[G.R. No. 166337.

March 7, 2005]
BAYANIHAN MUSIC vs. BMG
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAR 7 2005.
G.R. No. 166337 (Bayanihan Music Philippines, Inc. vs. BMG Records (Pilipinas) and Jose Mari Chan, et al.)
Subject of this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision dated December 14, 2004[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 69626, upholding the Order dated August 24, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, Branch 90, which found no merit
in petitioner's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, along with the Order dated January 10, 2002, which denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On July 16, 1973, private respondent Jose Mari Chan (Chan) entered into a contract with petitioner Bayanihan Music Philippines,
Inc. (Bayanihan), whereunder the former assigned to the latter all his rights, interests and participation over his musical composition
"Can We Just Stop and Talk A While". On March 11, 1976, the parties entered into a similar contract over Chan's other musical
composition entitled "Afraid For Love To Fade".
On the strength of the abovementioned contracts, Bayanihan applied for and was granted by the National Library a Certificate of
Copyright Registration for each of the two musical compositions, thus: November 19, 1973, for the song "Can We Just Stop and Talk A
While" and on May 21, 1980, for the song "Afraid for Love To Fade."
Apparently, without the knowledge and consent of petitioner Bayanihan, Chan authorized his co-respondent BMG Records
(Pilipinas) [BMG] to record and distribute the aforementioned musical compositions in a then recently released album of singer Lea
Salonga.
In separate letters both dated December 7, 1999, petitioner Bayanihan informed respondents Chan and BMG of its existing
copyrights over the subject musical compositions and the alleged violation of such right by the two. Demands were made on both to
settle the matter with Bayanihan. However no settlement was reached by the parties.
Hence, on August 8, 2000, Bayanihan filed with the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City a complaint against Chan and BMG for
violation of Section 216 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, with a prayer
for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent BMG from further
recording and distributing the subject musical compositions in whatever form of musical products, and Chan from further granting any
authority to record and distribute the same musical compositions.
In its answer, BMG contended, among others, that: (1) the acts of recording and publication sought to be enjoined had already
been consummated, thereby rendering moot Bayanihan's prayer for TRO and/or preliminary injunction; and (2) there is no clear
showing that petitioner Bayanihan would be greatly damaged by the refusal of the prayed for TRO and/or preliminary injunction. BMG
also pleaded a cross-claim against its co-respondent Chan for violation of his warranty that his musical compositions are free from
claims of third persons, and a counterclaim for damages against petitioner Bayanihan.
Chan, for his part, filed his own answer to the complaint, thereunder alleging that: (1) it was never his intention to divest himself of
all his rights and interest over the musical compositions in question; (2) the contracts he entered into with Bayanihan are mere music
publication agreements giving Bayanihan, as assignee, the power to administer his copyright over his two songs and to act as the
exclusive publisher thereof; (3) he was not cognizant of the application made by and the subsequent grant of copyrights to Bayanihan;
and (4) Bayanihan was remissed in its obligations under the contracts because it failed to effectively advertise his musical compositions
for almost twenty (20) years, hence, he caused the rescission of said contracts in 1997. Chan also included in his answer a
counterclaim for damages against Bayanihan.
After hearing the parties, the lower court came out with an order denying Bayanihan's prayer for TRO, saying, thus:

After carefully considering the arguments and evaluating the evidence presented by counsels, this Court finds that the plaintiff has not
been able to show its entitlement to the relief of TRO as prayed for in its verified complaint (see Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended), hence, this Court is of the considered and humble view that the ends of justice shall be served better if
the aforecited application is denied.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the aforecited application or prayer for the issuance of a TRO is denied.

SO ORDERED.
 Thereafter, the same court, in its subsequent Order dated August 24, 2001,[2] likewise denied Bayanihan's prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction, to wit:

After carefully going over the pleadings and the pertinent portions of the records insofar as they are pertinent to the issue under
consideration, this Court finds that the plaintiff has not been able to show its entitlement to the relief of preliminary injunction as prayed
for in its verified complaint (see Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended), hence, this Court is of the
considered and humble view that the ends of justice shall be served better if the aforecited application is denied, (see also Order dated
July 16, 2001).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the application or prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Its motion for a reconsideration of the same order having been likewise denied by the trial court in its next Order of January 10,
2002,[3] petitioner Bayanihan then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69626,
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in issuing the Orders of August 24, 2001 and January 10, 2001, denying
its prayers for a writ of preliminary injunction and motion for reconsideration, respectively.
In the herein assailed Decision dated December 14, 2004, the Court of Appeals upheld the challenged orders of the trial court
and accordingly dismissed Bayanihan petition, thus:

WHEREFORE, finding neither flaw of jurisdiction nor taint of grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed Orders of the
respondent court dated August 24, 2001 and January 10, 2002, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Hence, Bayanihan's present recourse.

It is petitioner's submission that the appellate court committed reversible error when it dismissed its petition for certiorari and
upheld the trial court's denial of its application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner insists that as assignee of the copyrights
over the musical compositions in question, it has a clear legal right to a writ of preliminary injunction; that respondents BMG and Chan
violated its copyrights over the same musical compositions; that despite knowledge by respondent BMG of petitioner's copyrights over
the said musical compositions, BMG continues to record and distribute the same, to petitioner's great and irreparable injury.
We DENY.
We have constantly reminded courts that there is no power, the exercise of which is more delicate and requires greater caution,
deliberation and sound discretion, or which is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction. A court should, as
much as possible, avoid issuing the writ which would effectively dispose of the main case without trial.
Here, nothing is more evident than the trial court's abiding awareness of the extremely difficult balancing act it had to perform in
dealing with petitioner's prayer for injunctive reliefs. Conscious, as evidently it is, of the fact that there is manifest abuse of discretion in
the issuance of an injunctive writ if the following requisites provided for by law are not present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the
existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right,[5] the trial
court threaded the correct path in denying petitioner's prayer therefor. For, such a writ should only be granted if a party is clearly
entitled thereto.[6]
Of course, while a clear showing of the right to an injunctive writ is necessary albeit its existence need not be conclusively
established,[7] as the evidence required therefor need not be conclusive or complete, still, for an applicant, like petitioner Bayanihan, to
be entitled to the writ, he is required to show that he has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its complaint.[8]Here, the trial
court did not find ample justifications for the issuance of the writ prayed for by petitioner.
Unquestionably, respondent Chan, being undeniably the composer and author of the lyrics of the two (2) songs, is protected by
the mere fact alone that he is the creator thereof, conformably with Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property
Code, Section 172.2 of which reads:

172.2. Works are protected by the sole fact of their creation, irrespective of their mode or form of expression, as well as of their content,
quality and purpose.

An examination of petitioner's verified complaint in light of the two (2) contracts sued upon and the evidence it adduced during the
hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, yields not the existence of the requisite right protectable by the provisional relief but
rather a lingering doubt on whether there is or there is no such right. The two contracts between petitioner and Chan relative to the
musical compositions subject of the suit contain the following identical stipulations:

7. It is also hereby agreed to by the parties herein that in the event the PUBLISHER [petitioner herein] fails to use in any manner
whatsoever within two (2) years any of the compositions covered by this contract, then such composition may be released in favor of
the WRITER and excluded from this contract and the PUBLISHER shall execute the necessary release in writing in favor of the
WRITER upon request of the WRITER;

xxx xxx xxx

9. This contract may be renewed for a period of two-and-one-half (2 1/2) years at the option of the PUBLISHER. Renewal may be
made by the PUBLISHER by advising the WRITER of such renewal in writing at least five (5) days before the expiration of this
contract.[9]

It would thus appear that the two (2) contracts expired on October 1, 1975 and March 11, 1978, respectively, there being neither
an allegation, much less proof, that petitioner Bayanihan ever made use of the compositions within the two-year period agreed upon by
the parties.
Anent the copyrights obtained by petitioner on the basis of the selfsame two (2) contracts, suffice it to say 'that such purported
copyrights are not presumed to subsist in accordance with Section 218[a] and [b], of the Intellectual Property Code,[10] because
respondent Chan had put in issue the existence thereof.
It is noted that Chan revoked and terminated said contracts, along with others, on July 30, 1997, or almost two years before
petitioner Bayanihan wrote its sort of complaint/demand letter dated December 7, 1999 regarding the recent "use/recording of the
songs ‘Can We Just Stop and Talk A While' and ‘Afraid for Love to Fade,'" or almost three (3) years before petitioner filed its complaint
on August 8, 2000, therein praying, inter alia, for injunctive relief. By then, it would appear that petitioner had no more right that is
protectable by injunction.
Lastly, petitioner's insinuation that the trial court indulged in generalizations and was rather skimpy in dishing out its reasons for
denying its prayer for provisional injunctive relief, the same deserves scant consideration. For sure, the manner by which the trial court
crafted its challenged orders is quite understandable, lest it be subjected to a plausible suspicion of having prejudged the merits of the
main case.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.