312 (CHAPTER FIFTEEN ‘The doctrine of the holy spirit, then, inasmauch as it isa formulation of the theory of religious correlation, is realy, together with that ofthe uniqueness of God, the fundamental theme of Cohen’s philosophy of religion, i.e. of his conception of religion out of the sources of Judaism, and, at the same time, out of the source of reason,” as manifest in the philosophical tradition of critical idealism, of which Cohen considered Kant the major representative. Therefore, when elaborating the theme of the holy spirit, Cohen's effort towards a synthesis of philosophical culture and Judaism clearly emerges, in which the ideal of the «dew integrated into European culture» (Kiulturjude),” realised by means of the Science of Judaism, consists, and in which and on behalf of which, Cohen was deeply engaged. As he wrote in Der polnische Jude, cts the great product of Mendelssohn's spirit and the unassailable evidence of ils universal historical meaning for preservation of Judaism in general. (..) [we] show (...) that we have built up our authentic eulture (wir .. erweisen .. uns als echte Kulturmenschen), promoting the revelation of the science of our religion and starting out from ity.» © Ch RV'S Eng. trans cit, pp. 4 2H Couns, Der polnsche Jude, ct, 9. 165/194, Ibid, 9. 1661195. CHAPTER SIXTEEN YEARNING FOR FORM: HERMANN COHEN IN POSTMODERNISM ‘Nur wer dle Sehnsucht konnt, —ach der mich Nebr und kere U. W. Goethe ~ H, Cohen) ‘The question | intend to face here is, I believe, a simple and relevant one: if and how Hermann Cohen’s thought can be an important point of reference in present day postmodem culture. The implicit assumption is that nowadays we live and think in a completely new cultural context, which is radically different from modernism and aware of this difference. Postmodernism is not only a current of thought, which reached its climax in certain philosophical theorisations and artistic expressions between the 1960s and 1990s, doomed to oblivion, like all fashions, but @ profound tuning point, involving all aspects of contemporary society and culture, with which philosophy must also come to terms on a stable basis. This is the assumption, and the consequence is clear: either Hermann Cohen’s thought has perspectives and themes that are relevant for the development of philosophical thought and culture in general in the postmodern period, ot it will be relegated to archaeology and the museum, which, at most, would justify going on with historical and philological research into it, but not theoretical development starting out from it, ‘The question in the form of «if and how» as I posed it at the beginning, could appear pleonastic, since, it would scem, there is no other way to demonstrate the present relevance of a philosophy than ‘that of exhibiting those of its aspects and themes which are still valid and significant, Nevertheless, with the first question, I intend to face ‘an absolutely preliminary, radical problem: whether, that is, the very consideration of content and method of Cohen’s philosophy is still 313314 (CHAPTER SIXTEEN justified or not. Only an affirmative answer to this question will lead to the problem of «chown, ie. identification of possible reasons for present day interest in this philosophy. Postmodern culture, like all ‘culture, is certainly not unitary, even less uniform: there is room in it for many different perspectives, divergences, disputes and even conflicts of ideas. Besides, wien looking beneath appearances, postmodern problems are not all that different from those of modem cculture and previous cultures. Fundamental problems have always continued and will perhaps always continue to be present and posed anew as cultures develop. Nevertheless, like every culture, postinodernism also radically rejects certain past thought modalities, perspectives and even categories. They are not considered in debate nor is any right of citizenship allowed them. They are simply ignored, precisely because the entre culture is built up despite them; it actually develops on the basis of this rejection. Now, if we were to accept that Cohen’s philosophy is part of these denied, rejected, obsolete thoughts, there would be no point in further considering his contemporary relevance. But if, on the contrary, we were able to demonstrate that it does not fall under this cultural ostracism, then it ‘would have every right of entry into the éyopé of philosophical debate and present its arguments there. Then there would be good reason for going on to the question of how», ‘When posing the question of the contemporary relevance of Cohen's philosophy, something that in my view has still to receive adequate attention, despite the flourishing state of research on Cohen over the last few decades, my aim is not some kind of overstressed, comic apology. There will be no attempt to show that Coben was a postmodern philosopher, He was in all respects a philosopher of modernity and a man of his time (though, in some ways, in his last years, showing some difficulty in following and interpreting the cultural changes of his time). It is rather a question of seeing whether, in the thought of a classic of modernity, like Hermann Cohen, there are useful references for contemporary philosophical thinking, in a ‘new cultural context. This approach to the question, if it were to lead to positive results, could be of far greater importance than a clumsy recycling, or misinterpretation of his philosophy, since it could help to bring to light authentic traits of modemity which can stil “YRARNING FOR FORM: HERMANN COHEN IN POSTMODERNISM 315 communicate with postmodemity, though still respecting the later’s true novelty I certainly do not intend to provide an exhaustive account of the kstion in these few pages. Iam simply attempting to begin to posit it and point out certain themes, which, in my view, could and should bbe further developed and added to by others, in future research that Thope willbe fruitfully carried on by both established and new Cohen scholars Although simplification and generalisation are inevitable, in my view, the philosophical core of postmodemism lies in thought on difference and it intends to leave behind thought of identity, the concept and representation. In my outline of the situation 1 shall refer to the theory worked out by Gilles Deleuze in Difference et répétition.' Certainly, other writers and theories could be mentioned, but my choice is not an arbitrary one. Firstly, Différence et répéttion is and has been acknowledged as cone of the fundamental works for this new school of thought. Michel Foucault explicitly stated that Deleuze is to be ctedited with this new starting point: «a thunderbolt has appeared, which will bear the name of Deleuze: new thought is now possible; thought itself is possible again, Not thought to come, promised from the most distant point of new beginnings. It is here in, Delewze’s texts, jumping up and dancing before us and among us» Secondly, Deleuze’s theory has numerous, important aspects where problems develop in substantial, occasionally surprising, parallelism * 6, Datuuze, Diférec ot rpition, Presses Unvarsitires de France, Paris 1968; Fg, vans. by. Teton, The Athlone Press, London 19. Giles Deleuze subsequeily modified the theory presente herein other works and partially extiised bis owe previous view (6. the author's note it the appendix othe liz ansation of fb, Logigue dso, Les Eons de Mizu, Pats 1969 lian tans by M. de Sietatis, Feline, Milano 1975, pp 24) However, concerning the ental themes, which wil be the sole object of my stention ere, tis book remains e sable point ofreferene fr Deleze's bough and postmodern theory i gene ™M_ FOUCAULT, Thearum philoropicim, ta ID, Dis et doris 1954-1985, Bion ube sous la detion de. Defer et F. Ewald eves la ealleboration J. Lagzange, Gallimard, Pais 1994 vo 2,p. 98.316 (CHAPTER SIXTEEN with those treated by Cohen. The latter thus becomes ideal comparison for my purpose in this essay. In Deleuze’s view, the error of traditional philosophy of difference, throughout its history «from Aristotle to Hegel via Leibniz»,” consists «in confusing the concept of difference with a merely conceptual difference, in remaining content to inscribe difference in the concept in generaly.’ Philosophy continually tried to «saven' difference from its condition as a rebel and cursed insubordination in the face of identity turing to «reason» understood as «representation» capable of returning the anarchy and individualism of difference to the hierarchy and organicity of the concept. That prius which is in no way deducible and is the source of all production, «difference», where universal and particular were originatively joined, is reflectively submitted by representation to the identity of the concept and included in the zgeneral-particular organic relation, and thus distorted in its meaning. In Deleuze’s view there are four aspects of representative reduction ‘and mediation, by means of which «reason» neutralises the strength and meaning of difference: «identity, in the form of the undetermined ‘concept; analogy, in the relation between ultimate determinable concepts; opposition, in the relation between determinations within ‘concepts: resemblance, in the determined object of the concept itselb© Starting out from Aristotle (and this choice is undoubtedly significant), Deleuze showed how, thinking in terms of the gencral-particular relationship, representative reason organically includes difference in the identity of the generic concept as an element cof specification, in various forms, among which opposition is «at once the greatest and the most perfect».” Thus difference becomes. a predicate of the concept identical to itself, If one moves to the upper logical and ontological Ievel of comparison between the genus ot categories, where, owing ‘0 the non univocity of being, which cannot 3 G. Dussuze, Difference et réption, cit, p41; Bog tras, et p- 27, ‘bide. CX, pp. 48, 71; Ba, tans. ct, pp. 32, $0, SCE ibid, p45; Eng ans, itp. 29. * Pid, pp. 4 {Fg trans. cisp 29, "ibid, p 45; Eng, tans it, p30. The reference isto ARISIOILE, Metaphysics ©, 4, 8 and 9 YEARNING FOR FORM: HERMANN COHEN IN POSTMODERNISM 317 be considered itself a genus, difference cannot be understood as opposition, it is nevertheless retumed by judgement to a form of identity, albeit weaker and more confused, i. analogy, and is thus still included in organic representation. In the other direction, towards the complete determination of the individual, specific differences are again included in the organicity of conceptual representation as resemblances perceived among specific objects, which presuppose «ca continuity of sensible intuition in the conerete representation». With this conceptual and representative reduction of difference Deleuze contrasts new thought capable of seeing difference in its authentic meaning, as the «state in which determination takes the form of unilateral distinction»:? «instead of something distinguished from something else — he wrote -, imagine something which distinguishes itself — and yet that from which it distinguishes itself does not distinguish itself from ity.”” In this authentic meaning it cannot be thought within organic representation, with subordinate reference to the identity of the concept and analogy of being. On the contrary, it catastrophically subverts, provoking cbreaks of continuity in the series of resemblances (...) impassable fissures between the analogical structures». ‘The new thought of difference must abandon the resemblance of representations, the identity of the concept and analogy of being, to affirm the absolute univocity of being, thinking, however, being not as, a supreme genus, but as difference: «the essential in univocity is not that Being is said in a single and same sense, but thet it is said, in a single and same sense, of al its individuating differences or intrinsic modalities. Being is the same for all these modalities, but these ‘modalities are not the same. It is “equal” for all, but they themselves are not equal. It is said of all in a single sense, but they themselves do not have the same sense (...). Being is said in a single and same sense 6, DELBUZE, Difrence et répétion, cit, p. $1; Bg. tans cit, p34 9 thid. $3; Bag trans, i, p28. © Ibidom, " Bid, p. 52; Bog. tans. cit, p. 38.