID.; COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED (AN ACT TO
REGULATE THE USE OF ALIASES); PURPOSE IS TO REGULATE
THE USE OF ALIASES IN BUSINESS TRANSACTION. - The objective
and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883,
 An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than
True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of
Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for
Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14
November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28
November 1934. The enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made
primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting
scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous
confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the
crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be
successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly,
claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus
penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly
authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED (AN ACT
TO REGULATE THE USE OF ALIASES); ALIAS, DEFINED. - An alias is
a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly
and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name
by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute
name authorized by a competent authority. A mans name is simply the
sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and
by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several
different names and thse are known as aliases.
4. ID.; ID.; USE OF FICTITIOUS NAME IN A SINGLE TRANSACTION
WITHOUT INTENDING TO BE KNOWN BY THIS NAME IN ADDITION
TO HIS REAL NAME, NOT A VIOLATION THEREOF. - The use of a
fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single
instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known
by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall
within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. - This is so in the case at bench. It is not
disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman
as Oscar Perez, which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who
should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of
petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to
obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There
is no question then that Oscar Perez is not an alias name of
petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was
intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real
name. The use of the name Oscar Perez was made by petitioner in an
 isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his
real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of
the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the
complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not
refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open
to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper
circumstances. While the act of petitioner may be covered by other
provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept
of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion
and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related
statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are
peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in
enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure
and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored,
which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil
and injurious consequences. Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the
proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not
clearly penalize the act done by him.
Wherefore, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

6. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; A PENAL STATUTE LIKE

COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED, CONSTRUED STRICTLY
AGAINST THE STATE AND IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED. - As C.A.
No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State
and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness
of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a
certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the
discretion of the court limited.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Ceferino Padua Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a petition for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A.
No. 6085, otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Alliases. [1]

Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural

Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the
Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in
Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty,
abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other
officials of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The
complaint was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through
a resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and
others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs
in the area. [2]

On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote

the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished
copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client
Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his
law firms messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal
matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked
to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the
document since he was one of the respondents before the
Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign
his (Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the
complaint. [3]

When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he

was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors logbook. Instead
of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name Oscar Perez after which
he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the
complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of
the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy
of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name Oscar
Perez.[4]

Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an

acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the same office. They
conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the person who
introduced himself as Oscar Perez was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a
customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter
to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly
charged.
 On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the
presentation of its evidence, petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer
to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that his
supposed alias was different from his registered name in the local civil registry
was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no document from the local civil
registry was presented to show the registered name of accused which
according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction.
The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating
Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R. A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to
suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision
correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4) years of prision
correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided
for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner
but modified the penalty by imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as
minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of P5,000.00.
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as. he reasserts his
innocence. He contends that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by
R. A. No. 6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is Oscar Perez
his alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use
of another name by which a person is also known. He claims that he has
never been known as Oscar Perez and that he only used such name on one
occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his
position that an essential requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as
amended by R. A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the prosecution
failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name
in the Registry of Births. He further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in
not considering the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong law. [5]

Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the
light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be
kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the
intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of
[6]

the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,

injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. [7]

For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended,

which was allegedly violated by petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances
under which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its
amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was
approved on 7 November 1936, and before its amendment by R. A. No. 6085,
is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known
since his childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two
surnames.
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority
therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a
change of name. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new
petition shall set forth the original name and the alias or aliases for the use of which
judicial authority has been obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which
such authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded
in the proper civil register x x x.
The above law was subsequently amended by R. A. No. 6085, approved
on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a
normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with
which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which
he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered
in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been
authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been
registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year
from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry
of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two
surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in
proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of
name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than
one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the persons baptismal and family
name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrants name, if
an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real
name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for
the use of alias, the christian name and the alien immigrants name shall be recorded in
the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than
his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local
civil registry.
The objective and purpose of C. A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in
Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names
other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of
Commerce And Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations
thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931
and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934. The [8]

pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow -Section 1. It shall be

unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt
including receipt for tax or business or any written or printed contract not
verified by a notary public or on any written or printed evidence of any
agreement or business transactions, any name used in connection with his
business other than his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain
view in or at the place where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a
business, any sign announcing a firm name or business name or style without
first registering such other name, or such firm name, or business name or
style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of any
other person having a joint or common interest with him in such contract
agreement, business transaction, or business x x x.
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made
primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores
of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the
field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious
names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained
against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a
thousand and one names. CA. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an
alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial
proceedings and recorded in the civil register. [9]

In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic the Court had occasion to explain the

[10]

meaning, concept and ill effects of the use of an alias within the purview of
C.A. No. 142 when we ruled
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioners use of alias Kheng Chiau Young in
addition to his real name Yu Cheng Chiau would add to more confusion. That he is
known in his business, as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not
sufficient reason to allow him its use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to
his associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a
customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact that he had encountered
certain difficulties in his transactions with government offices which required him to
explain why he bore two names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner could
easily avoid said difficulties by simply using and sticking only to his real name Yu
Cheng Chiau.
The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by
his having filed a petition for naturalization in Branch V of the abovementioned court,
argues the more against the grant of his petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino
citizen, there would then be no necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be
contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of using only one name in ordinary as
well as business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he
believes (after he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his name
following the Occidental method, he can easily file a petition for change of name, so
that in lieu of the name Yu Kheng Chian, he can, abandoning the same, ask for
authority to adopt the name Kheng Chiau Young.
All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has
not shown satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds under the aforequoted
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant
the grant of his petition for the use of an alias name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or
intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business
transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or
baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent
authority. A mans name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is
commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but
sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known
as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging
[11]

to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the
user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that
day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as
amended. This is so in the case at bench.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the
Ombudsman as Oscar Perez, which was the name of the messenger of his
lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place
instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer
to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent.There
is no question then that Oscar Perez is not an alias name of petitioner. There
is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name
as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name Oscar
Perez was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not
even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified
himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able
to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the
Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public
records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the
proper circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such
does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended
under which he is prosecuted.The confusion and fraud in business
transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent
are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those
contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There
exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never
intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute
is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. Moreover, as C.A.
[12]

No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and
in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the
[13]

law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by
conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court
limited. Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner
[14]

should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by
him.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 164368-69

Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
 - versus - CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
and THE HONORABLE SPECIAL BRION, and
DIVISION OF THE PERALTA, JJ.
SANDIGANBAYAN,
Respondents. Promulgated:

April 2, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this Petition for Review
on Certiorari[1] to seek the reversal of the Sandiganbayans Joint Resolution dated
July 12, 2004, granting respondent Joseph Ejercito Estradas (Estrada) demurrer to
evidence in Crim. Case No. 26565.[2]

THE FACTS

On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No.

26558) was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other
accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias, docketed as Crim. Case
No. 26565, was likewise filed against Estrada. The Amended Information in Crim.
Case No. 26565 reads:

That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent

thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then President of the Republic
 of the Philippines, without having been duly authorized, judicially or
administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in
relation to office, i.e., in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE
ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity as THE President of the
Republic of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE VELARDE IN SEVERAL
TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias Jose Velarde which IS
neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents
with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently consolidated for joint
trial. Still another Information, this time for perjury and docketed as Crim. Case
No. 26905, was filed with the Sandiganbayan against Estrada. This was later
consolidated, too, with Crim. Cases No. 26558 and 26565.

Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the
Sandiganbayan issued.

On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a Special Division in the

Sandiganbayan to try, hear, and decide the charges of plunder and related cases
(illegal use of alias and perjury) against respondent Estrada.[3]

At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to

prove the allegations of the Informations for plunder, illegal use of alias, and
perjury. The Peoples evidence for the illegal alias charge, as summarized by the
Sandiganbayan, consisted of:

A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB)

officers Clarissa G. Ocampo (Ocampo) and Atty. Manuel Curato (Curato)
who commonly declared that on February 4, 2000, Estrada opened a
numbered trust account (Trust Account C-163) with PCIB and signed as Jose
Velarde in the account opening documents; both Ocampo and Curato also
testified that Aprodicio Lacquian and Fernando Chua were present on that
occasion;

B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa Barcelan,

who declared that a certain Baby Ortaliza (Ortaliza) transacted several times
with her; that Ortaliza deposited several checks in PCIB Savings Account
 No. 0160-62502-5 under the account name Jose Velarde on the following
dates (as evidenced by deposit receipts duly marked in evidence):
a. 20 October 1999 (Exh. MMMMM)
b. 8 November 1999 (Exh. LLLLL)
c. 22 November 1999 (Exh. NNNNN)
d. 24 November 1999 (Exh. OOOOO)
e. 25 November 1999 (Exh. PPPPP)
f. 20 December 1999 (Exh. QQQQQ)
g. 21 December 1999 (Exh. RRRRR)
h. 29 December 1999 (Exh. SSSSS)
i. 4 January 2000 (Exh. TTTTT)
j. 10 May 2000 (Exh. UUUUU)
k. 6 June 2000 (Exh. VVVVV)
l. 25 July 2000 (Exh. WWWWW)

(2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that Lucena Ortaliza

was employed in the Office of the Vice President and, later on, in the Office
of the President when Estrada occupied these positions and when deposits
were made to the Jose Velarde Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5.

The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the consolidated cases,
which the Sandiganbayan admitted into evidence in a Resolution dated October 13,
2003.[4] The accused separately moved to reconsider the Sandiganbayan
Resolution;[5] the People, on the other hand, filed its Consolidated
Comment/Opposition to the motions.[6] The Sandiganbayan denied the motions in
its Resolution dated November 17, 2003.[7]

After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be allowed to
file a demurrer to evidence in these cases.[8] In its Joint Resolution dated March 10,
2004,[9]the Sandiganbayan only granted the defense leave to file demurrers in
Crim. Case Nos. 26565 (illegal use of alias) and 26905 (perjury).

Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and
26905.[10] His demurrer to evidence for Crim. Case No. 26565 (illegal use of alias)
was anchored on the following grounds[11]:
1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only two (2)
witnesses, Ms. Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on
one occasion (4 February 2000), they saw movant use the name Jose Velarde;
 2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was prohibited only
in late 2001 as can be gleaned from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of
2001, dated 11 October 2001;

3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents offered
by the prosecution are banking documents which, by their nature, are
confidential and cannot be revealed without following proper procedures; and

4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.

The People opposed the demurrers through a Consolidated Opposition that

presented the following arguments:[12]
1. That the use of fictitious names in bank transaction was not expressly
prohibited until BSP No. 302 is of no moment considering that as early as
Commonwealth Act No. 142, the use of alias was already prohibited. Movant
is being prosecuted for violation of C.A. No. 142 and not BSP Circular No.
302;

2. Movants reliance on Ursua vs. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]) is
misplaced;

3. Assuming arguendo that C.A. No. 142, as amended, requires publication of

the alias and the habitual use thereof, the prosecution has presented more than
sufficient evidence in this regard to convict movant for illegal use of alias;
and

4. Contrary to the submission of movant, the instant case of illegal use of alias
is not absorbed in plunder.

Estrada replied to the Consolidated Opposition through a Consolidated

Reply Opposition.

THE ASSAILED SANDIGANBAYANS RULING

The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the Resolution now assailed in
this petition. The salient points of the assailed resolution are:

First the coverage of Estradas indictment. The Sandiganbayan found that the
only relevant evidence for the indictment are those relating to what is described in
the Information i.e., the testimonies and documents on the opening of Trust
Account C-163 on February 4, 2000. The Sandiganbayan reasoned out that the use
of the disjunctive orbetween on or about 04 February 2000 and sometime prior
or subsequent thereto means that the act/s allegedly committed on February 4,
2000 could have actually taken place prior to or subsequent thereto; the use of the
conjunctive was simply the prosecutions procedural tool to guard against any
variance between the date stated in the Information and that proved during the trial
in a situation in which time was not a material ingredient of the offense; it does not
mean and cannot be read as a roving commission that includes acts and/or
events separate and distinct from those that took place on the single date on or
about 04 February 2000 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto. The
Sandiganbayan ruled that the use of the disjunctive or prevented it from
interpreting the Information any other way.

Second the Peoples failure to present evidence that proved Estradas

commission of the offense. The Sandiganbayan found that the People failed to
present evidence that Estrada committed the crime punished under Commonwealth
Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085 (CA 142), as interpreted
by the Supreme Court in Ursua v. Court of Appeals.[13] It ruled that there is an
illegal use of alias within the context of CA 142 only if the use of the alias
is public and habitual. In Estradas case, the Sandiganbayan noted, the application
of the principles was not as simple because of the complications resulting from the
nature of the transaction involved the alias was used in connection with the
opening of a numbered trust account made during the effectivity of R.A. No. 1405,
as amended,[14] and prior to the enactment of Republic R.A. No. 9160.[15]

Estrada did not publicly use the alias Jose Velarde:

a. Estradas use of the alias Jose Velarde in his dealings with Dichavez
and Ortaliza after February 4, 2000 is not relevant in light of the conclusion that
the acts imputed to Estrada under the Information were the act/s committed
on February 4, 2000 only. Additionally, the phrase, Estrada did represent himself
as Jose Velarde in several transactions, standing alone, violates Estradas right to be
informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation, because it is very general
and vague. This phrase is qualified and explained by the succeeding phrase and use
and employ the said alias Jose Velarde which is neither his registered name at birth
nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or
other corporate entities. Thus, Estradas representations before persons other than
those mentioned in the Information are immaterial; Ortaliza and Dichavez do not
fall within the Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities specified in the
Information. Estradas representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez are not therefore
covered by the indictment.

b. The Sandiganbayan rejected the application of the principle in the

law of libel that mere communication to a third person is publicity; it reasoned out
that that the definition of publicity is not limited to the way it is defined under the
law on libel; additionally, the application of the libel law definition is onerous to
the accused and is precluded by the ruling in Ursua that CA No. 142, as a penal
statute, should be construed strictly against the State and favorably for the
accused. It ruled that the definition under the law on libel, even if it applies,
considers a communication to a third person covered by the privileged
communication rule to be non-actionable. Estradas use of the alias in front of
Ocampo and Curato is one such privileged communication under R.A. No. 1405,
as amended. The Sandiganbayan said:
Movants act of signing Jose Velarde in bank documents being absolutely
confidential, the witnessing thereof by bank officers who were likewise sworn to
secrecy by the same law cannot be considered as public as to fall within the ambit
of CA 142 as amended. On account of the absolute confidentiality of the
transaction, it cannot be said that movant intended to be known by this name in
addition to his real name. Confidentiality and secrecy negate
publicity. Ursua instructs:

Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name

belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign
or indication that the user intends to be knownby this name in
addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within
the prohibition in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
c. The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention not to be publicly
known by the name Jose Velarde is shown by the nature of a numbered account a
perfectly valid banking transaction at the time Trust Account C-163 was
opened. The opening, too, of a numbered trust account, the Sandiganbayan further
ruled, did not impose on Estrada the obligation to disclose his real identity the
obligation R.A. No. 6713 imposes is to file under oath a statement of assets and
liabilities.[16] Reading CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405 and R.A. No. 6713 together,
Estrada had the absolute obligation to disclose his assets including the amount of
his bank deposits, but he was under no obligation at all to disclose the other
particulars of the bank account (such as the name he used to open it).
Third the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9160.[17] The Sandiganbayan
said that the absolute prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against the use of anonymous
accounts, accounts under fictitious names, and all other similar accounts, is a
legislative acknowledgment that a gaping hole previously existed in our laws that
allowed depositors to hide their true identities. The Sandiganbayan noted that the
prohibition was lifted from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 251
dated July 7, 2000 another confirmation that the opening of a numbered trust
account was perfectly legal when it was opened on February 4, 2000.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No. 142, as interpreted

in Ursua, must necessarily be harmonized with the provisions of R.A. No.1405 and
R.A. No. 9160 under the principle that every statute should be construed in a way
that will harmonize it with existing laws. A reasonable scrutiny, the Sandiganbayan
said, of all these laws in relation to the present case, led it to conclude that the use
of an alias within the context of a bank transaction (specifically, the opening of a
numbered account made before bank officers) is protected by the secrecy
provisions of R.A. No. 1405, and is thus outside the coverage of CA No. 142 until
the passage into law of R.A. No. 9160.

THE PETITION

The People filed this petition raising the following issues:

1. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in
dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in holding that the use by
respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias Jose Velarde was not public
despite the presence of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando
Chua on 4 February 2000;

2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in
dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in holding that the use by
respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias Jose Velarde was allowable
under banking rules, despite the clear prohibition under
Commonwealth Act No. 142;

3. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in
dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in applying R.A. No. 1405
as an exception to the illegal use of alias punishable under
Commonwealth Act No. 142;
 4. Whether the alleged harmonization and application made by the
court a quo of R.A. No.1405 and Commonwealth Act No. 142
were proper;

5. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in
limiting the coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case
No. 26565 to the use of the alias Jose Velarde by respondent
Joseph Estrada on February 4, 2000;

6. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in
departing from its earlier final finding on the non-applicability
of Ursua v. Court of Appealsand forcing its application to the
instant case.

THE COURTS RULING

The petition has no merit.

The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling

Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read:

Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television,
radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of
pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the
local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of
an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or
such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court:
Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil
registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this
act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The
name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.

Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority
therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for
a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority
for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's
baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if
different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such
names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for
 the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and
the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and
no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless
the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.

How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of an
alias a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by
him publicly and habituallyusually in business transactions in addition to his real
name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name
authorized by a competent authority.There must be, in the words of Ursua, a sign
or indication that the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition
to his real name from that day forth [for the use of alias to] fall within the
prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.[18]

Ursua further relates the historical background and rationale that led to the
enactment of CA No. 142, as follows:
The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily to curb the common
practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases
which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost
bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could
not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly,
claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized
the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper
judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.[19]

Following the doctrine of stare decisis,[20] we are guided by the Ursua ruling
on how the crime punished under CA No. 142 may be committed. Close adherence
to this ruling, in other words, is unavoidable in the application of and the
determination of criminal liability under CA No. 142.

Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the application of
the Ursua ruling proceeds from Estradas position in the government; at the time of
the commission of the offense, he was the President of the Republic who is
required by law to disclose his true name. We do not find this argument sufficient
to justify a distinction between a man on the street, on one hand, and the President
of the Republic, on the other, for purposes of applying CA No. 142. In the first
place, the law does not make any distinction, expressly or impliedly, that would
justify a differential treatment. CA No. 142 as applied to Estrada, in fact allows
him to use his cinema or screen name of Joseph Estrada, which name he has used
even when he was already the President of the Philippines. Even the petitioner has
acquiesced to the use of the screen name of the accused, as shown by the title of
the present petition. Additionally, any distinction we make based on the Peoples
claim unduly prejudices Estrada; this is proscribed by the Ursua dictum that CA
No. 142, as a penal statute, should be construed strictly against the State and in
favor of the accused.[21] The mode of violating CA No. 142 is therefore the same
whoever the accused may be.

The People also calls our attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan ruling

(Resolution dated February 6, 2002) denying Estradas motion to quash the
Information. This earlier Resolution effectively rejected the application
of Ursua under the following tenor:
The use of the term alias in the Amended Information in itself serves to
bring this case outside the ambit of the ruling in the case of Ursua v. Court of
Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]), on which the accused heavily relies in his
motion to quash. The term alias means otherwise known as (Webster Third New
International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p. 53). The charge of using an alias logically
implies that another name has been used publicly and habitually. Otherwise, he
will not be known by such name. In any case, the amended information adverts to
several transactions and signing of documents with the Equitable PCI Bank and/or
other corporate entities where the above-mentioned alias was allegedly employed
by the accused.

The facts alleged in the information are distinctly different from facts
established in the Ursua case where another name was used by the accused in a
single instance without any sign or indication that that [sic] he intended to be
known from that day by this name in addition to his real name.[22]

The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
applying Ursua notwithstanding this earlier final ruling on its non-applicability a
ruling that binds the parties in the present case. The People thus claims that the
Sandiganbayan erred to the point of gravely abusing its discretion when it
resurrected the application of Ursua,resulting in the reversal of its
earlier final ruling.

We find no merit in this argument for two reasons. First, the cited Sandiganbayan
resolution is a mere interlocutory order a ruling denying a motion to quash [23] that
cannot be given the attributes of finality and immutability that are generally
accorded to judgments or orders that finally dispose of the whole, of or particular
matters in, a case.[24] The Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order
because its effects would only be provisional in character, and would still require
the issuing court to undertake substantial proceedings in order to put the
controversy to rest.[25] It is basic remedial law that an interlocutory order is always
under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient
grounds shown at any time before final judgment.[26] Perez v. Court of
Appeals,[27] albeit a civil case, instructively teaches that an interlocutory order
carries no res adjudicata effects. Says Perez:

The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved only an

interlocutory matter, the principle of res judicata cannot be applied in
this case. There can be no res judicata where the previous order in
question was not an order or judgment determinative of an issue of
fact pending before the court but was only an interlocutory order
because it required the parties to perform certain acts for final
adjudication. In this case, the lifting of the restraining order paved the
way for the possession of the fishpond on the part of petitioners and/or
their representatives pending the resolution of the main action for
injunction. In other words, the main issue of whether or not private
respondent may be considered a sublessee or a transferee of the lease
entitled to possess the fishpond under the circumstances of the case had
yet to be resolved when the restraining order was lifted.[28]

Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely looked at the
allegations of the Information to determine the sufficiency of these allegations and
did not consider any evidence aliunde. This is far different from the present
demurrer to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a fuller view of the
prosecutions case, and was faced with the issue of whether the prosecutions
evidence was sufficient to prove the allegations of the Information. Under these
differing views, the Sandiganbayan may arrive at a different conclusion on the
application of Ursua, the leading case in the application of CA 142, and the change
in ruling is not per se indicative of grave abuse of discretion. That there is no error
of law is strengthened by our consideration of the Sandiganbayan ruling on the
application of Ursua.

In an exercise of caution given Ursuas jurisprudential binding effect, the

People also argues in its petition that Estradas case is different from Ursuas for the
following reasons: (1) respondent Estrada used and intended to continually use the
alias Jose Velarde in addition to the name Joseph Estrada; (2) Estradas use of the
alias was not isolated or limited to a single transaction; and (3) the use of the alias
Jose Velarde was designed to cause and did cause confusion and fraud in business
transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent. The
People also argues that the evidence it presented more than satisfied the
requirements of CA No. 142, as amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or
established that Estradas use of the alias was public.

In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties expressed positions, we
shall now examine within the Ursua framework the assailed Sandiganbayan
Resolution granting the demurrer to evidence. The prosecution has the burden of
proof to show that the evidence it presented with the Sandiganbayan satisfied
the Ursua requirements, particularly on the matter of publicity and habituality in
the use of an alias.

What is the coverage of the indictment?

The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred and abused its
discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case No.
26565 to Estradas use of the alias Jose Velarde on February 4, 2000. It posits that
there was a main transaction one that took place on February 4, 2000 but there
were other transactions covered by the phrase prior to or subsequent thereto; the
Information specifically referred to several transactions with Equitable PCI Bank
and/or other corporate entities. To the People, the restrictive finding that the
phrase prior to or subsequent thereto is absorbed by the phrase on or about 04
February 2000 drastically amends the succeeding main allegations on the
constitutive criminal acts by removing the plurality of both the transactions
involved and the documents signed with various entities; there is the undeniable
essential relationship between the allegations of the multiplicity of transactions, on
one hand, and the additional antecedent of prior to or subsequent thereto, on the
other. It argues that the Sandiganbayan reduced the phrase prior to or subsequent
thereto into a useless appendage, providing Estrada with a convenient and totally
unwarranted escape route.

The People further argues that the allegation of time is the least exacting in
satisfying the constitutional requirement that the accused has to be informed of the
accusation against him. Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that an allegation of the approximate date of the commission of the
offense will suffice, while Section 11 of the same Rule provides that it is not
necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material ingredient of the crime. This liberality
allegedly shaped the time-tested rule that when the time given in the complaint is
not of the essence of the offense, the time of the commission of the offense does
not need to be proven as alleged, and that the complaint will be sustained if the
proof shows that the offense was committed at any time within the period of the
statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action (citing People v.
Bugayong [299 SCRA 528, 537] that in turn cited US v. Smith [3 Phil. 20,
22]). Since allegations of date of the commission of an offense are liberally
interpreted, the People posits that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
in disregarding the additional clause prior to or subsequent thereto; under the
liberality principle, the allegations of the acts constitutive of the offense finally
determine the sufficiency of the allegations of time. The People thus claims that no
surprise could have taken place that would prevent Estrada from properly
defending himself; the information fully notified him that he was being accused of
using the alias Jose Velarde in more than just one instance.

We see no merit in these arguments.

At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature the right of Estrada to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Under the
provisions of the Rules of Court implementing this constitutional right, a complaint
or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of
the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense in the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.[29] As
to the cause of accusation, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in
ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the
statute, but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know the offense charged and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances,
and for the court to pronounce judgment.[30] The date of the commission of the
offense need not be precisely stated in the complaint or information except when
the precise date is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged
to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its
commission.[31]

The information must at all times embody the essential elements of the crime
charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that bear on the culpability
and liability of the accused so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his
defense.[32] In short, the allegations in the complaint or information, as written,
must fully inform or acquaint the accused the primary reader of and the party
directly affected by the complaint or information of the charge/s laid.

The heretofore cited Information states that on or about 04 February 2000,

or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
[did] willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE
VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID
alias Jose Velarde which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his
baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other
corporate entities.

We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayans reading of the

Information, as this was how the accused might have similarly read and understood
the allegations in the Information and, on this basis, prepared his defense. Broken
down into its component parts, the allegation of time in the Information plainly
states that (1) ON February 4, 2000; (2) OR before February 4, 2000;
(3) OR sometime prior or subsequent to February 4, 2000, in the City of Manila,
Estrada represented himself as Jose Velarde in several transactions in signing
documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.

Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of

documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities all had their
reference to February 4, 2000; they were all made on or about or prior or
subsequent to that date, thus plainly implying that all these transactions took place
only on February 4, 2000 or on another single date sometime before or after
February 4, 2000. To be sure, the Information could have simply said on or
about February 4, 2000 to capture all the alternative approximate dates, so that the
phrase sometime prior or subsequent thereto would effectively be a surplusage that
has no meaning separately from the on or about already expressed. This consequent
uselessness of the prior or subsequent thereto phrase cannot be denied, but it is a
direct and necessary consequence of the use of the OR between the two phrases
and the THERETO that referred back to February 4, 2000 in the second
phrase. Of course, the reading would have been very different (and would have
been clearly in accord with the Peoples present interpretation) had the Information
simply used AND instead of OR to separate the phrases; the intent to refer to
various transactions occurring on various dates and occasions all proximate
to February 4, 2000 could not be disputed. Unfortunately for the People, the
imprecision in the use of OR is the reality the case has to live with.To act contrary
to this reality would violate Estradas right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him; the multiple transactions on several separate days that
the People claims would result in surprise and denial of an opportunity to prepare
for Estrada, who has a right to rely on the single day mentioned in the Information.
 Separately from the constitutional dimension of the allegation of time in the
Information, another issue that the allegation of time and our above conclusion
raise relates to what act or acts, constituting a violation of the offense charged,
were actually alleged in the Information.

The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the Peoples case, as it

deals a fatal blow on the Peoples claim that Estrada habitually used the Jose
Velarde alias. For, to our mind, the repeated use of an alias within a single day
cannot be deemed habitual, as it does not amount to a customary practice or
use. This reason alone dictates the dismissal of the petition under CA No. 142 and
the terms of Ursua.
The issues of publicity, numbered accounts, and
the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405,
and R.A. No. 9160.

We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues.

The People claims that even on the assumption that Ocampo and Curato are
bank officers sworn to secrecy under the law, the presence of two other persons
who are not bank officers Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua when Estradas
signed the bank documents as Jose Velarde amounted to a public use of an alias
that violates CA No. 142.

On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues that to premise the
validity of Estradas prosecution for violation of CA No. 142 on a mere banking
practice is gravely erroneous, improper, and constitutes grave abuse of discretion;
no banking law provision allowing the use of aliases in the opening of bank
accounts existed; at most, it was allowed by mere convention or industry practice,
but not by a statute enacted by the legislature. Additionally, that Estradas
prosecution was supposedly based on BSP Circular No. 302 dated October 11,
2001 is wrong and misleading, as Estrada stands charged with violation of CA No.
142, penalized since 1936, and not with a violation of a mere BSP Circular. That
the use of alias in bank transactions prior to BSP Circular No. 302 is allowed is
inconsequential because as early as CA No. 142, the use of an alias (except for
certain purposes which do not include banking) was already prohibited. Nothing in
CA No. 142 exempted the use of aliases in banking transactions, since the law did
not distinguish or limit its application; it was therefore grave error for the
Sandiganbayan to have done so. Lastly on this point, bank regulations being mere
issuances cannot amend, modify or prevail over the effective, subsisting and
enforceable provision of CA No. 142.
On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and its relationship with
CA No. 142, that since nothing in CA No. 142 excuses the use of an alias, the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that R.A. No. 1405 is an
exception to CA No. 142s coverage. Harmonization of laws, the People posits, is
allowed only if the laws intended to be harmonized refer to the same subject
matter, or are at least related with one another. The three laws which the
Sandiganbayan tried to harmonize are not remotely related to one another; they
each deal with a different subject matter, prohibits a different act, governs a
different conduct, and covers a different class of persons,[33] and there was no need
to force their application to one another. Harmonization of laws, the People adds,
presupposes the existence of conflict or incongruence between or among the
provisions of various laws, a situation not obtaining in the present case.

The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not apply to trust
transactions, such as Trust Account No. C-163, as it applies only to traditional
deposits (simple loans). A trust account, according to the People, may not be
considered a deposit because it does not create the juridical relation of creditor and
debtor; trust and deposit operations are treated separately and are different in legal
contemplation; trust operation is separate and distinct from banking and requires a
grant of separate authority, and trust funds are not covered by deposit insurance
under the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation law (R.A. No. 3591, as
amended).

The People further argues that the Sandiganbayans conclusion that the
transaction or communication was privileged in nature was erroneous a congruent
interpretation of CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 shows that a person who signs in
a public or private transaction a name or alias, other than his original name or the
alias he is authorized to use, shall be held liable for violation of CA No. 142, while
the bank employees are bound by the confidentiality of bank transactions except in
the circumstances enumerated in R.A. No. 1405. At most, the People argues, the
prohibition in R.A. No. 1405 covers bank employees and officers only, and not
Estrada; the law does not prohibit Estrada from disclosing and making public his
use of an alias to other people, including Ocampo and Curato, as he did when he
made a public exhibit and use of the alias before Messrs. Lacquian and Chua.

Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan ruling that the use of an
alias before bank officers does not violate CA No. 142 effectively encourages the
commission of wrongdoing and the concealment of ill-gotten wealth under
pseudonyms; it sustains an anomalous and prejudicial policy that uses the law to
silence bank officials and employees from reporting the commission of
crimes. The People contends that the law R.A. No. 1405 was not intended by the
Legislature to be used as a subterfuge or camouflage for the commission of crimes
and cannot be so interpreted; the law can only be interpreted, understood and
applied so that right and justice would prevail.

We see no merit in these arguments.

We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the Sandiganbayan position that
the rule in the law of libel that mere communication to a third person is
publicity does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. Our close reading of Ursua
particularly, the requirement that there be intention by the user to be culpable and
the historical reasons we cited above tells us that the required publicity in the use
of alias is more than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to
be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to
cause it to become generally known. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA
No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall
publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use
the alias must be manifest.

To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as
Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate
his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to
Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had no access to
Estradas privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in Malacaan where
he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters
of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by
his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and
secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing
as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and
Chua were also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estradas
alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for
these representations to be admissible. All of Estradas representations to these
people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.

The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords
Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to
the opening of a trust account a transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers
absolutely confidential in nature.[34] We previously rejected, in Ejercito v.
Sandiganbayan,[35] the Peoples nitpicking argument on the alleged dichotomy
between bank deposits and trust transactions, when we said:
The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term deposits, as
used in R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor
relationship between the trustor and the bank, does not lie. An examination of the
law shows that the term deposits used therein is to be understood broadly and not
limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor relationship between
the depositor and the bank.

The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:

SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give

encouragement to the people to deposit their money in banking institutions and to
discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized by banks in
authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the
country. (Underscoring supplied)

If the money deposited under an account may be used by bank for

authorized loans to third persons, then such account, regardless of whether it
creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank, falls
under the category of accounts which the law precisely seeks to protect for the
purpose of boosting the economic development of the country.

Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust
Agreement between petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the trust account
covers deposit, placement or investment of funds by Urban Bank for and in behalf
of petitioner. The money deposited under Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore,
intended not merely to remain with the bank but to be invested by it elsewhere. To
hold that this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would encourage
private hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by bank in other
ventures, contrary to the policy behind the law.

Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the
term deposits was intended to be understood broadly:

SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with bank or banking

institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the
Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential
nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the
depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court
in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in
 cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The phrase of whatever nature proscribes any restrictive interpretation

of deposits. Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted provision that,
generally, the law applies not only to money which is deposited but also to those
which are invested. This further shows that the law was not intended to apply only
to deposits in the strict sense of the word. Otherwise, there would have been no
need to add the phrase or invested.

Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No.
858.[36]

We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of
privacy.[37] Given the private nature of Estradas act of signing the documents as
Jose Velarde related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim
that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the
signing. We need not even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by
R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is essentially significant is the privacy
situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions. This statutorily
guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction
was done publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly.

The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a significant

development only because it clearly manifests that prior to its enactment,
numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were permitted banking transactions,
whether they be allowed by law or by a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an
indictment against Estrada using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained
without violating the constitutional
[38]
prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws.

We hasten to add that this holistic application and interpretation of these

various laws is not an attempt to harmonize these laws. A finding of commission of
the offense punished under CA No. 142 must necessarily rest on the evidence of
the requisites for culpability, as amplified in Ursua. The application of R.A. No.
1405 is significant only because Estradas use of the alias was pursuant to a
transaction that the law considers private or, at the very least, where the law
guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy to the parties to the transactions; it
is at this point that R.A. No. 1405 tangentially interfaces with an indictment under
CA 142. In this light, there is no actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and R.A.
No. 1405 that requires harmonization. Each operates within its own sphere, but
must necessarily be read together when these spheres interface with one
another. Finally, R.A. No. 9160, as a law of recent vintage in relation to the
indictment against Estrada, cannot be a source or an influencing factor in his
indictment.

In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked at the

totality of the circumstances obtaining in Estradas use of the alias Jose Velarde vis-
-vis the Ursua requisites. We do not decide here whether Estradas use of an alias
when he occupied the highest executive position in the land was valid and legal;
we simply determined, as the Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made liable
for the offense charged based on the evidence the People presented. As with any
other accused, his guilt must be based on the evidence and proof beyond
reasonable doubt that a finding of criminal liability requires. If the People fails to
discharge this burden, as they did fail in this case, the rule of law requires that we
so declare. We do so now in this review and accordingly find no reversible error of
law in the assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of

merit.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 162205, March 31, 2014 ]

 REVELINA LIMSON, PETITIONER, VS. EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Under review is the decision promulgated on July 31, 2003,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals
dismissed petitioner Revelina Limson's petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the
Secretary of Justice of her petition for review vis-à-vis the adverse resolutions of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City (OCP) of her charges for falsification and illegal use of
aliases against respondent Eugenio Juan Gonzalez.

Antecedents

The antecedents as found by the CA are as follows:

On or about December 1, 1997, Limson filed a criminal charge against

Gonzalez for falsification, before the Prosecutor's Office of Mandaluyong
City.

The charge for [sic] falsification of [sic] Limson is based on Limson's

assertion that in the records of the Professional Regulatory Commission
(PRC), a certain 'EUGENIO GONZALEZ' is registered as an architect and
that Gonzalez, who uses, among others, the name
'EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ', and who pretends to be said architect.
Registered [sic] with the PRC, is an impostor and therefore, guilty [sic] of
falsification x x x."

Gonzalez filed his Counter-Affidavit, wherein he explained in detail that his

full name is EUGENIO (first given name) JUAN (second given name)
GONZALEZ (father's family name) y REGALADO (mother's family name).
He alleges that in his youth, while he was still in grade school and high
school, he used the name EUGENIO GONZALEZ y REGALADO and/or
EUGENIO GONZALEZ and that thereafter, he transferred to the University
of Santo Tomas and therein took up architecture and that upon
commencement of his professional practice in 1943, he made use of his
second name, JUAN. Consequently, in his professional practice, he has
identified himself as much as possible as Arch. Eugenio Juan Gonzalez,
because the surname GONZALEZ was and is still, a very common surname
throughout the Philippines and he wanted to distinguish himself with his
second given name, JUAN, after his first given name, EUGENIO. Gonzalez
supposed [sic] his allegations with various supporting documents x x x.

After receiving pertinent Affidavits and evidentiary documents from

Limson and Gonzalez, respectively, the Prosecutor dismissed the criminal
charge against Gonzalez, finding that indeed EUGENIO JUAN R.
GONZALES [sic] is the architect registered in the PRC. Said Resolution was
issued on March 30, 1998 x x x.

Limson elevated the Resolution of the Prosecutor x x x to the Secretary of

Justice. Before the Secretary of Justice, she utilized the basic arguments she
had raised before the Prosecutor's Office, with slight variations, in assailing
said adverse Resolution of the Prosecutor.

After Opposition by Gonzalez, the Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal

of Limson. The Secretary of Justice affirmed and even expanded the
findings of the Prosecutor x x x.

Not content with said Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, Limson filed a
motion for reconsideration therefrom; which, after Opposition by Gonzalez,
was dismissed by the Secretary of Justice, on September 15, 2000 x x x.
Said dismissal was with finality.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, on or about September 25, 2000, Limson

filed a new letter complaint against Gonzalez, with the Secretary of Justice.
She alleged the same basic facts, evidence, and charges, as already resolved
by the Prosecutor and affirmed with finality, by the Secretary of Justice; but
adding the accusation that because Gonzalez used various combinations of
his name, in different signature, on the [sic] different occasions, Gonzalez
had also violated Republic Act No. 6085 (the Anti-Alias Law). Limson, in
said letter complaint of September 25, 2000, suppressed from the Secretary
of Justice, the extant before-mentioned Resolutions, already decreed and
adverse to her.

The Secretary of Justice referred this letter complaint of Limson x x x to the

Prosecutor's Office of Mandaluyong City for investigation.

This new investigation was docketed as I.S. No. 01-44001-B and assigned to
Honorable Susante J. Tobias x x x.

After submission of Affidavits, Counter-Affidavits and other pertinent

pleadings, and evidences [sic], by the respective parties, before the
Prosecutor, the Prosecutor rendered a Resolution, dismissing the new
complaint x x x which Resolution reads as follows:

'After a careful evaluation of the letter complaint of Revelina Limson dated

September 25, 2000 addressed to the Secretary of Justice and endorsed to
this Office x x x and the evidence adduced by the contending parties, we
find the issues raised in the aforesaid letter to be a rehashed (sic) of a
previous complaint filed by the same complainant which has already been
long resolved with finality by this Office and the Department of Justice
more particularly under I.S. No. 97-11929.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant case

be considered closed and dismissed.'

Not content with said Resolution x x x, Limson filed a motion for

reconsideration; [sic]which was again opposed by Gonzalez and which was
denied by the Prosecutor x x x.

Not agreeable to said Resolution x x x, Limson filed a Petition for Review

with the Secretary of Justice x x x, to which x x x Gonzalez filed an
Answer/Opposition x x x.
The Secretary of Justice denied said Petition for Review of Limson, on April
3, 2002 x x x as follows:

'Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of Department Circular No. 70 dated

July 3, 2000, provides that the Secretary of Justice may, motu propio,
dismiss outright the petition if there is no showing of any reversible error in
the assailed resolution or when issued [sic] raised therein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration. We carefully examined the petition
and its attachments and we found no such error committed by the
prosecutor that would justify the reversal of the assailed resolution which is
in accord with the evidence and law on the matter.

Moreover, there was no showing that a copy of the petition was furnished
the Prosecution Office concerned pursuant to Section 5 of said Department
Circular.[2]
Although Limson sought the reconsideration of the adverse resolution of April 3, 2002, the
Secretary of Justice denied her motion for reconsideration on October 15, 2002.

Decision of the CA

Limson assailed on certiorari the adverse resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in the CA,
claiming that the Secretary of Justice had thereby committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for misappreciating her evidence establishing her
charges of falsification and violation of the Anti-Alias Law against respondent.

On July 31, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision dismissing the petition
for certiorari, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing discussions, the instant Petition is

perforce DENIED. Accordingly, the Resolutions subject of this petition
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[3]
On January 30, 2004, the CA denied Limson's motion for reconsideration.

Issues

In her petition for review, Limson avers the following errors, namely:

THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

DO NOT CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. MOREOVER,
THERE WAS A MISAPPRECIATION AND/OR MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS AND THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO NOTICE CERTAIN
RELEVANT POINTS WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD JUSTIFY A
DIFFERENT CONCLUSION

II

THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS A FINDING BASED

ON SPECULATION AND/OR SURMISE AND THE INFERENCES MADE
WERE MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN.[4]
Limson insists that the names "Eugenio Gonzalez" and "Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado" did
not refer to one and the same individual; and that respondent was not a registered architect
contrary to his claim. According to her, there were material discrepancies between the
graduation photograph of respondent taken in 1941 when he earned his degree in Architecture
from the University of Sto. Tomas, Manila,[5] and another photograph of him taken for his
driver's license in 1996,[6] arguing that the person in the latter photograph was not the same
individual depicted in the 1941 photograph. She submits documents showing that respondent
used aliases from birth, and passed himself off as such persons when in fact he was not. She
prays that the decision of the CA be set aside, and that the proper criminal cases for falsification
of public document and illegal use of alias be filed against respondent

In his comment,[7] respondent counters that the petition for review should be denied due course
for presenting only factual issues; that the factual findings of the OCP, the Secretary of Justice,
and the CA should remain undisturbed; that he did not commit any falsification; that he did not
use any aliases; that his use of conflicting names was the product of erroneous entry,
inadvertence, and innocent mistake on the part of other people; that Limson was motivated by
malice and ill will, and her charges were the product of prevarication; and that he was a
distinguished architect and a respected member of the community and society.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal has no merit.

To start with, the petition for review of Limson projects issues of fact. It urges the Court to undo
the findings of fact of the OCP, the Secretary of Justice and the CA on the basis of the documents
submitted with her petition. But the Court is not a trier of facts, and cannot analyze and weigh
evidence. Indeed, Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Court explicitly requires the petition for
review on certiorari to raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.
Accordingly, the petition for review of Limson is outrightly rejected for this reason.

Secondly, Limson appears to stress that the CA erred in concluding that the Secretary of Justice
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence submitted to the
OCP. She would now have us reverse the CA.

We cannot reverse the CA. We find that the conclusion of the CA about the Secretary of Justice
not committing grave abuse of discretion was fully warranted. Based on the antecedents earlier
rendered here, Limson did not persuasively demonstrate to the CA how the Secretary of Justice
had been gravely wrong in upholding the dismissal by the OCP of her charges against
respondent. In contrast, the assailed resolutions of the Secretary of Justice were quite
exhaustive in their exposition of the reasons for the dismissal of the charges. And, even
assuming that the Secretary of Justice thereby erred, she should have shown to the CA that
either arbitrariness or capriciousness or whimsicality had tainted the error. Yet, she tendered no
such showing. She should be reminded, indeed, that grave abuse of discretion meant either that
the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised by the Secretary of Justice in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the Secretary of Justice
evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when the Secretary of Justice, while exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial powers, acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.[8]

Thirdly, the discrepancy between photographs supposedly taken in 1941 and in 1996 of
respondent did not support Limson's allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Secretary of Justice. It is really absurd to expect respondent, the individual depicted on the
photographs, to look the same after 55 long years.

And, fourthly, on the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the Court observes that
respondent's aliases involved the names "Eugenio Gonzalez", "Eugenio Gonzales", "Eugenio
Juan Gonzalez", "Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado", "Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez", "Eugenio J.
Gonzalez", and per Limson "Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez." But these names contained his true
names, albeit at times joined with an erroneous middle or second name, or a misspelled family
name in one instance. The records disclose that the erroneous middle or second names, or the
misspelling of the family name resulted from error or inadvertence left unchecked and
unrectified over time. What is significant, however, is that such names were not fictitious names
within the purview of the Anti-Alias Law; and that such names were not different from each
other. Considering that he was not also shown to have used the names for unscrupulous
purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public, the dismissal of the charge against him was
justified in fact and in law.

An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to the real name by which he was
registered at birth or baptized the first time, or to the substitute name authorized by a
competent authority; a man's name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly
designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him, but sometimes a man is known by
several different names and these are known as aliases.[9] An alias is thus a name that is
different from the individual's true name, and does not refer to a name that is not different from
his true name.

In Ursua v. Court of Appeals,[10] the Court tendered an enlightening discourse on the

history and objective of our law on aliases that is worth including here, viz:

Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the
light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied.
Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in
mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended
scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the
statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.

For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended,

which was allegedly violated by petitioner, and the surrounding
circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions
thereof, its amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No.142,
which was approved on 7 November 1936, and before its amendment by R.
A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as
follows:

Section 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use

any name different from the one with which he was christened or by which
he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute name as may
have been authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise the
patronymic name and one or two surnames.

Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for
authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain
judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall be had
for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the original name and
the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has been obtained,
specifying the proceedings and the date on which such authority was
granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the
proper civil register x x x.

The above law was subsequently amended by R. A. No. 6085, approved on

4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads:

Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television,

radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use
of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any
name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the
office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first
time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of
immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been
authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have
not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been
baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to
register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall
comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.

Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor
in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a
change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial
authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth
the person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil
registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym,
if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the
reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of
alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded
in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or
names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly
recorded in the proper local civil registry.

The objective and purpose of C. A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act
No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names
other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the
Bureau of Commerce And Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties
for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14
November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November
1934. The pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow Section
1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or
printed receipt including receipt for tax or business or any written or
printed contract not verified by a notary public or on any written or printed
evidence of any agreement or business transactions, any name used in
connection with his business other than his true name, or keep
conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place where his business
is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm
name or business name or style without first registering such other name,
or such firm name, or business name or style in the Bureau of Commerce
together with his true name and that of any other person having a joint or
common interest with him in such contract agreement, business
transaction, or business x x x.

For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended

was made primarily to curb the common practice among the
Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which
created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a
practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names
which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained
against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they
possessed a thousand and one names. CA. No. 142 thus penalized
the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly
authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the
civil register.

In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic the Court had occasion to explain the

meaning, concept and ill effects of the use of an alias within the purview of
C.A. No. 142 when we ruled

There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use of alias 'Kheng Chiau
Young' in addition to his real name 'Yu Cheng Chiau' would add to more
confusion. That he is known in his business, as manager of the Robert Reid,
Inc., by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its use. After
all, petitioner admitted that he is known to his associates by both names. In
fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a customer, knows him by
his real name. Neither would the fact that he had encountered certain
difficulties in his transactions with government offices which required him
to explain why he bore two names, justify the grant of his petition, for
petitioner could easily avoid said difficulties by simply using and sticking
only to his real name 'Yu Cheng Chiau.'

The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as

shown by his having filed a petition for naturalization in Branch V of the
abovementioned court, argues the more against the grant of his petition,
because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no necessity
for his further using said alias, as it would be contrary to the usual Filipino
way and practice of using only one name in ordinary as well as business
transactions. And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he believes (after
he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his name following
the Occidental method, 'he can easily file a petition for change of name, so
that in lieu of the name 'Yu Kheng Chian,' he can, abandoning the same, ask
for authority to adopt the name 'Kheng Chiau Young.' (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review

on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 31, 2003;
and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo,* and Villarama, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

* Vice Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, who penned the decision under review, pursuant
to the raffle of May 8, 2013.

[1] Rollo, pp. 74-91; penned by Associate Justice Reyes (now a Member of this Court), with the
concurrence of Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. (retired/deceased) and Associate Justice
Danilo B. Pine (retired).

[2] Id. at 75-78.

[3] Id. at 91.

[4] Id. at 50.

[5] Id. at 123 (Annex "O" of the Petition).

[6] Id (Annex "P" of the Petition).

[7] Id. at 158-208.

[8] De los Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 153852,
October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 410, 422-423,

[9] Ursua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996, 256 SCRA 147, 155.

[10] Id. at 163-166.

EN BANC

[A.M. No. CTA-01-1. April 2, 2002]

ATTY. SUSAN M. AQUINO, complainant, vs. HON. ERNESTO D. ACOSTA,

Presiding Judge, Court of Tax Appeals, respondent.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

The present administrative case filed with this Court originated from a sworn affidavit-
complaint[1] of Atty. Susan M. Aquino, Chief of the Legal and Technical Staff of the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA), charging Judge Ernesto Acosta, Presiding Judge of the same court, with
sexual harassment under R.A. 7877 and violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In her affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged several instances when respondent judge
sexually harassed her.
On November 21, 2000, she reported for work after her vacation in the United States,
bringing gifts for the three judges of the CTA, including respondent. In the afternoon of the same
day, he entered her room and greeted her by shaking her hand. Suddenly, he pulled her towards
him and kissed her on her cheek.
On December 28, 2000, while respondent was on official leave, he called complainant by
phone, saying he will get something in her office. Shortly thereafter, he entered her room, shook
her hand and greeted her, "Merry Christmas." Thereupon, he embraced her and kissed her. She
was able to free herself by slightly pushing him away. Complainant submitted the Joint
Affidavit[2] of Ma. Imelda C. Samonte and Anne Benita M. Santos, CTA Tax Specialists, to
prove that respondent went to her office that day.
On the first working day in January, 2001, respondent phoned complainant, asking if she
could see him in his chambers in order to discuss some matters. When complainant arrived there,
respondent tried to kiss her but she was able to evade his sexual attempt. She then resolved not to
enter his chambers alone.
Weeks later, after the Senate approved the proposed bill expanding the jurisdiction of the
CTA, while complainant and her companions were congratulating and kissing each other,
respondent suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her.
In the morning of February 14, 2001, respondent called complainant, requesting her to go to
his office. She then asked Ruby Lanuza, a clerk in the Records Section, to accompany
her. Fortunately, when they reached his chambers, respondent had left.
The last incident happened the next day. At around 8:30 a.m., respondent called complainant
and asked her to see him in his office to discuss the Senate bill on the CTA. She again requested
Ruby to accompany her. The latter agreed but suggested that they should act as if they met by
accident in respondents office. Ruby then approached the secretarys table which was separated
from respondents office by a transparent glass. For her part, complainant sat in front of
respondent's table and asked him what he wanted to know about the Senate bill. Respondent
seemed to be at a loss for words and kept glancing at Ruby who was searching for something at
the secretary's desk. Forthwith, respondent approached Ruby, asked her what she was looking for
and stepped out of the office. When he returned, Ruby said she found what she was looking for
and left. Respondent then approached complainant saying, me gusto akong gawin sa iyo kahapon
pa. Thereupon, he tried to grab her. Complainant instinctively raised her hands to protect herself
but respondent held her arms tightly, pulled her towards him and kissed her. She pushed him
away, then slumped on a chair trembling. Meantime, respondent sat on his chair and covered his
face with his hands. Thereafter, complainant left crying and locked herself inside a comfort
room. After that incident, respondent went to her office and tossed a note[3] stating, sorry, it wont
happen again.
In his comment, respondent judge denied complainants allegation that he sexually harassed
her six times. He claimed that he has always treated her with respect, being the head of the CTA
Legal Staff. In fact, there is no strain in their professional relationship.
On the first incident, he explained that it was quite unlikely that complainant would ask him
to go to her office on such date in order to give him a pasalubong.
With respect to the second incident on December 28, he claimed it could not have happened
as he was then on official leave.
Anent the third incident, respondent explained that he went to the various offices of the CTA
to extend New Years greetings to the personnel. He also greeted complainant with a casual buss
on her cheek and gave her a calendar. In turn, she also greeted him.
As to the fourth episode, he averred that he and complainant had been attending the
deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee at the Senate on the bill expanding the
jurisdiction of the CTA.Hence, when the bill was finally approved that particular day,
respondent, in jubilation and in the presence of other people, gave complainant a spontaneous
peck on her cheek. He could not recall any resentment on her part when he kissed her. She even
congratulated him in return, saying Justice ka na Judge. Then he treated her to a lunch to
celebrate the event. Respondent recounted several times when they would return to the CTA in
the evening after attending the committee hearings in Congress to retrieve complainants personal
belongings from her office. Surely, if he had malice in his mind, those instances would have
been the perfect opportunities for him to sexually harass her.
As to the fifth incident, respondent alleged that he did not call complainant to harass her, but
to discuss with her and Elizabeth Lozano, HRMO III, and Elsie T. Forteza, Administrative
Officer, the health plan for the CTA officers and employees. The fact that such meeting took
place was confirmed by a Certification issued by Lozano.[4]
Regarding the sixth incident, respondent narrated his version as follows: Complainant
arrived in his office past 9 a.m. that day, followed by another court employee, Ruby Lanuza. He
proceeded to discuss the CTA Expansion Bill with complainant. Then he went for a while to the
rest room. When he returned, Ruby had already left but complainant was still there. Forthwith,
he remarked that he forgot to greet her on Valentines Day, the day before. He approached
complainant to give her a casual buss on the cheek. But she suddenly stood and raised her arms
to cover her face, causing her to lose her balance. So he held her arms to prevent her from
falling. Her rejection came as a surprise to him and made him feel quite embarrassed. Shortly,
complainant excused herself and left the room. Stunned at the thought that she might
misinterpret his gesture, he sent her a short note of apology. Respondent further explained that
the structure of his office, being seen through a transparent glass divider, makes it impossible for
anyone to commit any improper conduct inside.
In a Resolution dated August 21, 2001, this Court referred the instant case to Justice Josefina
G. Salonga of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
Justice Salonga set the hearing of the case on November 6, 2001. However, the parties,
through counsel, manifested that they will not be adducing any further evidence. On November
7, 2001, Justice Salonga issued an Order directing them to submit their memoranda
simultaneously, after which, the case shall be considered submitted for resolution.
On January 9, 2002, Justice Salonga forwarded to this Court her Report on Investigation and
Recommendation, thus:
We find for the respondent.
"The complainant failed to show by convincing evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta
in greeting her with a kiss on the cheek, in a 'beso-beso' fashion, were carried out with
lustful and lascivious desires or were motivated by malice or ill-motive. It is clear
under the circumstances that most of the kissing incidents were done on festive and
special occasions. In fact, complainant's testimony that she was sexually harassed on
November 21, 2000, is hardly believable. Notably, complainant declared in her
affidavit-complaint that she brought some 'pasalubongs' for the respondent judge from
her trip abroad. Therefore, Atty. Aquino could not have been 'taken aback' by the
respondent's act of greeting her in a friendly manner and thanking her by way of a kiss
on the cheek. Moreover, it was established that Judge Acosta was on official leave of
absence from December 26-29, 2000. This was corroborated by Ricardo Hebia, the
driver of respondent judge, in his Panunumpa (Affidavit) dated March 26, 2001,
where he stated among others, to wit:
xxx
"Corollarily, the joint affidavit of Ms. Santos and Ms. Samonte attesting to the fact
that respondent dropped by at the third floor of the CTA and greeted them Happy
New Year, even if it true, can not be given any evidentiary weight. Clearly, they did
not make any categorical statement that they had witnessed or seen Judge Acosta
making sexual advances on the complainant. Nor did they even attribute any
malicious acts on respondent constituting sexual harassment.
"In addition, the respondent admitted that when he handed a calendar and greeted
complainant with a buss, complainant reciprocated by greeting him a Happy New
Year. The allegation of Atty. Aquino that the respondent merely used the calendars as
'props' to kiss her on the cheek and that she was singled out by respondent is not
supported by any convincing evidence. The affidavit of Ms. Aurora U. Aso and
Renelyn L. Larga that Ms. Carmen Acosta gave them calendars for the office of Attys.
Margarette Guzman and Felizardo O. Consing, is immaterial and irrelevant, as Judge
Acosta had stated that he handed to complainant Aquino, a 2001 calendar in the
course of greeting her with a buss on the cheek. Said affidavit could not account for
the calendars distributed to the other offices in the CTA, more specifically, the Legal
and Technical Staff headed by Atty. Aquino.
"Moreover, the claim of the complainant that she was sexually harassed immediately
after the final reading of the bill anent the expansion of the CTA at the Senate, can not
be accorded great evidentiary value. The alleged kissing incident took place in the
presence of other people and the same was by reason of the exaltation or happiness of
the moment, due to the approval of the subject bill. Quite interesting to note, is that
Atty. Aquino reciprocated by congratulating respondent and remarking "justice ka na
judge" after the latter had bussed her on the cheek. Complainant even failed to dispute
the fact that after the kissing incident, she joined Judge Acosta and his driver for lunch
at a seafood restaurant in Luneta. There was even a time that she allowed the
respondent judge to accompany her to the office alone and at nighttime at that, to
retrieve her car keys and bag when they returned to the CTA after the hearing at the
Senate on the CTA expansion bill. These acts are not at square with the behavior of
one who has been sexually harassed, for the normal reaction of a victim of sexual
harassment would be to avoid the harasser or decline his invitations after being
offended. In fact, this occasion could have provided the respondent judge with the
right opportunity to commit malicious acts or to sexually harass complainant, but then
Judge Acosta never even attempted to do so. Undoubtedly, it could be said that no
strained relations existed between Atty. Aquino and Judge Acosta at that moment.
"Neither can the alleged continuous call of Judge Acosta on complainant in the
morning of February 14, 2001 to see him in his office, be considered as acts
constituting sexual harassment. Atty. Aquino failed to state categorically in her
affidavit-complaint that respondent demanded sexual advances or favors from her, or
that the former had committed physical conduct of sexual nature against her. The
telephone calls were attributed malicious implications by the complainant. To all
intents and purposes, the allegation was merely a product of her imagination, hence,
the same deserves no weight in law. Indeed, Atty. Aquino's own version, indicates
that she well knew that the purpose of the respondent in calling her in the morning of
February 14, 2001 was to discuss the CTA Health Plan which was disapproved by the
Supreme Court and not for the respondent to demand sexual favors from her. This was
corroborated by Atty. Margarette Guzman in her affidavit dated February 28, 2001,
attached to the complainant's affidavit, where she stated:
xxx
"Finally, while Judge Acosta admitted having pecked Atty. Aquino on her cheek,
which was avoided by the latter, the same was not meant to sexually harass her. Judge
Acosta's act of extending his post Valentine greeting to complainant was done in good
faith and sans any malice. This is so because immediately after the complainant had
displayed annoyance to the kissing episode, Judge Acosta immediately extended an
apology by way of a handwritten note saying that the incident won't happen again.
"Parenthetically, the undersigned is convinced that Ms. Lanuza's affidavit that she
supposedly accompanied complainant to respondent's office as she allegedly had a
previous 'bad experience' with the latter when he was still an Associate Judge, was
merely concocted to add flavor to the baseless imputations hurled against Judge
Acosta. The accusation is implausible as Ms. Lanuza did not seem to complain about
the alleged bad experience she had with Judge Acosta or relate it to anyone until ten
(10) years later. It must be stressed that Ms. Lanuza is a biased-witness who harbored
ill feelings against the respondent, as she was reprimanded by Judge Acosta for
habitual absenteeism and tardiness in 1996. More importantly, Ms. Lanuza did not
even attest that she was a witness to the alleged sexual advances of Judge Acosta.
"In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's pecks on the cheeks of the
complainant should be understood in the context of having been done on the occasion
of some festivities, and not the assertion of the latter hat she was singled out by Judge
Acosta in his kissing escapades. The busses on her cheeks were simply friendly and
innocent, bereft of malice and lewd design. The fact that respondent judge kisses other
people on the cheeks in the 'beso-beso' fashion, without malice, was corroborated by
Atty. Florecita P. Flores, Ms. Josephine Adalem and Ms. Ma. Fides Balili, who stated
that they usually practice 'beso-beso' or kissing on the cheeks, as a form of greeting on
occasions when they meet each other, like birthdays, Christmas, New Year's Day and
even Valentine's Day, and it does not matter whether it is Judge Acosta's birthday or
their birthdays. Theresa Cinco Bactat, a lawyer who belongs to complainant's
department, further attested that on occasions like birthdays, respondent judge would
likewise greet her with a peck on the cheek in a 'beso-beso' manner. Interestingly, in
one of several festive occasions, female employees of the CTA pecked respondent
judge on the cheek where Atty. Aquino was one of Judge Acosta's well
wishers. (Annex "8" to Comment, p. 65, Rollo)
"In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed transpired on those six occasions. Judge
Acosta's acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on her cheek were merely forms of greetings,
casual and customary in nature. No evidence of intent to sexually harass complainant
was apparent, only that the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were given malicious
connotations by the complainant. In fact, she did not even relate to anyone what
happened to her. Undeniably, there is no manifest sexual undertone in all those
incidents.[5]
Justice Salonga then made the following recommendation:
Considering the above, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the
administrative complaint for sexual harassment and violations of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics and the Code of Professional Responsibility be DISMISSED and
accordingly, respondent Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta be exonerated therefrom;
that in view of these charges which might have tainted the image of the Court, though
unsubstantiated they may be, Judge Acosta is WARNED to refrain from doing similar
acts, or any act for that matter on the complainant and other female employees of the
Court of Tax Appeals, which in any manner may be interpreted as lustful advances.[6]
We agree with the findings of Justice Salonga.
Administrative complaints against members of the judiciary are viewed by this Court with
utmost care, for proceedings of this nature affect not only the reputation of the respondents
concerned, but the integrity of the entire judiciary as well.
We have reviewed carefully the records of this case and found no convincing evidence to
sustain complainants charges. What we perceive to have been committed by respondent judge
are casual gestures of friendship and camaraderie, nothing more, nothing less. In kissing
complainant, we find no indication that respondent was motivated by malice or lewd
design. Evidently, she misunderstood his actuations and construed them as work-related sexual
harassment under R.A. 7877.
As aptly stated by the Investigating Justice:
"A mere casual buss on the cheek is not a sexual conduct or favor and does not fall
within the purview of sexual harassment under R.A. No. 7877. Section 3 (a) thereof
provides, to wit:
'Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training - related Sexual Harassment Defined. - Work,
education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer,
employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor,
coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral
ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether
the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said
Act.
a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed
when:
1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-
employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said
individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions or privileges; or the
refusal to grant sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the
employee which in anyway would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employees;
2) The above acts would impair the employee's right or privileges under existing labor
laws; or
3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment
for the employee.'
"Clearly, under the foregoing provisions, the elements of sexual harassment are as
follows:
1) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person has authority, influence or
moral ascendancy over another;
2) The authority, influence or moral ascendancy exists in a working environment;
3) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, or any other person having authority, influence or moral
ascendancy makes a demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.
"In her Complaint-affidavit, Reply and Sur-rejoinder, complainant did not even allege
that Judge Acosta demanded, requested or required her to give him a buss on the
cheek which, she resented. Neither did Atty. Aquino establish by convincing evidence
that the busses on her cheek, which she considers as sexual favors, discriminated
against her continued employment, or resulted in an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment. In fact, complainant continued to perform her work in the office with
the usual normalcy. Obviously, the alleged sexual favor, if there ever was, did not
interfere with her working condition (Annexes "9" - "9-FFF"). Moreover, Atty.
Aquino also continued to avail of benefits and leaves appurtenant to her office and
was able to maintain a consistent outstanding performance. On top of this, her
working area which, is at the third floor of the CTA, is far removed from the office of
Judge Acosta located at the fourth floor of the same building. Resultantly, no hostile
or intimidating working environment is apparent.
"Based on the foregoing findings, there is no sufficient evidence to create a moral
certainty that Judge Acosta committed the acts complained of; that Atty. Aquino's
determination to seek justice for herself was not substantiated by convincing
evidence; that the testimony of respondent judge and his witnesses are credible and
therefore, should be given weight and probative value; that the respondent's acts
undoubtedly do not bear the marks of misconduct, impropriety or immorality, either
under R.A. No. 7877 or the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[7]
Indeed, from the records on hand, there is no showing that respondent judge demanded,
requested or required any sexual favor from complainant in exchange for favorable
compensation, terms, conditions, promotion or privileges specified under Section 3 of R.A.
7877. Nor did he, by his actuations, violate the Canons of Judicial Ethics or the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
While we exonerate respondent from the charges herein, however, he is admonished not to
commit similar acts against complainant or other female employees of the Court of Tax Appeals,
otherwise, his conduct may be construed as tainted with impropriety.
We laud complainants effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront
to her honor. Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and
accuse her superior of sexual harassment. However, her assessment of the incidents is misplaced
for the reasons mentioned above.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Ernesto D. Acosta is hereby EXONERATED of the
charges against him. However, he is ADVISED to be more circumspect in his deportment.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., no part. Counsel to respondent was my former law office.
Puno, and Vitug, JJ., on official leave.

DIGITEL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC.,

VS
MARIQUIT SORIANO
492 SCRA 704 (2006)
Forced resignation must be sufficiently established by substantial, concrete and credible evidence.
Mariquit Soriano (Soriano) was hired as Director of Marketing by Digitel Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. (Digitel). Soriano worked under Vice President for Business Division Eric J.
Severino (Severino) and Senior Executive Vice President Johnson Robert L. Go (Go). Following a
professional dispute against Severino and Go, Soriano filed a resignation letter which was accepted
by her superiors.
After her resignation, Soriano filed a suit for illegal termination alleging that she was forced to resign
due to professional and sexual harassment. She alleged that her superiors are preventing her former
colleagues in testifying to the sexual harassment. She produced an affidavit by one of the persons
involved with Digitel stating that the employees of the company were being forced not to testify
against Go and Severino. In defense, Go and Severino provided witnesses that testified that the acts
alleged by Soriano din not happen.
The Labor Arbiter held that Mariquit voluntarily resigned, thus dismissing the complaint. On appeal,
the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
NLRC. Hence,this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Soriano was forced to resign, due to professional and sexual harassment, thus
amounting to constructive dismissal.
HELD:
Soriano’s own allegation, although they are so detailed, appear incredible if not downright puny. An
analysis of her statements shows that her own conclusion that she was being sexually and
professionally harassed was on the basis of her own suppositions, conjectures, and surmises.
She could not satisfactorily explain her allegation that she was consistently professionally harassed
by respondent Severino. The latter’s alleged words: “How come you claim you know so much yet
nothing ever gets done in your department?” do not jurisprudentially constitute nor clearly establish
“professional harassment.” Aside from these words, the complainant could only venture to allege
instances in general and vague terms. As to the facts allegedly constituting “sexual harassment”
advanced by Go and Severino, after an objective analysis over their assertions as stated in their
respective counter-affidavits and further considering the other supporting documents attached to the
respondents’ pleadings, it is found that these far out weigh the Soriano’s own evidence
A reading of the affidavit of the witness, who was never an employee nor present at the party of
Digitel, reveals, however, that she merely “concluded” that the employees of Digitel were instructed
or harassed not to testify in favor of Soriano when they failed to meet one Matet Ruiz, a Digitel
employee “who kept avoiding to meet with such tendency to threaten resignation every time higher
management would refuse her demand to transfer subordinates who had administrative differences
with her, we therefore have no doubt that complainant voluntarily resigned when respondent
Severino refused to heed her demand that Ms. Arnedo and Ms. Inductivo, her subordinates, be
transferred to other departments. We also have no doubt that such resignation does not constitute
constructive dismissal, much less an illegal one.

Domingo vs. Rayala (596 SCRA 90)

Domingo vs. Rayala
546 Scra 90

Facts:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment
against Rayala, the chairman of NLRC.
She alleged that Rayala called her in his office and touched her shoulder, part of her neck then tickled her ears. Rayala
argued that his acts does not constitute sexual harassment because for it to exist, there must be a demand, request or
requirement of sexual favor.

Issue:
Whether or not Rayala commit sexual harassment.

Rulings:
Yes.

The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual
harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work, education or training-related sexual
harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor,
coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or
training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless
of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment
of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or
the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;
. (2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or
. (3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.

even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be administratively
liable. It is true that this provision calls for a “demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.” But it is not necessary
that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It
may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders,
running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money
allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual
overtones – all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.

ivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or

aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
xxx
Article 63 states that the greater penalty, which is death, will be applied when in the
commission of rape there is present one aggravating circumstance. We hold that the
aggravating circumstance that is sufficient to warrant the imposition of the graver
penalty of death must be that specifically enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code. Since it is only relationship that is alleged and proven in this case, and it is not an
aggravating circumstance per se, the proper penalty is the lower penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Even for the purpose of awarding exemplary damages, there was lingering doubt
whether the alternative circumstance of relationship should be considered an
aggravating circumstance to justify such an award. People v. Catubig[56] settled the
lingering doubt in this manner:
The attendance of aggravating circumstances in the perpetration of the crime serves to
increase the penalty (the criminal liability aspect), as well as to justify an award of
exemplary or corrective damages (the civil liability aspect), moored on the greater
perversity of the offender manifested in the commission of the felony such as may be
shown by (1) the motivating power itself, (2) the place of commission, (3) the means
and ways employed, (4) the time, or (5) the personal circumstances of the offender or
the offended party or both. There are various types of aggravating circumstances,
among them, the ordinary and the qualifying. Relationship is an alternative
circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.
Art. 15. Their concept. --Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into
consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the
crime and other conditions attending its commission. They are relationship,
intoxication, and degree of instruction and education of the offender.
The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when
the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted
brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender.
As a rule, relationship is held to be aggravating in crimes against chastity, such as
rape and acts of lasciviousness, whether the offender is a higher or a lower degree
relative of the offended party.
Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, the death penalty is to be imposed in rape cases when the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The Court has since held that the
circumstances enumerated by the amendatory law are to be regarded as special
qualifying (aggravating) circumstances. Somehow doubts linger on whether
relationship may then be considered to warrant an award for exemplary damages
where it is used to qualify rape as a heinous crime, thereby becoming an element
thereof, as would subject the offender to the penalty of death. Heretofore, the Court
has not categorically laid down a specific rule, preferring instead to treat the issue on a
case to case basis.
In People vs. Fundano, People vs. Ramos, People vs. Medina, People vs. Dimapilis,
People vs. Calayca, People vs. Tabion, People vs. Bayona, People vs. Bayya, and
People vs. Nuez, along with still other cases, the Court has almost invariably
appreciated relationship as an ordinary aggravating circumstance in simple rape and
thereby imposed exemplary damages upon the offender whether or not the offense has
been committed prior to or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659.
Exceptionally, as in People vs. Decena, People vs. Perez, and People vs. Ambray, the
Court has denied the award of exemplary damages following the effectivity of that
law. In qualified rape cases, such as in People vs. Magdato, People vs. Arizapa, and
People vs. Alicante, the Court decreed the payment of exemplary damages to the
offended party but it did not so do as in People vs. Alba, People vs. Mengote, and
People vs. Maglente.
It may be time for the Court to abandon its pro hac vice stance and provide, for the
guidance of the bar and the bench, a kind of standard on the matter.
Also known as punitive or vindictive damages, exemplary or corrective damages are
intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue
sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those
guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used
interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages
when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and
humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and
wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt
caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant - associated with such
circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness,
oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud- that intensifies the injury. The terms
punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that
may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either
case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others
like him from similar conduct in the future.
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having
specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission
of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social
order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of
which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the
accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the
penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award
of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party
who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to
be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but
to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of
an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence
to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to
the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within
the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Catubig, we held that the alternative circumstance of relationship
serves as basis for an award of exemplary damages because the term aggravating
circumstances must be understood in its broad or generic sense. However, this
interpretation is only applicable to the civil aspect, not the criminal aspect of rape,
which involves the imposition of the proper penalty. When the penalty to be imposed on
the accused is teetering between reclusion perpetua and death, the term aggravating
circumstance in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code must be understood in the
strictest sense. The aggravating circumstance that would spell the difference between
life and death for the accused must be that specifically listed in Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Death is an irrevocable penalty. Thus, the rule on strict interpretation of criminal
statutes applies with greater force when the law defines the offense as a heinous crime
punishable by death.
However, we resort to the strict interpretation of the term aggravating circumstance
only for the purpose of imposing the death penalty. When the penalty to be imposed is a
range of penalties where the maximum penalty is death and the appreciation of an
aggravating circumstance would call for the imposition of the maximum penalty, which is
death, the term aggravating circumstance must be strictly construed. The aggravating
circumstance sufficient to justify the imposition of the death penalty must not only be
duly alleged and proven it must be one of those enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code or that specified by law. In all other cases where the maximum penalty is
not death, the term aggravating circumstance must be interpreted in its broad or generic
sense so as to include the alternative circumstances under Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code.
We cannot consider dwelling as a generic aggravating circumstance because the
Amended Information did not allege dwelling. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which applies retroactively in this case, now explicitly mandates that the
information must state in ordinary and concise language the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances.[57] When the law or rules specify certain circumstances that can
aggravate an offense or qualify an offense to warrant a greater penalty, the information
must allege such circumstances and the prosecution must prove the same to justify the
imposition of the increased penalty.[58]
Relationship in this case serves to justify the award of exemplary damages to
Remilyn of P25,000.[59] Remilyn is also entitled to P50,000 moral damages and P50,000
civil indemnity. Case law requires the automatic award of moral damages to a rape
victim without need of proof because from the nature of the crime it can be assumed
that she has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. [60] Such award is
separate and distinct from civil indemnity, which case law also automatically awards
upon proof of the commission of the crime by the offender.[61]
The trial court was so revolted by the perversity of appellants crime that it was
moved to include this proposal in the dispositive portion of its decision:
xxx in the event that upon automatic review by the Honorable Supreme Court, that the
penalty of Death is not imposed but that of Reclusion Perpetua, this Honorable Court
recommends that accused should not be granted pardon within the period of thirty
(30) years.
Incestuous rape is indeed reprehensible. It deserves our full condemnation.
However, the recommendation by the trial court is improper.[62] It is the Presidents
prerogative whether or not to grant a pardon subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution.[63]
 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region,
Branch 54, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, is AFFIRMED insofar as it finds appellant
Joseph Orilla GUILTY of one count of rape in Criminal Case No. 3219-A with the
MODIFICATION that the death sentence imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua, and
the amount of civil indemnity is reduced toP50,000. In addition, appellant is further
ordered to pay Remilyn Orilla P50,000 moral damages and P25,000 exemplary
damages. Criminal Case No. 3220-A is dismissed. The provision recommending the
disqualification of appellant from executive clemency is deleted. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, and Vitug, JJ., in the result.
Corona, J., joins the dissent of J. Callejo, Sr.
Callejo, Sr., J., see dissenting opinion.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

When the evidence fails to establish all the elements of the crime, the verdict must be
one of acquittal of the accused. This basic legal precept applies in this criminal litigation
for rape.

Factual Antecedents

Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez (appellant) appeals the September 26, 2013
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 05452 which affirmed
with modification the February 15, 2012 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 37, in Criminal Case No. 08-264453. The RTC found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against "AAA"[3]under
paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The designation of the
crime in the Information against appellant is rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the RPC. However, the accusatory portion of the Information charges
appellant with rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1(b), Article 266-A, to
wit:

That on or about September 29, 2008 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring and confederating with one whose true name, real
identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping
each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, commit sexual abuse
upon the person of "AAA" by then and there making her drink liquor which
made her dizzy and drunk, depriving her of reason or otherwise
unconsciousness, bringing her to a room and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her, against her will.

Contrary to law.[4]
When arraigned, appellant pleaded "not guilty." Elvis James Meneses (Meneses) was
involved in the commission of the crime but could not be prosecuted due to his
minority. He was only 14 years old at the time of the incident.

Version of the Prosecution

"AAA" testified that at around 9:30 p.m. of September 29, 2008, she was having a
drinking session with appellant and Meneses in the house of appellant. After some time,
she felt dizzy so she took a nap. At around 11:00 p.m., she was roused from her sleep by
Meneses who was mounting her and inserting his penis into her vagina. She felt pain but
could only cry in silence for fear that the knife which they used to cut hotdog and now
lying on top of a table nearby would be used to kill her if she resisted. Meneses left after
raping her. While still feeling dizzy, afraid and shivering, appellant approached her and
asked if he could also have sex with her. When she did not reply appellant mounted and
raped her. Appellant stopped only when she tried to reposition her body. "AAA" then left
appellant's house and immediately returned to the house she shared with her live-in
partner.

The following day, "AAA" reported the incident to the police. She also underwent a
medical examination and the results revealed two lacerations in her hymen.

Version of the Defense

Appellant denied raping "AAA." He claimed that on that fateful night, he was having a
drinking session with his cousin, Gerry Tionloc. After a while, Meneses and "AAA"
arrived and joined in their drinking session. Meneses and "AAA" then went inside his
bedroom and continued drinking while he went out of the house to buy food. When he
returned and entered his bedroom, he saw Meneses and "AAA" having sex. They asked
him to leave, so he went to the kitchen. Meneses then came out of the bedroom followed
by "AAA" who was holding a bottle of "rugby," which she brought home with her.
Appellant contended that nothing more happened that night. Meneses corroborated his
version of the incident.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision[5] dated February 15,2012, the RTC clarified that appellant is charged
with rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC based
on the allegations in the Information and not with rape by sexual assault under
paragraph 2 of the same provision of law, as the designation in the Information
suggests. The RTC stressed that this is consistent with the legal precept that it is the
allegations or recital in the Information that determine the nature of the crime
committed. Thus, the RTC ruled that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
rape through sexual intercourse against "AAA." It held that the prosecution successfully
established the crime through the testimony of "AAA," which was credible, natural,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Juan Richard Tionloc y

Marquez GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable
under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to
pay the private complainant Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
Php50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[6]
Appellant appealed the RTC's Decision arguing that discrepancies in the sworn
statement of "AAA" and her testimony diminished her credibility. Appellant contended
that "AAA" alleged in her sworn statement that: (1) appellant held her hands while
Meneses was on top of her; and (2) she slept after Meneses raped her and awakened
only when he was on top of her. However, "AAA" did not mention these allegations
during her direct examination. Appellant maintained that "AAA" failed to refute his
assertions that her aunt and uncle fabricated the charges against him for having
previous affairs with two of her cousin.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision[7] dated September 26, 2013, the CA ruled that discrepancies between the
affidavit and testimony of "AAA" did not impair her credibility since the former is
taken ex parte and is often incomplete or inaccurate for lack or absence of searching
inquiries by the investigating officer. The inconsistencies even preclude the possibility
that the testimony given was rehearsed. Moreover, the CA held that a rape victim like
"AAA" is not expected to make an errorless recollection of the incident, so humiliating
and painful that she might even try to obliterate it from her memory. The CA gave scant
consideration to the appellant's claim of ill motive of the aunt and uncle of"AAA," as well
as his denial of raping her which cannot overcome her positive, candid and categorical
testimony that he was the rapist. The CA therefore affirmed the Decision of the RTC
with modification that interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages
awarded from the date of finality of the CA's Decision until fully paid. The dispositive
portion of the CA's Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision

dated 15 February 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region. Manila, Branch 37, in Crim. Case No. 08-264453 finding
accused-appellant Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and another Php50,000.00 as moral damages in favor of private
complainant AAA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that interest at
the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from the date
of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.[8]
Still insisting on his innocence, appellant comes to this Court through this appeal.

Assignment of Error

Appellant adopts the same assignment of error he raised before the CA, viz.:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.[9]
Appellant asserts that he should be acquitted of rape since the prosecution was not able
to establish the required quantum of evidence in order to overcome the presumption of
innocence.

Our Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

The Facts Recited In The Information Determine the Crime Charged.

It is apparent that there is a discrepancy in the designation of the crime in the

Information (rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC) and
the recital in the Information (rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of the
same provision of law). However, this discrepancy does not violate appellant's right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. As ruled correctly by
the RTC, the allegations in the Information charged appellant with rape through sexual
intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC and said allegations or recital
in the Information determine the nature of the crime committed. "[T]he character of the
crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of
the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information."[10]
The Use Of Force, Threat or Intimidation Causes Fear on the Part of the
Rape Victim.

Be that as it may, the prosecution had to overcome the presumption of innocence of

appellant by presenting evidence that would establish the elements of rape by sexual
intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, to wit: (1) the offender is a
man; (2) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; (3) such act was accomplished
by using force, threat or intimidation. "In rape cases alleged to have been committed by
force, threat or intimidation, it is imperative for the prosecution to establish that the
element of voluntariness on the part of the victim be absolutely lacking. The prosecution
must prove that force or intimidation was actually employed by accused upon his victim
to achieve his end. Failure to do so is fatal to its cause."[11]

Force, as an element of rape, must be sufficient to consummate the purposes which the
accused had in mind. On the other hand, intimidation must produce fear that if the
victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to
her at that moment or even thereafter as when she is threatened with death if she
reports the incident.[12] "Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear caused by
threatening the girl with a knife or pistol."[13]

It this case, the prosecution established that appellant was an 18-year old man who had
sexual intercourse with "AAA," a woman who was 24 years old during the incident.
However, there was no evidence to prove that appellant used force, threat or
intimidation during his sexual congress with "AAA." She testified that appellant and
Meneses are her good friends. Thus, she frequented the house of appellant. At around
7:00p.m. of September 29, 2008, she again went to the house of appellant and chatted
with him and Meneses while drinking liquor. From that time up to about 11 p.m. when
she took a nap, there is no showing that appellant or Meneses forced, threatened or
intimidated her.

As to how appellant and Meneses had sexual intercourse with her, "AAA" merely
testified as follows:

Q - Madam Witness, you said that it was Elvis James who raped you first.
And then after he left this Juan Richard Tionloc [accused] approached
you and asked if you can do it?
Yes, Ma'am; he asked me but I did not answer because I was still
A-
shivering.

Q - And then what else happened after that?

A - That is it; he was the one who did it.[14]
No allegation whatsoever was made by "AAA" that Meneses or appellant employed
force, threat or intimidation against her. No claim was ever made that appellant
physically overpowered, or used or threatened to use a weapon against, or uttered
threatening words to "AAA." While "AAA" feared for her life since a knife lying on the
table nearby could be utilized to kill her if she resisted, her fear was a mere product of
her own imagination. There was no evidence that the knife was placed nearby precisely
to threaten or intimidate her. We cannot even ascertain whether said knife can be used
as a weapon or an effective tool to intimidate a person because it was neither presented
nor described in court. These findings are clear from the following testimony of "AAA:"

While Elvis James was inserting his penis to [sic] your vagina, what are
Q-
[sic] you doing?
A - I was crying, Ma'am.

Q - You did not shout for help?

A - I did not because I was afraid, Ma'am.

Q - Why were you afraid, madam witness?

Because there was a knife inside the room which we used in cutting the
A - hotdog and then [I] did not shout anymore because I was afraid that
they might stab me, Ma'am.[15]
Even assuming in the nil possibility that Meneses was able to force or instill fear in
"AAA's" mind, it should be noted that he was already gone when appellant asked "AAA"
for a sexual favor. In other words, the source of the feigned force, threat or intimidation
was no longer present when appellant casually asked his friend, "AAA," if she "can do it"
one more time. "AAA" did not respond either in the affirmative or in the negative.

Resistance Should be Made Before the Rape is Consummated.

Later on, appellant went on top of "AAA" without saying anything or uttering
threatening words. For her part, "AAA" neither intimated any form of resistance nor
expressed any word of rejection to appellant's advances. It was only when she felt
something painful minutes during their sexual intercourse that "AAA"
tried to move. Thus:

During the intercourse that was about few minutes and when I felt the
A-
pain that was the time when I tried to move.

Q - When you tried to move, what else happened?

A - When I tried to move he released himself.

Q - And then what happened?

A - He went out of the room.[16]
Three things are thus clear from the testimony of "AAA:" first, appellant never
employed the slightest force, threat or intimidation against her; second, "AAA" never
gave the slightest hint of rejection when appellant asked her to have sex with him;
and, third, appellant did not act with force since he readily desisted when "AAA" felt
the slightest pain and tried to move during their sexual congress.

"AAA" could have resisted right from the start. But she did not, and chose not to
utter a word or make any sign of rejection of appellant's sexual advances. It was only in
the middle of their sexual congress when "AAA" tried to move which can hardly be
considered as an unequivocal manifestation of her refusal or rejection of appellant's
sexual advances.

In People v. Amogis,[17] this Court held that resistance must be manifested and
tenacious. A mere attempt to resist is not the resistance required and expected of a
woman defending her virtue, honor and chastity. And granting that it was sufficient,
"AAA" should have done it earlier or the moment appellant's evil design became
manifest. In other words, it would be unfair to convict a man of rape committed against
a woman who, after giving him the impression thru her unexplainable
silence of her tacit consent and allowing him to have sexual contact with her, changed
her mind in the middle and charged him with rape.

The Age Gap Between the Victim and Appellant Negates Force, Threat or
Intimidation.

"AAA's" state of"shivering" could not have been produced by force, threat or
intimidation. She insinuates that she fell into that condition after Meneses had sexual
intercourse with her. However, their age gap negates force, threat or intimidation; he
was only 14 while "AAA" was already 24, not to mention that they were friends. In
addition, per "AAA's" own declaration, Meneses and appellant did not also utter
threatening words or perform any act of intimidation against her.

Drunkeness Should Have Deprived the Victim of Her Will Power to Give
her Consent.

The fact that "AAA" was tipsy or drunk at that time cannot be held against the appellant.
There is authority to the effect that "where consent is induced by the administration of
drugs or liquor, which incites her passion but does not deprive her of her will power, the
accused is not guilty of rape."[18]

Here, and as narrated by "AAA" on the witness stand, appellant and Meneses were her
friends. Thus, as usual, she voluntarily went with them to the house of appellant and
chatted with them while drinking liquor for about four hours. And while "AAA" got dizzy
and was "shivering," the prosecution failed to show that she was completely deprived of
her will power.

"AAA's" degree of dizziness or "shivering" was not that grave as she portrays it to be.
"AAA" is used to consuming liquor.[19] And if it is true that the gravity of her "shivering"
at that time rendered her immobile such that she could not move her head to signal her
rejection of appellant's indecent proposal or to whisper to him her refusal, then she
would have been likewise unable to stand up and walk home immediately after the
alleged rape.

It has been ruled repeatedly that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
defense. The burden of proof rests on the State. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to
discharge its burden of evidence in this case entitles appellant to an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The September 26, 2013 Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 05452 affirming with modification the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, in Criminal Case No. 08-
264453 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Juan Richard
Tionloc y Marquez is ACQUITTED due to insufficiency of evidence. His
immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby ORDERED, unless he is being
held for another lawful cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation, who is then
directed to report to this Court the action he has taken within five days from receipt
hereof.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Perlas-Bernabe,

and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

CA rollo, pp. 113-127; penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and

[1]
concurred in by Associate Justices Franchito N. Diamante and Melchor Q.C. Sadang.

[2] Records, pp. 123-140; penned by Presiding Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig.

[3]The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise
her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be
withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence
And Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation And Discrimination, And for
Other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9262, An Act Defining Violence Against Women And
Their Children, Providing For Protective Measures For Victims, Prescribing Penalties
Therefor, and for Other Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as
the Rule on Violence against Women and Their Children, effective November 15,
2004. People v. Dumadag, 667 Phil. 664, 669 (2011).
[4] Records, p. 1.

[5] Id. at 123-140.

[6] Id. at 140.

[7] CA rollo, pp. 113-127.

[8] Id. at 124.

[9] Id. at 28.

[10] Pielago v. People, 706 Phil. 460, 470 (2013), citing People v. Rayon, Sr., 702
Phil. 672, 684 (2013).

[11] People v. Amogis, 420 Phil. 278, 292 (2001).

See People v. Frias, 718 Phil. 173, 183 (2013), citing People v. Sgt. Bayani, 331
[12]
Phil. 169, 193 (1996).

[13] Id.

[14] TSN, May 7, 2009, pp. 6-7.

[15] TSN, February 3, 2009, pp. 14-15.

[16] TSN, May 7, 2009, pp. 9-10.

[17] Supra note 11.

See State v. Lung, 21 Nev. 209 (1891), cited in Reyes, L., The Revised Penal Code,
[18]
Book II, 2001 Edition, p. 523.

[19] See TSN, February 3, 2009, p. 17.

270 Phil. 637

REGALADO, J.:
Assailed in this special civil action for certiorari is the order rendered by
Judge Manuel Castañeda on January 28, 1976 dismissing Criminal Case
No. D-868 of the former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and the
order rendered in the same case on March 22, 1976 by his successor, the
herein public respondent, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration
of the aforesaid order of dismissal.
Culled from the records,[1] it appears that complainant Mariano Carrera and
his brother, Severo Carrera, are co-owners of a parcel of land located at
Barrio Buenlag, Binmaley, Pangasinan, registered in their names under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682.
On February 5, 1964, complainant allegedly executed a special power of
attorney before Notary Public Jaime B. Arzadon, Jr., naming private
respondent Federico de Guzman as his lawful attorney-in-fact. On
February 13, 1964, private respondent mortgaged the parcel of land with
the People's Bank and Trust Company in Dagupan City using the said
special power of attorney, and was able to obtain the amount of P8,500.00
as a loan from the mortgagee bank. Both the special power of attorney and
the mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry of Deeds
of Pangasinan on February 13, 1964.
After the expiration of the term of the mortgage, and the mortgage account
not having been paid, the mortgagee bank foreclosed said mortgage and the
land was sold to one Ramon Serafica and Vileta Quinto who were issued
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 85181 for said property. In January, 1972,
complainant allegedly discovered that their property was already registered
in the name of said Ramon Serafica when the latter filed on said date an
action for the ejectment of the former from the premises.
On March 29, 1974 Criminal Case No. D-868 for estafa thru falsification of
a public document was filed against private respondent in the then Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, the information reading as follows:
"That on or about the 5th day of February, 1964, in the City of Dagupan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named
accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, being then a private individual, after
having in his possession Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally falsify and forge the
signature of one MARIANO F. CARRERA, in a Power of Attorney, causing
and making it appear that the said MARIANO F. CARRERA, signed and
affixed his signature in the said Power of Attorney, which is a public
document, when as a matter of fact and in truth, said MARIANO F.
CARRERA, did not in anyway (sic) participate in any acts thereof, nor gave
his permission, and in order to make good the acts of falsification, with
intent of gain and by means of fraud and other deceits, the said accused
FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, thru the said falsified public document (Power
of Attorney) did succeed in securing the loan from the People's Bank and
Trust Company in the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P8,500.00) Philippine currency, without the knowledge and
consent of said MARIANO F. CARRERA, to the damage and prejudice of
the latter in the amount of P4,250.00, and other consequential damages."[2]
After arraignment where private respondent pleaded not guilty, the case
proceeded to trial and the prosecution presented complainant Mariano
F. Carrera and one Melanio Esguig from the Office of the Register of Deeds
for the Province of Pangasinan. Another witness, Col. Jose G. Fernandez, a
handwriting expert, gave his partial testimony but the same
was not continued as counsel for private respondent moved for and was
granted leave to file a motion to dismiss.
On December 16, 1975, the motion to dismiss[3] was filed, wherein it was
alleged that the crime charged would not lie due to the partial testimony of
complainant allegedly to the effect that he authorized private respondent to
mortgage the said one-half portion of the land owned by him and his
brother. Said partial testimony of complainant was quoted, with the
emphasized portions, as follows:
"Q Mr. Carrera, do you know what happened to the title of your property
at present?
A Yes, sir, I know.
Q Could you tell us what happened to your title?
A It was foreclosed by the Bank, sir.
Q Now, you said that it was foreclosed by the Bank. Do you know the
reason why it was foreclosed by the Bank?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you tell this Honorable Court how it was foreclosed by the Bank?
A Yes, sir. On February 10, 1964, my brother Severo Carrera went to
Manila and he asked me to sign a document as a witness and I asked him he
interpreted that this is an authorization to Federico de Guzman to get a
loan from the Bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my
brother said.
Q So sometime in 1964, your older brother Severo Carrera went to you in
Manila and asked you to sign a power of attorney authorizing de Guzman to
mortgage the one-half portion of that land owned by you and your
brother. Do you have any document to show that?
xxx
Atty. Diaz:
Q Can you recognize that document which you signed in 1964 if shown to
you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now I am asking ... I am showing here a document which is, your
Honor, for the purpose of identification, and may we request that it be
marked as Exhibit B for the prosecution. This document consist (sic) of two
pages, your Honor, and the first page be marked as Exhibit B and the
second page be marked as Exhibit B-1, page two. Will you tell this
Honorable Court what is this?
A This is the document brought by my brother to Manila for me
to sign, sir.
xxx
(Hearing of June 18, 1974, pp. 8-10; Underscoring supplied)"[4]
Based on the aforequoted testimony, private respondent contends that
there is no sufficient basis for the charge and this fact warrants the
dismissal of the case.
Private respondent also claims that the crime has prescribed since more
than ten (10) years had elapsed from the time the crime was
committed. Since the information charges the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of a public document, then the penalty shall be that for the
more serious crime which shall be applied in its maximum period, as
provided for by Article 48 of the Penal Code. The more serious crime in the
present case is the falsification of the public document which is punishable
with prision correccional in its medium and maximum period and a fine
not exceeding P5,000.00. Prision correccional being a correctional penalty,
the same prescribes in ten (10) years.
It was noted in said motion to dismiss that the information filed in the case
merely alleged the date of the commission of the crime which was February
5, 1964 and the information was filed only on March 29, 1974. This being
the case, private respondent claims that more than ten (10) years had
passed from the commission of the crime to the filing of the
information. No other allegation having been made as to the discovery of
the alleged crime, private respondent claimed that the period of
prescription commenced on the day on which the crime was
committed. He asserts that, from the date appearing in the transfer
certificate of title covering the land mortgaged with the bank, the mortgage
documents were duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City
on February 13, 1964, hence the alleged crime became public knowledge on
the same date. To support his theory, private respondent made the
following citation:
"The period of prescription commences to run from the date of the
commission of the crime if it is known at the time of its commission.
"Thus, if there is nothing that was concealed or needed to be discovered,
because the entire series of transactions was by public instruments, duly
recorded, the crime of estafa committed in connection with said transaction
was known to the offended party when it was committed and the period of
prescription commenced to run from the date of its commission. People
v. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12th Supp. 50 (The Revised Penal Code by
Justice Luis B. Reyes, Revised Edition 1967, Vol. I, pp. 711-712)."[5]
The prosecution countered that the testimony of Mariano Carrera shows
that what was intended was an authority to mortgage only the one-half
portion pertaining to his brother and he was only quoting what his brother
told him when he said that "x x x this is an authority to Federico de Guzman
to get a loan from the bank on the half portion of the land which belongs
to me, my brother said."[6]
It further submitted that the information was not filed out of time since the
date to be considered should not be the date of registration of the alleged
power of attorney on February 13, 1964. It argued that the crime was
actually discovered only in January, 1972 when Ramon S. Serafica filed an
action to eject complainant from the premises, which fact was not alleged in
the information because it was considered by the prosecution as a mere
evidentiary matter which would not be in accord with the legal truism that
an "information must allege only ultimate facts and not evidentiary
matters."[7]
With regard to the case of People vs. Dinsay cited by private respondent,
petitioner submits that "(t)he same has only a persuasive effect and not to
be considered as an interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
as the same is the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court."[8]
As earlier noted, then Presiding Judge Manuel Castañeda of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch III, dismissed the case onJanuary 28,
1976 on the ground that the crime had prescribed. The People's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the succeeding Presiding
Judge Felicidad Carandang Villalon.
On March 25, 1976, the prosecution filed a notice of appeal from both
orders of the trial court. In a resolution dated May 13, 1976, this Court
required the prosecution to file a petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Republic Act No. 5440.[9] Thereafter, said petition for
review and the corresponding comment and reply of the parties having
been filed, on February 21, 1977 the Court resolved to treat said petition as
a special civil action and required petitioner and private respondent to
submit their respective memoranda.[10]
From the memoranda submitted, the Court is tasked with the resolution of
the following issues:
1. Whether the People could appeal from the order of dismissal because
the private respondent would thereby be placed in double jeopardy;
2. Whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document
filed against the private respondent has sufficient ground to exist in law and
in fact; and,
3. Whether the offense charged in the aforementioned criminal case is
already extinguished by prescription.[11]
The bar of double jeopardy is not involved in the present recourse. As
enunciated in People vs. City Court of Manila, etc., et al.:
"As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after
arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid information shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the complaint or information (Section
9, Rule 113). However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of
dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute double
jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express
consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based
upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the
question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that
should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the
guilt or innocence of the defendant."[12]
On the issue of whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public
document has sufficient basis to exist in fact and in law, we hold in the
affirmative. The falsification of a public document may be a means of
committing estafa because before the falsified document is
actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already
been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial
documents. The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa,
not by the falsification of the document, hence, the falsification of the
public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to
commit the estafa.[13]
Petitioner posits that the offense charged is supported by the fact that what
was intended to be mortgaged was the one-half portion pertaining
to Severo Carrera, not the portion pertaining to complainant, otherwise
complainant would not have quoted his brother's words. The theory of
petitioner and the findings of public respondent are substantially the
same. We agree that the offense charged does exist in fact and in law, as
explained in the findings of the court below:
"In the light of the circumstances revealed by the partial testimony of
complainant Mariano Carrera and of the record, as regards the first ground,
the court finds that the contention is the defense that the authorization
given to him to mortgage the whole property is not sustained by the
evidence because a cursory study of the answer made by the witness
complainant clearly shows that what was intended to be mortgaged was the
one-half (1/2) portion pertaining only to Severo Carrera, excluding that
portion pertaining to said complainant. (tsn, pp. 8-10, hearing on June 18,
1974). In other words, the alleged authorization given to Federico de
Guzman to geta loan from the Bank on the half portion of the land referred
to the share of Severo Carrera only. This finding is based on the following
quoted answer:
'A x x x xxx xxx
and when I asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization to
Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the bank on the half portion of the
land which belongs to me, my brother said.'
Mariano Carrera on June 18, 1974, gave the above-quoted testimony. He
merely quoted his brother Severo Carrera to whom the half portion of the
land belongs. Severo Carrera, as quoted by Mariano Carrera, did not use
the phrase 'which belongs to you.'"[14]
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition on the sufficiency of the charge
of estafa thru falsification of a public document, the resolution of the issue
on prescription is, however, determinative of the validity of the impugned
orders of public respondent.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for a
complex crime is that for the most serious component offense, the same to
be applied in its maximum period. In the crime of estafa thru falsification
of a public document, the more serious crime is the falsification which
carries with it the correctional penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine not more than P5,000.00 imposed by
Article 172 of the Code. Crimes punishable by correctional penalties
prescribe in ten (10) years pursuant to Article 90 of the Code, and Article 91
thereof states that the prescriptive period commences to run "from the day
on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents x x x."
The document which was allegedly falsified was a notarized special power
of attorney registered in the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on February
13, 1964 authorizing private respondent to mortgage a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682 in order to secure a loan
of P8,500.00 from the People's Bank and Trust Company. The information
for estafa thru falsification of a public document was filed only on March
29, 1974. We reject petitioner's claim that the ten-year period commenced
when complainant supposedly discovered the crime in January, 1972 by
reason of the ejectment suit against him.
People vs. Reyes[15] cites authorities on the well established rule that
registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is
constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and
equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of
what it contains. On these considerations, it holds that the prior ruling
in Cabral vs. Puno, etc., et al., [16] to the effect that in the crime of
falsification of a public document the prescriptive period commences from
the time the offended party had constructive notice of the alleged forgery
after the document was registered with the Register of Deeds is not without
legal basis.
It was also noted that in Armentia vs. Patriarca, et al.,[17] in interpreting the
phrase "from the discovery" found in Article 1391 of the Civil Code which
authorizes annulment, in case of mistake or fraud, within four years from
the time of the discovery of the same, the Court also held that the discovery
must be reckoned to have taken place from the time the document was
registered in the Register of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration
is a notice to the whole world and this should apply to both criminal
and civil cases.
We are further in accord with the conclusion in Reyes that the application
of said rule on constructive notice in the interpretation of Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code would most certainly be favorable to private
respondent herein, since the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to
be reckoned with earlier, that is, from the time the questioned documents
were recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
In the instant case, the special power of attorney involved was registered
on February 13, 1964. The criminal of information against private
respondent having been filed only on March 29, 1974, or more than ten (10)
years thereafter, the crime with which private respondent was charged has
indubitably prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and
the challenged orders of public respondent are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Complainant's Affidavit, Original Record, 4-5, 193-194; TSN, June 18,

[1]

1974, 2-7; Nov. 28, 1975, 2-6.

[2] Original Record, 1.
[3] Rollo, 54-69.
[4] Ibid., 55-56.
[5] Ibid., 59.
[6] Ibid., 62.
[7] Ibid., 64.
[8] Ibid., 65.
[9] Ibid., 42.
[10] Ibid., 136.
[11] Ibid., 153, 165.
154 SCRA 175 (1987), reiterating People vs. Desalisa, et al., 125 Phil. 27
[12]

(1966).
[13] Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Twelfth Edition, 1981, Book II, 235.
[14] Original Record, 204-205.
[15] 175 SCRA 597 (1989).
[16] 70 SCRA 606 (1976).
[17] 18 SCRA 1253 (1966).

REYES, J.:
"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish
and protect his wife, to give her a home, to provide her with the comforts
and the necessities of life within his means, to treat her kindly and not
cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to honor her x x x; it is his duty not
only to maintain and support her, but also to protect her from oppression
and wrong."[1]

Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit
within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy
expressly legislated in Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

The Case
This is an automatic review[2] of the Decision[3] dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353, which affirmed the Judgment[4] dated April
1, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in
Criminal Case Nos. 99-668 and 99-669 convicting Edgar Jumawan (accused-appellant)
of two (2) counts of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count.

The Facts

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,[5] were married on October 18, 1975. They lived
together since then and raised their four (4) children[6] as they put up several businesses
over the years.

On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit,[7] alleging that her

husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their
residence in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December
12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.

On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Joint
Resolution,[8] finding probable cause for grave threats, less serious physical injuries and
rape and recommending that the appropriate criminal information be filed against the
accused-appellant.

On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively
docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-668[9] and Criminal Case No. 99-669.[10] The
Information in Criminal Case No. 99-668 charged the accused-appellant as follows:

That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at

Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter[']s
will.

Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:

That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter's
will.

Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999.[11] On
August 18, 1999, the accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reinvestigation,[12] which was
denied by the trial court in an Order[13] dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the
accused-appellant was arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty to both charges.[14]

On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended

Information[15] averring that the name of the private complainant was omitted in the
original informations for rape. The motion also stated that KKK, thru a Supplemental
Affidavit dated November 15, 1999,[16] attested that the true dates of commission of the
crime are October 16, 1998 and October 17, 1998 thereby modifying the dates stated in
her previous complaint-affidavit. The motion was granted on January 18,
2000.[17] Accordingly, the criminal informations were amended as follows:

Criminal Case No. 99-668:

That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.

Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.[18]

Criminal Case No. 99-669:

That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.[19]

The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty plea to
both indictments and a joint trial of the two cases forthwith ensued.

Version of the prosecution

The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters
MMM and OOO, which, together with pertinent physical evidence, depicted the
following events:

KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of
the laborers. They got married after a year of courtship.[20] When their first child,
MMM, was born, KKK and the accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store.[21] Later on,
they engaged in several other businesses trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK
managed the businesses except for the rice mill, which, ideally, was under the accused-
appellant's supervision with the help of a trusted employee. In reality, however, he
merely assisted in the rice mill business by occasionally driving one of the trucks to haul
goods.[22]

Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as

KKK's dedication. Even the daughters observed the disproportionate labors of their
parents.[23] He would drive the trucks sometimes but KKK was the one who actively
managed the businesses.[24] She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children;
he, on the other hand, did not acquiesce with that objective.[25]

In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa Ernesto,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.[26] Three of the children transferred residence therein while
KKK, the accused-appellant and one of their sons stayed in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She
shuttled between the two places regularly and sometimes he accompanied her.[27] In
1998, KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City most of the days of the week.[28] On
Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure supplies for the family store
and then returned to Cagayan de Oro City on the same day.[29]

Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the accused-
appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of
course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm.[30] However, in 1997, he started to
be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay,
insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically
painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into
submission.[31]
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his complaint
that she failed to attend to him. She was preoccupied with financial problems in their
businesses and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home because "a woman must
stay in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She disobeyed his wishes and focused
on her goal of providing a good future for the children.[32]

Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the
accused-appellant slept together in Cebu City where the graduation rites of their eldest
daughter were held. By October 14, 1998, the three of them were already back in
Cagayan de Oro City.[33]

On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about
their nightly routine. The family store in their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m.
before supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the girls' bedroom
at the mezzanine of the house to pray the rosary while the accused-appellant watched
television in the living room.[34] OOO and MMM then prepared their beds. Soon after,
the accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him to their conjugal
bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK complied.[35]

Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but
she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot
near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are you
lying on the c[o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order: "You transfer here [to] our
bed."[36]

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal
pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got
angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to
fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and
transferred to the bed.[37]

The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to
copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off
his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.[38]

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist
by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the
sides.[39] KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.[40]

The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster,[41] stretched her legs apart and rested
his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and
succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued
to protest by desperately shouting: "[D]on't do that to me because I'm not
feeling well." [42]

With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other enclosing the
spouses' bedroom,[43] KKK's pleas were audible in the children's bedroom where MMM
lay awake.

Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to
me, have pity on me,"[44] MMM woke up OOO who prodded her to go to their
parents' room.[45] MMM hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of
her parents' bedroom and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is crying?"[46] The
accused-appellant then quickly put on his briefs and shirt, partly opened the door and
said: "[D]on't interfere because this is a family trouble," before closing it
again.[47] Since she heard her mother continue to cry, MMM ignored his father's
admonition, knocked at the bedroom door again, and then kicked it.[48] A furious
accused-appellant opened the door wider and rebuked MMM once more: "Don't
interfere us. Go downstairs because this is family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK
crouching and crying on top of the bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached her
mother and asked: "Ma, why are you crying?" before asking her father: "Pa, what
happened to Mama why is it that her underwear is torn[?]"[49]

When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother get
up in order to bring her to the girls' bedroom. KKK then picked up her torn underwear
and covered herself with a blanket.[50] However, their breakout from the room was not
easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-appellant blocked the doorway by
extending his arm towards the knob. He commanded KKK to "[S]tay here, you sleep
in our room," when the trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go out." He
then held KKK's hands but she pulled them back. Determined to get away, MMM leaned
against door and embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their way out.[51]

In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what
happened.[52] KKK relayed: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me
to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well." The girls then locked the
door and let her rest."[53]

The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the family
store on October 17, 1998, KKK and the children took their supper. The accused-
appellant did not join them since, according to him, he already ate dinner elsewhere.
After resting for a short while, KKK and the children proceeded to the girls' bedroom
and prayed the rosary. KKK decided to spend the night in the room's small bed and the
girls were already fixing the beddings when the accused-appellant entered. "Why are
you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded that she
preferred to sleep with the children.[54] He then scoffed: "It's alright if you will not
go with me, anyway, there are women that could be paid
[P]1,000.00." She dismissed his comment by turning her head away after
retorting: "So be it." After that, he left the room.[55]

He returned 15 minutes later[56] and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became
infuriated. He lifted her from the bed and attempted to carry her out of the room as he
exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?] Let's go to our bedroom." When she
defied him, he grabbed her short pants causing them to tear apart.[57] At this point,
MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama because we are in front of
you."[58]

The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who yelled,
"[E]ven in front of you, I can have sex of your mother [sic] because I'm the
head of the family." He then ordered his daughters to leave the room. Frightened, the
girls obliged and went to the staircase where they subsequently heard the pleas of their
helpless mother resonate with the creaking bed.[59]

The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly
pulled KKK's short pants and panties. He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on't do that
to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what
you wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand sex."[60]

After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands,
mounted her and forced himself inside her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on
his short pants and briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing as he conceitedly
uttered: "[I]t's nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or
fond of sex." He then retreated to the masters' bedroom.[61]

Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried
upstairs but found the door locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her
arm, reached for the doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the room,
MMM and OOO found their mother crouched on the bed with her hair disheveled. The
girls asked: "Ma, what happened to you, why are you crying?"KKK
replied: "[Y]our father is a beast and animal, he again forced me to have
sex with him even if I don't feel well."[62]

Version of the defense

The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a land adjacent
to that of KKK's father. He came to know KKK because she brought food for her father's
laborers. When they got married on October 18, 1975, he was a high school graduate
while she was an elementary graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a comfortable
life. Through their joint hard work and efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal
properties and established their own businesses that included a rice mill managed by
the accused-appellant. He also drove their trucks that hauled coffee, copra, or corn.[63]

The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed
that on those dates he was in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling corn. On October 7, his
truck met an accident somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon. He left the truck by the roadside because he had to attend MMM's graduation
in Cebu on October 12 with KKK. When they returned to Bukidnon on October 14, he
asked KKK and MMM to proceed to Cagayan de Oro City and just leave him behind so
he can take care of the truck and buy some corn.[64]

Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June 1999 corroborated
the above claims. According to him, on October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was
within the vicinity of the rice mill's loading area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a
pick-up truck. On October 17, 1998, he and the accused-appellant were in Dangcagan,
Bukidnon, loading sacks of corn into the truck. They finished loading at 3:00 p.m. The
accused-appellant then instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko, Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon while the former attended afiesta in New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan,
Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m., Equia, together with a helper and a mechanic, left for
Maluko in order to tow the stalled truck left there by the accused-appellant in October 7
and thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de Oro City together with the separate truck loaded
with corn.

They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the truck
around and hoist it to the towing bar of the other truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the
accused-appellant arrived in Maluko. The four of them then proceeded to Cagayan de
Oro City where they arrived at 3:00 a.m. of October 18, 1998. The accused-appellant
went to Gusa while the other three men brought the damaged truck to Cugman.[65]

The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her
revenge because he took over the control and management of their businesses as well as
the possession of their pick-up truck in January 1999. The accused-appellant was
provoked to do so when she failed to account for their bank deposits and business
earnings. The entries in their bank account showed the balance of P3,190,539.83 on
October 31, 1996 but after only a month or on November 30, 1996, the amount dwindled
to a measly P9,894.88.[66] Her failure to immediately report to the police also belies her
rape allegations.[67]

KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant

gradually detected from her odd behavior. While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for
MMM's graduation rites, the accused-appellant and KKK had sexual intercourse. He
was surprised when his wife asked him to get a napkin to wipe her after having sex. He
tagged her request as "high-tech," because they did not do the same when they had sex
in the past. KKK had also become increasingly indifferent to him. When he arrives
home, it was an employee, not her, who opened the door and welcomed him. She
prettied herself and would no longer ask for his permission whenever she went out.[68]

Bebs,[69] KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accused-appellant
several love letters purportedly addressed to Bebs but were actually intended for
KKK.[70]

KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to know
as: Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey, somebody from the military or the Philippine
National Police, another one is a government employee, a certain Fernandez and three
other priests.[71] Several persons told him about the paramours of his wife but he never
confronted her or them about it because he trusted her.[72]

What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on November 2,
1998. At that time, OOO was listening loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to
watch a television program, he asked OOO to turn down the volume of the cassette
player. She got annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned around and hit the accused-
appellant's head with the socket. His head bled. An altercation between the accused-
appellant and KKK thereafter followed because the latter took OOO's side. During the
argument, OOO blurted out that KKK was better off without the accused-appellant
because she had somebody young, handsome, and a businessman unlike the accused-
appellant who smelled bad, and was old, and ugly.[73]

KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof going
to her and one-fourth to the accused-appellant. However, the separation did not push
through because the accused- appellant's parents intervened.[74] Thereafter, KKK
pursued legal separation from the accused-appellant by initiating Barangay Case No.
00588-99 before the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City and thereafter obtaining a Certificate to File Action dated February 18, 1999.[75]

Ruling of the RTC

In its Judgment[76] dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the
prosecution by giving greater weight and credence to the spontaneous and
straightforward testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also upheld as
sincere and genuine the two daughters' testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for
daughters to testify against their own father for a crime such as rape if the same was not
truly committed.

The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the accused-
appellant's accusations of extra-marital affairs and money squandering against KKK.
The trial court shelved the accused-appellant's alibi for being premised on inconsistent
testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the other defense witness, Equia, as to
the accused-appellant's actual whereabouts on October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC
ruling disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY"

beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate charges of rape and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay
complainant [P]50,000.00 in each case as moral damages, indemnify
complainant the sum of [P]75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00 as
exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[77]

Ruling of the CA

In its Decision[78] dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA
held that Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the
amendment of the original informations. Further, the accused-appellant was not
prejudiced by the amendment because he was re-arraigned with respect to the amended
informations.

The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the victim
herself and the corroborative declarations of MMM and OOO, was able to establish,
beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The accused-
appellant had carnal knowledge of KKK by using force and intimidation.

The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical examination did not
negate the commission of the crime because a medical certificate is not necessary to
prove rape.

The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are husband
and wife with mutual obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, there must be
convincing physical evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation
used upon KKK such as bruises. The CA explained that physical showing of external
injuries is not indispensable to prosecute and convict a person for rape; what is
necessary is that the victim was forced to have sexual intercourse with the accused.

In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses
only reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's accusations because no wife in her right mind
would accuse her husband of having raped her if it were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when she
stated that she only found out that a wife may charge his husband with rape when the
fiscal investigating her separate complaint for grave threats and physical injuries told
her about it.

Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing evidence
that it was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at
the time of the commission of the crimes, considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the
place where he allegedly was, is only about four or five hours away. Accordingly, the
decretal portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment is

hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[79]

Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution[80] dated July 6, 2009, the Court
notified the parties that, if they so desire, they may file their respective supplemental
briefs. In a Manifestation and Motion[81] dated September 4, 2009, the appellee,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, expressed that it intends to adopt its Brief
before the CA. On April 16, 2012, the accused-appellant, through counsel, filed his
Supplemental Brief, arguing that he was not in Cagayan de Oro City when the alleged
rape incidents took place, and the presence of force, threat or intimidation is negated
by: (a) KKK's voluntary act of going with him to the conjugal bedroom on October 16,
1998; (b) KKK's failure to put up resistance or seek help from police authorities; and (c)
the absence of a medical certificate and of blood traces in KKK's panties.[82]

Our Ruling

I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection

The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of 'bride
capture' whereby a man conquered a woman through rape and 'stealing an heiress'
whereby a man abducted a woman and married her.[83]

The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's chastity
but rather to punish the act of obtaining the heiress' property by forcible marriage[84] or
to protect a man's valuable interest in his wife's chastity or her daughter's virginity.[85] If
a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her father's property and if a
man raped his wife, he was merely using his property.[86]
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment was
justified under three ideologies.

Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the property of
her father until she marries to become the property of her husband.[87] If a man
abducted an unmarried woman, he had to pay the owner, and later buy her from the
owner; buying and marrying a wife were synonymous.[88]

From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage and
the law denied her political power and status under the feudal doctrine of
coverture.[89] A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she
misbehaved, allowing him to bring order within the family.[90]

This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept.
Upon marrying, the woman becomes one with her husband. She had no right to make a
contract, sue another, own personal property or write a will.[91]

II. The marital exemption rule

In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England, conceived the
irrevocable implied consent theory that would later on emerge as the marital exemption
rule in rape. He stated that:

[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his

lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the
wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot
retract.[92]

The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of America
(USA) and England. It gives legal immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his
wife, an act which would be rape if committed against a woman not his wife.[93] In those
jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as "the forcible penetration of the body of a
woman who is not the wife of the perpetrator."[94]

The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was Commonwealth
v. Fogerty[95] promulgated in 1857. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
pronounced that it would always be a defense in rape to show marriage to the victim.
Several other courts adhered to a similar rationale with all of them citing Hale's theory
as basis.[96]

The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband was
endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife.[97] The
privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his
wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.[98]

In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA demanding for
its abolition for being violative of married women's right to be equally protected under
rape laws.[99]

In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the
application of the rule in cases where the husband and wife are living apart pursuant to
a court order "which by its terms or in its effects requires such living apart," or a decree,
judgment or written agreement of separation.[100]

In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of
Appeals of New York declared the same unconstitutional in People v. Liberta[101] for
lack of rational basis in distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The
decision, which also renounced Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, ratiocinated
as follows:

We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital

rape and nonmarital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted
in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the
consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to
withstand even the slightest scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital
exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional.

Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman

to sexual intercourse has been cited most frequently in support of the
marital exemption. x x x Any argument based on a supposed consent,
however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a sexual act to which one party
does not consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates the
bodily integrity of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting
physical and psychic harm x x x. To ever imply consent to such an act is
irrational and absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes, marriage
has never been viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse
on demand x x x. Certainly, then, a marriage license should not be viewed
as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married
woman has the same right to control her own body as does an unmarried
woman x x x. If a husband feels "aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to engage
in sexual intercourse, he should seek relief in the courts governing domestic
relations, not in "violent or forceful self-help x x x."
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the
common-law doctrines that a woman was the property of her husband and
that the legal existence of the woman was "incorporated and consolidated
into that of the husband x x x." Both these doctrines, of course, have long
been rejected in this State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-law world
[or] in any modern society is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by
denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with
recognition as a whole human being x x x."[102] (Citations omitted)

By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the District
of Columbia, outlawing the act without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states
granted some exemptions to a husband from prosecution such as when the wife is
mentally or physically impaired, unconscious, asleep, or legally unable to consent.[103]

III. Marital Rape in the Philippines

Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until
now. It appears, however, that the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC
adhered to Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form. According
to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino,[104] a husband may not be guilty of rape under Article
335 of Act No. 3815 but, in case there is legal separation, the husband should be held
guilty of rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual intercourse.[105]

In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-
CEDAW).[106] Hailed as the first international women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the
first major instrument that contains a ban on all forms of discrimination against
women. The Philippines assumed the role of promoting gender equality and women's
empowerment as a vital element in addressing global concerns.[107] The country also
committed, among others, to condemn discrimination against women in all its forms,
and agreed to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, a policy of
eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertook:

(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their
national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet
incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate
means, the practical realization of this principle;

(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including

sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;
xxxx

(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or

abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute
discrimination against women;

(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination

against women.[108]

In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the Philippines enshrined

the principle of gender equality in the 1987 Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and
14 of Article II thereof, thus:

Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights.

xxxx

Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and
shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

The Philippines also acceded to adopt and implement the generally accepted principles
of international law such as the CEDAW and its allied issuances, viz:

Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of

national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all
nations. (Emphasis ours)

The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In
1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the
RPC.[109] The law reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it from the
ambit of crimes against chastity. More particular to the present case, and perhaps the
law's most progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the
reality of marital rape and criminalizing its perpetration, viz:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. The subsequent valid marriage between the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.

In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent

forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or
the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.

Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in
defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without regard
to the rapist's legal relationship with his victim, thus:

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.

The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the
deliberations of the 10th Congress on the law's progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and
Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due to
conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was
clearly to include and penalize marital rape under the general definition of 'rape,' viz:

MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point of

clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265,
we never agreed to marital rape. But under Article 266-C, it says here: "In
case it is the legal husband who is the offender…" Does this presuppose that
there is now marital rape? x x x.

MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very
limited 17 years of private practice in the legal profession, Madam Speaker,
and I believe that I can put at stake my license as a lawyer in this
jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits a husband from being sued by the
wife for rape. Even jurisprudence, we don't have any jurisprudence that
prohibits a wife from suing a husband. That is why even if we don't provide
in this bill expanding the definition of crime that is now being presented for
approval, Madam Speaker, even if we don't provide here for marital rape,
even if we don't provide for sexual rape, there is the right of the wife to go
against the husband. The wife can sue the husband for marital rape and she
cannot be prevented from doing so because in this jurisdiction there is no
law that prohibits her from doing so. This is why we had to put second
paragraph of 266-C because it is the belief of many of us. x x x, that if it is
true that in this jurisdiction there is marital rape even if we don't provide it
here, then we must provide for something that will unify and keep the
cohesion of the family together that is why we have the second paragraph.

MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version
specifically House Bill No. 6265 our provision on a husband forcing the
wife is not marital rape, it is marital sexual assault.

MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.

MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of

sexual assault. So, Your Honor, direct to the point, under Article 266-C, is it
our understanding that in the second paragraph, quote: "In case it is the
legal husband who is the offender, this refers to marital rape filed against
the husband? Is that correct?

MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.

MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you

call it?

MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.

MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have

already stated that. Because under 1 and 2 it is all denominated as rape,
there is no crime of sexual assault. That is why I am sorry that our House
version which provided for sexual assault was not carried by the Senate
version because all sexual crimes under this bicameral conference
committee report are all now denominated as rape whether the penalty is
from reclusion perpetua to death or whether the penalty is only prision
mayor. So there is marital rape, Your Honor, is that correct?

xxxx

MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of

this. I am in favor of punishing the husband who forces the wife
even to 30 years imprisonment. But please do not call it marital
rape, call it marital sexual assault because of the sanctity of
marriage. x x x.[110] (Emphasis ours)

HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape but
marital rape is not excluded.

HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.

HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.

xxxx

HON. ROCO: x x x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital
rape can be implicitly contained in the second paragraph. x x x So marital
rape actually was in the House version x x x. But it was not
another definition of rape. You will notice, it only says, that because
you are the lawful husband does not mean that you cannot commit rape.
Theoretically, I mean, you can beat up your wife until she's blue. And if the
wife complains she was raped, I guess that, I mean, you just cannot raise
the defense x x x[:] I am the husband. But where in the marriage contract
does it say that I can beat you up? That's all it means. That is why if we stop
referring to it as marital rape, acceptance is easy. Because parang ang
marital rape, married na nga kami. I cannot have sex. No, what it is saying
is you're [the] husband but you cannot beat me up. x x x. That's why to me
it's not alarming. It was just a way of saying you're [the] husband, you
cannot say when I am charged with rape x x x.

PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHANI: All right, so how do you propose it if we

put it in[?]

HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful
husband does not mean you can have carnal knowledge by
force[,] threat or intimidation or by depriving your wife reason,
a grave abuse of authority, I don't know how that cannot apply. Di ba
yung, or putting an instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi ko lang, it is not
meant to have another classification of rape. It is all the same
definition x x x.

xxxx

HON. ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x x,

we can say that this rule is implicit already in the first proviso. It
implies na there is an instance when a husband can be charged
[with] rape x x x.

HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.

HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito. But
it is understood that this rule of evidence is now transport[ed], put
into 266-F, the effect of pardon.

PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of pardon. We

will remove marital rape.

HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but
we will retain the one on page 8, the effect of pardon. x x x [I]t is
inferred but we leave it because after all it is just a rule of
evidence. But I think we should understand that a husband
cannot beat at his wife to have sex. Di ba? I think that should be
made clear. x x x.

xxxx

HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital

rape. All we are saying is that if you're [the] legal husband, Jesus Christ,
don't beat up to have sex. I almost want, you are my wife, why do you have
to beat me up.

So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in
proviso, I mean, we can face up, I hope, to the women and they would
understand that it is half achieved.

HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not

defining or creating a new crime but instead, we are just defining a rule of
evidence. x x x.

HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of
evidence the fact that he is husband is not, does not negate.[111]

CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the point in

discussion. The only disagreement now is where to place it. Let us clear this
matter. There are two suggestions now on marital rape. One is that it is
rape if it is done with force or intimidation or any of the circumstances that
would define rape x x x immaterial. The fact that the husband and wife are
separated does not come into the picture. So even if they are living under
one roof x x x for as long as the attendant circumstances of the
traditional rape is present, then that is rape.[112]

PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x x [t]his

provision on marital rape, it does not actually change the
meaning of rape. It merely erases the doubt in anybody's mind,
whether or not rape can indeed be committed by the husband
against the wife. So the bill really says, you having been married to one
another is not a legal impediment. So I don't really think there is any
need to change the concept of rape as defined presently under
the revised penal code. This do[es] not actually add anything to
the definition of rape. It merely says, it is merely clarificatory.
That if indeed the wife has evidence to show that she was really
brow beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated into having
sexual intercourse against her will, then the crime of rape has
been committed against her by the husband, notwithstanding the
fact that they have been legally married. It does not change anything
at all, Mr. Chairman.

PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change on this x

x x.[113]

The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by
R.A. No. 9262,[114] which regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that
may be committed by a man against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz:

Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a

series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is
his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child,
or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of
such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature,

committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not
limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her

child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks,
physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to
watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or
her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife
and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the
same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual

activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical
or other harm or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of
non-personal violence are the most common type of spousal violence accounting for
23% incidence among ever-married women. One in seven ever-married women
experienced physical violence by their husbands while eight percent (8%) experienced
sexual violence.[115]

IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments

The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied
consent theory. In his appeal brief before the CA, he posits that the two incidents of
sexual intercourse, which gave rise to the criminal charges for rape, were theoretically
consensual, obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a legally married and
cohabiting couple. He argues that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting
husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated
differently from ordinary rape cases and that the standards for determining the
presence of consent or lack thereof must be adjusted on the ground that sexual
community is a mutual right and obligation between husband and wife.[116]

The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.

The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory
evolved have already been superseded by modern global principles on the equality of
rights between men and women and respect for human dignity established in various
international conventions, such as the CEDAW. The Philippines, as State Party to the
CEDAW, recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of
women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between them.
Accordingly, the country vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the social
and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the
elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based on the idea of
the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men
and women.[117] One of such measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the
archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute
proprietary rights over his wife's body and thus her consent to every act of sexual
intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.

Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration

on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, which was promulgated[118] by the UN
General Assembly subsequent to the CEDAW. The Declaration, in enumerating the
forms of gender-based violence that constitute acts of discrimination against women,
identified 'marital rape' as a species of sexual violence, viz:

Article 1

For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against

women" means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or
is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or
suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in
private life.

Article 2

Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be

limited to, the following:

(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the

family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the
household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital
mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal
violence and violence related to exploitation;[119] (Emphasis ours)

Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within
marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will
commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW
and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No.
8353.

A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who
has sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a
marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal[120] to that he accords
himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a
sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its
international commitments and accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on
marital activities[121] that have lost their relevance in a progressive society.

It is true that the Family Code,[122] obligates the spouses to love one another but this
rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both
spontaneous and mutual[123] and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or
coercion.

Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife
excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness.
It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual
communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's feelings at a
time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening marital
relationship.[124] When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to
advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step
in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State policies.
Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute
refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's intervention to declare
her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital obligation.[125] But he
cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her coercively or violently.

Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of
the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the
equal protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws[126] ordains that similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give
undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others; no person or class of
persons shall be denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by other persons
or other classes in like circumstances.[127]

As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a)
rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the
victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the
crime shows that the law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and
those committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped
by their husband and those raped by any other man alike.

The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against

married rape victims over unmarried rape victims because it withholds from married
women raped by their husbands the penal redress equally granted by law to all rape
victims.

Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting
the argument akin to those raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage license
should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity.
A married woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an unmarried
woman.[128] She can give or withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse with her
husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she refuses.

Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide
freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and
reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence.[129] Women do not
divest themselves of such right by contracting marriage for the simple reason that
human rights are inalienable.[130]

In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape
nor provide for different definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret
and apply what the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial
legislation and unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth. Neither can the Court
frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would inequitably
burden its victims and unreasonably and irrationally classify them differently from the
victims of non-marital rape.

Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the
evidentiary rules on rape any differently if the aggressor is the woman's own legal
husband. The elements and quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in
rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship between the
accused and his accuser.

Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with the
established legal principles and evidentiary policies in the prosecution and resolution of
rape cases and found that no reversible error can be imputed to the conviction meted
the accused-appellant.

The evidence for the prosecution was

based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies

In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim.
Hence, the strict mandate that all courts must examine thoroughly the testimony of the
offended party. While the accused in a rape case may be convicted solely on the
testimony of the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless, duty-bound to establish
that their reliance on the victim's testimony is justified. Courts must ensure that the
testimony is credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature. If the
testimony of the complainant meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted
on the basis thereof.[131]

It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. This is in view of its inimitable
opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and their deportment, conduct and
attitude, especially during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its
evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness or certain facts of substance and value have
been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not be disturbed
on appeal.[132]

After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the
entire records of the trial proceedings and the transcript of each witnesses' testimony,
the Court found no justification to disturb its findings.

Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible and
spontaneous. Hailed to the witness stand on six separate occasions, KKK never wavered
neither did her statements vacillate between uncertainty and certitude. She remained
consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid during the rigorous cross-
examination and on rebuttal examination, she was able to convincingly explain and
debunk the allegations of the defense.

She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him despite
her refusal on October 16, 1998. He initially ordered her to sleep beside him in their
conjugal bed by violently throwing the cot where she was resting. In order not to
aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated for them to have sex.
When she rejected his advances due to abdominal pain and headache, his request for
intimacy transformed into a stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK held her panties but
the accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down. The tug caused the small clothing to
tear apart. She reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged him to stop. But no
amount of resistance or begging subdued him. He flexed her two legs apart, gripped her
hands, mounted her, rested his own legs on hers and inserted his penis into her vagina.
She continued pleading but he never desisted.[133]

Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 17, 1998 is likewise
unmistakable. After the appalling episode in the conjugal bedroom the previous night,
KKK decided to sleep in the children's bedroom. While her daughters were fixing the
beddings, the accused-appellant barged into the room and berated her for refusing to go
with him to their conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to stay in the children's
bedroom, the accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up. MMM's attempt to pacify
the accused-appellant further enraged him. He reminded them that as the head of the
family he could do whatever he wants with his wife. To demonstrate his role as
patriarch, he ordered the children to go out of the room and thereafter proceeded to
force KKK into sexual intercourse. He forcibly pulled down her short pants and panties
as KKK begged "Don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my
abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand
sex."[134] But her pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-appellant removed his shorts and
briefs, spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her and inserted his penis into
her vagina. After gratifying himself, he got dressed, left the room as he chuckled: "It's
nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex."[135]

Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that
must be proved is the absence of the victim's consent to the sexual congress.[136] Under
the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat or
intimidation, fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is
incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is under 12 years of age or is
demented.

Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was wrestled from her
through force and intimidation both of which were established beyond moral certainty
by the prosecution through the pertinent testimony of KKK, viz:

On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:

(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO:
So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your
Q
husband, do you remember what happened?
A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.
Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?
He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I
A
warded off his hand.
Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?
 Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by
A touching or knocking her lap which means that he wanted to have
sex."
Q So, what did you do after that?
I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well.
A
(at this juncture the witness is sobbing)
So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex
Q
with you?
He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie
A
[sic] was torn.
Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?
I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he
A
is so strong.
xxxx
So, when your pantie [sic] was torn by your husband, what else did
Q
he do?
A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.
Q So after that what else did he do?
He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands
A no matter how I wrestled but I failed because he is stronger than
me.
Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her
COURT:
testimony.
ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)
So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two
Q
legs and rode on you and held your two hands?
I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my
A
whole body is aching."
Q How did you say that to your husband?
A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."
Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?
xxxx
A I shouted when I uttered that words.
xxxx
Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?
xxxx
A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything.[137]

(Cross-Examination)
ATTY. AMARGA;
 Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband
Q
normally remove your panty?
A Yes, Sir.
It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty
Q because according to you he normally do that if he have sex with
you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?
Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty
A
because I don't want to have sex with him at that time.
You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your
Q
panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?
A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.
xxxx
At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he
Q
also remove your nightgown?
A No, Sir.
Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?
A He raised my duster [sic] up.
In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster
Q
[sic]?
A No, only on the breast level.[138]

On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:

(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO

Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?
He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short
A
pant and pantie forcible.
So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and
Q
pantie?
I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my
A abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot
withstand sex."
Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?
A It was torn.
Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband,
 what did he do?
He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and
A
mounted on me and succeeded in having sex with me.[139]

The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by gripping
her hands, flexing her legs and then resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the
consummation of his much-desired non-consensual sexual intercourse.

Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon
KKK. His actuations prior to the actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that he
imposed his distorted sense of moral authority on his wife. He furiously demanded for
her to lay with him on the bed and thereafter coerced her to indulge his sexual craving.

The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their
bed, when she insisted to sleep in the children's bedroom and the fact that he exercises
dominance over her as husband all cowed KKK into submission.

The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal
bedroom on October 16, 1998 cannot be stretched to mean that she consented to the
forced sexual intercourse that ensued. The accused-appellant was KKK's husband and
hence it was customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No consent can be
deduced from such act of KKK because at that juncture there were no indications that
sexual intercourse was about to take place. The issue of consent was still irrelevant since
the act for which the same is legally required did not exist yet or at least unclear to the
person from whom the consent was desired. The significant point when consent must be
given is at that time when it is clear to the victim that her aggressor is soliciting sexual
congress. In this case, that point is when the accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her
lap, a gesture KKK comprehended to be an invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she
refused.

Resistance, medical certificate and

blood traces.

We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have hit
him to convey that she was resisting his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an element
of rape and the law does not impose upon the victim the burden to prove
resistance[140] much more requires her to raise a specific kind thereof.

At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused-
appellant to recognize that she seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held on
to her panties to prevent him from undressing her, she refused to bend her legs and she
repeatedly shouted and begged for him to stop.

Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be

just enough to bring about the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or
intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in
mind[141] or is of such a degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow
into submission.[142]

Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK's

panties or the lack of a medical certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or
absence of blood on the victim's underwear that determines the fact of
rape[143] inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable evidence that is not necessary
to prove rape.[144] These details do not pertain to the elements that produce the
gravamen of the offense that is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or
without her consent.[145]

The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v. Godoy,[146] the

evidentiary circumstances of which are, however, disparate from those in the present
case. In Godoy, the testimony of the complainant was inherently weak, inconsistent,
and was controverted by the prosecution's medico-legal expert witness who stated that
force was not applied based on the position of her hymenal laceration. This led the Court
to conclude that the absence of any sign of physical violence on the victim's body is an
indication of consent.[147] Here, however, KKK's testimony is, as discussed earlier,
credible, spontaneous and forthright.

The corroborative testimonies of MMM

and OOO are worthy of credence.

The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative
value as they did not witness the actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that
rape is essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim who
can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse. [148] Hence, the
probative value of MMM and OOO's testimonies rest not on whether they actually
witnessed the rape but on whether their declarations were in harmony with KKK's
narration of the circumstances, preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape
incidents.

MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's narration.

MMM heard KKK shouting and crying: "Eddie, don't do that to me, have pity on
me"[149] on the night of October 16, 1998 shortly after KKK and the accused-appellant
went to their conjugal bedroom. When MMM went upstairs to check on her mother, the
accused-appellant admonished her for meddling. Frustrated to aid her mother who
persistently cried, MMM kicked the door so hard the accused-appellant was prompted
to open it and rebuke MMM once more. OOO heard all these commotion from the room
downstairs.

MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair disheveled while
her torn panty lay on the floor. After a brief struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM
and KKK were finally able to escape and retreat to the children's bedroom where KKK
narrated to her daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me
to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well."

KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the accused-
appellant barged inside the children's bedroom. The couple had an argument and when
MMM tried to interfere, the accused-appellant ordered her and OOO to get out after
bragging that he can have sex with his wife even in front of the children because he is the
head of the family. The girls then stayed by the staircase where they afterwards heard
their mother helplessly crying and shouting for the accused-appellant to stop.

Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the accused-
appellant, through the use of force and intimidation, had non-consensual and forced
carnal knowledge of his wife, KKK on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.

KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal and
physical resistance were clear manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when MMM
saw her on the bed after the accused appellant opened the door on October 16, 1998, her
conduct towards the accused-appellant on her way out of the room, and her categorical
outcry to her children after the two bedroom episodes all generate the conclusion that
the sexual acts that occurred were against her will.

Failure to immediately report to the

police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.

The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they
failed to report the rape incidents to the police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed
the rape charges. Delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults does not
necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained.[150]

At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife to
submit to sexual intercourse is considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that she
could sue his husband for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor
Tabique) told her about it when she filed the separate charges for grave threats and
physical injuries against the accused-appellant.[151] It must be noted that the incidents
occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 abolishing marital exemption in
rape cases hence it is understandable that it was not yet known to a layman as opposed
to legal professionals like Prosecutor Tabique.

In addition, fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common factor that
deter rape victims from reporting the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in
marital rape cases. This is in view of the popular yet outdated belief that it is the wife's
absolute obligation to submit to her husband's carnal desires. A husband raping his own
wife is often dismissed as a peculiar occurrence or trivialized as simple domestic trouble.

Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the stigma
and public scrutiny that could have befallen KKK and her family had the intervention of
police authorities or even the neighbors been sought, are acceptable explanations for the
failure or delay in reporting the subject rape incidents.

The victim's testimony on the witness stand

rendered unnecessary the presentation of
her complaint-affidavit as evidence.

The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for rape is not fatal
in view of the credible, candid and positive testimony of KKK on the witness stand.
Testimonial evidence carries more weight than the affidavit since it underwent the
rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross examinations. Affidavits or
statements taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus,
by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court.[152]

Ill motive imputed to the victim

The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire belief as it
is riddled with loopholes generated by incongruent and flimsy evidence. The
prosecution was able to establish that the P3 Million deposit in the spouses' bank
account was the proceeds of their loan from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI).
Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML instruction sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the amount of
P3,149,840.63 is the same amount the accused-appellant claimed to have entrusted to
her wife. Although the accused-appellant denied being aware of such loan, he admitted
that approximately P3 Million was spent for the construction of their house. These
pieces of evidence effectively belie the accused appellant's allegation that KKK could not
account for the money deposited in the bank.[153]

Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to explain how
Bebs could be his wife KKK when the letter-sender greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on
October 28 while KKK's birthday is June 23. The accused-appellant also did not present
Bebs herself, being a more competent witness to the existence of the alleged love letters
for KKK. He likewise failed, despite promise to do so, to present the original copies of
such love letters neither did he substantiate KKK's supposed extra-marital affairs by
presenting witnesses who could corroborate his claims. Further, the Court finds it
unbelievable that an able man would not have the temerity to confront his wife who has
fooled around with 10 men some of whom he has even met. The accused-appellant's
erratic statements on the witness stand are inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital
romance making it reasonable to infer that he merely made up those malicious stories as
a desperate ploy to extricate himself out of this legal quandary.

At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-appellant's
unfounded suspicions that hold no evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to
destroy KKK's credibility and that of her testimony. In sum, the defense failed to present
sufficiently convincing evidence that KKK is a mere vindictive wife who is harassing the
accused-appellant with fabricated rape charges.

Alibi

It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as defense, the
accused-appellant has essentially admitted the facts of sexual intercourse embodied in
the two criminal informations for rape. This admission is inconsistent with the defense
of alibi and any discussion thereon will thus be irrelevant.

At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.

Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and
unreliable, but also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who had
no improper motive to testify falsely.[154]

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some
other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical
impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the place where the
accused was and the place where the crime was committed when the crime transpired,
but more importantly, the facility of access between the two places.[155]

Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a fiesta in
Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was hauling corn with Equia on the dates of commission of the
crime, the same will not easily exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed to adduce
clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at his
residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crime.
Dangcagan, Bukidnon can be traversed by about four or five hours from Cagayan de Oro
City, and even less by private vehicle which was available to the accused appellant at any
time.[156] Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the situs criminis at
the dates and times when the two rape incidents were committed.

Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive identification and
credible testimony of the victim, and her two daughters, the Court must give weight to
the latter, especially in the absence of ill motive on their part to falsely testify against the
accused-appellant.

Conclusion

All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently

overcome by KKK's clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two
separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, without her
consent and against her will. Evidence of overwhelming force and intimidation to
consummate rape is extant from KKK's narration as believably corroborated by the
testimonies of MMM and OOO and the physical evidence of KKK's torn panties and
short pants. Based thereon, the reason and conscience of the Court is morally certain
that the accused-appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of October 16 and 17,
1998.

Penalties

The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted
upon the accused-appellant for being in accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B
of the RPC. Further, he shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No.
9346, which states that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of
this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."[157]

The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of P50,000.00. Moral
damages are granted to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape
under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she
underwent.[158]

The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that rape took
place. Considering that the crime committed is simple rape, there being no qualifying
circumstances attendant in its commission, the appropriate amount is
P50,000.00[159] and not P75,000.00 as awarded by the RTC.

To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of domestic
violence, an award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is imperative.[160]

The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum to be reckoned from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.[161]

A Final Note

Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a

woman's value and dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place, age, physical
condition or social status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even,
as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored fortress, the family
home, committed against her by her husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty.
The herein pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide the
atonement they seek from their sexually coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their
wives. A husband does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she
does not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body
and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A
husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse
cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek succor before
the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological
incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.

Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological
communion that achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and
self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual
coercion or imposition.

The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement,
menacing personalities may use this as a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this
regard, let it be stressed that safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to
spot and scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints and any person who
institutes untrue and malicious charges will be made answerable under the pertinent
provisions of the RPC and/or other laws.

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar
Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count, without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape. The award of damages shall
earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,

Bersamin, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1] 26 Am Jur SS8, p. 636.

 Pursuant to People v. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640,
[2]
653-658.

[3]Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, with Associate Justices Edgardo
A. Camello and Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 5-30.

[4] Issued by Judge Anthony E. Santos; records, pp. 760-769.

[5]The real name of the victim, her personal circumstances and other information which
tend to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of their immediate family
or household members, shall not be disclosed to protect her privacy and fictitious
initials shall, instead, be used, in accordance with People v. Cabalquinto (533 Phil.
703 [2006]), and A.M. No. 04-11-09-SC dated September 19, 2006.

[6] Pre-trial Order dated November 16, 1999, records, pp. 71-74.

[7] Id. at 23-24.

[8] Id. at 3-5.

[9] Id. at 2.

[10] Id. at 13.

[11] Id. at 27.

[12] Id. at 44-48.

[13] Id. at 50.

[14] Id. at 49.

[15] Id. at 84-85.

[16] Exhibit "7".

[17] Records, p. 89.

[18] Id. at 86.

[19] Id. at 87.

[20] TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 93-95.

[21] Id. at 98-99.

[22] Id. at 101; TSN, July 3, 2000, p. 5.

[23] TSN, February 10, 2000, pp. 26-27.

[24] TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 21.

[25] TSN, May 24, 2000, p. 99.

[26] Id.

[27] Id. at 100; TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 21-22.

[28] TSN, February 4, 2000, p. 30.

[29] TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 23.

[30] TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 95-97.

[31]
TSN, July 3, 2000, p. 17; TSN, July 13, 2000, p. 14; KKK's Complaint Affidavit dated
February 19, 1999, records, pp. 10-11.

[32] TSN, July 3, 2000, pp. 6-7.

[33] TSN, February 4, 2000, p. 37.

[34]
TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 8-9; TSN, February 4, 2000, pp. 45-47; TSN, August 2,
2000, pp. 5-6.

[35] TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 9-10; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 74-75.

[36] TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 75-76.

[37] Id. at 76-77.

[38] Id. at 77-78.

[39] Id. at 78-79; Exhibit "A".

[40] TSN, July 13, 2000, p. 11.

[41] Id.

[42] TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 79-81.

[43] TSN, February 4, 2000, pp. 46-47.

[44] Id. at 49-50.

[45] TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 8.

[46] TSN, February 3, 2000, p. 11

[47] Id. at 12; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 81-82.

[48] TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 11-13; TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 8.

[49] TSN, February 3, 2000, Id.

[50] Id. at 14; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 82-83.

[51] TSN, February 4, 2000, pp. 56-59.

[52] TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 14-15.

[53] Id. at 16; TSN, May 24, 2000, p. 83; TSN, August 2, 2000, pp. 9-10.

[54]
TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 17-19; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 84-86; TSN, August 2,
2000, pp. 11-13.

[55] TSN, February 10, 2000, pp. 40-41.

[56] Id. at 44-45.

[57] Exhibit "B".

[58]
TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 19-20; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 86-87; TSN, August 2,
2000, pp. 13-14.
[59]
TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 21-22; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 87-88; TSN, August 2,
2000, pp. 14-16.

[60] TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 88-89.

[61] Id. at 89-90.

[62] Id. at 90; TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 23-24; TSN, August 2, 2000, pp. 16, 18-19.

[63] TSN, October 24, 2000, pp. 4-7.

[64] Id. at 17.

[65] TSN, April 30, 2001, pp. 6-8.

[66] TSN, October 24, 2000, pp. 7, 10-11; Exhibit "1".

[67] Id. at 7.

[68] Id. at 12-13.

[69] Also referred to as Bebie in the other parts of the records.

[70] Id. at 14; Exhibit "3".

[71] TSN, February 2, 2001, pp. 14-15.

[72] Id. at 16-17.

[73] TSN, October 24, 2000, pp. 19-21; TSN, March 12, 2001, p. 155.

[74] TSN, October 24, 2000, p. 18.

[75] Id. at 18-19; Exhibit "2".

[76] Records, pp. 760-769.

[77] Id. at 769.

[78] Rollo, pp. 5-30.

[79] Id. at 29.

[80]Id. at 35-36; The contents of the Resolution was reiterated in another Resolution
dated November 15, 2010, id. at 47-48.

[81] Id. at 37-38.

[82] Id. at 78-93.

[83]
Cassandra M. DeLaMothe, Liberta Revisited: A Call to Repeal the Marital
Exemption for All Sex Offenses in New York's Penal Law, 23 Fordham Urban Law
Journal, p. 861 (1995). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj, last accessed on March 31,
2014.

[84]Maria Pracher, The Marital Rape Exemption: A Violation of a Woman's Right of

Privacy, 11 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., p. 725 (1981).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss3/1, last accessed on March 31,
2014.

[85] Supra note 83.

[86] Id.

[87] Id. at 860.

[88]Id. at 860-861, citing Arthur R. Cleveland, Woman Under the English Law 71 (Fred
B. Rothman 7 Co. 1987) (1896), p. 24.

[89] Id. at 859-860.

[90]Id. at 860, citing 1 William Blackstone Commentaries *432 and Katherine M.

Schelong, Domestic Violence and the State: Responses to and Rationales for Spousal
Battering, Marital Rape and Stalking, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 81 (1994).

[91] Id., citing Schelong, 86. (Other citations omitted)

1 Hale, History of Pleas of the Crown, pp. 628-629 (1736), as cited in People v.
[92]

Liberta, Court of Appeals of New York, 474 N.E. 2D 567 (1984).

[93] Supra note 84, at 717. (Citations Omitted)

[94]Julie Allison and Lawrence Wrightsman, Rape, The Misunderstood Crime, United
States, Sage Publications, Inc., p. 87 (1993).

[95] 74 Mass 489, as cited in People v. Liberta, supra note 92.

[96] See People v. Liberta, supra note 92.

[97] DeLaMothe, supra note 83, at 862, citing N.Y. Penal Law SS 2010 (Consol. 1909),
viz:

"A person who penetrates an act of sexual intercourse with a female not his wife, against
her will or without her consent…[i]s guilty of rape in the first degree and punishable by
imprisonment for not more than twenty years.

A person who penetrates an act of sexual intercourse with a female, not his wife, under
the age of eighteen years, under circumstances not amounting to rape in the first degree,
is guilty of rape in the second degree, and punishable with imprisonment for not more
than ten years."

[98]Id., citing the 1922 case of People v. Meli (193 N.Y.S. 365 [Sup. Ct. 1922]). John
Meli was convicted of rape for aiding and abetting another man in raping his wife. Meli
did not commit the rape himself but he was present while the rape was being committed
and he actually helped to overcome his wife.

[99]
Racquel Kennedy Bergen, Ph.D., Marital Rape, Applied Research Forum, National
Electronic Network on Violence Against Women, p. 2 (1999).
www.hawaii.edu/hivandaids/Marital Rape.pdf, last accessed on April 1, 2014, citing
Bidwell, L., & White, P., The family context of marital rape. The Journal of Family
Violence, I, pp. 277-287 (1986) and Finkelhor, D., & Yllo, K., License to Rape: Sexual
Abuse of Wives, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston (1985).

[100] People v. Liberta, supra note 92.

[101] Id.

[102] Id.

[103]Bergen, supra note 99, citing Bergen, R.K., Wife Rape: Understanding the Response
of Survivors and Service Providers. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage (1996) and Russell,
D.E.H., Rape in Marriage, New York, Macmillan Press (1990).

[104] Tenure: November 20, 1985 to March 6, 1986.

[105]Ramon C. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Volume III, Central Lawbook Supply,
Inc. (1988 Ed.), pp. 382-383.

[106]http://pcw.gov.ph/international-commitments/cedaw/state-obligations, last
visited on March 20, 2014; CEDAW came into effect on September 4, 1981, the
Philippines has signed it on July 17, 1980 and ratified it on July 19, 1981, the first
Association of South East Asian Nation country to do so.

[107]
CA Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal, Women Empowerment,
http://ca.judiciary.gov.ph/index.php?action=mnuactual_contents&ap=j8040&p=y, last
accessed on April 1, 2014.

[108] CEDAW, Article 2, Part I.

[109]
Also known as The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the law took effect on October 22,
1997; See People v. Maceda, 405 Phil. 698, 721 (2001).

[110] Consideration of the Conference Committee Reports, September 3, 1997.

[111]
Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting, Committee on Revision of Laws J/W
Committee on Women, March 17, 1997.

[112]
Sub-committee on Disadvantaged Women (Committee on Women) JT. Sub-
committee on Criminal Laws Committee on Revision of Laws), November 15, 1995.

[113] Committee on Revision of Laws J/W Committee on Women, January 29, 1996.

[114] ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004.

[115]http://pcw.gov.ph/statistics/201304/statistics-violence-against-filipino-women,
last visited on March 18, 2014.

[116] CA rollo, pp. 150-151.

[117] CEDAW, Article 5, Part I.

[118]
UN General Assembly, December 20, 1993.
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm, last accessed on April 1, 2014.

[119] Id.
[120] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1:

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

[121] UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, Article 4:

States should condemn violence against women and should not invoke any custom,
tradition or religious consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to its
elimination. States should pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of
eliminating violence against women x x x.

Article 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live

[122]

together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support. (Emphasis ours)

[123] See Tsoi v. CA, 334 Phil. 294, 304 (1997).

[124] Id. at 304.

[125]Refusal to have sexual intercourse must be rooted on psychological incapacity

which in turn must be established by the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability; Baccay v. Baccay, G.R. No. 173138, December 1, 2010, 636 SCRA
350, 368-369; See also the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion in
the case stating that: "The failure to consummate the marriage by itself, however, does
not constitute as a ground to nullify the marriage. The spouse's refusal to have intimate
sexual relations must be due to causes psychological in nature, i.e., the psychological
condition of the spouse renders [her] incapable of having intimate sexual relations with
the other. x x x." 636 SCRA 350, 375.

[126] 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 1.

[127] CITY OF MANILA V. HON. LAGUIO, JR., 495 Phil. 289, 326 (2005).

[128] Supra note 92.

[129]
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, The Fourth World Conference on
Women, September 15, 1995, paragraph 96.
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20E.pdf, last accessed on
April 3, 2014. According to the Philippine Commission on Women, the Philippines
acceded to the commitments set forth in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for
Action. http://www.pcw.gov.ph/international-commitments, last accessed on April 3,
2014.
[130] R.A. No. 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women), Section 3:

Principles of Human Rights of Women. Human rights are universal

and inalienable. All people in the world are entitled to them. The universality of
human rights is encompassed in the words of Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which states that all human beings are free and equal in dignity and
rights. (Emphasis ours)

[131] People v. Publico, G.R. No. 183569, April 13, 2011, 648 SCRA 734, 742.

[132] People v. Agustin, G.R. No. 194581, July 2, 2012, 675 SCRA 424, 434.

[133] TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 75-81.

[134] Id. at 87-89.

[135] Id. at 89-90.

[136] Sison v. People, G.R. No. 187229, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 645, 659.

[137] TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 77-81.

[138] TSN, July 13, 2000, pp. 10-11.

[139] TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 88-89.

[140] People v. Estoya, G.R. No. 200531, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 376, 386.

[141] People v. Dimanawa, G.R. No. 184600, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 770, 778.

[142] People v. Magtibay, 435 Phil. 353, 365 (2002).

[143] People v. Baltazar, 397 Phil. 277, 288 (2000).

[144] People of the Philippines v. Joey Bacatan, G.R. No. 203315, September 18,
2013.

[145] Id.

[146] 321 Phil. 279 (1995).

[147] Id. at 318.

[148] People v. Cias, G.R. No. 194379, June 1, 2011, 650 SCRA 326, 337.

[149] TSN, February 3, 2000, p. 10; TSN, February 4, 2000, pp. 48-50.

[150] People v. Satioquia, 460 Phil. 167, 173 (2003).

[151] TSN, July 3, 2000, pp. 13-14.

[152] See People v. Cabtalan, G.R. No. 175980, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 174,
192-193.

[153] TSN, November 21, 2000, pp. 13-14.

[154]People v. Ogarte, G.R. No. 182690, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 395, 413,
citing People v. Palomar, 343 Phil. 628, 663-664 (1997).

[155] People v. Viojela, G.R. No. 177140, October 17, 2012, 684 SCRA 241, 257-258.

[156] TSN, May 11, 2001, p. 171.

[157] People of the Philippines v. Joey Bacatan, supra note 144.

[158] Id.

[159] Id.

[160] Id.

[161] Id.

BRION, J.:
We review the appeal, filed by appellant Jose Dalan, assailing the decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated January 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04279. The CA affirmed
the Judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64, Abatan, Buguias,
Benguet, which found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts
of statutory rape.

In its Judgment dated December 3, 2009, the RTC convicted the appellant of two counts
of statutory rape. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove that the appellant
inserted his penis in AAA's vagina on two occasions, namely, in December 2006 and on
March 3, 2007. It added that AAA's testimony was corroborated by the medical findings
of Dr. Sabrina Florendo. The RTC further explained that AAA's mental retardation
cannot disqualify her as a witness, since she capably narrated the details of the sexual
abuses committed against her by the appellant in 2006 and 2007.

Accordingly, the RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and to indemnify the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages, both for each count of statutory rape.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA ruled that AAA positively
identified the appellant as the person who raped her on two occasions. According to the
CA, AAA was consistent in her recollection of the details of the crime. It also added that
AAA's moderate mental retardation was sufficiently established by the prosecution's
evidence. Finally, the RTC found the appellant's uncorroborated denial and alibi to be
unmeritorious.

Our Ruling

We deny the appeal, but modify the designation of the crime committed and the
awarded indemnities.

For the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished such act through force or
intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.[3] Carnal knowledge of a woman
who is a mental retardate is rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a mental
retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What need to be proven are the
facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation
of the latter.[4]

In the present case, the prosecution established the elements of rape under Article 266-
A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. First, AAA positively identified the appellant
as the person who inserted his penis in her vagina in December 2006 and in
March 2007; she never wavered in this identification. Significantly, AAA's claim of
sexual intercourse had been corroborated by the medical findings and testimony of Dr.
Florendo who testified that the marked attenuated hymen at 6 o'clock position was most
probably caused by an erect penis, while the absent hymen at the 4, 5 and 7 o'clock
positions could be caused by repeated sexual experience.

Second, the prosecution satisfactorily established the mental condition of the victim.
Dr. Ekid conducted a battery of tests to determine the mental age, social maturity and
emotional condition of AAA. During trial, Dr. Ekid explained each test, and how she
arrived at her conclusions. Accordingly, she found AAA to be suffering from moderate
retardation, with a mental age of a person four (4) years and seven (7) months old.

As the lower courts did, we are unpersuaded by the appellant's alibi that he was at a
farm in Ca-ew, Bulalacao, during the two rapes. Aside from being uncorroborated, we
point out that Ca-ew was just five (5) minutes away from the scene of the rape. In short,
the appellant miserably failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the places where AAA had been sexually abused.

The Crime Committed

Article 266-A paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:

Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise

b)
unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is

d) demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present; x x x
In the present case, the Information alleged that the victim was "xxx a minor, being
seventeen (17) years of age, or below eighteen (18) years old at the time of the
commission of the crime, but mentally retarded with a mental age that equates to a child
of four (4) years and seven (7) months," and this circumstance had been proven during
trial. The RTC, however, equated AAA's mental retardation with dementia. It is settled
that carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape as she is in the same
class as a woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.[5] Our ruling in People
v. Monticalvo[6] on this point is instructive:

The term "deprived of reason" has been construed to encompass those

suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation. The term
"demented," on the other hand, means having dementia, which Webster
defines as mental deterioration; also madness, insanity. Dementia has also
been defined in Black's Law Dictionary as a "form of mental disorder in
which cognitive and intellectual functions of the mind are prominently
affected; xxx total recovery not possible since cerebral disease is involved."
Thus, a mental retardate can be classified as a person "deprived of reason,"
not one who is "demented" and carnal knowledge of a mental
retardate is considered rape under subparagraph (b), not
subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(I) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. [Emphasis in the original]
Aside from erroneously equating AAA's mental retardation with dementia, the RTC
further justified its conviction of the appellant of statutory rape on account of the
victim's mental age.

The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape, as provided for in Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is the carnal knowledge of a
woman below 12 years old. To convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the
prosecution must prove: first, the age of the complainant; second, the identity of the
accused; and last but not the least, the carnal knowledge between the accused and the
complainant.[7]

In the present case, it is not disputed that AAA was already 17 years old when she was
raped. In People v. Butiong,[8] we held that carnal knowledge of a female mental
retardate with the mental age below 12 years of age is considered as rape of a
woman deprived of reason, thus:

It should no longer be debatable that rape of a mental retardate falls under

paragraph 1(b), of Article 266-A, x x x, because the provision refers to a
rape of a female "deprived of reason," a phrase that refers to mental
abnormality, deficiency or retardation.
We are not unaware that there have been cases[9] where the Court stated that sexual
intercourse with a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape. Nonetheless, the Court in
these cases affirmed the accused's conviction for simple rape despite a finding that the
victim was a mental retardate with a mental age of a person less than 12 years old.

Based on these discussions, we hold that the term statutory rape should only be
confined to situations where the victim of rape is a person less than 12 years of age. If
the victim of rape is a person with mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation, the
crime committed is simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(b) as she is
considered "deprived of reason" notwithstanding that her mental age is
equivalent to that of a person under 12. In short, carnal knowledge with a mental
retardate whose mental age is that of a person below 12 years, while akin to statutory
rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d), should still be designated as simple rape
under paragraph 1(b). At any rate, proof of force, threat or intimidation is dispensed
with in both statutory rape and rape with a person who is deprived of reason.

With respect to the awarded indemnities, we further direct the appellant to pay the
victim P30,000.00 as exemplary damages to set a public example and to protect hapless
individuals from sexual molestation. We also impose a 6% interest on all the monetary
awards for damages to be reckoned from the date of finality of this decision until fully
paid.[10]

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the CA decision dated January 31, 2012
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04279 is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

the appellant is found guilty of simple rape under Article 266- A(1)(b) of
(a)
the Revised Penal Code, as amended;

he is further ordered to pay AAA P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(b)
and

he is ordered to pay interest, at the rate of 6% per annum on the award

(c) of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages from
finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Rollo, pp. 2-20; penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Rosmari D.

[1]
Carandang, and concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario, and Danton Q.
Bueser.

[2] CA rollo, pp. 42-52; penned by Judge Agapito K. Laoagan, Jr.

[3] People of the Philippines v. Hermenigildo Deleny Escobilla, G.R. No.

194446, April 21, 2014.
[4] People v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 177294, February 19, 2008, 546 SCRA 363, 376.

[5] People v. Tablang, G.R. No. 174859, October 30, 2009, 604 SCRA 757, 766.

[6] See People v. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013, 689 SCRA 715, 731.

[7] People v. Balunsal, G.R. No. 176743, July 28, 2010, 626 SCRA 77, 91.

[8] G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 557, 571 and 573.

See People v. Alipio, G.R. No. 185285, October 5, 2009, 603 SCRA 40; People v.
[9]

Arlee, G.R. No. 113518, January 25, 2000, 323 SCRA 201; People v. Andaya, 365
Phil. 654 (1999).

[10] People v. Manicat, G.R. No. 205413, December 2, 2013.