ACTIONS/CAUSE OF ACTION/CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM

SHOPPING/CERTIORARI

13.JESUS GARCIA vs. Hon. RAY ALAN DRILON

GR No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 9262 was enacted, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women
and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor,
and for Other Purposes.” It defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their
children (VAWC) perpetrated by women’s intimate partners, such as husband, former husband, or
any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common
child.

Private Respondent Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed for herself and in behalf of her minor
children, a petition before the RTC for the issuance of Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against
her husband, Jesus Garcia, pursuant to RA 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse;
emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner, Jesus Garcia, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and financial support.
Petitioner, as described by the private respondent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute
obedience from his wife and children, jealous guy, have an illicit affair with a manager of a bank,
everytime they will argue petitioner will physically hurt the wife and the children. Worst, petitioner
deprived the private respondent of her right to their businesses. The RTC, finding reasonable ground
to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private respondent and her children exists
or is about to recur, it issued a TPO effective for thirty days ordering, among others, that the
petitioner should stay away from the petitioner and her children, not to harass, annoy, contact or
otherwise communicate with the Petitioner. Later on, upon motion by Rosalie, the trial court issued
an amended TPO, effective for 30 days it added, among others, to give monthly support to the wife
and children.

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully
comply with the TPO; and committed new acts if harassment against her their children, Rosalie filed
another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte which was granted by the trial court effective
for 30 days. The said TPO was extended by the trial court for another ten (10) days, and gave
petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed,
extended, or modified. However, petitioner claimed that he did not receive a copy of the Motion to
Modify/Renew the TPO, hence, the court ordered that he will be furnish with a copy of said motion.
Petitioner failed to comment on the Motion for Renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an
“exercise in futility.”

While the case is pending in the trial court, Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA)
a petition for prohibition, with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses.

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The appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the enforcement of
the TPO including the amended TPOs. However, the appellate court dismissed the petition for
failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue before the trial court in the civil case.

Hence, petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the unconstitutionality of a statue is a cause of action.

RULING:

No. The unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a
counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint.

Petitioner should have raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition
Protection Order before the RTC. Section 20 of A.M. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against
Women and their Children, provides that respondent may file an opposition to the petition and
respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate
civil action.

The Supreme Court cannot subscribe to the theory of Petitioner Jesus Garcia that, since a
counterclaim, cross-claim and third party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue
of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is any claim for money or other
relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A crossclaim, on the other hand,
is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. A third-party complaint is a
claim that a defending party, may with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action
for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim. Since,
unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action; therefore, it is not prohibited from being
raised in the opposition, which the petitioner failed to do.

14. CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS vs. JUANITA REYES, et.al.

GR No. 185891, June 26, 2013

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals. This case started as a complaint for damages filed by respondents Reyeses against Cathay
Pacific Airways (Cathay Pacific and Sampaguita Travel.

Wilfredo Reyes made a travel reservation with Sampaguita Travel for his family’s trip to
Adelaide, Australia. Upon booking and confirmation of their flight schedule, he paid for the airfare

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and was issued a Cathay Pacific round-trip plane ticket. Wilfredo Reyes, his wife, son and Sixta Lapu,
his mother-in-law flew to Adelaide, Australia. One week before they scheduled to fly back home,
Wilfredo confirmed his family’s return flighty with the Cathay Pacififc office and he was advised that
the reservation was “still okay as scheduled.” However, on the day of departure, Wilfredo and his
family were informed that Reyeses did not have confirmed reservations, only Sixta’s flight was
confirmed. But due to pleas of Wilfredo, they were allowed to board the flight to HongKong. When
they arrived in HongKong, they were informed of the same problem, but this time, they were not
allowed to board because the flight was fully booked. Only Sixta was allowed to proceed to Manila
from HongKong. When Wiflredo and his wife and son were allowed to fly back home, he went to
Sampaguita Travel to report the incident and he was informed that it was actually Cathay Pacific
which cancelled their bookings. Wilfredo informed Cathay Pacific regarding the incident and
demanding payment of damages. After failure to settle the problem, respondents, including Sixta
filed a Complaint for damages against Cathay Pacific and Sampaguita Travel. In its answer, Cathay
Pacific claimed, among others, a cross-claim against Sampaguita and blamed the same for the
cancellation of respondents’ return flights. On the other hand, Sampaguita Travel denied the
allegations of Cathay and blamed Cathay for the cancellation.

After trial, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit and likewise dismissed the
counterclaims and cross-claims by Cathay. The trial court found that respondents were in possession
of valid tickets but did not have confirmed reservations for their return trip to Manila. However, it
did not find any basis to establish liability on the part of either Cathay Pacific or Sampaguita Travel.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ordered Cathay to pay
respondents nominal damages.

Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration, Cathay Pacific filed the instant petition for
review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Sixta Lapuz had cause of action against Cathay Pacific or
Sampaguita Travel.

RULING:

No. It bears pointing out that respondent Sixta Lapuz had no cause of action against Cathay
Pacific or Sampaguita Travel.

The elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff; (2) a duty
on the part of the defendant to respect the plaintiff’s right; and (3) an act or omission of the
defendant in violation of such right.

As culled from the records, there has been no violation of any right or breach of any duty on
the part of Cathay Pacific and Sampaguita Trave. As a holder of a valid booking, Sixta had the right
to expect that she would fly on the flight and on the date specified on her airplane ticket. Cathay

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Pacific met her expectations and Sixta was indeed able to complete her flight without any trouble.
The absence of any violation to Sixta’s right as passenger effectively deprived her of any relief against
either Cathay Pacific or Sampaguita Travel.

APPEALS/DOCKET FEES/CERTIORARI/MODES OF DISCOVERY

15. INTERNATIONAL HOTEL CORP. vs. FRANCISCO JOAQUIN JR. and RAFAEL
SUAREZ.
GR No. 158361, April 10, 2013

FACTS:

This is Petition for Review on Certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Respondent Joaquin Jr., submit a proposal to the Board of Directors of the International
Hotel Corporation (IHC) for him to render technical assistance in securing a foreign loan for the
construction of a hotel. Phase 1 to Phase 6 of the proposal was approved and respondents were paid
of their services rendered. Subsequently, Joaquin was able to negotiate to foreign a financier which is
Barnes International (Barnes). Pending the negotiation with Barnes, IHC negotiate with another
financier which is Weston. However, Joaquin was not able to secure the needed loan, IHC, canceled
the shares of stock issued to Joaquin and Suarez as payment for their services.

Consequently, Joaquin Jr. and Suarez filed an action for specific performance, annulment,
damages and injunction impleading IHC and its Board of Directors. The complaint alleged among
others that the cancellation of the shares had been illegal. The RTC decided the case in favor of
Joaquin Jr. and Suarez. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA concurred with the
RTC, upholding IHC’s liability under Art. 1186 of the Civil Code. It ruled that in the context of
Article 1234 of the Civil Code, Joaquin had substantially performed his obligation and had become
entitled to be paid for his services.

IHC appealed to the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA. Joaquin filed a
comment arguing among others that the petition was fatally defective for raising questions of facts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not IHC’s Petition improperly raised question of fact.

RULING:

Considering that what IHC seeks to review is the CA’s application of the law on the facts
presented therein, there is no doubt that IHC raises questions of law and not fact.

A question of law exists when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
but, in contrast, a question of fact exists when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the facts

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alleged. When there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusion
drawn from the facts is correct is a question of law.

The basic issue posed here is whether the conclusions drawn by the CA were correct under
the pertinent laws.

Article 1186 and Article 1234 of the Civil Code cannot be the source of IHC’s obligation to
pay respondents. The argument of IHC that it should not be held liable because it was Joaquin who
had recommended Barnes and IHC’s negotiation with Barnes had been neither intentional to prevent
Joaquin from complying with his obligations. Such argument is meritorious.

The Supreme Court discusses Art. 1186 and Art, 1234. Article 1186 provides that the
condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment. This
provision refers to the constructive fulfillment of a suspensive condition which has two
requirements, namely: (a) the intent of the obligor to prevent the fulfillment of the condition, and (b)
the actual prevention of the fulfillment. Mere intention without actually preventing the fulfillment is
insufficient. The error lies in the CA’s failure to determine IHC’s intent to preempt Joaquin from
meeting his obligations. IHC only relied on the opinion of its consultants in deciding to transact with
Materials Handling and later on, with Barnes. In negotiating with Barnes, IHC had no intention to
prevent Joaquin and Suarez from meeting their undertaking. Such absence of any intention negated
the basis for the CA’s reliance on Article 1186.

Article 1234 applies only when the obligor admits breaching the contract after honestly and
faithfully performing all the material elements thereof except for some technical aspects that cause no
serious harm to the obligee. IHC correctly submits that the provision refers to an omission or
deviation that is slight, or technical and unimportant, and does not affect the real purpose of the
contract. All the steps that Joaquin and Suarez undertook to accomplish had a single objective, to
obtain a loan to fund the construction and eventual operation of the hotel of IHC. Joaquin himself
admitted that his assistance was specifically sought to seek finance for IHC’s hotel project. Whatever
benefits IHC gained from their services could only be minimal, and were even probably outweighed
by whatever losses IHC suffered from the delayed construction of its hotel. Consequently, Article
1234 did not apply.

Notwithstanding the inapplicability of Article 1186 and Article 1234 of the Civil Code, IHC
was liable based on the nature of obligation.