H E R A C L IT U S ’ A N D W IT T G E N S T E IN ’S R IV E R IM A G ES:

S T E P P IN G T W IC E IN T O T H E SA M E RIVER*

1. Stepping Tw ice into the S a m e R iver

T his paper exam ines a num ber o f river im ages which have been a t­
tributed to H eraclitus, the ways they are used by P la to an d W ittgenstein,
a n d th e c o n n e c tio n b etw een th ese uses o f im agery a n d the
m etaphilosophical issues ab o u t th e n atu re an d lim its o f philosophy which
they lead to. A fte r indicating som e o f th e connections betw een H eracli­
tu s’, P la to ’s an d W ittgenstein’s use o f river im ages, I give a prelim i­
nary reading o f three crucial fragm ents from the H craclitean corpus,
associating each with a differen t river im age. E ach o f these im ages implies
a n overall conception o f th e n a tu re o f change and continuity an d o f the
relationship betw een language an d w orld. I then tu rn to the use o f these im­
ages by P la to an d W ittgenstein, and explore the relationship between their
uses o f river im agery an d their conceptions o f philosophy. T o put it slightly
d ifferently, this paper is ab o u t P la to ’s an d W ittgenstein’s use o f certain
H eraclitean id e a s.2
T he interp retatio n o f H eraclitu s’ river im agery naturally raises ques­
tions ab o u t the au th o rsh ip , transm ission and reception o f philosophical
texts. Because o u r know ledge o f his w riting a n d teaching derives entirely
from subsequent q u o ta tio n s and d o x o g rap h y , one can n o t separate the inter­
p retatio n o f H eraclitu s’ th o u g h t as a w hole, an d his use o f river im agery in
p articular, from questions ab o u t th e veracity an d reliability o f o u r sources.
As a result, discussion o f w hat H eraclitus w rote an d w hy has, in large part,
been determ ined by in terp reters’ views ab o u t the au thenticity o f o u r
sources. T hus, m uch recent deb ate over H eraclitus’ river imagery can only
be understoo d as a re-enactm ent o f th e controversy over the reliability o f
o u r sources.
T he sayings “ everything flows a n d nothing sta y s,” an d “ you c a n ’t step
twice into the sam e river” are p ro b ab ly the best know n w ords a ttrib u ted to
H eraclitus. T hey are usually stressed in in tro d u cto ry expositions o f his
th o u g h t, an d are the only entries u nder “ H eraclitu s” in the O x fo rd D ic­
tionary o f Q u o ta tio n s.3 N evertheless, o u r sources for b o th o f these q u o ta ­
tions arc unreliable, an d influential H eraclitus scholars have argued th at
they are quite incom patible with his real position; Diels an d K ranz treat
them as apo cry p h al.4 T his scenario is o f a kind fam iliar from K ripke’s
discussions o f reference: p erhaps H eraclitus never said the w ords th at are
stereotypically associated w ith h im .5

Copyright © 1991, THE MON1ST, La Salle, IL 61301.

580 DAVID G. STERN

T he fam e o f these sayings a n d th e co n tro v ersy over th eir authenticity

a re b o th d u e to th e fact th a t they occur in th e w orks o f P lato . In the
C ratylus, S ocrates m entions th at

Heraclitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and nothing at rest; he
compares them to the stream o f a river, and says that you cannot go into the
same water twice.6

S ocrates treats H eraclitu s’ river im agery as a m e ta p h o r fo r th e n atu re o f the

w orld, an d tak es it to im ply a view o n w hich everything is co n stantly chang­
ing, an d so a w orld in w hich “ th e re is n o th in g stable o r perm an en t, b u t only
flux an d m o tio n .” 7 H e sum s u p th e view he attrib u te s to H eraclitus w ith the
w ords p a n ta rhei, “ everything flow s,” o r “ all is in flu x .” T his is echoed in
W ittgenstein ’s use o f th e phrase “ A lle s f l i e s s t ” “ all is in flux” in m an ­
uscripts w ritten sh o rtly a fte r his retu rn to philosophy in 1929. In 1931,
W ittgenstein sum m ed u p his respect fo r th is H eraclitean position as follows:

The fundamental, expressed grammatically: What about the sentence:

“ One cannot step into the same river twice” ? 8

T his rem ark is tak en u p in th e n u m b er o f later typescripts, including Z ettel.

W ittgenstein read a n d enjo y ed P la to .9 H e ow ned a five-volum e G er­
m an tran slatio n o f P la to by P reisen d an z, an d was well acquainted with the
Theaetetus an d C ra ty lu s.10 In 1944, when he was p u ttin g th e first p art o f the
P hilosophical In vestig a tio n s in to its final fo rm , he w rote to a friend th a t he
was reading P la to ’s Theaetetus-. “ ‘P lato in this dialogue is occupied with the
sam e problem s th a t I am w riting a b o u t’.” 11 L ike N ietzsche, he had a deeply
am bivalent view o f S ocrates. H e co u ld , o n o ccasion, be quite dismissive:

Reading the Socratic dialogues one has the feeling: what a frightful waste
of time! What’s the point of these dialogues that prove nothing and clarify
nothing?'1

O n the o th er h an d , this an im u s was u ndoubtedly m otiv ated by a recognition

o f his ow n failings:

In the course o f our conversations Russell would often exclaim: “ Logic’s hell!”
—And this perfectly expresses the feeling we had when we were thinking about
the problems o f logic; that is to say, their immense difficulty, their hard and
slippery nature.
I believe our main reason for feeling like this was the following fact: that
every time some new linguistic phenomenon occured to us, it could retrospec­
tively show that our previous explanation was unworkable. . . .
But that is the difficulty Socrates gets into in trying to give the definition of
a concept. Again and again a use o f the word emerges that seems not to be com­
patible with the concept that other uses have led us to fo rm .'3
 HERACLITUS’ AND WITTGENSTEIN’S RIVER IMAGES 581

S ocrates an d th e early W ittgenstein aim ed at d efinitions which cap tu red the

essence o f o u r concepts, an d were repeatedly stym ied by counter-exam ples.
P la to an d th e a u th o r o f th e Tractatus held th a t th ere m ust be a well defined
o rd er underlying th e ap p earances. T h e later W ittgenstein repudiated this
philosophical tra d itio n , m aintaining th a t language has no essence, is a
“ com plicated netw ork o f sim ilarities overlapping an d criss-crossing” 12*14 and
th a t the search fo r precise defin itio n s is m otivated by a n illusory goal:

I cannot characterize my standpoint better than by saying that it is opposed

to that which Socrates represents in the Platonic dialogues. For if I was asked
what knowledge is, I would list items o f knowledge and add “ and suchlike.”
There is no common element to be found in all o f them, because there isn’t
one.15

T here is no direct evidence th a t W ittgenstein read a collection o f

H eraclitus’ fragm ents. W hile I th in k it likely th a t W ittgenstein did read
H eraclitus, given his o th er interests an d w hat we now know ab o u t the range
an d b read th o f his reading, this can be n o m o re th an a c o n je c tu re .16 O n the
o n e h an d , W ittgenstein’s earlier use an d subsequent criticism o f river im­
agery is obviously colored by his reading o f P la to . But W ittgenstein’s co n ­
viction th at “ all is in flux” tries to say som ething which cannot be p ut into
w ords b ut is nevertheless deeply significant is in sh arp con trast with
S ocrates’ flat-out dism issal o f th e doctrin e o f flux in the Theaetetus. W itt­
genstein’s later river im age, unlike th e one in the C ratylus, gives com ­
plem entary roles to b o th change and perm anence: it is an im age in which
som e things a re in m otion an d others a re at rest. A nd this is a vital aspect o f
H eraclitus’ river im agery which can n o t be found in P la to ’s use o f
H eraclitus.

2. H eraclitus' R iver Im ages

But we m ust begin by looking at th e three river fragm ents a ttrib u ted to
H eraclitus by Diels. In K ahn’s tra n sla tio n , they read as follows:

(12) As they step in to the sam e rivers, o th er and still other

w aters flow upon them .

(91) O ne can n o t step twice in to the sam e river, n o r can one grasp
any m o rtal substance in a stable co n d itio n , b ut it scatters and
again gathers; it fo rm s and dissolves, an d approaches and
departs.

(49a) In to th e sam e rivers we step and d o n o t step, we are and we

are n o t .'7
582 DAVID G. STERN

F ro m D iogenes L aertius, we learn th a t H eraclitu s flourished a b o u t 500

B.C.. A rius D idym us, the source o f the first frag m en t, was b orn not long
b efo re Jesus. T he H eraclitus w ho is o u r source for the second fragm ent,
som etim es called pseud o -H eraclitu s o r H eraclitu s H om ericus, probably
lived d u rin g th e first cen tu ry A .D .. P lu ta rc h , o u r source fo r the th ird , was
b o rn a ro u n d a . d . 45 a n d died a b o u t 120. S o appro x im ately h a lf a m illenium
an d a n un k n o w n n u m b er o f scribes separate H eraclitus from these sources.
F ragm ent (12) is alm ost certainly a d irect q u o ta tio n ; (91) a n d (49a) are co n ­
troversial, as th eir a u th o rs have proven unreliable w hen it has been possible
to check their q u o ta tio n s against th e originals.
N one o f these frag m en ts, n o r fo r th a t m a tte r, an y fragm ent w hich can
plausibly be a ttrib u te d to H eraclitus, explicitly com pares the w orld to a
riv e r.1* It is only in the d o xo g rap h ic trad itio n th a t we find such claim s as
“ All things com e ab o u t th ro u g h o p p o sitio n , an d the universe flow s like a
riv er.” 19 In stead , we have these th ree passages, passages w hich we have to
in terpret fo r ourselves. Each o f these passages offers us a differen t river im ­
age an d so can provide th e basis fo r a d ifferen t in terp retatio n o f H eraclitus’
river im agery.
T he first fragm ent co n tain s a n im age o f b o th flux an d perm anence: the
w aters are co n tin u ally flow ing a n d changing, b u t the rivers persist. T his
passage explicitly talks ab o u t stepping into the sa m e rivers, in sh arp contrast
to the second’s denial th a t o n e can step twice in to the sam e river. T he frag­
m ent, in describing people stepping in to flow ing rivers, im plicitly invokes a
c o n trast w ith th e com paratively firm river b anks. It is possible th at
H eraclitus w rote a b o u t stepping in to the sa m e rivers o nly to go on to un d er­
m ine the im plicit com m itm ent to a persisting river an d the banks which it
flow s betw een. But the passage as we have it treats rivers as things which
b o th change an d persist an d speaks o f a plurality o f persons stepping into
th e w aters. T his is a conservative river im age: things change, b ut they persist
th ro u g h these changes. Som e read ers, n o ta b ly K irk, p o in t o u t th at it is even
co m patible w ith th e view th a t som e things, such as gold ingots, d o not
c h an g e.10
T he second im age leaves th e firm riverb an k behind a n d w ith it, the n o ­
tio n o f persisting sub stan ce, fo r th e flux o f th e changing w aters. Because the
river is continually changing, we can n o t step in to it tw ice. T his is a radical
river image: everything is u ndergoing change, an d nothing persists.
H ow ever, while this requires us to give u p a concep tio n o f things as having a
“ stable co n d itio n ,” as persisting th ro u g h change, th e fragm ent does not
challenge th e n o tio n th a t we can talk o f a th in g ’s co n d itio n at any given
tim e. In stead , it im plies an onto lo g y o f m o m e n ta ry things, things which o n ­
 HERACLITUS1 AND WITTGENSTEIN’S RIVER IMAGES 583

ly last a n in sta n t, as they a re alw ays changing in to som ething else. As in the
first in terp retatio n , the w orld consists o f things w ith properties, b u t on this
in terp retatio n these things do n o t persist.
T he th ird im age, im m ersed in the ever-changing w ater, denies th a t we
can even talk consistently a b o u t the to ta l flux: it is im possible to say
anything ab o u t th e identity o f the river, o r o n e ’s ow n identity, w ithout im ­
m ediately contradicting oneself. T his is an extrem e river im age, o n which all
talk o f things an d their properties, even at a single m om ent, is rendered in­
coherent. T here is considerable su p p o rt for this reading in P la to an d A risto ­
tle. In the C ratylus, S ocrates says th a t the H eracliteans had arrived at the
“ m istaken o p in io n ” th a t “ all things were in m otion o r flux . . . an d having
fallen into a kind o f w hirlpool them selves, they are carried ro u n d , an d want
to drag us in after th e m .” 21 In th e Theaetelus, S ocrates argues th at this ex­
trem e position is the inevitable an d self-refuting consequence o f accepting
th e radical in te rp re ta tio n .22 A ristotle ascribes it to C ratylus, “ w ho finally
did n ot think it right to say anything but only m oved his finger, an d criti­
cized H eraclitus for saying th a t it is im possible to step twice into the sam e
river, fo r he th o u g h t one could not d o it even o n ce.” 23
O n the conservative in terp retatio n , things change, an d the things that
change persist. In oth er w ords, there are persisting things, an d these things
undergo change. The fragm ent describes the act o f stepping into rivers, as
changing w aters flow over the steppers. The radical in terp retatio n denies
th a t any tw o acts o f stepping in to a river have the sam e object: everything is
changing, an d n o th in g persists. T here arc n o persisting things, only m om en­
tary things. O n the extrem e in terp retatio n , everything is alw ays changing in
every respect, a n d so th ere are no things. A ll talk o f things a n d their p ro p er­
ties, even at a single m om ent, is rendered incoherent. T he identity o f the
river is affirm ed o nly to be denied.

3. H eraclitus a n d Plato
T he passages from P la to in th e previous section sum u p his u n d erstan d ­
ing o f H eraclitu s’ philosophy. O n his reading, H eraclitu s’ conception o f the
w orld is concealed by his rhetoric, b u t is really a n esoteric doctrine o f total
change, a n d is closely related to the view S ocrates a ttrib u te s to P ro tag o ras.
In the Theaetetus, S ocrates sets o u t P ro ta g o ra s’ “ secret th eo ry ” as follows:

Nothing is one thing just by itself, and you can’t correctly speak o f anything
either as some thing or as qualified in some way. If you speak o f something as
big, it will also appear small; if you speak o f it as heavy, it will also appear light;
and similarly with everything, since nothing is one—either one thing or qualified
in one way. The fact is that, as a result o f movement, change, and mixture with
 584 DAVID G. STERN

one another, all the things which we say are—which is not the right way to speak
of them—arc coming to be; because nothing ever is, but things are always com­
ing to be.24

A fter explicitly a ttrib u tin g this th eo ry to H eraclitus an d a w hole succession

o f wise m en, the H craclitean d o ctrin e o f flux is p u t aside fo r a while in order
to explore the closely related P ro ta g o re a n thesis th a t people are the m easure
o f all things. W hen they re tu rn to discussing H eraclitus, S ocrates suggests
they focus on a m o re precise statem en t o f his theory. T h eo d o ru s responds
th a t th e H eracliteans a re to o crazy to be o f any assistance:

Because, in literal conformity with their texts, they keep moving; as for stopping
an argument or a question and, without moving, giving an answer and asking a
question in turn, there’s less than none of that in them. . . . If you ask one of
them a question, they draw out enigmatic little expressions from their quiver, so
to speak, and shoot one off; and if you try to get hold o f an account o f what
that one meant, you’re transfixed by another novel set o f metaphors.2*

T his passage, w ith its m etap h o rical atta c k o n the H eraclitean use o f
m etap h o r, m akes it clear w hy the p articip an ts in th e dialogue were reluctant
to a ttrib u te any specific view to H eraclitus: he a n d his follow ers w ere u n ­
willing to give any straig h tfo rw ard exposition o f th eir views ab o u t change
an d persistence. S o crates’ response is to m ain tain th a t this exoteric denial o f
d o ctrin e is a device w hich conceals an esoteric d o ctrin e o f radical change:
th a t everything is alw ays changing in every respect, and n o th in g persists.
S ocrates a n d T h eo d o ru s a ttrib u te this esoteric doctrine to H eraclitus
because they were u n ab le to see his refusal to p ro p o u n d a doctrine o f flux as
b o th a consequence an d a prim e exam ple o f his principled o p p o sitio n to any
statem en t o f philosophical d o ctrin e. H eraclitu s’ surviving w ritings use strik ­
ing im agery to convey a philosophy which m ost people will never un d er­
sta n d because they d o n o t know how to look a n d listen. His bo o k began
w ith th e w arning th a t he did n o t expect to be u n d ersto o d , fo r the Logos,
w hich in fo rm s th e w orld an d o u r speaking o f it, can only be grapsed by the
few:

(1) O f the Logos which is as I describe it men always prove to be uncom­

prehending, both before they have heard it and when once they have heard it.
For although all things happen according to this Logos men are like people of
no experience, even when they experience such words and deeds as I explain,
when 1 distinguish each thing according to its constitution and declare how it
is; but the rest o f men fail to notice what they do after they wake up just as
they forget what they do when asleep.
(2) Therefore it is necessary to follow the common; but although the Lo­
gos is common the many live as though they had a private understand­
ing.2*
 HERACLITUS’ AND WITTGENSTEIN’S RIVER IMAGES 585

U nlike P la to ’s form s, w hich belong to a transcen d en t realm , the Logos is

fully present in o u r co m m o n w aking life: b u t m ost o f us are caught up in
o u r private w orlds, unable to really see w hat su rro u n d s us. Socrates, w ho
sleepw alks past such signposts in his search for d o ctrin e, treats them as
m ere evasiveness, saying th a t he will set o u t the position which H eraclitus
w ould have defended if only he an d his follow ers had not been so busy ru n ­
ning aro u n d in circles.
Instead, I believe we should focus on in terpreting the im agery which
H eraclitus a n d his follow ers have left us. T h ere is a very clear indication
th a t is w hat he w anted in the follow ing fragm ent:

(93) The lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither speaks out nor conceals, but
gives a sign.”

T he oracle o f A pollo, the god o f the sun, o f w isdom , an d o f philosophy,

gives advice indirectly: she produces an im age, riddle o r am biguous u t­
terance w hich we m ust interpret. T his is the only way the oracle can speak
beyond the lim its o f w hat can be stated literally.” T his is hinted at by
P lu ta rc h ’s gloss on the passage, which tells us th at

the god here uses the priestess with regard to hearing in the same way as the sun
uses the moon with regard to sight.2’

W hat w ould deafen us if we heard it, o r blind us if we saw it, can be grasped
indirectly. A s we can see th e s u n ’s light reflected by th e m oon, but cannot
stare a t it directly when it is shining, we can hear th e divine m essage, which
w ould d eafen us if we heard it directly, by listening to the oracle. Heracli-
tcan im agery uses language to indirectly convey a m essage w hich leads to
co n trad ictio n w hen one tries to state it directly.
In view o f the com plexity and the am biguity o f H eraclitus’ surviving
rem arks, it is likely th a t his use o f the river im age was considerably m ore
subtle th a n any o f the three in terp retatio n s I have outlined. N or are we en­
titled to expect th a t either th e oracle o r H eraclitu s’ m etap h o rs have only one
co rrect in terpretatio n . P erh ap s nothing so sim ple is tru e, an d tru th can only
be reached by playing o f f one in terp retatio n against a n o th e r. W e should
h ardly expect less from a th in k er w ho m ade so m uch o f the unity o f o p ­
posites, w ho said th a t “ the way u p and dow n is one and the sam e.” 10 In­
deed, th is very fragm ent has received ju st as wide a range o f divergent inter­
p retatio n s as th e river im age itself. O n a conservative reading, it expresses
th e truism th a t the p ath w hich goes u p from A to B goes dow n from B to A ,
o r m ore generally, th a t a n o bject w hich has a p ro p erty could have a com ­
plem entary or co n trad icto ry p roperty. O n a radical reading, the fragm ent
challenges the n o tio n th a t we can identify any particu lar p ath as a way up or
586 DAVID G. STERN

a way dow n; o n an extrem e reading, it is m eant to subvert th e assum ption

th a t we can speak consistently a b o u t p ath s, o r anything else, fo r th a t m at­
ter. H eraclitus m ight have accepted S ocrates’ claim th a t he is com m itted to
a n extrem e po sition o n which n o th in g can be said w ith out contradiction
w ith eq uanim ity , as entirely consistent with his conception o f Logos.

4. W ittg en stein ’s a n d S o c ra te s’ sim ples

In the readings 1 have p roposed o f H eraclitu s’ river im ages, I have em ­
phasized how th e river stands for alternative conceptions o f the n atu re o f
th e w orld. B ut these a re n o t im ages o f the w orld as it is in itself; each image
also refers to th e act o f stepping in to th e river, an d th u s implies a hum an
agent. A n d so these im ages n o t only raise the p roblem o f w hat the w orld is
like, b ut also, o f o u r place in th e w orld. T h ere is an intim ate relationship be­
tw een these issues for b o th S ocrates an d W ittgenstein, as can be seen in the
follow ing passage fro m th e Theaetetus, a passage w hich W ittgenstein
quotes an d discusses in the P hilosophical G ra m m a r an d P hilosophical In ­
vestigations:

Socrates to Theaetetus: And if you imagine mustn’t you imagine

something'! —Theaetetus: Necessarily. —Socrates: And if you imagine
something, mustn’t it be something real? —Theaetetus: It seems so.
Socrates: So if someone imagines what is not, he has an idea of nothing?
—Theaetetus: It seems so. —Socrates: But surely if he has an idea of nothing,
then he hasn’t any idea at all? —Theaetetus: That seems plain.11

H ow can we th in k b oth a b o u t w h at is and w hat is not? S ocrates and

T heaetetus tak e it fo r gran ted th a t if I im agine som eth ing, then there is
som e thing I im agine. B ut w h at is th a t thing? It c a n ’t ju st be m y idea o f
w hat I im agine, fo r I can also im agine things th a t a re real. But then w hat are
we to say ab o u t th e case in w hich 1 im agine som ething w hich d o esn ’t exist?
O ne w ay o f resolving these difficulties co ncerning th e objects o f
th o u g h t is to arg u e th a t there are term s w hich refer to things which m ust ex­
ist. T he m eaning o f these directly referring term s ju st are th e objects they
refer to . F or R ussell, these term s were d em onstratives w hich picked o u t the
co n ten ts o f im m ediate experience; fo r the early W ittgenstein, they were the
nam es in a fully analyzed language which referred to m etaphysical sim ples.
These sim ples can n o t com e in to existence o r cease to be, fo r they are the un ­
changing g ro u n d w hich m akes change possible. T h u s, in the Tractatus,
W ittgenstein writes:

The object is simple.

 HERACLITUS’ AND WITTGENSTEIN’S RIVER IMAGES 587

Only if there are objects can there be a fixed form o f the world.
The fixed, the existent and the object are one.
The simple signs employed in propositions are called names.
Objects can only be named.37

In the P hilosophical Investig a tio n s, W ittgenstein asks him self “ W hat lies
behind the idea th a t nam es really signify sim ples?” a n d replies by quoting
w hat S ocrates says in the T h eaetetus:

“ If I make no mistake, I have heard some people say this: there is no definition
of the primary elements—so to speak—out o f which we and everything else are
composed; for everything that exists in its own right can only be named, no
other determination is possible, neither that it is nor that it is n o t. . . . But what
exists in and for itself has to b e ___ named without any other determination. In
consequence it is impossible to give an account of any primary element; for it,
nothing is possible but the bare name; its name is all it has. But just as what con­
sists of these primary elements is itself complex, so the names of the elements
become descriptive language by being compounded together. For the essence of
speech is the composition o f names.”
Both Russell’s “ individuals” and my “ objects” ( Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus) were such primary elements.”

5. W ittgenstein's Earlier R iver Im age

In th e passage I have ju st q u o ted , we have W ittgenstein’s testim ony
th a t concerns a b o u t th e co m position o f language an d the possibility o f
referring to objects led him to p o stu late sim ple objects which could only be
nam ed an d h ad to exist. T his rem ark , 1 believe, holds the key to u n d erstan d ­
ing the objects o f the Tractatus: th eir existence was required as a condition
fo r the possibility o f language, but W ittgenstein did not think it necessary to
fully delineate the ch aracter o f the objects he had p o stu lated .34 O n his
subsequent retu rn to philosophy in 1929, W ittgenstein did identify the sim ­
ple objects w ith th e co n ten ts o f experience: he cam e to think th at w hat had
to exist, the g round o f language w hose existence could not be d o u b ted , was
th e form o f experience, a stream o f consciousness whose form eluded
description:

I feel today such a particular poverty o f problems around me; a sure sign
that the most important and hardest problems lie before me.
10.11 (1929]
The immediate finds itself in constant flux [Fluss). (It has in fact the form
o f a stream [Srrom].)
 It is quite clear that if one wants to say here the ultimate, one must thus
come to the limit o f the language which expresses it.35

T h e G erm an w ord fo r river is Fluss, w hich can also m ean flux. A s a result
o f this am biguity, there is a n a tu ra l tran sitio n betw een the no tio n o f a river
a n d the no tio n o f flux in the G erm an . W ittgenstein describes the im m ediate­
ly given as being in co n stan t flux, like a stream , but concludes th a t one can’t
actually say it, an d certainly im plies th a t o n e c a n ’t draw it, either. But w hat
W ittgenstein’s w ords on th e page d o say an d w hat his draw ing depicts d o in­
directly convey a conception o f th e w orld, a conception which can , to a co n ­
siderable extent, be stated m o re explicitly. At first, his draw ing hard ly looks
like a river, fo r it term in ates in m id stream ; read from left to rig h t, it comes
to a stop. I tak e th is as a schem atic illu stratio n o f the co n ten ts o f co n ­
sciousness: the present is the sh a rp line in th e m iddle, w ith th e specious p re­
sent fading o f f in to the p ast o n th e left. W hether o r n o t this in terp retatio n is
co rrect, W ittgenstein certainly d id use th e flux thesis to gesture a t the inex­
pressible aspect o f experience:

The blurredness, indeterminacy o f our sense impressions is not something

which can be remedied, a blurredncss to which a complete sharpness cor­
responds (or is opposed.) Rather, this general indeterminacy, ungraspability,
this swimming of the sense impressions, is that which has been designated by the
words “ all is in flux.’’36

N evertheless, he was also convinced th a t th e n atu re o f experience can n o t be

described o r p ictured. F o r instance, he dism issed M ach ’s draw ing o f visual
experience, a sketch th a t looks as if d raw n from a p o in t a few inches behind
som eone’s eyes, b o rd ered by a hazy b o u n d ary o f eyelids an d nose, w ith the
w ords “ you c a n ’t m ake a visual picture o f the visual field .” 37 T his is a con­
sequence o f his T ractarian view th a t no general thesis ab o u t th e n atu re o f
 HERACLITUS* AND WITTGENSTEIN’S RIVER IMAGES 589

language or experience can ever be explicitly stated; such m atters can only
be show n o r conveyed by m aking clear th e form o f o u r language. T hus, in
th e P hilosophical R e m a rk s, he writes:

What belongs to the essence o f the world cannot be expressed by language.

For this reason, it cannot say that all is in flux. Language can only say those
things we can also imagine otherwise.1*

T o sum up: W ittgenstein’s thesis is th a t all is in flux an d his m etathesis is

th at th e thesis c a n ’t be stated , th a t any attem p t to state it as a thesis m ust
ru n up against the lim its o f language an d m isfire. D espite this, he tried to do
it. In the next p a rag rap h , he says “ all is in flux” m ust be expressed in the
“ applicatio n ” o f language, th e act which m akes th e d ead w ords we u tter or
th e signs wc m ake into a living, significant language. H e com pares the a p ­
plication o f language to th e act which m akes an evenly m arked rod into a
ruler, w hat he calls “p u ttin g language up against reality .” 39 In 1929 and
1930, he characterized this act o f applying language as a m atter o f verifying
o u r propositio n s on the basis o f im m ediate experience:

The stream o f life, or the stream o f the world, flows on and our proposi­
tions are so to speak only verified at instants.
Only the present verifies our propositions.
So they must be so constructed that they can be verified by it.40

L anguage, on this view, gains its significance by being connected up with

the stream o f consciousness, w hich is identifed w ith b o th life an d w orld.
W hile wc c a n ’t say how , wc can show this in m etap h o rs and im agery which
indicate w here language ru n s o u t. This H eraclitean conception is n o t one
th a t he holds fo r long. Strictly speaking, it’s not one th a t he ever holds, even
at this point, because he doesn’t say it, he ju st does as m uch as he can to in­
tim ate it. T he follow ing passage captures th a t tension and shows how im ­
p o rta n t it was for W ittgenstein a t this point: he connected it w ith his sense
o f unclarity a b o u t w here philosophy begins, an d considered it a possible
starting point fo r his next book:

If I don’t quite know how to start a book, this is because I am still unclear
about something. For I should like to start with what is given to philosophy,
written and spoken sentences, with books as it were.
And here we come on the difficulty o f “ all is in flux.” Perhaps that is the
very point at which to start.4'

By “ books, as it w ere,” W ittgenstein m eans language as people actually use

it, language used to com m unicate, b u t he finds him self driven tow ards try-
590 DAVID G. STERN

ing to u n d erstan d how this language is connected to o u r experience, the

relatio n sh ip betw een the flux o f experience an d the w ords we u tter. A few
years later, he began his d ra ft o f th e P hilosophical In vestigations w ith a
critique o f A u g u stin e’s “ picture o f th e essence o f h u m an lan g u ag e,” a
discussion w hich is highly critical o f m any o f th e assu m p tions he had taken
fo r gran ted in his early use o f the river im age.

6. “ O ne can step tw ice in to th e sa m e riv e r”

T he next developm ent in W ittgenstein’s th o u g h t is a quite striking
reversal; he gives up his early river im age. In a m anuscript d ated F ebruary
4 , 1931, he discusses a n u m b er o f philosophical q uestions ab o u t how
language represents w hat is seen. O nce again, this leads him to refer to the
specious present slipping aw ay, the river o f tim e continually bearing ex­
perience aw ay from us. H e writes:

That all is in flux seems to prevent us from expressing the truth, for it is as
though we can’t get hold of it, since it slips away from us.41
But it doesn't prevent us from expressing something. —We know what it
means to want to get hold of something fleeting in a description. That happens
say, when we forget the one while we want to describe the other. But that’s not
what we are dealing with here. And that’s how the word “ fleeting” is to be ap­
plied.
We lead words back from their metaphysical use to their correct use in
language.
The man who said that one couldn’t step twice in the same river, said
something false. One can step twice into the same river.
And th at’s how the solution o f all philosophical difficulties looks. Their
answers, if they arc correct, must be everyday and prdinary. But one must only
look at them in the right spirit, then it_makcs no difference
But given this answer: “ But you know how sentences do it, for nothing is
concealed” one would like to say “ Yes, but it all flows by so quick and I should
like to see it spread out more broadly, as it were.”
But here also we go wrong. For m this case, too, nothing happens which
eludes us rapidly.43

T his is a q u ite flat-fo o ted insistence th a t it is possible to step twice in the

sam e river: people d o it, we talk ab o u t it, we ta lk ab o u t things being
fleeting, an d in each case we should c o n tra st cases w here we genuinely see
fleeting things, o r genuinely find ourselves u n ab le to step into a river the se­
cond tim e, w ith cases w here we can. In the B lue B o o k , W ittgenstein puts the
sam e point in a som ew hat m ore didactic form :

. . . in stating our puzzles about the general vagueness o f sense-experience, and

about the flux o f all phenomena, we are using the words “ flux” and
 HERACLITUS’ AND WITTGENSTEIN’S RIVER IMAGES 591

"vagueness” wrongly, in a typically metaphysical way, without an antithesis;

whereas in their correct and everyday use vagueness is opposed to clearness, flux
to stability, inaccuracy to accuracy, and problem to solution.*4

W ittgenstein is o ften accused in his later w ork o f ju st m issing the point; but
here it is quite clear th a t he is well aw are o f the point a t issue, and
deliberately rejects it fo r good reason. In fact, the passage th at m akes
clearest his respect for river im agery occurs a b o u t a hund red pages a fte r his
a ffirm atio n th a t one can step twice into th e sam e river:
The fundamental, expressed grammatically: What about the sentence:
"O ne cannot step into the same river twice” ? 45

T he core o f W ittgenstein’s criticism is taken from the T heaetetus: if all were

in flux, one w ould be unable to say anything coherent at all. You co u ld n ’t
even talk ab o u t the thing th a t is in flux, because as soon as you talk ab o u t it
y o u ’re talkin g ab o u t som ething else, it is no longer th a t thing but som ething
else, fo r otherw ise, it w ou ld n ’t have been changing and so w ouldn’t have
been in flux. In oth er w ords, the extrem e flux thesis m akes speaking im ­
possible. W e need to recognize th a t only som e things are in flux, th a t the
term only m akes sense in co n trast w ith o th e r cases in which it is n ot a p ­
plicable. In th e follow ing passage, S ocrates sets o u t w hat he takes the ex­
trem e flux thesis to a m o u n t to:

Socrates: Since not even this stays constant, that the flowing thing flows white,
but it changes, so that there’s flux o f that very thing, whiteness, and change
to another colour, in order not to be convicted o f staying constant in that
respect—since that’s so, can it ever be possible to refer to any colour in
such a way as to be speaking o f it rightly?
Theodorus: How could it be, Socrates? Indeed, how could it be possible to do
so with any other thing of that kind, if it’s always slipping away while one
is speaking; as it must be, given that it’s in flux?44

S ocrates goes o n to arg u e th a t this conclusion is equally applicable to

anything else one m ight say; if th e flux thesis were tru e, th en language
w ould be useless.47 T his partially an ticipates one o f W ittgenstein’s objec­
tions to the very idea o f a private language: som e stan d ard o f correctness is
necessary if we a re to have a language at all, an d a w orld in to tal flux cannot
provide such a stan d ard .
A couple o f years a fte r W ittgenstein repudiated his earlier river im age,
we find him repeating a fam iliar passage:

What belongs to the essence o f the world cannot be expressed by language.

For this reason, it cannot say that all is in flux. language can only say those
things we could also imagine otherwise.4*
 592 DAVID G. STERN

But instead o f explaining th is claim by invoking th e act o f applying

language to the w o rld , th e verification o f p ro p o sitio n s, he now writes:

That all is in flux must lie in the essence o f the contact of language with
reality. Or better: that all is in flux must lie in the essence of language.49

Instead o f looking to th e specious presen t, th e site at w hich he had supposed

th a t language an d the w orld m ust m eet, he tu rn s o u r a tte n tio n to the nature
o f language itself. T his change in his treatm en t o f th e flux thesis tu rn s on a
new conceptio n o f the role o f language in philosophy. W c need to look at
o u r use o f language b o th to u n d erstan d how we w ere m isled in to affirm ing
th at all is in flux, an d also to u n d erstan d the tru e role th a t flux a n d stability
d o play in o u r lives. T his positive role fo r language, the way in which
language is m eant to help us see these things is intim ated in the next passage,
a descendant o f W ittg en stein ’s original recan tatio n o f the flux thesis:

Wc bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (The
man who said one can’t step twice into the same river, said something false; one
can step twice into the same river. —And sometimes an object ceases to exist
when I stop looking at it, and sometimes it doesn’t. —And sometimes wc know
which colour the other sees, if he looks at this object, and sometimes we don’t.)
And this is how the solution o f all philosophical difficulties looks. Our answers,
if they are to be correct, must be everyday and trivial. For these answers make
fun of the questions, as it were.
Where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to
destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? (As it
were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits o f stone and rubble.) What wc
are destroying is nothing but castles in the air and we arc clearing up the ground
of language on which they stand.
The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of
plain nonsense and bumps that the understanding has got by running up to the
end (alternate wording, also in text: limits] o f language. They, the bumps, make
us see the value of that discovery.*0

In this early version o f som e o f the cen tral m ethodological passages o f

W ittgenstein’s m ajo r late w ork, th e P hilosophical Investigations, he gives
exam ples o f specific philosophical p roblem s; in th e subsequent rew orking
o f this m aterial it becom es increasingly com pressed an d the illustrations
d ro p o u t. T he d u al roles th a t a re given to language in these passages, the n o ­
tio n o f language as th e stab le g ro u n d on w hich the m etaphysical cloud
castles are built a n d th e n o tio n o f language as a hom e from which language
has gone astray , are developed fu rth e r in the final version:
When philosophers use a word—“ knowledge,” "being,” “ object,” “ I,”
“ proposition,” “ name,” —and try to grasp the essence o f the thing, one must
 HERACLITUS’ AND WITTGENSTEIN’S RIVER IMAGES 593

always ask oneself: in the word ever actually used this way in the language
[Sprache] which is its original home?
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their every­
day use.*'

In o rd er to u n d erstan d w ords as they are used in philosophy we have to

trace them back to th eir use in o rd in ary language, back to the ways we o r­
dinarily use them . H ere, there is a striking connection w ith P lato . W ittgen­
stein w rites that:

Learning in philosophy really is recollection. We remember that we really

have used the words in this way.52

F o r W ittgenstein, philosophy is not a m atter o f recollecting the Form s from

a previous life, a m etaphysical dom ain we once knew . Instead, philosophy
rem inds us o f som ething we already know , b u t find h a rd to p ut into words:
it brings us back to the everyday.

7. W ittgenstein ’s L ater R iver Im age

T he late r W ittgenstein argues th a t philosophical theses, such as the
claim th at it is im possible to step tw ice in to the sam e river, o r to see
som eone else’s sensation, arise o u t o f a m isunderstanding o f gram m atical
platitudes. T h e im possiblities in question a re n o t a reflection o f th e n atu re
o f things, b u t rath er a shadow cast by the stru ctu re o f o u r language. T hus,
W ittgenstein advises:
Instead o f “ one cannot.” say: “ it doesn’t exist in this game.’’ Not: “ one
can’t castle in draughts” but—“ there is no castling in draughts” ; and instead of
“ I can’t exhibit my sensation” —“ in the use of the word ‘sensation’, there is no
such thing as exhibiting what one has got” ; instead o f “ one cannot enumerate
all the cardinal numbers” —“ there is no such thing here as enumerating all the
members, even if there is an enumerating o f members.”
The proposition “ sensations are private” is like: One plays patience by
oneself.52

T hese ordinarily unpro b lem atic im possibilities only becom e philosophically

tro u b lin g if one divorces them from the p articu lar linguistic context which
m ade it im possible to say those things. T his is th e heart o f W ittgenstein’s
later response to th e T ractarian question: w hat are the lim its o f th o u g h t,
w hat determ ines w hether an u tterances m akes sense? H is answ er is th at
w hat we thin k and say can only be u n d ersto o d in its everyday context, o u r
o rd in ary use o f w ords. A p hilosopher m ight well ask: w hat are those cir­
cum stances, th e co n d itio n s u nder which w ords can be used intelligibly, and
594 DAVID G. STERN

w hat lim itatio n s d o they im pose? In this w ay, o n e can sta rt constructing a
philosophical th eo ry o f the very kind th a t this view was m eant to p rev en t.94
T his concern fo r th e w ay th eo ry can reco n stitu te itself o u t o f anti-
theoretical claim s m o tivates a subsequent use o f the passage above, w here
W ittgenstein explicitly connects it w ith the thesis th a t th o u g h t and language
require p articu lar circum stances, a co n tex t, if they are to m ake sense:

Wc only speak o f "thinking” in quite particular circumstances.

How then can the sense and the truth (or the truth and the sense) of
sentences collapse together? (Stand or fall together?)
And isn’t it as if you wanted to say: " I f such-and-such is not the case, then
it makes no sense to say it is the case?”
Like this, e.g.: “ If all moves were always false, it would make no sense to
speak of a 'false move’.” But that is only a paradoxical way o f putting it. The
non-paradoxical way would be: "T he general description----- makes no sense.”
Instead o f “ one cannot,” say: "it doesn’t exist in this game.” Not: "O ne
can’t castle in draughts" but—"there is no castling in draughts” ; and instead of
" I can’t exhibit my sensation” —“ in the use o f the word ‘sensation’, there is no
such thing as exhibiting what one has got” ; instead o f "one cannot enumerate
all the cardinal numbers” —"there is no such thing here as enumerating all the
members.”
Conversation, the application and interpretation o f words flows on, and
only in the flow (Fluss) does a word have its meaning.
"H e has gone away.” —"W hy?” What did you mean, when you uttered
the word "w hy” ? What did you fhink of?55

In the final p a ra g ra p h , W ittgenstein first states the thesis th a t w ords only

have m eaning in th e flow , th e river, o f conv ersatio n , an d then illustrates it
w ith a b rie f co n v ersatio n al exchange. T he exchange is a capsule reference to
a train o f th o u g h t th a t occu rs repeatedly th ro u g h o u t W ittgenstein’s later
philosophical w riting, in w hich he co u n ters the dem an d th a t th ere m ust be
som e o ccurren t state o f a ffa irs w hich acco u n ts for o u r w ords’ m eaning,
som ething going on in th e sp eak er’s h ead o r m ind w hich explains w hy those
w ords are significant. W ittgenstein counsels th a t we look instead to the
practical co n tex t, th e stream o f th o u g h t an d activity, in which a given use o f
w ords is em bedded: ‘‘W o rd s o nly have m eaning in th e river o f th o u g h t an d
life .” 46 T h e river im age retu rn s in a very d ifferen t form : w ords no longer
have m eaning in virtue o f th eir ap p licatio n to th e flux o f present experience;
instead the significance o f a p articu lar u tteran ce is a m atter o f its location
w ithin the stream o f co n v ersatio n , o u r o rd in ary use o f language. T hus, in
the follow ing passage, W ittgenstein describes a snippet o f conversation and
p o in ts o u t th a t n o th in g in p articu lar need go o n in th e sp eak er’s m ind in
o rd er for th e sp eak er’s w ords to be significant:
 HERACLITUS’ AND WITTGENSTEIN’S RIVER IMAGES 595

What docs someone mean when he says “ I think he’s pretending” ? —Well,
he’s using a word which is used in such-and-such situations. Sometimes he will
continue the game by making conjectures about the other person’s future
behaviour; that doesn’t have to happen.
There’s some behaviour and some conversation taking place. A few
sentences back and forth; and a few actions. That might be all.
(Words only have meaning in the river o f life.)5*

W ittgenstein also responds to the claim th a t one c a n ’t look inside a n o th e r’s

m ind by pointing o u t th a t inner experience, which he had once equated with
life, only has m eaning in virtue o f its place in o u r lives as a whole:

What goes on inwardly, too, only has meaning in the river o f life.5*

W ittgenstein’s conception o f life is now social, n o t solipsistic; while he

could have accepted the w ords ju st q u o ted in early 1929, when he w as still
w orking w ithin a T ractarian fram ew ork, they w ould have referred to the
stream o f consciousness, n o t the cou rse o f o rd in ary life.5’ His later river im ­
age is a n im age o f m ovem ent an d activity; b u t it is not an im age in w hich all
is in flux. In this im age, the river’s ban k s an d bed are fixed, at least for the
present, a n d fo r the m ost p a rt. In oth er w ords, at any given tim e, one m ust
tak e som e things for g ra n ted , and this taken fo r g ran ted background lim its
w hat one can say and do.
In O n C erta in ty, W ittgenstein sets o u t this im age a t length, both as an
illustration o f th e n atu re o f th e b o u n d ary betw een everyday em pirical
claim s and th e w ords we use to describe th eir b ack g ro u n d , an d to indicate
w hy it is so h a rd to describe th a t b ackground:

But I did not get my picture o f the world by satisfying myself o f its correct­
ness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied o f its correctness. No: it is the in­
herited background against which I distinguish between true and false.
The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a
mythology. And their role is like that o f rules o f a game; and the game can be
learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules.
It might be imagined that some propositions, o f the form of empirical
propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical
propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with
time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.
The mythology may change back into a state o f flux, the river-bed of
thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on
the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division
of the one from the other.
But if someone were to say ‘‘So logic too is an empirical science” he would
be wrong. Yet this is right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as
something to test by experience, at another as a rule o f testing.
5% DAVID G. STERN

And the bank o f the river consists partly o f hard rock, subject to no altera­
tion or only to an imperceptible one, partly o f sand, which now in one place
now in another gets washed away, or deposited/0

In this passage, W ittgenstein sketches a w orld-picture, a graphic depiction

o f his un d erstan d in g o f the w orld an d o u r place in it. H is recourse to im ­
agery here is a consequence o f his conception o f a w orld-picture: alth o u g h it
can be described, the p ro p o sitio n s w hich describe it a re m ore like a m yth, or
the rules o f a gam e which we m ay have never artic u la te d , th a n a trad itio n al
analysis. T h is is n o t only because they a re im plicit an d norm ative, rath er
th a n explicit an d fa c tu a l, but because any explicit fo rm u lation o f o u r world
picture will be n o m o re th a n a n a p p ro x im atio n to th e ways o f acting in
which it is em bedded. T hese practices have a flexibility w hich resists being
cap tu red by any set o f necessary a n d sufficient con d itio n s. C h aracteristical­
ly, W ittgenstein refuses to tu rn this conception o f th e prim acy o f praxis into
a d o ctrine. In ste a d , he establishes it indirectly, th ro u g h o u t th e P hilo­
so p h ical Investigations a n d his su bsequent w riting, by giving exam ples
o f o u r agreem ent in the use o f language, show ing how these practices are
p a rt o f w hat he calls “ o u r n a tu ra l h isto ry ” an d how they depend o n ‘‘cer­
tain very general facts o f n a tu re .” 61 In a p re p a ra to ry d ra ft fo r P a rt II o f the
In vestigation s, he lists som e o f these everyday practices, and insists they
m ust be treated as a given:
Instead of the unanalysable, specific, indefinable: the fact that we act in
such-and-such ways, e.g. punish certain actions, establish the state of affairs
thus and so, give orders, render accounts, describe colours, take an interest in
others’ feelings. What has to be accepted, the given—it might be said—are facts
of living//forms o f life .//61

T hey have to be treated as a given because any explanation o f w hat

w ords m ean presupposes th a t this b ack g ro u n d is, for th e m ost p a rt, already
in place. F o r if we try to specify everything one has to know in o rder to
u n d erstan d statem en ts ab o u t p unishing a specific actio n , establishing a state
o f a ffa irs o b tain s, o r sim ply o rdering som eone to o p en the d o o r, those
sentences will also h ave to be u n d ersto o d , an d th a t will presuppose furth er
practical abilities o n the p a rt o f the re a d e r.61
P a rt o f th e flexibility o f o u r practices consists in th eir indeterm inacy:
alth o u g h we all agree in som e o f o u r ju d g m en ts, th e borderline betw een the
em pirical a n d the m ethodological is n o t sh arp ly d em arcated , an d will
change over tim e. T h e d istrib u tio n o f san d on th e river bed alters, an d even
th e underlying rock will eventually be w orn aw ay, b u t these changes cannot
be assim ilated to th e flow o f the w aters. In this im age, the w aters’ continual
 HERACLITUS1 AND WITTGENSTEIN'S RIVER IMAGES 597

flow is not treated as a m odel o f the n atu re o f all things. Instead, it is used
as a n object o f co m p a riso n ,64 as a way o f bringing o u t the continuum which
stretches betw een o u r w orld picture, the inherited b ackground which we
tak e for gran ted in ju d g in g tru th an d falsity, an d the p articu lar tru th s an d
falsehoods we discuss. Shiner argues th a t this is crucial for an u n d erstan d ­
ing o f W ittgenstein’s anti-essentialist conception o f change and unity:

Wittgenstein wants not only to qualify the hardness of the rock, but also to
point out that a sandy river-bed is still a river-bed. For him, the unity that can
persist through change can persist even through open-ended, non-cyclical
change.61

But w here Shiner sees a sh arp co n trast w ith an ultra-conservative construal

o f H eraclitus on which th e river bed is unchanging, we can also see a strik ­
ing congruence w ith th e first, conservative river im age, the im age w hich ac­
com odates b oth change and persistence. F o r on this view also, change is
possible only against a b ack g ro u n d ; in talking o f change one m ust hold
som e things co n sta n t, at least fo r the present. A fu rth e r point o f congruence
betw een b o th o f W ittgenstein’s river im ages an d the H eraclitean im ages is
th eir insistence o n the indeterm inacy o f th e w orld we live in, the im possibili­
ty o f fully grasping it in language. But while the early W ittgenstein explains
this in term s o f the fleeting ch aracter o f present experience, continually car­
ried aw ay by the river o f tim e, th e later W ittgenstein points to th e prim acy
o f the back g ro u n d and its in d eterm in acy .66 T hus, for very different
reasons, both th e early an d the late W ittgenstein are driven to the H eracli­
tean conclusion th a t the n atu re o f language can only be show n. In the Trac­
ta tes, this leads to a conception o f philosophy o n w hich the n atu re o f
language, logic and the w orld m ust be accepted as a given; b ut in W ittgen­
stein’s later w ork, the view th a t the n atu re o f language can only be show n is
illustrated by a close exam ination o f o u r linguistic practice:

Am 1 not getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be
described? You must look at the praxis o f language, then you will sec it.67

D a vid G. Stern
U niversity o f Iow a

NOTES

1. This paper is dedicated to the memory of George Myro. Previous drafts wer
read as a George Myro Memorial Lecture at University of California, Berkeley, in
April 1990 and at Tulanc University, in November 1990. Earlier versions were read at
598 DAVID G. STERN

the University o f Alberta in 1988 and the University o f Iowa in 1989.1 would like to
thank those audiences and also Marianne Constable, Jim Duerlingcr, Sabine Gttlz,
Nancy Mullcnax, Geeta Patel, Maureen Robertson, Ted Schatzki, Roger Shiner,
Hans Sluga and Gucnter Zoellcr, for their constructive criticism.
2. Here 1 make use o f Charles Kahn’s wording in his introduction to “ On Plato
and Heraclitus” Proceedings o f (he Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy
1 (1985). 241.
3. Oxford Dictionary o f Quotations, p. 246. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
3rd ed’n., 1979.)
4. See G. S. Kirk, “ Natural Change in Heraclitus,” M ind 60 (1951), 35-42;
Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments pp. 366-84 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1954). See also K. Reinhardt "H eraklits Lehrc vom Feuer” H erm esll (1942),
1-27 and “ Heraclitea” Hermes 77 (1942), 225-48. Roger Shiner’s pioneering and
valuable discussion “ Wittgenstein and Heraclitus: two river images” (Philosophy 49
(1974], 191-97) is constrained by the assumption that Kirk’s interpretation is ac­
curate. This is a much contested issue; cf. G. Vlastos’ reply to Kirk, “ On
Heraclitus,” American Journal o f Philology’l l (1955), 337-68 and W. K. Guthrie, A
History o f Creek Philosophy, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1962), 488-92.
5. S. Kripke Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1980).
6. Plato, Cratylus, 402b. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Plato: The Collected
Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1963).
7. Plato, Cratylus, 411c.
8. L. Wittgenstein, Zettel, #459. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombc and G. H. von
Wright, translated by G. E. M. Anscombc. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2nd cd’n., 1981).
MS 110, p. 155. (May or June 1931). While the quotations from Wittgenstein’s
published writings in this paper are based on the available translations, they are
sometimes rather more literal.
9. See G. H. von Wright “ A Biographical Sketch” in N. Malcolm Ludwig Witt­
genstein: A Memoir p. 19. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).
10. Wittgenstein referred to passages in Plato quite frequently. There are
references to the Theaetetus in the Blue Book (p. 20), the Philosophical Investiga-
tions(K 46, #48, #518); and the Philosophical Grammar (pp. 120ff., 137, 164,208).
There are also references to the Sophist and the Philebus in the Grammar (pp. 56,
141) and a reference to the Cratylus in the unpublished Big Typescript (TS 213, p.
40).
Full references for the books o f Wittgenstein’s cited above are as follows:
Preliminary studies fo r the “Philosophical Investigations” generally known as
“ The Blue and Brown Books, ” hereafter either Blue Book or Brown Book. (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2nd ed’n., 1969). Philosophical Investigations, edited by G. E. M.
Anscombe and R. Rhces, translated by G. E. M. Anscombc. (Oxford: Blackwell,
2nd ed’n., 1967). German text and English translation by A. Kenny. (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1974).
References to Wittgenstein’s typescripts and manuscripts are the numbering
system in G. H. von Wright’s catalogue o f the Wittgenstein papers, originally
published in the Philosophical Review, vol. 78 (1969), 483-503. The latest revisions
 HERACLITUS’ AND WITTGENSTEIN’S RIVER IMAGES 599

can be found in the version published in S. Shanker Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical

Assessments (Wolfeboro, NH: Croom Helm, 1986) vol. 5, pp. 1-21.
11. M. O ’C. Drury “ Conversations with Wittgenstein” in R. Rhees (ed.) Ludwig
Wittgenstein: Persona! Recollections (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1981) p.
163. Shortly afterward, Wittgenstein sent a copy o f a translation of the Theaetetus to
Drury.
12. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 14. (1931). Edited by G. H. von Wright,
trans. P. Winch. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).
13. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 30. (1937).
14. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ft66.
15. Wittgenstein, TS 302, p. 14. (1930-32). The German reads:
Ich kann meinen Standpunkt nicht besser charactcrisicrcn, als indem ich sage, dass cr dcr
cntcgcgensetztc Standpunkt dessen ist, wclchen Sokrates in den platonischen Dialogen
vertritt. Dcnn wtlrde ich gefragt, was Erkenntnis sei, so wUrde ich Erkenntnisse aufzahlen
und die Worte ‘und Ahnliches’ hinzufUgen. Es ist kein gemeinsamer Bestandteil in ihnen
alien zu ftnden, weil es keinen gibt.
16. For an extensive list of authors Wittgenstein read and referred to, see Garth
Hallctt, A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (Ithaca, NY &
London: Cornell University Press, 1977) pp. 759-75.
17. Charles H. Kahn, The A rt and Thought o f Heraclitus (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1979) pp. 53, 289. The fragment numbers follow the standard
numbering system in Hermann Diels and Walter Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vor-
sokratiker, vol. 1, ch. 22, sec. B. (Berlin, 1952 (10th ed’n.))
18. See Reinhardt, “ Heraklits Lehre vom Feuer” p. 17ff.
19. Diogenes Laertius, Lives o f the Philosophers IX, trans. J. Barnes Early Greek
Philosophy (New York: Penguin, 1987) pp. 116-17.
20. Kirk, “ Natural Change in Heraclitus," pp. 40ff.
21. Plato, Cratylus, 439c.
22. See Theaetetus, 156ff. and especially 181d-3c.
23. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV.5, 1010al0-14. The Basic Works o f Aristotle, cd.
Richard McKcon, trans. W. D. Ross (New York: Random House, 1941) pp.
746-47.
24. Plato, Theaetetus, 152d-e. Trans. John McDowell. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1973).
25. Plato, Theaetetus, 179d-180a.
26. G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven and M. Schofield The Presocratic Philosophers (Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed’n., 1983) p. 187.
27. Kirk, Raven and Schofield, p. 209. The fragment is from Plutarch, Why the
Pythia N o Longer Prophesies in Verse, 404. See Kahn, The A rt and Thought o f
Heraclitus, pp. 123-24.
28. See U. HOlscher “ Heraklit" in Anftinglisches Fragen: Studien zur friihen
griechischen Philosophic (Gottingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1968) pp. 130-72.
There is a partial translation of this material in "Paradox, Simile and Gnomic Ut­
terance in Heraclitus” in A. P. D. Mourelatos, The Pre-Socratics: A Collection o f
Critical Essays (New York: Anchor Books, 1974) pp. 229-40.
29. Plutarch, Why the Pythia N o Longer Prophesies in Verse, 404. Trans.
Jonathan Barnes in Early Greek Philosophy, pp. 118-19.
600 DAVID G. STERN

30. B60. Kahn, The A rt and Thought o f Heraclitus, p. 75.

31. Plato, Theaetetus 189; Wittgenstein quotes both paragraphs in TS 228
(Bermerkungen I), a typescript drawn up as a source for the final arrangement of
Part 1 of the Philosophical Investigations. The first is quoted in Philosophical In­
vestigations, #518; the second in Philosophical Grammar ft 90. MS 114, p. 134. In
Zettel ft 69, Geach erroneously inserted the first passage, to precede a copy of Witt­
genstein’s discussion of the second passage. The translations of Wittgenstein’s
quotations from Plato are from the German translation Wittgenstein used (Preisen-
danz), not the original Greek. Cf. Philosophical Grammar ft 114 and Blue Book pp.
36-39, esp. p. 38.
32. L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 2.02, 2.026-7, 3.202, 3.221.
Translated by C. K. Ogden. (New York: Routlcdgc & Kcgan Paul, 2nd ed’n., 1933).
33. Philosophical Investigations, #46. 1936 or earlier. Cf. Philosophical Gram­
mar, p. 208ff. The standard pagination for Socrates’ dream is 201d-202c.
Further exploration of the connections between Wittgenstein’s changing treat­
ment of the nature of language and the issues raised by the quotations from the
Theaetetus in this section will have to be left for another occasion. One would also
need to consider the anticipations o f logical atomism in the discussion of the thesis
that the “ essence o f speech is composition o f names’’ in the Cratylus. See also: D.
Bolton, A n Approach to Wittgenstein's Philosophy, ch. 4, a provocative and il­
luminating discussion o f Wittgenstein, Plato and Heraclitus on truth and judgement.
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979). J. Bogen Wittgenstein’s
Philosophy o f Language: Some Aspects o f its Development (London: Routlcdgc &
Kcgan Paul, 1972) pp. 6ff., 62. 74ff., on Wittgenstein and Plato on the objects of
thought. M. Burnycat’s introduction to The Theaetetus o f Plato (Indianapolis, IN:
Hackctt. 1990) includes a section on “ Wittgenstein and the Dream" pp. 149-64, and
a bibliography pp. 247-48.
34. I defend this interpretation in my Wittgenstein on Mind and Language (Ox­
ford: Clarendon Press, forthcoming).
35. Wittgenstein, MS 107, pp. 158-59. (10-11 October 1929). The German reads:
Ich fQhlc heute eine so besondere Armut an Problemen um mich; cin sichcres
Zcichcn dass vor mir die wichtigsten und hartesten Problcmc liegen.
11.10
Das unmittelbarc ist in staltdigem Fluss begriffen. (Es hat tatsachlich die Form cincs
Stroms).
Es ist ganz klar, dass wenn man hier das Letzte sagen will, man eben auf die Grenzc
der Sprachc kommen muss, die es ausdrllckt.
36. Wittgenstein, Big Typescript, #96, p. 448. (1932-33). The German reads:
Die Vcrschwommcnhcit, Unbestimmthcit unscrcr SinncseindrOcke ist nicht etwas.
dem sich abhclfen lasst, cine Vcrschwommcnhcit, der auch vollige Sch&rfe entspricht
(oder entgegensteht). Vielmchr ist diesc allgcmcinc Unbestimmthcit, Ungreifbarkeit,
dieses Schwimmen der SinnescindrUckc, das, was mit dem Worte “ alles flicsst"
bezeichnet worden ist.

37. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, #213 (1930). Edited by R. Rhees,

translated by R. Hargraves and R. White. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975). German edi­
tion: Philosophische Bemerkungen. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1964).
 HERACLITUS* AND WITTGENSTEIN’S RIVER IMAGES 601

38. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, #54 (1930).

39. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, #54(1930). In the source manuscript,
the next sentence reads: “ And this application of language is the verification of the
propositions.” The German reads: “ Und dieses Anlegen der Sprache ist die
Verifikation der Satze.” (MS 108, p. 1).
40. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, #48 (1930). Cf. MS 107, p. 222 (1
December, 1929). He rejects a verificationist account o f the relation between
language and experience shortly afterward; see Zettel, #436, written in 1931 (MS
112, p. 230).
In the unpublished chapter on Idealism in the Big Typescript (1932-33), this
passage is presented in scare quotes, prefaced by the words “ A thought about the
represcntability o f immediate reality through language” : with the clear implication
that it’s a thought to be avoided (TS 213, # 102, p. 496). The German reads: “ Ein
Gedankc liber die Darstellbarkeit der unmittelbaren Realitat durch die Sprache:”
41. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 8. MS 110, p. 10. (December 1930).
42. Broken underlining in a typescript, corresponding to wavy underlining in a
manuscript, was Wittgenstein’s way o f indicating that he was not satisfied with his
choice of words.
43. Wittgenstein, MS 110, pp. 33-35. The penultimate paragraph is an early ver­
sion of the third paragraph o f Philosophical Investigations #435. The German
reads:
Dass alles fiicsst schcint uns am Ausdruck der Wahrheit zu hindern, denn es ist als ob
wir sic nicht auffassen kOnnten da sic uns entgleitet.
Abcr es hindert uns eben nicht am Ausdruck. —Was es heisst, ctwas cntfiichendes in
der Beschrcibung festhaltcn zu wollcn. wissen wir. Das gescheiht etwa, wenn wir das cine
vergessen, w&hrend wir das andcrc bcschrcibcn wollen. Aber darum handelt cs sich doch
hicr nicht. Und so ist das Wort "cntfiichcn’' anzuwenden.
Wir fOhren die WOrter von ihrer metaphysischen wiedcr auf ihre richtige Vcrwcn-
dung in der Sprache zurlick.
Der Mann, der sagte, man konne nicht zweimal in den gleichcn Fluss stcigen, sagte
etwas falsches. Man kann zweimal in den gleichen Fluss steigen.
Und so sieht die LOsung allcr philosophischcn Schwierigkeitcn aus. Ihre Antwortcn
mOssen wenn sie richtig sind hausbacken und gcwbhnlich sein. Aber man muss sie nur im
richtigcn Geist anschauen dann maejit dasnichts^
Aber auf die Antwort “T)u weisst ja wie es der Satz macht, es ist ja nichts verborgen”
mOchte man sagen: " Ja, aber es fiicsst alles so rasch vortlber und ich mdehte cs gleichsam
breiter auseinandergclcgt schen.”
Aber auch hicr irren wir uns. Denn cs geschicht dabei auch nichts was uns durch die
Gcschwindigkcit entgeht.
44. Wittgenstein, Blue Book, p. 46. (1933-34).
45. Wittgenstein, Zettel, #459. MS 110, p. 155. (May or June 1931).
46. Plato, Theaetetus, 182d. Trans. John McDowell. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1973).
47.
Socrates: We were eager to show that all things change, so that it might become clear that
that answer was correct. But what has in fact become clear is, apparently, that if all things
do change, then every answer, whatever it’s about, is equally correct: both that things are
602 DAVID G. STERN

so and (hai they're not so, or if you like, both that things come to be so and that they
come to be not so, so as not to bring those people to a standstill by what we say.
Theodorus: You're right.
Socrates: Yes, Theodorus, except that I said “ so” and “ not so.” One oughtn’t even to
use this word "so," because what’s so wouldn't any longer be changing; and, again, one
oughtn’t to use "not so." because that isn't a change either. No. those who state that
theory must establish some other language, because as things are they haven’t got expres­
sions for their hypothesis: unless, perhaps, “ not even so,” said in an indefinite sense,
might suit them best.
—Plato, Theaeteius, 183a~b.
48. Wittgenstein, Big Typescript, #91, p. 427. (1932-33). Cf. Philosophical
Remarks, If 54, quoted in section 6, above. The German reads:
Was zum Wesen dcr Welt gehOrt. kann die Sprache nicht ausdrllchen. Dahcr kann
sic nicht sagen, dass Alles fliesst. Nur was wir uns auch anders vorstcllcn kOnntcn, kann
die Sprache sagen.
49. Wittgenstein, Big Typescript, #91.2, p. 427. (1932-33).
Dass Alles fliesst, muss im Wesen der BerUhrung der Sprache mit der Wirklichkcit
liegen. Oder besscr: dass Alles fliesst, muss im Wesen der Sprache liegen.
50. Wittgenstein, Early Investigations, #111 (113). An unpublished typescript,
edited by G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman (University of Helsinki, Helsinki:
photocopy, 1979). For further information, see von Wright’s paper "T he Origin and
Composition o f the Philosophical Investigations?' in his Wittgenstein (Minneapolis,
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1982). Wittgenstein composed the Early In­
vestigations during the period from 1936 to 1938. All three paragraphs were first
drafted during 1930-31; they arc from the first stratum o f drafts which ultimately led
to the published Philosophical Investigations. Many of these remarks are about
philosophical method and the nature of language. For the first paragraph, see In­
vestigations, # l!6 b , which is based on the first sentence alone. For the second
paragraph, sec Investigations # 118. The first two sentences were composed in 1931
(MS 112, p. 229) and arc also in the Big Typescript, #88; the last was added in 1937
(MS 157b, p. 33). For the third paragraph, sec Investigations #119 and MS 108, p.
247 (1930). The German reads:
Wir fOhrcn die WOrtcr von ihrer mctaphysischen, wieder auf ihre alltflglichc Vcrwen-
dung zurtlck. (Der Mann, der sagte, man kOnne nicht zweimal in den gkichen Fluss
steigen, sagte etwas Falsches; man kann zweimal in den gkichen Fluss steigen. —Und ein
Gegenstand hOrt manchmal auf zu existieren, wenn ich aufhOre ihn zu sehen, und
manchmal nicht. —Und wir wissen manchmal, welchc Farbe der andere sicht, wenn er
diesen Gegenstand bctrachtct, und manchmal nicht). Und so sieht die LOsung alter
philosophischcn Schwierigkciten aus. Unscre AntwOrten mUssen, wenn sie richtig sind,
gcwOhnliche und trivialc scin. —Denn diese Antwortcn machen sich glcichsam Qbcr die
Fragen lustig.
Woher nimmt die Betrachtung ihre Wichtigkeit, da sie doch nur alks Intercssante,
d.h. alles Grosse und wichtige, zu zerstOren scheint? (Glcichsam alle Bauwcrke; indem sic
nur Steinbrocken und Schutt Ubrig lasst). Aber es sind nur Luftgcbaude, die wir
zerstOren, und wir kgen den Grund der Sprache frei, auf dem sie standen.
 HERACLITUS’ AND WITTGENSTEIN’S RIVER IMAGES 603

Die Ergebnisse der Philosophic sind die Entdeckung irgendeines schlichten Unsinns
und Beulen, die sich der Verstand beim rennen an das Ende (alternate word, also in text:
Grcnze] der Sprachc geholt hat. Sic, die Beulen, lassen uns den Wert jener Entdeckung
crkcnncn.
51. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #116. Cf. Big Typescript,
#91.15-18, pp. 429-30.
52. Wittgenstein, Big Typescript, #89, p. 419. (1932-33). The German reads:
Das Lernen der Philosophic ist wirklich ein RQckeninnern. Wir erinnern uns, dass
wir die Worte wirklich auf diese Weise gebraucht haben.
Cf. Philosophical Investigations # 127: “ The work o f the philosopher consists in
assembling reminders for a particular purpose.” Wittgenstein “ once observed in a
lecture that there was a similarity between his conception of philosophy . . . and the
Socratic doctrine that knowledge is reminiscence; although he believed there were
other things involved in the latter.” Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, p.
44.
53. Wittgenstein, MS 116, p. 178. From a typescript prepared by H. Nyman, p.
80, # #352-53. (Helsinki: University o f Helsinki, photocopy 1982). 1937-38. The se­
cond remark is an early version of Philosophical Investigations # 248. The German
reads:
Statt: “ man kann nicht", sage: “es gibt in diesem Spiel nicht” : Statt "man kann im
Damespiel nicht rochieren” —"es gibi in Damespiel kein Rochieren"; statt "ich kann
mcine Empfindung nicht vorzeigen” —"es gibt in der Verwendung von *kh habe die
Empfindung . . . * kein Vorzeigen dessen, was ‘man hat’ "; statt "man kann nicht allc
Kardinalzahlen aufzahlen’’—"es gibt hier kein Aufzahlcn aller Glieder. wenn auch ein
Aufzahlcn von Glicdcrn” .
Der Satz "Empfindungen sind privat” is von der Art: Patience spiclt man allcin.
54. Cf. On Certainty, ft #617-18 on the idea that "th e possibility of a language-
game is conditioned by certain facts” and # #318-21 on the lack of a sharp boun­
dary between rules and empirical propositions, especially #321:
Isn't what I am saying: any empirical proposition can be transformed into a
postulate—and then becomes a norm of representation. But I am suspicious even of this.
The sentence is too general. One almost wants to say “ any empirical proposition can.
theoretically, be transformed . . . ” , but what does "theoretically" mean here? It sounds
all too reminiscent of the Tractatus.
L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von
Wright, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe and D. Paul. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969).
55. Wittgenstein, Zettel, ft ft 130-35. In the collection of fragments which form the
basis for the published work, the previously quoted paragraph (# 134) is typewritten,
while the remainder of the remark (# # 130-34 and ft ft 135-37) is a handwritten addi­
tion to the sheet.
56. Zettel, ft 174. (1948). Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright,
translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). See
also Remarks on the Philosophy o f Psychology, vol. I ft 240.
57. L. Wittgenstein Last Writings on the Philosophy o f Psychology, vol. I:
Preliminary studies fo r part II o f the “Philosophical Investigations,” #913. Early
604 DAVID G. STERN

1949. Edited by G. H. von Wright & H. Nyman, translated by C. G. Luckhardt &

M. A. E. Auc. (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1982).
58. MS 169, p. 47; “ On the ‘Inner* and the ‘Outer’,” p. 38. 1948-49. Unpub­
lished typescript prepared by G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman (University of Hel­
sinki, photocopy, 1983). The German reads:
Auch was im Innern vorgcht hat nur im Fluss des Lebens Bcdcutung.
59. Cf. Malcolm’s use o f Wittgenstein’s later references to the stream of life to
draw a sharp contrast between his earlier and later philosophy in the Epilogue to
Nothing Is Hidden. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). Unaware o f this ambiguity, he has
insisted that “ ‘Words have their meaning only in the flow o f life’ is not a possible
remark within the framework o f the Tractatus" (p. 238).
60. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, tt #94-99. 1950.
61. Sec Philosophical Investigations, #25, #142, the remark without a number
on p. 56 and p. 230.
62. Remarks on the Philosophy o f Psychology, I #630. The last sentence is an
early version of a remark in Philosophical Investigations, l i p . 226.
63. Cf. Searle, Intentionally: A n essay in the Philosophy o f Mind, p. 148: " I f we
try to spell out the relevant parts of the Background as a set o f sentences expressing
further semantic contents, that would simply require yet further Backgrounds for
their comprehension.’’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Searlc’s
clear and straightforward exposition o f what he calls the “ preintentional” character
o f our skills, practices and habits in ch. 5 is impressive, although his insistence that
the Background is not primarily social or biological, but consists of mental
phenomena, strikes me as a case o f shutting the vat door after the horse has bolted.
64. Cf. Philosophical Investigations #131:
For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the
model as what it is, as an object of comparison, as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a
preconceived idea to which reality must correspond. (The dogmatism into which we fall
so easily in doing philosophy).
65. Shiner “ Wittgenstein and Heraclitus: Two River-Images,’’ p. 197.
66. “ If a pattern of life is the basis for the use o f a word then the word must con­
tain some amount o f indefiniteness. The pattern o f life, after all, is not one o f exact
regularity.” Last Writings on the Philosophy o f Psychology, I #211; cf. # #243-47.
67. On Certainty, #501.