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39 Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership Vs CA - Scra
39 Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership Vs CA - Scra
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* SECOND DIVISION.
749
750
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
751
QUISUMBING, J.:
752
14. . . . restrictions shall run with the land and shall be construed
as real covenants until December 31, 2025 when they shall cease
1
and terminate . . .
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1 Rollo, p. 92.
753
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2 Rollo, p. 52.
3 Id., at 227.
754
4
owners.‰ Lastly, it avers that the appellate court
„unaccountably failed to address‰ several questions of fact.
Principally, we must resolve the issue of whether the
Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to
apply MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 to Civil Case No. 64931.
But first, we must address petitionerÊs allegation that
the Court of Appeals „unaccountably failed to address‰
questions of fact. For basic is the rule that factual issues
may not be raised before this Court in a petition for review
and this 5 Court is not duty-bound to consider said
questions. CA-G.R. SP No. 39193 was a special civil action
for certiorari, and the appellate court only had to
determine if the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, unless
vital to our determination of the issue at band, we shall
refrain from further consideration of factual questions.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in
limiting its decision to the cited zoning ordinance. It avers
that a contractual right is not automatically discarded once
a claim is made that it conflicts with police power.
Petitioner submits that the restrictive clauses in the
questioned contract is not in conflict with the zoning
ordinance. For one, according to petitioner, the MMC
Ordinance No. 81-01 did not prohibit the construction of
residential buildings. Petitioner argues that even with the
zoning ordinance, the seller and buyer of the re-classified
lot can voluntarily agree to an exclusive residential use
thereof. Hence, petitioner concludes that the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that the condition imposing
exclusive residential use was effectively nullified by the
zoning ordinance.
In its turn, private respondent argues that the appellate
court correctly ruled that the trial court had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to subject the contract
to the MMC Ordi-
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4 Ibid.
5 First Nationwide Assurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 128797, November 18, 1999, p. 1, 318 SCRA 589.
755
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6 CA Rollo, p. 26.
7 Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172,
185 (1979).
8 US vs. Diaz Conde, 42 Phil. 766, 769 (1922).
9 CONST., Art. III, Sec 10.
10 Melchor, Jr. vs. Moya, 121 SCRA 1, 6 (1983); Co Chiong vs.
Cuaderno, 83 Phil. 242 (1949); Santos vs. Alvarez, 78 Phil. 503 (1947).
756
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11 Presley vs. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 201 SCRA 13, 18-19
(1991).
12 Phil. American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 22 SCRA
135, 136-137 (1968).
13 168 SCRA 634, 669 (1988).
14 162 SCRA 390 (1988).
15 Id. at 396.
16 Ibid.
17 CIVIL CODE, Art. 1159.
757
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758
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals
21
volved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is
meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from
a mere expectancy or a22 future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest.
Tested by the foregoing definition, private respondent in
this case is clearly a real party in interest. It is not
disputed that he is in possession of the lot pursuant to a
valid lease. He is a possessor in the concept of a 23„holder of
the thing‰ under Article 525 of the Civil Code. He was
impleaded as a defendant in the amended complaint in
Civil Case No. 64931. Further, what petitioner seeks to
enjoin is the building by respondent of a commercial
structure on the lot. Clearly, it is private respondentÊs acts
which are in issue, and his interest in said issue cannot be
a mere incidental interest. In its amended complaint,
petitioner prayed for, among others, judgment „ordering
the demolition
24
of all improvements illegally built on the lot
in question.‰ These show that it is petitioner Mathay III,
doing business as „Greenhills Autohaus, Inc.,‰ and not only
the Hermosos, who will be adversely affected by the courtÊs
decree.
Petitioner also cites the rule that a stranger 25
to a
contract has no rights or obligations under it, and thus
has no standing to chal-
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760