1
Canon 8 Courtesy, Fairness, Candor Towards Professional Colleagues
[A.C. No. 5148. July 1, 2003]
Atty. RAMON P. REYES, complainant, vs. Atty. VICTORIANO T. CHIONG
JR., respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, dignity and
civility. The bickering and the hostility of their clients should not affect
their conduct and rapport with each other as professionals and members
of the bar.
The Case
Before us is a Sworn Complaint[1] filed by Atty. Ramon P. Reyes with
the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court, seeking the disbarment of
Atty. Victoriano T. Chiong Jr. for violation of his lawyers oath and of Canon
8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. After the Third Division of this
Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline resolved to suspend him as follows:
x x x [C]onsidering that respondent is bound by his oath which binds him
to the obligation that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. In
addition, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
a lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel. In impleading complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in
Civil Case No. 4884, when it was apparent that there was no legal ground
to do so, respondent violated his oath of office as well as the above-
quoted Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [r]espondent is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years.[2]
The Facts
In his Complaint, Atty. Reyes alleges that sometime in January 1998,
his services were engaged by one Zonggi Xu,[3] a Chinese-Taiwanese, in a
business venture that went awry. Xu invested P300,000 on a Cebu-based
fishball, tempura and seafood products factory being set up by a certain
Chia Hsien Pan, another Chinese-Taiwanese residing in Zamboanga
City.Eventually, the former discovered that the latter had not established
a fishball factory. When Xu asked for his money back, Pan became hostile,
making it necessary for the former to seek legal assistance.
Xu, through herein complainant, filed a Complaint for estafa against
Pan, who was represented by respondent. The Complaint, docketed as IS
98J-51990, was assigned to Assistant Manila City Prosecutor Pedro B.
Salanga, who then issued a subpoena for Pan to appear for preliminary
investigation on October 27 and 29, 1998. The latter neither appeared on
the two scheduled hearings nor submitted his counter-affidavit. Hence,
Prosecutor Salanga filed a Criminal Complaint[4] for estafa against him
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. [5] On April 8, 1999, the
Manila RTC issued a Warrant of Arrest[6] against Pan.
Thereafter, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the
Warrant of Arrest.[7] He also filed with the RTC of Zamboanga City a Civil
Complaint for the collection of a sum of money and damages as well as for
the dissolution of a business venture against complainant, Xu and
Prosecutor Salanga.
When confronted by complainant, respondent explained that it was
Pan who had decided to institute the civil action against Atty.
Reyes. Respondent claimed he would suggest to his client to drop the civil
case, if complainant would move for the dismissal of the estafa
case. However, the two lawyers failed to reach a settlement.
In his Comment[8] dated January 27, 2000, respondent argued that
he had shown no disrespect in impleading Atty. Reyes as co-defendant in
Civil Case No. 4884. He claimed that there was no basis to conclude that
the suit was groundless, and that it had been instituted only to exact
vengeance. He alleged that Prosecutor Salanga was impleaded as an
additional defendant because of the irregularities the latter had
committed in conducting the criminal investigation. Specifically,
Prosecutor Salanga had resolved to file the estafa case despite the
pendency of Pans Motion for an Opportunity to Submit Counter-Affidavits
and Evidence,[9] of the appeal[10] to the justice secretary, and of the
Motion to Defer/Suspend Proceedings.[11]
On the other hand, complainant was impleaded, because he
allegedly connived with his client (Xu) in filing the estafa case, which the
former knew fully well was baseless. According to respondent, the
irregularities committed by Prosecutor Salanga in the criminal
investigation and complainants connivance therein were discovered only
after the institution of the collection suit.
The Third Division of this Court referred the case to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.[12] Thereafter, the Board of
Governors of the IBP passed its June 29, 2002 Resolution.[13]
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In her Report and Recommendation,[14] Commissioner Milagros V.
San Juan, to whom the case was assigned by the IBP for investigation and
report, averred that complainant and Prosecutor Salanga had been
impleaded in Civil Case No. 4884 on the sole basis of the Criminal
Complaint for estafa they had filed against respondents client. In his
Comment, respondenthimself claimed that the reason x x x was x x x the
irregularities of the criminal investigation/connivance and consequent
damages.
Commissioner San Juan maintained that the collection suit with
damages had been filed purposely to obtain leverage against the estafa
case, in which respondents client was the defendant. There was no need
to implead complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, since they had never
participated in the business transactions between Pan and Xu. Improper
and highly questionable was the inclusion of the prosecutor and
complainant in the civil case instituted by respondent on the alleged
prodding of his client. Verily, the suit was filed to harass complainant and
Prosecutor Salanga.

Commissioner San Juan held that respondent had no ground to
implead Prosecutor Salanga and complainant in Civil Case No. 4884. In so
doing, respondent violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The IBP adopted the investigating
commissioners recommendation for his suspension from the practice of
law for two (2) years.
This Courts Ruling
We agree with the IBPs recommendation.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to
appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence.[15] Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain
obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they
must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.Moreover, Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that [a] lawyer shall conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Respondents actions do not measure up to this Canon. Civil Case
No. 4884 was for the collection of a sum of money, damages and
dissolution of an unregistered business venture. It had originally been filed
against Spouses Xu, but was later modified to include complainant and
Prosecutor Salanga.
The Amended and Supplemental Complaints[16] alleged
following:
27. The investigating prosecutor defendant Pedro Salanga knowingly and
deliberately refused and failed to perform his duty enjoined by the law
and the Constitution to afford plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan due process by
violating his rights under the Rules on preliminary investigations; he also
falsely made a Certification under oath that preliminary investigation was
duly conducted and plaintiff [was] duly informed of the charges against
him but did not answer; he maliciously and x x x partially ruled that there
was probable cause and filed a Criminal Information for estafa against
plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan, knowing fully [well] that the proceedings were
fatally defective and null and void; x x x;
28. Said assistant prosecutor, knowing also that plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan
filed said appeal and motion to defer for the valid grounds stated therein
deliberately refused to correct his errors and consented to the arrest of
said plaintiff under an invalid information and warrant of arrest.
29. Defendant Atty. Ramon Reyes, knowing that the suit of defendant
Zongoi Xu is baseless connived with the latter to harass and extort money
from plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan by said criminal prosecution in the manner
contrary to law, morals and public policy, resulting to the arrest of said
plaintiff and causing plaintiffs grave irreparable damages[.][17]
We concur with the IBP that the amendment of the Complaint and
the failure to resort to the proper remedies strengthen complainants
allegation that the civil action was intended to gain leverage against the
estafa case. If respondent or his client did not agree with Prosecutor
Salangas resolution, they should have used the proper procedural and
administrative remedies. Respondent could have gone to the justice
secretary and filed a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion for
2
Reinvestigation of Prosecutor Salangas decision to file an information for
estafa.
In the trial court, a Motion to Dismiss was available to him if he
could show that the estafa case was filed without basis. Moreover, he
could have instituted disbarment proceedings against complainant and
Prosecutor Salanga, if he believed that the two had conspired to act
illegally. As a lawyer, respondent should have advised his client of the
availability of these remedies. Thus, the filing of the civil case had no
justification.
The lack of involvement of complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in
the business transaction subject of the collection suit shows that there
was no reason for their inclusion in that case.It appears that respondent
took the estafa case as a personal affront and used the civil case as a tool
to return the inconvenience suffered by his client. His actions demonstrate
a misuse of the legal process. The aim of every lawsuit should be to render
justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.[18]
Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers
with courtesy, dignity and civility. A great part of their comfort, as well as
of their success at the bar, depends upon their relations with their
professional brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other, they
must treat one another with trust and respect. Any undue ill feeling
between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct and
demeanor toward each other. Mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations
and offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract from the dignity of
the legal profession,[19] but also constitute highly unprofessional conduct
subject to disciplinary action.
the Furthermore, the Lawyers Oath exhorts law practitioners not to
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
nor give aid nor consent to the same.
Respondent claims that it was his client who insisted in impleading
complainant and Prosecutor Salanga. Such excuse is flimsy and
unacceptable. While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interests of their
clients, their office does not permit violation of the law or any manner of
fraud or chicanery.[20] Their rendition of improper service invites stern and
just condemnation.Correspondingly, they advance the honor of their
profession and the best interests of their clients when they render service
or give advice that meets the strictest principles of moral law.[21]
The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem
of their professional brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased,
perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of
sharp contests and thrives despite conflicting interests. It emanates solely
from integrity, character, brains and skill in the honorable performance of
professional duty.[22]
WHEREFORE, respondent is found guilty as charged and is
hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of law, effective
immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.
ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., A.C. No. 5768
Complainant,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
 3

- versus - BRION,
D 1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as
E
L plaintiffs counsel in Civil Case 7040, filed a reply with
C
A opposition to motion to dismiss that contained
S
abusive, offensive, and improper language which
T
IL
insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified
L
O document in court.
,
A
B
A 2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge
D
, against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case 7040 for alleged
a
n falsification of public document when the document
d
P allegedly falsified was a notarized document
E
executed on February 23, 1994, at a date when
R
E
Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer nor was assigned
Z,
J in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a
J.
ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR., signatory to the document.
Respondent. Promulgated:

March 26, 2010

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x 3. On December 19, 2000, at the

DECISION courtroom of Municipal Trial Court

ABAD, J.: (MTC) Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer,

evidently drunk, threatened

Atty. Barandon saying, Laban kung laban, patayan ku

This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to
ng patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na p
have hurled invectives upon another lawyer and filed a baseless suit
alang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang
against him.
abogadona rito ay mga taga-

Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hin

The Facts and the Case
di kayo taga-rito.

On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a

4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of
complaint-affidavit[1] with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
falsification of public document without bothering to
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment,
check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of Court
suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate
and, with gross ignorance of the law, failed to
disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the
consider that a notarized document is presumed to
following offenses:
be genuine and authentic until proven otherwise.
 4

that the court did not take steps to stop, admonish,

5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his or cite Atty. Ferrer in direct contempt for his

first disbarment case against repeating his unethical behavior.

act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual

harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter 4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in

in Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of support of his allegations that Atty. Ferrer was drunk

lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and grave on December 19, 2000 and that he degraded the law

threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him. In profession. The latter had received various citations

October 2000, Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to that speak well of his character.

falsify the daily time record of his son who worked

with the Commission on Settlement of Land 5. The cases of libel and grave threats that

Problems, Department of Justice. When Atty. Barandon filed against Atty. Ferrer were still

Atty. Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly pending. Their mere filing did not make the latter

harassed him with inflammatory language. guilty of the charges. Atty. Barandon was forum

shopping when he filed this disbarment case since it

Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to referred to the same libel and grave threats subject

dismiss: of the criminal cases.

1. Instead of having the alleged forged In his reply affidavit,[2] Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for

document submitted for examination, disbarment. He alleged that on December 29, 2000 at about 1:30 p.m.,

Atty. Barandon filed charges of libel and grave threats while Atty. Ferrer was on board his sons taxi, it figured in a collision with a

against him. These charges came about because tricycle, resulting in serious injuries to the tricycles passengers. [3] But

Atty. Ferrers clients filed a case for falsification of neither Atty. Ferrer nor any of his co-passengers helped the victims and,

public document against Atty. Barandon. during the police investigation, he denied knowing the taxi driver and

blamed the tricycle driver for being drunk. Atty. Ferrer also prevented an

2. The offended party in the falsification eyewitness from reporting the accident to the authorities.[4]

case, Imelda Palatolon, vouchsafed that

her thumbmark in the waiver document had been Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had already

falsified. been dismissed. He belittled the citations Atty. Ferrer allegedly

received. On the contrary, in its Resolution 00-1,[5] the IBP-

3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered Camarines Norte Chapter opposed his application to serve as judge of the

the threatening remarks against Atty. Barandon, the MTC of Mercedes, Camarines Sur, on the ground that he did not have the

MTC Daet was already in session. It was improbable qualifications, integrity, intelligence, industry and character of a trial judge
 5

and that he was facing a criminal charge for acts of lasciviousness and a presented certified copies of orders issued by courts in Camarines Norte

disbarment case filed by an employee of the same IBP chapter. that warned Atty. Ferrer against appearing in court drunk.[13]

On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of The Issues Presented

the IBP-CBD submitted to this Court a Report, recommending the

suspension for two years of Atty.Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner The issues presented in this case are:

found enough evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrers violation of

Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He 1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP

attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the falsification Investigating Commissioner erred in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty

of the plaintiffs affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the of the charges against him; and

document had in fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to

it. The Investigating Commissioner also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the 2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on

threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of other counsels, him is justified.

court personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing.

The Courts Ruling

On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-

225,[6] adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioners We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree

recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year. with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and

the Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board

denied it in its Resolution[7] of October 19, 2002 on the ground that it had The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high

already endorsed the matter to the Supreme Court. On February 5, 2003, standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these

however, the Court referred back the case to the IBP for resolution of standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.[14]

Atty. Ferrers motion for reconsideration.[8] On May 22, 2008 the IBP Board

of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers

Recommendation[9] of the Investigating Commissioner that denied to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their

Atty. Ferrers motion for reconsideration.[10] fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code provides:

On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of

Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his
Governors IBP Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008.[11] On August 12, 2009 professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
the Court resolved to treat Atty. Ferrers comment as a petition for review

under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court. Atty. Barandon filed his

comment,[12] reiterating his arguments before the IBP. Further, he

 6

Atty. Ferrers actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrers drunken invectives

shows that he imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsification of at Atty. Barandon shortly before the start of a court

the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not present convincing evidence to support his

imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that the affidavit had denial of this particular charge. He merely presented a certification from

been falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the same. the police that its blotter for the day did not report the threat he

supposedly made.Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police blotter

Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of on a subsequent date that recorded his complaint against Atty. Ferrer.

falsification in a proper forum and without using offensive and abusive

language against a fellow lawyer. To quote portions of what he said in his Atty. Ferrer said, Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang la

reply with motion to dismiss: hat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte

, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-

1. That the answer is fraught with grave
and culpable misrepresentation and FALSIFICATION Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-
of documents, committed to mislead this Honorable
Court, but with concomitant grave responsibility of rito. Evidently, he uttered these with intent to annoy, humiliate,
counsel for Defendants, for distortion and serious
misrepresentation to the court, for presenting a incriminate, and discredit Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court
grossly FALSIFIED document, in violation of his oath
personnel, and litigants waiting for the start of hearing in court. These
of office as a government employee and as member
of the Bar, for the reason, that, Plaintiff, IMELDA
language is unbecoming a member of the legal profession. The Court
PALATOLON, has never executed the SALAYSAY
AFFIDAVIT, wherein her fingerprint has been cannot countenance it.
falsified, in view whereof, hereby DENY the same
including the affirmative defenses, there being no
knowledge or information to form a belief as to the
truth of the same, from pars. (1) to par. Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it
(15) which are all lies and mere fabrications,
sufficient ground for DISBARMENT of the one should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
responsible for said falsification and distortions.[15]
profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has

no place in the dignity of judicial forum.[17] Atty. Ferrer ought to have

The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified
realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal
language in their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal
profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it.
system.[16]
Whatever moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way

he chose to express his indignation.

Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Contrary to Atty. Ferrers allegation, the Court finds that he has been
Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of
accorded due process. The essence of due process is to be found in the
the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides:
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may

Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that have in support of ones defense.[18] So long as the parties are given the
adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life behave in opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process are
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
satisfactorily complied with.[19] Here, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
profession.
 7

Respondent, Promulgated:
gave Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to file countless pleadings and
October 25, 2005
refute all the allegations of Atty. Barandon.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts
RESOLUTION
who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence

they must conduct themselves honorably and TINGA, J.:

fairly.[20] Atty. Ferrers display of improper attitude, arrogance,

misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a

Clerk of Court. Members of the bar decorum must at all times comfort
lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a
themselves in a manner befitting their noble profession.
patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the
Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court
IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case 01-809 and ORDERS the suspension of
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May
Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for one year effective
2003, she filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
upon his receipt of this Decision. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a Complaint-Affidavit[1] with

supporting documents[2] against respondent Atty. Virgil R. Castro for

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrers personal Unprofessional Conduct, specifically violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon

8 and Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[3] The charge in

record as an attorney with the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy of
the complaint is summed up as follows:
the same be served to the IBP and to the Office of the Court Administrator

for circulation to all the courts in the land.

Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of
SO ORDERED. IBP-Nueva Vizcaya Chapter. On 5 May 2003, respondent went to

Rule 8.01 – No Abusive and Improper Language complainants office to inquire whether the complete records of Civil Case

No. 784, entitled Sps. Crispino Castillano v. Sps. Federico S. Castillano and
ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, A.C. No. 6396
Felicidad Aberin, had already been remanded to the court of origin, MCTC
Complainant,
Dupax del Norte, Alfonso Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It must be noted that
Present:
respondent was not the counsel of record of either party in Civil Case No.
PUNO, J., 784.
Chairman,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
C
Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet
A
L transmitted since a certified true copy of the decision of the Court of
been
L
Appeals
E should first be presented to serve as basis for the transmittal of

theJ records to the court of origin. To this respondent retorted scornfully,

O
Who, will certify the Court of Appeals Decision, the Court of Appeals? You
TINGA, and
mean to say, I would still have to go to Manila to get a certified true copy?
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO, Surprised at this outburst, complainant replied, Sir, its in the Rules but you
 8

could show us the copy sent to the party you claim to be representing. Affidavit/Documentary Evidence was filed by complainant on 25

Respondent then replied, Then you should have notified me of the said September 2003.[8]

requirement. That was two weeks ago and I have been frequenting your

office since then, but you never bothered to notify me. Complainant On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order[9] requiring respondent to

replied, It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said requirement. submit his answer to the complaint. Respondent submitted

his Compliance[10] dated 18 June 2003. Respondent explained that he was

Respondent then answered, You mean to say it is not your duty counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 847, entitled Sps. Federico

to remand the record of the case? Complainant responded, No, Sir, I Castillano, et al. v. Sps. Crispin Castillano, et al., filed with the RTC of

mean, its not our duty to notify you that you have to submit a copy of the Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30. He learned of the finality of the decision of the

Court of Appeals decision. Respondent angrily declared in Ilocano, Kayat Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 64962 with respect to Civil Case No. 847

mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam yon? Kasdiay? (You mean to say you dont before the lower court. Prior to the incident, he went to the office of the

care anymore? Is that the way it is?) He then turned and left the office, complainant to request for the transmittal of the records of the case to

banging the door on his way out to show his anger. The banging of the the MCTC and the complainant reassured him of the same.

door was so loud it was heard by the people at the adjacent RTC, Branch

30 where a hearing was taking place.[4] Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the

transmittal of the records on 5 May 2003. However, he has no explanation

After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and as to what transpired on that day. Instead, he narrates that on 25 May

pointed his finger at complainant and shouted, Ukinnan, no adda ti unget 2003, twelve days after the incident, the records had not yet been

mo iti kilientek haan mo nga ibales kaniak ah! (Vulva of your mother! If transmitted, and he subsequently learned that these records were

you are harboring ill feelings against my client, dont turn your ire on me!) returned to the court of origin.

Complainant was shocked at respondents words but still managed to

reply, I dont even know your client, Sir. Respondent left the office and as The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD

he passed by complainants window, he again shouted, Ukinnam nga was set on 25 September 2003 by the Investigating Commissioner

babai! (Vulva of your mother, you woman!)[5] Milagros V. San Juan. However, on said date, only complainant appeared.

The latter also moved that the case be submitted for

Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it resolution.[11] Respondent later on filed a Manifestation stating that the

happened in her office of which she was, and still is, the head and in front reason for his non-appearance was because he was still recuperating from

of her staff. She felt that her credibility had been tarnished and physical injuries and that he was not mentally fit to prepare the required

diminished, eliciting doubt on her ability to command full respect from her pleadings as his vehicle was rained with bullets on 19 August 2003. He also

staff.[6] expressed his public apology to the complainant in the

same Manifestation.[12]

Complainant filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to

The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days after the incident, was supported appear on the next hearing date in view of respondents public apology,

by an Affidavit[7] signed by employees of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya adding that respondent personally and humbly asked for forgiveness

who witnessed the incident. The Affidavit narrated the same incident as which she accepted.[13]

witnessed by the said employees. A Motion to File Additional

 9

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent considering that he did all these to a woman and in front of her

be reprimanded and warned that any other complaint for breach of his subordinates.

professional duties shall be dealt with more severely.[14] The IBP submitted

to this Court a Notice of Resolution adopting and approving the As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco,[16] respondent ought to

recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.[15] have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the

legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for

At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the it.[17] These acts violate Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to wit:

counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. Had he been counsel of record, it
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in
would have been easy for him to present the required certified true copy conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to
of the decision of the Court of Appeals. He need not have gone to Manila practice law, now shall he, whether in public or
private life behave in scandalous manner to the
to procure a certified true copy of the decision since the Court of Appeals discredit of the legal profession.
furnishes the parties and their counsel of record a duplicate original or
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself
certified true copy of its decision. with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his

professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case

when its records were already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable.

Not being the counsel of record and there being no authorization from
Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
either the parties to represent them, respondent had no right to impose
demands that lawyers conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and
his will on the clerk of court.
candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the

dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct themselves without

reproach at all times.[18]

Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, encroach upon the professional As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner,
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the
right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give respondent did not categorically deny the charges in the complaint.
proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief
Instead, he gave a lengthy narration of the prefatory facts of the case as
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
well as of the incident on 5 May 2003.

Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-Affidavit that

Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the
respondents uncharacteristic behavior was not an isolated incident. He
records of Civil Case No. 784, respondent deliberately encroached upon
has supposedly done the same to Attys. Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and
the legal functions of the counsel of record of that case. It does not matter
Temmy Lambino, the latter having filed a case against respondent pending
whether he did so in good faith.
before this Court.[19] We, however, cannot acknowledge such allegation

absent any evidence showing the veracity of such claim. No affidavits to

Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to
that effect were submitted by either Atty. Asuncion or Atty. Lambino.
Civil Case No. 784, respondent acted rudely towards an officer of the

court. He raised his voice at the clerk of court and uttered at her the most

vulgar of invectives. Not only was it ill-mannered but also unbecoming

 10
Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered
owing to the fact that respondent had apologized to the complainant and
the latter had accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent
should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the
consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent
afterwards. The fact remains that things done cannot be undone and
words uttered cannot be taken back. Hence, he should bear the
consequences of his actions.
The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the
esteem of their brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily
created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contexts
and thrives despite conflicting interest. It emanates solely from integrity,
character, brains and skills in the honorable performance of professional
duty.[20]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the
amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that any
similar infraction with be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of
this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in
the record of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
[A. C. No. 5398. December 3, 2002]
ANTONIO A. ALCANTARA, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIANO
PEFIANCO, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint against Atty. Mariano Pefianco for conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar for using improper and offensive
language and threatening and attempting to assault complainant.
The complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, is the incumbent
District Public Attorney of the Public Attorneys Office in San Jose,
Antique. He alleged that on May 18, 2000, while Atty. Ramon Salvani III
was conferring with a client in the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) at the Hall
of Justice in San Jose, Antique, a woman approached them. Complainant
saw the woman in tears, whereupon he went to the group and suggested
that Atty. Salvani talk with her amicably as a hearing was taking place in
another room. At this point, respondent Atty. Mariano Pefianco, who was
sitting nearby, stood up and shouted at Atty. Salvani and his client,
saying, Nga-a gina-areglo mo ina, ipapreso ang imo nga kliyente para
mahibal-an na anang sala.(Why do you settle that case? Have your client
imprisoned so that he will realize his mistake.)
Complainant said he was surprised at respondent Pefiancos
outburst and asked him to cool off, but respondent continued to
fulminate at Atty. Salvani. Atty. Salvani tried to explain to respondent that
it was the woman who was asking if the civil aspect of the criminal case
could be settled because she was no longer interested in prosecuting the
same. Respondent refused to listen and instead continued to scold Atty.
Salvani and the latters client.
As head of the Office, complainant approached respondent and
asked him to take it easy and leave Atty. Salvani to settle the
matter. Respondent at first listened, but shortly after he again started
shouting at and scolding Atty. Salvani. To avoid any scene with
respondent, complainant went inside his office. He asked his clerk to put a
notice outside prohibiting anyone from interfering with any activity in the
Public Attorneys Office.
Complainant said that he then went out to attend a hearing, but
when he came back he heard respondent Pefianco saying: Nagsiling si
Atty. Alcantara nga pagwa-on na kuno ako dya sa PAO, buyon nga klase
ka tawo. (Atty. Alcantara said that he would send me out of the PAO, what
an idiot.) Then, upon seeing complainant, respondent pointed his finger at
him and repeated his statement for the other people in the office to hear.
At this point, according to complainant, he confronted respondent
Pefianco and told him to observe civility or else to leave the office if he
had no business there. Complainant said respondent resented this and
started hurling invectives at him. According to complainant, respondent
even took a menacing stance towards him.
This caused a commotion in the office. Atty. Pepin Marfil and Mr.
Robert Minguez, the Chief of the Probation Office, tried to pacify
respondent Pefianco. Two guards of the Hall of Justice came to take
respondent out of the office, but before they could do so, respondent
tried to attack complainant and even shouted at him, Gago ka! (Youre
stupid!) Fortunately, the guards were able to fend off respondents blow
and complainant was not harmed.
Complainant also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III,
Felizardo Del Rosario, Atty. Pepin Joey Marfil, Robert Minguez, Herbert
Ysulat and Ramon Quintayo to corroborate his allegations.
In his Comment and Counter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco said
that the sight of the crying woman, whose husband had been murdered,
moved him and prompted him to take up her defense. He said that he
resented the fact that complainant had ordered an employee, Napoleon
Labonete, to put a sign outside prohibiting standbys from hanging round
in the Public Attorneys Office.
Respondent claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani concerning
the womans case, complainant, with his bodyguard, arrived and shouted
at him to get out of the Public Attorneys Office. He claimed that two
security guards also came, and complainant ordered them to take
respondent out of the office. Contrary to complainants claims, however,
respondent said that it was complainant who moved to punch him and
shout at him, Gago ka! (Youre stupid!)
Prior to the filing of the present complaint, respondent Pefianco had
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative and criminal
 11
complaint against complainant. However, the complaint was dismissed by
the said office.
The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines found that respondent committed the acts alleged in the
complaint and that he violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Committee noted that respondent failed not only to
deny the accusations against him but also to give any explanation for his
actions. For this reason, it recommended that respondent be reprimanded
and warned that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more
severely in the future.
We find the recommendation of the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline to be well taken.
The evidence on record indeed shows that it was respondent
Pefianco who provoked the incident in question. The affidavits of several
disinterested persons confirm complainants allegation that respondent
Pefianco shouted and hurled invectives at him and Atty. Salvani and even
attempted to lay hands on him (complainant).
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility[1] admonishes
lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the
legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly toward each
other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times.[2]
In this case, respondents meddling in a matter in which he had no
right to do so caused the untoward incident. He had no right to demand
an explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not or
could not be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the
matter to respondent, but the latter insisted on his view about the case.
Respondent said he was moved by the plight of the woman whose
husband had been murdered as she was pleading for the settlement of
her case because she needed the money. Be that as it may, respondent
should realize that what he thought was righteous did not give him the
right to demand that Atty. Salvani and his client, apparently the accused in
the criminal case, settle the case with the widow. Even when he was being
pacified, respondent did not relent. Instead he insulted and berated those
who tried to calm him down. Two of the witnesses, Atty. Pepin Marfil and
Robert Minguez, who went to the Public Attorneys Office because they
heard the commotion, and two guards at the Hall of Justice, who had been
summoned, failed to stop respondent from his verbal
rampage. Respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public
behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation
and erode public respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness respondent
had was negated by the way he chose to express his indignation. An
injustice cannot be righted by another injustice.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Mariano Pefianco is found GUILTY of violation of
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, considering this to
be his first offense, is hereby FINED in the amount of P1,000.00 and
REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action in the future will be
sanctioned more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo,
Sr., JJ., concur.
Rule 8.02 – Not to Encroach on Professional Employment
[A.C. No. 4807. March 22, 2000]
MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant, vs. ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C.
PANGULAYAN, REGINA D. BALMORES, CATHERINE V. LAUREL and
HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW
OFFICES, respondents.
D E C I S IO N
VITUG, J.: JVITUG
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of
Professional Ethics, specifically Canon 9 thereof, viz:
"A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon
the subject of controversy with a party represented
by counsel, much less should he undertake to
negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but
should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent
upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything
that may tend to mislead a party not represented by
counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as
to law." barth
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising
the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis
Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel, and
Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the hired counsel of some
expelled students from the AMA Computer College ("AMACC"), in an
action for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and
for Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that respondents, then counsel
for the defendants, procured and effected on separate occasions, without
his knowledge, compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements")
with four of his clients in the aforementioned civil case which, in effect,
required them to waive all kinds of claims they might have had against
AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such
an act of respondents was unbecoming of any member of the legal
profession warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice
of law.
In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his
co-respondents had taken part in the negotiation, discussion, formulation,
or execution of the various Re-Admission Agreements complained of and
were, in fact, no longer connected at the time with the Pangulayan and
Associates Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he claimed, had
nothing to do with the dismissal of Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were
executed for the sole purpose of effecting the settlement of an
administrative case involving nine students of AMACC who were expelled
therefrom upon the recommendation of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal.
The students, namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R.
Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon, Melyda B. De Leon, Leila D. Joven,
Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and Cleo B. Villareiz,, were all
members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, who apparently had caused
to be published some objectionable features or articles in the paper. The
3-member Student Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately convened, and
after a series of hearings, it found the students guilty of the use of
indecent language and unauthorized use of the student publication funds.
 12

The body recommended the penalty of expulsion against the erring Manifestation[1] which, among other things, explicitly contained the
students. Jksm following stipulation; viz:

The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, "1.......Among the nine (9) signatories to the
AMACC President, gave rise to the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97- complaint, four (4) of whom assisted by their
30549 on 14th March 1997 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of parents/guardian already executed a Re-Admission
Quezon City. While the civil case was still pending, letters of apology and Agreement with AMACC President, AMABLE R.
Re-Admission Agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating the AMA
of some of the expelled students, to wit: Letter of Apology, dated 27 May COMPUTER COLLEGE MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARY
1997, of Neil Jason Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and Re-Admission ACTIONS and agreed among others to terminate all
Agreement of 22 June 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, civil, criminal and administrative proceedings which
dated 31 March 1997, of Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter they may have against the AMACC arising from their
Melyda B. De Leon and Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the previous dismissal. Esm
AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila Joven,
assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 May 1997 "x x x......x x x......x x x
with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22 September 1997, of
Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October 1997 with the
"3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent
AMACC President; and letter of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of
Motion to Withdraw from Civil Case No. Q-97-30549
Michael Ejercito, assisted by his parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of
will by filed them."
23 January 1997 with the AMACC President.

The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and
Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission
the IBP Board of Governors in their findings; nevertheless, the
Agreements, a Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997, was filed with the trial
recommended six-month suspension would appear to be somewhat too
court where the civil case was pending by Attorney Regina D. Balmores of
harsh a penalty given the circumstances and the explanation of
the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices for defendant AMACC. A copy
respondent.
of the manifestation was furnished complainant. In his Resolution, dated
14 June 1997, Judge Lopez of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court
thereupon dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS
effective immediately upon his receipt of this decision. The case against
On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
the other respondents is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
Philippines ("IBP") passed Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus:

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent

"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex 'A,' and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on SO ORDERED.
record and the applicable laws and rules, with an
amendment Atty. Meinrado Pangulayan is suspended Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being JJ., concur.6/27/00 3:07 PM
remiss in his duty and DISMISSAL of the case against
the other Respondents for they did not take part in Canon 9 Unauthorized Practice of Law
the negotiation of the case." Chief

It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-
Admission Agreements were formalized, complainant was by then already
the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the civil case. Respondent
Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact. Although aware that the
students were represented by counsel, respondent attorney proceeded,
nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their parents without at the very
least communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who
was counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This failure of
respondent, whether by design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable
violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a
duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell short of the demands required
of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers
only on the administrative aspect of the controversy is belied by the
[G.R. No. 139281. September 29, 1999]
SPOUSES ROMUALDO and NORA SUAREZ, petitioners, vs. ARSENIO
SALAZAR, et al., respondents.
RESOLUTION
Considering respondents Motion to expunge All Pleadings Filed by
Atty. Filemon A. Manangan with Motion to Hold Him in Contempt of Court
and to Dismiss the Petition and said Atty. Manangans admission at the
hearing this morning, September 29, 1999, that he is not a lawyer entitled
to practice law in the Philippines, and that he is the same Filemon A.
 13
Manangan who was found by this Court G.R. No. 82760 (Filemon
Manangan v. Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya, Branch 28) decided
on August 30, 1990, to be in reality Andres Culanag who is not a member
of the Philippine Bar, but despite these facts he has continued to
misrepresent himself to be an attorney-at-law and has appeared as
counsel for petitioners in this case, Atty. Filemon A. Manangan, who is in
reality Andres Culanag, is hereby declared guilty of indirect contempt of
this Court. Wherefore, he is hereby sentenced to three (3) months
imprisonment to be served at the Headquarters of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Taft Avenue, Manila, until further orders from this Court.
SO ORDERED
[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L.
RANA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the
requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession.
Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of
legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the
morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even
if he passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who
passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant
Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and
grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the
Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine
International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that
respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of
the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law
and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet
a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections
before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon,
Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the
MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the
Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of
Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel
for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed
the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that
respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not
allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative
body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty
candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents
services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy
to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent
to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of
Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same
resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint
against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific
assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains,
however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented
himself as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001
which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of
the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001
signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the
complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the
daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents
Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before
the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant
alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a
petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent
signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent
appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his
appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a
lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents
Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is
motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
 14
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC
as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC
proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the
MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001.
The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on
his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that
respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his
admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that
respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a
law which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for
Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as
secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was
authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that
respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not
deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the
records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22
May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading
entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in
Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of
the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned
Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T.
BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had
authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the
MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also
retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly
D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized
by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate
of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001
that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate
Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before
the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers
oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a
member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated
that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law,incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship
have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means
any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice
of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the
legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service
which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings,
without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing
fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has
shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is
a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified.The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the
court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by
passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be
withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably
strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar examinations
but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in
contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar.
Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages
in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of
court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took
the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that
finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed
the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know
that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and
his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.[9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the
law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any
court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting
unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to
Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang
Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your
acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation
effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the evidence does not support the charge
that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan.
 15
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence
shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his
counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice
law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the
Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
[A.M. No. P-99-1287. January 26, 2001]
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. MISAEL
M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 133, Makati City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M.
Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for
authority to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza
Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled People vs. Narcisa Naldoza
Ladaga for Falsification of Public Document pending before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40.[1] While respondents
letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private
complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court
Administrator, dated September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification
with regard to respondents authority to appear as counsel for the accused
in the said criminal case.[2] On September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court
Administrator referred the matter to respondent for comment.[3]
In his Comment,[4] dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted
that he had appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior
authorization. He reasoned out that the factual circumstances surrounding
the criminal case compelled him to handle the defense of his cousin who
did not have enough resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte;
while, on the other hand, private complainant was a member of a
powerful family who was out to get even with his cousin. Furthermore, he
rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice his
office nor the interest of the public since he did not take advantage of his
position. In any case, his appearances in court were covered by leave
application approved by the presiding judge.
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a resolution denying
respondents request for authorization to appear as counsel and directing
the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal charges against him for
appearing in court without the required authorization from the
Court.[5] On January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator filed the instant
administrative complaint against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of
Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions
of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and
existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and
transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared
to be unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.-
Public officials and employees during their incumbency
shall not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, Provided, that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with
their official functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent
to comment on the administrative complaint.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are
close blood cousins who belong to a powerless family from the
impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he
finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always supported and guided him
while he looked up to her as a mentor and an adviser. Because of their
close relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondents help and advice when
she was charged in Criminal Case No. 84885 for falsification by the private
complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in filing the said
criminal case was to seek vengeance on her cousin. He explained that his
cousins discord with Ms. Andres started when the latters husband, SPO4
Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During
the course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three
(3) children. The birth certificate of their eldest child is the subject of the
falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is
the only lawyer in their family, he felt it to be his duty to accept Ms.
Ladagas plea to be her counsel since she did not have enough funds to pay
for the services of a lawyer. Respondent also pointed out that in his seven
(7) years of untainted government service, initially with the Commission
on Human Rights and now with the judiciary, he had performed his duties
with honesty and integrity and that it was only in this particular case that
he had been administratively charged for extending a helping hand to a
close relative by giving a free legal assistance for humanitarian purpose.
He never took advantage of his position as branch clerk of court since the
questioned appearances were made in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding office. He stressed that
during the hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as shown by his
approved leave applications attached to his comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondents
comment and referred the administrative matter to the Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for
investigation, report and recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the
following findings and recommendation:
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and
in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal
 16
Case No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public Documents before the METC of
Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in
said case was without the previous permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the
respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he
was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge
Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. That the
respondent appeared as pro bono counsel likewise cannot be denied. His
cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively declared that the
respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was
and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to
represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever
handled a case for a member of his family who is like a big sister to
him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case
amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance
as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has
been in government service, he has maintained his integrity and
independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as
counsel for his cousin without first securing permission from the court,
and considering that this is his first time to do it coupled with the fact that
said appearance was not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his
Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully recommended that he be
REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would
be dealt with more severely.[6]
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits
civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A
similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private
practice of their profession. The said section reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice.- No judge or other official or
employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General,
shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give
professional advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that private practice of a profession,
specifically the law profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not
pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding
ones self to the public as a lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva,[7] we explained the meaning of
the term private practice prohibited by the said section, to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not
constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the
Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In
other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87
Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768) Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self
out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services
(State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel
on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the
private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General
is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must
have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of
the legal profession and that his professional services are available
to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been
given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.[8]
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances
when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal
Case No. 84885 does not constitute the private practice of the law
profession contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondents isolated court appearances did not
amount to a private practice of law, he failed to obtain a written
permission therefor from the head of the Department, which is this Court
as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules,
thus:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial,
credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission
from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be
absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission
to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours
should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way
the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no
permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or
employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his
private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the
discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of
the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors.[9]
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court
proceedings on numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998,
July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is
true that he filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he
appeared in court. However, he failed to obtain a prior permission from
the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to which
respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated
by law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M.
Ladaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition
of such act would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
 17
Exception: Rules of Court, Rule 138-A
G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, grounded on pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-
0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal
Case No. 00-1705;1 and the RTC’s Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued
by this Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the
MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal
Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the
complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his
appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan
v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts
as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers
that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public
prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be
his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied
permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground
that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction
with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should
take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan;
and set the case for continuation of trial.3
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for
Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging
that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the
effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret
the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the
public respondent MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public
respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705
pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3,
2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground
that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705,
is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil
indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is
not legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide
that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner
cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for
the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or
friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the
bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration
before the RTC, the petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration
dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4,
2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No.
730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari
proceedings before the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the
petitioner’s Second Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in
Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already denied the
Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant
Petition and assigns the following errors:
I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its
discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for the
writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite
petitioner having established the necessity of
granting the writ;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR
THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE
SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE]
THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS
OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;
III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE
 18
MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT
WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO
DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING
THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED
TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT,
CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS
BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE
APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER
COURTS (MTC’S).4
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if
warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may take cognizance of
petitions filed directly before it.5
Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and
implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter
No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court
takes cognizance of herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear
before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated
in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law
student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private
complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney
duly accredited by the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has
successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law
curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal
education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial
court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by
the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by
this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school.
Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be
filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the
legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the
Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an
inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In
inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without
the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the
peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally
or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by
a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or
friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the
bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is
subsequently changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it now appears
in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality
a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney.
In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid
of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of
Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction
exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term
"Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138
and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an
agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule
provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of
a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138.
The court a quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner
referred to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A
should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to
act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule
138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by
a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student.
As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule
138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant,
without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very
nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for
this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been
intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the
RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by the
 19

private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case do not C
provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s hico-
appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable. Nazario, JJ.
ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO,
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable Respondent. Promulgated:
August 31, 2006
for a felony is also civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to
an enemy country, and crime against popular representation.9 The basic
DECISION
rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.10

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint[1] was filed
nor prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it
follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed by complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco against respondent Atty. Rogelio P.
instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an
rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.
officer of the court when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order despite receipt of payment representing attorneys fees.
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to
ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705
According to the complainant, she engaged the services of
as a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the
public prosecutor. respondent sometime in January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in

recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank,

No pronouncement as to costs.
Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the release of
SO ORDERED. her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the
Associate Justice name of said bank is the subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of

WE CONCUR: possession then pending before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna,

Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610.

Rule 9.01 – Not to Delegate Work

Rule 9.02 – Not to Divide Legal Fees

Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before
LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO, A.C. No. 6317
Complainant, the trial court in the hearing for the issuance of the Writ of Possession and
Presen
t: did not protect her interests in the Compromise Agreement which she
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), subsequently entered into to end LRC Case No. B-2610.[2]
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
C
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred
al
l that the P70,000.00 he received from complainant was payment for legal
e
j services for the recovery of the deposit with Planters Development Bank
o and did not include LRC Case No. B-2610 pending before the Regional Trial
,
S Court of Bian, Laguna.
r.
,
a The complaint was referred[3] to the Integrated Bar of the
n
d Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

On September 21, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner submitted his

 20

agreement with a false and misleading assurance that

report finding respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provide:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
complainant can still recover after Three (3) years her
foreclosed property respondent violated Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which says a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.[4]

Rule 9.02 A lawyer shall not divide or

stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with
persons not licensed to practice law, except:
a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement
with a partner or associate that, upon the latters
death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period
of time to his estate or to the persons specified in the
agreement; or
The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended:
WHEREFORE, finding respondent
responsible for aforestated violations to protect the
public and the legal profession from his kind, it is
recommended that he be suspended for Six (6)
months with a stern warning that similar acts in the
future will be severely dealt with.[5]

b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete

unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of

c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes the investigating commissioner.[6]

non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if
the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit-
sharing arrangement. We agree with the findings of the IBP.

In finding the respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show

of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Investigating Commissioner that they possessed and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it.

opined that: Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of

legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and
against him must be established by convincing proof.
The record must disclose as free from doubt a case norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
which compels the exercise by the Supreme Court of
Responsibility.[7]
its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the
act done as well as of the motivation thereof must be
clearly demonstrated. x x x.
Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
In the instant scenario, despite the strong immoral or deceitful conduct[8] and are mandated to serve their clients
protestation of respondent that the Php70,000.00
legal fees is purely and solely for the recovery of the with competence and diligence.[9]They shall not neglect a legal matter
Php180,000.00 savings account of complainant
entrusted to them, and this negligence in connection therewith shall
subsequent acts and events say otherwise, to wit:
render them liable.[10]
1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a
Php180,000.00 savings deposit is too high;
2.) Respondent actively acted as complainants lawyer
Respondents claim that the attorneys fee pertains only to the
to effectuate the compromise agreement.
recovery of complainants savings deposit from Planters Development
By openly admitting he divided the
Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that he acted as complainants
Php70,000.00 to other individuals as
commission/referral fees respondent violated Rule counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement between the latter
9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not and the bank relative to LRC Case No. B-2610. Respondent admitted that
divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services
he explained the contents of the agreement to complainant before the
with persons not licensed to practice law. Worst, by
luring complainant to participate in a compromise latter affixed her signature. Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner
 21

observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance in the recovery of answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts

the deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall and society.

charge only fair and reasonable fees.[11]

Respondents disregard for his clients interests is evident in the A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his

iniquitous stipulations in the compromise agreement where the clients case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the

complainant conceded the validity of the foreclosure of her property; that task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true to his

the redemption period has already expired thus consolidating ownership oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer should accept only as much cases as he

in the bank, and that she releases her claims against it.[12] As found by the can efficiently handle in order to sufficiently protect his clients

Investigating Commissioner, complainant agreed to these concessions interests. It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the qualification to

because respondent misled her to believe that she could still redeem the handle the legal matter; he must also give adequate attention to his legal

property after three years from the foreclosure. The duty of a lawyer to work. Utmost fidelity is demanded once counsel agrees to take the

safeguard his clients interests commences from his retainer until his cudgels for his clients cause.[18]

discharge from the case or the final disposition of the subject matter of

litigation. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney- In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the

client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients practice of law for six months is warranted. In addition, he is directed to

cause. The canons of the legal profession require that once an attorney return to complainant the amount he received by way of legal fees

agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with zeal, care and pursuant to existing jurisprudence.[19]

utmost devotion.[13]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of

Respondents admission[14] that he divided the legal fees with violating Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of Professional

two other people as a referral fee does not release him from liability. A Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)

lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with months effective from notice, and STERNLY WARNED that any similar

persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases.[15] infraction will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of to RETURN, within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to

the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on the following grounds: 1) complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this Court proof of his

deceit; 2) malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office; 3) grossly compliance within three (3) days therefrom.

immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5)

violation of the lawyers oath; 6) willful disobedience to any lawful order Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of

of a superior court; and 7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator

without authority. who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.

In Santos v. Lazaro[16] and Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,[17] we held SO ORDERED.

that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is a basic

THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS
postulate in legal ethics. When a lawyer takes a clients cause, he

covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights. The Canon 10 Observe Candor, Fairness and Good Faith

failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention makes such

lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him

[A.C. No. 5161. April 14, 2004]

 22
ISIDRA TING-DUMALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROLANDO S.
TORRES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed on 22 October 1999 with this Court,
complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali charges respondent Atty. Rolando S.
Torres with presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent to,
and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainants signature in a
purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation
in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery, thereby violating
his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial ethics.
The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita
Reynante and Vicente Ting. Her siblings are Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam T.
Saria; Felicisima T. Torres, who is married to herein respondent; Vicente
Ting, Jr.; and Eliseo Ting. Their parents died intestate and left several
parcels of land, to wit:
a) One half of Lot 1586 of the San Francisco de Malabon
Estate, containing an area of 43,908 square meters
more or less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-
6203) RT-19151 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;
b) Lot 1603 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate,
containing an area of 16,073 square meters, more or
less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6425) RT-
7688 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;
c) Lot 1605 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate,
containing an area of 22,131 square meters, more or
less and covered at that time by TCT No. T- 1869 of
the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.
According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his
relationship with her and her brothers and used his profession to deprive
them of what was lawfully due them even if it involved the commission of
an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to the respondent the
following acts or omissions:
1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise
against, the perjury committed by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law
Miriam when they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
dated 11 November 1986, wherein the two made it appear that they were
the sole heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting,
knowing fully well that the same was false. He presented that document
to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the transfer of the title over Lot No.
1586 in the names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was later sold to Antel
Holdings Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and received
by, Felicisima and Miriam.
2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise
against, the forgery of complainants signature in a purported Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 when he
knew that she was in Italy at that time working as an overseas contract
worker. He even presented the falsified document to the Register of
Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the property in favor of his wife
Felicisima and sister-in-law Marcelina. The forgery or falsification was
made to enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was
received and misappropriated by Felicisimaand Marcelina.
3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re:Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of
the Original Copy and Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering
Lot No. 1605 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, filed by
complainants sisters Marcelina and Felicisima on 24 October 1995, the
respondent made gross misrepresentation and offered false testimony to
the effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and legal
heirs of the late spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante for the purpose
of obtaining a new title in their names. With the reconstituted title, and
with the express conformity of the respondent, Felicisima and Marcelina
were able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100
and profited from the sale to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial
payment was even received pending the reconstitution proceedings.
4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false
misrepresentations for the purpose of profiting therefrom when he
requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full
payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense that the order of reconstitution
would be released within a month when he knew that it would be
impossible because he presented evidence in the reconstitution case only
on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even used
the stationery of the Philippine National Bank, of which he was an
employee.
In his Comment,[2] the respondent denies the allegations of the
complaint and asserts that he did not take advantage of his profession to
deprive any of the co-heirs of his wife of the estate left by his parents-in-
law.
Insofar as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms that
Felicisima and Miriam were not motivated by any desire to solely profit
from the sale. Neither can he be faulted by the execution of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 because
he had no part in the execution of the document. All the while he believed
in good faith that the Ting sisters had already agreed on how to dispose of
the said lot. If ever complainants signature was affixed on that document,
it was done in good faith.
The respondent admits that he was the counsel of Marcelina Ting
Rivera, et. al., in LRC Case No. 5964 for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-
1869. The false testimony of Marcelina in that case that she and Felicisima
were the only children of spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante could
not be faulted on him because such was a clear oversight. Moreover, the
sale of Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., was the decision of Marcelina and
his wife. His conformity through his signature was pro-forma because the
property was a paraphernal property of Marcelina and his wife. Anent his
alleged gross and false misrepresentation that the order of reconstitution
would be released by the end of November 1996, suffice it to say that the
assurance was made by the Clerk of Court, Mr. Rosauro Morabe. Besides,
petitions for reconstitution are usually uncontested and granted by courts.
Finally, the respondent believes that complainant intended to
harass him in bombarding him with numerous lawsuits, i.e., this
administrative case; Civil Case No. TM-855 for Annulment of Documents,
Titles, and Reconveyance plus Damages; and a criminal case for Estafa and
Falsification of Public Documents.
In her reply, the complainant denies the presence of toka or verbal
will allegedly made by her mother and allegedly implemented by their
eldest brother Eliseo in view of the following circumstances: (1) her
mother met a sudden death in 1967; and partition of the properties in
 23
total disregard of their father was morally reprehensible, since the latter
was still alive; (2) when their mother died, four of the siblings were still
minors including respondents wife herself; (3) on 5 February 2000, Eliseo
wrote his siblings, in response to the previous letter of Felicisima,
Marcelina, and Miriam, denying the existence of a toka. She further states
that the respondent was not merely a passive onlooker but, as he
admitted, the administrator of the properties of the Ting spouses.
On 14 June 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation or
decision.[3]
On 9 January 2003, after due hearing and consideration of the
issues presented by both parties, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V.
San Juan of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP found the
actuations of the respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of
Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus she recommended that the respondent be disbarred
from the practice of law.[4]
In its Resolution No. XV-2003-333[5] of 21 June 2003, the Board of
Governors of the IBP approved and adopted Commissioner San Juans
report, but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for
six years.
We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in her findings
of facts and conclusion of culpability. The respondent has sufficiently
demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the
exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession. In his long years
as a lawyer, he must have forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is
time once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that
pledge; thus:
LAWYER'S OATH
I, , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD.
This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement
to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice is not a mere ceremony or
formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere
words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and
keep inviolable at all times. By swearing the lawyers oath, they become
guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as instruments in the fair
and impartial dispensation of justice.[6] This oath is firmly echoed and
reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
...
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
...
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice.
All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our
legal system. When the respondent took the oath as a member of the
legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. In
this covenant, respondent miserably failed.
The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986 that they are
the children of Julita Reynante and thus adjudicated only between them
Lot No. 1586 to the exclusion of their other siblings. [7] There was
concealment of the fact that there were other compulsory heirs to the
estate of the deceased. Significantly, the respondent is the brother-in-law
of complainant. Being married to complainants sister, he knew of his wifes
siblings. In fact, he declared that the complainant stayed with them while
she was in the Philippines.[8] Yet, the respondent presented that
document to the Register of Deeds of General Trias, Cavite, to effect the
transfer of the title of the lot in question in the name of his wife and his
sister-in-law Miriam.
It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted[9] regarding
the falsification of complainants signature in the Extrajudicial
Settlement[10] dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603, which contains a
purported waiver by the complainant of her right over the property.
Marcelina admitted that she signed complainants name in that
document.[11] Such act of counterfeiting the complainants signature to
make it appear that the complainant had participated in the execution of
that document is tantamount to falsification of a public document.[12]
Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of
attorney and against committing falsification, he presented[13] such
document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a new title for the lot in favor
of Marcelina and his wife.[14] He himself, therefore, may also be held liable
for knowingly using a falsified document to the damage of the
complainant and her other co-heirs.[15] Notably, he also admitted in an
affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that he prepared the legal documents for the
transfer of Lot 1603.[16]
Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing
acts which are contrary to law. He must have kept in mind the first and
foremost duty of a lawyer, which is to maintain allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and obey the laws of the land.
The Code of Professional Responsibility underscores the primacy of such
duty by providing as its canon that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution,
 24
obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal
processes.[17] For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a
profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and
the dispensation of justice.[18] As such, he should make himself more an
exemplar for others to emulate.[19] He should not, therefore, engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. [20] He makes himself
unfit to remain in the profession who commits any such unbecoming act
or conduct.[21]
Respondents argument that the non-declaration by his wife and his
sister- in-law Marcelina of the other siblings in LRC Rec. No. 5964 for the
reconstitution of title involving Lot 1605 was a mere oversight does not
deserve credence in view of the following circumstances: First, the
petition clearly names only Felicisima and Marcelina as the petitioners
when there were six siblings who were heirs of the unpartitioned
lot.[22] Second, during the hearing of said case when the respondent asked
Marcelina whether she has brothers and sisters other than Felicisima, the
latter said none. The transcript of that hearing reads:
ATTY. TORRES:
Q Madame Witness, are you the only child or daughter of the
deceased Sps. Vicente Ting, Jr. and Julita Reynante?
WITNESS:
A No, sir. We are two, Felicisima Torres and I.
Q Do you have other brothers and sisters?
A None, sir.[23]
The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false
testimony[24] in court, and he never corrected the same despite full
knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the case. [25] Moreover,
in knowingly offering in evidence such false testimony, he himself may be
punished as guilty of false testimony.[26]
Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the
court. He shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice.[27] This Rule was clearly and openly violated by the respondent
when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no siblings
aside from Felicisima and when he offered such testimony in the petition
for reconstitution of the title involving Lot 1605.
The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an
officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration of justice.
Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. For this
reason, any act on his part that obstructs and impedes the administration
of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against
him.[28]
It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the
reconstitution, he offered in evidence an Affidavit of Loss, which was
executed by Marcelina and notarized by him. During the hearing of this
administrative case, Marcelina admitted that her statement in that
affidavit that the title was in her possession was false, as she was never in
possession of the title[29] and would not, therefore, know that the same
was lost.
Moreover, in a letter dated 20 November 1996 addressed to a
certain Mrs. Ong, the respondent requested the release of 50% of the
remaining balance for the sale of Lot 1605, relaying to Antel Holdings, Inc.,
through Mrs. Ong that he was assured by the Clerk of Court that the order
directing the reconstitution of title for Lot 1605 would be released within
the month.[30]Respondents information was misleading because he
presented evidence only on 12 August 1997, or almost a year after he sent
the letter.[31] Such act, therefore, shows lack of candor and honesty on the
part of the respondent.
Respondents acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless
bring intolerable dishonor to the legal profession. They constitute gross
misconduct for which he may be disbarred or suspended pursuant to
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. -- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against
an erring lawyer, we take into account the primary purpose of disciplinary
proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.[32]While the assessment of what sanction may be imposed is
primarily addressed to our sound discretion, the sanction should neither
be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice. Rather, it should ever be controlled by the imperative need to
scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar.[33]
Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. We will not
hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers where the evidence calls for it.[34] Verily, given the peculiar factual
circumstances prevailing in this case, we find that respondents gross
misconduct calls for the severance of his privilege to practice law for life,
and we therefore adopt the penalty recommended by the Investigating
Commissioner.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando
S. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath, as
well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal
profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and
his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the personal files of the
respondent; all the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and
all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
ASntiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-martinez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
 25

Rule 10.01 – Truthfulness

Towards the Court
Rule 10.02 – Not to Misquote or Misrepresent Contents of Paper