Professional Documents
Culture Documents
University of Calgary
Dr. J. K. Donlevy
EDUC 525-01
Before demonstrating the negligence of Lindsay Waterman, Amanda Ballard, and Prim
Irwin, it is important to establish certain assumptions arising from the hypothetical, namely: (i)
the fact that Lindsay Waterman dismissed her class at 3:00 p.m. does not negate the fact that the
time of the accident (3:05 p.m.) occurred during official school hours, which ordinarily ends at
3:30 p.m. and (ii) the physical education activity at Marabelle Resort Golf Course was a school-
sponsored activity.
Lindsay Waterman, the supervising teacher for the school-sponsored activity, acted in a
negligent manner and this caused the damages to the plaintiff. The duty of care of a teacher to
their students is laid out in Section 18(f) of the School Act, which states that a teacher providing
instruction or supervision must “maintain, under the direction of the principal, order and
discipline among the students while they are in the school or on the school grounds and while
they are attending or participating in activities sponsored or approved by the board” (School Act,
2000, p. 26). The principle of in loco parentis also plays a role as Waterman held the
The second element of negligence is the standard of care provided. A careful and diligent
person would have upheld the School District Policy, which states that a student cannot transport
Waterman should not have let Ballard drive another student from the facility and should have
ensured all students had safe transportation to the off-campus facility and back to the school.
Waterman failed to uphold the standard of care that a reasonable and prudent parent would
drive another student from a school-sponsored activity, Waterman could have foreseen an
accident occurring. Driving is widely perceived as a dangerous activity, especially for younger
and inexperienced motorists, and Waterman could have foreseen the inherent risks. It is probable
that Waterman could have anticipated a motor vehicle accident happening as her students drove
back to the school. As established by Bain V. Calgary Board of Education (1993), a teacher can
be found negligent even when students are not being directly supervised at the time of an
accident.
The fourth element of negligence is causation. But for the teacher’s action of allowing the
students to break district policy regarding driving other students to and from events, outside of
the city, the damages to the plaintiff would not have occurred. A reasonable person would have
ensured all students had safe transportation back to the school, and not permitted students to
break district policy. As established by Hoar V. Nanaimo (1984), a teacher can be found
negligent for injuries caused by students utilising dangerous machinery unsafely. An automobile
certainly fulfils the requirements to be considered dangerous machinery, and Waterman failed to
The final element necessary for negligence to be proven is establishment of damages. The
damages resulting from this accident were both pecuniary and non-pecuniary. The injuries were
catastrophic, leaving Irwin quadriplegic, which would not only cause pain and suffering,
physical impairments, emotional and mental distress and the like, but also adversely affects
Irwin’s prospects for employment, education and pursuits that may have physical, emotional and
mental demands. The injury that was sustained by the plaintiff, Irwin, lead to her becoming a
quadriplegic as a direct result of the accident. The injuries sustained by the plaintiff can be
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EDUC 525: The Law Assignment
described as catastrophic as she is now paralyzed; lacking motor function in all four of her limbs.
The principle status quo ante, dictates that objective must be to return Irwin to the state she
enjoyed before the accident. As this is medically impossible, and damages paid must reflect the
enormous impact the accident has had and will continue to have on her life.
In terms of defences Waterman may invoke, Volenti non fit injuria does not apply. As a
minor, it is impossible for the plaintiff to willingly cede her right to bring claim against a
negligent party. Irwin could not have voluntarily assumed risk as she is a minor and therefore
unable to process and assess risk in the same manner as an adult. Additionally, as a minor, Irwin
does not have a limitation period with regards to seeking remedial action through tort. Therefore,
Waterman is unable to utilise the Limitation of Action defence. Waterman does have access to
the defence of contributory negligence, as both Ballard and Irwin played a role in the negligent
Ballard, as the operator of the vehicle, contributed to the causation of injury. Ballard
possessed a duty of care towards her passenger, the plaintiff Irwin. As laid out in the Traffic
Safety Act Vehicle Equipment Regulation (2009) section 82(3), a person shall not drive a vehicle
that has a seat belt in the passenger seat unless the passenger in that seat is wearing the complete
seat belt assembly and is over 6 years of age and younger than 16 years. Ballard was directly
responsible for her passenger’s safety. Additionally, the standard of care provided by Ballard as
driver of the vehicle was insufficient. A reasonable person would not allow a passenger to sit in a
seat with an inoperative seat belt while driving a vehicle. Ballard failed to uphold the standard of
care to keep all occupants inside her vehicle safe, allowing her passenger to ride without an
operational seatbelt as well as through her careless driving. A reasonable person would also have
abided by School District and School policy which forbade students driving other students to or
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EDUC 525: The Law Assignment
from school-sponsored events. In breaking this rule, Ballard failed further to uphold the standard
of care owed to the plaintiff. With regards to foreseeability, Ballard could have foreseen an
functioning seatbelt in the front passenger side, Ballard could have foreseen greater risks to her
passenger. In assuming the role of driver, Ballard accepted vicarious liability for any injuries to
Irwin that may have resulted from her driving. Ballard’s actions caused the injuries to Irwin, but
for Ballard’s action of violating district and school policy (driving another student) and driving
carelessly, the damages to Irwin would not have occurred. Additionally, but for Ballard’s action
of permitting the plaintiff to utilise a car seat with a faulty seatbelt, the damages would likely not
have been so catastrophic. As established above, the damages to Irwin were severe and life-
changing.
Irwin, as all individuals do, possessed a duty of care towards herself. The standard of this
care, such as a reasonable person would hold by not placing oneself into dangerous situations
and wilfully neglecting proper use of functioning safety equipment. Irwin had overheard a
conversation regarding the faulty seatbelt, and furthermore an accident reconstruction expert
found no evidence of the seatbelt being used by Irwin. Although a minor, Irwin nevertheless
could have foreseen the risks due to failure to wearing a seatbelt. It cannot be proven that Irwin
caused the accident itself, but she did contribute to the extent of the damages through negligence.
Irwin’s action of opening the sunroof during the return trip to the school further contributed to
her injuries as she was later ejected from the vehicle through this egress.But for Irwin’s decisions
to fail to use a functioning seatbelt, and to open the vehicle’s sunroof, her injuries would not
We conclude upon the evidence presented in the case that negligence on the part of
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Waterman, with contributory negligence from Ballard and Irwin, caused the damages to the
plaintiff. We back this conclusion based on the foreseen damages clause in which that we believe
the teacher, the victim, and the student driver had the opportunity to assess the situation and
Waterman is liable for the plaintiff's injuries due to her failure to uphold a proper
standard of care, through failure to follow district and school policy. Waterman did not diligently
assess the situation (such as inspecting Ballard’s vehicle), as a reasonable and prudent parent
would have. She could have foreseen the inherent danger in allowing Ballard to drive another
student back to the school. In addition to failing to uphold her duty of care to the standard of a
reasonable person, Waterman directly caused the damages to the plaintiff by allowing a violation
of the student driver policy. Ballard is contributorily liable for the damages to Irwin as she
violated the student driver policy, in addition to driving carelessly. Ballard knowingly allowed
her passenger to sit in a seat without properly functioning safety equipment. The plaintiff is also
contributorily liable as she failed to uphold her duty of care to herself by entering a dangerous
situation without a seat belt, and could have foreseen the dangers of failing to utilise a
functioning seat belt. While the school principal’s decision to allow teachers to dismiss students
early when activities at off-site locations conclude may have minorly contributed to the accident,
the principal nevertheless cannot be found negligent or liable for this accident. The principal
could not have foreseen the accident as they were unaware that students were breaking the
School Division Policy regarding students transporting other students. Additionally the principal
lacked the same duty of care as Waterman, the supervising teacher, held to these students.
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Reference:
Bain v. Calgary Board of Education, 1993 CanLII 7301, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench.
http://www.canlii.org/en/ab/abqb/doc/1993/1993canlii7301/1993canlii7301.html
Hoar v. Nanaimo School District 68, 1984 CarswellBC 756, British Columbia Court of
Appeal. (1984).
School Act. (2000). Revised Statutes of Alberta 2000 Chapter S-3. Retrieved from
http://www.qp.alberta.ca/documents/acts/s03.pdf.
Traffic Safety Act Vehicle Equipment Regulation (2009). Alberta Regulation 122/2009.