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A Critique of The Rajamannar Committee Report PDF
A Critique of The Rajamannar Committee Report PDF
have more often been missed; and it has been more often than not forgot
ten that the constitutions of no two countries are the same. The compari
sons do not go far; and should merely help appreciate the unique peculia
rities of the constitutional systems in the background of the national
history, aspirations, ideals, values and needs for national consolidation,
and the imperatives of social and economic development of the two
countries.
For the major part of the period under review the debate on the
centre-state relations wasless than acrimonious because, the political power
was held, both at the Centre and the state levels by the same party which
could also take the credit to have played a near decisive role in the
Constitution-making. The instances, if any, when this party was out of
office in the states were few, in respect of the States of Kerala and Orissa.
The National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir did not differ much
from the Congress Party and that state too could unmistakenly be said to
be under its sway. The non-Congress parties especially the Communist
Marxist Party after the split in the Communist Party of India in the State
of Kerala, and the state parties like the DMK (Dravida Munnetra
Kazhgam) of Tamil Nadu (formerly, Madras State) in the South and the
Akalis in the North, all post-Independence parties generated heat in the
centre-state relations debate after assuming offices, of course, for brief
periods respectively, in Kerala and West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and the
Punjab. For political reasons they joined hands, and seemingly held out
that the Union which now exists was not the same as contemplated by the
Constituent Assembly. They contended that the Congress Party effected
changes in the centre-state relations in the course of its near monopoly in
political power unquestioned for long. If not by design, by considerations
of functional efficiency and absence of any effective opposition and non-
existence of any viable challenge to i:s exclusive control of power,
it did not make much of a distinction between the state and the party.
The centres of decision-making shifted to the party organs, most notably,
the Congress High Command, and Parliament and the state legis
lature merely implemented the deiisions and policies approved by it. The
states' governments could have no separate programme, much less any
separate thinking, theory or philosophy. They would be controlled by the
party High Command in mind and action, and would have no separate
political-constitutional identity. The political and constitutional images of
the states were eclipsed by the shadows of the party units.
Be that as it may, the long spell of the Congress Party dominance was
broken following the fourth general elections held in early 1967. The
Congress was reduced to a shambles by the electoral flows. Precariously it
manoeuvred to remain in nower at the Centre: and for the first time, the
A Critique of the Rajamctnnar Committee Report 257
country was under a government devoid of unquestioned political sway
throughout the land. The non-Congress parties and the dissident factions
of the Congress Party formed a number of coalitions—United Fronts and
Samyukt Vidhayak Dais in Bihar, Kerala, Orissa, the Punjab, Uttar
Pradesh and West Bengal; and the DMK secured an exclusive electoral
mandate in Tamil Nadu. Each one of the non-Congress parties differed
from the other and no two of them shared any common political theory or
had any shared economic programme; but all of them were united in their
anti-Congress posture. They were strange bed follows; but impelled still
to join hands against the Congress, of course, temporarily. When in office
they raised an anti-Centre hue. This was dictated by sheer political expe
diency and their common political objective to keep themselves in office
only if they were to be suffered in control of the states for any length of
time. They thought they had to make their noisy presence felt and
maintained. The verbalists of the United Fronts in Kerala and West
Bengal raised a clamour of a loud noise and a rhetoric against the Union,
and against the so-called Union colonialism and interference in the states'
domain. Not only they protested angrily against the Union presence in the
states, but they also verbalised the high offices established by the Constitution,
particularly, that of the Governor. They raised hostile slogans against
the Governor, doubted his responsibilities and challenged his obligations and
duties entrusted to him by the Constitution, the President and the Central
Government and as the constitutional head of the state government. They
cried wolf at imaginary threats of central interference and started a quixotic
struggle against the Union for putting an end to the possible central inter
vention and for getting the so-called states' due share in revenues and
policy formulations. They lodged strong noisy protests against the ab
extra the Central thrust into the states' domain and warned against
such intervention in the states' affairs—political, administrative and
economic.
realistic Janus-faced policy in its relations with the Centre. With its front
face it spoke of cooperation and coordination so far as it would advance
the state interests with the Central Government; and did not hesitate to
evolve an electoral understanding with the Congress Party after its split in
the course of the Presidential election in 1969. With its other face, it
evolved an expansive theory of the states' rights and powers under the
Constitution; and raised a murmur against the mounting central inter
ference in the state affairs with the Damocles' sword hung over the head of
the state government in the shape of the President's rule. It put forth a
demand for restoration of the real constitutional powers of a state govern
ment which, it maintained, had been eclipsed by the practices and pro
grammes pursued by the central government since the commencement of
the Constitution. So to say, it made the demand of state autonomy,
which a date remains unarticulated. The DMK spokesmen have spared
no pains to emphasise that the DMK demand for greater autonomy is
more in the nature of restoration of the rights given to the states under
the Constitution. It is different from and must be distinguished from the
autonomy demand raised by certain leaders of the State of Jammu and
Kashmir. M. Karunanidhi, the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, said:
"They are not the same, though both of us (Sheikh Abdullah and me)
voice the demand for autonomy, the DMK's demand differed in many
ways." He explained the difference by referring to the rights enjoyed by
Kashmir and the powers conferred on other states by the Constitution.
He further said that no time limit had been fixed to achieve the DMK
autonomy demand. The specific points made by him from time to time
include the following :
II
The scheme and the pattern of distribution of legislative powers
detailed in Part XI chapter 1 of the Constitution by and large stood the
test of times. The plan sets the guidelines for the power structure and
relations—legislative as well as the executive between the Union and the
states. It lays stress more on power sharing than upon power distribu
tion—a concept deemed essential by the conformist federalists. Under the
plan the power is shared; and the manner of sharing, it must be conceded,
allots the larger share to the Union. The decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Hight Courts wherein the contentions based upon ultra vires of
legislation passed by Parliament, or as the case was on occasions, by the
various state legislatures were raised, and the questions of law as to the
interpretation of the List entries were decided, clearly brought out this
aspect of the matter.1 The so-called 'sovereignty' of the states is the sove
reignty of the enumerated powers which find articulation in the State List
entries and their judicial construction and interpretation. Within the
span of these entries, the state powers are plenary, subject only to the
opening phrases, respectively, of clause (1) of article 246 and clause (3) of
the same article. The entries are enumeratio simplex of broad categories
of legislative powers; and the state legislatures can enact laws with respect
to the subject-matters covered by such entries to the exclusion of
Parliament. Any parliamentary legislation with respect to such matters
can be enacted only under conditions and circumstances permitted and
I. Union of India v. U.S. Dhillon, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1068; Asst. Commr., Madras
v. B.C. Co., A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 162; Second G.T. Officer, Mangalore v. DM.
Hazereth, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 999; Harak Chand v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970
S.C. 1453; Gujarat University v. Sri Krishna. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 703; K.C.G.
Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 375; State of Bombay v.
Narottamdas, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 69; State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, A.I.R.
1951 S.C. 318; Manofiar v. S(ate, A.I.R. Í95I S.C. 315.
A Critique of the Rajamannar Committee Report 261
envisaged in the Constitution, e.g., articles 249, 250, 252, 253 (b), 356 (1)
(c) and 357. The exhaustive enumeration, the definitive precision of
66 entries of the State List, the non-obstante clauses of article 246 and the
mention of specific circumstances permitting parliamentary initiative in
respect of the State List matters leave no scope for any judicial contribution
or interpretational expansion of the state legislative powers. This does
not, in any way, mean that states' exclusive legislative powers can be
restrictively construed. The maxims and techniques evolved and applied
by the Supreme Court underlie its judicial concern for a constructive,
purposive and liberal attitude. It has received an ultra vires contention
in relation to a state law only with care and on clear cogent and substan
tive grounds. The presumption that a state legislature passes a law that
is intra vires its powers is strong indeed; and the onus to displace it falls
squarely on one who asserts to the contrary. In aid of this presumption, the
court has habitually applied the doctrines and principles of interpretation
evolved by the Federal Court of India and the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in the Australian, Canadian and Indian matters. Under
clear specific circumstances it has, consistent with the public policy inferrable
from the Union List entries, found fit to invalidate certain state laws on
the ground, say, the coordination power in respect of determination of
educational standards in institutions of higher learning.2
The residuary legislative powers mark the outer space of the exclusive
powers of the Union. These powers are unlimited by any categorisation
or enumeration, and for that matter, include all matters which the framers
excluded from the list enumeration of the Seventh Schedule, or could not
comprehend in the world they lived in, e.g., outer space and trips to the
moon. The all-inclusive contents of residuary power was brought out
in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Dhillon's case.4 The Court
recognised that the List enumerations of the Seventh Schedule were unique
in their comprehension, lengths and details, but were not, after all, all
exhaustive. It then declared that the framers excluded nothing from the
legislative power of the Union; and the Union Parliament could enact all
laws on all matters whether known to the framers or not. Its powers were
limited only in one manner, that is, it would normally not enact laws with
respect to the State List matters and would let the state legislatures take
the initiative in the state field. Because the Concurrent List was inflexibly
set, the dimensions of the exclusive powers of the Union were unmapped;
and the exclusive powers embraced all matters uncovered by the State
List and the Concurrent List. The Union List enumeration was not
exhaustive; and in no way affected the generality of the exclusive legislative
powers of the Union. Any inclusion or exclusion from the Union List did
not put any matter beyond the reach of Parliament, unless, of course, it
was included in an entry in the State List. A matter excluded, from a
Union List entry, but not included in the relevant entry of the State List
was not put out of the reach of Parliament. It must be included within
the unlimited scope of its residuary power. The matters found to fall
under the residuary head include : wealth tax on agricultural land and
assets,5 gift tax,6 expenditure tax,7 tax on postal articles,8 and under Golak
Math's9 case constitutional amendments.
The apex of the Union legislative powers was reached in the Golak
Math case. Herein the Supreme Court declared that power to pass a
constitutional amendment was residuary legislative power of Parliament,
subject to the condition of its exercise in accordance with the procedure
established by article 368. This power was, so to say, subject to the express
constitution.il limitations of clause (2) of article 13. The declaration of
this residuary power was an innovation in the theory of written constitu
tions known to stress upon the distinction between the legislative powers
sinipliciter and the constituent (organic) legislative power. It approxi-
4. Supra note 1.
5. Second G.T. Officer, Mangalore v. D.H. Hazereth, supra note 1.
6. The Gift Tax Act, 1958.
7. The Expenditure Tax Act, 1957.
8. The Tax on Postal Articles Act, 1971.
9. L.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1943.
A Critique of the Rajamannar Committee Report 263
10. Ibid. The decision has since been overruled in Kesavananda v. State of Kerala,
A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461; see Kagzi, The Kesavananda's case (1973).
11. Article 246(2) and article 254, The Constitution of India. Zarerbhai v. State of
Bombay, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 752.
264 Constitutional Developments Since Independence
that the same procedure may be tried in respect of income tax on agric
ultural income. It is said that it could have obviated the extreme remedy
of constitutional amendment in respect of inter-state sales taxation.
The transcendental character of the Union concurrent legislation is
witnessed most prominently in the area of economic and planning legisla
tion. The states seem to have lost initiative in respect of economic and
social legislation, and laws pertaining to public control of trade, control
of essential commodities, development and regulation of industries, labour
legislation, social security, social control, etc.
Not only the near unlimited lengths of the legislative powers of the
Union surveyed, but the full lengths of such powers were also stretched out
to reach the stale owned land and property. The Union laws, for instance,
the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, was held
to reach the land under the state ownership. The Act provided for acqui
sition of land in coal belt areas by the Central Government. In exercise of
their statutory powers under this law, the Central Government took steps
to acquire certain land which was the property of the State of West
Bengal. The state government claimed immunity in respect of such land
and contended that a central law would not per se apply to the state
property. Any ether view, it was contended, would violate the recognised
'sovereignty' of the state as a constituent unit of the Indian Union which
was declaredly a federation. The federal concept and the state's sovereignty,
it was argued, could not be impaired. Neither Parliament could
legislate with respect to acquisition of the state property, nor the Central
Government could acquire such property under its authorisation. With
a view to seeking the enforcement of its contentions based upon the so-
called true theory of federal government, the state filed a suit against the
Union of India, for restraining the Central Government from going ahead
with the land acquisition proceedings against the suit property. The
defendant, the Union of India, denied the state's claim for immunity
against the central laws. It was submitted that no such immunity could
be founded on any federal theory which must be alien to the provisions of
the Constitution. The Union was not, it was submitted, founded upon
any federal compact to which the plaintiff state was a party with the defen
dant. The true historical perspective proved that there was no such
compact. The Union was established by "We, The People of India" who
alone were sovereign and was not based upon any compact wherein the
states could be said to have reserved certain immunities. The powers of
the Union were in no way impaired by any theory of implied powers
known to the American Constitution and other constitutions which sought
inspiration from that. The Indian Constitution was a complete code and
no extrinsic theories could be invoked to restrict the powers of the Union.
A Critique of the Rajamannar Committee Report 265
The Supreme Court dismissed the suit, and declared that the state's
contentions were not supported by the letter and spirit of the Constitu
tion.12 A Union law, if enacted in general terms bound a state as well,
unless it was provided that it would not be so applied within a'state.
There should be clear expressis verbis statutory immunity extended to the
state and its property, if at all.
Expressis- unius est exclusio alterius : The one and the only one
instance of immunity based on the federal principle of inter-governmental
immunity known to our system is provided in the area of direct taxation.
The state property and income are exempted from the Union taxation.
The state property is not subject to the wealth tax and capital tax of the
Union. No income tax or corporation tax can be levied in respect of
income derived from the state owned property, investments, securities, etc.
or in respect ef the budgetary receipts of a state government. The scope
of the exemption is inflexibly fixed by definition and express words of
restrictions, leaving no scope of its extension by judicial legislation on the
basis of any implied restrictions upon the Union tax powers. For avoidance
of doubt, the President referred certain aspects of the matter to the
Supreme Court for its opinion. The opinion of the court makes an instru
ctive essay on the doctrine of immunity of instrumentalities.13
12. State of West Bengal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1241.
13. In re the Sea Customs Act, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1760.
14. The Report of the Centre-State Relations Inquiry Committee 25-56 (1971).
15. Union List entries suggested to be transferred to the State List ; 40 (state lotte
ries); 48 (futures markets); 53 (mineral and oil resources); 54 (mines and
minerals); 55 (labour regulation and labour safety in mines and oil fields); 67
(historical monuments and records); 76 (state audits), and 84 (excises on medic
inal and toilet preparations); see the Report, supra note 14 at 28-32).
266 Constitutional Developments Since Independence
Ill
The financial relations between the Centre and the states present a
two-fold problem, namely, (i) distribution of tax powers bstween the Union
and the states; and (//') the issues relating to assignment of taxes levied
and collected by the Union; distribution and sharing of the revenues of
the unassigned Union taxes; and the grants in aid to the revenues of the
states. The pattern of the distribution of tax powers constituted an
important strand in the centre-state relationship. During the period
under survey the states have frequently agitated about the unfair deal
in the distribution of tax powers. However, the distribution plan set
forth in the Constitution has largely stood the test of times. The
alterations were made in the main only in respect of sales taxation. The
17. Proviso to article 304(¿>)—Atiaban Tea Co. v. Stale of Assam, A.I.R. 1961 S.C.
232.
18. Article 200; see also article 254(3), The Constitution of India.
268 Constitutional Developments Since Independence
19. Article 286(2) Explanation to cl. (1) (a); Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of
Bihar, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 661; State of Bombay v. United Motors, A.I.R. 1953
S.C. 252.
A Critique of the Rajctmannar Committee Report 269
20. Final Report of The Direct Taxes Enquiry Committee 40-42 (1971).
21. The Report of the Committee on Taxation of Agricultural Wealth and Income
64-75 (1972).
?2. The Finance Minister's speech in the L °!i s<|bha on 28-?-1973.
270 Constitutional Developments Since Independence
income was not taxable; but it pushed up the slab or slabs, as might be of
the taxable non-agricultural income. The inevitable result was the
assessment of tax at higher slab-rates; otherwise it should have been at
the lower slabs. The pushing up of non-agricultural taxable income to
the higher income slabs and tax collection in larger amounts for that
reason was entirely due to the agricultural income. The excess over the
tax amount which would have been collected had the total income not
included agricultural income could be attributed indirectly to non-taxable
agricultural income. Indirectly it would be a tax on the non-taxable
agricultural income; and hence it might be argued that it was an ingenious
attempt to tax indirectly what could not be taxed directly. This would
be so, because the excess tax would not have been assessed, had the
assessee had no agricultural income to include in his total income. There
fore, in the real economic sense it was a liability accrued due to agricul
tural income, nay, a false-faced tax on agricultural income. This would
be in accord with the principle of tax equity and progression in a tax
system. An argument based on colourable exercise of tax power could
be raised; but in view of tax power of the Union to tax non-agricultural
income at any rate whatever, it would not most probably be sustained.
The contentions based on the ultra vires character of the scheme and
the amendments consequent to its implementation in the Income Tax Act,
1961, may be raised in the days to come. The opinion given by the Law
Commission to the Raj Committee was favourable.
The second fact of the centre-state financial relations was the subject-
matter of inquiry and investigation quinquennially by the successive
Finance Commissions. The reports submitted by these commissions provide
a great deal of information on developing trends in federal finance. The
commissions have investigated into the causes and ills of the imbalance
between the functional responsibilities of the states and their inelastic
limited financial resources. They made careful periodical studies of the
estimates and forecasts of revenue receipts of the various state govern
ments and their non-plan expenditure, and examined the information given
and views expressed by the state governments.23 They felt that the states'
own revenue resources were not only not exploited, but were also not
properly assessed and comprehended. Cynically their tax potential
was allowed to decrease for narrow immediate political reasons.
Therefore, quite a few of the states lost financial credibility and
23. See the Report of the Finance Commission (Fifth) 1969; the Report of the Finance
Commission (Fourth) 1965; the Report of the Finance Commission (Third) 1961;
the Report of the Finance Commission (Second) 1957; the Report of Finance
Commission (First) 1952.
A Critique of the Rajamannar Committee Report 271
Tamil Nadu Cold Madras State) that the corporation tax should be made
a shared tax and be treated on the footing of the tax on personal income
for purposes of article 270. They also found no reason for the state not
sharing export and customs duties; and recommended their complusory
distribution between the Union and the states. They further recommended
that wealth tax should be deemed a tax which was levied and collected by
the Union, but the whole net proceeds were given to the states as was
done in the case of estate duty proceeds. They also suggested that article
272 should be amended to make excises complusorily divisible. Their
idea was that the revenue devolution should be enlarged so much so that
the need for grants-in-aid under article 275 'either disappears or is
minimised.' Ex facie in this they seemed to be thinking not very unlike
the Administrative Reforms Commission.
IV
The issues which assumed wide proportions and often raised contro
versies in the area of administrative relations between the Union and the
states during the period under review, and, particularly, in the last quin
quennium centred round, amongst others, the following matters :
(¿) Governors' appointments, responsibilities and discretion generally,
and their position of being so many arches in the structure of the
centre-state masonry.
(i'() States' obligations to carry out the directions of the Central Govern
ment and the central laws generally, and in particular, to so
exercise their own powers as not to impede the exercise of the
executive power of the Union under articles 256-257.
(///) The presence of the Union Government within the states, say,
deployment of the units of Central Reserve Police (hereinafter
referred as the C.R.P.).
(i'v) Powers of the Central Government in the event of accrual of a
situation "in which the government of the State cannot be carried
on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution",
including the discretion to extend the President's rule to a state.
These are really formidable matters and the space and scope of this paper
are too limited to permit any near exhaustive reference of all the aspects,
much less, their treatment exhaustively. Only a brief mention of certain
limited issues which interest the writer of this paper may be mentioned
for discussion in the present Seminar. Though an appointee of the
President, and required to hold office during his pleasure, a Governor,
as made out above, is a link and an arch joining the Central Government
A Critique of the Rajamannar Committee Report 273
and the state government. At the same time he is the head of the state
as well, and lex litera the executive power of the state is declared to be
vested in him. He has, so to say, too faces, one in front turned to the
state, and the other at his back turned towards New Delhi. His Janus
like position invests his office with much opportunity and responsibility,
although less of initiative and action. He is the constitutional head of the
state; and must act on aid and advice of the state council of ministers
in the affairs of the state. At the same time he must report to the President
to help him discharge his obligation to ensure the functioning of the state
government in accordance with the Constitution. In this latter capacity
he seems to be under attack at the state level. The convention seems to
exist that before the final selection for appointment in this position, the
Union home minister ascertains the views of the concerned state chief
minister and his ministerial colleagues without making it a formal affair
requiring consideration of the state council of ministers. The final choice
in the matter rests with the Central Government and does not require the
approbation of the state council of ministers. It is also possible that a
decision is made in consultation with one government, but before the
Governor designate assumes his office, the government goes out and a
new council of ministers is sworn in by the Acting Governor who is
generally, by practice the Chief Justice of the state High Court. This
new ministerial team may not approve of the selection. Howsoever
embarrassing, the decision of the Central Government, if already
announced, cannot be changed by the new government. The
fear of incompatability of temperament, likely to arise between the
Governor designate and the state government for the time being is no
ground to make any decisional change in the gubernatorial selection and
appointment. In one case the Governor designate actually arrived in the
state capital and assumed his august office amidst cold sociality and
immodest cordiality. There were instances, notably, in West Bengal, wherein
the relations between the Governor and the state council of ministers of
the United Front were unseemly hostile, so much so the latter went to the
forbidden limits of asking for the former's recall. In any such case the
President is not under any obligation to respond. The office of the
Governor is established by the Constitution and the person appointed to
this office is not a mere dignity. Instead, he is entrusted with clear
inalienable duties; and must play an important, if not deliberative, part
in the centre-state relations.85
The gubernatorial office was devalued during the long spell of the
Congress Party rule, because the chances of realisation of its true opera-
25. See Kagzi, M.C.J., "Governor's Discretion—Making and Unmaking of the SVD
and UF Ministries Induced by to and fro Defections'', Vol. I, No. 1, Delhi Law
Review (1972).
274 Constitutional Developments Since Independence
tional equation between the Governor and a state chief minister were
non-existent. The Governor was usually an ageing Congressman defeated
at the polls, or else a non-political man chosen by the Central Government
for his known quality of inaction or conformist conduct. The result was
that the high office lay in desuetude. The chief minister who would be
an active politician would have his way reducing the Governor to a
figurehead. The importance of the gubernatorial office was realised
overnight after the general elections of 1967 when the sway of the Congress
Party was broken. The Raj Bhawans in the state capitals came to be
known more. In the selection of Governors too, the Centre became
a little more careful; and appointed good administrators and other able
persons to these positions. It dawned upon the Union home ministry
that the Central Government must act through him to be able to discharge
their constitutional duty of security of the state amidst unusual situations
of mass agitations or violence with consequent breakdown of the state
government and administration, and also when the state government
could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Consti
tution necessitating the central intervention and the imposition of the
President's rule.
The new non-Congress governments did not welcome this new, rather
inevitable, development. The gubernatorial office came under attack in
a number of states, notably, in the States of Bihar, Kerala, Orissa, the
Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. A Governor was
decried as an officer of the central government posted at a state capital to
keep a watch over the state's popular governments and to report on the
affairs of the state to the Union home minister, more often than not,
behind the back of the state chief minister and the council of ministers.
He would intermeddle with the ministry-making in the state, would be
invited to inspect parades of the members of the state assembly under the
command of the 'king' among defectors, laying their numerical claim to
the ministerial office, and in marginal circumstances would be accused
of having turned the scales in favour of the Congress Party. Worse
still, he would be charged for currying favour with New Delhi by sending
a report, and recommend, thereby, the central take-over and the President
rule for the state. The non-Congress chief minister would protest and
question the propriety of such report and recommendation. He would
deny any such prerogative of the Governor and would insist that he had
no discretionary functions. He was merely a nominal head; and could act
only and exclusively on the chief minister's advice.
practice, if not checked, will embolden the defectors and aid 'operation-
toppling' at the instance of persons from outside the state. It was not
without reason that Karunanidhi, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, lodged a
protest wifh the Central Government, although he went a little too far
while he disputed their power to entertain a memorandum, much more,
their power to appoint any commission of inquiry.
The Rajamannar Committee were of the view that the power of the
President under article 356 was 'being used to deprive the States of their
autonomy'. While they were happily prepared to accept the position that
the power was not 'so far' used in an unjustified manner, they expressed
their disapproval of its use except on occasions on which 'the government
of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this
Constitution'. The necessity for this should be felt not only by the Central
Government, but at the other end as well. They seemed to think that any
action at the instance of the Union council of ministers might bring out
an 'inherent conflict between the Centre and the States'. They recom
mended for their unfounded apprehension the outright repeal of articles
A Critique of the Rajctmannar Committee Report 279
356 and 357. Alternatively, they pressed that steps should be taken 'to
provide safegards to secure the interests of the States against the arbitrary
and unilateral action.' They recommended appropriate amendments in these
articles, which should ensure that the state governments functioned 'without
fear' of being toppled over. They insisted that the President should not
act exclusively on the recommendation of the Governor. His report
should be referred to the state assembly for expressions of its views. They
suggested that the word 'otherwise' should be dropped from clause (1) of
article 356, thus making any unilateral action under it impossible.
The most debatable aspect of action under the article is as to the
circumstances giving rise to a situation which impelí the President to feel
'satisfied' that 'the government of the State cannot be carried on in accor
dance with this Constitution'. Placed as he is, he must be helped in the
matter by the Governor's report containing his assessment of the situation
and his recommendations. In the nature of things the circumstances
necessitating central action must vary from situation to situation. Its
necessity must, finally, be determined on the President's satisfiction, arrived
at constitutionally on the advice of the Union council of ministers. The
Governor's report is despatched from the state capital to New Delhi by a
special courier; and is considered by the Union cabinet or in practice
first by the Internal Affairs Committee of the cabinet. The President is
advised in accordance with the Governor's appreciation of the prevailing
political situation in the state, his apprehensions of worsening political con
ditions, his informed assessment of the situation and his recommendations.
The Governor's report is not published in full, although at the option of
the government, it is placed on the tables of the Houses of Parliament
along with the instruments of the President's proclamation and other
papers of follow-up action. The questions which we may consider here in
this Seminar are the following :—
(/) Should the Governor's report, except that part which the govern
ment considers to be against the public interest to disclose, be
published, as soon as may be, after the proclamation of emergency?
(») Should the Governor's recommendations be not debated in the
House of the People and the Council of States before the Presi
dent's action pursuant thereto.
(Hi) Should the function of the state legislature be not discharged by
the Council of States instead of their being delegated to the Presi
dent under article 357?
V
The Rajamannar Committee Report befittinglyhas failed to attract much
attention, because in the main it expresses one sided narrow thinking held
280 Constitutional Developments Since Independence
by a political party which can never become a national party. The com
mittee failed to articulate any constructive and purposeful theory of centre-
state relations. Their report singularly lacks any originality, intrinsic merit
and force nece ssary to initiate a debate at national level to build up any
opinion in accordance with their recommendations. A major defect in
the report is an abject disregard of views other than the views held by their
patrons. The report opens with a terse recitation of the terms of reference
put forth inexhaustively in the government notification; and deals with the
topics they thought would concern the state government most in a rather
inarticulate manner. The views noted, if at all, are not such as support
their position over the narrow state autonomy idea. Occasionally the
treatment of certain topics is not at all properly balanced or up-to-date,
and it may not be too much to say, it is abjectly incomplete and not worth
the pages devoted to it. The committee ascribed certain merit to the
provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, enacted by the British
Parliament and on that basis made suggestions frequently. They did not
like the alterations and changes effected by the Constituent Assembly and
the Drafting Committee, and unashamedly termed them 'deviations'. They
seem to have overlooked the fact that the Constitutent Assembly worked
hard and enacted a Constitution of the people and for the people. To
maintain that the Government of India Act gave India a better Constitu
tion and to run down the provisions of the Constitution is not a very
healthy exercise. The committee pleaded for a backward looking ap
proach to the problems of the new emerging social order after indepen
dence. Their recommendations for amendments to the Constitution were
very often, supported by the views and stray ideas held by certain
individual persons albeit the members of the Constitutent Assembly, its
committees or at other forums. The speeches of individual members
selected by the committee in their own way are referred even though they
were discussed and overwhelmingly rejected by the Constituent Assembly.
Any approach developed on the basis of the views already rejected by the
bulk of the people cannot be a constructive approach to the national
problems. Over-reliance on foreign constitutions also is out of
context and outrageous to the peculiar genius of the Indian people. Some
of their recommendations are ex facie damaging to the national objectives
of unity and emotional integration, and the institutions of our constitu
tional and legal system. For instance, the committee suggested that the
appeals—criminal and civil—to the Supreme Court should be abolished;
and appeals should be permitted only in constitutional matters. If
accepted, the change in pursuance to this recommendation must spell a
ruin of our legal system. One has to, be in the United States of America
to feel the pitfalls of a non-uniform system of civil and criminal laws which
vary from state to state. The whole uniformity and certainty which our
A Critique of the Rctjamannar Committee Report 281