s Robert C.

Tucker
~ o o k by STALINISM
philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx
he Soviet Political Mind Essays in
Grent Purge Trial (Co-Editor)
p he

The Marxian Revolutionary Idea

Historical Interpretation
The Marx-Engels Reader (Editor)
Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879-1929: Edited by Robert C . Tucker, Princeton University
A Study in History and Persoilality

The Lenin Anthology (Editor) with contributions by

.
W W . NORTON & COMPANY. INC .
NEW YORK
 't -'

76 '1'. 11. Ri&

r e l a ~ i i ~ eIlCy[ , ( I ~ chief e x e c ~ ~ l i vrole.
e This prohnhly rcflects ili<rrc t l ~ anything
a ~ ~
else l>rotective me:lsures taken w i l l i i ~the ~ r)ligarchy itsell; wl~uscnic~libersrecog.
nize that a strong chief execolive might quickly rn:ikc l i i n ~ r e ldictator f i n ;Isystem ,
lacking serious x)ciclal cl~cckso t ~the supreme eclielot~o f powcr. I t re~iiainc
prirhlcniatical. Iiowevcr, w l ~ e t l ~ the c r oligarcl~ic;~l
Stalinism as
strilcllirc o f Ilowcr could sur. :
vive a profound or prolonged crisis situation requiring expeditious and dccisive
leadership.
Revolution from Above
Should sonie future chief executive attempt "to escape frcrni the control ofthr :
collective," as Kl~rushchevwas alleged to be doing o r the eve o f his removd,
he w i l l need speedily l o assume the powers and methods o f a tyr:mt i f he i s to .,
Robert C. Tucker
escape a similar fate. Such an uutccrnie may now sertn i ~ ~ ~ p n i h nhut h l ecannot ;
be ruled out. Should i t occur, we \\suuld ag;lin havc "a ~~i,~~~<)-orgitl~iz'~tiond 7
society ruled by a tyralitn-our definition of Stalinism. Ilut w t i i ~ l t il l he Sluii~rism i
with a society so much richer, better educated, and more cotnplex t11a11that of !
1953, with a new political elite, and above all a di&ro>cty~.il~~t? I
POTif, IS T~Istoy Walern scholarsl~iphas bee11 tardy in fixing analytic attention upon Stalinism.
tells us, "all happy families rescrilble each other, every unhappy family is util~appy A bulky historical literalure on the Stalin period and many biographies and
ill its own way," every tyralit w i l l impose his own particul;lr variant of ~~lisery; memoirs dealing will1 the m a l l Stalin coexist with a dearth o f interpretive discus-
on his subjects. F o r the sanie reason, i t prnbably casts niore c<u~fi~si<rn than light : Gan of the "ism," by whicli I mean not alone the body o f t h o u g h t but the entire
to extend the "Stalinist" label eveti to tliose ullicr Cnnitiiut~islregimes with Shlinisl p l l e ~ i o o i e ~ ~SI: o nan historical stage in the dcvelopnient o f tlie Russian
strolignle:l at the top; i t is colifusing ill the sanie way, lirr i ~ ~ s l a n cas
c , labcling md other Com~nuriistrevolutions and o f Coni~nunismas a culture.
the various fascist dictatorsliips of tlie 1930's "Hitlerite." Still, as Stalin was thr To sonie degree. Illis situation shows the impact o f Soviet thought patterns
man whose tyranny was built i n tandem wit11 the first nio~~u-orgal~izational : upon our scholarsl~ip.F r o m the mid-1920's. i t became a firm article o f doctrine
society, there is some justice i n invoking his nanie whencvcr such n society lliron in the C o m t ~ ~ u ~movement
~ist illat 111eonly legitimate "ism" was Leninism-or
up a new tyrant. Marxisn~-Le~iinisti~, to irse the subsequet~tlyadopted phrase. Stalin l~imselfnever
countenanced tlie use nf "Stalinism" because o f the deviational implications i t
would cot~seque~llly have carricd. T h e forcible rnass collectivization, the ilidustri-
~lizationdrive, atld other events o f the Stalinist revolutiot~from above o f the
1930's were oficially described as Marxism-Leninism ill action-the natural and
logical u ~ i f o l d i n gol' l l l e original Leninist revolutionary impulse and program
There was a slrnlls l c ~ ~ < l ei n ~~ c ywester^^ sovietological literature o f the 1940's
the
md 1950's l o give c r e d e ~ ~ ctoc Illis claim. slbcit wit11 ;I difTcrent mural jr~clgment
on the process. As n snml)le or-and perhaps epitaph 011-the tendency ill ques-
tion, we may cite the fnllowing: " S t a l i ~ ~ i scall t ~ i and milst be defined as a pattern
o f t b o ~ ~ gand
l ~ t action illat flows directly from L e l i i t ~ i s n Stali~l's
~. way o f looking
at thecontenlpornry world, llis prirfessed aitiis, the decisions lie made at varin~ice
with one another, his concel>ti~ns o f the tasks facing the con~muniststate-these
md many specilic traits are entirely Lel~itlist."1 Froni sucli a standpoint, there
l ~ d sno special pri>blem o f interpretive t~ndersta!~ding o f "Slalil~isti~."
Although S t a l i ~never, ~ not even at the l i e i g l ~ ot f his personality cult, tolerated
beuseortlie tern1 "Stalinis~n," he and his party allies o f the mid-1920's employed
(or, as Trotsky maintailled, concocted) the term "Trotskyism" as the emblem
ofa system o f political heresy agninst 1,enitiisni. F o r Trotsky and his followers,
however, the heresy was the political line that Stalili and his associates were

I.Alfred G. Meyer, LC)INII.?!II

(Catnbridp~.Mass.. 1957). pp. 282-83.

77

78 Robert C Tuck
pursuing and llie ideological tenets, like "socialis~i~ i n one country." wliich thq
were using illjustification o f the line. So i t is i n the Trotskyist poletnical literatulr ,
that we fitid the earliest interpretive and critical discussio~~ o f Stali~iism.In !hi ;
interpretation, Slalioisni appeared as lhe practice, and i l s rellectio~ii n the0ry.d
a cot~scrvativebureaucratic takeover o f t l ~ eBolshevik Revolutior~,a Soviet Thcr. ,
midor, o f which Stalin himself was merely the represe~~tative figure and symbol? :
i o nthe lirst o f t h e two positiotls just mentioned. Ihold thr~ 1
I n c ~ ~ t ~ t r n d i s t i n c tto
S l a l i ~ ~ i s niust
rn be recognized as an l~isloricallyd i s t i ~ ~and c t specilic phenomenon '
whicll d i d !rut flow directly from Leni~rism,a l t h o u g l ~Leninist11 was an iti~portanl
contributory factor. I n contradistinction to the secotid, Iw i l l argue here (I)thsl
Slali~iism,despile conservative, reactiot~ary,or cout~ter-I-evolulio~~nry elcnienti 1
i t 1 its makeup, was a revolutior~aryp l ~ e n o n ~ e n i no essence;
~~ (2) that the Stalinin
revolutior~f r o m above, wl~ateverthe c o n t i ~ ~ g e ~ ~ict ~i evso l v t din i l s inceptiot~and :
pattern, was an integral phase o f the Russian revolutioi~aryprocess as a wholq j
a11d (3) that ilotable anlottg the causal factors explaining why the Staliriist pharr
occurred, or why i t took the form i t did, are the heritage o f Bolshevik revolutian. !
ism, the lieritage o f o l d Russia, and the mind and p e r s o ~ ~ a l i o l yf Stalin.
Decaosc o f the presence and significant c o t ~ l r i h u l i <o) f~Illis ~ I;~sl, the prrsod 1
factor, wliich may he see,, as all 11isloric;tl accidettt (Slillin, lilr exan~ple,ntigh! ,
easily have died, like Jacob Sverdlov, in the great flu epidetiiic of 1918-I"!, m).
tl~esisthat the Stalinist revolution f r o n ~above was an "i~~tegl-al phase" of tk
Russia11 revolutionary process as a whole is nut tlleallt to imply that the Stalinia 1
pliase was an unavoidable one given the nature o f the l~olshevikrnovenienl, d i
Russia, and o f the historical circumstances which prevailed i n the prelude. Giva
the diversity o f currents in the Bolshevik nioverllent o f 1l1e niid-1920's, we must j
allow that a different. IIOII-revolutiotiary f o r n ~o f further Soviet de\,elopnimtd ;
niovenlent was a possibility. That such a possibility d i d lot ti~alerializei s a lacL
but i t could have-given such an easily inlagillable dilfcrence i n the historical
situatioti as the rise o f some other political leader than Stalin to power i n succa- j
siun to Lenin. O n tlle other hand, nly stress here 011the culturalisl Cdctorsin tk ,
Stalinist revolulion from above implies that Stalin's personality alone niusl na
be seen as (he e x p l a ~ ~ a t i oonf why Soviel developn~entproceeded i n the revulution.
ary tnatiner that it did under his leadersl~ipi n the 1930's.
Tlie distinction between a palace revolutioti or coup d'Ctat and a full-scale sod.
apolitical revolution is familiar and generally accepted. I n Ihe one, a swifi and
more o r less violent chat~geo f a society's polilical l e a d e n l ~ i plnkes place without
far-reaching inroads into the character of t l ~ society
c itself. 111lhe other, a chanp
2. For Trotsky's thesis on the anlilhesis belwecn Bolshevirn~and Slalisi\m, s e t his pamphh
S,olirri.r,t,ondRo/.~hcvir,n:Concen~b~gtbeHi.~toricolond T h m r e r i c o / R w r r o f ~ k i b a r I binternnriod
(New York. 1927). The lherts is elaboralrd lurlhcr is his bnok Tile Rrb~o/rrrio,8Rc'tro.vcd(New Ymt .
19.17)
!.
W n i r m nq Rc~vI18tioslrnnn ,\hnre 79
$political learlcrsl~ip,wllich may witness a coup <l'&tat at s u c l ~a critical point
oftransition as Noveniber 6-7, 1917, i n Russia, furthers a radical reconstitutiu~~
dthcswiupnlilical c o n ~ l n u n i t yand ;III attenipte<l brcak wit11 the social past. an
tfon lo refasllio~~ the sociely's culture o r habitl~alinode o f lil'e-its i ~ ~ s t i t ~ ~ t i o t i s ,
>ymbol-systen~s,beli;~vioral patlerns, rituals, art forms, values, ctc. 111 the later
spect, a sociolx~lilicalrevolution confortns to Wallace's notiotl o f a "revitaliza-
:!on movenient." '
Asociopolitical revolution tiorrnally takes placc, to start wit11 at any rate, boll1
: 'Tmm above" :>lid "frorii bclaw." Masses of ordinary people 1,articip;ite ill the
: pmess, while l l ~ etlew political leatlersllip which the revolutioti has brought to
pwer espouses the t r a n s f o r m a l i o ~of ~ the society as a prograin and actively
I promotes it as a policy. Insofar as t l ~ crevolutiotiary leadership's ideology contains
rprevision of a lransfortr~cdsociety, Wallace describes this as its "goal culture."
The r~tethudsa(lvanced for conipletit~gthe transfort~~ative process he calls the
; "mnsfer culture." '
Asociopolitical revolutior~may, therefore, be an liistorically protracted proc-
i 5,taking placc o\'er years o r decades, w i t h intervals ofquiescence, r i ~ t l i c rthan
only during lllr sltort time nf' spectacular social c h n ~ ~ gwhetl e i t is utiivcl-siilly
rmlized that a r e v o l t ~ l i <i sr ~i t~1 progress. ' l ' l ~ eRussia81cast illuslr;~tczIllis p o i ~ ~ t .
To mauy, "Russiat~ Revolution" rlleatls l l ~ eevents o f 1917 c u l n ~ i ~ l a t i ni gn the
Bolslieviks' sei7ure of power toward tltc end of t l ~ a year. l F r o n i a broader and
historically more a~leqoatestaodpoittt, the Russian llevolution wasa social epoch
mmprising l l i c tnanikrld social, political, ecotrotnic, and cultural transforn~ations
: durine the period o f c i v i l W a r and War C o n ~ t i ~ u t i i sthat i n ensued after 1917 and
b l e d u t ~ t ithe t N e w Eco~tomicPolicy ill 1921.5 A n d on llie still
l i ~ ~ i t i a t i o f~the
more c o m p r c l ~ c ~ ~ sview i v e lhal is being advocated here, l l ~ e Revolution exle~i(led
: over slightly illore than t w o decades. Otllerwise exprcssitig it, N E P society war
m inlcrval o f relative quiescet~cebetween two phases o f t h e Russian revolulionary
process: llle 1917-21 phase just nie~~lit,ned,and the Stalit~i-lphase t l ~ n ev~suetl t
in 1929-39. 111 s a y i ~ ~this, g I do 11ot mean l o suggest that N E P society was
: rnnden~~~ed by the nalure o f Bolslievis~nto be n o niore than an "i~itel-val ol'
relative quiescer~ce."Other oulcon~es,as already suggested, are readily in~agitta-
ble. But given oil l l ~ cfaclors that wcrc operative, Slali~l'spersolla1 role included.
j
Iheoutcome WIS tlie one that history witnessed. The NEP, that is, proved i n fact
lo be ;a11 i ~ i t e r v ; ~hetween
l t w o phases of the Russian revolutionary process.
Bolsl~evikpuhlic discussiol~d u r i ~ the ~ g early 1920's reflected a sensc o f the N E P
; rran l~isloricalpause i n the cot~tmonlyen~ployeddescription o f W a r Communism
, a a time o f revolutionary "advance" or o f the N E P as a rime of revolutionary
"retreat" and " t c g r u u p i ~ ~ofli,rces."
g The Bolsheviks were aware-grinily so-of
: king s u r r o u t ~ ~ l cby d a vast mass o f prcdomitiantly peasant people whose tetiipo-
I See p. rv and ,,rl~e 5 . above.
4. Anthony F. C. Wallace. C~lrrrreond Personnlitv. 2nd ed. (New York. 1910). p. 192.
I. S u c l ~a vicw i\ I;>kcn,for eranlple, by W. I!. Clranberlin in, I t i s classic study in two vulun>es,
Tkt Rurihn Re~nlnrio!?19/7-1921 (New York. 1915).

SO Rcbl,crl C. Turks
rary willingness to r e s p o ~ ~to d revolutionary leadership in tlic 1917-1921
uplieaval went along w i t h a t e n a c i o ~ ~underlying s resistance to tlle resh;tpi~~g
their way of lire and t l i o u g l ~ l .The peasants who burned down nlanor l~ollsesin ..
1917 and parceled out thc estates had, for example, l i l t l c ; ~ ~ l i n ~against us
Russian Orthodox religio~rand, still more irnportal~t.110 w i s l ~to live and work .
i n agricultural conimunes under the Soviet regime. Wltence their eloquently
erlwessive s:tyirig, qu,~tcd b y L r ~ l i r ~ OIIC occasio~l." L C Mlive I ~ llte ilolslieviks
down will1 llie Con11nu1iisls1"-the former b e i ~ l gtllosc w l ~ oItad b i d then1 lakc
the landow~lers'land and the latter those who [low wanted l o deprive thentof :
it. By early 1921 the Bolsheviks found that their continoed tenurc of potvcr
(lepended 11pcr11l l ~ sul~pression
e o f t l i e Comn~unislsillside thcmselves to l l ~extent
of legalizing private prt,duction and trade under tlle N E P i n t l ~ crural economy.
small industry, and coriinierce. To niake peace witti l l ~ n e v e r \ v l ~ e l l ~ i irnajorily
~ig
o f lhe p o p u l a t i o ~ ~to, reestablish the link, or snzyclrko. hetween workers and
peasants, they had to desist from herculean elforts toward rapid socialist transfor.
mation o f thecountry's economic way o f life and tolcratc, i f not actively encour. :
age, that small-scale c o m n ~ o d i t yproduction o r which Lenin wrote i n 1920 that
it "e,~gendcr.~capitalis~~l arid l l i e bourgeoisie c o n l i n ~ ~ , ~ ~ trl:rily.
s l y , I~ourly,sponta :
~leuusly,a ~ ~OIIr l ;I mass scale." " gradually ren~otlrlsit. takiug a r c l o bl.ci~kas little 11s pc~ssiblc..' War CO~III~~I-
The N E P Russia that emergecl from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1111: .21 :
coold he described as a society w i t h two uneasily cucxisti~lgcultures. There s8S
an olTicially dorninant Soviet culture comprising the Revolutiot~'stnyri;~dinnova.
tions i ~ ideology,
t goverrin~e~ital structure, political llrocedures. ecot~otnicorgani- .
zation, legal order, educatioti, tile intellectual p ~ ~ r s u i tvalues. s, itrt, daily life, and
ritual. Side by side w i t h i t was a scarcely suvictizcd Russian culture that l i d
on from the pre-1917 past as well as i n the stnall-scale rural : ~ r ~~dl r b a nprivaa
enterprise that flourished under the N E P . I t was a Russia of c l ~ t ~ r c l ~tile r s ,villagt
mir, the patriarcl~alpeasant ramily, old valucs, old pastinles, old oullooks along
wit11 widespread illiteracy, niuddy roads, and all tliat Trotsky liad ill mind WIIO
Ile wrote that: "Essentially tlie Revolutioo means the people's final break with
the Asiatic. with the S e v e l i t e e ~ ~Cetttury, tl~ \ v i l l ~l l o l y Russia, \*it11 icolls and
cockronclles." 7 I l ~ coexistcncc
e of cultures mas conipetilive i n a one-sided way:
it was the declared objective of the new one to transforni the o l d one, so !ha&
as L e n i ~ declared
~ i n addressing the M(,scow Soviet 011 N o v e ~ n b e20. r 1922. "oul
o f N E P Russia w i l l come socialist Russia."
Doubts o f this existed i n some quarters, including the emigre Russian intells-
luals associated w i t h the s y n ~ p o s i u nStnola ~ vekh (Change of Landmarks). FM :
IJstrialov and his fellow smer~avekhovry.the N E P was !he beginning o f theend ,
o f Russian C o m m u ~ ~ i sas m a revolutiol~aryculture-transfor~iiit~g inovenlent, iB
incipient deradicalization, and Russia's imminent return l o naliunal foundationi
O n the Rolsl~eviks'behalf, Lenin anathematized that perspecti\,e. A n d replying ,
6. ..Lcfl-Wlnp" Conlrnullisll8-An lnfanlile Dirordcr, i n T11r Lerri,, Aalholow cd. R o k r l C
Tucker (New York. 1975). p. 553.
7. Lcun Trotsky. Lilerorurc ond Revohrio,t (Ann Arbor, Mlch.. 1960). p. 94,
f
lo lllose Metisl~evik-111i11ded Marxists ("1111r European [)Iiilistines") who argued,
of like Sukhanov, ~II:II i t had been a n~istakefor socialists to seize power i n so
culturally backw:~td:icaontry as Russia, Lcnio defiai~tlyreplied i n one of liis
thc last articles, " W l ~ ycould we not lirsl create such prereqtlisites o f civilization i n
our country as tlle e x p l l l s i o ~o~f the lando\vners and the Russia11capitalists, and
then start movitig tou'ard s o c i a l i s ~ ~ i ? ' Iaf definite level of c ~ ~ l t o was r e needecl.
a they said, L I 1111. ~ 1>11ildiug~ ~ l ' s ~ c i i ~ l"iW s ~l ~n y,ci~ntiotwe bcgir by l i r s t ;~cllicv-
ing l l ~ eprerequisilcs l'or that definite level o f culture i n a revolutionary way, and
{hen, wit11 the aid o f the workers' and peasants' govertilnent and tlie Soviet
systcnl, proceed to overtake llie other nations?" 8
r Wllile o p l ~ [ ~ l c l i rl l~l cg hislnrical correctncsv o f l l ~ cBirlsl~evikdecisim l o takc
power i n 1917 and 10 pursuc thc revoluliu!iary political course Illat il d i d subse-
qucntly, Lenin ill 1'121 alld after redelinell the moven~e!it'sobjective and strategy
.
in the new situaliot~marked by retreat at home and delay o f otlier Marxist
revolutions abnr:~d. The transcendi~~g of the N E P was to take place within the
framework oS thc NEP, by evolution 1101 revolutioti. Lenin could not have been
more explicit (III l l ~ ipoint. \ Rcvolutin~~ he, explained, "is a cllange wltich breaks
the old orrlcr 10 if, urry f o ~ t n ~ l n l i ~ illid ~ r ~ s~,i u OUU
t tlial C~III~~IISIY.
slowly i ~ r ~ c l
nisnl, wilh its forcible Suod requisitioning, had represented a "revolulionary
. approach" l o t l ~ hr u i l d i ~ l go f ;i socialist sociely; i t liad suugltt to break up thc
old social-ecor~o~nic systcni cotnpletely at one stroke and substitute fur i t a new
one. The N E P signified an a h a n d o n ~ n c ~ o f~ Illat
l i n favor o f a "reformist ap-
proach" wl~oscn i e t l ~ o dwas "11ot to break rip the o l d social-economic systenl-
trade, petty pn,rl~~ctioli,petty pn~prielorsliip,capitalism-but to revive trnrle,
pctty proprietol-sltip, cnpitalisnl, wllilc cautiously and gradually getting the upper
hand over thcni, or tnakitig it possible to subject tl1e111 to slate regulation UI@
lo ihc extent lllal lltey revive.'' "
Tlie transfer cullure, as Lenin now envisaged it, was t l ~ e"cooperating
(koopcrirovank) of Russia" alorig witli the development o f a popularly admi~lis-
lered. ~~otl-bure;ruc~;~tizerl society with a large-scale, adv;~nced inacl~inci ~ ~ d u s l l - y
bawd heavily on c l c c l r i l i c i l t i o ~and~ operating according to plan. The c o o p e r a l i ~ ~ g
of Russia meatit l l ~ einvolve~ncntof the entire p o p u l a t i o ~i ~ n cooperative forrns
of\\,ork. This wuuld realize the utopian dreams a f the "old cooperators" like
Rol,erl Owell, wlrorc error l ~ a dbeen 1101 the vision o f a cooperative socialism b u l
: the belief that il ccn~ldbe put into practice witliout a polilical revolution sucll
a the one that I l ~ Uolsl~eviks
c had carried out. '1'0 acliieve tile cuoperated Russia
through tlie NEI', hy the reforniist methods that tiow defined the transfer culture
in 1.enin's n ~ i n d ,wnuld be the work o f "a whole l~istoricalepoch" comprising
.
~ l i n ~ nr
8 . "Our R r v ~ ~ l ~li2pmpcns ~ N. S u k l t a ~ ~ n vNola)."
's in l%< y , 705~6.Fur
icnirr A ~ i r h o l o ~ pp.
I*sfs's a~~alhenla on Illr .Stnow vrkh l e n r l e ~ > rseeg this report lo #be Elcvrnll~I'arly Congress III 1!122.
h l i i ~Leri8 A,irhokr8: p p 525-26 Uslrisl<,v was I l x i~>tcllwlual leader of lhr a t ~ r , , n v e l l i o ~ ~ i ~ y .
q A l l quutalionr H I I l l i s pasqape arc rrom "Tllr lrnportroce of Gold Now snd Aner !he Cumpletc
V$rlory of Sc,cialisni," I I I Ihc I.e!,i,! A , r r b o i o ~ ,p. 512. The csray rvvr \vrillen in Navcnlhcl 1920.
82 1<11IrerfC'. 'hckn
one or t w u dccades a1 :I n l i n i ~ n u ~ 'Tlic
l i . nletliods tl~ctl~selves \>rruld col~cirtvery
largely of "ci~lluralizing" (kul'rur~~iclrexrru),the r e r i ~ i ~ k i nOFp the IIOPLIIII~ nie~ltal.
ity ilntl ell~clsby ethicalive means starting will1 l l ~ oveccr,~lii~~g
c o f illiter;tcy. Only
t l ~ r o u g l isuch a gradual, long-range "cultural rev[rlutirrn" would i t he pwsiblc
to gain the populatio~l'svoluntary accepliince o f couper;~tivr~ o c i i i l i s n i .IIt ~was ~ fmrn Oeluw by the ~ i ~ i l l i o nosf pcasnnts, wlio were f i g l t t i ~ ~t go I l ~ r o woff kttlak
the p u s i t i o ~taken
~ by Leliin in "On Cooperalion" nncl other last articles that
Uukli;tril~subsequetitly elaborated as his c o n l r i b u t i [ ~ ~ t ol l l ~ cthcory o f building
socialisnl i n one country which he deknded against tlle Left oppositioti ill thc
inlra-parly conlruversies o f the early p o s t - L e n i ~period.ll
~ lied when i t spoke o f niass peasant support from helow. Historical evidence
History, as we know, d i d no1 go the way that Lenin charted; i t wen1 the Slalinisl
w i y . This was radically dilTerent fro111 the p a t l ~d e l i ~ ~ c a t eill d tl~ost.I.et1i11 ;irticla
of llie final period that U u k l l a r i ~ ~i n, tlie essay l l i a l Ile publisl~edi n Pravdain
Ja~iunry1929 for l l ~ efifth anniversary o f Lcrii~l'sdeath, described as "Lcnin's
Political T e s t a o ~ e ~ ~Stalinism
t." i n its time o f self-assertion and triulnph. the
1930's, was a revi>lulion i n exactly the se~isethat Lenili had defincd i t ill warning
i ~ g a i ~ l sa trevolutionary approacli l o t l further
~ building o f Sovict socialisni: "a '
cllangc which bre;iks the o l d order to its very fourlclalions. and ~ i o tone t l ~ a t
cautiously, slowly, and gradually remodels it, laking care t o break as little as ,
possible." Instead o f trarisce~idingtlie N E P evnlutionarily. Slalillisn~ilbolisl1.4
i t revolutio~iarily,by decree a ~ l dby force. Itislead o f proceeding gra(lually ?.nd
by niealis of persoasion, i t proceeded at breakneck speed and wielded state p o w a
coercively t o sniash popular resistance by terrorizi~ig[lie populalio~i.Instead of
laking care t o break as little as possible, i t broke l l ~ spirit e a l o ~ l gwit11 the bodia
o f a great p r o p o r l i o ~o~f the generation that lrad come ofage during Llie first pharc
o f the Revolution a decilde beC11l-e. I t also co~isunledii very heavy proportion of
tllose party leaders and rnetnbers who had, i n the 1920's. bccn Stalinisls in the
'
simple sense of supporters of the general secretary and Ilia "getirral l i ~ i e "ill !he
fight wit11 the oppositions.
Tlie rural revolution called "mass collectivizntion" i l l o s l r ~ ~ t cthese s poillts. In
the space o f a few years and at llle cost o f untold suffering and :I Ca~ilineWIIOY
toll o f lives ran into Inany millions, a countryside will1 i ~ b o ut\ve~ity-live l nlillion
peasant farmsteads functioning o ~ natiorializcd i land was tratisfor~lledinto one
i n ivllicli the great majority o f t l i o s r peasants were orga~iizedinto some 200.WO
collective farms (kulkliozyl while many more were employed ns hired workerr
on state farrils lsuvkl?ozy). In the Shorr Cuurse uC parly llistory (1938). which
Stalin edited personally, the colleclivization is described as "a profourid revolu j
10. All quotsliotls and the ideas sunrnlarizcd i n tl,is paragrapt) nre rronl "0sCoopetill
pp. 707-13. The esray wins dirtalcd by 1.ellin in Jaltuary 1921.
Tlw L C I I A~III,VIO~.V.
~~
I I. For ilukhar~o'srlnoughl in thin period, sec Stephen F. Cohe~>. Oukborin orrd !he Bnrr,rent
Rswliirio,>:AA,lrrirol Oiogropl?y(New York. 1973). Chap. VI: atld Mo~llcLewi81. PoIilic.ol Uoder<sr(~).
retrii in Soviet Ec~onuazi<Ihburcc From Dukbori,~to ,he M o d m ~Rr./i,rmeo Il'ri~icclos. 19741. Chaa
Sowr Pcwer A Srurly ojCollecrivr2o,ion ( E v a n r r o ~ ~1968).
. Chap. 12; and N Valenli~~or,
Dokl"no
proropu kornniu,!rimo (Munich. 19b0).
~ ~
lion, a leap Crom an old qualitative slate of society l o :t new qualitative stale.
cquivalerit i n its consequences t o the revolution o f Oct<,her 1917." The Slrori
i n g o f Illis evolution in Illat i t was
Course goes no: " l ' l ~ e d i s t i ~ i g ~ ~ i s l ~Ceat~~re
acconiplished /rut71 ubove. on the i t ~ i l i a t i v eof tlic state. ;tnd directly supported
bandage and tu live i n frer<lom i n the collective farnis." ' 2
I t was indeed a state-i~~itiatcd, stale-directed. and statc-enrorced revolu~ion
from above-as was t l ~ cStalitiisl revolution as a ivholc-but the Slrurr Conrsr
available l o us nuw in greal abundance attests tlrat not lone thc ones classified
in kulaks, whr~se"liquidation ;IS a class" was proclainlcrl as tlie banner of ihe
mllectivi7ation drive, hut the mass ofniiddle peasatits and even some o f t l ~ rural c
pour were sullenly opposed t o the rural revolutiorl and iclilled llie ko1khoz.vonly
under duress or because o f fear. The claim i n Soviet publicity of' Stalio's time
and aftcr that tlie collectivizstioll was Lenin's "coopernfive plan" i n action is
groundless. N o t only was tllrre IO patierit, l o n g - d r a w ~ ~ o uecluc;~tin~~al t eni~rt
("cultural revolutiori") t o prepare l l ~ peasantry'sc m i n d l i v voluntary acceptance
ofcooperative Carniing, atid n o anlececlent i ~ ~ d u s t r i a l i z ; ~ lsullicient
iol~ t o produce
the hur~rlrcdthousand tractors that Lcnin had Coreseen as ;I powerful inducen~cnt
to the peasatllc to farm conl1er;ttively; still more iniporl;~tit,the kolkhuz~,were
(and arc) socialist couperatives otily i n their formal faqade.
The rural revolutiorl I'ronl above o f 1929-33 proceeded simultn~ieouslyi\,ilh
Ihe heroic phase o f llie St;~linist industrial revolution f r o n ~ahove: 11i:it state-
directed, frantic, ~nililary-owicnledi~~dustrialization drive wllose very slogan.
"Fulfill the Five-Year Plat ill Four," reflected the gap between ~ t ~ aclually n t
happened and the Plan as ollicially adopted i n 1929.13 T l i e relationship between
these two processes prcsents ;I Ilighly complex p r o b l c ~ non whicll scholarly opiti-
ion has evolved as new Farl~r;il i n f o r n ~ a t i u nhas beconlc available i n the recent
past. I t was at one time widely believed that the fc)rcible mass collectivizatio~i
was a necessity for thc desired high-speed super-industrializalion i n that the
kolklioz syste~iienahled i l ~ cSoviet state t o extract otherwise onobtai~lable(or
uncertainly oblainable) agricultural surpluses t o finance such basic necds of
industrialization as the i n ~ p o r l a t i oo~fi foreign ~ i i a c l l i ~ i eand
r y technicians and t o
supply the urban population w i t h food and industry w i t h raw materials.14 Such,
indeed, appears t o have bee11tlie uoderlying conception on wliicll Stalili acted
12. Hismry ojrhr Co,,?n~~ni.?r
Pony of rhc Sovier Union (Bolshrviksj .S/!orl Ciurre (Moscow, 1945).
1. 305.
I 3 0s the dispnrily betweell plan ahd practicr. invulviog also ll~r"\vilcl targel illcresses issued
.n 1930 and 1931," -ec Hollil!ld Ilunler. "The Ovrran~hiliouaFirs1 So\,iel Five-Year Plan." and the
mmnlcnls on Hu~llcr'rarticle by Stcpl>ev~Cuhen and Morhe Lewin in 718,,.Tl,,,vrr Rei,iciviIto~te.1973).
Huntcr'r rcferc!>cel o (he wild Inreel incresxq appcan on p. 239.
14. For a rel>rerenlvliveslaLenlcn1 of this belief, see C . H. Carr aud R. W. Davits. ~ounrloiioar
ofa Plonncd Econo,n)r 1 9 2 6 2 9 , \'"I Osc. Purl I(London, 19b9). pp. 269-70, wbrrr the aulllo~s
wile. inter olio. "If ir~duslriali~.rlinr~was a ro~~dition of col1cctivii;tliun. colteclivirafion was a
candilion or i~tduslrializatiol~
"
 f
84 Robert C. Tucks Winism nr Rcut,lsli<,a frosm Above 85
at the titoe; collectiviza~io~i was ellvisaged as the presupposition o f a form ol men1 shrunk from :III upl~eaval,acted "under l h r overwhelniir~gpressure of
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o ~geared
~ t o tlie priority of heavy industry and war induslry ova menls" and enibarkcd upon tllc secon~lrevr~lutiuni t ) an "u~~premeditated, prsg-
the cot~sunier-goodsi ~ ~ d u s t r i whose es greater dcvelopmet~tw < ~ u lhaved heert a sins malic n ~ a t ~ ~ ~I lccr was
. " "prucipiti~tcdillto collcctivizntiot~by tlie c l ~ r o n i crlnljgel-
quo nun o f a Soviet i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o ~w~i l h i n the frame of a continuetl rural NEP. : o l f a r ~ ~iin~ ~
1928
e l t i d 1929." 17
I n llre event, howcver, the economic co~isequcr~ces o f collcctivizntior~were ul Such, ill D c r i ~ s c l ~ c rc1;rssic
's vcrsi<lt~,i s lllc " c i r c t ~ t ~ ~ r t : ~ nexplar~;tti<,n''
liaI (nu
calastrophic that recent researches by Weslerr~scliolars. supporled by archival . wc niay call i t ) of 1l1e inilial phase ul' lhc Stalinist r c v o l u l ~ c ~li-urn n above. 11 is
data published i n 1968 and 1969 by the Soviet fiistoriar~ A . A. Barsov, have ? lollowed by Carr and Davies will1 specific rrferc~lcct o tlie collectiviznlion drive.
reached the conclusior~sthat (I)"mass collectivizatio~~ o f Soviet agriculture must 1 Having s11owt1Ilia1 party policy, i ~ ~ c l u d i n tliat
g o f the Lefts such as Trolsky and
be reckoned as an unmitigated ecol~omicpolicy disaster," axid (2) "the oppressive I Preobrazhe~~sky,had always c~~visaged a gradualistic approach i n co1lectiviz1-
state agricultural procurement system, rather than serving t o extract a inet contri. f tion, Carr and Davics find the enplanntiol~fur rhe abs~idonrnentof gradualisn~
bution iron1 agriculture as a whole, should be credited will1 preventing the
collectivization disaster from disrupting the i ~ ~ d u s l r i a l i z a t i odrive." n
i in favor of "direct assault" ill "tlie now clironic alid il-remediable crisis of the
grain collections" and " t l ~ edire ~ i e e dfor grain l o feed town and lictories." They
Ii j
goon: "111 this dcspcrate impasse, the lenders snatcl~rdeagerly at l l ~ cgrowing
belief i n the prospects o f collective agriculture and ill i l s capacity t o meet the
needs of a plarmed econuniy." Anrl, echoing Deutscher, they declare l h t ~ "llie t
Only t w o major aspects o f the Stalinist revolution fro111above have been discussed I sudden decisiou reached at lhc e t ~ do f 1929 !*.as rlcill~erpreco~~ceived riot premedi-
here. A n y adequate account, even o f fundaniet~rals,would have to consider also : tated." l 8This rest:lles Cnl-r'c c;~rlierargument (likewise an eello of Deutscl~er's)
the state-building process which went on pari parrrr w i t h mass collectivization ha1in the sulnnier of 1929 the system ofoflicial grain c o l l e c l i u ~ ~hat1 s eficlivcly
and induslrializstio~~: tlie expar~siuno f t h e bureaucratic state alrp;iratus, the huge
growl11 of the systen~o f forced labor, the c o ~ ~ c o ~ n i t g; ~r onw t l l i o f the politic wmed :ahcad. T l ~ ep t o b l e ~ ioi f s u p p l y i ~ ~town g and faclories h;ld h e c o f ~ ~ctrm- e
economic police elripire which a d n i i ~ ~ i s l e r eit,d and t l ~ eexlrcme centralizati lelely i~~traclahlc. Gradualisni was rtot enough." 'I'lien, too, Carr 11:1d referred
o f t h e state power. Something more w i l l be said about this below. Concelltrati 1"lhe haphazard and irnpolsivc character o f the final decisioli." 1 ' Elsewl~ere.
for tlie present on collectivizatio~~ and industrialization, I want t o ask why they ,rRrrir~gl o the industrial revolutioli from above, Carr m e ~ ~ t i otlie ~ i sso-called war
took place i n the Stalinist way. ; a r e of 11127 after the severance o f diplomatic relstio~isw i t h Soviet Russia by
Accordilig t o a view which draws part o f its i ~ ~ s p i r a t if o r o~mi Trotsky's thinking Great Britain, a ~ goes ~ d on t o say that "the security molive i n the drive t o c a ~ c l ~
and which achieved wide i l i f l u e ~ ~ cowing
e t o its espousal hy Isaac Deutscher, up with the west by rapid industrialization should not be ovcrlooked." 2"
i
S t a l i ~ ~ ii~~dustrinlieatiost-cum-collcctiviz;~tioli
st ( w h i c l ~i>culscl~crcalls "lhe stt. The C~~CLI~IISI:II~~I;II c s p l : ~ ~ ~ :I!;,-
! l i ~hcctt
~ ~ ~~ ~ l l i i r c~
c l I:II still IIIOTC c x l r r m c ~ < I ~ I I I
ond revolutio~i")was a l~ecessitaledresponse t o a "grave social crisis" o f the lata i by Alexatider G c r s c l i e l ~ k r oi ~ n ~lhis lhcsis t l ~ t r ltlie economic crisis ;)I t l i r end o f
1920's. Citing Stalin'sstatistics, Deulscher states that in January 1928, in particu. ! the NEP era was alsr, a "polilic:rl crisis of the first rnagnilude." H e explains:
lar. government grain purchases fell short by t w o million lolls o f [lie ~ n i ~ ~ i n i u r n ; "Inability l o nlitinlitin llje k l ~ sd ~ ~ ~ > ptol i IIIU m cities a t ~ t lhc l g r n \ v i l ~ gI . C S ~ S ~ ~ I I ~ C
needed l o feed the urban populationl6 Emergency measures were applied by the : ofthe ~ n i l l i o l i or f the pcilsin~ts,SII.O~I~: i n I l ~ e i irl ~ l a l ~ g i bdifilsion,
lc SC~IIIC~ to s ~ c I I

g o v e r ~ ~ m e ot to extract grain that was being w i t l ~ t i e l dfro111 the marker. The
peasants were not, for the most part, polilically motivated against the Sovid
regime, but were driven by eco~iomiccircumstances, i n that the small farm
produced only enough t o meet the peasants' o w n food needs while the "big
farn~ers" w i t h surpluses were charging prices beyond the ability o f the town
population t o pay and also were demanding concessioos t o capitalist fartiiin& '
In this dilemma, yielding t o the peasants would antagonize the urban working i
class, and refusal t o yield would also bring a threat of famine and urban u l ~ r a t t
A "radical salutioo" was demanded, and Stalin, having u n t i l the very lasl rnw !
'
: mnvcrrion olnlilliotl~
the doom o f t l ~ eSuviet dict:ilorsliip." A llircat existed l o the c o l ~ t i ~ l u a t i oonf t l i e
I1 Ibid. pp. 31 X. 322. Dcul\cl~errepeals Illis irllerprclaliw~181 lirieler lorn> 1%~.
Prupliri Ovirm,:
Tmoiiy, 1921)-/94O(NcwYork, l965), pp. 67-68 Fol a <<,mewhat diITcrent ;altrolpl lo expiair\ l11c
Slali~lislrevillstioat by rc<molnicitccesslty, sec Maurice Uobb. St13,icr ,?co,>o,,ric Uc~i',.lop,rirrrr.Since
1917, rev a).(Ne\v Yclrk, I9661, p. 214.
I8 Carr and Da%,irs,Fo,dndnrii~,~r of,! P101111edEcorroml:pp. ZM, 26% 269. Apropm Trnlsky and
Prmbrazhenrky. tlte;~olhorrlr<siltlout (p. 265) III;IIi n 1925 Trolsky wrote rrl"thc gradu;d lran~rltio~l
l o c o l l t i l i r c failmli8s" rrllicll would he possible wt>cnllre inrcrssi8ry Icch~licalbare !had heen created:
md that "Preob~;~rl~c~~sky'n drastic ixnal?<s lhsd hcrn conducled \vitl>iwihc frail1c1\~0rhof NEI' and
onthe assulllp:ionr o l r in>;wkrlro,ll<,#~~y." Farlber. "l'moh~rzbcnrkys1tcr\vnrd<spoke 01'?herapid
o l r l l ~ a lpcr5ntlt
l lloldi~lgrlo colleclivc farms' as 'a llling r n o 1 1 ~01 US f t i l ~ s : $ ~ , . '
"

15, Janter R. Millar. "Mass Cotlecliviuliun and rheCor~lribuliot~olSovict

Agriculture l o llw Fim : The laller starerllcr>l wss ~natlea! the S e r c r ~ t r e ~ l tPany
ll O~ngresrit, 1934.
Five-Year Plan: A Review Article," 7'1re Slavic Review, Dmenlber 1974. pp. 761, 765. : 19. C.H. Carr. "Rrr<,lution rro8n Ahwe- Tllc Road loCullectiviralioa," ih, Tlte O c l o t r Rca,htiuri
16. Isaac Dealrcl~cr,Slolin: A Puliricollliopropl~y.
21drd. (New York. 1967). p 313. Thephrur . 8cj1rcond A J i e r ( N e a Ywk. 196'1). pp. 104. 109. I be cited r's:ly war lirrt puhlirllid ill 1967.
"a grave a x i a l cnrir" appears wn p. 312. j 20. E II.C a r l . "llrllwtioos on Suvicl I~~dusl~isli,~~tic~~~," ihcd.. p. 121
 t

-
86 Rubrrt C T u r k

Soviel repirile ill these c o n d i t i o ~ i s ,G e r s c l i e ~ i k r o ~ asserts,

i atirl "it was under the prepared for it. Y e l 11r. a n d i n n s c ~ ~ sliec alotlc. : ~ c c c ~ ~ i i ~ ~ lit." i s h 2e4dWhcrsc idcas
pressure o f Ilia1 threat that S l a l i n u n d c r w c n l :I r:idic;il c l l ; ~ ~ i g oe f riiitid and were they, lhcn'? D e ~ t l s c l i c rdocs ~ i r l dl i r c c l l y say. ;illl111ogl1 sonic p:~yes l i ~ t c rIIC
erlibarked u p u r i the gamble o f t h e F i r s t Five-Year I'li~~i." 21 n o t s 1l1at Y u r i Lzlrill, "a sccolld-rate e c o ~ ~ , n i i s tonce , a riglit-wing Met~slie~~ik."
111 D e u l s c l ~ e r ' sr e r s i o n o f t h e c i r c u ~ ~ ~ s t a ~ei txi la~l l a t ~ a t i o
as~ lias
~ , been not& had prup:~p:~tedt l l c i d c x o f a "seco~icl r c v u l u t i o l ~ " ill the c o t j ~ ~ t r y s i dase early ;IS
Slaliti. l l i e p o l i t i c a l leader o f t l ~ er e v ~ , l u l i u t ~f r o t i i : ~ b ~ v e:ll>l)ears
, as a gre! / 1925.2i W e arc lcfl 10 illfcr III:II t i l e i d m s ill questio!~w c r c thosc ~ r f r e p r c s c t l l i ~ t i v e s
i m p r o v i s e r w h o responded to tile pressure o f extretiiely adverse national circum. ' of the Lest o l > p o s i t i o l ~l i k e I'reobrazlie~isky. w h o lhad pr,~poutided i n tlie carly
stances i n "at] unpremeditated, pragmaric ~ i i a n n e r . " 111 consollance with thin 1920's the idca o f "pritnilive s t ~ c i a l i s l a c c i ~ n ~ ~ ~ l a l i o ni.e., ." itirluslrinlizati~~~i
view, D e u t s c l ~ e calls
r Stalia ~~ rn;iui of";~lrnosr i ~ n l ? c r s < ~ ipcrsc~tiality."
~:tI 2 2 A l l thii ~ h r o u g el ~n l ~ l o i t i ~ t i cchiefly.
~r~. d ' l h c r u r a l eccrnrIniy. Y e t I>eutscher :llso ~lerl;trcs.
received later elabnratiun in Cnrr's c l ~ n r a c l e r i z a l i cofS1:1li11 ~~~ ;IS"Ilie tilost irnpa. and riplllly so i n I l l i s illsl;lllvc. I h n l "lllcrc was 11tr q t ~ c s t i o ~ill i , l l t c vicw r r f l l l e
sonal o f great historical figures." T o s l i o w what h e calls "tlie essentially is~pcr- . kft Bolslieviks, u f d r i v i t ~ gt h e peasants i l l t o collective farms b y force. 'l'he switcll-
sonal character o f Stalitlist policy," C a r r slates I l l a t n o element o f personal j over from private 111 colleclive Sarmitlg mas t u be carried o u t gradually, w i t h the
conviction, !!or any o r i g i n a l i t y o f conception, was i n v o l v e d wllen Slalin look ! pcasa~its'own c o ~ ~ s e n l .2"" T h e strange upshot i s lh:~lSlalit! is tre:~ted b o t h as
E
leadership o f t h e i n d u s l r i a l r e v o l u l i o n from ahuvc. T l ~ c a i ~ ihe
i s rullilessly pursucd a leader w l i o actcd u l i d e r rclcrltless pressure o f c i l - c u m s t s t ~ c e sw i l h o u l precoli-
w c r e those "dictated b y the d y n n n i i c force i n h e r e ~ i ti n l h e r e v o l u t i o n itself." His k v e d idcas, and as o r ~ ew l l ~ acted r will! o r o,r certain ideas which, however, were
qualities, l i k e liis convictions, w c r c those o f his milieu; t h e y "niirrored tl~ecurrenl ' not his OWII. B u t tllose whose ideas tllese presumably were d i d 1101 think. ill t h e
stage o f the historical process." H i s r u l e it1 Soviet l i i s t u r y was tliat o f "the g r e l Slalinist w:ly, u f collectiviz;~tion as a r e v o l u l i o t ~ a ~leap - y w l i i c l i t h e state w o u l d
executor o f r e v o l u l i o ~ i a r ypolicy" w i t h "no visiuti of w h e r e i t w o u l d lead.""
111seeming inconsistelicy w i t h the image o f an a l l h o t niindlcss political i m p m
1 ac~onlplislib y cuercive meatis. 111 sllorl, whatever ide;~s S l e l i t ~l o o k l i u m t h e
c n l w l ~ i l eL d t r~ppostion,the idca o f a cuercive r e v o l u t i o r ~Srum above \vas nut
viscr ctrnjured u p b y the d e s c r i p t i a t ~o f Staliti cited ahove. I>eulsrhcr doesallor 1 one o f them.
the I T ~ ~ I I w h o l c d Soviet l<ussin ill t h c r c v o l u t i u t ~fro111a l x ~ v eilcted OI cet!zin
lIi;~l :
ideas. B u t l i e niailitains tliat lllese were borruwed f r o m ulhers. " T h e i d e a s o f l k
secotid revolution w c r e not liis," Deutscher writes. " H e i i c i l h c r loresaw it nor
It is a central thesis o f # l i e present essay that the circumstantial explan;ition.
21. A1exall~lr.rG c r ~ c b e , ~ k r uE<o,?o,?irc
~~. Bodw~ord,r,lrwin ili.~iorlcol/'err/,ecnve(Ncw Ynrk. 19ba n a ~ w i t l ~ s t a t i dai ~c~egr l a i ~speciuus
l plausil)ilily, is fiit:~llyHawed, a n d tliat we shall
1pp. 14445. Ge~scbet~kro~, lutllrer rtatrs (p. 145). "Vipwed its a hIri,rl-rul~n>e:~rure,lhc p o r p x d not al1:1i11 a tetlable view o f S t a l i r ~ i s nii n its f u t i d a ~ i i e l ~ l :abpcct il as r e v o l u l i o ~f r~o n i
lhc Firs! Fivc.Yclr I'hts war lo break lhc disequilihri~rtrtIllrough i~lcrci~sc in c o ~ ~ r ~ ~ c ~ ~ r r . g n c ~above u l i l i l this is utrdel-sloud. T h e circutr~sl;lnliz~l
nulp. e x p l a l ~ a t i o tis~ fl:~wcd, first, ill
hssrd on i t x r w c in pl;#sl cdpacity." ulthuvgh once the peasant\ Ih;~dheen li,rcerl iltto tllc kolkhag theutterly u l l p r o v c l l i l a t u r c of i l s a s s u l i l p t i ~ ~II:II~ t ~ cullectivi7atio1i i t 1 i l i c terroris-
"the handr o l the xovcrnn,ent were unlied. lhcre war oo lklil~er . a t l .v rcarrul lo ronard the EN tic Torni that il t o o k =,as t h e o t ~ l yrealistic alternative Sor t h e Soviet regimc ill
Fiuc.Ycar t'liln as 3 sell-colltaincd brief ptriod ofrapid induslrialiralir,!l, and l l l ~ I)LII.~OSE o f i ~ ~ d u ~ l b
rlization !?a$ no lollger in relieve llae sl~ortaeeof coirsunler gooclq'' (11. 146). I t clocr IIDI i l p p 1929, niucli less a sitre qrro ~ l o r rof i l s survival as G e r s c l i c n k r o n suggests. ~ -
Eveti
nccurale lo say 1I1al l l l e slsill lpurpo-e oftlle Brsl Plrn \va\ 111 illc!ra\c roo\o!#lrl.-gllodr pnrdaclim allowing that l l t e regirrie was faced ill 1027-28 wit11 SOIIICI~I~I~~ l i k e a 1,c;rs;trlt
ill nrly e%,elll,lhc Illrust ofthe i~~duslni~lizuti(m drivcirn 1929 13 w i l l t~>\,icr<I ll8~ th~8tlding~ ~ p o l h m v "grain strike" (10 use t l ~ clo:~dcrl Slrorr (i>arrctcrmi~~r,logy),~hel-cis IO seritrtls
ih>rlurlry.and cotlran,er-goods supply decli~~erl ion Russia bnp011 I I ~ cI ~ t t r l ! ! ~ i ~ l i ~(sf
) # IIIC
l NCP, evidence o f i n c i p i c ~ ~ xt l l i l i c ; i l r e h c l l i u u s ~ ~ e si ns l l i e c u u r ~ f r y s i d en l I l l a t l i ~ n c iltid
;
22. Sri,li,i: A Poliiin~lBio~mopity.p. 273. Trotrky'r influore is rellwted ill Deutscher'i pond
ul Slatit) ;aa prsgn~atirtand ~tnproviserwho would a r l w!llnottl pre!,trd6t;ction under prarurrd there is evidence o f gctieral pensallt :icceplallce t h e Soviet regime, wllalevcr
cirrumrlunces. See, for example, Trotsky's characteristic de%rripliosof Slillfn i s "a nlan ill w h a hespecilic griev:lncer l l l a l cilllsed peasat!ls l o g r u m b l e or t o w i t h h o l d grain fro111
ctlerpy, wiil and reralutc~~ers are conthincd witla nlq>irici%sl.~m).opia. an organic tnclirlalion 16 Ihe niarket ill e x p e c t a t i ~ ~ o ft ~m o r e return. N o r , as already i t ~ d i c a t e dhas it lheet~
oppoMuc~irtdecisio>~r ibi great qorrtiu~~s, personal mdcut-5s.di4oy;llty itrmd i s rri~dinewlarhusr pm , showt~,i ~ o is r i t true, tliat l l ~ eterroristic collectivation was a tieccssily fnr the
it! older to ?uppressl l l e party " Leon Trulrky, "A Contnhution lo llnr t'olitirsl MiographgofSlalio.. I
in Tlrt Stolirr Schuoi ofFi~Is$coriot> (Ncw York, 1'162). p. 198. 'The h o k w.ls nriglnally puhlirhol
is 1937. ; 24. Yoii,!: A Palli!kol Ifioyrr~~p~~.y. 11. 295.
23. E. H. Csrr, So~.io/ismin Oliv Coi,,zrry 1924-/926(Nrw York. 1'4681, Vol I,p p 177. I S 5 . T k ; 25. lhid.. 1., 319, Slalil,. 1)e~rtrchrrc~hserver.11 lhal earlier lime disnlirsed t.arivt's itaiun 8 % n
characlerization is repeated with only very slight nlodilicnlio8l in fourrdorio,>r ofo Plorzned Econcm~ ?tanks 1de;t:'
(Vol. 11. p. 448) where Carr and Dsvies dese~.ihrSli,lio as "lhe repres~erllali~e figure oilhe p c r i c 1 26. Ihid.. p 303. Elsewhere Deutrcher expands OIL the relauol~ofllle Stal~r>isl
potrant as follo~vs"The Oppoqitiorl w;t!lted i~~duslrialiiatio~t
course l o the Lefts'
and collectivirolion to he carried out
adding: "Slalin's personalily,combined with lhe primiliveand cruel tr8dllioor oflhe Kusian burmu.
racy. imparted to llle revolutia~~ from nbove a parliculnrly hrutal cl>aractrr,which lhar romcilna rn lhc hnmd dayliplit o l proletarian denlocracy, with the cu~~rent or the rnnrres aod frce initcativr
ohrcurrd the fut~damortalhistorical prnblenm iovolrcd." l h e aulhorr do not r a y what they maa , Ymm hlaw': wltcrc:.;lr Slalis !cliecl 1111 lhc I<ITCC oftbe decree and coerciou froln shove. All l l ~ \ifime. c
by "the fundamental hirlorical prr,blenlr involved." hut vile tllc ilifere81cc lhar ihey are i,>vuk~ng: !kOppodlios~ 11;nd r l w d for ~vlvallhc war doing even if ihc wily lhc WRS dllilq il wi~st ~ l , ~ # g ~ >II, itol
what wr have called the eircsn,stantial expla!>nlin~> of the revolulior> frolri ahovr. , lhm " rht, PropI~eIOr,rrorl, p. 7U.
88 Rnhcrt C. TUC~I Slslinirnn ss Rorolutivt~fro", Aborc 89
results achieved i n the it~duslriali;.alion ellirrl during l l ~ cP l n t ~ycars. As for the that which l ~ a dto bc paid ibr tile SL;~lit~ist soluliur~.Suclt, also, is tlie p o s i t i o ~ ~
secnrity motive ro which C a r r referred, g r o w i ~ t gout o f l l ~ eexlernal ~ e ~ ~ s i of ons of an i ~ ~ f l u e t l l i ascltool
l of colttentporary posl-Sfalin Soviel politico-eco~~ontic
1926-27, a recent and carer111scholarly rcvicw o f the facts, while it indicates l l t a l lhougl~lwhose "scarcely veiled eodorsentent of Rukharin's induslrializalion
the war scare was niore than a mere s11at11and conlriv;~ncco f iolra-party co~~tlicls strategy" has been persuasively argued and documented by Moslie Lewirt.)l
of the tinlc and probably enjoyed a certain credence on l l ~ par1 e o f uarious Soviel At this poillt, a ~ n u d i f i c n t i oof ~ ~l l ~ ecircurnstat~tinle x p l ; ~ ~ ~ a t intighl
o r ~ suggest
leading fignres, also corlcludes lltat "thc war score was in facl grossly and crudely itself: if Stalit~isrnwas riot the necessary or sole practicable course tltat it o ~ t c c
manipulated b y Sovict politiciatts ill 1!)27." 2' There were. as I would put it, reenled l o be, i t was t~evel-lllelessso perceivedat tlte time by tlte decision-ntakers,
grounds for Soviet concerli about external r e l a l i o ~ ~ins Europe, ;llthough nut, at who after all had l o act w i t l ~ o o tforek~~owletlge of the wllole sequence of erects,
that liltte, for serious fear of an onconling crralilion war against lhe USSR; but including catastrophic cunsequenccs, w l ~ i c their l ~ decisions would bring ah1111l.
thepnr.ribilityof war was brandisl~edas a j u s t i l i c a t i o ~for ~ the developing Slalinisl The dilliculty with such n hypothetical fitllback position (and lltis 111ay explai~t
orientation ill inlernal policy. why still-livin! a r l l ~ e r e ~nf ~ l ctile circumstanlinl expl:i~tatic~tthave not lakc11 i t ) i s
T l l c c i r c u ~ t l s l ; l ~ ~c~x ip:l~aIn o l i o ~of~ fi,racrl 11las9~ ~ ~ l l e ~ l i v i 7 i 1Ililrtlly
l i 0 1 1 s(luare3 [hat nuoicrous Dolshrvik 111inds ill Mcrscow a n d a r t ~ u r ~t ld~ ccoulltry, i ~ t c l u ~ l i n g
with the tiow d e ~ ~ ~ o t t s t ~ .conclusiun, ated cited carlier f r o n ~Millar, lltal thiscourse some and possibly even a majority ill tlie Polilburo, did trur perceiw rhe Sfo1i111:sr
proved ill practice a11 "unrr~itigated e c o ~ l o ~ ~policy l i c disaster," nor is it cogenl course as the only possible nclion ru toke irr rhe circ~,~ii.rmncesrhor oblni/r;~ly.
that a policy which directly and indirectly produced l l ~ worsl e fanline i n Russia's Bukharin, in a c l a n d e s l i ~ ~conversalion
e of July 1928 wit11 Kame~tevw l r i c l ~be-
famine-plagued history. that of 1932-34, wltich cost a conservatively estimated canie widely known ill party circles. clearly lirresaw the catastropl~iccoltse-
five r n i l l i o ~ tlives,ZR was necessitated by l l ~ eneed to aver1 a famine. Altltough quences of Stalin's c o ~ ~ l e ~ l ~ p l rur:%l a t e d revolutior~from ahovc. 11 was, he s;~id.
historical "~nigl~l-11ave-bee~~s" are just as d i f i c u l t to c s ~ a b l i s as
l ~ arc argumena aruinous policy cnurse s i g ~ ~ i r yai ~relllrn ~ g 10 War C o n ~ ~ i t t ~ ~a~cclurse i s n ~ ,leitding
of the "(here-was-oo-other-possible-course" type, the i~~sistetitly emerging con- to civil war, l o an t~prisingl h ; ~ t \\,\.oold have l o be drowned i n bloud.32 Hi*
clusion from scholarly researches based on the more abundanl data now available prevision proved well founded i n essence if not i n specific detail.
from Sovict sources is that "a c o ~ i l i n u a l i oo~fi the N e w Econonric Policy ofllte Thc hypothetical fallback position cannot save llte c i r c u m s ~ a ~ ~explanatiort tial
1920s would have pcrmitted at least as rapid a rale o f iridustrialization n'ith leu because it leaves open and u~lexplainedIlle facl l h a l the r u l i ~ party ~ g was divided
cost to the t ~ r b a ras ~ well as to thc rural populaliun o f the Soviet U ~ t i o n . " In '' in its appraisal of the c i r c u n ~ s t a ~ ~ cine s1928-29 and t l ~ a an l i t ~ f l u e ~ ~ tscctioti
ial
effect, infor~ltedand tliougl~tfttlltislorical lii~idsiglttis c o l ~ l i r ~ ~ l the i t t gbasic ec* of Soviel political o p i n i o ~opted ~ for a course i n a g r a r i a ~policy
~ and indusrrializa-
noniic realisn~of the program for a bala~tcedi~tdustrializaliottpolicy within the lion that would l ~ a v ebeen cvolulionary, ill a c c o r d ; ~ ~ ~with c e the lalcr Lenin's
frame o f a colttinuing N E P that Bukharin presented in his Provdo article of counsel, rather t l i a ~rcvolulionary.
~ 'l'l~e i ~ ~ e v i l a bnext
l e queslion-wl~y d i d {lie
Seplcrltber 30, 1928, "Notes o f an Economist." ' 0 The Bukharinist non-revolu. cvoluliu~~ists go down l o defeat i n l l ~ eparty slrugple, o r why d i d Slalinisn~
tionary alternative for Soviet i ~ ~ d u s t r i a l i z a l i opolicy n at the close rrf the twe~~lia, win?--ca~tnolbe answered b y refere~~c'e l o the socioeco~lon~ic circu~itsla~lces nvcr
an alter~tativeillspired ill large part hy the L e ~ ~ i l t itllinking st o f 1921-23 discussd which I h e q n ~ ~ r rragcd el i n nolsl~evikcircles. 11can be answered o ~ ~by l yrcfcrencc
earlicr hcre, was real. H a d i t been adopted, i t could well have worked; had it to the factors lltal deterntinerl tlte Slolir~i.srrcrpu/r.rr l o 111ccircu~t~slnnccz and i l s
worked poorly, the cosl to the Soviet econorny could tot have curnparcd with polilical victory. Tlle circuti~stnr~ces as such c a ~ ~ f~u ~ r ~o~ ti sthe
h explana~iono f
Ihe revolulio~ifro111 above.
27. Jrlhn P. So!>lrg,"Tile Snviel War Scare of 192627," Tire Ruaian Revieis: Inltuary 1971. p.
77. See also Leonard Schitpiru. The Co,n,nu,iirr Puny vjrhv Soviri U~rio,,(New Yurk, 19591, p. 111.
where it is staled: "There war little prorpcct of any kind of invasion ill 1928."
2%. Dana 0.Dalrympl,le."The Soviel Famine of 1922-34," Sovir~iSiiidirr. Janonry 1964, 13. b l . One of tlic forccs ct~n(luciveto 3 Slalit~istr e v o l t ~ t i u ~ ~ a respolise
ry anlong 110I-
29. Milliw, up. cil., p. 766. One of the sources cilrd by Millar i n I l l i s rrvicw essay is a s ailick
shevik politicians was l l ~ eother L c n i ~ l - l l ~ c still very i ~ ~ l l t ~ e o trevolulioriary
ial
hy Karr, who writes chat "thc dnmsgc done to agriculture within the first three years ofthe indunntl.
iration drive was so revere that it affwled adverselyi t * .hilily 10 cnnlrihute rig<liRcrt>tly to furlhs Lenin of the War Cununut~ismperiod and t l i r heritage o f Bolshevik revolulionism
e~o!~~m dcvelopmmt:'
ic Karz concludes that "lhcre i s a sig~~ifi~nnl probability" II1aI l l l e Savh [hat the oilier Leltin syn~bulized.1( is ttndersla~tdablethat Bukharin, involved
dilcmntil in agrarian policy toward the end of N E P was not one thal hod lo he rerulvd b
collcclivira~ionatad ihcaunciatcd con>pulrnryprocurement offarm products or by the nbasdonmml -

ofa sendhle nnd innitial induaridliwliun dnve"Sre Jerzy F. Karz, "Frorn Slnlin t o Brrzl~ncu:SnwO
~griculturalPolicy is) Historical Pe'enpcctive:' in TheSovier R~trolC,~i>rt,izmit,: cd. Ja!ner R. Milk
(Urbana. 197th pp. 41. 51.
30. For recenl arguments lo this cfTmt, see Cohcn. B~kllorinond the Uoirhevik RevoIriio,l. Chap
9 and Epilogue, and Lewin. Polrrrcol Undercurrents. pp. 52-61.
11. L.ewil>,I'olirb~~I
U,rdcrcvrro~l.?,Chap. 12.
32. Tllr Bukhari!l-Knnlenev co~tversstiaai s Ducurne~llTI 897 in the Trotsky Archives at Hiward
Univsrily. Funher llislorirnl tcslimul~yl a the eficl tlanl the disaslrour consequence< o l lhr Stalinist
murx were rore.icnl by sonic well.knuw!i Soviet solton~islr ill lltr later 1920's is given by
N. Vslentinov, "17 lpll~slllogo,"So~sio/i.ricikiivermik, April 1961, pp. 68-72.
911 Ruherl C . 'I'wker Slolinirnl as R c v e l l l l i ~ ~from
n Al,c,rr 91

as lie was ill a politicel struggle agait~stStalin : ~ n dllie p ~ l i c i ~IIC h W ~ ad\.ucitl~~~g

S t r a ~ t s i t i ~was
t ~ associatec willt the idc:~tliat the f u ~ t d i ~ ~ i i robstacle r ~ l i ~ l to soci;~lisn~
i n 1928-29, trealed Lc~titt's1;ist writings as Iiis "l~olitical testii~iic~it.";III~ 11131 was fhe body of lhabit left over frotn the past a ~ that ~ d the r e v o l u t i ~ ~ ~ i i zof
ing
is certailily what L e ~ t i nhiniself itttct~dedillern to be. 13111 ihr llie 13olsllevik habit-in ollicr words, of culture-was o i l Jbrld an educatior~altask riltlter t l ~ a n
Iiiovetiletlt a ~ part)', ~ d L~II~II's p i ~ l i t i ~ .Iie~sl I a i i ~ e ~W:IS~ t lltc c111i1.ecorpus (11his one to be resolvcil by n l c r u i r c inieil!~s. 111 Iiis article of M a y 1919, "A C;rc;it
I l ~ o u g l i tatid \vriling, the whole record o f his revolutionsry learlersltip of the Beginni~~g,"LCII~II hailed a workers' iniliativc o f v u l u ~ t t a r yu ~ ~ p aSaturday id work
niovctnent up to, during, aud alter [lie Octobcr Revnlulint~:and Leilirl's political (Ihe Communist rrrbhr~r~lik) ;is ;I dcvclopment of enornious historical sigtiificaiice.
lestilrtient ill tliis tilore c o n i p r e l ~ e ~ ~ sselise,
i v e o r L e ~ t i ~ t i s as
t n ;I wliole. c o ~ ~ t s i ~ i e d and observed ill Illis c o n ~ ~ r o t i oltli ~ a "the l dictat<~rsltipo i the prole1:tri;it i s ,lot
very 11i11cl1I l i i t t Stalin :>!id S t a l i t t i s t ~had
~ goorl c l a i n ~10 as ;a11 autltoritative text only llie ttse of rorce i ~ g c ~ i ~the t s l exploiters, and not even n ~ a i r ~ the l y osc of
slid warralil fur tlie policies followed i n tile revolution lion1 above. force." 3 5
Tlte very idea o f ;I process o f "revolulio~t from nhove." 1skc11ill the must But it would not he proper tu (liscc!unt ~ I this I evidence tlie L c n i ~f~,r ~ wlinrn
gcner;il ternts. h;ls a Leninist pedigree. Evcn i t 1 o11e o f l ~ i slost a r t i c l e cited ahore, revolutiolt \c.ils. ill Ilia rlwll laler worils, ";I cllnnge w l t i c l ~b r c a k llle old order
Le1ti11spoke o f uvcrtaking other nations " ~ i t htlie aid 01' thc workc~s'and loils very fuundntiul~s,a l ~riot l nrle t l ~ i ca~lli<rusly,
~t slowly a i ~ dgradually r c ~ i i o d -
pc;~sants' govcrtiiiient." Uut the idea o f r e v o l u t i o ~from ~ ahove liaz ;I deeper place els it, titking cxre t o brcak as liltle as possible"-atid for w l ~ o r nstate power, once
i n Leni~t'sthought. When he c o n t e ~ ~ d ei nd TIreSrure orrd Reloiririon i n 1917, and in tile hands o f the revolution;iry party, s l ~ o u l dbe used as a cudgel against the
i n s ~ c l si~hsequent
i works as Tile P r o l ~ ~ r o r i ~Revolrr/iu,r
,r a n d rhe Reliegode class nieniy. W~ICII Stalili ill Ilccember 1926 rl~eloricallyasked (he C o n ~ i l ~ t e r ~ ~
Karrtsky, that tlie doctrine o f proletarian dictalorshil> was l l i c core idea of Marr. Executive what [lie b u i l d i t ~ gi~I'soci;disn~ rnrallt i n class terms and answered t l ~ a t
is111atid t11;tl Marxisni callcd for a seizure o f power followed by rlictatol-ial rule "building soci:~lictiiill t l ~ cUSSR o l e : ~ ~O>VsC I . C O O I ~ ~ ~1I1~111. 0 \ ~ 1 1S ~ l v i c O l o~~~~~~oisic
by violcnce against the i ~ l t e r l ~ ;bourgeoisie
tl and associ;tted social rnrccs, he was by our IWU forces ~II Ille c0111xe< ) f a slr!~gglc," l t e \v;t< sittiply dr;t\vi~tgU ~ C U lI l ~ e
s a y i ~ ~ Tile
g : revolution docs not end \vitli the pnrly's taking i>fpower: tliat i s only Le~tin:ind L~II~~I~SIII or IIICC i v i l War pcriud :tnd earlier. the L c ~ t i ~ t i sillnwhic11 ~
a ~ n o m e t i l o ~point
~ s o f historical transition beyolid which the party cottlinues its thefunrlanie~ttnlqueslio~ifur a Marxist seeking tocreatc socialisrn was Kru-k<~g,~?.
revoluliotiary deslruction o f the o l d order froni above, i.c, by wielding the or who w i l l vi~nquisllw h o ~ iin~ the class war? 'To this L.e~iil~isnt o f Klo-koso, lie
coerci\'e instruments of state power against the revolution'? class rncn~ies.Lenin- did subseq~tenllyadd oile proposilioo tliat wasorigin;~lwith him: that the internal
ist r e v o l u t i o ~frnm
~ above meant tlie use o f state power for tlie continuation or class slruggle i~tlet~silies wit11 the society's ~idvaocetoward socialism. He was
class war of/cr the revolutiotiary party lias achieved sucli pouaerand furnled its drawing upon the Lertinisni that had stood during 1918-21 for forcible food
gover~tt~ient under tlie title orUpn,letariat~dictatorship." 3 3 T11is basic idea round : req~~isilioning f r o n ~the pe:tsant (prodruzv;rsrko). fur s l i r r i ~ ~u gp of class war i n
ils sharpest, tltouglt by 110 means its only, later expressioli i r t Lenin's prospectus the villages by nte;ins o f tlic c o i i ~ ~ n i t t e eofs tlic poor (ko~nbedy), lor the belief (to
o f 1919 for a work (never conipleted) on the proletariar~dictarorsliip. Two pas. cile Lenin) lliat the proletarian dic1;ilorship should tilean " i r o ~rule" ~ atid nut a
sages are especially ~lolahle:"The dictatorsllip o f [lie prulctariat is the cotrri~rrro. "jellylisb pnrlcl;lri:t~l g i r v c r ~ ~ ~ ~ tand t . " tile rulltless resort l o terror SI; ;ttt
r ~ ~ fur
riot1 o r t l i e class struggle i n nea'forrns. That is tlic crux o f the ~ i i i i l t e rtltnt : is whal . i n s ~ r ~ i n ~of e ~dictatorial
tt rule. 7hi.5 war S~oli,ri.sr L e ~ r i r r i r ~n~~l t. r [lie
l ;~t~tii~.ti~i~ity
they d o 1101 uliderstand." A n d : "The state is only a nrupurr o f tlie proletariat in olStali~~is~n clati111
's to i t is not seriuusly d i ~ i i i ~ i i s h eby d tlie i~tiportantfact ~II;II
its class struggle. A special k i n d o f cudgel (~/uluDi~rka),riel1 dc plus." i4 Whether \\,hill Lellinicnl stoorl fur ill 1.enin's own mind, as a conception of llo\$, l o h ~ l i l d
Leniii cver used tlie phrase "from above" i t 1 arguing tliis i ~ o t i o tot f t h e proletarian socialisn~ill llussi;~, u ~ i d c r w e grcnt ~ ~ l n~odificalio~ illt 1921-23.
dictatorship as a c o ~ i t i t ~ u i t irevolutionary
g struggle lion1 tlte van1;tge-point of Nor was tliis Stalinist Lenitlis~nSlalin's o t ~ l y A . consider;il)le p r i ~ p o r t i oo~ft his
' ~eneratio~ ~ , ~ v h oI I bcc(ime
nlen ~ Uolsheviks wlien Bolshevis~nwas still an anti-
state power is o f 110 consequence; the idea was unrtiistakably present ill his
thougllt. regime revolulio~tarynloverne~tland wlio polilically came ofage, as Stalin i~irnsclf
I t is lrue that as early as 1919, at the lieiglil o f the C i v i l War slid War Corniitu- did, during the era of W a r C o n ~ ~ i t u ~ t i sltared s n ~ , his oulluok t o one or a n o t l ~ c r
rcisttt, we find inti~nariortsill Lenin o i t h e transition t o the later reformist approach ; degree. I itni not speaking here about general ideas alone o r about Le~iirrism
t o the building o f socialism tliat has been described earlier i n these pages. Tltis I sintply as a system of political belief, but likewise about the ingrained habits of
:
niind, ways of ~ l e l i l t i ~and i g responding 10 situations, ctyles of action, conlrnon
33. For ao argunlrnl by ihr young S t d i n slung thew liues, srr Itis esiey o l 1906, "Anarchiui?or 4 memories. n i y s t i q ~ ~ cetc., , tliat collectively constitute the culture o f a polilical
Socialinn7" in I.Stali,t. Sochi,~e,!,~ri( M u s o w . 1954), 1. 34546. Hc cited as hlr aulllorlly lherc no1 1 movement insofar as a given age cohort o f its membership (and leadership) is
L c ~ ~but i n lhe passage in TI,@Conit,!unirr Monfcsroaboul lhe pralclsn:!l's becouli8lg llle raliog clsrr : cuncerned. A s its name illdicates, War Cotnniunisn~had militarized [lie revolu-
and using its polilical powcr to deprive the bourgeoisie of i l s capitol slcl~hy slcp, r l c .
tionary polilical culture o f the Rolshevik ntovenient. The h e r i ~ a g cof that fornia-
34. 7%c Lrniin AsrhuP,gy, p. 4'M. The prorpcctur waq firs1 publ~shrd i n 1925 it8 Lrttt+~rkiiShornzk
I l l . Tllr "lhey" who "do not understand were not idenlkfied: Lcnili t r ~ i i yIrilve had in nliud such
people as Knutsky and the Russian Mcnrhevikr. 35. The I.cvi,ni . l ~ ~ r l i n b p~ ~478.
,a
 P.
92 Rnherl C. T u c h Wlnirm RS Re~nlotionfrom A b ~ w 93
tive time ill tlic Soviet culture's history was rnartii~lzeal, r e v o l u l i u ~ ~ avolunh ry I n seeking to refulc 111e"circumstat~tialenpla~li~tion" o f the i t ~ i l i ipliase
~l of tllr
rism and elon, readiness to resort to coercion, rule by adniinistralivefial (fldlninu. SIdinisl revolutiotl, i t is !lot llle i t ~ l r nofthis l essay to deny 1 1 i ~ t ~ ~ i ~ ; ~ l
rrirovorri[,)), ccetralizcd administration. summary juslice, atid n o slllall dosed , to the circomstences lhcing the Soviet regiri~ci n 1927-29, tllost llofah~y [he
that Conlmunist arrogance (kor~rchvansrvo) tlnit L e ~ l i nlater inveighed agaim. ~ n - c o l l e c t i o ndiWcultics. 'l.l~epoilit is illat thcse c i r c u n ~ s t adid ~ ~,,,,I~ ~cilrry
I t was not simply the "heroic period of the greal Kussiall Revolution," as LO a single unn~istakabled e l i ~ ~ i t i o fl ~the s i t u a ~ i ~and n implicit prescril,[ion for
K r i t z ~ n a tchristened
i i t in the title of the book about War Coliilnunism that he plicy. That widely dilferenl dt+nitiotts of the situation and w i ~ l e l y<lirerelll
published in the nnd-I920's, but above all t l l e j g l r l i l l g period, the lime when in j policy prescriptiolls were possible is proved by the licrce debarcs and deep
Rolshevik niinds the citadel uf socialisn~was l o be taker1 by s l o r n ~ . ~ " i differences that mmerged at t l ~ olin,e. Our- argtrrrictrt i tliat l l ~ S~olirtist
c dcfi~ii~ion
War Conimunistt~had given way to the N E P i n 1921 as a Itlatter of o f f i d i ollhesituatio~ii n lernls ol-class war with the kulak forces and the Staliliist policy
party policy, and i n the ensuing new period there emerged. again under Letlin'j ? rapotlse in thc form of"Uw111-Siberian nielhods" o l forcible grain requisitiollillg
political and ideological lcadersl~ip,s~trietliingthat could he called "NEP cul. i and then inass c o l l e c t i ~ i z a t i oreprece~~lcd,
~~ ill part, an appeal l o the no~q~,evik
ture." This N E P culture comprised a many-sided [new way of Soviet lire which 1 mores of War Commonisnl. atid thiit Illis orientatio~lproved potell~ly l,ersuasive
four~denpressio~~ i n institutions, ideas, ltabits of nlitld, atid c o ~ ~ d u cAnlong t. itr i llrgely because of the surviving strettpth o f those mores among the ~ o l s h ~ ~ i k ~
elements were the restored monetary economy, the emergetlt bystem of Soviet
legality, the new stress o n a volul~tarysrnychko between workers and Peasantry, i
: mdllot by meal13 ollly, as some have thought, because o f S l a l i ~ i forlnidnhlr
arganizdlio~ialpower SI: General Secrelary. From this viewpoint, the great strug.
'~

the primacy of persuasion and educative methods ill the reginle's approach lo $koverparl~policy ill 1928-29 hetweett Stalinisni and Bukltarinisnl was a figlit
tlie people. the previously mentioned Lenitiist lotion of grarlualisn~atld cullunl ! klween policies conreivc~lill llnc spirit crf tltr ~ e v ~ r l o l i o ~cultnrc ~ a r ~ ,r wZlr
rcvolulion as the tr211isferculture, and a general at~nosphel-eof relative social 1 Camniut~isri~ and the e u o l ~ ~ t i o t ~ aNEI1 r y cultltrc--and t l ~ eli,rl~ler prev;rilccl.
nornlalcy. But we must beware of inferring from the f a i ~ i i l i a rl~istory-booklinear I t must br: added ihnl Sl;lli~tIlinlscIf slio~ald1101 he seen i r ~;,I1 this ;IS Z I lllilll
scheme o f d e ~ e l o ~ l i l e nfrom t War C o n ~ n i u t ~ i ston N
~ E P socielg l l ~ aN
t E P culture oforgartizalio~~al powcl- orily. I t i s true 111;1t the s o c i a l i s ~ ~ ~ . i ~ ~ -cc,llcclll ~~~~~.c~~~~~,lr~
di.yplocctl the culture of W a r C o n ~ ~ n u t ~ i isnn li l ~ etnind.; of l l l e gelleralion d j aiginaled \vitll l l u k l ~ a r atltl i ~ ~ tltal Slalin on numerous occasiulls ill the ,llid.
1301sheviks who were moving into political leadership i n the later 1920's. It ; 192Ws eclloerl the Rtlkhal-inis1 version o f it, stressing NEI1, for ex;~m~de, as the
certainly did in some, indeed many, instances; NEI' cultilrc ihad its powerrully 1 mdiuln of the l n t l v e t i i e ~toward
~l socialia~itand tlie peasa~it'sameoability tostlc)l
'

persuasive proponents not only i n Lenin but also illBukliarin, Rykov, at~dnuma. a nlovenlerrl. This has helped to foster f l ~ ei~tiageof llim as an ixnproviscr ~ i r h
ous ~ t h e r s ,sanle represen~itlgthc gifted party y o u t l ~ .But we have the weighly hardly any policy ideas of his own at tllat time, or as one whose policy ideas were
testilllony of sucll men as Valentinov, Piatakov, and Stnliti llinlself tllat the purely R~tkharinist."' Agai~tstsuch a view, two points need to be made. First,
~ l ~ i l i t a nvoluntarist
t, political cultureattd mystique of W a r Conimnllisnl lived On i given the exigencies o f t l ~ ejoin1 Stalio-Bukharin f a c t i o ~ ~ battle al against tile Left
amollg very many Communists. A t i d from about 1927 on, sorile sellsilive minds opposition. wllicll was pressillg thc need for rapid III~USII-ialiw~io~~, i t was polifi-
among the expone~lfso f N E P c u l t u r e becanteapprelie~~sively aware ofan impend- tally inlpossiblc for Stalin l o lake i.ssue ope~rlywith the Bttkllarirlist poljcy ,os.i
illgllew social cataclysm, a second storming of the citadel as i t were." 1.0lh'i j lion, or eve11 to fail 1 0 clrucur it1 il, beli~retile v a ~ i q u i s l i n ~ eo~f ~the t 'I'rotskyist
i t needs to be added that Lenin llitnself liad provided possible cues for such a Left at the end of 1927 Secun~lly,a chlsc reading o f the recon1 sl~nrr,ctI,:11 the
reslx,,,qe ill the n l i ~ i t a r yimagery that he lt:td used i ~ ~ o lrl c~ i t OIICC
! ~ ill speaking Sialinisr p o s i l i u ~:1lIl111ugli
~, tot brouglit into the opeti as a policy p l a l f o ~ nbefore ~
of the N E P itself: as a forced "retreat" which would ill good time be f~>llowd 1928, found expression sotto voce i n various Slalin pronouncements o f t l i c N E P
by a "subsequent victorious advance." " period, at Illevery Iiine u,Iten hegave to many tl~eappearallceofbei~ig a Ilukharin-
in in tl~eoryand policy.
36. P , , ~the nrgun,m~t l n r War Communism brought about a milifarila:i~flofthe revnlutianW One such prolloullcemellt, the slalcment of 1926 about huildine - ~~~- ~o socialiqm
~~~....,-..
p a ~ i ~ i c auf~Dolst~evirm,lllr currelative argutnenl that we mast dislilleuisll two Leninism* : througll L.ovcrcor~lj,,g sovjc( btluregeojsie by uur forces ill (he
that wur ~onlmuni~m and !ha( or t ~ , eNEP, and (he further view ~ t l a :~ t a t ~ n
wrs a rryrcsentallrr i
A S~vdt : murse of a struggle," Itas :ilresdy been cited as at1 example of the Stalitlist

'3
of llle War Conltou~iiststrain, see Rubcrl C. I'ucker. Sioli,, iir R e v o l r r i ~ ~ ~ i olcV79-192(r
rjr ,
irr 14irror)m nrrd P~.rronoliry(NewYork, 1973). pp. 208-9, 3954211.
37. Scc 9 o i ; n or ne~oiunio,torypp. 402.3. 413,415-16, fur dccurno~tationo~~ thc survival o r l b 19. Spcakit~gof Slalit?'raIli;~sccwilt# line "aklnnrin\ir~~. Kolzr~V. Datnielr wrilcv " I t ? mzlllels of
War Comn~llnirlspirit during the NEP. According, lor example. to Vale~~finov,
o f Moscow in the NEP years, "the pany, parliculrrly in irr lower ceNr, was instinctively, sukm
who war a rcsid-I
' dicy and drxcrinr lllclr l # l # ewas his guide; io r ~ ~ a l t e r s o r n r g a i ~ i ~ a lhis
3lalin.s Rise lo D~ctalnrship.1922-1939," i t ) Poliiitr jn rhc,Sovi~iUirion SCPC,~
i o opower
, war llleir supper:."
Co.ws, ed. Alcxa~~rlcr
hitinmd Alan Wali!! ( N e w York. 1906). p. 2 7 'This slvlenlenl is hvnnhly c i l d hy Slepllerr Collerl
rciously, antagonistic toward Ihe NEP." As for the apprehensive awarenccs or the i8amifhcnce a l l
social cataclysm, see the above-cilcd article by Valesli!mv. "11 prorI~lnRn.'' ulhcpoi~llwllerc lhc ihinlretf~rriler:'' I'ilere was. pctlrrally qpe;\king.r rough division<,fl;thorhel\rren
38. Foreclsmplc. i n "T1teln~porlanccolGold Now and After l l l e Complete Viclrlry ofS<xlatirm.' Bukharin and Slatin, b e t w ~ c r lpolicy f i l r l t ~ u t i ~arid
l i ~ ~lbeory
> un ooc side nncl urga~#i~olio~~nl iuwscte
The L ~ m i nAarbologv p. 517. m th~olbrr."R u k i o n a arzd rirr ilr,hhevik Ken>lv,iio,t, p. 215.
 77
94 Rcnlbert C.Turk Wbbm nr Hevotulion from ~ h o v r 95
~ ~ ~
,,IKro.Xo~o? O t l ~~c revidellce i i~icludes: ~ i'ruw{a i article ~
~ Slalill's d ~ ~
:o the leadership itselS."' Still atlier, major diUerences callfor lllcrl~ioll:
lllc
~ ~7, 1925, ill
~ w h i c l ~11e
~ d e l i ~ ~,cthe
d present
~ perio(l ~as all o ~ rbo l o ~ oo/lhfl
c ~ ~:olkhoz
~ system itself. w l l i c l ~hore sniall resembla!~ccto tllc agricultural coni-
p,.~,.~)l.lo~pr 1 ~ 1 7 i.e.,
, the preludc to a llew revt)lutiollary slurnl; and rnunes inilialed during the Civil War period; l l ~ euse u f p o l i c e terror as a llrinle
studied i-eslatemc,lt o f t h i s thcn~e,w i t h added dct;~il,i n 1926. Moreover. there inslrun~ellto f g o v e r l ~ n ~ eill
r ~al rnarlllcr sl~arplydilTere~~tiated fruni the Red terror
w;ls a tlieoretical dilTerc~icebetweeti I ~ u k h i ~ ar il ~l ~lStalill l ill their w a P sponsored by Letlilt via tllc o r i g i ~ ~Cheka: al and illcinter-relntionsllip betweell
(,(.arglliIlg t 1 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ l i s n 1 - i 1 i - o 1 1 e - c notioli.
o u 1 1 i r yBuklinrin llwelt I I ~ r l i c u l a rUpon
l~ i internal and exler11~1l policy. Tlir brrsic u,r~icrlyi,~/"cr co,!fr,i,r/ilr lhur ,,,ho,
ic
lllea,lllellt ol'lllissocialism as all "agrarian-couperz~tive socialis~ii" of llle kind ! rhRus.riua r e v o l u ~ i o r ~ u r y p r r rrr~u,,red
~ ~ s . ~ i n [he S~a/it,;sr slr,gr. ; Ihod d l ~ r e r r ~
Ixojected ill ilellill.~ last articles; Stali~i's emphasis fell l l e a v i l ~011 the "one ! rharacrer/itlt~r the revo/ulio,rary procrrr of desmrr,crjo,t of /heold rno~e.
b
coulllry'. t l l m ~ eill a spirit of truculent Soviet Russia11 ~ ~ i i l i u n a l i srelllilliscenl nl rhijr cr<wrion of rhe frc~vi h u l h a d rltarked rhe earlier, 1917-21 l}ri,y
of llisRllssocentric "creative Marxism" (as l ~ et h e ~ called i it) o f August 1917, dange o f charocler i r l o he u~rdersluodb t lerrns of a reversio,~l o o revo/t,riOlrory
wllrll lie prophesied that Rossia, l l o l Europe, might show the uaorldthe way lo i pmcess sear earlier i n Rus.riot? hitrorp
soci;llislll.A Great Russian ~ l a t i ~ l ~ i a lt ies~t i d e l ~ cnlay y be secll, llioreo~er.3%an i I t has beell argued here Ilia1 the idea o f r e v o l u t i o ~f ~ r o n ~ahove had a ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~
illgredielit or (IleC i v i l W a r s y ~ ~ d r o u ii er ~Soviet culture, Illis war !laving hem : pedigree. While that is i ~ i i ( n ~ r t a fnr u t all ioterpretation of Stalinisln, i t milst now
lbugl1t llo~a l o ~ l eagainst the Whites hut also against their fiireigrl supporters and i bestressed that the p h e n o o i e o o ~of~ r e v o l u t i o ~from
~ above has a range or forms,
foreigti i ~ ~ t c r v e ~ ~ t i o n i s t s . : md that the Le~linistSorni-revolution fro111above as a victorious r e v o l u ~ i o t ~ a r y
~ 1 ul~sl~ot
% ~ is 111x1 there were two versions of the s 0 ~ i a l i ~ 1 n - i l i - ~ l ~ e - c o u n t ! prty's violent use lrf the "cudgel" of slate power t o repress its interlla] class
l,ositioll ill {lie lllid-~920's. A l t l ~ o u g hthe Stalinist versir~ll11:ld to be rr~uledthen enemies-represe~~lcd(111lyo ~ ~ e e l c n i eioStali11isn1
ut asaco1oplex~~d~~~~.~id~~1
because the a f o r e ~ n e ~ ~ t i o rpressures
~ed o f tlie intr:~-p;~rlycolllest, the grml revolution fro111 abirvc. W l ~ e r et h r Stalinist p l ~ e n o n ~ e werlt ~ l o ~ far
~ beyond [lie
rapidity i t s S~lll-scsleemerier~cei~rimedialelyu p o ~ tlie
~ defeat o f t h e Trotskyist f Lcnin heritage lay ill its co~lstructiveaspect. Leninist r e v o l u t i o l ~from above
~ ~ 1 furlher
. 1 altcsts to i t s prcsellce ill the witips o f thc Soviet lx>liticalscelle even 1 axlllially a destructivc process, a tearing dowtl o f t h e o l d order rrolll the vatltagc.
durillg the l~eydayoSR~~kharinisrn.'~This is 1101l o d c ~ Illat
~ y S l a l i showed
~~ plenty paintofslate power; Stalinist revolution frornabove used destructiveor repressive
polilic;~l
'i
opportunism at illat lime, or at olllers. But l o treat o p p o r t u l l i ~ l i ~I meatls, among o l h c l ~ sor
. what was, both in intent and i n reality, a coiistructive
l ci t h deeply held beliek is to.tate a !, (as well as destructive) process. I t s slogan o r ideological banner was tlic building
bctlavior ill puliticiai~as i ~ ~ c o m p a l i b w
The ~ i c t u r eo f S t a l i l ~:IS ;I 1c:ldcr wl11l reprc~~lltcd
Sillll,]is~ic (,f lloliti~iil iiii~ll. ofa socialist society. Hilt ill substi~tl~e.S t a l i l ~ i s nBS
~ r e v o l ~ ~ t i ofrorll
ll above w i l ~
orgallizntiollal powerwithout policy idc:~s atid who embarked upon the revolu. Istale-buildillg process, the c o ~ ~ s t r u c t i o lf ~a pnwerrul, highly c e u t r a l i ~ , ~ d ,
tiull frool above ill " o l ~ ~ r e n ~ e d i t a t epragmatic
d, r~~anaea
r " ~ will1
~ d "110 vision bureaucratic, n l i l i t a r y - i ~ ~ d u s t r iSoviet
i~l Russian state. Although i t was pro-
of wllere i t would lead" is a f i ~ ~ ~ d a m e ~nlisaollceptiull.
ital claimed "socialist" i n the illid-IY~O'S,i t dilfered i n v a r i ~ u svital ways lion) whtlt
:
most socialist thinkers-Marx, Engels, and L e ~ i i among r~ them-had utidcntood
VI sxialisrn l o mean. Stalinist "socialisni" was a social is^^^ o f mass poverty rather
: lhan plenty; of sharp social s t r a l i f i c a t i o ~rather
~ than relative equality: of u l ~ i v e r -
uut iftile surviuirlg spirit o r War C o ~ n ~ ~ ~ u illflaencc~l
liisn~ t l ~ eway ill whicl~the lal,constalit fear r a l l ~ ethat1r emancipation ufperson;~Iity;ofnariollal c h a u v i l ~ i s ~ l
drives fur c(illectivization atid iodustrializatio~iwcre col~ceiveda l ~ dcarricd out, rather t h ~ l nbrotherliood o f man; and o f a n~orrstrouslyhypertrophied state power
i t does lrit follow tliat the Stalinist r e v o l u l i o ~repeated
~ 1917-21 or that llle new rather Illan the decreasingly statified commune-state delil~eatedby M a r x in Tile
Slalinist order which look shape i n the 1930's was a retjival of the System ofwar Civil War ill prance and by Leoilt in Tfrr Slare atrd Revolr~rion.
Comlnunisni. T o be sure, the start o f the new decade saw such renlillders of the i t was not, however, by mere caprice or accident that this happened. Stalinist
lleroic period as food rationing, and other rese~nblal~ces appeared. As Mashe : revolutiollisrn fro111 above had a prel~istoryi n the political culture o f Russian
Lewin has pointed out, however, theearly Stalillist pnicess showed lrlarly distinc- ISarism; it e ~ i s t e das a patterrl in the Russiall past and hence could be seen by
live trails that differe~iliatedi t from its pre-NEP predecessor: ttie feverish itidus- i
a twelltieth-celitury stalesmall as both a precedent and legitimation of a political
trial expansion. the emergence of anti-egalitarian tel~denciesi n cotllrast lo the : murse that would, i n essentials, recapitulate the liistorical pattern.42
egalitarinnist~~ e d the !
of tlic C i v i l War period, the rise uf new elites c o ~ i ~ b i l ~with
loss o f the relatively indepe~idel~t political role of the lesser leadersl~ipranks at
the earlier linlr, and the political rnuzzli~igof the party rank-and-lilt i n relation
' 41. Pol;licul U!zlrrurres,r pp. 98-99.
f
; 41. This argumcnr. along will) theview !hat Stalinism i!~ essence war such n rccapvnllaliono r t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t
: molulinnirm from abuve, liar becn prcvnled in nly ssag "The Image of Dual Russia." in 76r
40. his .nrpnmes~and the docurncnlatiot~of lhr evidcncc addseed ie ilr supporl have bco, ; Twn$nrlurnrorion cfRurrroti Society, e d . C. E. Dlnck (Cambridge. Mass.. 1960). The essay is r e p r i n ~ ~
prcsrstd in SluIi,, or R~~vlrrrionow.
CLat,. II. 1 h Roberl C. Tucker. The Sovim PolNicul Mitrd, 2nd cd. (New York, 1971). Chap 6~
 r
96 Rnhrrt C. Tuck
I t was not, l~owever,by mere caprice or accident that this I ~ a p p e ~ ~ Stalind ed.
' Wbbm ar Revolution frow Ahevc
mVes~ecial
poi1lt to this ~ c r c e l > l i o l 01le
l. was tlial the ko/lchozycanie to operate
97

revolutionism from above had a prehistory ill the politicel culture o f Russian i m r d i l l g to arrallgenlellts under wllicli the pcasant owed the kolkhozall allnllal
tsaristn; i t existed as a patter81 i n the Russian past and lierice c u ~ r l dbe seen by *ligatory nlinilllulll, s~ccifieclby Saviel lalv, of "work-day o ~ ~ i t s(rrvdm/,ri);this
"
a twe~~tietli-ceolury statesnlan as b o l h a prccedcnt and legitit~iationof a political ; YYarefUrll lo6u1'.s/lchfll(l. Second, when the internal passport sytern, a11ilistitu.
course tbat would, ill essentials, recapitulate the historical patteni. Col~fronted 1 imnoftsarist Russia, was revived ill Soviet Russia by a g o v e r ~ ~ l i i e ~ decree ital of
ill the aftermath of tlie two-century-long Mollgo1 d o r n i ~ i a t i o ~wii t l i liostile and : December jl, 1932, as a 11le;llls of bureaucratic control over the movenients of
ill sorile cases more adva~tcedneiglibor-slates i n possessioti of p o r t i o ~ ~ ofs t k i citizerls. Ihe film1 l P ~ ) l ~ ~ l l awils t i ~ t lint
l issued 1)assports. The deprivalioll
extensive territories Illat had made u p the loosely coufcdcraled Kievan RUT:t k of~ass~orts llle Peasallt l o the soil u f t h e k u l k l ~ o r o sovkhozas
r securely
princes-later tsars-f Muscovy uridertook the building of a powerful "military his serf had heell ntfaclled l o the soil o f the l a ~ ~ d eestate. d
i'
~ ~ a t i o nstate"
al capable o f gatheritig the Russiari lands under itu aegis. Given the Theculminating pllascoftsaris~iias a d y ~ i n m i cpolilical supcrstructllreellgaged
primacy of the concern for e x t e r ~ ~ a defense
l and expansion arid the country's . lube transforrniltillll of Russia11society and developnlent o f its ecoriuriiic base
relative economic backwardtiess, the goverririient proceeded by remo~lrlitigthe ' r state-ordair1ed Purposes canle ill the lollg reigll of Peter I,that "crowned
O

soci;ll slructurr, at times by forcible nieatls, i n sucli a way illat all classes ofthe : "O1utio"ar~~" as H e r ~ eliltel. ~ l called him. N o w the pattern o f r c v o l o t i o ~iton1 i
population werc bound i n one or atrother for111 ofcon11,ulsory service to theslatr hove enler~edlllosg d i s l i l l c l l ~ ,olle its i~~Olllillc111aspects being all i ~ ~ d u s t r i ; l l
"The fact is," writes Miliukov, "that it1 Russia the state exerted enormous influ. j
mOIutioll above ainled at b ~ i l d i l i ga puwerful Russian war-industrial base.
elice upon the social organization whereas i n the West tlte social organization lMensifying serfdom. Peter clnployed state-owlled serfs a l o r ~ gw i t l i prisoriers of
1
cu~iditionedthe state system. . . . I t was the e l e m e ~ ~ t a rstate y of tlie ecoriornic 1 frlr illcluslrial projects as well as the conslruction of canals (111
'base' (fundurt~e,rr) which ill Russia called forth the hypertrophy of thr stale LakesLadoga, Oncga, alld c)tller.;: rllld 1111 rlccasion moved enlire townullips
'superstructure' (nadsrroiku) aiid conditior~edthe powerful counter-influence d : P"pIe lothe constrllctioll sites [f tile llew ellterpriscs i n wll;it are descril~cdas
i "Peter's forced labour camps." 1('
this superstructure upon the 'base' itself." 4'
A salient expression o f t l l e tsarist patter11 of revolutionism from above was the *g"", 'lie parallel \vitll the S ~ a l i l l i sindustrial
l revolution from above is strik.
legalized imposition of serfdom upon tlie Russiari peasantry i o the sixteelilli and I i%s 'lie"lajordirerelice beillg the greatly expanded scale o f the use of forced
seventee~itlice~itories,the peasa~it'sattaclirne~itby law to the soil, together wilh labor in llle Stalillistcase. 1.0what has been said above abqut the relati011hetweerl
,
the system of bar.rhchi~ra(the cnrv6c) t ~ ~ l n which er the peasant was b o u ~ ~tod : mllectivizatitlll itldusIria1izatioil. sornetliing o f importa~icehere ,iceds lobe
contribute a certain tiu~iiberof days of work on the l a ~ i d o i v ~ ~ e(or r ' s state's) land added. Durilg First Five-Year plall, the SIO~~III a110111 "liquidation of the
,
during tlie agricultural year. The Russian village cornniune, itself an archaic as a class" was ~ l s c d*s a P r c l e ~ tk)r del~ortatiuno f peasant families c ~ i
institutio~i,was transformed by governmental aclion into a "coercive organiu. ma"e-a Process made all the Inore massive by the extrelne looseness w i t h which
lion" for ellsurirlg each nietnber's fulfillment of state-imposed obligalio~isunda . Ihe label :11)17lied-to relllolc areas like the Urals, Siberia ;~ndthe
the principle of mutual responsibility (krugovui(r porrrka).+4 The Stalinist r u d far North lliey ~ c r sete ( 0 work i n timbering or on the c o ~ l s t r u c t i oof~ ~
revolutioti from above was ill essence aa accelerated repelilion u f this tsarin plants, such as the M ; l ~ . l l i t o g o n kiron atid sleel complex i n tlie Urals. The ";,st
developn1etital patter^^. I t 11as bccn loted ahtive t l ~ a ttlie kollchoz as it cnlcrgd ea~ansiutl or Illelilrcect-l;lhllr Cnllll~elllpire dates f r n n ~lliis time. T o cite So17.11e.
from the collectivizatio~~ process was a coopcrative only it1 its f o r ~ i ~ fal;ade al "i's~ll, "In 1'329-15'30. Ihillowed and gushed the multimillion wave ofdispossec.yed
Underueatli, i t bore a far from superficial resen~blariceto the latided estate is ihc . . . In size lllis llullrecurring tidal wave (it was an ocean) swelled
period of scrfdom; arid i t is a l ~ i g l i l y fact tllat the holkltozwas actually
' bolld (liebounds o f a l l ~ t l l i l l gfile 11ellal sYsIe111o f even an inirne~isestate call
perceived by maliy Russial peasarlts as a revival o f serfdom. Westertters who F ' " ~ ~ There was notllillg to be colilpared w i t h i t in all Russiari history.
traveled in rural Russia in the early 1930's have reported that i t was a conirnoa : I' lhe of a wllole people, an ethnic catastrophe." 47 Uut
peasant practice t o refer to "V.K.P." (the initials t i f V'~,r,~irtznaiu ko,~rr,~un&i. 3 size Ihere was llolllillg ill Russian llistory to compare w i t h it, this l r i ; , ~ ~
cheskuiu parriia. the A l l - U n i o n Communist party) in the esoleric nleanilig d f
"seco~idserfdom" (vroroe kr<~pos~rro~provo).+ T w o features o f tlie kolkhuz ssyiem I 4 6 [bid.. PP. 18-10.
: 4 7 Aleksandr 1. Solrl~a~ilr).~~. The G ~ / o gArchipelqqo 1918-1956. EX^^^^,,,^,, i,, ~i,~,,,,~
Innrngorio. 1-11, lrnllr. Tllornar P. Whilney (New York. IV73). p. 54. m,bbard ( ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , ,
"tricuirure,Pp. 17)cslirtlsteslllalduri~lpcollcclivila~iun "probnbly not lw than livemillioll pwsa,,tr.
43. P. Miliukov.~ ~ h ~ ~ k i kul ~ fury.
~ i~ ~ ~l ~ ~~ - i~ i i~~,~l , ,~~ peterburg,
~i ~ ( ~k ~ ~ , ~j
. 1901). ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ .
pp. 133-34. For Miliukov's use of the term "nlilitrry-nilina1 state," see. e.g.. p. 143. : mcludillb families. were deported 11, Siberia and the Far North, and or lhac i r is [hat 25
44. Ibid.. p. 238. P cent perish&." More rece~llly.Lewin has written that .'whist i s cenaill is illat ,,itlion
45. See. for example. Leonard E. ff,,bbard. T ~ ECm o m i ~orf ,brier ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ , l 1919~ r ~ ~ bdusd'atds.
~ ( ~ ~ lo , a~ d ~ of ~ fllillloo
. Persons. or more, murl have heen dcporled. or a
pp. 115-16. I many must have perished." Rossio,i Peusoals and sovier polver, 508,
 W B m as Revnlkrtion from Ahovc 99

use of deportation and forced labor for i ~ ~ d u s t r i a l i z a t had

i o ~ ~a definite l~istorial a n d pl~ase,sllcll SI; the destruction crf the Pokrovsky school of Bolshevik
precedent in Yetrine Russia. I n the Stali~iistir~dustrialrevolution fro111abovc, hirtoriogrepl~y,the c o n c ~ ~ m i t a nre-npporpriation
t n f major elements o f ihc Rus-
therefore, just as i n the rural revolution f r o n ~above, there were eleznents ola -tan past as part of the olliciel Soviet cullural herilage, the restoraliul~ofpre-I917
revival o f l l ~ e
tsarist pattern o f revolutionisn~from above. I n l l ~ i srespect, Stalin. pttertls ill arl, c d u c a l i o ~ ~law , and tllc L n ~ i l y 111 . thcse aspects, which entel~dcd
ism showed the influence not simply of the hislorically recent Witte system of inlo the 1910'r, there were (listioctly reactio~~ary o r c o u ~ ~ t e r - r e v o l u t i o ~ over-
~ary
slate-spo~~sored industrializalior~,hut o f the IIIIICIIearlier systcn? of direct exploi. tons in the revcilutio~~ f r o l ? ~;ihove.
tation o f servile labor in the Russian state-building I t has been said, r i p l ~ t l yin m y view. 1 1 1 i t l "Stiili~l's ~e\,oIutioni n i t g r i c u l t u r ~
Here a brief comnietlt is called for 011 l l ~ eview, someti~l~es encountered in md industry and his assaull on the party which consunl~naledIllis revolution
Weslert~thought, that sees the Stalinist revolutio~tf r o m above under the aspsl must be seen as integrated parts o f one a11<1the same process." 5" But it remaills
o f "moder~~izatiun."The difficulty w i t h this posilion-apart from the nebulow to explicate the nexus bet\\'een 111; t\\,o phases. I t does 11ot sullice to t;tke the
character o f the very concept o f modernization-is its oblivious~~ess o f the strong p i l i o n , as Schapiro does 2nd as Deutscher did after him, that "it was primarily
element o f "archaiziition" it, Stalinism, its resurrection o f the historic tsarist the need to perpetuate the Crr:tt C l ~ a r ~ gille the countryside that perpetualed the
pattern o f building a powerful n ~ i l i t a r y - ~ ~ a l i o ustate
a l by revolutiot~arymeans ~cnor." This line o f c x p l a ~ ~ a t is i ostraitled
~~ and i n the end simply unsalisfac-
involving the extension o f direct coercive controls over the populatior~and ihc lory, i f o t ~ l ybecause-as the postwar Stalinist years i n Russia sho\ved--rule by
growth of state power in the process. Unless "nioderoization" is reduced in lerror can be en'eclive w i l h o u l being massive. I t is not a persuasive argument that
meaning m a i ~ ~ to l y industrialization and illcrease o f the urban population (in terror on the scale o f !he S l a l i ~ ~ iholocaust sl o f 19.14-39 was lnecessary either to
which cnse [he tern] becomes supcrlluous), the use of it to characterize Stalinism perpetuate c o l l e c l i v i r e l i o ~o~r l u l>rcvet\lSI:lliu fro!^^ Iosillg puwer. Yet. Illc poi111
is n~isleading.I f a formula for the state-building prcrcess is t~ccded,i t n ~ i g lk~ t t about the two ph;tses lwiltg " i ! ~ l ~ . g r i ! l ~piil.ls ' I (11.01111 an11 IIIC S:!IIC III.IICCSS" ~.i$rric~
be t l ~ eone that Kliucl~evsky.providedi a his s u n ~ r n a t i c io~f~n ~ o d e r nRussian wnviclio~~.
history from the sixteenth to the ~ ~ i r ~ e l e ecentury:
r ~ t h "'The slate swelled up; the A partial e s p l t ~ ~ ~ a toi of rthis ~ linkage C;II be derived r r o the ~ ~ thesis ~ that the
people grew lean." 49 Stalinist revolution from above reuspitulated ill essc~~lials iln tsarisl predecessor's
The Russian historical perspective can c o ~ l l r i b u t ein still a furtller irnpurlanl ptlern. The latter involved t l ~ cbinding izahreposl~chenie) o f all classes o f the
way to o u r understanding o f Stalinism: it helps l o make intelligible the relalion- populatiot~,from thc lowest serf to the Ihighest noble, it1 compulsory service to
ship between the first and s e c o ~ ~phases d o f the Stalinist revolution. Following theslate. As the Ml~scoviteautocracy grew i n power, the hereditary land-owning
the phase that took place from 1928-29 to 1933, there was a k i n d of pause in nobility was tr;t~~sforn~ed illto a serving clilss (s11izhilyi kl<~..cs,to use Miliukov's
1934, after which the r e v o l u t i o ~from
~ above moved into its second phase. Sigsal- tern~inologyagain) whose title tu the land was made conditiol~alup011 the render-
ized by the murder of the party leader Sergei K i r o v i n Leningrad i n December ing of military service 111 the slate. 'l'lte Pelrille revolution l r o ~ rabove l rci~~forced
1 9 3 6 x 1 event conceived and organized frorn the center of power in Moscow this situation by i ~ ~ s l i l u t i an ~ t garistocracy o f rank (chi~rlbased upon lltc table
as a pretext for w l ~ a tfollowed-the mass terror o f the Great Purge enveloped of fourtee11 t l ~ i l i l a r yand c o r r e s p ~ ~ ~ dci invgi l i i ~ nranks, u l ~ d e rwhich nohility be-
the party and country i n the later 1930's. T l ~ Greate I't~rgcdestroyed a generation canlc a func1it111 li111k rather tl,;in vizc versa. 118 one its pl~;tscs. nloret,ver.
not simply of O l d Bolshevik veterans ofthe anti-lsarist struggle but o f very many the reduction o f f h e hoyar r u l i ~ ~ class
g o f Kievan and e;~rlyMuscovite Kussiii to
of their juriiors who had joined the movement after 1917 and served as active a serving class during the reign o f I\WIII I V i n lhe s i x l ~ e n t ce11111ry,
l~ thc chief
irnplementers of Stalinism i n its first phase. I t virtually transformed the composi- isstrun~er~l o f the process was the anti-boyar terror carried out under I\,an's
tion of the Soviet regime and the managerial elite i n all fields. T h i s in turn was personal supervisi<i~~ by his private retinue and security police, l l ~ eo p r i c l i ~ z i ~ ~ o .
accompanied by still other maoifestations o f the revolutior~f r o m above in its l v a t ~hirnself was the first of the Muscovite rulers to assume the title of tsar.
Tsarism as a systetn o f absolule autocracy was itself i n part a product of this
sixteenth-century purge, w h i c l ~ ,f r o m evidence at our disposal, we know that
48. Sergsi Witle war the Russian minister of finance hot" 1893 until 1903 0s the "Witte system" : Stalin consciously took as a model for emulation during the Great Purge o f the
and its inspiration it, Friedrich List's teaching that backward cou~>lrirr
could overcome "lhc p i 1 ;
of remaining behind" by giving priority lo #hemachinc-building it~durtriain industrialiratiat. sn i

Theodore H. Von Laue. S r a ~Wirreo,tdlhe

i Indu.lriolr2oiionofRuuio(New York. 1973), especially
pp. 58-60.
49. V. 0. Kliuchevrky, Kun rurrkoi isrurii(Moscow, 1937). Vol. Ill,p. l I. 'l'llis is a Soviet-iuur
of a pre-rcvulutionarytreatise based on Professor Kliuchevsky'r lectures at Moscow lltliverrily. In
rupporl uf Ihc modernizalianhypothesis, HClkne Carrere D'Encausre pointed nut during uur Bellagto
discussion that Stalinism promoted nmdernily in the following inlportant dimension: an i!,tegralcd
Soviet Russian nalio!lhd. Her argunlcnt calls for careful consfideralio!~.
: 50 khapiro, Tltc COI?I?INN~.CI Parry of i l w S o v i ~U,I~UI, p. 410.
JI. Isaac nrul\cher. 1.1~Prophet U~rcurr.p IOU. Scbapiro'e at.ganlent (7hr Comvxurev Por(b, o j
ihr Suuic,! Udrhnl ,r tlte i ; > l l # c rmvrc ccvnllrel~rr~rive
O C L CIllill. Ihavi~(gr!~ledhy levror i n l l ~ liril
e plkasc
,
: ofthr rcvululiun lrornt above, Slnlin war faced will, Ibc rlrong puwbilily o f losing power i f the terlcvr
rameloa~~ end, lhrncc chore terror as the ineanr ofl!i<renlaining co con?rnasd.To explain the colossal
: row of lhr lurmr i l l the second pl,arc. Scllrpiru refers only lo ;, persurtal cbaiaclrrirlic-Slrlin'r
"lhur""gll,lcss.-
 ?~
Robert C. 'luckcr
100 SWlnirrn sr Revolutier~frcm i\horr 101

193rs;
llchad to view IVX,I ( i r o r ~ t y a d in11 :nlu~~c
l'clcl llle Great as a allenlpted to ~ ~ I I I cli~ss ~ I I I war i n n ]he coontryside by ,nakillg (lie pcanallls
slatcslnallorscnria~ist ibrmation. W i t h very few encepti~llls,the illdeler'd- (bedniakil its allies i n 111ass collectivization. what lhis policy was a
ellt.lnilded o l d Bolsl~evikswere cast as his hoyars. success i s not entirely p b i n , as tllere is evidence, illcludillg documentary evillc,lce
~h~ p e r t i l ~ e ~ ~ofc ethis t o the problem of the nexus b c t ~ e c nIhe two phaws is lrom t l ~ eSmolensk party arcl~ives,that mass c o ~ ~ ~ was ~ ~rlol i o,lly ~ i ~ ~ t i ~ ~
~ 1 crcal , ~ purgewas at ollce the crucible of l l ~ erc.;lol;llioll . .
;lbsulute
posed by the w e l l - u K i ~ ~~nidcllc ~d peasants i n their greal but ulll,upu~ar
i l t Russia-under Stalin lluw-alld c m c o n l i t a l l t l ~ a col'tllluatlall 1 U well arnollg 1111 few of tile hpdn;(,ki.S2 E~~~ (,pd,,iak grasl, wllal
of formatioit o f Stalin.9 neo-tsarisl vrr.;i~)n o r t l l e com~bl'sor~-servicc j "V.K.P."nlcarll and 110, like it.
for worker l,arliC~pBtiorl ill m~~~tiViZRticl,,,
slate, all Illat may properly be called "totalital.iall." 'Tile pllasc 1 we have the case o f the t w e ~ ~ t y - f i vtllousa1,d
e illdustrial workers who ell-
revolutio~~ rrorn above had seer! the bitlditlg of tile Peasalltry workillg 'lass
mlled by llle party tu go into the villages as collectivizers. ~~t also
illservitude t o t l ~ eever s\relling, every more centralized. ever lnore bureauera f that at least sotrle portion of the utwe~~ty-fivc.thousaI1derSSS joille,jthislnnvelllellt
tized, ever more police-dominated Stalinist slate; this mkrepOs'lc'icnb . under pressure of dire Cimily neerl colllbincd Illaterial illcenliv~s lo
grew tigtller in later years. The seco~ld phase brortgl~l lllr party i~selland j i the collectiviei,,g.
tile illlelligelllsia ill illat grcally cxpanded Soviet sellse of IlleIer1l1 ( ~em. ;~ I n lllle secoud ~ phijse. ~ the~~ u c i a~ l ~ ~ , ~ ~ d wl1ile
c l ~ ~ sigllificalrtly. ,,o,od
braces managers, omcials, specialists, technicians, and profcssiollals Of
whose
inmained basically passive-indeed more p a s i v e (I,~,, inthe early 1930.s-large
ilto line wit11 the rest of society. They too became a ser'villg : dements of the first-phase o k r i v e x c l ~ a ~ gthe ~ drole ,,rilnplenlenters re,,olu~
as suchwas tangible and visible will1 the introductiofl ill tile later 1930'3 cion for that i l s victinls. very nlaIly tllese lreople died or went to
'
and 1 9 4 0 .af~,, Stalinist table of ranks that bore a distillct resemblance-as did during the Great Purge. 'To a far grenter ertcnl tllall tile first ,,llape, s e c o t , ~
the ullirorms and insignia-to t l ~ ecorrespon(1ing lsarlsl sct-up. Colople'i'gthe . was a police ope~tltion,2nd t l ~ esuprcnlr c o ~ t c r t i v e viclin, was ll,c~l,l,l,llll,lisl
process idculogically, the S t ~ l i n i s torder devclo~ledits i)wlt idec)log). of Parly itselras curlsliluled ill the early 1!)30.s. B~this very
~~~~i~~~ starism, which was epitumized by Sta1in.s courtier. Georpi Maletl"v, . .
many whodid llot aclively participate i n the second phase,
however, a
tlley belollged
to a party conference i o 1941: "We arc all scrvallls the state." tothe okrivor the ~ a r o dnevcrtlteless became its beneficiaries, F~~ decinla.
\"hen he
~ t ~ l given i ~ the~ cue t w o years before, whefl, at tile Eidlteellth Party Con. lio11ofthe pre-1934 regime, party. and intelligerltsia intile ~~~~t porge opelle,.
grcss, he Eligels' (and by impticaliot, Marl's) rnist3kerzidea "la' i career oP(wrt11llities on a vast scale t o thWe from] below , .,Ilo %how*
ism meall( the withering away of the state. ' mmbillcd with the acquiescent, state.oriented, and ~ t ~ l i ~ . ~Illat ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
.I.* wllal extent was the Stalinist revolution "li-oln below" as as. lrom . were hallmarks o f t h e chirruvnik under full Stalillisrll. hi^ ill~llx largely
this questlo"' .
above? ~~t until the social history of tile period is u'rittell i. influx of the peasant-hnm o r of tliosc wllo llad ixc,, childrer, ofpeasallts, ~ i ~ , ~ , ~
fullya,,swera~lc. Undoubtedly, we shuuld avrlid two ulllcllable, pm" Baris Pihiak's stalen~entof 1922 that '*the dark waters lnuzl,ik ~~~~i~ lriive
tiolls: that taken i n tile above-cited passage ill Stalin's Slzorrcourse . . that lhc ! swept and swallowed the Petrille empire," ~ i ~vakar h llas ~ arguedl ~ that ~
revolulinn fronl abovewas "directly supported from below by Illc ..
mil'ions. ,"
''
Slalinisl revolution, by lilling l l ~ e Snviet hierarclly persolls peasalll slot.
adl tile oppo)site view that the process had f~ suPI1ol.t final lhelow. Rut given . . and illfusillg age-old p e a : ~ r ~moles f values into tllc sovier l,121r~e(~
tl,c [r;,g,,lrn(ary state o f our kllowledpe, dimerencer rlf(~l~illion alld ellplss i lomplele P P f l s ~ l l l r i z ~ rOF i ~ rthe
~ Russian Revolll(ioll,53

.
illevilable we beyond thisobviuus elartitlg-poilll. pcrlla~sit
he useful, as a settilg for arlalysis and discossiot~,l o obcerve two distilrctioni
~ i ~the ~ diStillction
t , hetween the two pliases (1929-33 alld 1gA4-j9). i
VII
distinction between two direrent possible ~neanillgsof "below": Pennns In : This essay has advallced a cultllralist i!~terpretationof the R u s s i a ~ ~
low~level roles ill orclosely associated with it, notnhly LIle nlenlbenhip VrWess as ofle Illat took place ill two 111;tio stages wit11 an interval of quiesccllce
oftlle ,-onml usil t party alld the Komsornol; and the t,oi)ulati~)ll at large. Using
Soviet we may call tilem the ukriv and the !lord ; '2, Forcolleclivirariun aq r?llecled in I I archive,
~ EPF MC~I* 9,iu/uni~ u,,dcrsovie,
~ l t lllu~nerically ~ ~ ~ substantial,
~ l ~ therornrer was no Inore a ativelr small i mew 'Or', 1958).C 1 l a ~ 1 2 1x1 Hursior~Proronlr olid Sbl,icr Power fp 488). I.ewin implies a
; H i v e , posilive 1,articit~aliotlI,T thc village pour: .-I,, luu,,ders~s,,d pr,,ceas I,r allolesalc
millority o f the latter. aulakinlion. il is also essential to hear i n mind ihc ,,,isrry ill ~ 1 , i ~ liunr ,r bed,,yilrr lived
,,,iih
flkl;r: o r large elements of it, including contirlgerlt or you''', . , dl lm "rm !he). werll 1,ongr~:lbey hild neilher slloes o shin^, a,,y u,jE lr .jUIIITyjlU,,lS.. ,.be
a vitally inlportant iastrurnelltality of the regime in lhe first pllase oftheStallnB : m i o n wllich hllill up in the cuunlrysidc, and ~ l l eeagerness 1,) dispossess kulaks, ill
bgcmeasure cuntribuled (0by the arotcl~cdnesrolzlre bednynk?' cilndi~iuns,and ,he llarrrd whici,
revolution, Many in alllectivlzation and industrialization driva
only actively but entllus,astically all,j selr.sacriflci~~gly.But i t is llut clear ! '5 capab1e Or reeling un orcasioll for llleir more L ~ n u ~ t ~ %
pllnrlg wbeacver they bnil the C ~ B I I C C t o do
~ cl ci ~ h b~~1 , ," , rxl ~,lo
~,red
, ,he,,,

w h e t l ~ e rany a,ndderablc p o d i o n of the rzorod gavc "leregi1ne its volunlaq . 53. Nicholas Vakar, Tire Topruor ojsovier s ~ ~ ~ ~ , york, , , ( Nitjhl).
~ ~ ,.he by Pil,,iL,k,
sllpport during tllis phase. AS i n the time of War Communism, tllc r e ~ i m dcd by Vilknr al p. 16, rronl !,isnovrl Go!v80d
 6
102
Ilobert C. l a r k s S(ltinirmnr He?ululinnfnm Absrc 103
durillg NEP. ~h~ first i t was held. produced a s i l t l a l i o ~c~l ~ a r a c t e r i ~ ~ d ;,
that make rcfetrncc l o the .;peci;rl I~istoricalrole 01' ~ e a ~ ~ ~ ~ . l , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
hy tile uneasy co-existence of two cultures, a llew S[lviet cultore Srowir1gout ' cultural anthropolngists have p o i ~ ~ tout, e ~ l .'culture" :\lid "perrr,nality" I,,
~
the Reuolulinn and n dll-survivirlg nld l ~ u s ~ cultltrc i ~ l l with i t s s'n"lgbutd in ' I collsiderahle dcpree, twn ways u f viewillg one alltl [Ilesanle p~lellonlcnoll,
[Ile Tlie Soviet culture itself illlderwent collsiderable challge 'luril1g 'I1' culture being s o i n c l l ~ i ~wliich~g has its lheirlg inailllyi~iil,i,,l > c ~ p l eIn . ~lcrllls
~
~ ~ .l.lpIe
second,
, sta!inist, ~1.g~of 111c Rcvolulion yielded. as llns hen
more irno)e~liatcly~ ~ c r l i l ~ to e ruur
l l arguniel1l, ;Ilearjcrll,crsollnlilq.)~la~ity bce~l,les i,o[jli.
indicated, an anialganlaled Slalil~istSoviet cultllre Illat ~ ~ ~ illvolvd
~ ~ l. ~a l l y ~acculturated
~ ~ t~h n ~ lu g l ihis l y
life-experience both ill cally years an(! duritlg
or'h'
at ullce the full-scale sovietirario~lof Russia11 ~ ( l c i e t yo l l d t h e itassiliciltirlll manhood. Thus. 1917 :tlld (Ile C i v i l War a fo,l,l;,~ive :,cculluraling life.
soviet culture. The Soviet U l l i o l l \*'as re-Russified ill the . experience for Stalin axid many nthcrS of llisparly gerleratioIl, leavillg a deep
thal purported l o complcle Russia's s ~ ~ v i c t i ~ i l l g ,lotralalbrm NEP raidue of the rcvoluti<~narypolilical culture ol. WaK ~<,mmu~~isllr witllir~tllelil.
~ ~illto a~socialist ~ society. i a k n p i n g will1 the [sarist traditiurl, Illis
In Stalillist On tliis levcl u l . c ~ ~ , l i ~ n ; ~ tStalin's i o ~ ~ . llistorical role i n illulate 1920's was to make
Soviet Russian culture bore a prolloullced oflicial (kazgrl~'i) character Not himself, as elFeclivcly as he did, tile leader atid spokesl,,allofaII outlook Illat 1,"
surprisillg~y. one colisequence was the rebirth ill Stalin's tillle of .
unoflicia',
shared with numerous others i n the party leadership : I ~II ~I alone ~ ~ tile
ullderground b(,dy oft~lought, feeling, and art w l ~ i c hwas heretical wit11 referellce his ti^^^.
to the St:llinist culture illid which. will surl)risingly in view Russian 1
The recapiluliltio~lo f the lsarisl patteril of revoluLil,llislil fronl above presellts
tradilioli, emerged anlong tile nlucilled y ~ l u t h ilteJ1igellsia; 'iris Ihs amuredificult prablerr~ofexplanatior~irt culturalist o,.,,ersollality ternls, iforlly
relrilll~ llrtl~e..dual Russia"pllnlon1eflol~ sect1 lirsLh'llrorlhc'lil'eleettlh 1 because Russian Isarislll, i n all its ~ n a n i f e s t ~ t iwas ~ , the Bolshevik revolu.
o ~ ~\allat
ce,llury. I n the l~ost-Stalinera, the underground Russia hascolne illtosenli-public lionary movement had taken originall? as its mortal sociopolitical elieniy. How-
view via ;u~ffizdarend the like. So llow again, in a which is and
ever, the Russinl~~ ~ a l i o n a l i feeling
st aroused iaa .iectic$r,of tllc party durillg tllc
tl1er.e a1.e tri'o cullurcs ill Kussia. f Civil War years. t l t c revulutiut~-bortlspirit oi "Red Kit<sinll patriotism" against
g Stalinist revolulioll in culturalist
a d d i t i o ~l o~ i ~ ~ t e r p r e t i nthe lhi'
which a party delegate from the Ukraine protested at tllc Tellth Party Congress
essay has altcmptcd t o caplaill i t so. The circumstatltial ex~lallation
tion fro111 above was rejected in favor of olle which stressed* first of
fIhe
in 1921, was a11 elenleu1 i n the culture tliat could predispose a Bolsllevik to
perceive certaill paucrlls out o f the heritage of "Id I<ussia as relevant to the
ill which the circo~nstanceso f 1927-28 suere Perceived and defined by a pDlitical circumstances of the present. 011the other hand, i t d i d lot d o so i n tlle generality
leadersliip inany of whose members, illcludillg Stalin, had come polilically
of instances of w h i c l ~we know. I t is true that Bukhnrill grnspcd tile direc~iUrl
i,, the era o f the Octaher Revolution and War Cunlnluni~ln resl'ondcd lo '
of Stali~i'spolicy l l t i l i k i r ~ gi n 1928, will1 speci;,l to f<,rced collccti,,izn.
tlluse c i r c u t ~ ~ s t ; ~ t ~ill c cl lsl c rcvolutiollary nllirif of tl1e e;lrlicr railier tllatl in
lion, and alluded Lrr 11s l s ; ~ ~ . i sinslrintliol~
l hy ter~ningi t " ~ ~ t i I i t ; ~ r ~ - f e ucxplnitt~.
d;~l
!lieevolutiot~aryspirit of NEP Soviet culture. Further* (IlC [ilrnl take'1 hy lht tion of the peasatilry." But the party resolution o f A l l ~ i 23, l 1929, agailst tile
'lie'IatuR )
~ l ~ l i ~ ~ i ~ tthe relation between its IwU ~EIJU~pllases. Bukhnrinist group stipmntizcd tlukl~arirl.s charge as ..a libelous attack , . ,

of tile rlrw Stalinist order tlial it created have beell treated as recal'i'ulation
ill esselltiaIs of the pattern of revolutionism fro111 above tl1;lt hell'nged lo
culture of old Russia and was visible i n tllc ( w r i s t state-bnilding prmm
fro,,, the fifteenth trr the rightrenth c e n t i l r i s and the s~'Cio~olilical
pruduced.
~~t tile inevitably aripes. why did history rcciiPitr'late
illstalrce? Cultural patterris out of a llation's Past do llot
preserlt simply because they were there. N o r can we
re(erellce to like circumstances, such as NEP Russia's relative llltcrrlational isola
tion atid economic backwardness. for we have argued Illat
carry their owti self-evident meaning, that what people and political leaders
is always the circumsta~icesas perceived and dc.llcd 6.v LIrenl*
isinfluenced by culture. B u t also, we must now add,
colne at end to \"hat was mentioned at the start as a third inlportal1L explana.
tory factor underlyillg tile revolution from above-thc mind and per5o"alitYol
..
Staltn.
: draw11from the p;~rtyof Mili~lkov:' 5 C This was hardly ;,I, adn~issiuntllat Sl;llill's
Ih' : neo-tsarist Marxis111(the use ofsuch a phrase may sou~l,lmonstrous to Marxists,
but the Marxist Wel,o~lscharrrrn~iscapablc oftiyany nlelen;orphoses) had f,2ulld
"(Ier it favor with a snbstnntial hody o f party opiniot~.Hencc. i n this problem tile ex-
planatory ctiipl~asisniust fall more o n "personalily" Illan on "oulturr."
:" lhir
To pul it otllerwise, acculturatios is not to be viewe<l simply as a process in
therllselves lhr ' which an individual i s arected by ionnative life-expericn~ces thereby internal-
'hr: pllcl'onlelon by : izes culture paltertis, i ~ i c l u d i r ~patterr~sg out o f the past, as dictated by his psycho-
logical needs or predispositiul~s.Stali~i,the co~nnlissarfir natlorlality aflaim atld
. do not
ssuch the presumable protector of the rights of the minority nations in[IleSoviet
'* f kdcratioa, was ill Rct, as Leoill discovered to his horror shortly before dying,
wllichlumone of tliose Bolsheviks most infected by " ~[ l e d patrio~ism..~
~ ~~~,,i,, ~ i ~
persorlality And
[ shov'ed llis rcalictlion o f this ia the note? o n the tiatiollality question which Ile
, 54 See. Ivr cnatnptc. Wallace. C,zllt,rc und /'errunoli(~ 1,nlrnduc~ius:and Ralph I.intnn. The
C"!iurd Bockyround of Per.~o,toIi!~(NewYork, 1945). Cllaps. 6 5 .
'

.roa cer,aill extelt the perso~ialfactor iscovered by the culturalisl expla1latloa '
55. I;o~nmun;~!icherkrrivpor~iii? rovclrkopo ioiuro r m l , u ~ . ~ ~ o ki h,rsheelkh r ' ~ c z ~ ~ konfcre,,l,7~~
ov,
itself. 111gelieral, there is n o cor~flictbetween culturnlist explanations arldfhov ipirnu,nov r s , ~ M ~ 1954), ~ ~ ~ p, . 555,
dictaled on December 30-31, 1922 and in which he characterized S t a l i ~a~ ,
foreriiost anlong those Russified minority represe~ltativesill the party w l ~ o tended
l o err o n the side o f "true-Kussiar~is~i," (i.s/irrrro-rrr.~.~kie ~~msrrorniiu) and "Greal
VIII
Russian chal~vinism." UII~~~II~WII to L e ~ i i ~Stalin's
l, sense o f Russian ~iationality, Having sketched here a primarily culturalist i ~ ~ t e r p r e t a t ioof~Stalinism l as revolu-
if not his true-Russia~~ism, had dated iron] his yo11111fulconversion to Le11in.s lion iron] above, hasetl 011 l l ~ eSoviet 1930's, it remailis to co~iclutlew i t h a
lcadersl~ipand to Bolsl~evisn~, w l ~ i c hhe s t ~ w11s thc " K o s s i a ~ ~
faction" in the comment on the hislorical scquel. I wish to indicate in p i ~ r t i c ~ ~the l a r relevance
Empire's Marxist Party, Menshevism being the "Jewisl~faction." I t was 011 this ofthe arlalysis to the Stalinisl ~ ~ l ~ e ~ i oill~ its i ~suhseque~~l
e r ~ o ~ ~develop~r~ent. We
foundation that Stalin, during the 1920's. went forward i n his thinking and may dislinguish two suhsequellf iwriods: Illat of the Soviet-Germall c o ~ ~ f l i of. ct
appropriative self-acculturatio~~, as the generality o f his Russia~i-nationalist-ori- 1941-45 and that of puslwar S t i ~ l i l l i s (1946-53). l~~ In this sequence. 1945 f o r n ~ s
euted party comrades did ilot, to envisage the tsarist state-building process a, a sort of historici~lpause or Iiiat~ls,rather as 1034 d i d betweell tile two phases
a model for the Soviet Russian stale in its "building ofsocialis~n." r " A n d i t was ofthe r e v o l u t i o ~from
~ alrovc o f the 1930's.
the great personal power that he acquired by 1929, will1 tlie ouster o f l l ~ opposi. e Thesecond World W a r was, ill a way, an i r ~ l e r i mi n Stalinism's d e v e l o p n ~ e ~ ~ t .
tior~sfrom tlie parly leadership, that made it possible for l ~ i ~l or iproceed tocarry Not that the "Great Fatherland War," as it was callcd i n Stalin's Russia, had
out his design. no serious impact or1 Stalinist Soviet C o ~ n n l u ~ ~ ias s t an sociopolitical culture, hut
I f tlie thesis c o n c e r ~ ~tlie
i ~ ~recapitulatio~l
g of tlie state-building process placer that n ~ a i ~i ~
t reinforced
ly tendelicies already present before the war began. Thus,
heavy emphasis upon persollalily even in the context o f a culturalist approach. the war gave a p ~ ~ w e r f fuulr t l ~ e rimpetus to the Great Russia11~ ~ a t i o n a l i sw ml ~ i c l ~
a final explanatory consideration concerning the Stalinist phenomenon narrows had becon~eevident i n Slalin's perso~lalpolitical niakeup by the beginning o f (he
the focus o ~ ~ pt eor s o ~ ~ a l ito
t y 11 still greater dcgrec. U l ~ l i k cany othcr llolshevik, 1920's ;tnd a ~ ~ r n l l l i l l r rnnt o l i l i n Slnliuist 11101~g111 and polilics i n tile 1970's. The
official glorification o f n i ~ l i o ~ K ~ ua sl s i a ~tnilitary
~ I~eroeso f the prc-Soviet past,
t o my knowledge, Stalin, as we have noted. defined the Soviet situation in 1925
and 1926 i n eve-of-October terms, i n ~ p l i c i t l ypresaging tllereby a revolutionary notably G e ~ ~ e r aSl sa v o r o v a ~ i dKutuzov and Admiral N a k h i ~ n o vand , tl~eopening
of special Soviet officers' t r a i l ~ i r ~i~cadeniies g oarned after them, were among tile
assault against the existing order, i.e., the N E P , i n the drive to build socialism.
Then, looking back in the S l ~ u r rCorrr.scof 1938 on the a c c o ~ n p l i s l ~ ~ ~or i ethe
~lts many manifesli~lionso f Illis t r e ~ ~ Too, d . ~the ~ war inte~isiliedthe inilitsrist strain
Stalinist decade, he described thcm, and collectivizatior~i n particular, as eqoiva- in Stalinism, which has here bee11traced hack to the t i ~ i ~ o feW a r C o n ~ n ~ u n i s n ~ .
lent in consequence to the October Kevolutiori o f 1917. U ~ ~ d e r l y i nboth g the Ilstrengthened and further dcvelolled the l~ierarcl~icalstruclureof Stalinist Soviet
definition of the situa~iooin t l ~ emid-1920's and t11c retrospeclive satisfaclion society as recollstilutal clllrillg the revolution from above o f 111e 1930's, and
expressed i n the late 1930's was Stalin's con~l,ulsive psychological need, born of augmented the alrcady f a r - r c ; ~ c h i ~S~tga l i ~ ~ i hypertrophy st of tlie slate machine.
There were also covert lrcnds st Ihst lime toward tlie oflicial a n t i - S e ~ ~ ~ i twhich isn~
nei~rosis, to prove hin~selfa revolutionary hero o f Lenin-like proportions, lo
became blatant ill the poslwar Stalinist c a t ~ ~ p a i gagainst n "rootless cosrnopoli-
match or surpass what all Bolsheviks considered IRII~II'S soprenle historical
cnploil, t l ~ cleadersliip n f the party ill i l ~ eworld-l~isloricr e v o l u t i o ~ ~ a rsuccess
y tans," the murder F I large t ~ u ~ n h e o r sf Soviet Jewish inlellectuals. and 111einfa-
mous "doctors' arair" o f S l i ~ l i ~ tI~ISI ' % IIIOIII~IS ill 1Y53.511
of October 1917. ' l ' l ~ cgreat revolutionary drive t o c11;111gu Kusqia i n tlie early
1930's was i t i t e ~ ~ d eas
d Stalin's October. I n the pol\\,al- perin11 aflcr 1945, we see a situation w l ~ i c happears l o ronflict
with a revolulionary interpretatic~nof the Stalinist p l ~ c ~ ~ o n ~ e The n o n .d o ~ r ~ i ~ ~ a n l
I n practice i t achieved certain successes, notably in i ~ ~ d u s t r i a l i r a t i obut ~ i , at
note i n Soviet internal policy during lhose years was conservatisn~,the recotl-
a cost o f such havoc and misery ill Russia that Stalin, as the r e g i ~ i ~ esupreme 's
solidati~sgof the Stalinist order that had taken shape i n l l ~ e1930's.FqAn example
leader, aroused condemnation among many. This helps t u cxplail~,in psychologi-
ofsuch conservatisr~~ was the early post-war action of Stalin's regime i n cutting
cal terms, the lethal vi~~dictiveness that he visited upon r n i l l i o ~ ~ofs his party
comrades, fellow countrymen, and others in the e ~ ~ s u iyears. ~ i g I t was his way
o f trying t o c o n ~ et o terms w i t h the repressed fact that he, Djugashvili, had failed 57. On Stalinism nud Russiacl satio~lnlismaller 1919. see in parliculvr the informative accnslrl
t o prove hinlself the charismatically Lenin-like Stalin that i t was his lifelollg goal by F. Barghuarn. "Stalinism and the Russian Cullural Herifape," Review o/Puli~icr, Vol 14, No.
to he. If t l ~ i sinterpretatior~is well fouoded, he was l ~ a r d l ythe most impersonal 2 (April. 1952), pp. 178-201: and his So~.ierRur.cion Norionol~m(New York, 1956).
58. In "New Bic,grnphie.i orSlalin." Sovie1Jlrwirh AffnR,. Val. 5. No. 2 (1975), p. 104. Jack Miller
o f great historical figures.
has called alterllion to "Slalill's owen usc of antiscmitis~nnguiltrt Trolsky, Kanlenev and Zinouiev,
when in conlilion with Rtokllarin be was rumling tttem in 142527." and add?: "The exlent to which
&ntiselnitismappeared is llte Psrly rnachir~cd~trirtgthis phase or Slalin'r rise 10 suprenne power i s
56. The dernottslrslion aad documentation of this lhais is onr dthe aims ormy work i n progresr.
of special ihlleresl in the 'nssiryinp' nf Mariism."
Slolin o,ld rlre Rewlurio,r/rum Above. 1929-1939 A Study in Hi.~loryond l'crorio/i(v Io Sliilin or
59. In '711e Slalin Heritage in Soviet I'olicy" (7'lte Sovie1 Politico1.Wind. Chap. 4), 1 hnvc vrgucd
Revolu,ionory, 1879-1929. Ihave sought lodcmonrlra~ethe tl~rrirconcer!~i#>g Stalin'r Greal Kurrian
!ha1 Slrtin turned conservative in lhis pos~-w~tr illterlnnl poliUcr.
nnliol,alirs>and i t s youll>rulorigins.
106 Rol~eclC. Tuck#
.~*: -Ism as Re*elution Iron, Above 101
hack tile p r i ~ ; garilcn~ t ~ l , l o ~ wllicli-for
~ purlr,se\. o f h r t t l ~w:~l--ti~lle inorole and trkol place ill llusui;~ ill tlic l')1O's. l ' l i c y:~r,le I,l;,y he silicl <,f 1 1 , ~ l,c,qt,v~lr
l l ~ ri~ntion'sfoocl supply-the a>llectivizerl Soviet pe;lsallts ll;ld bccll allowed rc~0~utirlll:lry trallsf(~r1llillinl1i n N o r t h Kc~rca,wllicll llLld becll occupied by ,lie
surreptitiol~sly to illcrease in sizeduriog tlie war years. True. this was a "conscw- Soviet Arlily :kt llle war's end. Cliina, a pote~itialgreiil power ill its o\vll rig[,[,
ative" actior~i n the special sense 01- reinstati~igw l ~ a thad bccn a revtrlulionar) p m l i t e d for tllal very reason a special prohlern for Slslin-alrd fclr ~talillisol.
cliange at the time o f collectivizatio~~ lineell yciirs beinre. Insofar as Ille Stalinisl rrv<~ltrtic,l~ f r o ~ nhrrve
~l llad bcrll ai,led at ~rnllffi,rrlli,lg
Ullt Stalinism as revolulionism fro111ahove did 1101cild w i t h the colllp~e~i00 Soviet Russia into a grezil n i i l i l ; t r ~ - i r ~ d ~ ~ s fpower r i ; ~ l ~:,~,;,bl~ fullydere,ldilg
of t l ~ e state-directed revolutionary pruccsses o f the 193(l's and the conlillg o f t k 11% indepeodence a ~ illlerests ~ d i n t l ~ cworld, S t : ~ l i t ~ i s r ~ l likely to appeal
secolld W o r l d War. I t reappeared it1 1 9 3 9 4 0 and agirirl ill Llle late war and . lothe very Rossia!~-nationalist-111i1idedStaliu n ;I prol,er prescrilltioll for con\.
post-war Stalit~years ina new form: the e x t e r ~ ~ a l i z ; ~of l i oStali~iist
~~ revolution munislll 111 Cllilla. s:lve to the erlent t l ~ a fRussia c o u l ~ place l slid keep chilla
frorll above. years 1 9 3 9 4 0 are singled out ill Illis c o ~ ~ ~ ~ e checause t i o l l they : ~nderits calltrol. Very likely it was these coosider;ltio~~s,together the
witllessed tllc Soviet takeover o f eastern Poland atid 111e three Baltic cou!~tria rhrcwd realization orthe i~npossihilityof lotlg-ratigesucress ill keeping a c ~ ~ ~ ~
durillg llletillle of sovie[.Nazi collaboratiol~under tlie Stnlill-lliller pact of nkt Cbilla ut~derR u s s i : ~conlrnl. ~~ x l , l : ~ i ~~
w l ~ i c cl ~ ~ ~ :illll~liYi,lellee
~ l i ~ ~ tOWi. lrd- ~
i\ugust 1939. Under illl organized sllani pretense o l popi11;lr dc~nalld,llle easlem not lo say distasle f r ~ r - t l ~ cC ~ I I I ~ I I ~ I>(' the C h i ~ ~ e C s cO I I I I ~ I ~ ~ t~o ~power. S ~ ~ oy tile
polishterritories were i~icorporatedinto the Ukrainiau and Uclurussiall Sovifl ume tukeli, we can see ill all this a key t o the atlr:~ction tli;lt cerlaill aspects or
republics; arid Lithuallia, Latvia, and Estonia b e c a ~ i ~co~lslitucllt e ("ullioll") Slalinislll, llot i ~ l c l u d i n gits Ruc5ien ~iationalism,had tilr Mae.
repllblics of the USSR. Meanwhile, under cover of the Red A r n v occupation fiflally, despite what has he,.^^ said above ahout t l l c gellerally co,lservative
lands, the soviet party, police, and economic authorities proceeded with nature of Stalin's pcist-war ~II~<.~II;II policy, i t III;I~be suggesle(l fillat ill solllc
tllclorc,ble transp1alltation to them of Soviet political culture ill its Stalinized j paradoxical sense Stalinism as t e u o l u l i o ~froni ~ above rcturllec~ lo~~~~i~ durillg
fnrlIl, conlplc(e with deportalio~lof all suspect elenle~llsof tlle p l l l ? u l * l i o ~inlo . 1946-53 within the Settil~go r l l l c ct,nservntive i ~ i t e r n a la,licics l tlIcll be,,lp
tile ~~~~i~~~ itllerior. ~ l revolutionary
~ e transformatio~~s l r o m :~bove,illterrupted rued. For Stalill's very e f i ~ r tto turn t l ~ cSoviet clock h,.k to tile 1 9 3 0 . ~ tllr
by the G ~ illvasion
~ of Russia ~ ~i n Julie~ 1941,,were ~ resunicd arid conlpletd . war carried will1 i t a sl~aduwyrerun o f t l ~ cdevelopmel~ts tllaf earlier decalit.
,lpoll tllc soviet reoccupntion, later i n tlrc war, of what liad heen easterr1 I'oland . In otller words, [lie post-war reactinn \\.as a renctio~lto ;I period of radical
and t l ~ eindependent Rallic states. : change-froni above. IIIhis major postwar policy addrcss ~,r~ ~ h 9, ~1946,~ , ; ~ ~ ~
~l~~~ ~ ~ i ~ tfrom above was c:~rricd into tllc Balkans and ; Slalill vhced a series of furt11e1-livc-year p l a ~ l siln R~~ssi;t's
tile ~ t ~ l ircvo~ulioll agel,clil ;Is a gL,;lral,tce
nlucll of ~ ~ ~ t~ . u~i n the ~ r n~a k e~~of thel ~ Soviet
~ ~~ Arniy's l ~~ccupatioll of i agaillsl "all colltillge~~cics:' i.e.. 11, prepare the c u u ~ i t r yi;~r a possible rutlrrewar.
llulgaria, ~ ~
H ~~ lllerest~of ~ ~ and
~ol;,nd, ~~ [he eastern ~
~ parts~olGcr. i , , the re-cnacttnc~ito r the prc-war policy of givingpriority t o llaluy
~:. ~This meat11
'
~ ~ ~ likewise
~ l succuo~be<l
~ ~ to~ it h ll l o w~i ~ ~t l g~~ cC o l n~~ i i u ~k i i coup
st i ~ industry over ccrllsumer goods. \\,it11 all 111~. p r i v ; ~ t i oII,;,~ ~ ~ cl~t;liled for tile soviet
or~ebruary 1948. yuEoslavia, w \ l c r e s C o n ~ m u n i smovenrent
t hndcometopuwa : popula~ion.A minor rec<~llcctivizing campaign was ~ L , I tllrougll fn~~owillg (lie
illdepellderllly through successful partisall warfare during [lie German occopa abuve-nlellliolled early pnslwer decisioti l o cul back the size (,f the pcasnn(r.
tioll, but effeclivcly c~lecked the subsequent enhrts n f Stalin's cmissaria : private garden 11lu1s. Purtl~ertriore,ill the dictatnr's fit^:,^ tllerc wcrr ill-
,,) direct [heyugoslav ~l.lulsfornlatiol rroni above i n such ;Iway as to ensore firm crensillgly clear inOiciltio~istllat IIEwas p r e l x r i j ~ g ,if ;,
a lesser scale, st,rl
soviet of the yugoslav Communist politic:~l system; and as a resull nplica o f f l l e Gre;~t Porge of thc 1930's. Tllcre would be show trials the so,,iet
Yugoslavia was excommunicated by Stalin later i n 1948."" Jcl~ishdoctors. accused o f c o l ~ ~ p l i c i tiyn a11 illlaginary ill~erna~iolla~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l
lI,itswar.lillle alld post.war externalixed form, tlie Stalil~istrevolution from Americall-Jewi.;ll co~ispir:~cy to 41orte11(lie lives of Soviet leaders; alld dallht
above comprised bolll the takeover (or atten~ptedtakeover) o r a given cuulltrY, , olller s l l ~ ~lrials w as well. Tliesr \vould provide thc dranlatic symbolism rleeded
llorlnally ,,iamilitary and t11e11the use o f a Soriel-directed nallvs . 8s an accolnpallilllrlit and justification of the purge, jurt as tile show trials or
~olnnlullist party adl its subsidiary orga~~izatiolis as agents o f tlie c ~ u l l t r f i ! IheOId onlsllcviks of i . d t and R i g l ~ dt i d ill tile earlier version o f tile revolution
trallsforma~ion into wllat was called at first a "people's deniocracy." The estab : lrom above."'
{isllment and of Muscovite control over the orgajrs or F ) v c r in the j
coulltry collcerlled was, as indicated above, an esser~tialelernait Of tile process. : 61 Aninler~refalicrl~ ofll~csi~o~vlri8l :!?at> elen,ew olSlalinirt plilica~ cutture~,;,s bee,, lars,.,le~

7.11ere were variatiolls itl the rnet~lads and tinletables, b u t i n essence the East 1 Ihc Prr*nl ill ''Sli~lill.Iluk11:trin. and Hislrry ns canspiracy:. tirs! puh~inherl as ll,r
Introihetionlo T%eGrror PINRP ?i.iol. c d ~ ~ cbyd KOIX~IC. ~ ~ePllPl k r.C~~ J , ~(~, , N yI,,k,
u alld sl ~ ~
Europea~lrevolutiotl, illsofar as it took place 'Ider
auspices in a liunlbcr i 1061). alld reprillled III Thr Ji,s,rnPoiil,i.i?iMi,,das Cllapler 1. ~ ~ i , ,; ~~ , , ~ ~ hof ~ ~~t i ,~, ,~, ) i ~ , i ~ ~
~ r~lr
of smaller c o u ~ ~ t r i e involved
s, the trallsfer 10 fc3reig11 Ia1lds of inluch of i
had bow Ilia1 10 p,r$l-war Eulertt Europe. ~ z e ~ l ~ ~III ~p;,rticutar.
1 Skillingin l l i s crsaY hclclw, and ;al%,iut Czt~'lcchosiorukri',
r l ~ v ~ discuSrdk ~ ~ tl). 11 ~,,,rl~,,
l , r ? ~ m , , p t e d n ~ , v , ,( iP, , ~, ~, l, ~ ~ N.J , ~ ,,,1~76,.
.
m. 7.he c~a5ric ren~airaVlndirnir Drdijer, li,u (New Yurk. 1953). ! Chap. XIII.