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administrator was directed to deliver different from that literally expressed (In
the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil. 333).
trustee.
divested of the legacy and the brought about the controversy between the
administration of the ricelands would parish priest of Victoria and the testator's legal
pass to the incumbent parish priest heirs.
of Victoria and his successors.
7. That the parish priest-administrator of We hold that the said bequest refers to the
the ricelands would accumulate testator's nearest male relative living at the time
annually the products thereof, of his death and not to any indefinite time
obtaining or getting from the annual thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit,
produce five percent thereof for his the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the
administration and the fees moment the succession opens, except in case of
corresponding to the twenty masses representation, when it is proper" (Art.
with prayers that the parish priest 1025, Civil Code).
would celebrate for each year,
depositing the balance of the
income of the devise in the bank in The said testamentary provisions should be
the name of this bequest. sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe
them as referring to the testator's nearest male
relative at anytime after his death would render
From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it the provisions difficult to apply and create
may be deduced that the testator intended to uncertainty as to the disposition of his
devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative estate. That could not have been his intention.
who would become a priest, who was forbidden
to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if
he discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest legal
having been ordained a priest, he was heirs were his three sisters or second-degree
excommunicated, and who would be obligated to relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and
say annually twenty masses with prayers for the Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously, when the testator
repose of the souls of the testator and his specified his nearest male relative, he must
parents. have had in mind his nephew or a son of his
sister, who would be his third-degree relative, or
possibly a grandnephew. But since he could not
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish prognosticate the exact date of his death or state
priest of Victoria would administer with certitude what category of nearest male
the ricelands only in two situations: one, during relative would be living at the time of his
the interval of time that no nearest male relative death, he could not specify that his nearest
of the testator was studying for the priesthood male relative would be his nephew or
and two, in case the testator's nephew became grandnephews (the sons of his nephew or niece)
a priest and he was excommunicated. and so he had to use the term "nearest male
relative".
legal heirs presented in the lower court the What then did the testator mean by
affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario ac
grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who ondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he
deposed that after Father Rigor's death, her own was referring to a situation whereby his nephew
son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the living at the time of his death, who would like to
devise, although he was studying for the become a priest, was still in grade school or in
priesthood at the San Carlos Seminary, because high school or was not yet in the seminary. In
she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had that case, the parish priest of Victoriawould
intended that devise for his nearest male administer the ricelands before the nephew
relative belonging to the Rigor family (pp. 105- entered the seminary. But the moment the
114, Record on Appeal). testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he
would be entitled to enjoy and administer
the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In
Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own that event, the trusteeship would be terminated.
grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan, was not the
one contemplated in Father Rigor's will and
that Edgardo's father told her that he was not Following that interpretation of the will, the
consulted by the parish priest of Victoria before inquiry would be whether at the time Father
the latter filed his second motion for Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was
reconsideration which was based on the ground studying for the priesthood or who had
that the testator's grandnephew, Edgardo, was manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical
studying for the priesthood at the San Jose career. That query is categorically answered in
Seminary. paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions
of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He
unequivocally alleged therein that "no nearest
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this male relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor
juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a seminarian has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and
in 1961. For that reason, the legal 35, Record on Appeal).
heirs apprised the Court of Appeals that the
probate court's order adjudicating
the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria had Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by
no more leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellant's brief). any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in
question was ineffectual or
Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is inoperative. Therefore, the administration of
tantamount to evidence aliunde as to the the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as
testator's intention and which is hearsay, has no envisaged in the will, was likewise inoperative.
probative value. Our opinion that the said
bequest refers to the testator's nephew who was
living at the time of his death, when his The appellant in contending that a public
succession was opened and charitable trust was constituted by the testator in
the successional rights to his estate his favor assumes that he was a trustee or a
became vested, rests on a judicious and substitute devisee. That contention is
unbiased reading of the terms of the will. untenable. A reading of the testamentary
provisions regarding the disputed bequest does
not support the view that the parish priest
Had the testator intended that the of Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee
"cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que in the event that the testator was not survived by
estudie la carrera eclesiastica" would include a nephew who became a priest.
indefinitely anyone of his nearest male
relatives born after his death, he could have so
specified in his will. He must have known that It should be underscored that the parish priest
such a broad provision would suspend for an of Victoria could become a trustee only when the
unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of testator's nephew living at the time of his death,
his bequest. who desired to become a priest, had not yet
entered the seminary or, having been ordained a
priest, he was excommunicated. Those two
6
contingencies did not arise, and could not have G.R. No. 140975, December 08, 2000
arisen, in this case because no nephew of the
testator manifested any intention to enter the
seminary or ever became a priest. OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, PETITIONER,
VS. PASTORA PIEDAD, RESPONDENT.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this DECISION
case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil
Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the
bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it
VITUG, J.:
shall be merged into the estate, except in cases
of substitution and those in which the right of
accretion exists"
(“el legado x x x por qualquier causa,
no tenga efecto, se refundira en la masa de
la herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y d On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia
erecho de acrecer"). Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special
Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the Matter of
the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the
old Civil Code, now article 960(2), which Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of
provides that legal succession takes place when Pasay City. Asserting entitlement to a share of
the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad,
the testator". There being no substitution nor petitioner assailed the finality of the order of the
accretion as to the said ricelands, the same trial court awarding the entire estate to
should be distributed among the testator's legal respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the
heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made proceedings were tainted with procedural
no disposition as to the said ricelands. infirmities, including an incomplete publication of
the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to
the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die
disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by
partly testate and partly testate, or that there
the administrator of the estate. The trial court
may be mixed succession. The old rule as to
denied the motion, prompting petitioner to raise
the indivisibility of the testator's will is no longer
her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent
valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take
sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis
effect, there will be intestate succession as to
that the issues brought up on appeal only
the property covered by the said legacy
involved pure questions of law. Finding merit in
(Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil.
that argument, the appellate court dismissed the
267).
appeal, citing Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the 1997
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure which would
We find no merit in the appeal. The Appellate require all appeals involving nothing else but
Court's decision is affirmed. Costs against the questions of law to be raised before the
petitioner. Supreme Court by petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof
and consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court.
SO ORDERED.
In a well-written resolution, the Court of Appeals
belabored the distinctions between questions of
law and questions of fact, thus:
blood, and of article 987, paragraph 2, uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive,
concerning division between the paternal and they shall inherit in equal portions."
maternal lines."
The right of representation does not apply to
By right of representation, a more distant blood "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil
relative of a decedent is, by operation of law, degree" (to which group both petitioner and
"raised to the same place and degree" of respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of
relationship as that of a closer blood relative of preference following, firstly, the legitimate
the same decedent. The representative thereby children and descendants, secondly, the
steps into the shoes of the person he represents legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the
and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the illegitimate children and
person to whose estate the person represented descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse,
would have succeeded. and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and
nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral
"ART. 970. Representation is a right created relatives, except only in the case of nephews
by fiction of law, by virtue of which the and nieces of the decedent concurring with their
representative is raised to the place and the uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed
degree of the person represented, and in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an
acquires the rights which the latter would absolute rule. In determining the degree of
have if he were living or if he could have relationship of the collateral relatives to the
inherited." decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives
direction.
"ART. 971. The representative is called to the
succession by the law and not by the person "Article 966. x x x
represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one "In the collateral line, ascent is made to the
whom the person represented would have common ancestor and then descent is made to
succeeded." the person with whom the computation is to be
made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed
In the direct line, right of representation is proper from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the
only in the descending, never in the ascending, brother of his father, four from his first cousin
line. In the collateral line, the right of and so forth."
representation may only take place in favor of
the children of brothers or sisters of the Accordingly -
decedent when such children survive with their
uncles or aunts. Respondent, being a relative within the third civil
degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes
"ART. 972. The right of representation takes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from
place in the direct descending line, but never succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the
in the ascending. decedent.
"In the collateral line, it takes place only in The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010
favor of the children of brothers or sisters, of the Civil Code -
whether they be of the full or half blood."
"Article 1009. Should there be neither brothers
"ART. 974. Whenever there is succession by nor sisters nor children of brothers or sisters, the
representation, the division of the estate shall be other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
made per stirpes, in such manner that the estate.
representative or representatives shall not inherit
more than what the person they represent would "The latter shall succeed without distinction of
inherit, if he were living or could inherit." lines or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood."
"ART. 975. When children of one or more
brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, "Article 1010. The right to inherit ab
they shall inherit from the latter by intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree
representation, if they survive with their of relationship in the collateral line." -
9
G.R. No. L-40789, February 27, 1987 Macikequerox Rosales, ¼' and
"Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall (3) The widow or widower;
always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares." (4) Acknowledged natural children, and
natural children by legal fiction;
"Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and
descendants of other children who are dead, (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in
survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, article 287;
and the latter by right of representation."
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and
"Art. 982. The grandchildren and other 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2;
descendants shall inherit by right of neither do they exclude one another.
representation, and if any one of them should
have died, leaving several heirs, the portion In all cases of illegitimate children, their
pertaining to him shall be divided among the filiation must be duly proved.
latter in equal portions.”
The father or mother of illegitimate children of
the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from
"Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives
them in the manner and to the extent
with legitimate children or their descendants and
established by this Code."
illegitimate children or their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or
The aforesaid provision of law [3] refers to the
widower shall be entitled to the same share as
estate of the deceased spouse in which case the
that of a legitimate child."
surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a
compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate
There is no provision in the Civil Code which of a parent-in-law.
states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a
Code is devoid of any provision which entitles third person as regards the estate of the parent-
her to inherit from her mother-in-law either by in-law. We had occasion to make this
her own right or by the right of representation. observation in Lachenal v. Salas[4], to wit:
The provisions of the Code which relate to the
order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to
"We hold that the title to the fishing boat should
1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the
be determined in Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the
intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as
intestate proceeding) because it affects the
the final intestate heir. The conspicuous
lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the
absence of a provision which makes a daughter-
decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to
in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the
his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless
more confirms Our observation. If the legislature
a third person with respect to his estate. xxx."
intended to make the surviving spouse an
(Emphasis supplied).
intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have
so provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in By the same token, the provision of Article 999
accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of of the Civil Code aforecited does not support
the Civil Code which provides that: petitioner’s claim. A careful examination of the
said Article confirms that the estate
"Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
11
contemplated therein is the estate of the Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and
deceased spouse. The estate which is the We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an
subject matter of the intestate estate intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
proceedings in this case is that of the deceased
Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with
Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a costs against the petitioner. Let this case be
share of the inheritance by the right of remanded to the trial court for further
representation as provided by Article 981 of the proceedings.
Code.
The essence and nature of the right of SO ORDERED.
representation is explained by Articles 970 and
971 of the Civil Code, viz —
by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties Code, applied by the trial court in allowing
yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial plaintiffs-appellees to succeed to the properties
of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having left by Maura Bagsic were not the applicable
agreed to defer the partition of the same, the provisions. He asserts that in the course of the
plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime trial of the case in the lower court, plaintiffs
in 1959 only. This requested defendants to admit
time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as that Felipa Bagsic, the sole sister of full blood of
the debts, accordingly, had already been Maura Bagsic, died on May 9, 1955. Since
paid. Unfortunately, she died without the Maura Bagsic died on April 14,
division of the properties having been effected, 1952, Felipa succeeded to Maura's estate. In
thereby leaving the possession and support thereof, he cites Art. 1004 of the New
administration of the same to the defendants. Civil Code which provides that "should the only
survivors be brothers and sisters of the full
blood, they shall inherit in equal shares," and he
After trial, the court rendered judgment, concludes with the rule that the relatives nearest
the dispositive portion of which reads: in degree excludes the more distant ones. (Art.
962, New Civil Code)
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiffs who are hereby declared to On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that
be entitled to ten twenty-fourth (10/24) share on the date of death of Felipa Bagsic was not raised
the five parcels of land in dispute. The as an issue in the trial court. It was even the
defendant Engracio Manese and the heirs of the subject of stipulation of the parties as clearly
deceased Geronimo Almanza, who are shown in the transcript of the stenographic notes
represented in the instant case by the that Felipa Bagsic died on May 9, 1945.[3]
administrator FlorentinoCartena, are hereby
required to pay the plaintiffs from July 23, 1959
the sum of P625.00 per annum until the ten- The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the
twenty fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of case have been duly established in the trial court
land are delivered to the plaintiffs, with legal and that the only issue left for determination is a
interest from the time this decision shall have purely legal question involving the correct
become final. application of the law and jurisprudence on the
With costs against the defendants. matter, hence the appellate court certified this
SO ORDERED. case to Us.
City of San Pablo, September 21, 1962.
(SGD) JOSE G. BAUTISTA
Judge" We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006
Record on Appeal, p. 47 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are applicable
From the aforesaid decision of the trial to the admitted facts of the case at bar. These
court, Florentino Cartena, the substitute Articles provide:
defendant for Geronimo Almanza, appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The other
"Art. 975. When children of one or more
defendant, EngracioManese, did not appeal and
brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they
execution was issued with respect to the parcels
shall inherit from the latter by representation, if
of land in his possession, that is, those
they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if
described under Letters D and E in the
they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal
complaint. Hence, the subject matter of the
portions."
case on appeal was limited to the one-half
"Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the
undivided portion of only three of the five parcels
full blood survive together with brothers and
of land described under letters A, B and C in the
sisters of the half blood, the former shall be
complaint which defendant Cartena admitted to
entitled to a share double that of the latter."
be only in his possession.[2]
"Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of
the half blood shall succeed per capita or per
On appeal, defendant- stripes, in accordance with the rules laid down
appellant Cartena contends that the provisions for brothers and sisters of the full blood."
of Arts. 995, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil
14
In the absence of descendants, ascendants, May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Maura Bagsic.
Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased. It appearing that We find the judgment of the trial court to be in
Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, consonance with law and jurisprudence.
and her husband and all her ascendants had
died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court
surviving collateral relatives, namely the
is hereby affirmed.
daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten
(10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of
half blood, in accordance with the provision of
Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.
was free from illegal pressure or influence of any After the parties had presented their evidence,
kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from the probate court rendered its decision
any influence of fear or threat; that she freely on November 10, 1960 admitting the will to
and spontaneously executed said will and that probate but declaring the disposition made in
she had neither ascendants nor descendants of favor of Dr. Rene Teofico void with the
any kind such that she could freely dispose of all statement that the portion to be vacated by the
her estate. annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by
way of intestate succession.
interested party has been defined as one who a deceased brother of the deceased, and also
would be benefited by the estate such as an heir an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a
or one who has a claim against the estate like a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim
creditor (Idem.). On the other hand, cannot give her any comfort for, even if it be
in Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, et al., L- true, the law does not give her any right to
17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said: succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of
both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And
this is so because being an illegitimate child she
"According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of is prohibited by law from succeeding to the
Court, a petition for letters of administration must legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus,
be filed by an 'interested person. 'An interested Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An
party has been defined in this connection as one illegitimate child has no right to
who would be benefited by the estate, such as inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
an heir, or one who has a claim against the and relatives of his father or mother; x x x." And
estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of the philosophy behind this provision is well
Julio Magbanua 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well expressed in Grey vs. Fabie, 68 Phil., 128, as
settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as follows:
well as special proceedings, the Interest'
required in order that a person may be a party
thereto must be material and direct, and not Between the natural child and the legitimate
merely indirect or relatives of the father or mother who
contingent. (Trillana vs Crisostomo, G. R. No. L- acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of
3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70 succession. They cannot be called relatives and
Phil. 311)." they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a
blood tie, but the law docs not recognize it. In
this, article 943 is based upon the reality" of the
The question now may be asked: facts and upon the presumptive will of the
Has Oppositor any interest in any of the interested parties; the natural child is
provisions of the will, and, in the negative, would disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
she acquire any right to the estate in the event family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by
that the will is denied probate? the natural Child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
Under the terms of the will, Oppositor has no
former, in turn sees in the natural child nothing
right to intervene because she has no interest in
but the product of sin, a Palpable evidence of a
the estate either as heir, executor, or
blemish upon the family. Every relation is
administrator, nor does she have any claim to
ordinarily broken in life; the law does not more
any property affected by the will, because it
them recognize this truth, by avoiding further
nowhere appears therein any provision
grounds of resentment.' (7 Manresa, 3d ed., p.
designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of
110.)"
any portion of the estate. She has also no
interest in the will either as administratrix or
executrix. Neither has she any claim against any The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from
portion of the estate because she is not a co- the fact that she is an adopted child of
owner thereof, and while she previously had an Francisca Mortera because under our law the
interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, relationship established by adoption is limited
she had already disposed of it long before the solely to the adopter and the adopted does not
execution of the will. extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or
of the adopted child except only as expressly
provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is
In the supposition that the will is denied probate,
created between the adopted and the collaterals
would the Oppositor acquire any interest in any
of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the
portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She
adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the
would acquire such right only if she were a legal
relatives of the adopter.
heir of the deceased, but she is not under our
Civil Code. It is true that Oppositor claims to be
an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera,
17
"The relationship established by the adoption, presence of the three instrumental witnesses
however, is limited to the adopting parent, and and the notary public; that it was the testatrix
does not extend to his other relatives, except as herself who asked her and the other witnesses
expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted to act as such; and that the testatrix was the first
child cannot be considered as a relative of the one to sign and later she gave the will to the
ascendants and collaterals of the adopting witnesses who read and signed it.
parents, nor of the legitimate children which they
may have after the adoption, except that the law
imposes certain impediments to marriage by Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the
reason of adoption. Neither are the children of testatrix since 1945; that it was the testatrix
the adopted considered as descendants of the herself who asked her to be a witness to the will;
adopter. The relationship created is exclusively that the testatrix was the first one to sign and
between the adopter and the adopted, and do she gave the will later to the witnesses to sign
not extend to the relatives of either." (Tolentino, and afterwards she gave it to the notary public;
Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. (652) that on the day of the execution of the will the
testatrix was in the best of health.
It thus appears that the Oppositor has no right to This evidence which has not been successfully
intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir refuted proves conclusively that the will was,
in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling duly executed because it was signed by the
of the court a quo. testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the
notary public in the manner provided for by law.
she really wanted to, from subsequently "x x x The authentication of a will decides no
revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact reflect other questions than such as touch upon the
and express her own testamentary dispositions. capacity of the testator and the compliance with
For, as testified to by the Oppositorand her those requisites or solemnities which the law
witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not
the Escolta, in Quiapo and in Sta. Cruz, Manila, determine nor even by implication prejudge the
walking and accompanied by no one. In fact, on validity or efficiency of the provisions; these may
different occasions, each of them was able to be impugned as being vicious or null,
talk with her." notwithstanding its authentication. The questions
relating to these points remain entirely
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will
We have examined the evidence on the matter has been authenticated. x x x
and we are fully in accord with the foregoing
observation. Moreover, the mere claim that
Josefina Mortera and her husband "From the fact that the legalization of a will does
Rene Teafico had the opportunity to exert not validate the provisions therein contained, it
pressure on the testatrix simply because she does not follow that such provisions lack of
lived in their house several years prior to the efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the
execution of the will and that she was old and law recognizes when they are not impugned by
suffering from hypertension in that she was anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental
virtually isolated from her friends for several doctrine that the will of the testator is the law
years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove governing the interested parties, and must be
what the instrumental witnesses had testified punctually complied with in so far as it is not
that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with contrary to the law or to public morals."
full consciousness of the solemnity of the (Montefiano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil., pp. 676, 679-
occasion executed the will under consideration. 680)
The exercise of improper pressure and undue
influence must be supported by substantial
evidence and must be of a kind that would "To establish conclusively as against everyone,
overpower and subjugate the mind of the and once for all, the facts that a will was
testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make executed with the formalities required by law and
her express the will of another rather than her that the testator was in a condition to make a
own (Coso vs. Deza, 42 Phil., 696). The burden will, is the only purpose of the proceedings
is on the person challenging the will that such under the new code for the probate of a
influence was exerted at the time of its will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such
execution, a matter which here was not done, for proceedings determines and can determine
the evidence presented not only is sufficient but nothing more. In them the court has no power to
was disproved by the testimony of the pass upon the validity of any provisions made in
instrumental witnesses. the will. It can not decide, for example, that a
certain legacy is void and another one
valid." Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426,
3. The question of whether the probate court 428)
could determine the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of a will has been decided by this
Court in a long line of decisions among which Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the
the following may be cited: pronouncement by the court a quo declaring
invalid the legacy made Dr. Rene Teofico in the
will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been
"Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another
the provision of the will cannot be entertained in reason why said pronouncement should be set
Probate proceeding because its only purpose is aside is that the legatee was not given an
merely to determine if the will has been opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy
executed in accordance with the requirements of for he was not allowed to intervene in this
the law." (Palacios v. Palacios, 58 O.G., p. 220) proceeding. As a corollary, the other
pronouncements, touching on the disposition of
the estate in favor of some relatives of the
19
deceased should also be set aside for the same possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all
reason. surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their
children.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of On top of this, there is the vital question of
Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the
own decision dated February 28, 1989, [5] the decree of adoption, years after it became final
respondent court disposed as follows: and executory. That was way back in 1967.
[7]
Assuming that the petitioners were proper
parties, what they should have done was
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. seasonably appeal the decree of adoption,
No. 11541), the appealed decision is pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified
hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CA- Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and
G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should
is MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson have done this earlier, before the decree of
are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of adoption was issued. They did not, although
the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of
Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects. such birth.
That judgment is now before us in this petition When Doribel was born on, February 27, 1967,
for review by certiorari. Reversal of the or about TEN (10) days before the issuance of
respondent court is sought on the ground that it the Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have
disregarded the evidence of the petitioners and notified the court about the fact of birth of
misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or
when it declared the private respondents as the perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for
exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. the revocation or rescission of the adoption
(although the birth of a child is not one of those
provided by law for the revocation or rescission
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia
of an adoption). The court is of the considered
and Edmundo were not legally adopted because
opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA
Doribel had already been born on February 27,
and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding
1967, when the decree of adoption was issued
and binding to the present, the same not having
on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel
been revoked or rescinded.
disqualified her parents from adopting. The
pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil
Code, naming among those who cannot adopt Not having any information of Doribel's birth to
"(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge
acknowledged natural children, or natural cannot be faulted for granting the petition for
children by legal fiction." adoption on the finding inter alia that the
adopting parents were not disqualified.
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that
Doribel herself is not the legitimate daughter of A no less important argument against the
Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of
Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in
guardianship of the child that she was her their action for partition, but in a direct
natural mother.[6] proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
The inconsistency of this position is immediately The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite
apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or
adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground not, cannot be questioned in a collateral
that Teodoro and Isabel already, had a proceeding, for a presumption arises in such
legitimate daughter at the time but in the same cases where the validity of the judgment is thus
breath try to demolish this argument by denying attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts
that Doribel was born to the couple. were proven (Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I,
Sec. 350, pp. 719-720). (Emphasis supplied.)
21
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso,[8] this Court line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, [11] where
declared: we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public
documents must be sustained in the absence of
strong, complete and conclusive proof of its
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 falsity or nullity."
American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption,
Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge
must fail is the impropriety of the present
An adoption order implies the finding of the proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's
necessary facts and the burden of proof is on legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint
the party attacking it; it cannot be considered for partition and accounting but in a direct action
void merely because the fact needed to show seasonably filed by the proper party.
statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial
determination of some particular fact, such as
the abandonment of his next of kin to the The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code
adoption, may be essential to the exercise of x x x does not have this purely evidential
jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this character. It serves a more fundamental
does not make it essential to the jurisdictional purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the
validity of the decree that the fact be determined child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot
upon proper evidence, or necessarily in be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the
accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot child can be impugned only in a direct action
affect the jurisdiction, and the determination brought for that purpose, by the proper parties,
must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence and within the period limited by law.
cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were not
the rule, the status of adopted children would
always be uncertain, since the evidence might The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested
not be the same at all investigations, and might by way of defense or as a collateral issue in
be regarded with different effect by different another action for a different purpose. x x x.
[12]
tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one (Emphasis supplied.)
court to have been valid, while another court
would hold it to have been of no avail.
In consequence of the above observations, we
(Emphasis supplied.)
hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the
that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the
the respondent court must be sustained. deceased couple, conformably to the following
Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of Article 979 of the Civil Code:
evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of
recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their
and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as
descendants succeed the parents and other
the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age,
offers only prima facie evidence[9] of filiation and
and even if they should come from different
may be refuted by contrary evidence. However,
marriages.
such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia
eventually to his children as a token of his love and Edmundo as the adopted children and
for them and as a provision for their continued Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
care even after he is gone from this earth. Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive
heirs and are under no obligation to share the
estate of their parents with the petitioners. The
Coming now to the right of representation, we Court of Appeals was correct, however, in
stress first the following pertinent provisions of holding that only Doribel has the right of
the Civil Code: representation in the inheritance of her
grandparents’ intestate estate, the other private
respondents being only the adoptive children of
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by
the deceased Teodoro.
fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the
the rights which the latter would have if he were challenged decision of the Court of Appeals
living or if he could have inherited. is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioners.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the
succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one
whom the person represented would have
succeeded.
their parents appearing on the document are gave birth to TCT No. 5761 over Lot 6409
forgeries. registered in the name of Asuncion Teves It-it is
questioned by the plaintiffs as spurious for the
following reasons:
In sum, plaintiffs argue that these fraudulent
documents which defendants rely in claiming
ownership to the disputed properties are all 1. Erasure of the word "quitclaim" is
nullities and have no force in law and could not superimposed with the word "sale" in
be used as basis for any legal title. handwriting.
Consequently, in their view, they are entitled to
the reliefs demanded particularly, to their
respective shares of the disputed properties.[8] 2. The consideration of "One peso" stated in the
document is intercalated with the word
"hundred" in handwriting.
The other property in dispute is Lot 6409 which
was originally covered by OCT No. 9091[9] and
was registered in the name of Joaquin Teves 3. The signature of Maria Teves Ochotorena,
and his two sisters, Matea and Candida Teves. Pedro Teves and Felicia Teves are forgeries.
However, Matea and Candida died without
issue, causing the entire property to pass to
4. The thumbmark imposed on the name of
Joaquin Teves. On December 14, 1971, Lot
Gorgonio Teves does not actually belong to
6409 was adjudicated and divided in equal
Gorgonio Teves who was an educated man and
shares in a "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement &
skilled in writing according to his daughter.
Sale"[10] executed by Joaquin Teves’ children -
Asuncion, Teotimo, Felisia, Gorgonio, Arcadia
and Maria Teves. In the same deed, the shares Aside from these defects which would make said
of these same heirs in Lot 6409 were sold to document null and void, Arcadia Teves who is
Asuncion Teves for P100.00. Asuncion Teves one of the living sisters of the mother of the
took possession of the land and acquired principal defendants although confirming the
title[11] over the same on March 22, 1972. After authenticity of her signature averred that in
her death in 1981, her children, defendants- reality no consideration was ever given to her
appellees It-it herein, extrajudicially settled and that her impression of the said document
Asuncion Teves’ property, adjudicating unto was that she was only giving her consent to sell
themselves Lot 6409.[12] On July 20, 1983 a new her share of the land.
transfer certificate of title[13] was issued in the
names of Asuncion Teves’ children, namely
Elisa, Susana, Norberto, Isaac, Jaime, Felicitas, Plaintiffs likewise contend that as regards the
Teresita, Corazon, and Danilo, all surnamed It-it. share of Ricardo Teves, son of Crescenciano
On July 2, 1984, the It-its sold Lot 6409 to Teves who predeceased Joaquin and Marcelina,
defendants-appellees Lucrecio Baylosis, Sr. and it was not at all affected in that extrajudicial
Pacita Nocete-Baylosis for P20,000.00 [14] and a settlement and sale since neither Crescenciano
transfer certificate of title[15]was issued in the Teves nor his son Ricardo Teves participated in
name of the Baylosis couple. its execution.
it was not only attended with bad faith on the presumption of validity accorded to such
part of both the vendor and the vendee but documents.[18]
primarily the vendor had no right at all to part
with said property which is legally owned by
others.[16] The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s
decision affirming the validity of the extrajudicial
statements, with a slight modification. It
In answer to plaintiffs-appellants’ charges of disposed of the case, thus -
fraud, defendants-appellees maintained that the
assailed documents were executed with all the
formalities required by law and are therefore WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
binding and legally effective as bases for decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
acquiring ownership or legal title over the lots in modification in that herein defendant-appellees
question. Furthermore, it is contended that are hereby ORDERED to partition Lot 769-A and
plaintiffs-appellants have slept on their rights deliver to plaintiff-appellant Ricardo Teves one-
and should now be deemed to have abandoned eight (sic) (1/8) portion thereof corresponding to
such rights.[17] the share of his deceased father Cresenciano
Teves. No costs.
was legally made, confers upon each heir the indubitably constitutes laches, which is the
exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated negligence or omission to assert a right within a
to him.[33] Although Cresenciano, Ricardo’s reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
predecessor-in-interest, was not a signatory to the party entitled to assert it either has
the extrajudicial settlements, the partition of Lot abandoned it or declined to assert it.[37] Thus,
769-A among the heirs was made in accordance even assuming that plaintiffs-appellants had a
with their intestate shares under the law.[34] defensible cause of action, they are barred from
pursuing the same by reason of their long and
inexcusable inaction.
With regards to the requisite of registration of
extrajudicial settlements, it is noted that the
extrajudicial settlements covering Lot 769-A An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is
were never registered. However, in the case a well-entrenched doctrine that the law does not
of Vda. de Reyes vs. CA,[35] the Court, relieve a party from the effects of a contract,
interpreting section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of entered into with all the required formalities and
Court, upheld the validity of an oral partition of with full awareness of what he was doing, simply
the decedent’s estate and declared that the non- because the contract turned out to be a foolish
registration of an extrajudicial settlement does or unwise investment.[38] Therefore, although
not affect its intrinsic validity. It was held in this plaintiffs-appellants may regret having alienated
case that – their hereditary shares in favor of their sister
Asuncion, they must now be considered bound
by their own contractual acts.
[t]he requirement that a partition be put in a
public document and registered has for its
purpose the protection of creditors and at the WHEREFORE, the August 18, 1992 decision of
same time the protection of the heirs themselves the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. No
against tardy claims. The object of registration is pronouncements as to costs.
to serve as constructive notice to others. It
follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition
not executed with the prescribed formalities SO ORDERED.
does not come into play when there are no
creditors or the rights of creditors are not
affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is
competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into
an agreement for distribution in a manner and
upon a plan different from those provided by law.
Unlike Pope Alexander VI[1] who, faced with the Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I,
impasse between Spain and Portugal, deftly and Federico filed a petition for visitation rights over
literally divided the exploration, or more his grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita,
appropriately, the riches of the New World by and Emilio II. Although the Juvenile and
issuing the Inter Caetera,[2] we are confronted Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City
with the difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale of granted the petition and allowed Federico one
another family imbroglio over the estate of a hour of visitation monthly, initially reduced to
decedent.[3] thirty minutes, it was altogether stopped
because of a manifestation filed by respondent
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the unwanted visits of her grandparents.
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 74949,[4] reversing the decision of Significantly, Federico, after the death of his
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, spouse, Cristina, or on September 27, 1993,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III
No. 117-M-95.[5] and Nenita.[7]
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts. On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration in her
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina favor, containing the following allegations:
Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr.
Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In [A]t the time of [the decedent's] death, [she] was
1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay a resident of the Municipality of Hagonoy,
(Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Province of Bulacan; that the [decedent] left an
Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was estate of real and personal properties, with a
survived by her husband, Federico, and several probable gross value of P29,000,000.00; that the
grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio names, ages and residences of the surviving
A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel heirs of the [decedent] are: (1) Federico C.
Cojuangco-Suntay. Suntay, 89 years old, surviving spouse and a
resident of x x x; (2) Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay,
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel 36 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a
Cojuangco, and they begot three children, resident of x x x; (3) Margarita Cojuangco-
namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; Suntay, 39 years old, legitimate granddaughter
and Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. and a resident of x x x; and (4) Emilio
Emilio I's marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was Cojuangco-Suntay, 35 years old, legitimate
subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had grandson and a resident of x x x; and that as far
two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita as [respondent] knew, the decedent left no debts
Suntay Tañedo (Nenita), by two different or obligation at the time of her death.[8]
women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel
Santos, respectively. Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his
grandchild, respondent Isabel, Federico filed his
Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he opposition on December 21, 1995, alleging,
was reared ever since he was a mere baby, nine among others, that:
months old, by the spouses Federico and
Cristina and was an acknowledged natural child [B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is
of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural capable of administering her estate and he
child of Emilio I and was likewise brought up by should be the one appointed as its administrator;
the spouses Federico and Cristina. that as part owner of the mass of conjugal
properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded
As previously adverted to, the marriage between legal preference in the administration thereof;
Emilio I and Isabel was annulled. that Isabel and her family had been alienated
[6]
Consequently, respondent and her siblings from their grandparents for more than thirty (30)
Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother years; that the enumeration of heirs in the
on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately from petition was incomplete as it did not mention the
their father and paternal grandparents. other children of his son[,] namely: Emilio III and
Nenita S. Tañedo; that he is better situated to
30
protect the integrity of the estate of Cristina as Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay,
even before the death of his wife[,] he was III is hereby appointed administrator of the
already the one who managed their conjugal estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo
properties; that the probable value of the estate Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of
as stated in the petition was grossly overstated his trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount
(sic); and that Isabel's allegation that some of of P200,000.00, conditioned as follows:
the properties are in the hands of usurpers is
untrue.[9] (1) To make and return within three (3) months,
a true and complete inventory;
Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties
to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico (2) To administer the estate and to pay and
filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, discharge all debts, legatees, and charge on the
nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as same, or dividends thereon;
administrator of the decedent's estate on his
behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as the (3) To render a true and just account within one
one with a better right to the letters of (1) year, and at any other time when required by
administration. the court, and
Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio III's (4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Motion for Leave to Intervene considering his
interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III Once the said bond is approved by the court, let
filed his Opposition-In-Intervention, which Letters of Administration be issued in his favor.
essentially echoed the allegations in his
grandfather's opposition, alleging that Federico, SO ORDERED.[11]
or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped
than respondent to administer and manage the Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the
estate of the decedent, Cristina. Additionally, CA, which reversed and set aside the decision of
Emilio III averred his own qualifications that: the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration
"[he] is presently engaged in aquaculture and issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as
banking; he was trained by the decedent to work administratrix of the intestate estate of the
in his early age by involving him in the activities decedent, Cristina, to wit:
of the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation which was
established in 1979 in memory of her WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
grandmother's father; the significant work assailed decision dated November 9, 2001 of
experiences outside the family group are Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
included in his curriculum vitae; he was Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED
employed by the oppositor [Federico] after his and SET ASIDE and the letters of administration
graduation in college with management degree issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay
at F.C.E. Corporations and Hagonoy Rural III, if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner
Bank; x x x."[10] Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is hereby appointed
administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina
In the course of the proceedings, on November Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration
13, 2000, Federico died. be issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in
the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
After the testimonies of both parties' witnesses (P200,000.00) Pesos.
were heard and evidence on their respective
allegations were adduced, the trial court No pronouncement as to costs.
rendered a decision on November 9, 2001,
appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as SO ORDERED.[12]
administrator of decedent Cristina's intestate
estate, to wit: The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III
having been denied, he appeals by certiorari to
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel this Court, raising the following issues:
Cojuangco[-]Suntay is DENIED and the
Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED. A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE UNDER
31
SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF the benefit of the estate and its claimants,
COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE creditors, as well as heirs, the administrator
CIVIL CODE APPLIES; and should be one who is prepared, academically
and by experience, for the demands and
B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE responsibilities of the position. While
HEREIN PETITIONER WAS REARED BY THE [respondent], a practicing physician, is not
DECEDENT AND HER SPOUSE SINCE unqualified, it is clear to the court that when it
INFANCY, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE comes to management of real estate and the
NEW CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO BAR processing and payment of debts, [Emilio III], a
HIM FROM BEING APPOINTED businessman with an established track record as
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE DECEDENT'S a manager has a decided edge and therefore, is
ESTATE.[13] in a position to better handle the preservation of
the estate.[14]
In ruling against the petition of herein
respondent, the RTC ratiocinated, thus: In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio
III's status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and,
Evidence objectively assessed and carefully thus, barred from representing his deceased
evaluated, both testimonial and documentary, father in the estate of the latter's legitimate
the court opines that it is to the best interest of mother, the decedent. On the whole, the CA
the estate of the decedent and all claimants pronounced that Emilio III, who was merely
thereto, that the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay nominated by Federico, and which nomination
III, be appointed administrator of the estate in hinged upon the latter's appointment as
the above-entitled special proceedings. administrator of the decedent's estate, cannot be
appointed as the administrator of the decedent's
Based on the evidence and demeanor of the estate for the following reasons:[15]
parties in court, [respondent's immediate] family
and that of the decedent are apparently 1. The appointment of Emilio III was
estranged. The root cause of which, is not for subject to a suspensive condition, i.e.,
this court to ascertain nor is this the right time Federico's appointment as administrator
and the proper forum to dwell upon. What of the estate, he being the surviving
matters most at this time is the welfare of the spouse of Cristina, the decedent. The
estate of the decedent in the light of such death of Federico before his
unfortunate and bitter estrangement. appointment as administrator of
Cristina's estate rendered his
The Court honestly believes that to appoint the nomination of Emilio III inoperative;
petitioner would go against the wishes of the
decedent who raised [Emilio III] from infancy in
her home in Baguio City as her own child. 2. As between the legitimate offspring
Certainly, it would go against the wishes of the (respondent) and illegitimate offspring
surviving spouse x x x who nominated [Emilio III] (Emilio III) of decedent's son, Emilio I,
for appointment as administrator. respondent is preferred, being the "next
of kin" referred to by Section 6, Rule 78
As between [respondent] and the oppositor of the Rules of Court, and entitled to
[Federico], the latter is accorded preference as share in the distribution of Cristina's
the surviving spouse under Sec 6(a), Rule 78, estate as an heir;
Rules of Court. On the basis of such preference,
he vigorously opposed the appointment of the
petitioner and instead nominated [Emilio III], his 3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that
grandchild and adopted child. Such nomination, Article 992[16] of the Civil Code bars the
absent any valid and justifiable reason, should illegitimate child from inheriting ab
not be imperiously set aside and insouciantly intestato from the legitimate children
ignored, even after the oppositor [Federico] has and relatives of his father or mother.
passed away, in order to give effect to the order Thus, Emilio III, who is barred from
of preference mandated by law. Moreover, from inheriting from his grandmother, cannot
the viewpoint of the estate, the nomination of be preferred over respondent in the
[Emilio III] appear[s] intrinsically meritorious. For administration of the estate of their
32
principal creditors, if competent and willing to decedent, was actually treated by the decedent
serve; and her husband as their own son, reared from
infancy, educated and trained in their
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and businesses, and eventually legally adopted by
willing to serve, it may be granted to such other decedent's husband, the original oppositor to
person as the court may select. respondent's petition for letters of administration.
However, the order of preference is not absolute We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists
for it depends on the attendant facts and of a conflict and a lacuna in the law concerning
circumstances of each case.[19] Jurisprudence the bone of contention that is Article 992 of the
has long held that the selection of an Civil Code, beginning with the eminent Justice
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the J.B.L. Reyes:
trial court.[20] In the main, the attendant facts and
circumstances of this case necessitate, at the In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of
least, a joint administration by both respondent representation was admitted only within the
and Emilio III of their grandmother's, Cristina's, legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of
estate. that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child
can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals,[21] we children and relatives of his father and mother.
upheld the appointment by the trial court of a co- The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently
administration between the decedent's son and adhered to this principle since it reproduced
the decedent's brother, who was likewise a Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art.
creditor of the decedent's estate. In the same 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent
vein, we declared in Delgado Vda. de De la articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the
Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass
Damian[22] that: to his own descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from
principal consideration is the interest in the representing him in the intestate succession of
estate of the one to be appointed. The order of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an
preference does not rule out the appointment of illegitimate child can now do so. This difference
co-administrators, specially in cases where being indefensible and unwarranted, in the
justice and equity demand that opposing parties future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to
or factions be represented in the management of make a choice and decide either that the
the estates, a situation which obtains here. illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of
representation, in which case Art. 992 must be
Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article
the succession other putative heirs, including and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first
another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and solution would be more in accord with an
Federico, Nenita Tañedo, but who was likewise enlightened attitude vis-à-vis illegitimate
adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of children.[23]
respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all,
considering the conflicting claims of the putative Manresa explains the basis for the rules on
heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership intestate succession:
of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their
respective estates, we are impelled to move in The law [of intestacy] is founded... on the
only one direction, i.e., joint administration of the presumed will of the deceased... Love, it is said,
subject estate. first descends, then ascends, and, finally,
spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls the
One final note. Counsel for petitioner descendants, then the ascendants, and finally
meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil the collaterals, always preferring those closer in
Code, the successional bar between the degree to those of remoter degrees, on the
legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a assumption that the deceased would have done
decedent, does not apply in this instance where so had he manifested his last will... Lastly, in
facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary - default of anyone called to succession or bound
Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the to the decedent by ties of blood or affection, it is
34
in accordance with his presumed will that his payment of said obligations within such time as
property be given to charitable or educational the court directs.
institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of
humanity.[24] WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
accurately reflect the basis of intestate Letters of Administration over the estate of
succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue
decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and
her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon
Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, payment by each of a bond to be set by the
legally raised the status of Emilio III from an Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos,
illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-
child. The peculiar circumstances of this case, M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
painstakingly pointed out by counsel for Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a
petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in determination and to declare the heirs of
Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according
animosity and antagonism between legitimate to the actual factual milieu as proven by the
and illegitimate descendants of a deceased. parties, and all other persons with legal interest
in the subject estate. It is further directed to
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-
restraint impels us to refrain from making a final Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
declaration of heirship and distributing the
presumptive shares of the parties in the estates SO ORDERED.
of Cristina and Federico, considering that the
question on who will administer the properties of
the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
G.R. No. 66574, June 17, 1987
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata[25] on the
same issue remains good law:
ANSELMA DIAZ, GUARDIAN OF VICTOR,
[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower RODRIGO, ANSELMINA AND MIGUEL, ALL
court is premature, although the evidence SURNAMED SANTERO, PETITIONERS, AND
sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed FELIXBERTA PACURSA, GUARDIAN OF
the deceased. The estate had hardly been FEDERICO SANTERO, ET AL., VS.
judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND
yet reached the stage of distribution of the estate FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, RESPONDENTS.
which must come after the inheritance is
liquidated. DECISION
"a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 - is the Petition for for the "WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from
Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate not consistent with the facts and law applicable,
of Pablo Santero; the same is hereby set aside and another one
"b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 - is the Petition for the entered sustaining the Orders of December 1
Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole
of Pascual Santero; heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and
"c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 - is the Petition for ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in
Guardianship over the properties of an the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in
Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."
de Santero; "Costs against the oppositors-appellees."
"e) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 - is the Petition for The Motion for Reconsideration filed
Settlement of the Intestate Estate by oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) was
of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." denied by the same respondent court in its order
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. dated February 17, 1984 hence, the present
Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5, was allowed to petition for Review with the following:
intervene in the intestate estates of
Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of
the Court dated August 24, 1977. ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
36
I. The Decision erred in ignoring said provision of the New Civil Code modifies
the right to intestate succession of the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and
petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct recognizes the right of representation (Art. 970)
descending line (Art. 978) and/or to descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate
natural/"illegitimate children" (Art. 988) and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied
and prefering a niece, who is a collateral relative illegitimate children the right to represent their
(Art. 1003); deceased parents and inherit from their
II. The Decision erred in denying the deceased grandparents, but that Rule was
right of representation of the natural expressly changed and/or amended by Art. 990
grandchildren Santero to represent their father New Civil Code which expressly grants the ille-
Pablo Santero in the succession to the intestate gitimate children the right to represent their
estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of
de Santero (Art. 982); their grandmother, (Simona Pamuti)"[5]
III. The Decision erred in mistaking
the intestate estate of the
grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the
the estate of "legitimate child or relative" of hereditary conflict refers solely to the intestate
Pablo Santero, her son and father of the peti- estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who
tioners grandchildren Santero; is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the
IV. The Decision erred in ruling that applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the
petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin who is Civil Code which reads as follows:
a niece and therefore a collateral relative
of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero excludes the
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to
natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
are her
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
direct descendants and/or grand children;
such children or relatives inherit in the same
V. The Decision erred in applying Art.
manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990 are the
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an
applicable provisions of law on intestate
illegitimate child. On the other hand,
succession; and
the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the
VI. The Decision erred in considering
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
the orders of December 1 and December 9,
1976 which are provisional and interlocutory as
final and executory. Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
as follows- who are the legal heirs absolutely a succession ab intestato between
of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero- her the illegitimate child and the legitimate children
niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren and relatives of the father or mother of said
(the natural children of Pablo Santero)? legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of
blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purposes of Art. 992. Between the legitimate
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate
family and the illegitimate family there is
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
the issue here is whether oppositors-
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
children of Pablo Santero could inherit
family; the family is in turn, hated by the
from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of
illegitimate child; the latter considers the
representation of their father Pablo Santero who
privileged condition of the former, and the
is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda.
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
de Santero.
former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child
nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence
Now then what is the appropriate law on the of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more
matter? Petitioners contend in their pleadings than recognize this truth, by avoiding further
that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the grounds of resentment.[6]
applicable law on the case. They contend that
37
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the
father Pablo Santero in the succession of the late Simona Pamuti Vda.
latter to the intestate estate of his legitimate de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six
mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, minor natural or illegitimate children of
because of the barrier provided for under Art. Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are
992 of the New Civil Code. barred by the provisions of Article 992, the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not
commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-
In answer to the erroneous contention of Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the
petitioners that Article 941 of the Spanish Civil intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda.
Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil de Santero.
Code, We are reproducing herewith the
Reflections of the illustrious Hon. Justice Jose
B.L. Reyes which also finds full support from Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent
other civilists, to wit: Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling that
the Orders of the Court a quo dated December
1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 are final
"In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of and executory. Such contention is without
representation was admitted only within the merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order
legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of dated December 1, 1976 held that
that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not
can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate entitled to intervene and hence not allowed to
children and relatives of his father and intervene in the proceedings for the declaration
mother. The Civil Code of of the heirship in the intestate estate
the Philippines apparently adhered to this of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Subse-
principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the quently, Judge Jose Raval issued an Order,
Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine dated December 9, 1976, which
inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole
and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. The said
of the illegitimate child to pass to his own des- Orders were never made the subjects of either a
cendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So motion for reconsideration or a perfected
that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue appeal. Hence, said orders which long became
of a legitimate child from representing him in the final and executory are already removed from
intestate succession of the grandparent, the the power of jurisdiction of the lower court to
illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do decide anew. The only power retained by the
so. This difference being indefensible and lower court, after a judgment has become final
unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil and executory is to order its execution. The
Code we shall have to make a choice and respondent Court did not err therefore in ruling
decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in that the Order of the Court a quo dated May 30,
all cases the right of representation, in which 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin as intestate
case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda.
contrariwise maintain said article and modify de Santero "is clearly a total reversal of an Order
Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be which has become final and executory, hence
more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis- null and void."
a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the
Reform of Hereditary succession, JOURNAL of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby
First Quater, 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40- DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is hereby
41). AFFIRMED.
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New
Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother" SO ORDERED.
includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the
word "relative" includes all the kindred of the
person spoken of.[7] The record shows that from
the commencement of this case the only parties G.R. No. 84240, March 25, 1992
38
Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement On April 29, 1988, the respondent Court of
made by the oppositors, that they are not among Appeals rendered its decision the dispositive
the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres part of which reads:
Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
"This Compromise Agreement shall be without Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
prejudice to the continuation of the above-
entitled proceedings until the final determination
thereof by the court, or by another compromise After all the requirements had been filed, the
agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia case was given due course.
Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of
the deceased, Don Andres Pascual." (Rollo, p.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar
108)
is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of
The said Compromise Agreement had been
the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude
entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of
recognized natural children from the inheritance
the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes
of the deceased.
Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the
intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their
uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112). Petitioners contend that they do not fall
squarely within the purview of Article 992 and of
the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their
645 [1987]) because being acknowledged
Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp.
natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to
113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of
the subsistence of a prior marriage when such
Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp.
children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).
116-130).
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall "Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of
such children or relatives inherit in the same successional rights of illegitimate children, which
manner from the illegitimate child." rights are transmitted to their descendants upon
The issue in the case at bar, had already been their death. The descendants (of these
laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of
Court ruled that: the right of representation may be legitimate or
illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not
overlook the fact that the persons to be
"Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier represented are themselves illegitimate. The
or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a three named provisions are very clear on this
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate matter. The right of representation is not
child and the legitimate children and relatives of available to illegitimate descendants
the father or mother of said legitimate child. of legitimate children in the inheritance of a
They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as
not recognized by law for the purposes of Article done by petitioners, that the illegitimate
992. Between the legitimate family and descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to
illegitimate family there is presumed to be an represent by virtue of the provisions of Article
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The 982, which provides that ‘the grandchildren and
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down other descendants shall inherit by right of
upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn representation.' Such a conclusion is erroneous.
hated by the illegitimate child; the latter It would allow intestate succession by an
considers the privileged condition of the former, illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his
and the resources of which it is thereby father or mother, a situation which would set at
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, is inapplicable to the instant case because
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the Article 992 prohibits
law does no more than recognize this truth, by absolutely a succession ab intestato between
avoiding further grounds of resentment." the illegitimate child and the legitimate children
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners and relatives of the father or mother. It may not
are his illegitimate children. be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule
and Article 992 the exception.
"The rules laid down in Article 982 that
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar,
'grandchildren and other descendants shall
respondent IAC did not err in holding that
inherit by right of representation' and in Article
petitioners herein cannot represent their father
902 that the rights of illegitimate children x x x
Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to
are transmitted upon their death to their
the intestate estate of the decedent Andres
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate
Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article
992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
Article 992 in the light of Articles 902 and 989 of children and relatives of his father or mother."
the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice
to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v.
estate of Don Andres Pascual. Intermediate Apellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp.
431-432; [1990]).
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in the petitioner may be more humane but it is also
Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated the an elementary rule in statutory construction that
successional rights of illegitimate children, which when the words and phrases of the statute are
squarely answers the questions raised by the clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
petitioner on this point. determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it
says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759
The Court held: [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the
probable intent of the legislature apart from the
words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]).
41
de pruebas previa a la declaracion de quienes On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed
son los herederos legales o abintestato del an agreement for the settlement and physical
difunto". partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court
approved that agreement and noted that the
1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified.
The probate court in its order of December 26, That did not set at rest the controversy over the
1946 approved the project of partition. It held Yangco estate.
that in certain clauses of the will the testator
intended to conserve his properties not in the
sense of disposing of them after his death but for On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole
the purpose of preventing that "tales bienes heir of Juanita Corpus, filed an action in the
fuesen malgastados o desfilparrados por los Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her
legatarios" and that if the testator intended a supposed share in Yangco's intestate estate. He
perpetual prohibition against alienation, that alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in
condition would be regarded "como no puesta o Yangco's will imposing perpetual prohibitions
no existente". It concluded that "no hay motivos upon alienation rendered it void under article
legales o morales para que la sucesion de Don 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949
Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada intestada." partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's
(See Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which estate should be distributed according to the
cites article 785 of the Spanish Civil Code as rules on intestacy.
prohibiting perpetual entails, and Rodriguez vs.
Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 546.) The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956
dismissed the action on the grounds of res
judicata and laches. It held that the intrinsic
From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in its
Castro, Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the order dated December 26, 1946 in Special
estate of Luis R. Yangco appealed to this Court Proceeding No. 54863 approving the project of
(L-1476). Those appeals were dismissed in this partition for the testator's estate.
Court's resolutions of October 10 and 31, 1947
after the legatees and the appellants entered
into compromise agreements. In the Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals
compromise dated October 7, 1947 the legatees which in its resolution dated January 23, 1964 in
agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the CA-G. R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to
heirs of Pio V. Corpus, the heirs of Isabel this Court because it involves real property
Corpus and the heirs of Juanita Corpus. Herein valued at more than fifty thousand pesos (Sec.
appellant Tomas Corpus signed that 17[5], Judiciary Law before it was amended by
compromise settlement as the sole heir of Republic Act No. 2613).
Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R. Yangco
entered into a similar compromise agreement.
Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that
As the resolutions dismissing the appeals
the trial court erred in holding (1) that Teodoro
became final and executory on October 14 and
R. Yangco was a natural child, (2) that his will
November 4, 1947, entries of judgment were
had been duly legalized, and (3) that plaintiff's
made on those dates.
action is barred by res judicata and laches.
To answer that question, it is necessary to is disputably presumed "that a man and woman
ascertain Yangco's filiation. The trial court found deporting themselves as husband and wife have
that Yangco's "a su muerte tambien le sobre entered into a lawful contract of marriage"; "that
vivieron Luis y Paz appellidados Yangco, a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no
hermanos naturales reconocidos por su padre divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is
natural Luis R. Yangco". The basis of the trial legitimate", and "that things have happened
court's conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was according to the ordinary course of nature and
an acknowledged natural child and not a the ordinary habits of life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb] and
legitimate child was the statement in the will of [cc], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June 14,
1907, that Teodoro and his three other children
were his acknowledged natural children. His Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged
exact words are: natural child or was illegitimate and since
Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose
Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that
appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action
"Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos for the recovery of the supposed hereditary
naturales reconocidos, llamados Teodoro Paz, share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal
Luisa y Luis, los cuales son mis unicos heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not
herederos forzosos." (Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of a legal heir of Yangco because there is no
Teodoro Yangco). reciprocal succession between legitimate and
illegitimate relatives. The trial court did not err in
dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus.
That will was attested by Rafael del Pan,
Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus and Florencio
Gonzales Diez. Article 943 of the old Civil Code provides that "el
hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen derecho a
suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes
Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of legitimos del padre o madre que lo haya
the will of Luis R. Yangco, identified as Exhibit 1 reconocido, ni ellos al hijo natural ni al
herein, which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all successory
20, as found in the record on appeal in Special reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and
Proceeding No. 54863. He contends that it illegitimate relatives" (6 Sanchez Roman, Civil
should not prevail over the presumption of Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs.
legitimacy found in section 69, Rule 123 of the Aguas, 63 Phil. 279, 287. See 16 Scaevola,
old Rules of Court and over the statement of Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 455-6).
Samuel W. Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R.
Yangco, that Luis Rafael Yangco made a
second marital venture with Victoria Obin, Appellant Corpus concedes that if Teodoro R.
implying that he had a first marital venture with Yangco was a natural child, he (Tomas Corpus)
Ramona Arguelles, the mother of Teodoro. would have no legal personality to intervene in
the distribution of Yangco's estate (p. 8,
appellant's brief).
These contentions have no merit. The
authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as
reproduced in Exhibit 1 herein and as copied The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992
from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the probate of the Civil Code which provides that "an
of Teodoro R. Yangco's will, is incontestable. illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
The said will is part of a public or official judicial intestato from the legitimate children and
record. relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child".
On the other hand, the children of Ramona
Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to
be legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have That rule is based on the theory that the
taken place between Ramona and illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by
Tomas. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. It the legitimate family while the legitimate family
44
"(f) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and After hearing on the merits, the trial court
James Bracewell to pay jointly and severally rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the
plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo the amount of dispositive portion of which was earlier quoted,
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees; finding the evidence of the private respondent
insufficient to prove ownership of the properties
in suit. From said judgment, private respondents
"(g) Ordering defendants to pay the costs; and appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as
already stated, reversed the decision of the trial
court, thereby dismissing petitioner's complaint.
"(h) Dismissing defendants' counterclaim."[1]
Reconsideration having been denied by the
appellate court, this petition for review was filed
From the record, it appears that Francisca on the following assignment of errors:
Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was
survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and
I
Silvestra Cailles, and a grandson, Sotero
Leonardo, the son of her daughter, Pascuala
Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo "RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 THAT THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION ARE
without any issue. THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano
Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late II
Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership
of properties, sum of money and accounting in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking "RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED
heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled HIS FILIATION.
to one-half share in the estate of said deceased
jointly with defendant, private respondent herein,
Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by III
said Francisca Reyes, described in the
complaint, partitioned between him and
"RESPONDENT COURT ERRED HOLDING
defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an
THAT PETITIONER, AS THE GREAT
accounting of all the income derived from said
GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA REYES, HAS NO
properties from the time defendants took
LEGAL RIGHT TO INHERIT BY
possession thereof until said accounting shall
REPRESENTATION."
have been made, delivering to him his share
therein with legal interest.
To begin with, the Court of Appeals found the
subject properties to be the exclusive properties
Answering the complaint, private respondent
of the private respondents.
Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over
the subject properties and alleged that petitioner
is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by "There being two properties in this case both will
right of representation. For his part, the other be discussed separately, as each has its own
defendant, private respondent James Bracewell, distinct factual setting. The first was bought in
claimed that said properties are now his by 1908 by Maria Cailles under a deed of sale (Exh.
virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale which '60'), which describes it as follows:
Maria Cailles had subsequently executed in his
favor. These properties were allegedly
mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of
Parañaque, Inc. sometime in September 1963.
46
'. . . radicada en la calle Desposorio de este and 1917, are the same as the properties sought
dicho Municipio dentro de los limites y linderos by the plaintiff.
siquientes: Por la derecha a la entrada el solar
de Teodorico Reyes por la izquierda el solar de
Maria Calesa (Cailles) arriba citada por la "Carefully going over the evidence, We believe
espalda la via ferrea del Railroad Co., y la frente that the trial judge misinterpreted the evidence
la dicha calle Desposorio' as to the identification of the lands in question.
"After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles "To begin with, the deed of sale (Exh. '60’) of
paid the realty taxes starting from 1918 up to 1908 clearly states that the land sold to Maria
1948. Thereafter as she and her son Narciso Cailles is 'en la calle Desposorio' in Las Piñas,
Bracewell, left for Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes Rizal which was bounded by adjoining lands
managed the property and paid the realty tax of owned by persons living at the time, including
the land. However, for unexplained reasons, she the railroad track of the Manila Railroad Co. ('la
paid and declared the same in her own name. via ferrea del Railroad Co.’).
Because of this, plaintiff decided to run after this
property, erroneously thinking that as the great
"With the exception of the area which was not
grandson of Francisca Reyes, he had some
disclosed in the deed, the description fits the
proprietary right over the same.
land now being sought by the plaintiff, as this
property is also located in Desposorio St. and is
"The second parcel on the other hand, was bounded by the M.R.R. Co.
purchased by Maria Cailles in 1917 under a
deed of sale (Exh. '3') which describes the
"With these natural boundaries, there is indeed
property as follows:
an assurance that the property described in the
deed and in the tax declaration is one and the
'. . . una parcela de terreno destinado al same property.
beneficio de la sal, que linda por Norte con la
linea Ferrea y Salinar de Narciso Mayuga, por
"The change of owners of the adjoining lands is
Este con los de Narciso Mayuga y Domingo
immaterial since several decades have already
Lozada, por Sur con los de Domingo Lozada y
passed between the deed and the declaration
Fruto Silverio y por Oeste con el de Fruto
and 'during that period, many changes of abode
Silverio y Linea Ferrea, de una extension
would likely have occurred.'
superficial de 1229.00 metros cuadrados.'
the present petition is one for review on showing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in
certiorari, only questions of law may be raised. It the birth certificate is no other than he himself.
is a well-established rule laid down by this Court Thus, even without taking time and space to go
in numerous cases that findings of facts by the into further details, We may safely conclude that
Court of Appeals are generally, final and plaintiff failed to prove his filiation which is a
conclusive upon this Court. The exceptions are: fundamental requisite in this action where he is
(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in
entirely on speculation; (2) when the inference question."[4]
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a That is likewise a factual finding which may not
misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the be disturbed in this petition for review in the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went absence of a clear showing that said finding is
beyond the issues of the case and the same are not supported by substantial evidence, or that
contrary to the submission of both appellant and there was a grave abuse of discretion on the
appellee.[3] None of the above exceptions, part of the court making the finding of fact.
however, exists in the case at bar, hence, there
is no reason to disturb the findings of facts of the
Referring to the third assignment of error, even if
Court of Appeals.
it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero
Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of
Anent the second assignment of error, the Court representation, claim a share of the estate left by
of Appeals made the following findings: the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that,
as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was
born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that
"Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims when he was born on September 13, 1938, his
that he is the son of Sotero Leonardo, the son of alleged putative father and mother were not yet
one of the daughters (Pascuala) of Francisca married, and what is more, his alleged father's
Reyes. He further alleges that since Pascuala first marriage was still subsisting. At most,
predeceased Francisca Reyes, and that his petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has
father, Sotero, who subsequently died in 1944, no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
survived Francisca Reyes, plaintiff can children and relatives of his father, like the
consequently succeed to the estate of Francisca deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil
Reyes by right of representation. Code of the Philippines.)
"In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
evidence his alleged birth certificate showing Appeals sought to be reviewed in this petition is
that his father is Sotero Leonardo, married to hereby affirmed, with costs against the
Socorro Timbol, his alleged mother. petitioner.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES REMEDIOS R. dated January 13, 1995, approving the Receipt
SANDEJAS AND ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS of Earnest Money With Promise to Buy and Sell
SR. -- ROBERTO R. SANDEJAS, ANTONIO R. dated June 7, 1982, only to the three-fifth (3/5)
SANDEJAS, CRISTINA SANDEJAS portion of the disputed lots covering the share of
MORELAND, BENJAMIN R. SANDEJAS, [A]dministrator Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. [in] the
REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS; AND HEIRS OF property. The intervenor is hereby directed to
SIXTO S. SANDEJAS II, RAMON R. pay appellant the balance of the purchase price
SANDEJAS, TERESITA R. SANDEJAS, AND of the three-fifth (3/5) portion of the property
ELIODORO R. SANDEJAS JR., ALL within thirty (30) days from receipt of this [O]rder
REPRESENTED BY ROBERTO R. and x x x the administrator [is directed] to
SANDEJAS, PETITIONERS, VS. ALEX A. execute the necessary and proper deeds of
LINA, RESPONDENT. conveyance in favor of appellee within thirty (30)
days thereafter."
DECISION The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration
of the foregoing disposition.
xxxxxxxxx
50
`3. `5.
letters of administration [and] (2) to consolidate "On August 28, 1986, heirs Sixto, Roberto,
instant case with SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601 Antonio and Benjamin, all surnamed Sandejas,
RTC-Branch XI-Manila, docketed therein as SP. and heirs [sic] filed a [M]otion for
Proc. No. 85-33707 entitled `IN RE: INTESTATE [R]econsideration and the appointment of
ESTATE OF ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS, SR., another administrator Mr. Sixto Sandejas, in lieu
ALEX A. LINA PETITIONER", [for letters of of [I]ntervenor Alex A. Lina stating among others
administration] (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85- that it [was] only lately that Mr. Sixto Sandejas, a
33707, pp. 1-7). On November 29, 1985, Branch son and heir, expressed his willingness to act as
XXXVI of the Regional Trial Court of Manila a new administrator of the intestate estate of his
issued an [O]rder consolidating SP. Proc. No. mother, Remedios R. Sandejas (Record, SP.
85-33707, with SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601 Proc. No. 85-33707, pp. 29-31). On October 2,
(Record, SP. Proc. No.85-33707, p. 13). 1986, Intervenor Alex A. Lina filed his
Likewise, on December 13, 1985, the Regional [M]anifestation and [C]ounter [M]otion alleging
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, issued an that he ha[d] no objection to the appointment of
[O]rder stating that `this Court has no objection Sixto Sandejas as [a]dministrator of the
to the consolidation of Special Proceedings No. [i]ntestate [e]state of his mother Remedios R.
85-331707, now pending before Branch XXXVI Sandejas (Sp. Proc. No. 85-15601), provided
of this Court, with the present proceedings now that Sixto Sandejas be also appointed as
pending before this Branch' (Record, SP. Proc. administrator of the [i]ntestate [e]state of his
No. R-83-15601, p. 279). father, Eliodoro P. Sandejas, Sr. (Spec. Proc.
No. 85-33707), which two (2) cases have been
"On January 15, 1986, Intervenor Alex A. Lina consolidated (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707,
filed [a] Motion for his appointment as a new pp. 34-36). On March 30, 1987, the lower court
administrator of the Intestate Estate of granted the said [M]otion and substituted Alex
Remedios R. Sandejas on the following reasons: Lina with Sixto Sandejas as petitioner in the said
`5.01. FIRST, as of this date, [i]ntervenor has not [P]etitions (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707,
received any motion on the part of the heirs p.52). After the payment of the administrator's
Sixto, Antonio, Roberto and Benjamin, all bond (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 348-
surnamed Sandejas, for the appointment of a 349) and approval thereof by the court (Record,
new [a]dministrator in place of their father, Mr. SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 361), Administrator
Eliodoro P. Sandejas, Sr.; Sixto Sandejas on January 16, 1989 took his
oath as administrator of the estate of the
`5.02. SECOND, since Sp. Proc. 85-33707, deceased Remedios R. Sandejas and Eliodoro
wherein the [p]etitioner is herein Intervenor Alex P. Sandejas (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601,
A. Lina and the instant Sp. PROC. R-83-15601, p. 367) and was likewise issued Letters of
in effect are already consolidated, then the Administration on the same day (Record, SP.
appointment of Mr. Alex Lina as [a]dministrator Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 366).
of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas
in instant Sp. Proc. R-83-15601, would be "On November 29, 1993, Intervenor filed [an]
beneficial to the heirs and also to the Intervenor; Omnibus Motion (a) to approve the deed of
conditional sale executed between Plaintiff-in-
`5.03. THIRD, of course, Mr. Alex A. Lina would Intervention Alex A. Lina and Elidioro [sic]
be willing to give way at anytime to any Sandejas, Sr. on June 7, 1982; (b) to compel the
[a]dministrator who may be proposed by the heirs of Remedios Sandejas and Eliodoro
heirs of the deceased Remedios R. Sandejas, Sandejas, Sr. thru their administrator, to execute
so long as such [a]dministrator is qualified.' a deed of absolute sale in favor of [I]ntervenor
(Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 281- Alex A. Lina pursuant to said conditional deed of
283) sale (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 554-
"On May 15, 1986, the lower court issued an 561) to which the administrator filed a [M]otion to
order granting the [M]otion of Alex A. Lina as the [D]ismiss and/or [O]pposition to said omnibus
new [a]dministrator of the Intestate Estate of motion on December 13, 1993 (Record, SP.
Remedios R. Sandejas in this proceedings. Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 591-603).
(Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 288-
290) "On January 13, 1995, the lower court rendered
the questioned order granting intervenor's
[M]otion for the [A]pproval of the Receipt of
52
Earnest Money with promise to buy between found to be in the nature of a contract to sell -
Plaintiff-in-Intervention Alex A. Lina and Eliodoro where the suspensive condition set forth therein
Sandejas, Sr. dated June 7, 1982 (Record, SP. [i.e.] court approval, was not complied with;
Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 652-654). x x x."
The Order of the intestate court [5] disposed as "b) Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. was
follows: guilty of bad faith despite the conclusion of the
"WHEREFORE, [i]ntervenor's motion for the Court of Appeals that the respondent [bore] the
approval of the Receipt Of Earnest Money With burden of proving that a motion for authority to
Promise To Sell And To Buy dated June 7, sell ha[d] been filed in court;
1982, is granted. The [i]ntervenor is directed to
pay the balance of the purchase price amounting "c) Whether or not the undivided shares of
to P729,000.00 within thirty (30) days from Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. in the subject property
receipt of this Order and the Administrator is is three-fifth (3/5) and the administrator of the
directed to execute within thirty (30) days latter should execute deeds of conveyance
thereafter the necessary and proper deeds of therefor within thirty days from receipt of the
conveyancing."[6] balance of the purchase price from the
Ruling of the Court of Appeals respondent; and
Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the "d) Whether or not the respondent's petition-in-
contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and intervention was converted to a money claim
respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a and whether the [trial court] acting as a probate
perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the court could approve the sale and compel the
ownership of the four lots was to remain in the petitioners to execute [a] deed of conveyance
intestate estate of Remedios Sandejas until the even for the share alone of Eliodoro P. Sandejas
approval of the sale was obtained from the Sr."[9]
settlement court. That approval was a positive In brief, the Petition poses the main issue of
suspensive condition, the nonfulfillment of which whether the CA erred in modifying the trial
was not tantamount to a breach. It was simply court's Decision and in obligating petitioners to
an event that prevented the obligation from sell 3/5 of the disputed properties to respondent,
maturing or becoming effective. If the condition even if the suspensive condition had not been
did not happen, the obligation would not arise or fulfilled. It also raises the following collateral
come into existence. issues: (1) the settlement court's jurisdiction; (2)
respondent-intervenor's standing to file an
The CA held that Section 1, Rule 89 [7] of the application for the approval of the sale of realty
Rules of Court was inapplicable, because the in the settlement case, (3) the decedent's bad
lack of written notice to the other heirs showed faith, and (4) the computation of the decedent's
the lack of consent of those heirs other than share in the realty under administration.
Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. For this reason, bad faith
was imputed to him, for no one is allowed to This Court's Ruling
enjoy a claim arising from one's own
wrongdoing. Thus, Eliodoro Sr. was bound, as a The Petition is partially meritorious.
matter of justice and good faith, to comply with
his contractual commitments as an owner and Main Issue:
heir. When he entered into the agreement with Obligation With a Suspensive Condition
respondent, he bound his conjugal and
successional shares in the property. Petitioners argue that the CA erred in ordering
the conveyance of the disputed 3/5 of the
Hence, this Petition.[8] parcels of land, despite the nonfulfillment of the
suspensive condition -- court approval of the
Issues sale -- as contained in the "Receipt of Earnest
Money with Promise to Sell and to Buy" (also
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the referred to as the "Receipt"). Instead, they assert
following issues for our resolution: that because this condition had not been
"a) Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. is satisfied, their obligation to deliver the disputed
legally obligated to convey title to the property parcels of land was converted into a money
referred to in the subject document which was claim.
53
estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are This provision should be differentiated from
intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, specifically
so that the benefits that may flow from such requiring only the executor or administrator to
settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the file the application for authority to sell, mortgage
heirs and the beneficiaries.[16] or otherwise encumber real estate for the
purpose of paying debts, expenses and legacies
In the present case, the Motion for Approval was (Section 2);[19] or for authority to sell real or
meant to settle the decedent's obligation to personal estate beneficial to the heirs, devisees
respondent; hence, that obligation clearly falls or legatees and other interested persons,
under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To although such authority is not necessary to pay
require respondent to file a separate action -- on debts, legacies or expenses of administration
whether petitioners should convey the title to (Section 4).[20] Section 8 mentions only an
Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed realty -- will application to authorize the conveyance of realty
unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the under a contract that the deceased entered into
intestate estates of the deceased spouses. while still alive. While this Rule does not specify
who should file the application, it stands to
The suspensive condition did not reduce the reason that the proper party must be one who is
conditional sale between Eliodoro Sr. and to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or
respondent to one that was "not a definite, clear one who is to be entitled to the avails of the suit.
[21]
and absolute document of sale," as contended
by petitioners. Upon the occurrence of the
condition, the conditional sale became a Third Collateral Issue:
reciprocally demandable obligation that is Bad Faith
binding upon the parties.[17] That Acebedo also
involved a conditional sale of real Petitioners assert that Eliodoro Sr. was not in
property[18] proves that the existence of the bad faith, because (a) he informed respondent of
suspensive condition did not remove that the need to secure court approval prior to the
property from the jurisdiction of the intestate sale of the lots, and (2) he did not promise that
court. he could obtain the approval.
half (1/2) pro indiviso conjugal share of Eliodoro On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died
plus his one tenth (1/10) hereditary share as one intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an
of the ten legal heirs of the decedent, or a total estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was
of three fifths (3/5) of the lots in administration. [23] survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta
Calisterio.
Petitioners' computation is correct. The CA
computed Eliodoro's share as an heir based on Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta
one tenth of the entire disputed property. It who had previously been married to James
should be based only on the remaining half, after William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan
deducting the conjugal share.[24] City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace
on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta
The proper determination of the seller-heir's were married eleven years later, or on 08 May
shares requires further explanation. Succession 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a
laws and jurisprudence require that when a court declaration that James was presumptively
marriage is dissolved by the death of the dead.
husband or the wife, the decedent's entire estate
- under the concept of conjugal properties of On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia
gains -- must be divided equally, with one half Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of
going to the surviving spouse and the other half Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court
to the heirs of the deceased.[25] After the ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition
settlement of the debts and obligations, the entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the
remaining half of the estate is then distributed to Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos,
the legal heirs, legatees and devices. We Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter
assume, however, that this preliminary alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico
determination of the decedent's estate has Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and
already been taken into account by the parties, respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being
since the only issue raised in this case is allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void.
whether Eliodoro's share is 11/20 or 3/5 of the She prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas,
disputed lots. Jr., be appointed administrator, without bond, of
the estate of the deceased and that the
WHEREFORE, the Petition is inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the
hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The appealed obligations of the estate would have been
Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED with settled.
the MODIFICATION that respondent is entitled
to only a pro-indiviso share equivalent to 11/20 Respondent Marietta opposed the petition.
of the disputed lots. Marietta stated that her first marriage with
James Bounds had been dissolved due to the
SO ORDERED. latter's absence, his whereabouts being
unknown, for more than eleven years before she
contracted her second marriage with Teodorico.
Contending to be the surviving spouse of
G.R. No. 136467, April 06, 2000 Teodorico, she sought priority in the
administration of the estate of the decedent.
than seven years, is generally considered as In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that
dead and believed to be so by the spouse respondent Marietta's first husband, James
present at the time of contracting such William Bounds, had been absent or had
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is disappeared for more than eleven years before
presumed dead according to articles 390 and she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second
any of the three cases until declared null and marriage, having been contracted during the
void by a competent court." regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial
marriage contracted during the lifetime of the declaration of presumptive death of James
first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the Bounds.
prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved.
Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta,
the above rule. For the subsequent marriage no evidence having been adduced to indicate
referred to in the three exceptional cases therein another property regime between the spouses,
provided, to be held valid, the spouse present pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution
(not the absentee spouse) so contracting the with the death of Teodorico, the property should
later marriage must have done so in good faith. rightly be divided in two equal portions -- one
[6]
Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some portion going to the surviving spouse and the
moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong - it other portion to the estate of the deceased
partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a
known duty through some motive of interest or ill surviving spouse over the net estate [11] of the
will.[7] The Court does not find these deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers
circumstances to be here extant. and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by
right of representation), is one-half of the
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews
spouse is not necessary[8] as long as the and nieces, being entitled to the other half.
prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally Nephews and nieces, however, can only
noteworthy that the marriage in these succeed by right of representation in the
exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the
Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null other hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in
and void by a competent court." It follows that their own right which is to say that brothers or
the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only
the party assailing the second marriage. in representation by the latter of their parents
who predecease or are incapacitated to
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in succeed. The appellate court has thus erred in
order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive
exceptionally be considered valid, the following portion of its judgment, successional rights, to
conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior petitioner's children, along with their own mother
spouse of the contracting party must have been Antonia who herself is invoking successional
absent for four consecutive years, or two years rights over the estate of her deceased brother.
where there is danger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the
Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the Coin of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51574 is
spouse present has a well-founded belief that AFFIRMED except insofar only as it decreed in
the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion thereof
is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of that the children of petitioner are likewise
presumptive death of the absentee for which entitled, along with her, to the other half of the
purpose the spouse present can institute a inheritance, in lieu of which, it is hereby
summary proceeding in court to ask for that DECLARED that said one-half share of the
declaration. The last condition is consistent and decedent's estate pertains solely to petitioner to
in consonance with the requirement of judicial the exclusion of her own children. No costs.
intervention in subsequent marriages as so
provided in Article 41[9], in relation to Article 40, SO ORDERED.
[10]
of the Family Code.
58
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to
ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the
SANTILLON, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, conflicting claims of the parties with respect to
VS. PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art.
MIRANDA AND ROSARIO CORRALES, 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after
OPPOSITORS AND APPELLEES. deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties as
the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2
must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4
DECISION
for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand,
claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was
entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code, to
BENGZON, C.J.:
another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words,
Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while
Pexfecta claimed 1/2. .
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of After due notice and hearing, the court, on June
First Instance of Pangasinan, specifying the 28, 1961/ issued an order, the dispositive portion
respective shares of tho principal parties herein of which reads:
in the intestate estate of Pedro Santallion.
On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without
testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his residence,
leaving one son Claro, and his wife, Perfecta "In view of the foregoing considerations it is
Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired hereby ruled and ordered that in the intestate
several parcels of land located in that province. succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the
surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit
ONE-HALF (1/2) share and the remaining one-
About four years after his death, Claro Santillon half (1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro
filed a petition for letters of administration. Santillon. This is after deducting the share ' of
Opposition to said petition was entered by the the widow as co-owner of the conjugal
widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito properties. * * *."
U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the
following grounds: (a) that the properties
enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, From this order, petitioner Claro Santillon has
except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda appealed to this Court. Two questions of law are
claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that involved. The first, raised in Perfecta's Motion to
Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents Dismiss Appeal, is whether the order of the
had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most lower court is appealable. And the second,
of the properties enumerated in the petition to raised in appellant's lone assignment of error, is:
said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that How shall the estate of a person who dies
administration of the estate was not necessary, intestate be divided when the only survivors are
there being a case for partition pending; and (d) the spouse and one legitimate child?
that if administration was necessary at all, the
oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the THE FIRST ISSUE:—It is clear that the order of
petitioner was better qualified for the post. It the' lower court is final and therefore appealable
appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta to this Court.
Miranda was appointed administratrix of the
estate.
Under Rule 109, sec. 1, a person may appeal in
special proceedings from an order of the Court
On March 22, 1961, the court appointed of First Instance where such order determines *
commissioners to draft within sixty days, a
59
* * "the distributive share of the estate to which provision on intestate succession shall apply; i.
such person is entitled." e. Art. 996.
THE SECOND ISSUE:—Petitioner rests his Some commentators of our New Civil Code
claim to 3/4 of his father's estate on Art. 892, of seem to support Claro's contention; at least, his
the New Civil Code which provides that: objection to fifty-fifty sharing. But others confirm
the half and half idea of the Pangasinan court.
Art. 887.—The following are compulsory heirs: legislator's desire to promulgate just one general
rule applicable to both situations.
On April 26, 1973, the court a quo, pursuant to a direct, the court may proceed summarily, without
verbal agreement forged between the parties, the appointment of an executor or administrator,
issued an order requiring them to come up with and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance
a joint stipulation of facts (p. 9, rec.). of the will, if any there is, to determine who are
the persons legally entitled to participate in the
estate, and to apportion and divide it among
On May 19, 1973, the parties submitted the them after the payment of such debts of the
following stipulation of facts: estate as the court shall then find to be due; and
such persons, in their own right, if they are of
lawful age and legal capacity, or by their
"OPPOSITOR admits that petitioner is the
guardians or trustees legally appointed and
legitimate mother of the late FELIX
qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled
L. DEL ROSARIO.
to receive and enter into the possession of the
"PETITIONER admits that oppositor DOROTEA
portions of the estate so awarded to them
OTERA DEL ROSARIO is the legitimate
respectively. The court shall make such order
surviving wife of the deceased FELIX
as may be just respecting the costs of the
L. DEL ROSARIO.
proceedings, and all orders and judgment made
"PETITIONER admits that MARILOU
or rendered in the course thereof shall be
DEL ROSARIO, is the legally adopted child of
recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order
the late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO and
of partition or award, if it involves real estate,
DOROTEA DEL ROSARIO CONANAN.
shall be recorded in the proper registrar's office.
"THAT THE PARTIES admit that the late FELIX
L. DEL ROSARIO died last September 12, 1969
at Antipolo, Rizal in a plane crash and within the "While it may be true that a petition for summary
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court. settlement is allowed under
"That the only surviving nearest the aforequoted provision of the rules, the same
relatives of deceased FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO rule specifically limits the action to estates the
are the petitioner and oppositors DOROTEA O. gross value of which does not exceed
CONANAN and MARILOU DEL ROSARIO. P10,000.00. The instant petition, however,
"Parties admit to pay their respective counsel in clearly alleges that the value of the real
the amount to be determined by the court. properties alone left by the deceased Felix del
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Rosario amounts to P33,000.00 which is
Honorable Court that on the basis of the facts obviously over and above the value of the estate
stipulated, the Court declare the heirs of the allowed under the rules. The action taken by the
deceased" (pp. 9-10, rec.). petitioner (cannot be) construed as one filed
On June 21, 1973, the lower court issued the under an intestate proceeding as the
challenged order, pertinent portions of which requirements provided by law for the same has
read: not been complied with. Based on the foregoing
observation alone, the petition must perforce be
dismissed.
"A perusal of the petition shows that the instant
"But granting arguendo that this Court may
case was filed under the provisions of Section 2,
consider the petition as an exercise (of) the
Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
powers of a probate Court in determining and
reads as follows:
declaring the heirs of the deceased as prayed
'Whenever the gross value of the estate of a
for in the aforequoted partial joint stipulation of
deceased person, whether he died testate or
facts, the law on intestate succession is clear
intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos,
that an adopted child concurring with the
and that fact is made to appear to the Court of
surviving spouse of the adopter excludes the
First Instance having jurisdiction of the estate by
legitimate ascendants from
the petition of an interested person and upon
succession. x x x x x.
hearing, which shall be held not less than one
"The contention of the petitioner that Article 343
(1) month nor more than three (3) months from
is applicable in the instant case finds no basis
the date of the last publication of a notice which
for the said article is applicable in cases where
shall be published once a week for three (3) con-
there are no other concurring intestate heirs of
secutive weeks in a newspaper of general
the adopted child. x x x x x.
circulation in the province, and after such other
notice to interested persons as the court may
62
"Based on the foregoing, therefore, the petitioner grounds of equity and fair play, WE cannot allow
not being included as intestate heir of the to befall on petitioner - WE deem it essential, for
deceased cannot be considered as a co-owner the guidance of the parties, especially herein
of or have any right over the properties sought to petitioner, to point out the demerits of the
be partitioned and under the provisions of appealed verdict.
Section 1, Rule 69 in relation to Section 2, Rule
3 of the Revised Rules of Court, such action
must be commenced or instituted by the party in A couple of important issues are posed for our
interest. consideration, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
findings, the Court hereby DISMISSES the
1. Which of the following articles of the New Civil
petition without pronouncement as to costs" (pp.
Code will apply, Article 343 on the one hand, or
10-12, rec.).
Articles 341, 978 and 979 on the other; and
On July 10, 1973, petitioner filed a notice of
appeal, record on appeal and appeal bond (see
respondents' comments, p. 18, rec.). 2. Whether the material data rule enunciated by
Rule 41, Section 6 of the New Rules of Court
should be followed, ex cathedra, in the present
I
case.
Article 343 of the New Civil Code is qualification determined by Article 1000 of the New Civil
to Article 341 which gives an adopted child the Code, which reads:
same rights and duties as though he were a
legitimate child. The reason for this is that:
"Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the
surviving spouse and illegitimate children are
"(I)t is unjust to exclude the adopter's parents left, the ascendants shall be entitled to one-half
from the inheritance in favor of an adopted of the inheritance, and the other half shall be
person" (Report of the Code Commissioner, p. divided between the surviving spouse and the
92). illegitimate children so that such widow or
It is most unfair to accord widower shall have one-fourth of the estate, the
more successional rights to the adopted, who is illegitimate children the other fourth."
only related artificially by fiction of law to the B
deceased, than those who are naturally related
to him by blood in the direct ascending line.
Anent the other issue, respondents, in their
comment of June 29, 1973, emphasize that the
The applicability of Article 343 does not exclude petitioner's record on appeal violates the
the surviving parent of the deceased adopter, material data rule in that
not only because a contrary view would defeat
the intent of the framers of the law, but also
because in intestate succession, where "It does not state when the notice of appeal and
legitimate parents or ascendants concur with the appeal bond were filed with the lower court in
surviving spouse of the deceased, the latter disregard of the requirement of Section 6, Rule
does not necessarily exclude the former from the 41 of the Rules of Court that the record on
inheritance. This is affirmed by Article 893 of the appeal must contain such data as will show that
New Civil Code which states: the appeal was perfected on time."
Recent jurisprudence has construed liberally the
material data rule, whenever circumstances and
"If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants, substantial justice warrant.
but leaves legitimate ascendants, the surviving
spouse shall have a right to one-fourth (only) of
the hereditary estate. The cases of Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals,
"This fourth shall be taken from the free portion." No. L-36629, September 28, 1973 (53 SCRA
Article 343 does not require that the concurring 228) and Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals (No. L-
heirs should be the adopted child and the 29719, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 216, 220)
legitimate parents or ascendants only. The are particularly in point.
language of the law is clear, and a contrary view
cannot be presumed.
In Villanueva, WE held:
SO ORDERED.