Professional Documents
Culture Documents
• Every decision is made with the • Very high aircraft utilization • Route network designed by a • Utilize next-generation dynamic
goal to reduce cost per seat and during peak periods management team that has pricing / promotion / package
deliver maximum profitability experience launching several engines not employed by other
• No overnights hundred new routes Canadian carriers
• Ultra-low base fare with
ancillary services for additional • No scheduled connections, no • Significant variance in schedule • Internet distribution focus
fees baggage transfers by day of week and season to
match capacity and demand • Strong pre-operational growth
• Maximum seating density, all- • Outsourcing above / below wing in earned followers and organic
economy A320 configuration airport staff and maintenance • Focus on spilled or underserved engagement on social media
(180 seats) peak traffic to mitigate platforms
competition
• Limited human interaction at
• Focus on automation to ensure the airport – DIY – for checking • Brand that serves as the
workforce efficiency and in and bag drops ‘people’s airline’, targeting cost-
productivity conscious travelers
Serving Primary Markets • Will fly domestic and international routes on markets where airport incentives and ground handling
From Airports Offering contracts increase the cost difference versus existing competitors
Reduced Operating Cost • Plan to fly to secondary airports near major cities
• Jetlines will offer a fully unbundled approach to fares, allowing it to offer base fares approximately
True ULCC Cost Structure 50% below current competitors
Experienced Low Cost • Led by Javier Suarez, former VP, Network, Revenue Management and E-Commerce at VivaAerobus
Carrier Leadership • Supporting management are highly proficient individuals who have past ULCC experience
1.74
1.68
1.65 1.66
1.60
4.0
Hamilton
Both Macro and Sector Trends Indicate a High Demand for a Jetlines' Product Offering
Europe Asia
Jetlines will use the proven North America
global ULCC model that has 106.4M PAX 56.6M PAX
historically achieved 11.1M PAX 73.1M PAX
43.5M PAX
significantly lower costs 21.6M PAX 20.0M PAX
than other scheduled legacy 33.3M PAX
airlines 14.9M PAX 29.3M PAX
5.1M PAX
34.0M PAX
• Approximately 81% of the • Population growth of 5.7% • Canadian propensity to • Jetlines has been granted
Canadian domestic and - 8.2% over the next five travel lags behind the U.S. an exemption by the
trans-border market is years1 by 17.9% (2.8 vs 3.3) due to government to allow up to
controlled by Air Canada lack of competition3 49% voting foreign
and WestJet1 • Stable Canadian dollar ownership
• Profitable Canadian airline
• There is no incentive for • GDP is growing at an sector (estimated $1.5 • The Canadian government’s
the mainline carriers to annual growth rate of billion pre-tax profit for public policy supports
lower fares 1.5%1 2017) greater competition
• As a result, Canada has • ~5 million Canadians drive • Canada is the only G7 • Strong consumer feedback
some of the highest fares to U.S. boarder for country without a thriving through social media for
globally cheaper tickets and ~5 ULCC market lower fares
million don’t fly at all due
• Canada ranked 65th out of to high fares2 • Analysts estimate the
80 countries for having the untapped ULCC space will
highest fares2 require 60 A320 - sized
aircraft to fully exploit it2
Source:
1: Stats Canada
2: Globe and Mail
3: OAG (2017), World Bank, Internal analysis, Note that the calculation is based on all departing flights from said countries www.jetlines.ca / JET: TSX-V / 10
CANADA’S AIR TRANSPORT MARKET IS
CONCENTRATED COMPARED TO EUROPE AND THE USA
Canada - departing seats 2017 USA - departing seats 2017 Europe - departing seats 2017
Ryanair
Other 10%
Other
16% American Airlines
19%
22% easyJet
7%
JetBlue
Sunwing Turkish Airlines
4%
2% 6%
United Airlines Alaska Airlines Other
Air Canada
2% 4% 45%
Air Transat 45%
Lufthansa
3%
6%
Porter
4%
British Airways
Delta Air Lines 4%
United Airlines
15% 20% Air France
3%
Aeroflot
SAS 3%
Westjet Alitalia 3%
Southwest Airlines 2% Iberia Pegasus Wizz Air KLM Vueling
25%
19% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3%
• Two carriers comprise 70% of total departing • In the U.S., following consolidation in recent • In the European market, the top 5 carriers
seats in the Domestic, Trans-Border, & years, 5-6 monolithic blocks are emerging account for just a third of the market
International Canadian market
• The top 5 airlines represent 80% of seats, • The largest two airlines by seats are ULCCs
• The top 5 airlines represent 79% of seats similar to the Canadian market
• Consolidation phase is ongoing (e.g. Air Berlin,
• However, the four largest airlines are roughly Alitalia)
equal in size
0.15
0.10 Aegean
Alaska United
Delta
AA
Southwest AF / KLM
Many LCCs, such as JetBlue Jet2 IAG
WestJet, are moving up Air Berlin Hawaiian
0.12
0.08 market, creating hybrid easyJet Air Canada
(US cents)
Norwegian -20%
Allegiant
0.06
0.04 In recent years, the new
breed of ULCCs have Ryanair Spirit
filled the void left by
yesterday’s LCCs and Wizz Air Approx.
0.03
0.02 have further stimulated -50%
demand
0.00
0.00
0 310 621 932 1,243 1,553 1,864 2,175
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500
Average sector length (miles)
Region Average sector length (km) Business Model
6.0
• Canadian propensity to travel lags behind the U.S. by 17.9%
5.0
4.4 (2.8 vs 3.3) due to lack of competition
4.3
3.9
4.0
3.3 3.1
3.0 2.8 2.7 2.7
1.9
2.0 1.6
France
Norway
Ireland
Switzerland
Germany
Canada
Finland
Sweden
USA
United Kingdom
demand for air travel in
these countries
140 134.5
129.9
125.6
121.3
117.2
120 113.2*
80
60
40
16.8
20 13.0 17 M
9.4
6.1
1.1 2.9 Customer
0 Opportunity
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Notes:
• 3.5% annual growth rate in domestic, trans-border, and new demand
• Assumed ULCC market penetration 1% - 12.5% over 6 years
• * 95.7M Domestic and Trans-border + 10M new demand adjusted for 3.5% CAGR in 2017, 2018
Source: Stats Canada, InterVISTAS Consulting Inc., Internal Analysis www.jetlines.ca / JET: TSX-V / 14
COST PER AVAILABLE SEAT MILE COMPARISON
15.0 Jetlines
+58%
14.0 14.4
Jetlines Jetlines
13.0 +8% to +17% 24.8 +40%
12.9
12.0
CASM (Cents CDN)
11.0
10.8
10.0 10.2
9.9*
9.2
9.0
8.0
*Spirit is growing capacity at 15-20% annually (Source: May 2017 Bank of America / Merrill Lynch Transportation Conference)
CASM is not stage length adjusted. For example, WestJet’s average stage length for the 12 months ended June 30, 2017
was ~900 miles. Jetlines 2019 average stage length is 1,158 miles www.jetlines.ca / JET: TSX-V / 15
NETWORK OPPORTUNITY IN SOUTHERN ONTARIO
500
• 30% discount = over 100
markets
Total Revenue Per Passenger (CAD)
450
• 20% discount = over 140
400 markets
40%
350
30%
300
20%
250
0%
200
* Limited to markets with current catchment traffic of over 50 PDEW. Includes markets within Canada as well as international
routes to the US, Mexico, and the Caribbean.
Source: Sabre MIDT Global Demand database. Fares provided by Sabre are in USD and have been converted to CAD. www.jetlines.ca / JET: TSX-V / 19
PRIMARY COMPETITORS IN CANADA
Commenced Mainline Fleet Domestic Destinations
Carrier Operating Model Network Scope
Service Size Market Share Served in 2018
Leisure
2013 Global 53
Subsidiary
Domestic/
2011 Regional Brand 156
Trans-Border
Domestic/
2013 Regional Subsidiary 46
Trans-Border
Ultra-Low Cost
2018 Domestic/ Trans-Border 4 Unknown 5
Subsidiary
10 (summer) to 40 <1%
2005 Leisure Carrier Sun/Limited Domestic 48
(winter)
2016
Ultra-Low-Cost Carrier Domestic 7 2% 10
(As NewLeaf)
Calgary,
Regional Brand 166 (20 E175, 43
Domestic / 3.4m [Incl. in AC Montreal,
2011 (incl. Jazz, Sky CRJ, 86 Dash 8, 7.4 yrs N/A 119 N/A
Trans-border (+18.5%) %] Toronto,
Regional & others) 17 B1900)
Vancouver
• Few carriers have received as much help as Air Canada in terms of bailouts, restructurings, labour concessions, and pension relief
• In 2009, it almost ran out of cash and consequently, market share was lost to new entrants such as WestJet but also to international carriers
• To claw back lost ground, Air Canada’s recent strategy is to expand aggressively on trans-border (US), intercontinental and 6th freedom (hub) routes
• These segments now account for two thirds of its revenues and offer some risk diversification away from the domestic markets
• Ten-year agreements are in place with most of its unions since 2015
Notes: Average frequency considered over full year across all scheduled routes operated in 2017.
Source: Flightglobal (2017), OAG, Internal analysis. www.jetlines.ca / JET: TSX-V / 21
WESTJET HAS MORPHED INTO A HYBRID CARRIER
WITH REGIONAL AND LONG-HAUL OPERATIONS
14/w
Regional Domestic / 42 Dash 8-400 [Incl. in Calgary, (46 out of
2013 2.4 yrs N/A N/A 61
Subsidiary Trans-border [3 Dash 8-400] WestJet%] Toronto 61 routes
min. daily)
• WestJet started off as an LCC modelled after Southwest with David Neeleman (ex-JetBlue) as one of its founders
• Since then, the airline has added some complexity to its business model, e.g. by offering different fare types and by entering into alliances / codesharing
agreements (over 40 such partnerships exist, e.g. with Emirates, TAM, LAN and Hainan Airlines)
• The airline was able to benefit from Air Canada’s restructuring efforts to build a significant, profitable presence in the Canadian market but has recently
been searching for additional growth opportunities
• In 2013, its Encore regional subsidiary was launched, operating turboprop aircraft
• In 2017, orders for 10 widebody B787s were announced for international expansion and plans for a ULCC were unveiled
• According to industry observers, these two additional initiatives may add too much complexity to a business model that thrives on simplicity
• Moreover, recent pilot unionisation (ALPA) at both WestJet and WestJet Encore will prevent their ULCC from having an ultra-low cost base
Notes: Average frequency considered over full year across all scheduled routes operated in 2017.
Source: Flightglobal (2017), OAG, Internal analysis. www.jetlines.ca / JET: TSX-V / 22
WESTJET’S NEW LOW-COST SUBSIDIARY – OTHERS
TRIED BEFORE BUT THE TRACK RECORD IS DISMAL
“Those that fail to learn from history,
are doomed to repeat it.”
- Winston Churchill
Rationale • Response to growing competition in the price-sensitive markets
• WestJet CEO: “unlikely to operate in markets with a nice business mix” Continental Lite Continental 1992 Stopped 1994
Network • Separate vehicle with complementary network, avoiding cannibalisation Shuttle United Oct 1994 Stopped Sep 2001
Jetlines will capitalize on the opportunity to bring about a true ultra-low cost carrier model to
Canada
• Offer base fares that are approximately 50% lower than Air Canada and WestJet
Market Opportunity
• ULCC market opportunity of 17 MM customers in 5 years
• Jetlines has been granted an exemption to allow up to a 49% foreign voting ownership
Favourable Timing • The Canadian government’s public policy supports greater competition across all sectors
• Strong economic growth
Options
Vested 3,720,000 $0.20 - $0.76 July 22, 2020 – February 5, 2023
Unvested 2,387,500 $0.21 - $0.76 February 28, 2022 – December 10, 2023
Total Options 6,107,500
RSUs
Vested -
Unvested 2,750,000
Total RSUs 2,750,000
Warrants
JET.WT 8,607,607 $0.375 September 16, 2019
JET.WT.A 7,761,218 $0.50 February 28, 2019
Agent Warrants* 296,952 $0.30
Underlying Agent Warrants* 488,920 $0.50
Other Warrants 300,000 $0.30 March 10, 2019
Total Warrants 17,454,697
as of December 3, 2018
Share Price $0.60
52 Week Range $0.36 – 1.42
Market Cap ~ $43.68 million
*Agent Warrants are exercisable for 1 share plus 1/2 Underlying Agent Warrant. The 754,902 Underlying Agent Warrants are issuable on the exercise of the
1,509,805 Agent Warrants. Each whole Underlying Agent Warrant is exercisable for 1 share.
www.jetlines.ca / JET: TSX-V / 27
CORPORATE HEAD OFFICE AIRPORT OPERATIONS ADDRESS INVESTOR RELATIONS
1240 – 1140 West Pender Street 327 – 5360 Airport Road South Toll Free: 1-833-226-5387
Vancouver, BC, V6E 4G1 Richmond, BC, V7B 1B4 investor.relations@jetlines.ca
Tel: 604-681-8030 Tel: 604-273-5387
Fax: 604-681-8039 Fax: 604-273-5399