SECOND DIVISION

ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ G.R. No. 164108

SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST
FARMERS HOLDING Present:
CORPORATION,
Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES, J.,*
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** and
BRION, JJ.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, THE HONORABLE Promulgated:
AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, May 8, 2009
Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX
JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was
survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto),
and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.[1] At the time of his death, there were two
pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-
9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with
petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178,
was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar
Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.[2]

On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78
of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent
Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to
be P5 Million, net of liabilities.[3] On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order
appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and
issuing letters of administration in her favor.[4] In January 2001, private respondent submitted an
Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her
deceased husband.[5] In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent
included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated
before the Bacolod City courts.[6] Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability
corresponding to the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137
and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.[7] Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private
respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the
estate.[8]

On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex

Abundanti Cautela,[9] praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion,
disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband.
Even before the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus
motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of
the required inventory of the decedents estate.[10] Petitioners also filed other pleadings or
motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her
administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as
unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the
ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court
to intervene in the intestate proceedings.[11] After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition
argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of
Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the
Bacolod RTC.

On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision[12] dismissing the petition
and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to
intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene,
according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of
Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent
or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.

Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying
them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto.
Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on
intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.[13]
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo.
First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished copies of all processes and orders issued by
the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said
court.[14] Second, they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by
administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon
submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same.[15] Third, petitioners moved that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administrator of her verified annual
account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect
thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and
disposition of the estate.[16]

The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule
on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule
19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court x x x While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude
petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the
legal interest required of an intervenor must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and
not simply contingent and expectant.[17]

Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure
necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased
persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court,[18] not the Rules on
Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that [i]n the absence of special provisions,
the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special
proceedings.

We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth
under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent
claim. The definition of intervention under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent
claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC,
and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it
were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would
not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the
right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our
focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.

In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle any interested persons or any
persons interested in the estate to participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate
proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which
recognizes the right of any person interested to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and
to file a petition for administration; (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice
of hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and to any
other persons believed to have interest in the estate; (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a
person interested in the estate to petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87,
which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased to complain to the court of
the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of
the decedents title or interest therein; (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the
time and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrators account to persons
interested; (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice to the persons
interested before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the
properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows any person interested in the
estate to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent,
after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.

Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or
implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice
to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and
published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice.[19] However, it
appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in
connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-
delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required
under Rule 86.[20] These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and
may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the
records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was
successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case[21] was already
pending review before this Court at the time of Benedictos death.

Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases
where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for
damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against
the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate
proceedings?

Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,[22] and it does provide
us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan
had filed an action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and during a hearing of
the case, learned that the same trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to
whom Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to
implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified
claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-
administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, and that the intestate
proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been terminated. When the trial court ordered
the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the pending civil case, the administrator moved
to close the intestate proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an
extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings
pending the termination of the civil case, and the Court affirmed such action.

If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only
pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it appearing that the property in
litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left
subject of administration and distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance
of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil
case will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination and
distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not
assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence because of
the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in
excess of its jurisdiction.

Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate
proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no
rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after the separate
action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section
1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal
property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an
injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or
administrator." What practical value would this provision have if the action against the
administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to close
the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule
is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property
alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate
action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These
rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed
by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x[23] (Emphasis supplied) [Citations
omitted]

It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in-

intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind such
pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: [t]he rulings of
this court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are
allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision on their action.[24]

Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable
interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just
creditors, but also any person interested or persons interested in the estate various specified
capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim
based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that
by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already
been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced
against it.

In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any
person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate
proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act
in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the
petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not
explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their
interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can
be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.

The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in
connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of
the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would
be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the
assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate
remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to
complain to the intestate court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently
conveyed.

At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and contingent
counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of
respondents submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes
and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent
or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of
merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all
court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent
claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately
offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.

Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court,
with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of petitioners to be
apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,[25] the Court
heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC judge,
praying that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which the
respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision
stating that the records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for
the inspection of any interested person x x x. The Court ruled that petitioners were interested
persons entitled to access the court records in the intestate proceedings. We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records tomonitor prompt compliance with the
Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the
completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an
annual accountingappears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money
against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his
estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x
x[26]

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is
an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings
upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being
preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging
their right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order or
pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the
intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means
by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or
all interested parties the petitioners as interested parties will be entitled to such notice. The
instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85
in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or
administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or
administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates;
and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of
the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted
inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.

We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the
submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the
estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual
account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect
thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and
disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.

Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and
appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from
appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his
administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of
administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to
perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the
party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these
duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and
available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the
estate.

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy
is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the
provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do
not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief.
After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to
answer for the debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary
to fulfill such purpose.

All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless,
as we have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules
on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as

persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and
rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased
Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174975 January 20, 2009

LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH

MONTAÑER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAÑER-DALUPAN,
Petitioners,
vs.
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI
CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER,
Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Shari’a District
Court, Fourth Shari’a Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 20061 and September 21,
2006.2

On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro
Montañer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City.3 Petitioners
Alejandro Montañer, Jr., Lillibeth Montañer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montañer-Dalupan
are their children.4 On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died.5

On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen
Liling S. Montañer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties
before the Shari’a District Court.6 The said complaint was entitled "Almahleen Liling S.
Montañer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro Montañer,
Sr., Luisa Kho Montañer, Lillibeth K. Montañer, Alejandro Kho Montañer, Jr., and Rhodora
Eleanor K. Montañer," and docketed as "Special Civil Action No. 7-05."7 In the said complaint,
private respondents made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr.
died; (2) the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the
decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S.
Montañer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list of the
properties comprising the estate of the decedent.8 Private respondents prayed for the Shari’a
District Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of the
decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent.9

Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the
Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr.,
because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the correct amount of
docket fees; and (3) private respondents’ complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to
establish filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and the decedent, pursuant to Article
175 of the Family Code.10

On November 22, 2005, the Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’
complaint. The district court held that Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its
jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims.11
On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 12 On December
28, 2005, petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the
motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing.13 On January 17, 2006, the Shari’a
District Court denied petitioners’ opposition.14 Despite finding that the said motion for
reconsideration "lacked notice of hearing," the district court held that such defect was cured as
petitioners "were notified of the existence of the pleading," and it took cognizance of the said
motion.15 The Shari’a District Court also reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration. 16

In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Shari’a District Court reconsidered its order
of dismissal dated November 22, 2005.17 The district court allowed private respondents to
adduce further evidence.18 In its second assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the Shari’a
District Court ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further
evidence, and pre-trial conference.19

Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues:

I.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT – MARAWI CITY LACKS JURISDICTION

OVER PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN CATHOLICS AND NON-MUSLIMS.

II.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT – MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE

JURISDICTION OVER "THE ESTATES AND PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO
MONTAÑER, SR." WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH
CAPACITY TO BE SUED.

III.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER

THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO
NON-PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND DOCKETING FEES.

IV.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT—MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
DENIED THE OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL.
WHICH WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A "NOTICE OF HEARING."

V.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT—MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET
SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS
THAT RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER SEEKS RECOGNITION
FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR. WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION PRESCRIBED
UPON THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR. ON MAY 26, 1995.

In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the Shari’a
District Court must be given the opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the
decedent is a Muslim in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction.20

Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims

Petitioners’ first argument, regarding the Shari’a District Court’s jurisdiction, is dependent on a
question of fact, whether the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this
argument is the premise that there has already been a determination resolving such a question of
fact. It bears emphasis, however, that the assailed orders did not determine whether the decedent
is a Muslim. The assailed orders did, however, set a hearing for the purpose of resolving this
issue.

Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Shari’a District Courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims:

ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. — (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over:

xxxx

(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased
Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators
or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property.

The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and
character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition.21 The designation given by parties to
their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the said
designation. Rather than rely on "a falsa descriptio or defective caption," courts are "guided by
the substantive averments of the pleadings."22

Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari’a District Court as
a "Complaint" for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim,23 such as the
fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said
petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as known to the
private respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the very
properties sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal
that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the
decedent.24 These include the following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the
decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate.

We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have
jurisdiction over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that
Montañer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its
subject matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer25 or a motion to
dismiss.26 Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant27 or result in
having "a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple
stratagem.28 Indeed, the "defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of fact
does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction." 29

The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss.30 In the case at bar, the
Shari’a District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a
defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Shari’a District Court has the
authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires
an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a District
Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Special Proceedings

The underlying assumption in petitioners’ second argument, that the proceeding before the
Shari’a District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an
erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may be
attributed to the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court, where the parties were designated
either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action. We
reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special
proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." This Court has
applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate
of a deceased Muslim.31 In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement,
and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and
later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs, which would allow them to exercise
their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent.32 Here,
the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and, subsequently,
for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among his heirs, if
such is the case in fact.

Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party
defendant in a civil action33 applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate
of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special
proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special
proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a party
sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong"34 necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant.35 On
the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a
particular fact,"36 has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status,
right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that
the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the
purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the
estate,37 pay its liabilities,38 and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.39

Docket Fees

Petitioners’ third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment of
docket fees, is untenable. Petitioners point to private respondents’ petition in the proceeding
before the court a quo, which contains an allegation estimating the decedent’s estate as the basis
for the conclusion that what private respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient.
Petitioners’ argument essentially involves two aspects: (1) whether the clerk of court correctly
assessed the docket fees; and (2) whether private respondents paid the correct assessment of the
docket fees.

Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.40 If the party filing the case paid less than
the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of
court, the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of court.41
In such a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a
party’s reliance on the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment of the docket fees.42 As "every
citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties
knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law," the party filing the case cannot be
penalized with the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment.43 However, the party concerned will
be required to pay the deficiency.44

In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of court’s assessment of the docket fees.
Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be no determination of whether
private respondents correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of court’s assessment.

Exception to Notice of Hearing

Petitioners’ fourth argument, that private respondents’ motion for reconsideration before the
Shari’a District Court is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique
circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to this requirement. The Rules require
every written motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to address the notice of hearing
to all parties concerned.45 The Rules also provide that "no written motion set for hearing shall
be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof."46 However, the Rules allow a
liberal construction of its provisions "in order to promote [the] objective of securing a just,
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."47 Moreover, this Court has
upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of hearing in cases where "a rigid
application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party
successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not
apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein."48 In these exceptional cases, the
Court considers that "no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities," and for this
reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits rather than on
technicalities.49

The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Shari’a District Court of an opportunity
to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a
decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to control its
process to ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a situation simply
because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of justice.

In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing,
because the rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to
the rules on notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not
affected.50 The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with procedural due process,51 for the
court to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not
fix any period within which to file a reply or opposition.52 In probate proceedings, "what the
law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of
opportunity to be heard."53 In the case at bar, as evident from the Shari’a District Court’s order
dated January 17, 2006, petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the motion for reconsideration
in question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the
said motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Shari’a District Court reset the
hearing for the motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the
opportunity to object to the said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show
that the purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural process, was duly observed.

Prescription and Filiation

Petitioners’ fifth argument is premature. Again, the Shari’a District Court has not yet
determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the event that a
special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding
heirship, including prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and
settled in the said proceeding.54 The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to
declare who are the heirs of the decedent.55 In the case at bar, the determination of the heirs of
the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the Shari’a District
Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Shari’a District Court,
dated August 22, 2006 and September 21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against
petitioners.
Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN, namely: LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN,
PEREGRINO GABATAN, REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA GABATAN AND JESUS
JABINIS, RIORITA GABATAN TUMALA and FREIRA GABATAN, Petitioners,
vs.
Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES EVERO PACANA, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the
Decision1 dated April 28, 2000, and Resolution2 dated September 12, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 52273. The challenged Decision affirmed the decision 3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, dated October 20, 1995 in
Civil Case No. 89-092, an action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession,
thereat commenced by respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against petitioners, heirs of Teofilo
Gabatan, Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado.

Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified as Lot 3095 C-5
and situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was declared for taxation in
the name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC, respondent alleged that she is the
sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena
Gabatan Evero (Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that her mother, Hermogena, is the
only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the
death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo),
and Teofilo’s wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration. It was also claimed that prior to her death
Hermogena demanded for the return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogena’s death,
respondent also did the same but petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender
the subject property. According to respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners Jesus
Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado took possession of the disputed land despite respondent’s
demands for them to vacate the same.

In their answer, petitioners denied that respondent’s mother Hermogena was the daughter of
Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of
Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any
issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the
subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse,
continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty
(50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole
world including respondent. Petitioners clarified that Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado
have no interest in the subject land; the former is merely the husband of Teofilo’s daughter
while the latter is just a caretaker. Petitioners added that a similar case was previously filed by
respondent against Teofilo’s wife, Rita Vda. de Gabatan, on February 21, 1978, docketed as
Civil Case No. 5840 but the case was dismissed on May 3, 1983 for lack of interest. Finally,
petitioners contended that the complaint lacks or states no cause of action or, if there was any,
the same has long prescribed and/or has been barred by laches.

On June 20, 1989, the complaint was amended wherein the heirs of Teofilo were individually
named, to wit: Lolita Gabatan, Pompeyo Gabatan, Peregrino Gabatan, Reynaldo Gabatan, Nila
Gabatan and Jesus Jabinis, Riorita Gabatan Tumal and Freira Gabatan.

On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an amended answer, additionally alleging that the disputed
land was already covered by OCT No. P-3316 in the name of the heirs of Juan Gabatan
represented by petitioner Riorita Gabatan (Teofilo’s daughter).

On October 20, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants,
declaring the plaintiff the owner of Lot No. 3095 C-5 situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan
de Oro City; and ordering the defendants represented by Riorita Gabatan Tumala to
RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No. P-3316 in favor of plaintiff Lourdes Evero
Pacana, free of any encumbrance; ordering the defendants to pay ₱10,000.00 by way of moral
damages; ₱10,000.00 as Attorney’s fees; and ₱2,000.00 for litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED.4

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA whereat their recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 52273.

On April 28, 2000, the CA rendered the herein challenged Decision affirming that of the RTC.
Dispositively, the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned decision of the lower court dated October
20, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Discounting petitioners’ argument that respondent is not related to Juan Gabatan, the CA
declared that respondent’s claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established
during trial. Thus, the CA echoed a long line of jurisprudence that findings of fact of the trial
court are entitled to great weight and are not disturbed except for cogent reasons, such as when
the findings of fact are not supported by evidence.

The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale5 executed by Macaria Gabatan de
Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena was identified as
an heir of Juan Gabatan:
x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and presently residing
at Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, as Heir of the deceased, JUAN GABATAN; x x
x.

To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such declaration which was
signed by Teofilo and the latter’s nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a tangible proof that they
acknowledged Hermogena’s status as the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Applying Section 38, Rule
1306 of the Rules of Court on the declaration against interest, the CA ruled that petitioners could
not deny that even their very own father, Teofilo formally recognized Hermogena’s right to
heirship from Juan Gabatan which ultimately passed on to respondent.

As to the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that petitioners’ possession of the disputed property
could not ripen into acquisitive prescription because their predecessor-in-interest, Teofilo, never
held the property in the concept of an owner.lawphil.net

Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court via the present recourse principally contending
that the CA committed the following reversible errors:

FIRST ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that Juan Gabatan died single and
without issue;

SECOND ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring the plaintiff-appellee (respondent)
as the sole and surviving heir of Juan Gabatan, the only child of a certain Hermogena
Clareto "GABATAN";

THIRD ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring that a certain Hermogena Clareto
"GABATAN" is the child and sole heir of Juan Gabatan;

FOURTH ERROR: The lower court erred in failing to appreciate by preponderance of

evidence in favor of the defendants-appellants (petitioners) claim that they and the heirs
of Justa and Macaria both surnamed Gabatan are the sole and surviving heirs of Juan
Gabatan and, therefore, entitled to inherit the land subject matter hereof;

FIFTH ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that the cause of action of
plaintiff-appellee (respondent) if any, has been barred by laches and/or prescription.7

Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we must pass upon certain preliminary matters.

In general, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. Questions of fact cannot be the subject of this particular mode of
appeal, for this Court is not a trier of facts.8 It is not our function to examine and evaluate the
probative value of the evidence presented before the concerned tribunal upon which its
impugned decision or resolution is based.91avvphi1

However, there are established exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of the findings of fact
by the lower courts, such as (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.10

Moreover, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive the
lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned. Thus, the Court is
clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the
appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical
errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the
case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not
specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record
having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower
court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error
assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a
question properly assigned, is dependent. 11

In the light of the foregoing established doctrines, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the
case.

The respondent’s main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of ownership and
possession of property. It is undisputed that the subject property, Lot 3095 C-5, was owned by
the deceased Juan Gabatan, during his lifetime.12 Before us are two contending parties, both
insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent.

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be
made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery
of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made
in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil
action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners
here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.13
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,14 this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship
must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was
reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals15 where the Court held:

xxx where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they
claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman,
hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his
marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-
appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal
properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this
Court, we ruled that ‘such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent)
is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in
Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in
issue until the presentation of the project of partition.

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes,16 the Court reiterated its ruling
that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper
probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such
rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang,17 this Court held that the status of an illegitimate
child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent’s estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary
civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.

However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,18 where the
Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to
determine the status of the party therein as heirs, to wit:

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of
Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to
a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and
expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the
parties to the civil case – subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented
evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’
status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners (Vide Pereira v. Court of
Appeals, 174 SCRA 154 [1989]; Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 [1955]),
the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial
and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x. (emphasis
supplied)
Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the
contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to
dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as
the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-
092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the
same and consequently rendered judgment thereon.

We GRANT the petition.

After a meticulous review of the records of this case, we find insufficient and questionable the
basis of the RTC in conferring upon respondent the status of sole heir of Juan Gabatan.

Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of the property, pinned her
claim entirely on her alleged status as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her to
present preponderant evidence in support of her complaint.

Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the
Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.

ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be
proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.

ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession
of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.

Here, two conflicting birth certificates19 of respondent were presented at the RTC. Respondent,
during her direct testimony, presented and identified a purported certified true copy of her
typewritten birth certificate which indicated that her mother’s maiden name was "Hermogena
Clarito Gabatan." Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a certified true copy of respondent’s
handwritten birth certificate which differed from the copy presented by respondent. Among the
differences was respondent’s mother’s full maiden name which was indicated as "Hermogena
Calarito" in the handwritten birth certificate.

In resolving this particular issue, the trial court ruled in this wise:

The parties are trying to outdo with (sic) each other by presenting two conflicting Certificate
(sic) of Live Birth of plaintiff herein, Lourdes Evero Pacana, which are Exhibit "A" for the
plaintiff and Exhibit "1" for the defendants. Which of this (sic) is genuine, and which is
falsified. These (sic) issue is crucial and requires serious scrutiny. The Court is of the
observation that Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff which is a certified true copy is in due form and
bears the "as is and where is" rule. It has the impression of the original certificate. The forms
(sic) is an old one used in the 1950’s. Her mother’s maiden name appearing thereof is
Hermogina (sic) Clarito Gabatan. While Exhibit "1", the entries found thereof (sic) is
handwritten which is very unusual and of dubious source. The form used is of latest vintage.
The entry on the space for mother’s maiden name is Hermogena Calarito. There seems to be an
apparent attempt to thwart plaintiff’s mother filiation with the omission of the surname
Gabatan. Considering these circumstances alone the Court is inclined to believe that Exhibit
"A" for the plaintiff is far more genuine and authentic certificate of live birth.20

Having carefully examined the questioned birth certificates, we simply cannot agree with the
above-quoted findings of the trial court. To begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial court noted, was
an original typewritten document, not a mere photocopy or facsimile. It uses a form of 1950’s
vintage21 but this Court is unable to concur in the trial court’s finding that Exhibit 122 was of a
later vintage than Exhibit A which was one of the trial court’s bases for doubting the
authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the contrary, the printed notation on the upper left hand corner of
Exhibit 1 states "Municipal Form No. 102 – (Revised, January 1945)" which makes it an older
form than Exhibit A. Thus, the trial court’s finding regarding which form was of more recent
vintage was manifestly contradicted by the evidence on record. No actual signature appears on
Exhibit A except that of a certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy Local Civil Registrar of the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City, who purportedly certified on July 6, 1977
that Exhibit A was a true copy of respondent’s birth certificate. The names of the attendant at
birth (Petra Sambaan) and the local civil registrar (J.L. Rivera) in 1950 were typewritten with
the notation "(Sgd.)" also merely typewritten beside their names. The words "A certified true
copy: July 6, 1977" above the signature of Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear to be
inscribed by the same typewriter as the very entries in Exhibit A. It would seem that Exhibit A
and the information stated therein were prepared and entered only in 1977. Significantly,
Maximo P. Noriga was never presented as a witness to identify Exhibit A. Said document and
the signature of Maximo P. Noriga therein were identified by respondent herself whose self-
serving testimony cannot be deemed sufficient authentication of her birth certificate.

We cannot subscribe to the trial court’s view that since the entries in Exhibit 1 were
handwritten, Exhibit 1 was the one of dubious credibility. Verily, the certified true copies of the
handwritten birth certificate of respondent (petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly
authenticated by two competent witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms. Vidal), Assistant
Registration Officer of the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and
Maribeth E. Cacho (Ms. Cacho), Archivist of the National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa,
Manila. Both witnesses testified that: (a) as part of their official duties they have custody of
birth records in their respective offices,23 and (b) the certified true copy of respondent’s
handwritten birth certificate is a faithful reproduction of the original birth certificate registered
in their respective offices.24 Ms. Vidal, during her testimony, even brought the original of the
handwritten birth certificate before the trial court and respondent’s counsel confirmed that the
certified true copy (which was eventually marked as Exhibit 1) was a faithful reproduction of
the original.25 Ms. Vidal likewise categorically testified that no other copy of respondent’s birth
certificate exists in their records except the handwritten birth certificate.26 Ms. Cacho, in turn,
testified that the original of respondent’s handwritten birth certificate found in the records of the
NSO Manila (from which Exhibit 8 was photocopied) was the one officially transmitted to their
office by the Local Civil Registry Office of Cagayan de Oro.27 Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho
testified and brought their respective offices’ copies of respondent’s birth certificate in
compliance with subpoenas issued by the trial court and there is no showing that they were
motivated by ill will or bias in giving their testimonies. Thus, between respondent’s Exhibit A
and petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8, the latter documents deserve to be given greater probative
weight.

Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate presented by respondent
(Exhibit A) is a reliable document, the same on its face is insufficient to prove respondent’s
filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had been credible and
authentic, would have proven was that respondent’s mother was a certain "Hermogena Clarito
Gabatan." It does not prove that same "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan" is the daughter of Juan
Gabatan. Even the CA held that the conflicting certificates of live birth of respondent submitted
by the parties only proved the filiation of respondent to Hermogena.28

It was absolutely crucial to respondent’s cause of action that she convincingly proves the
filiation of her mother to Juan Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondent’s
mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the
record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In
the absence of these, respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two
classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules
of Court of her mother’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.

However, respondent’s mother’s (Hermogena’s) birth certificate, which would have been the
best evidence of Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at
the RTC. Neither did respondent present any authentic document or final judgment
categorically evidencing Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.

Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima Nagac Pacana
and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who testified that they personally knew Hermogena (respondent’s
mother) and/or Juan Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan was married to Laureana Clarito and
that Hermogena was the child of Juan and Laureana. However, none of these witnesses had
personal knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of birth of
Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They were not yet born or were very young when Juan
supposedly married Laureana or when Hermogena was born and they all admitted that none of
them were present at Juan and Laureana’s wedding or Hermogena’s birth. These witnesses
based their testimony on what they had been told by, or heard from, others as young children.
Their testimonies were, in a word, hearsay.

Other circumstances prevent us from giving full faith to respondent’s witnesses’ testimonies.
The records would show that they cannot be said to be credible and impartial witnesses. Frisco
Lawan testified that he was the son of Laureana by a man other than Juan Gabatan and was
admittedly not at all related to Juan Gabatan.29 His testimony regarding the relationships within
the Gabatan family is hardly reliable. As for Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac
Villareal who are children of Justa Gabatan Nagac,30 this Court is wary of according probative
weight to their testimonies since respondent admitted during her cross-examination that her
(respondent’s) husband is the son of Felicisima Nagac Pacana.31 In other words, although these
witnesses are indeed blood relatives of petitioners, they are also the mother and the aunt of
respondent’s husband. They cannot be said to be entirely disinterested in the outcome of the
case.

Aside from the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily
on a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale32 (Exhibit H) presented by respondent and which
appeared to be signed by the siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this
document involving the sale of a lot different from Lot 3095 C-5, "Hermogena Gabatan as heir
of the deceased Juan Gabatan" was indicated as one of the vendors. The RTC deemed the
statement therein as an affirmation or recognition by Teofilo Gabatan, petitioners’ predecessor
in interest, that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan.33 The CA considered the
same statement as a declaration against interest on the part of Teofilo Gabatan.34

However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the signatures
therein, as competent evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected to by petitioners’
counsel for being a mere photocopy and not being properly authenticated.35 After a close
scrutiny of the said photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court cannot uphold the
admissibility of the same.

Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself.36 Although the best
evidence rule admits of exceptions and there are instances where the presentation of secondary
evidence would be allowed, such as when the original is lost or the original is a public record,
the basis for the presentation of secondary evidence must still be established. Thus, in
Department of Education Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario,37 we held that a party must first
satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary
evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation
for non-production of the original instrument.

In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac Pacana (who
identified the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that she gave no
testimony regarding the whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or whether it was
recorded in any public office.

There is an ostensible attempt to pass off Exhibit H as an admissible public document. For this,
respondent relied on the stamped notation on the photocopy of the deed that it is a certified true
xerox copy and said notation was signed by a certain Honesto P. Velez, Sr., Assessment
Officer, who seems to be an officer in the local assessor’s office. Regarding the authentication
of public documents, the Rules of Court38 provide that the record of public documents, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy.39 The attestation of
the certifying officer must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be.40

To begin with, no proof whatsoever was presented by respondent that an original of Exhibit H
was registered or exists in the records of the local assessor’s office. Furthermore, the stamped
certification of Honesto P. Velez is insufficient authentication of Exhibit H since Velez’s
certification did not state that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Even worse, Velez
was not presented as a witness to attest that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Indeed,
it is highly doubtful that Velez could have made such an attestation since the assessor’s office is
not the official repository of original notarized deeds of sale and could not have been the legal
custodian contemplated in the rules.

It is the notary public who is mandated by law to keep an original of the Deed of Absolute Sale
in his notarial register and to forward the same to the proper court. It is the notary public or the
proper court that has custody of his notarial register that could have produced the original or a
certified true copy thereof. Instead, the Deed of Absolute Sale was identified by Felicisima
Nagac Pacana who, despite appearing to be a signatory thereto, is not a disinterested witness
and as can be gleaned from her testimony, she had no personal knowledge of the preparation of
the alleged certified true copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale. She did not even know who
secured a copy of Exhibit H from the assessor’s office.41 To be sure, the roundabout and
defective manner of authentication of Exhibit H renders it inadmissible for the purpose it was
offered, i.e. as proof that Teofilo Gabatan acknowledged or admitted the status of Hermogena
Gabatan as heir of Juan Gabatan.

Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper authentication of Exhibit H and consider the same
admissible, it still nonetheless would have only provided proof that a certain Hermogena
Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H does not show the filiation of respondent to
either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan Gabatan. As discussed above, the only document that
respondent produced to demonstrate her filiation to "Hermogena Gabatan" (respondent’s
Exhibit A) was successfully put in doubt by contrary evidence presented by petitioners.

As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to likewise rule against respondent. According to
respondent’s own testimony,42 Juan Gabatan died sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of
action of the heirs of Juan Gabatan to recover the decedent’s property from third parties or to
quiet title to their inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet, respondent and/or her mother Hermogena, if
they were truly the legal heirs of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their rights as such. It is only in
1978 that respondent filed her first complaint to recover the subject property, docketed as Civil
Case No. 5840, against Rita Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo Gabatan.43 However, that case was
dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute.44 Again, respondent waited until 1989 to
refile her cause of action, i.e. the present case.45 She claimed that she waited until the death of
Rita Gabatan to refile her case out of respect because Rita was then already old.46

We cannot accept respondent’s flimsy reason. It is precisely because Rita Gabatan and her
contemporaries (who might have personal knowledge of the matters litigated in this case) were
advancing in age and might soon expire that respondent should have exerted every effort to
preserve valuable evidence and speedily litigate her claim. As we held in Republic of the
Philippines v. Agunoy: "Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law aids the
vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights…[O]ne may not sleep on a right while expecting to
preserve it in its pristine purity."47

All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing,
credible and independently verifiable proof, her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan
Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under litigation. Aggravating the weakness of her
evidence were the circumstances that (a) she did not come to court with clean hands for she
presented a tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her certificate of live birth and (b)
she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action. If the Court cannot now
affirm her claim, respondent has her own self to blame.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision in CA-G.R. CV

No. 52273, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 89-092, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint and amended complaint in Civil Case No.
89-092 are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Fule vs. CA [G.R. No. L-79094. June 22, 1988]

15 Aug

Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court, which
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting
petitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing
Checks Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution and
the defense during the pre-trial conference in the Trial Court. At the hearing of August 23,
1985, only the prosecution presented its evidence. At the subsequent hearing on September 17,
1985, petitioner-appellant waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a
Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-
appellant.

On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the
judgment of conviction. Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that the
Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals erred in the decision of the Regional Trial Court
convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the
conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on August 8,
1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel. In Sec.4 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedures:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made or entered
during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to
writing and signed by him and his counsel. (Rule 118) [Emphasis supplied]

Having been effective since January 01, 1985, the above rule is applicable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily
required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence.

HELD:

YES. Judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby ordered
RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of
Lucena City, for further reception of evidence.

RATIO:

By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative
words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely
directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]). The use of the term “shall” further
emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty
which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176).
And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by
consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the
accused (People vs. Terrado No. L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).

MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
FACTS
Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and his common-law wife Ma. Lourdes
Belen. When Eliseo died intestate, Elise represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las Piñas City in order to preserve the estate of
Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value. She likewise sought her appointment as
administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with her two children, filed an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue asserting that Eliseo was a
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper
venue,
the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed
administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon
posting the necessary bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by
the
Court of Appeals. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise
was
able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a
common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from
1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the
decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.
2. Whether or not Elise is qualified to be administrator of the estate.
HELD:

1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the
decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from
that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13
Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed
or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the
same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing
more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming
the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid
in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
2. Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s
estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of
interest
in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a
compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate
are
satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural
children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO,
LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO,
CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla Law Office for petitioner.

Jalandoni and Jamir for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964, and its subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July
1964 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:

On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital,
Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons,
Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St.,
Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents herein,
namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco,
Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.

On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator)1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco
filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc.
No. 2433-R), alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25
February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and
personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order
setting the petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the
heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a
newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.

The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one
released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to be heard at Branch II
instead of Branch I of the said Cebu court. On the same date, a third order was further issued
stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special administrator
dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as reasons
the following:

It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly
acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice
of hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies of the petition
have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic petition for the
issuance of letters of administration.2

In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu petition)
herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal
(Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of
letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and
testament. The said proceeding was docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.

Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco
filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as
an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10
April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's
motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the
petition for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the
deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco."3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to the probate
proceedings in the Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be
reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did they challenge the same by certiorari or
prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.

Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated
10 April 1964, opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon
City court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp.
Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the
Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a
principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding."4 The said
court further found in said order that the residence of the late senator at the time of his death
was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order
follows:

On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition and

motion to dismiss reads as follows: "that since the decedent Don Mariano Jesus
Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his death, the aforesaid
petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not filed with the
proper Court (wrong venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of
the New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to
understand that the oppositors do not mean to say that the decedent being a
resident of Cebu City when he died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should
prevail over the probate proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the
probate of the will should take precedence, but that the probate proceedings should
be filed in the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire
of the oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also be entertained as
proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of the will indicates that
Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a resident of Quezon City
at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco)
of the petition for probate of the will shows that the decedent at the time when he
executed his Last Will clearly stated that he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta.
Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as
his first choice and the latter as his second choice of residence." If a party has two
residences, the one will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself
selects or considers to be his home or which appears to be the center of his affairs.
The petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before this Court, follows the first
choice of residence of the decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction of the
probate proceeding it is to the exclusion of all others.5

Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said order
of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as deferred to
by the Cebu court was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated
20 May 1964 was likewise denied.

On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate of the
last will of the decedent was called three times at half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due
notification none of the oppositors appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m.
with the hearing in their absence.

As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court noted that
respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their opposition and motion to dismiss on
the following grounds:
 (a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;

(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on
the part of the beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit;

(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted
by mistake and did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at
the time he affixed his signature thereto.6

The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing
had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and
after receiving the testimony of the three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will,
namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the
notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and the documentary
evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport,
deed of donation) all indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon
City, as also affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15 May
1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as having been "freely and
voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed
petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in
his will as probated.

Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and
naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action of
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals
(docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case No.
Q-7898.

On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents

(petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding that:

Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc.
2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction
was first invoked and which first attached. It is that court which can properly and
exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not
leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the
time of his death.

Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI
(Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said court must exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate was
filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898). The
said respondent should assert her rights within the framework of the proceeding in
the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court.
 The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge
Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated that the
petition for appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready for the
consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act
thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . "
It is sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge was certainly not
referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is
acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise of jurisdiction
in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all events, jurisdiction is conferred
and determined by law and does not depend on the pronouncements of a trial
judge.

The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing the
respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and the
respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually from proceeding and
taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said respondent
court. All orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore taken by said respondent
court and respondent Judge, therein and connected therewith, are hereby annulled.
The writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent Court of

Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition for review on certiorari.

The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court erred in law in
issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually
from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and
actions, particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and testament and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance with the testator's
express wish in his testament. This issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate
court, to wit, whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 expressly
consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings that it (the
Quezon City court) should first act "on the petition for probate of the document purporting to be
the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which order of the
Cebu court respondents never questioned nor challenged by prohibition or certiorari
proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon City court to proceed without any impediment or
obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate
proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, to proceed with the hearing of the
petition and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its due execution and
authenticity.
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the
writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings
and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of
the deceased's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish, for the following considerations:
—

1. The Judiciary Act7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance
over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73,
section of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule
indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may
properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts." The cited Rule provides:

Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant

of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the Province in which he resides at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of the
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence, of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in
a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)8

It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. This was lucidly stated by
the late Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa vs. Co Ho9 as follows:

We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases the
place of residence of the deceased is regarded as a question of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter. But we decline to follow this view because of its mischievous
consequences. For instance, a probate case has been submitted in good faith to the
Court of First Instance of a province where the deceased had not resided. All the
parties, however, including all the creditors, have submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court and the case is therein completely finished except for a
claim of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from
an adverse decision raises for the first time in this Court the question of jurisdiction
of the trial court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province. If we
consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial
court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings
including all decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in court will
have to be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced anew before
 another court of the same rank in another province. That this is of mischievous
effect in the prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require comment.
(Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942)
Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a deceased
person shall be settled in the province where he had last resided, could not have
been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-
matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing
merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is
one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney-General vs.
Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction — Act No. 136,
11 Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all
probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Since,
however, there are many courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of
Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case
shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground
that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person
shall be settled is properly called "venue".

It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or
intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.

The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts."

A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and
co-ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must
also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it
to the exclusion of all other courts.

Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will
has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and
resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the
intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may
decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead
defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged
last will.

2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to
dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the
dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition for
probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly
admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take
cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and
improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all
other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to
resolve the question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at the time of his
death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as
claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance
of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter
would make a negative finding as to the probate petition and the residence of the decedent
within its territory and venue.

3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring
to the Quezon City court.

Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction
in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the
Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise
jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is
undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had
at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.

Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City
court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts.

Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their
opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due
notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted
without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow
as executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.

4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental 12 with
facts analogous to the present case 13 is authority against respondent appellate court's
questioned decision.

In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate
proceedings in this wise:

It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of
the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate
succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for
the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with
settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the
same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
 proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent
had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the
intestate proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate
in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This however, is
understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or
is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted
to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy
priority over intestate proceedings. 14

The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case, the Quezon
City court) although opining that certain considerations therein "would seem to support the
view that [therein respondent] should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court,
[in this case, the Cebu court] either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion
for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344," 15 thus:

But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court,
Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not
accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider
said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable

procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant
case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to raise
such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in
this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan
Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition
to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise
was served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the
Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court
since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the
dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only
on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No.
51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and
annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the
Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to
admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on
October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the
probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had
in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence.
Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul
proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper
venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in
some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where
the objection against said proceedings is raised too late. 16
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the
decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and
finding that Quezon City was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal
home and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court —
could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The last paragraph
of said Rule expressly provides:

... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of

residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)

The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could
probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon
City court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court
had taken cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.

6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late senator, the
appellate court while recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja
vs. Tan 17 that.

... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court is
considered to prevail in the exercise jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of First
Instance of Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that the question of
the residence of the deceased is a serious one, requiring both factual and legal
resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be submitted in the ordinary course of
procedure in the first instance, particularly in view of the fact that the deceased was
better known as the Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also gives
Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that this matter requires
airing in the proper court, as so indicated in the leading and controlling case of
Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.

In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition
first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in
effect asked the Quezon City court to determine the residence of the decedent and whether he
did leave a last will and testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate
proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for
both courts — at the behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court — that
Quezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper
venue, the Borja ruling would seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the practical
ends of justice to still require the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as
indicated in the decision under review, to determine for itself the actual residence of the
decedent (when the Quezon City court had already so determined Quezon City as the actual
residence at the Cebu court's behest and respondents have not seriously questioned this factual
finding based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should likewise determine
Quezon City as the actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to
allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding
proceedings in Quezon City.

7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into
consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a will must
show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held
by the Court in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his residence at the
time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, his having left his estate in such province."

This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will
is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is
a constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court
is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by a court having
jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The Quezon City court
acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not
the proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting
the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the
Quezon city court's action should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed lack of
jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and should instead be sustained in
line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the
Manila court's action admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in
accordance therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this Court
is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the
proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some
other court of similar jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the
mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of considering the question of residence as
affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all
over again the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province "is
too obvious to require comment."

8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the decedent's
relatives gets first to file a petition for settlement of the decedent's estate, then the established
jurisprudence of the Court that Rule 73, section 1 provides only a rule of venue in order to
preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so and creating
conflicts between them to the detriment of the administration of justice, and that venue is
waivable, would be set at naught. As between relatives who unfortunately do not see eye to eye,
it would be converted into a race as to who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her
choice regardless of whether the decedent is still in cuerpo presente and in disregard of the
decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last will and testament and the right of his
surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire consequences were certainly not
intended by the Rule nor would they be in consonance with public policy and the orderly
administration of justice.
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable
rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had
filed an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred
to the Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the
decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and petitioned for
letters testamentary and is admittedly entitled to preference in the administration of her
husband's estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way
to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by
asking that the intestate proceedings be converted into a testate proceeding — when under the
Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record and as already
affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow
had their conjugal domicile.

It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix
of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her
rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more
time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an
important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.

It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, section 2, 21
since petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the death of her husband, their community
property and conjugal estate have to be administered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of
the deceased spouse. Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides in
Quezon City, and the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the
Quezon City court properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the
deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise of jurisdiction would
be nullified and petitioner would have to continually leave her residence in Quezon City and go
to Cebu to settle and liquidate even her own community property and conjugal estate with the
decedent.

10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without
jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate
petition and instead deferring to the testate proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as
surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the record before it
(the petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of the allegation in the
intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents
never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April
1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter
free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the
decedent's will to probate.

For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without
jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate and
appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of
the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not
of jurisdiction.

Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15,
1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court
concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has long since become
final and can not be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.

11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority
over all inferior courts, 22 it may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that
venue was properly assumed by and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the
interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent of the
Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of
petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and
all its orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized
rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same
proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the
Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the
strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal
residence of the decedent.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is
ordered dismissed. No costs.