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EN BANC
BRICCIO Ricky A. POLLO, G.R. No. 181881
Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,*
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, PEREZ,
DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN MENDOZA,

BUENSALIDA,
SERENO,
DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A.
REYES, and
CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE AND THE CIVIL Promulgated:
SERVICE COMMISSION,
Respondents.
October 18, 2011
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DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was charged
administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal files stored in the
computer were used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1] dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution[2]dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA). The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 98224) filed by petitioner Briccio Ricky
A. Pollo to nullify the proceedings conducted by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which found him
guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 and penalized him with dismissal.
The factual antecedents:
Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the
Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the Mamamayan Muna
Hindi Mamaya Na program of the CSC.
On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC
Chairperson Karina Constantino-David which was marked Confidential and sent through a courier
service (LBC) from a certain Alan San Pascual of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received by the
Integrated Records Management Office (IRMO) at the CSC Central Office. Following office practice in
which documents marked Confidential are left unopened and instead sent to the addressee, the
aforesaid letter was given directly to Chairperson David.
The letter-complaint reads:
The Chairwoman
Civil Service Commission
Batasan Hills, Quezon City
Dear Madam Chairwoman,
Belated Merry Christmas and Advance Happy New Year!
As a concerned citizen of my beloved country, I would like to ask from you personally if it is just alright
for an employee of your agency to be a lawyer of an accused govt employee having a pending case in the
csc. I honestly think this is a violation of law and unfair to others and your office.
I have known that a person have been lawyered by one of your attorny in the region 4 office. He is the
chief of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na division. He have been helping many who have
pending cases in the Csc. The justice in our govt system will not be served if this will continue. Please
investigate this anomaly because our perception of your clean and good office is being tainted.
Concerned Govt employee[3]

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information
technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically to back
up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions. [4] After some
briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City. Upon their
arrival thereat around 5:30 p.m., the team informed the officials of the CSC-ROIV, respondents Director
IV Lydia Castillo (Director Castillo) and Director III Engelbert Unite (Director Unite) of Chairperson Davids
directive.
The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was
witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely monitored said
activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who
were both out of the office at the time, informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their
divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair. The text messages received by petitioner read:
Gud p.m. This is Atty. Unite FYI: Co people are going over the PCs of PALD and LSD per instruction of the
Chairman. If you can make it here now it would be better.
All PCs Of PALD and LSD are being backed up per memo of the chair.
CO IT people arrived just now for this purpose. We were not also informed about this.
We cant do anything about it its a directive from chair.
Memo of the chair was referring to an anonymous complaint; ill send a copy of the memo via mms [5]
Petitioner replied also thru text message that he was leaving the matter to Director Unite and that he
will just get a lawyer. Another text message received by petitioner from PALD staff also reported the
presence of the team from CSC main office: Sir may mga taga C.O. daw sa kuarto natin. [6] At
around 10:00 p.m. of the same day, the investigating team finished their task. The next day, all the
computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the purpose of preserving all the files stored
therein. Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD
computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the
CSCs Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files
copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42
documents, were draft pleadings or letters [7] in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and
other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause
Order[8] dated January 11, 2007, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his
explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
Evaluating the subject documents obtained from petitioners personal files, Chairperson David made the
following observations:
Most of the foregoing files are drafts of legal pleadings or documents that are related to or connected
with administrative cases that may broadly be lumped as pending either in the CSCRO No. IV, the CSC-
NCR, the CSC-Central Office or other tribunals. It is also of note that most of these draft pleadings are for
and on behalves of parties, who are facing charges as respondents in administrative cases. This gives rise
to the inference that the one who prepared them was knowingly, deliberately and willfully aiding and
advancing interests adverse and inimical to the interest of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the
government tasked to discipline misfeasance and malfeasance in the government service. The number of
pleadings so prepared further demonstrates that such person is not merely engaged in an isolated
practice but pursues it with seeming regularity. It would also be the height of naivete or credulity, and
certainly against common human experience, to believe that the person concerned had engaged in this
customary practice without any consideration, and in fact, one of the retrieved files (item 13 above)
appears to insinuate the collection of fees. That these draft pleadings were obtained from the computer
assigned to Pollo invariably raises the presumption that he was the one responsible or had a hand in
their drafting or preparation since the computer of origin was within his direct control and disposition. [9]
Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-
complaint which had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he lawyering for
people with cases in the CSC. He accused CSC officials of conducting a fishing expedition when they
unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer, and subsequently asking him to submit his
comment which violated his right against self-incrimination. He asserted that he had protested the
unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave, citing the letter dated January 8, 2007
in which he informed Director Castillo that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of
his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying,
duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection against
self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He pointed out that though government property,
the temporary use and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt (MR) is
ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for personal
purposes. As to the anonymous letter, petitioner argued that it is not actionable as it failed to comply
with the requirements of a formal complaint under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service (URACC). In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer
without his consent is thus inadmissible as evidence, being fruits of a poisonous tree. [10]
On February 26, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 070382 [11] finding prima facie case against the
petitioner and charging him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees). Petitioner was directed to submit his answer under oath within five days from notice
and indicate whether he elects a formal investigation. Since the charges fall under Section 19 of the
URACC, petitioner was likewise placed under 90 days preventive suspension effective immediately upon
receipt of the resolution. Petitioner received a copy of Resolution No. 070382 on March 1, 2007.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal
charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC
Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court. Petitioner reiterated that he never aided any
people with pending cases at the CSC and alleged that those files found in his computer were prepared
not by him but by certain persons whom he permitted, at one time or another, to make use of his
computer out of close association or friendship. Attached to the motion were the affidavit of Atty.
Ponciano R. Solosa who entrusted his own files to be kept at petitioners CPU and Atty. Eric N. Estrellado,
the latter being Atty. Solosas client who attested that petitioner had nothing to do with the pleadings or
bill for legal fees because in truth he owed legal fees to Atty. Solosa and not to petitioner. Petitioner
contended that the case should be deferred in view of the prejudicial question raised in the criminal
complaint he filed before the Ombudsman against Director Buensalida, whom petitioner believes had
instigated this administrative case. He also prayed for the lifting of the preventive suspension imposed
on him. In its Resolution No. 070519[12] dated March 19, 2007, the CSC denied the omnibus motion. The
CSC resolved to treat the said motion as petitioners answer.
On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Petition [13] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 98224, assailing both the January 11, 2007 Show-Cause Order and Resolution No.
070382 dated February 26, 2007 as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or total absence of jurisdiction. Prior to this, however, petitioner lodged an
administrative/criminal complaint against respondents Directors Racquel D.G. Buensalida (Chief of Staff,
Office of the CSC Chairman) and Lydia A. Castillo (CSC-RO IV) before the Office of the Ombudsman, and a
separate complaint for disbarment against Director Buensalida. [14]
On April 17, 2007, petitioner received a notice of hearing from the CSC setting the formal investigation of
the case on April 30, 2007. On April 25, 2007, he filed in the CA an Urgent Motion for the issuance of
TRO and preliminary injunction.[15] Since he failed to attend the pre-hearing conference scheduled
on April 30, 2007, the CSC reset the same to May 17, 2007 with warning that the failure of petitioner
and/or his counsel to appear in the said pre-hearing conference shall entitle the prosecution to proceed
with the formal investigation ex-parte.[16] Petitioner moved to defer or to reset the pre-hearing
conference, claiming that the investigation proceedings should be held in abeyance pending the
resolution of his petition by the CA. The CSC denied his request and again scheduled the pre-hearing
conference on May 18, 2007 with similar warning on the consequences of petitioner and/or his counsels
non-appearance.[17] This prompted petitioner to file another motion in the CA, to cite the respondents,
including the hearing officer, in indirect contempt. [18]
On June 12, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071134 [19] denying petitioners motion to set aside the
denial of his motion to defer the proceedings and to inhibit the designated hearing officer, Atty. Bernard
G. Jimenez. The hearing officer was directed to proceed with the investigation proper with dispatch.
In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner
was deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.
On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071420, [20] the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby finds Briccio A. Pollo, a.k.a. Ricky
A. Pollo GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
and Violation of Republic Act 6713. He is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its
accessory penalties, namely, disqualification to hold public office, forfeiture of retirement benefits,
cancellation of civil service eligibilities and bar from taking future civil service examinations. [21]
On the paramount issue of the legality of the search conducted on petitioners computer, the CSC noted
the dearth of jurisprudence relevant to the factual milieu of this case where the government as
employer invades the private files of an employee stored in the computer assigned to him for his official
use, in the course of initial investigation of possible misconduct committed by said employee and
without the latters consent or participation. The CSC thus turned to relevant rulings of the United States
Supreme Court, and cited the leading case of OConnor v. Ortega[22] as authority for the view that
government agencies, in their capacity as employers, rather than law enforcers, could validly conduct
search and seizure in the governmental workplace without meeting the probable cause or warrant
requirement for search and seizure. Another ruling cited by the CSC is the more recent case of United
States v. Mark L. Simons[23] which declared that the federal agencys computer use policy foreclosed any
inference of reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of its employees. Though the Court therein
recognized that such policy did not, at the same time, erode the respondents legitimate expectation of
privacy in the office in which the computer was installed, still, the warrantless search of the employees
office was upheld as valid because a government employer is entitled to conduct a warrantless search
pursuant to an investigation of work-related misconduct provided the search is reasonable in its
inception and scope.
With the foregoing American jurisprudence as benchmark, the CSC held that petitioner has no
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the computer he was using in the regional office in view
of the CSC computer use policy which unequivocally declared that a CSC employee cannot assert any
privacy right to a computer assigned to him. Even assuming that there was no such administrative policy,
the CSC was of the view that the search of petitioners computer successfully passed the test of
reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the aforecited
authorities. The CSC stressed that it pursued the search in its capacity as government employer and that
it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving work-related misconduct, which exempts
it from the warrant requirement under the Constitution. With the matter of admissibility of the evidence
having been resolved, the CSC then ruled that the totality of evidence adequately supports the charges
of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of
R.A. No. 6713 against the petitioner. These grave infractions justified petitioners dismissal from the
service with all its accessory penalties.
In his Memorandum[24] filed in the CA, petitioner moved to incorporate the above resolution dismissing
him from the service in his main petition, in lieu of the filing of an appeal via a Rule 43 petition. In a
subsequent motion, he likewise prayed for the inclusion of Resolution No. 071800 [25] which denied his
motion for reconsideration.
By Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari after finding no grave
abuse of discretion committed by respondents CSC officials. The CA held that: (1) petitioner was not
charged on the basis of the anonymous letter but from the initiative of the CSC after a fact-finding
investigation was conducted and the results thereof yielded a prima facie case against him; (2) it could
not be said that in ordering the back-up of files in petitioners computer and later confiscating the same,
Chairperson David had encroached on the authority of a judge in view of the CSC computer policy
declaring the computers as government property and that employee-users thereof have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer system; and (3)
there is nothing contemptuous in CSCs act of proceeding with the formal investigation as there was no
restraining order or injunction issued by the CA.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal arguing that
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED SERIOUS IRREGULARITY
AND BLATANT ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT
ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT IS ACTIONABLE UNDER E.O. 292 WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT THE
CONTRARY IS EXPLICITLY PROVIDED UNDER 2 nd PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 8 OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 99-
1936, WHICH IS AN [AMENDMENT] TO THE ORIGINAL RULES PER CSC RESOLUTION NO. 94-0521;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED PALPABLE ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING
TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER CANNOT INVOKE HIS RIGHT TO
PRIVACY, TO UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE, AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, BY VIRTUE OF
OFFICE MEMORANDUM NO. 10 S. 2002, A MERE INTERNAL MEMORANDUM SIGNED SOLELY AND
EXCLUSIVELY BY RESPONDENT DAVID AND NOT BY THE COLLEGIAL COMMISSION CONSIDERING
THAT POLICY MATTERS INVOLVING SUB[S]TANTIAL RIGHTS CANNOT BE COVERED BY AN OFFICE
MEMORANDUM WHICH IS LIMITED TO PROCEDURAL AND ROUTINARY INSTRUCTION;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
RULED THAT MEMO SEARCH DATED JANUARY 3, 2007 AND THE TAKING OF DOCUMENTS IN THE
EVENING THEREOF FROM 7:00 TO 10:00 P.M. IS NOT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION LIMITING THE
DEFINITION [OF] GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ONE INVOLVING AND TAINTED WITH PERSONAL
HOSTILITY. IT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DATA STORED IN THE GOVERNMENT COMPUTERS ARE
GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES INCLUDING THE PERSONAL FILES WHEN THE CONTRARY IS PROVIDED
UNDER SECTION 14 OF OM. 10 s. 2002. AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED STILL WHEN IT RULED THAT
RESPONDENT DAVID BY VIRTUE OF O.M. 10 DID NOT ENCROACH ON THE DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF A
JUDGE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION;
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL OTHER NEW ARGUMENTS,
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE HEREUNTO SUBMITTED AS WELL AS ITS FAILURE TO EVALUATE AND TAKE ACTION
ON THE 2 MOTIONS TO ADMIT AND INCORPORATE CSC RESOLUTION NOS. 07-1420 DATED JULY 24, 2007
AND CSC RESOLUTION 07-1800 DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 2007. IT DID NOT RULE LIKEWISE ON THE FOUR
URGENT MOTION TO RESOLVE ANCILLARY PRAYER FOR TRO. [26]
Squarely raised by the petitioner is the legality of the search conducted on his office computer and the
copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a transgression on his
constitutional right to privacy.
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by
the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution,[27] which provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of unreasonable
searches and seizures.[28] But to fully understand this concept and application for the purpose of
resolving the issue at hand, it is essential that we examine the doctrine in the light of pronouncements in
another jurisdiction. As the Court declared in People v. Marti[29]:
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its
origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. (Sec. 1[3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As
such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State
Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction. [30]
In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States,[31] the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in
electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth
violated his right to privacy and constituted a search and seizure. Because the petitioner had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Harlan, it was further noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold
requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). [32]
In Mancusi v. DeForte[33] which addressed the reasonable expectations of private employees in the
workplace, the US Supreme Court held that a union employee had Fourth Amendment rights with regard
to an office at union headquarters that he shared with other union officials, even as the latter or their
guests could enter the office. The Court thus recognized that employees may have a reasonable
expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.
That the Fourth Amendment equally applies to a government workplace was addressed in the 1987 case
of OConnor v. Ortega[34] where a physician, Dr. Magno Ortega, who was employed by a state hospital,
claimed a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights when hospital officials investigating charges of
mismanagement of the psychiatric residency program, sexual harassment of female hospital employees
and other irregularities involving his private patients under the state medical aid program, searched his
office and seized personal items from his desk and filing cabinets. In that case, the Court categorically
declared that [i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the
government instead of a private employer. [35] A plurality of four Justices concurred that the correct
analysis has two steps: first, because some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or
the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable, a court must consider [t]he operational realities
of the workplace in order to determine whether an employees Fourth Amendment rights are implicated;
and next, where an employee has a legitimate privacy expectation, an employers intrusion on that
expectation for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related
misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. [36]
On the matter of government employees reasonable expectations of privacy in their

workplace, OConnor teaches:
x x x Public employees expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar
expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and
procedures, or by legitimate regulation. x x x The employees expectation of privacy must be assessed in
the context of the employment relation. An office is seldom a private enclave free from entry by
supervisors, other employees, and business and personal invitees. Instead, in many cases offices are
continually entered by fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for conferences,
consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put, it is the nature of government offices that others
such as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public may have frequent
access to an individuals office. We agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that [c]onstitutional protection against
unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear merely because the government has the
right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as employer, x x x but some government offices may
be so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable. x x x Given
the great variety of work environments in the public sector, the question of whether an employee has
a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. [37] (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied.)
On the basis of the established rule in previous cases, the US Supreme Court declared that Dr. Ortegas
Fourth Amendment rights are implicated only if the conduct of the hospital officials infringed an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider as reasonable. Given the undisputed evidence
that respondent Dr. Ortega did not share his desk or file cabinets with any other employees, kept
personal correspondence and other private items in his own office while those work-related files (on
physicians in residency training) were stored outside his office, and there being no evidence that the
hospital had established any reasonable regulation or policy discouraging employees from storing
personal papers and effects in their desks or file cabinets (although the absence of such a policy does not
create any expectation of privacy where it would not otherwise exist), the Court concluded that Dr.
Ortega has a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in his desk and file cabinets. [38]
Proceeding to the next inquiry as to whether the search conducted by hospital officials was reasonable,
the OConnor plurality decision discussed the following principles:
Having determined that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, the Court of
Appeals simply concluded without discussion that the searchwas not a reasonable search under the
fourth amendment. x x x [t]o hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by [public
employers] is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such searches[W]hat is reasonable
depends on the context within which a search takes place. x x x Thus, we must determine the
appropriate standard of reasonableness applicable to the search. A determination of the standard of
reasonableness applicable to a particular class of searches requires balanc[ing] the nature and quality of
the intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. x x x In the case of searches conducted by a
public employer, we must balance the invasion of the employees legitimate expectations of privacy
against the governments need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.
xxxx
In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an
employees office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt the routine
conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome. Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in such
cases upon supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar with such procedures, is
simply unreasonable. In contrast to other circumstances in which we have required warrants, supervisors
in offices such as at the Hospital are hardly in the business of investigating the violation of criminal
laws. Rather, work-related searches are merely incident to the primary business of the agency.Under
these circumstances, the imposition of a warrant requirement would conflict with the common-sense
realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision became a
constitutional matter. x x x
xxxx
The governmental interest justifying work-related intrusions by public employers is the efficient and
proper operation of the workplace. Government agencies provide myriad services to the public, and the
work of these agencies would suffer if employers were required to have probable cause before they
entered an employees desk for the purpose of finding a file or piece of office correspondence. Indeed, it
is difficult to give the concept of probable cause, rooted as it is in the criminal investigatory context,
much meaning when the purpose of a search is to retrieve a file for work-related reasons. Similarly, the
concept of probable cause has little meaning for a routine inventory conducted by public employers for
the purpose of securing state property. x x x To ensure the efficient and proper operation of the agency,
therefore, public employers must be given wide latitude to enter employee offices for work-related,
noninvestigatory reasons.
We come to a similar conclusion for searches conducted pursuant to an investigation of work-related

employee misconduct. Even when employers conduct an investigation, they have an interest
substantially different from the normal need for law enforcement. x x x Public employers have an
interest in ensuring that their agencies operate in an effective and efficient manner, and the work of
these agencies inevitably suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence, mismanagement, or other work-
related misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in many cases, public employees are entrusted with
tremendous responsibility, and the consequences of their misconduct or incompetence to both the
agency and the public interest can be severe. In contrast to law enforcement officials, therefore, public
employers are not enforcers of the criminal law; instead, public employers have a direct and overriding
interest in ensuring that the work of the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient manner. In our
view, therefore, a probable cause requirement for searches of the type at issue here would impose
intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the employee misconduct caused by
the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible and
often irreparable damage to the agencys work, and ultimately to the public interest. x x x
xxxx
In sum, we conclude that the special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make
theprobable-cause requirement impracticable, x x x for legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory
intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will
neither unduly burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the efficient and proper operation
of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of public employees. We hold,
therefore, that public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of
government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of
work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion
must be reasonable:
Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider
whether theaction was justified at its inception, x x x ; second, one must determine whether the search
as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place, x x x
Ordinarily, a search of an employees office by a supervisor will be justified at its inception when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty
of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related
purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. x x x The search will be permissible in its scope when the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive
in light of the nature of the [misconduct]. x x x[39] (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Since the District Court granted summary judgment without a hearing on the factual dispute as to the
character of the search and neither was there any finding made as to the scope of the search that was
undertaken, the case was remanded to said court for the determination of the justification for the search
and seizure, and evaluation of the reasonableness of both the inception of the search and its scope.
In OConnor the Court recognized that special needs authorize warrantless searches involving public
employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which government
interests are weighed against the employees reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test
implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement.
[40]
OConnor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on employees privacy rights in the
workplace. One of these cases involved a government employers search of an office computer, United
States v. Mark L. Simons[41] where the defendant Simons, an employee of a division of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), was convicted of receiving and possessing materials containing child
pornography. Simons was provided with an office which he did not share with anyone, and a computer
with Internet access. The agency had instituted a policy on computer use stating that employees were to
use the Internet for official government business only and that accessing unlawful material was
specifically prohibited. The policy also stated that users shall understand that the agency will periodically
audit, inspect, and/or monitor the users Internet access as deemed appropriate. CIA agents instructed its
contractor for the management of the agencys computer network, upon initial discovery of prohibited
internet activity originating from Simons computer, to conduct a remote monitoring and examination of
Simons computer. After confirming that Simons had indeed downloaded pictures that were
pornographic in nature, all the files on the hard drive of Simons computer were copied from a remote
work station. Days later, the contractors representative finally entered Simons office, removed the
original hard drive on Simons computer, replaced it with a copy, and gave the original to the agency
security officer. Thereafter, the agency secured warrants and searched Simons office in the evening when
Simons was not around. The search team copied the contents of Simons computer; computer diskettes
found in Simons desk drawer; computer files stored on the zip drive or on zip drive diskettes; videotapes;
and various documents, including personal correspondence. At his trial, Simons moved to suppress these
evidence, arguing that the searches of his office and computer violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion and Simons was found guilty as charged.
Simons appealed his convictions. The US Supreme Court ruled that the searches of Simons computer and
office did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights and the first search warrant was valid. It held that the
search remains valid under the OConnor exception to the warrant requirement because evidence of the
crime was discovered in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection. Simons violation of
the agencys Internet policy happened also to be a violation of criminal law; this does not mean that said
employer lost the capacity and interests of an employer. The warrantless entry into Simons office was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment standard announced in OConnor because at the inception of
the search, the employer had reasonable grounds for suspecting that the hard drive would yield
evidence of misconduct, as the employer was already aware that Simons had misused his Internet access
to download over a thousand pornographic images. The retrieval of the hard drive was reasonably
related to the objective of the search, and the search was not excessively intrusive. Thus, while Simons
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, he did not have such legitimate expectation of
privacy with regard to the files in his computer.
x x x To establish a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, Simons must first prove that he
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the item seized. x x x And, in order to
prove a legitimate expectation of privacy, Simons must show that his subjective expectation of privacy is
one that society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. x x x
xxxx
x x x We conclude that the remote searches of Simons computer did not violate his Fourth Amendment
rights because, in light of the Internet policy, Simons lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
files downloaded from the Internet. Additionally, we conclude that Simons Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated by FBIS retrieval of Simons hard drive from his office.
Simons did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the record or fruits of his
Internet use in light of the FBIS Internet policy. The policy clearly stated that FBIS would audit, inspect,
and/or monitor employees use of the Internet, including all file transfers, all websites visited, and all
e-mail messages, as deemed appropriate. x x x This policy placed employees on notice that they could
not reasonably expect that their Internet activity would be private. Therefore, regardless of whether
Simons subjectively believed that the files he transferred from the Internet were private, such a belief
was not objectively reasonable after FBIS notified him that it would be overseeing his Internet use. x x
x Accordingly, FBIS actions in remotely searching and seizing the computer files Simons downloaded
from the Internet did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
xxxx
The burden is on Simons to prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office. x x
x Here, Simons has shown that he had an office that he did not share. As noted above, the operational
realities of Simons workplace may have diminished his legitimate privacy expectations. However, there is
no evidence in the record of any workplace practices, procedures, or regulations that had such an
effect. We therefore conclude that, on this record, Simons possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy
in his office.
xxxx
In the final analysis, this case involves an employees supervisor entering the employees government
office and retrieving a piece of government equipment in which the employee had absolutely no
expectation of privacy equipment that the employer knew contained evidence of crimes committed by
the employee in the employees office. This situation may be contrasted with one in which the criminal
acts of a government employee were unrelated to his employment. Here, there was a conjunction of the
conduct that violated the employers policy and the conduct that violated the criminal law. We consider
that FBIS intrusion into Simons office to retrieve the hard drive is one in which a reasonable employer
might engage. x x x[42] (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
This Court, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board [43] which involved the constitutionality
of a provision in R.A. No. 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students
of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses, have also recognized the fact that there may
be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon
which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution,
intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy
expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees
privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the companys work policies, the
collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the
inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy
expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon
such privacy has been upheld. (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying the analysis and principles announced in OConnor and Simons to the case at bar, we now
address the following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office
and computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of
the hard drive on petitioners computer reasonable in its inception and scope?
In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include (1) the employees relationship
to the item seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee when it was
seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item. These factors are
relevant to both the subjective and objective prongs of the reasonableness inquiry, and we consider the
two questions together.[44] Thus, where the employee used a password on his computer, did not share his
office with co-workers and kept the same locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy and any
search of that space and items located therein must comply with the Fourth Amendment. [45]
We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal
files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone,
or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege
that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer
files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally
would have visitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he even
allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He described his office as full of
people, his friends, unknown people and that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions
at the PALD, he is personally assisting incoming clients, receiving documents, drafting cases on appeals,
in charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector Unionism, Correction of
name, accreditation of service, and hardly had anytime for himself alone, that in fact he stays in the
office as a paying customer.[46] Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such
expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual
circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he
claims, such is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers, as in Simons.
Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 Computer Use Policy (CUP) explicitly provides:
POLICY
1. The Computer Resources are the property of the Civil Service Commission and may be used only for
legitimate business purposes.
2. Users shall be permitted access to Computer Resources to assist them in the performance of their
respective jobs.
3. Use of the Computer Resources is a privilege that may be revoked at any given time.
xxxx
No Expectation of Privacy
4. No expectation of privacy. Users except the Members of the Commission shall not have an expectation
of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer system.
The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall select and assign Users to
handle the confidential examination data and processes.
5. Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any right to privacy in anything they create, store,
send, or receive on the computer through the Internet or any other computer
network. Users understand that the CSC may use human or automated means to monitor the use of
its Computer Resources.
6. Non-exclusivity of Computer Resources. A computer resource is not a personal property or for the
exclusive use of a User to whom a memorandum of receipt (MR) has been issued. It can be shared or
operated by other users. However, he is accountable therefor and must insure its care and maintenance.
xxxx
Passwords
12. Responsibility for passwords. Users shall be responsible for safeguarding their passwords for access
to the computer system. Individual passwords shall not be printed, stored online, or given to
others. Users shall be responsible for all transactions made using their passwords. No User may access
the computer system with another Users password or account.
13. Passwords do not imply privacy. Use of passwords to gain access to the computer system or to
encode particular files or messages does not imply that Users have an expectation of privacy in the
material they create or receive on the computer system. The Civil Service Commission has global
passwords that permit access to all materials stored on its networked computer system regardless of
whether those materials have been encoded with a particular Users password. Only members of the
Commission shall authorize the application of the said global passwords.
x x x x[47] (Emphasis supplied.)
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no
expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that
the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means. This
implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only
for such legitimate business purposes.
One of the factors stated in OConnor which are relevant in determining whether an employees
expectation of privacy in the workplace is reasonable is the existence of a workplace privacy policy. [48] In
one case, the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit held that a state university employee has not shown
that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer files where the universitys computer
policy, the computer user is informed not to expect privacy if the university has a legitimate reason to
conduct a search. The user is specifically told that computer files, including e-mail, can be searched
when the university is responding to a discovery request in the course of litigation. Petitioner employee
thus cannot claim a violation of Fourth Amendment rights when university officials conducted a
warrantless search of his computer for work-related materials. [49]
As to the second point of inquiry on the reasonableness of the search conducted on petitioners
computer, we answer in the affirmative.
The search of petitioners computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related
misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaintaddressed to Chairperson David regarding
anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is
supposedly lawyering for individuals with pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson David stated in her
sworn affidavit:
8. That prior to this, as early as 2006, the undersigned has received several text messages from unknown
sources adverting to certain anomalies in Civil Service Commission Regional Office IV (CSCRO IV) such as,
staff working in another government agency, selling cases and aiding parties with pending cases, all done
during office hours and involved the use of government properties;
9. That said text messages were not investigated for lack of any verifiable leads and details sufficient to
warrant an investigation;
10. That the anonymous letter provided the lead and details as it pinpointed the persons and divisions
involved in the alleged irregularities happening in CSCRO IV;
11. That in view of the seriousness of the allegations of irregularities happening in CSCRO IV and its
effect on the integrity of the Commission, I decided to form a team of Central Office staff to back up the
files in the computers of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) and Legal Division;
x x x x[50]
A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at inception when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-
related misconduct.[51] Thus, in the 2004 case decided by the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, it was
held that where a government agencys computer use policy prohibited electronic messages with
pornographic content and in addition expressly provided that employees do not have any personal
privacy rights regarding their use of the agency information systems and technology, the government
employee had no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the use and contents of his office computer, and
therefore evidence found during warrantless search of the computer was admissible in prosecution for
child pornography. In that case, the defendant employees computer hard drive was first remotely
examined by a computer information technician after his supervisor received complaints that he was
inaccessible and had copied and distributed non-work-related e-mail messages throughout the
office. When the supervisor confirmed that defendant had used his computer to access the prohibited
websites, in contravention of the express policy of the agency, his computer tower and floppy disks were
taken and examined. A formal administrative investigation ensued and later search warrants were
secured by the police department. The initial remote search of the hard drive of petitioners computer, as
well as the subsequent warrantless searches was held as valid under the OConnor ruling that a public
employer can investigate work-related misconduct so long as any search is justified at inception and is
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified it in the first place. [52]
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioners computer was justified at its inception
and scope. We quote with approval the CSCs discussion on the reasonableness of its actions, consistent
as it were with the guidelines established by OConnor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind
of the Commission that the search of Pollos computer has successfully passed the test of reasonableness
for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed American authorities. It
bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a government employer and
that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of
the circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint
was received recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was lawyering for parties having
pending cases with the said regional office or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation was
serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in
the practice of lawyering for parties with pending cases before the Commission would be a highly
repugnant scenario, then such a case would have shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast
clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the
process, render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of
administrative justice. It is settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be actually
impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would not have any trust and
confidence in it.
Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or
limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was
received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional
office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was justified since these furnished
the easiest means for an employee to encode and store documents. Indeed, the computers would be a
likely starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of
computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and
immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would
invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related investigation.
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the warrantless search in an open and
transparent manner. Officials and some employees of the regional office, who happened to be in the
vicinity, were on hand to observe the process until its completion. In addition, the respondent himself
was duly notified, through text messaging, of the search and the concomitant retrieval of files from his
computer.
All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on computer assigned to Pollo
was not, in any way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of the managerial
prerogative of the Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and
efficiency by going after the work-related misfeasance of its employees. Consequently, the evidence
derived from the questioned search are deemed admissible. [53]
Petitioners claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other
argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate
intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the aforecited
authorities. We likewise find no merit in his contention that OConnor and Simons are not relevant
because the present case does not involve a criminal offense like child pornography. As already
mentioned, the search of petitioners computer was justified there being reasonable ground for
suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation
being conducted by CSC as government employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous
complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement in
administrative searches defined in OConnor.
The Court is not unaware of our decision in Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales,
Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila [54]involving a branch clerk (Atty. Morales) who was
investigated on the basis of an anonymous letter alleging that he was consuming his working hours filing
and attending to personal cases, using office supplies, equipment and utilities. The OCA conducted a
spot investigation aided by NBI agents. The team was able to access Atty. Morales personal computer
and print two documents stored in its hard drive, which turned out to be two pleadings, one filed in the
CA and another in the RTC of Manila, both in the name of another lawyer. Atty. Morales computer was
seized and taken in custody of the OCA but was later ordered released on his motion, but with order to
the MISO to first retrieve the files stored therein. The OCA disagreed with the report of the Investigating
Judge that there was no evidence to support the charge against Atty. Morales as no one from the OCC
personnel who were interviewed would give a categorical and positive statement affirming the charges
against Atty. Morales, along with other court personnel also charged in the same case. The OCA
recommended that Atty. Morales should be found guilty of gross misconduct.The Court En Banc held that
while Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards required of every court employee,
the Court cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal computer against him for it violated his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court found no evidence to support
the claim of OCA that they were able to obtain the subject pleadings with the consent of Atty. Morales,
as in fact the latter immediately filed an administrative case against the persons who conducted the spot
investigation, questioning the validity of the investigation and specifically invoking his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure. And as there is no other evidence, apart from the pleadings,
retrieved from the unduly confiscated personal computer of Atty. Morales, to hold him administratively
liable, the Court had no choice but to dismiss the charges against him for insufficiency of evidence.
The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar because, unlike the former which involved
a personal computer of a court employee, the computer from which the personal files of herein
petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government property the use of
which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor. Such relationship of the petitioner with the
item seized (office computer) and other relevant factors and circumstances under American Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, notably the existence of CSC MO 10, S. 2007 on Computer Use Policy, failed
to establish that petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the office computer assigned to
him.
Having determined that the personal files copied from the office computer of petitioner are admissible
in the administrative case against him, we now proceed to the issue of whether the CSC was correct in
finding the petitioner guilty of the charges and dismissing him from the service.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the CSC, are accorded not
only respect but even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence
is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. [55]
The CSC based its findings on evidence consisting of a substantial number of drafts of legal pleadings and
documents stored in his office computer, as well as the sworn affidavits and testimonies of the witnesses
it presented during the formal investigation. According to the CSC, these documents were confirmed to
be similar or exactly the same content-wise with those on the case records of some cases pending either
with CSCRO No. IV, CSC-NCR or the Commission Proper. There were also substantially similar copies of
those pleadings filed with the CA and duly furnished the Commission. Further, the CSC found the
explanation given by petitioner, to the effect that those files retrieved from his computer hard drive
actually belonged to his lawyer friends Estrellado and Solosa whom he allowed the use of his computer
for drafting their pleadings in the cases they handle, as implausible and doubtful under the
circumstances. We hold that the CSCs factual finding regarding the authorship of the subject pleadings
and misuse of the office computer is well-supported by the evidence on record, thus:
It is also striking to note that some of these documents were in the nature of pleadings responding to
the orders, decisions or resolutions of these offices or directly in opposition to them such as a petition
for certiorari or a motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution. This indicates that the author thereof
knowingly and willingly participated in the promotion or advancement of the interests of parties
contrary or antagonistic to the Commission. Worse, the appearance in one of the retrieved documents
the phrase, Eric N. Estr[e]llado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo, lends plausibility to an inference that the
preparation or drafting of the legal pleadings was pursued with less than a laudable motivation.Whoever
was responsible for these documents was simply doing the same for the money a legal mercenary selling
or purveying his expertise to the highest bidder, so to speak.
Inevitably, the fact that these documents were retrieved from the computer of Pollo raises the
presumption that he was the author thereof. This is because he had a control of the said
computer. More significantly, one of the witnesses, Margarita Reyes, categorically testified seeing a
written copy of one of the pleadings found in the case records lying on the table of the respondent. This
was the Petition for Review in the case of Estrellado addressed to the Court of Appeals. The said
circumstances indubitably demonstrate that Pollo was secretly undermining the interest of the
Commission, his very own employer.
To deflect any culpability, Pollo would, however, want the Commission to believe that the documents
were the personal files of some of his friends, including one Attorney Ponciano Solosa, who incidentally
served as his counsel of record during the formal investigation of this case. In fact, Atty. Solosa himself
executed a sworn affidavit to this effect.Unfortunately, this contention of the respondent was directly
rebutted by the prosecution witness, Reyes, who testified that during her entire stay in the PALD, she
never saw Atty. Solosa using the computer assigned to the respondent. Reyes more particularly stated
that she worked in close proximity with Pollo and would have known if Atty. Solosa, whom she personally
knows, was using the computer in question. Further, Atty. Solosa himself was never presented during the
formal investigation to confirm his sworn statement such that the same constitutes self-serving evidence
unworthy of weight and credence. The same is true with the other supporting affidavits, which Pollo
submitted.
At any rate, even admitting for a moment the said contention of the respondent, it evinces the fact that
he was unlawfully authorizing private persons to use the computer assigned to him for official purpose,
not only once but several times gauging by the number of pleadings, for ends not in conformity with the
interests of the Commission. He was, in effect, acting as a principal by indispensable cooperationOr at
the very least, he should be responsible for serious misconduct for repeatedly allowing CSC resources,
that is, the computer and the electricity, to be utilized for purposes other than what they were officially
intended.
Further, the Commission cannot lend credence to the posturing of the appellant that the line appearing
in one of the documents, Eric N. Estrellado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo, was a private joke between the
person alluded to therein, Eric N. Estrellado, and his counsel, Atty. Solosa, and not indicative of anything
more sinister. The same is too preposterous to be believed. Why would such a statement appear in a
legal pleading stored in the computer assigned to the respondent, unless he had something to do with
it?[56]
Petitioner assails the CA in not ruling that the CSC should not have entertained an anonymous complaint
since Section 8 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 (URACC) requires a verified complaint:
Rule II Disciplinary Cases
SEC. 8. Complaint. - A complaint against a civil service official or employee shall not be given due course
unless it is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant.However, in cases initiated by the
proper disciplining authority, the complaint need not be under oath.
No anonymous complaint shall be entertained unless there is obvious truth or merit to the allegation
therein or supported by documentary or direct evidence, in which case the person complained of may
be required to comment.
xxxx
We need not belabor this point raised by petitioner. The administrative complaint is deemed to have
been initiated by the CSC itself when Chairperson David, after a spot inspection and search of the files
stored in the hard drive of computers in the two divisions adverted to in the anonymous letter -- as part
of the disciplining authoritys own fact-finding investigation and information-gathering -- found a prima
facie case against the petitioner who was then directed to file his comment. As this Court held in Civil
Service Commission v. Court of Appeals[57] --
Under Sections 46 and 48 (1), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292 and Section 8, Rule II of
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, a complaint may be initiated against a civil
service officer or employee by the appropriate disciplining authority, even without being subscribed
and sworn to. Considering that the CSC, as the disciplining authority for Dumlao, filed the complaint,
jurisdiction over Dumlao was validly acquired. (Emphasis supplied.)
As to petitioners challenge on the validity of CSC OM 10, S. 2002 (CUP), the same deserves scant
consideration. The alleged infirmity due to the said memorandum order having been issued solely by the
CSC Chair and not the Commission as a collegial body, upon which the dissent of Commissioner
Buenaflor is partly anchored, was already explained by Chairperson David in her Reply to the Addendum
to Commissioner Buenaflors previous memo expressing his dissent to the actions and disposition of the
Commission in this case. According to Chairperson David, said memorandum order was in fact
exhaustively discussed, provision by provision in the January 23, 2002 Commission Meeting, attended by
her and former Commissioners Erestain, Jr. and Valmores. Hence, the Commission En Banc at the time
saw no need to issue a Resolution for the purpose and further because the CUP being for internal use of
the Commission, the practice had been to issue a memorandum order. [58] Moreover, being an
administrative rule that is merely internal in nature, or which regulates only the personnel of the CSC
and not the public, the CUP need not be published prior to its effectivity. [59]
In fine, no error or grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in affirming the CSCs ruling that
petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, and violation of R.A. No. 6713. The gravity of these offenses justified the imposition on
petitioner of the ultimate penalty of dismissal with all its accessory penalties, pursuant to existing rules
and regulations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated October 11, 2007 and
Resolution dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98224 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
See Separate Concurring Opinion I join opinion of J. Bersamin
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

I join the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice ARTURO D. BRION
Bersamin
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Please see Concurring & Dissenting Opinion
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
(No Part) I join Justice L. Bersamins concurring and
dissenting opinion
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

I concur but share J. Carpios concerns BIENVENIDO L. REYES
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
*
No part.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 63-83. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza, with Associate Justices Mariano C. Del
Castillo (now a Member of this Court) and Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok concurring.
[2]
Id. at 85.
[3]
Id. at 306.
[4]
Id. at 305.
[5]
CA rollo, p. 56.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id. at 21-24.
[8]
Id. at 20-25.
[9]
Id. at 25.
[10]
Id. at 55-62.
[11]
Id. at 26-33. Chairperson Karina Constantino-David and Commissioner Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-
Mendoza concurred in ruling that a prima facie case existed against petitioner while Commissioner Cesar
D. Buenaflor dissented [see Memorandum (OCOM-C Memo No. 14, s. 2007, CA rollo, pp. 431-434).
[12]
CSC records, pp. 71-l to 71-n. Chairperson Karina Constantino-David and Commissioner Mary Ann Z.
Fernandez-Mendoza concurred in the denial of the omnibus motion while Commissioner Cesar D.
Buenaflor reiterated his dissent.
[13]
CA rollo, pp. 2-19.
[14]
Id. at 288-294, 321-325.
[15]
Id. at 336-340.
[16]
Id. at 373.
[17]
Id. at 376-378.
[18]
Id. at 388-392.
[19]
Mendoza concurred in denying the motion while Commissioner Cesar D. Buenaflor dissented stating that
based on his dissenting position, any subsequent proceedings in this case is of no moment since the
initiatory proceedings was in violation of a persons fundamental rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights of
the Constitution. (Id. at 465.)
[20]
Mendoza concurred in ruling that petitioner is guilty as charged while Commissioner Cesar D. Buenaflor
maintained his dissent.
[21]
Id. at 618.
[22]
480 U.S. 709 (1987).
[23]
206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000).
[24]
Id. at 560-585.
[25]
Mendoza concurred in the denial of the motion for reconsideration while Commissioner Cesar D.
Buenaflor reiterated his dissent under his Addendum to the Dissenting Position Under OCOM-C Memo
No. 14, S. 2007. (Id. at 720.)
[26]
Rollo, p. 19.
[27]
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658,
November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427, citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA
141, 169.
[28]
Joaquin Bernas, S.J., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY,
2003 ed., p. 162.
[29]
G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991, 193 SCRA 57.
[30]
Id. at 63.
[31]
389 U.S. 437 (1967).
[32]
Id.
[33]
392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968).
[34]
Supra note 22.
[35]
Id. at 717.
[36]
City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, U.S. 2010, June 17, 2010.
[37]
Supra note 22 at 717-718.
[38]
Id. at 718-719.
[39]
Id. at 719, 722-725.
[40]
Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, C.A. (Md), December 2, 2009.
[41]
Supra note 23.
[42]
Id.
[43]
Supra note 27 at 432-433.
[44]
U.S. v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246, C.A.10 (Okla.), April 3, 2007, citing United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d
1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 1998).
[45]
U.S. v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184 C.A.9 (Mont.), January 30, 2007.
[46]
CA rollo, pp. 42, 61.
[47]
Id. at 440-443.
[48]
Biby v. Board of Regents, of the University of Nebraska at Lincoln, 419 F.3d 845 C.A.8 (Neb), August 22,
2005.
[49]
Id.
[50]
CA rollo, p. 639.
[51]
U.S. v. Thorn, 375 F.3d 679, C.A.8 (Mo.), July 13, 2004.
[52]
Id.
[53]
CA rollo, pp. 611-612.
[54]
A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520, November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 361.
[55]
Vertudes v. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 153166, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 210, 230, citing Rosario v.
Victory Ricemill, G.R. No. 147572, February 19, 2003, 397 SCRA 760, 766 and Bagong Bayan Corp., Realty
Investors and Developers v. NLRC, G.R. No. 61272, September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 107.
[56]
CA rollo, pp. 616-617.
[57]
G.R. No. 147009, March 11, 2004, 425 SCRA 394, 401.
[58]
Rollo, p. 299.
[59]
See Taada v. Hon. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528, 535 (1986).
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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried
and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high
time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at
about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted
him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information was amended to include Farida
Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both
were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge
against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough
investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who
was eventually convicted .6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that
the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was
Identified by name. 8Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and
approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They
detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were
later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10who testified that she conducted
microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and
immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he
was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a
piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He
insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and
sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not
properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC
headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have
come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that
purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that
he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when
he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his
manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although
the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even
know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not
sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had
immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility
on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes,
which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial
judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant
was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical
examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was
at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was
arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was
arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point.
For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of
Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless
arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they
had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only
justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to
them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time
they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third
"weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting
team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of Idel Aminnudin on June
25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of marijuana leaves on
that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from that particular
informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the particular operation which was being
participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984 with respect to the coming
of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. For instance,
report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25, 1984, did you also
receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe for security reason
and we cannot Identify the person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was received by you
many days before you received the intelligence report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on June 23, 1984 that was
the time when I received the information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his activities, we
have reports that he was already consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had already gathered
information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject mentioned in your
intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a search warrant
anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC.
The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of
men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government,
the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just
been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even
expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan
v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and
seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is
clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was
Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could
have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet
they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether
because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own
authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly
called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the
precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was
only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect
and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by
the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized
them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised
dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without
trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more
flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest
that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption
is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is
not strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution
must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court
for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use
Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no
warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of
Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was
inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people,
especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than
the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm,
including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent
and the guilty alike against any manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy
their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think
it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It
is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated
is the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-
appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged
on the presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is
so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I hold that the accused was caught in flagrante, for he was carrying marijuana
leaves in his bag at the moment of his arrest. He was not "innocently disembarking from the vessel." The
unauthorized transportation of marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime. (Sec. 4,
Rep. Act No. 6425). Since he was committing a crime, his arrest could be lawfully effected without a
warrant (Sec. 6a, Rule 113, Rules of Court), and the search of his bag (which yielded the marijuana
leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful (Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court). I vote to affirm the
judgment of the trial court finding him guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I hold that the accused was caught in flagrante, for he was carrying marijuana
leaves in his bag at the moment of his arrest. He was not "innocently disembarking from the vessel." The
unauthorized transportation of marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime. (Sec. 4,
Rep. Act No. 6425). Since he was committing a crime, his arrest could be lawfully effected without a
warrant (Sec. 6a, Rule 113, Rules of Court), and the search of his bag (which yielded the marijuana
leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful (Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court). I vote to affirm the
judgment of the trial court finding him guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 29.
2 Ibid., p. 2.
3 Original Records, p. 6.
4 Ibid., p. 20.
5 "Exh. 1," Original Records, p. 204.
6 Original Records, p. 26.
7 TSN, Sept. 19, 1984, p. 5; Oct. 25, 1984, p. 31.
8 TSN, Oct. 25, 1984, p. 29.
9 TSN, Sept. 19, 1984, pp. 6-7.
10 TSN, Sept. 5, 1984, pp. 8-10.
11 TSN, Aug. 15, 1985, p. 3.
12 Ibid., pp. 8-9; 19-20.
13 Id., pp. 10 & 13.
14 Brief for the Appellant, p. 22.
15 Rollo, p. 28.
16 TSN, Aug. 15, 1985, pp. 17-18; 22-24.
17 Ibid., p. 29.
18 Id., p. 4.
19 Rollo, p. 28.
20 TSN, Oct. 25, 1984, p. 31.
21 TSN, Sept. 19, 1984, p. 19.
22 TSN, Oct. 25, 1984, p. 12.
23 TSN, Oct. 25, 1984, pp. 31-33.
24 65 SCRA 336.
25 People v. Rubio, 142 SCRA 329; People v. Madarang, 147 SCRA 123; People v. Sarmiento, 147 SCRA
252; People v. Cerelegia; 147 SCRA 538; People v. Fernando, G.R. No. L-68409, December 1, 1987.
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength
mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he
pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized
and was therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree. The Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver
was validly received in evidence by the trial judge because its seizure was incidental to an arrest that was
doubtless lawful even if admittedly without warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a
telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan
Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith
dispatched to the place. As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto
Juan, 1 they there saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen.
They approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to
run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects
were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38
caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as
Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from
them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the
Intelligence Division.
On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-appellant before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila:
The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866,
committed as follows:
That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control a firearm, to
wit:
one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing

Serial No. 8720-T
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan,
who identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his
house in Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly reported
the robbery to the police, indicating the articles stolen from him, including the revolver. 2 For his part,
Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and
claimed instead that the weapon had been "Planted" on him at the time of his arrest. 3
The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and C and admitted
over the objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the principal evidence that led
to Mengote's conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. 4
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence
because of its illegal seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have
been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having
been also effected without a warrant. The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the
alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial
court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in
any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the
Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Judge Learned
Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot
profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed." The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule,
maintains that it is not applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote
and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court
reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we can agree with the
prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution
when he was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under
either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question,
the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to
the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was
being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as
Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them
the belief that an offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it." The
question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from
side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It might
have been different if Mengote bad been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had
no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the
morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with I his companion. He
was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine
about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes were
darting from side to side and be was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the
arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion
was all about. In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only
because of the telephone call from the informer that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that
vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he
thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused
because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon
inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the accused boarded a
bus and placed the buri bag she was carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat
in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found to
contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless arrest and seizure that we subsequently
upheld on the ground that probable cause had been sufficiently established.
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion
other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could
it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being
committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the
accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all appearances
no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was be actually
committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not
even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly
suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The
prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been
committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had
committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that
had yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and neither were
they aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had
appeared at the Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's
supposed involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person,
the policemen discovered this only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later
revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.
Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact
(or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of
Danganan's house.
In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, 9 this Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or
is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of the fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually
have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is
not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense
must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
(Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime about
to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the
record of such a falsification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113,
Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as
stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos. (Emphasis supplied)
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is
holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp
handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is
actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police
state where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting officer
may be justified in the name of security.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we here make
is sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of
his illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The
testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him.
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the accused-appellant not
only in the brief but also in the reply brief, which she did not have to file but did so just the same to
stress the constitutional rights of her client. The fact that she was acting only as a counsel de oficio with
no expectation of material reward makes her representation even more commendable.
The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights,
the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their
over-zealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid
search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the vital evidence they had invalidly seized.
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the
acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of the law because, ironically
enough, it has not been observed by those who are supposed to enforce it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED
and ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 TSN, September 21, 1987, October 21, 1987.
2 Records, p. 54.
3 TSN, October 26, 1987. p. 11.
4 Through Judge Romeo J. Callejo.

5 198 SCRA 401.
6 160 SCRA 646.
7 163 SCRA 402.
8 TSN, September 23, 1987, p. 10.
9 144 SCRA 1.
10 151 SCRA 279.
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 128587 March 16, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Manila, and
LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
On pure questions of law, petitioner People of the Philippines has directly come to this Court via this
petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolution 1 dated 13 March 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case Nos. 96-149990 to 96-149992, entitled People
of the Philippines v. Lawrence Wang y Chen, granting private respondent Lawrence C. Wang’s Demurrer
to Evidence and acquitting him of the three (3) charges filed against him, namely: (1) Criminal Case No.
96-149990 for Violation of Section 16, Article III in relation to Section 2(e)(2), Article I of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act); (2) Criminal Case No. 96-149991 for Violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms); and (3) Criminal Case No. 96-149992 for Violation of
Comelec Resolution No. 2828 in relation to R.A. No. 7166 (COMELEC Gun Ban).
The three (3) separate Informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang in the court of origin respectively
read:
Criminal Case No. 96-149990 (Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control a
bulk of white and yellowish crystalline substance known as SHABU contained in thirty-two (32)
transparent plastic bags weighing approximately 29.2941 kilograms, containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription therefor.
Contrary to law.2
Criminal Case No. 96-149991 (Illegal Possession of Firearms):
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control
one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm, automatic pistol with one loaded magazine and one AMT Cal. .380 9mm
automatic backup pistol with magazine loaded with ammunitions without first having secured the
necessary license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
Contrary to law. 3
Criminal Case No. 96-149992 (Violation of Comelec Gun Ban):
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control
one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm automatic pistol with one loaded magazine and one (1) AMT Cal. 380 9mm
automatic backup pistol with magazine loaded with ammunitions, carrying the same along Maria Orosa
St., Ermita, Manila, which is a public place, on the date which is covered by an election period, without
first securing the written permission or authority from the Commission on Elections, as provided by the
COMELEC Resolution 2828 in relation to Republic Act 7166.
Contrary to law. 4
During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the Informations and instead
interposed a continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police operatives.
Thus, the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for him. 5 Thereafter, joint trial of the
three (3) consolidated cases followed.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against
Crime of the Department of Interior and Local Government, namely, Captain Margallo, Police Inspector
Cielito Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo Cristobal, arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain
Arellano, for unlawful possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug popularly
known as shabu. In the course of the investigation of the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias
Frank, and Joseph Junio were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment operation was then set
after the three were prevailed upon to call their source and pretend to order another supply of shabu.
At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were arrested while they were
about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company. Questioned, Redentor Teck and
Joseph Junio informed the police operatives that they were working as talent manager and gymnast
instructor, respectively, of Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. Redentor Teck and
Joseph Junio did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that they were working for Wang. 6 They
also disclosed that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning of 17 May
1996, and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila.
The police operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Redentor
Teck and Joseph Junio. Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa
Apartment and placed the same under surveillance.
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Cielito Coronel testified that at about 2:10 a.m. of 17 May 1996,
Wang, who was described to the operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment and walked towards a
parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness) together with Captain Margallo and two other police
officers approached Wang, introduced themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and, upon
hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back
compartment of the BMW car. 7 When frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and
confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic Back-up Pistol loaded with
ammunitions. At the same time, the other members of the operatives searched the BMW car and found
inside it were the following items: (a) 32 transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance
with a total weight of 29.2941 kilograms, which substance was later analyzed as positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug locally known as shabu; (b) cash in the amount of
₱650,000.00; (c) one electronic and one mechanical scales; and (d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol
with magazine. Then and there, Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search. 8
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion, accused Wang was granted 25
days from said date within which to file his intended Demurrer to Evidence. 9 On 19 December 1996, the
prosecution filed a Manifestation10 to the effect that it had rested its case only in so far as the charge for
Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 96-149990 is concerned, and not as regards
the two cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms (Crim. Case No. 96-149991) and Violation of the Comelec
Gun Ban (Crim. Case No. 96-149992). Accordingly, trial continued.
On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, 11 praying for his acquittal and the
dismissal of the three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the
inadmissibility of the prosecution’s evidence against him. Considering that the prosecution has not yet
filed its Opposition to the demurrer, Wang filed an Amplification 12 to his Demurrer of Evidence on 20
January 1997. On 12 February 1997, the prosecution filed its Opposition 13 alleging that the warrantless
search was legal as an incident to the lawful arrest and that it has proven its case, so it is now time for
the defense to present its evidence.
On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the herein assailed
Resolution14 granting Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of evidence,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the accused's undated Demurrer to Evidence is hereby granted; the accused is acquitted of
the charges against him for the crimes of Violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
Illegal Possession of Firearms, and Violation of Comelec Gun Ban, for lack of evidence; the 32 bags of
shabu with a total weight of 29.2941 kilograms and the two unlicensed pistols, one AMT Cal. .380 9mm
and one Daewoo Cal. 9mm. are ordered confiscated in favor of the government and the branch clerk is
directed to turn over the 32 bags of shabu to the Dangerous Drugs Board in Intramuros, Manila, and the
two firearms to the Firearms and Explosive Units, PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon City, for proper disposition,
and the officer-in-charge of PARAC, Department of Interior and Local Government, is ordered to return
the confiscated amount of P650,000.00 to the accused, and the confiscated BMW car to its registered
owner, David Lee. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition15 for review on certiorari by the People, submitting that the trial court erred -
XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT CONSTITUTE PROBABLE
CAUSE WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND IN
HOLDING THAT SUCH FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES NEITHER JUSTIFIED THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF
ACCUSED'S VEHICLE AND THE SEIZURE OF THE CONTRABAND THEREIN.
ll
XXX IN HOLDING, IN EFFECT, THAT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOWABLE AND

CAN ONLY BE VALID AS AN INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
lII
XXX IN DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AND THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF HIS
HANDGUNS UNLAWFUL.
IV
XXX IN NOT DECLARING THE ACCUSED AS HAVING WAIVED, AS A RESULT OF HIS SUBMISSION AND
FAILURE TO PROTEST THE SEARCH AND HIS ARREST, HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND HIS OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE
SEIZED.
XXX IN NOT ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AND OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION AND
IN NOT DENYING ACCUSED'S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
In its Resolution16 of 9 July 1997, the Court, without giving due course to the petition, required the public
and private respondents to comment thereon within ten days from notice. Private respondent Wang
filed his comment17on 18 August 1997.
On 10 September 1997, the Court required the People to file a reply, 18 which the Office of the Solicitor
General did on 5 December 1997, after several extensions. 19
On 20 October 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda,20 which they did.
The case presents two main issues: (a) whether the prosecution may appeal the trial court’s resolution
granting Wang’s demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the charges against him without violating
the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy; and (b) whether there was lawful arrest, search
and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a
search warrant.
First off, it must be emphasized that the present case is an appeal filed directly with this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 in relation to Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph (c) of the Rules
of Court raising only pure questions of law, ordinary appeal by mere filing of a notice of appeal not being
allowed as a mode of appeal directly to this Court. Then, too, it bears stressing that the right to appeal is
neither a natural right nor a part of due process, it being merely a statutory privilege which may be
exercised only in the manner provided for by law (Velasco v. Court of Appeals 21). Although Section 2, Rule
122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that any party may appeal, the right of the People to
appeal is, in the very same provision, expressly made subject to the prohibition against putting the
accused in double jeopardy. It also basic that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole records of the
case wide open for review by the appellate court, that is why any appeal from a judgment of acquittal
necessarily puts the accused in double jeopardy. In effect, the very same Section 2 of Rule 122 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, disallows appeal by the People from judgments of acquittal.
An order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits, and it
amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would
violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. To this general rule, however, the Court has
previously made some exceptions.
The celebrated case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan 22 presents one exception to the rule on double
jeopardy, which is, when the prosecution is denied due process of law:
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very President who by an
amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition
challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan
instead of to a court martial, as mandatorily required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for
exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses committed by military men) made it
possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of
due process of law. As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and
not by preselection of the Executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a means of
predetermining the outcome of individual cases." This criminal collusion as to the handling and
treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only
after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and
voided ab initio its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of
respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that
there has been no evidence or witness suppressed against them, that the erroneous conclusions of
Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he investigated and the
appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be
time and opportunity to present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the
cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand
unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would
have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and
duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are
sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a
right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of
politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know
the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military
tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the
regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim
of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved
parties plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial — the non-trial of the century
— and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy. — It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this
Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which
represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. As the Court stressed in the
1985 case of People vs. Bocar,
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due
process is thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of
their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional
issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which
cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process
is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs.
Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 19731, 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 Feb. 27,
1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a
"lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its
head" (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the
same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court
was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due
process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further
hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and
does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal case
by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence. In point is the fairly recent case of People v. Uy, 23 which
involved the trial court’s decision which granted the two separate demurrers to evidence filed by the two
accused therein, both with leave of court, resulting in their acquittal of their respective charges of
murder due to insufficiency of evidence. In resolving the petition for certiorari filed directly with this
Court, we had the occasion to explain:
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. People v.
Court of Appeals explains the rationale of this rule:
In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double jeopardy faithfully
adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United States. In this case, verdicts of acquittal are
to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. The cases of United States v. Yam Tung Way, People
v. Bringas, Gandicela v. Lutero, People v. Cabarles, People v. Bao, to name a few, are illustrative cases. The
fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the
defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government oppression
through the abuse of criminal processes. As succinctly observed in Green v. United States "(t)he
underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is
that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty." (Underscoring supplied)
The same rule applies in criminal cases where a demurrer to evidence is granted. As held in the case
of People v. Sandiganbayan:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had
rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by
the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in
a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a
criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place
the accused in double-jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there. (Italics in the
original)
Like any other rule, however, the above-said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a judgment of
acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not
merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Sanvicente v. People,24 the Court allowed the review of a decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
reversed the accused’s acquittal upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with leave of court, the
CA ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in preventing the prosecution from
establishing the due execution and authenticity of certain letter marked therein as Exhibit "LL," which
supposedly "positively identified therein petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime charged." The Court,
in a petition for certiorari, sustained the CA’s power to review the order granting the demurrer to
evidence, explaining thus:
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court may
dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused with or without leave of court. In resolving accused’s demurrer to evidence, the court is merely
required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or
support a verdict of guilt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and its
ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly,
once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of
the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an
exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused
or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy. The finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed thus in
People v. Velasco:
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into the
"humanity of the laws and in jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizens, when brought in
unequal contest with the State xxx. Thus Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one
that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all
its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent, he may be found guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to
the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this
rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice
system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in the
finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need
for "repose", a desire to know the exact extent of one’s liability. With this right of repose, the criminal
justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests
upon a jury’s leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
Given the far-reaching scope of an accused’s right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an
alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach
is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a
sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in
such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. (Emphasis supplied.)
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an
accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65
based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such
dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of
dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the
right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.
Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines, through then Secretary of Justice Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. and then Solicitor General Silvestre H. Bello, III, filed with the Court in the present case is an
appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure question of law, which is
different from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
In Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, 25 we have enumerated the distinction
between the two remedies/actions, to wit:
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall be
explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors
of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:
"When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court
would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot
be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of
judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the
original civil action of certiorari."
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the
purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court -- on the basis either of
the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings
of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond
the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a
mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of
review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of
control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the
original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part of the
trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal
are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved
party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the
prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declared
are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an
interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal
or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must file a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of judgment or final
order. A petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the
decision, or of the petitioner’s timely filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In an
appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or
final order, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of
judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed,
the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally required prior
to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the
alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the
law. Such motion is not required before appealing a judgment or final order.
Also in Madrigal, we stressed that the special civil action of certiorari and appeal are two different
remedies mutually exclusive; they are neither alternative nor successive. Where appeal is available,
certiorari will not prosper. In the dismissal of a criminal case upon demurrer to evidence, appeal is not
available as such an appeal will put the accused in double jeopardy. Certiorari, however, is allowed.
For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of the Philippines in this case, this petition is
outrightly dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal order of the trial court by appeal
without violating private respondent’s right against double jeopardy.
Even assuming that the Court may treat an "appeal" as a special civil action of certiorari, which definitely
this Court has the power to do, when there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by
the lower court, the instant petition will nevertheless fail on the merits as the succeeding discussion will
show.
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the warrantless arrest and the warrantless
search. There is no question that warrantless search may be conducted as an incident to a valid
warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the
process cannot be reversed. 26 However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and seizure
which thereafter shows that the accused is currently committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully
arrested in flagrante delicto27 without need for a warrant of arrest.
Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar, the trial court
granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all the three charges for lack of
evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an
invalid warrantless search. The trial court’s ratiocination is quoted as follows:
The threshold issue raised by the accused in his Demurrer to Evidence is whether his warrantless arrest
and search were lawful as argued by the prosecution, or unlawful as asserted by the defense.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer may arrest a person without a
warrant: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it, and (c) when the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while being transferred from one confinement to
another. None of these circumstances were present when the accused was arrested. The accused was
merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the
police officers arrested and frisked him and searched his car. The accused was not committing any visible
offense at the time of his arrest. Neither was there an indication that he was about to commit a crime or
that he had just committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol that
the accused had in his possession was concealed inside the right front pocket of his pants. And the
handgun was bantam and slim in size that it would not give an outward indication of a concealed gun if
placed inside the pant's side pocket as was done by the accused. The arresting officers had no
information and knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did they see him
in possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest.
Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Cal. 9mm Pistol with magazine that
were found and seized from the car. The contraband items in the car were not in plain view. The 32 bags
of shabu were in the trunk compartment, and the Daewoo handgun was underneath the driver’s seat of
the car. The police officers had no information, or knowledge that the banned articles were inside the
car, or that the accused had placed them there. The police officers searched the car on mere suspicion
that there was shabu therein.
On this matter, pertinent portions of the testimonies of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and SP03
Reynaldo are hereunder quoted:
POLICE INSPECTOR CIELITO CORONEL’S TESTIMONY
"PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: Direct-Examination
Q. Mr. Witness, what was your role or participation in this case?
A. I am one of those responsible for the arrest of the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Where did you make that arrest, Mr. Witness?

A. The apprehension was made in front of an apartment along Maria Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila.
Q. What date was that when you arrested the accused?
A. It was on May 17, 1996, at about 2:10 a.m.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What was the reason why you together with other policemen effected the arrest of the accused?
A. We arrested him because of the information relayed to us by one of those whom we have previously
apprehended in connection with the delivery of shabu somewhere also in Ermita, Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you established that he was somewhere at Maria Orosa, what did you do?
A. We waited for him.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You yourself, Mr. Witness, where did you position yourself during that time?
A. I was inside a vehicle waiting for the accused to appear.
Q. What about your other companions where were they?
A. They were position in strategic places within the area.
Q. What happened when you and your companions were positioned in that place?
A. That was when the accused arrived.
Q. How many of your approached him.
A. Inspector Margallo, myself and two other operatives.
Q. What happened when you approached the accused, Mr. Witness?
A. We introduced ourselves as police officers and we frisked him and we asked him to open the back
compartment of his car.
Q. You said you frisked him, what was the result of that?
A. He was found in possession of one back-up pistol with one loaded magazine and likewise when the
compartment was opened several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance suspected to be
shabu (were found).
Q. What did you do when you found out Mr. Witness?
A. When the car was further search we later found another firearm, a Daewoo Pistol at the place under
the seat of the driver.
Q. Then what happened?
A. He was brought to our headquarters at Mandaluyong for further investigation.

Q. What about the suspected shabu that you recovered, what did you do with that?
A. The suspected shabu that we recovered were forwarded to the NBI for laboratory examination.
Q. Did you come to know the results?
A. It was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. (TSN, pp. 3-8, November 15, 1996).
ATTY. LOZANO TO WITNESS: CROSS
Q. You arrested Joseph Junio and Redentor Teck for alleged transporting of shabu on May 16, 1996, at
11:00 p.m., is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. You asked Redentor Teck where he is employed, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Redentor Teck told you that he is a talent manager at the Glenmore Modeling Agency, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
.Q. The Glenmore Modeling Agency is owned by Lawrence Wang, is it not?
A. I supposed, Sir.
Q. And that is why immediately after Redentor Teck told you that he is an employee of the Glenmore
Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang, naturally, you and your companions look for Lawrence
Wang to shed light on the transporting of shabu by Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Thereafter, you spotted a person previously described by Redentor Teck as Lawrence Wang, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. While you were arresting Lawrence Wang, your companions at the same time searched the BMW car
described in your affidavit of arrest, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Lawrence Wang was not inside the BMW car while the same was searched, is it not?
A. He was outside, Sir.
Q. The driver of the car was inside the car when the arrest and search were made, is it not?
A. He was likewise outside, Sir.
Q. Lawrence Wang did resist arrest and search is it not?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. When you effected the arrest, there was no warrant of arrest, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. When the search was made on the BMW car, there was no search warrant, is it not?
A. Yes, none, Sir. (TSN, pp. 3-12, November 15, 1996)
SPO3 REYNALDO CRISTOBAL’S TESTIMONY
PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: DIRECT EXAMINATION
Q. What is you role or participation in this case?
A. I was one of the arresting officers and investigator, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What kind of specific offense did the accused allegedly do so that you arrested him, Mr. Witness?
A. He was arrested on the basis of the recovered drugs in his possession placed inside his car.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Mr. witness, you said that you recovered drug from the car of the accused, please tell us the
antecedent circumstances which led you to recover or confiscate these items?
A. Earlier in the evening about 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested one Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio.
COURT: Where did you arrest these people?
A They were arrested in Metro Manila also.
COURT: The same date?
A. May 16, about 11:00 p.m. They were arrested and when they were investigated, Teck mentioned the
name of Lawrence Wang as his employer.
COURT: Why were these people, arrested?
A. For violation of R.A. 6425.
COURT: How were they arrested?
A. They were arrested while in the act of transporting shabu or handling shabu to another previously
arrested person. It was a series of arrest.
COURT: So, this involved a series of operation?
A. Yes, Your Honor. About 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested three (3) persons, SPO2 Vergel de Dios, a
certain Arellano and a certain Rogelio Noble. When they were arrested they divulged the name of the
source.
COURT: They were arrested for what, for possession?

A. Yes, Your Honor. For unlawful possession of shabu . Then they divulged to us the name of the person
from whom they get shabu.
COURT: Whose name did they mention:
A. One Alias Frank, who turned out to be Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. We let them call Redentor
Teck and Joseph Junio thru the cellphone and pretend and to order another supply of shabu.
COURT: So there was an entrapment?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: So, these two (2) were arrested?
A. While they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to Noble and company.
COURT: And these two reveals (revealed) some information to you as to the source of the shabu?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: What was the information?
A. Teck told us that he is an employee of Lawrence Wang.
COURT: What did you do when you were told about that?
A. They also told us that there was an ongoing delivery of shabu on that morning.
COURT: When?
A. Of that date early morning of May 17, 1996.
COURT: At what place?
A. We asked them where we could find Lawrence Wang and Teck lead us to Maria Orosa Apartment
where we conducted a stake out which lasted up to 2:00 a.m.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: What happened during the stake out?
A. When the person of the accused was identified to us, we saw him opening his car together with his
driver.
COURT: So, he was about to leave when you saw him?
A. Probably, Sir.
COURT: What did you do?
A. We saw him opened his car and we have a suspicion that there was a shabu inside the compartment
of the car.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: All right, when you saw the accused opened his car, what did you do?
A. We approached him.
COURT: What happened when you approached him?
A. We suspected the shabu inside the compartment of his car.
COURT: And this shabu that you saw inside the compartment of the car, what did you do with that?
A. Well, he was first arrested by Captain Margallo and Lt. Coronel while I was the one who inspected and
opened the compartment of the car and saw the shabu. (TSN, pp. 15-24, December 16, 1996).
CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONING OF SPO3 CRISTOBAL BY THE COURT
COURT: From your testimony and that of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel, this Court has gathered that
prior to the arrest of the accused there were three (3) men that your team arrested. One of whom is a
police officer.
A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: And on the occasion of the arrest of these three men shabu were confiscated from them?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And in the course of the investigation of these three men, you were able to discover that Redentor
Teck and Joseph Junio were the source of the regulated drug that were confiscated from the three men
that you have arrested?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, thru entrapment base[d] on your testimony you were able to apprehend also these two men,
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio?
A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: These two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio they were also investigated by your team?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: You were present while they were investigated?
A: I was the one whom investigated them.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did you ask Redentor and Joseph the source of shabu that you confiscated from them at the time of
the (their) arrest?
A: Yes, Sir. They refuse to say the source, however, they told me that they were working for the accused.
Q: You also testified that Redentor informed you that there was another delivery of shabu scheduled
that morning of (stop) was it May 16 or 17? The other delivery that is scheduled on?
A: On the 17th.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did he tell you who was to make the delivery?
A: No, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: At that time when you decided to look for the accused to ask him to shed light on the matter
concerning the arrest of these two employees in possession of shabu. Did you and did your team suspect
the accused as being involved in the transaction that lead (led) to the arrest of Redentor and Joseph?
A: Yes, Sir. We suspected that he was the source of the shabu.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you saw the accused walking towards his car, did you know whether he was carrying a gun?
A: No, Sir. It cannot be seen.
Q: It was concealed?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So, the only time that you and your team learned that he was in possession of the gun is when he was
bodily search?
A: Yes, Sir. That is the only time that I came to know about when Capt. Margallo handed to me the gun.
Q: Other than walking towards his car, the accused was not doing anything else?
A: None, Sir.
Q: That would invite your suspicion or give indication that he was intending to do something unlawful or
illegal?
A: No, Sir.
Q: When you searched the car, did the accused protest or try to prevent your team from searching his
car?
A: No, Sir." (TSN pp. 3-16, Feb. 26, 1997)
Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his person and the car were
without probable cause and could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did not fall under any of the
exception to the requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court) and is therefore,
unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional right of liberty. x x x
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the search, and
finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful.
Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the
trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence.
Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now posits that "inasmuch as it has been
shown in the present case that the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and unlicensed
firearms in the accused’s possession had been validly made upon probable cause and under exigent
circumstances, then the warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be regarded as
having been made on the occasion of the commission of the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore
constitutionally and statutorily permissible and lawful." 28In effect, the People now contends that the
warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest. Since the case falls under an exception to the
general rule requiring search warrant prior to a valid search and seizure, the police officers were justified
in requiring the private respondent to open his BMW car’s trunk to see if he was carrying illegal drugs.
The conflicting versions as to whether the arrest preceded the search or vice versa, is a matter of
credibility of evidence. It entails appreciation of evidence, which may be done in an appeal of a criminal
case because the entire case is thrown open for review, but not in the case of a petition for certiorari
where the factual findings of the trial court are binding upon the Court. Since a dismissal order
consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal and reviewable only by certiorari, the
factual finding that the arrest preceded the search is conclusive upon this Court. The only legal basis for
this Court to possibly reverse and set aside the dismissal order of the trial court upon demurrer to
evidence would be if the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in excess of jurisdiction when it
ruled that there was no legal basis to lawfully effect a warrantless arrest.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provide:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a)
arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of
the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the author of a crime which had just
been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be
valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 291awphi1.nét
The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious behavior on
the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the police.
He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car
when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open
the compartment of the car, which was later on found to be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not
committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante
delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt
act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is
not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. 30
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is clearly
established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the
information that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who were previously arrested
and charged for illegal transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be
their source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duo’s declaration that
there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the following day, May 17, which is only a few
hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the
arresting officers conducted "surveillance" operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a person
which will match the description of one Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These
circumstances do not sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on personal knowledge
as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was illegal.
Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
In People v. Aminnudin,31 the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the marijuana found in
appellant’s possession during a search without a warrant, because it had been illegally seized, in
disregard of the Bill of Rights:
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was
only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became a
suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the fugitive finger that triggered his arrest. The
identification of the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officer (and not a judge) that
authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
The People’s contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable search and seizure has no
factual basis. While we agree in principle that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, however,
based on the evidence on record, Wang resisted his arrest and the search on his person and
belongings.32 The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than
mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. 33Moreover, the continuing objection to
the validity of the warrantless arrest made of record during the arraignment bolsters Wang’s claim that
he resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
We cannot close this ponencia without a word of caution: those who are supposed to enforce the law
are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price
for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes once said, "I think it is less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to
violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. 34
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Foonotes
1
Penned by Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr.; Annex "A" of the petition, Rollo, pp. 41-55.
2
RTC records, p. 2.
3
Id. at 3.
4
Id. at 4.
5
Id. at 36.
6
TSN, February 26, 1997, p. 6.
7
TSN, November 15, 1996, p. 7.
8
Id. at 11.
9
RTC records, p. 45.
10
Id. at 47-49.
11
Id. at 51-76.
12
Id. at 78-85.
13
Id. at 109-115.
14
Original Record, pp. 135-149.
15
Rollo, pp. 8-38.
16
Id. at 57.
17
Id. at 58-60.
18
Id. at 181.
19
Id. at 316-337.
20
Id. at 353.
21
G.R. No. L-31018, June 29, 1973, 51 SCRA 349.
22
G.R. No. L-72670, September 12, 1986, 144 SCRA 43.
23
G.R. No. 158157, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 668.
24
441 Phil. 139 (2002).
25
G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 123.
26
Malacat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997, 283 SCRA 159.
27
People v. Claudio, G.R. No. L-72564, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 646.
28
Petition, p. 21; Rollo, p. 23.
29
Supra, citing the Concurring Opinion of then Justice, later Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in
People v. Doria, supra.
30
People v. Binad Sy Chua, 444 Phil. 757 (2003), citing People v. Molina, G.R. No. 133917, February 19,
2001, 352 SCRA 174.
31
G.R. No. L-74869, July 6, 1988, 163 SCRA 402.
32
TSN, November 15, 1996, p. 11 and December 6, 1995, p. 24.
33
People v. Compacion, 414 Phil. 68 (2001).
34
Supra note 32, at 411.

Constitution
Statutes
Executive Issuances
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Other Issuances
Jurisprudence
AUSL Exclusive
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 182348
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
CARLOS DELA CRUZ, Promulgated:
Accused-Appellant.
November 20, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the November 29, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 02286 entitled People of the Philippines v. Carlos Dela Cruz which affirmed the September 16, 2005
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77 in San Mateo, Rizal in Criminal Case Nos. 6517
(Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition) and 6518 (Possession of Dangerous Drug). The RTC found
accused- appellant Carlos Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11(2) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
On November 15, 2002, charges against accused-appellant were made before the RTC. The Informations
read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6517
That, on or about the 20th day of October 2002, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then a
private citizen, without any lawful authority, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly have
in his possession and under his custody and control One (1) Gauge Shotgun marked ARMSCOR with
Serial No. 1108533 loaded with four (4) live ammunition, which are high powered firearm and
ammunition respectively, without first securing the necessary license to possess or permit to carry said
firearm and ammunition from the proper authorities.
Criminal Case No. 6518
That on or about the 20th day of October 2002, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, direct
custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag weighing 49.84 grams of white
crystalline substance, which gave positive results for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.[1]
Accused-appellant entered a not guilty plea and trial ensued.
The facts, according to the prosecution, showed that in the morning of October 20, 2002, an informant
tipped off the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Marikina Police Station that wanted drug pusher Wifredo
Loilo alias Boy Bicol was at his nipa hut hideout in San Mateo, Rizal. A team was organized to arrest Boy
Bicol. Once there, they saw Boy Bicol by a table talking with accused-appellant. They shouted Boy
Bicol sumuko ka na may warrant of arrest ka. (Surrender yourself Boy Bicol you have a warrant of
arrest.) Upon hearing this, Boy Bicol engaged them in a shootout and was fatally shot. Accused-appellant
was seen holding a shotgun through a window. He dropped his shotgun when a police officer pointed his
firearm at him. The team entered the nipa hut and apprehended accused-appellant. They saw a plastic
bag of suspected shabu, a digital weighing scale, drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and magazines lying
on the table. PO1 Calanoga, Jr. put the markings CVDC, the initials of accused-appellant, on the bag
containing the seized drug.
Accused-appellant was subsequently arrested. The substance seized from the hideout was sent to the
Philippine National Police crime laboratory for examination and tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. He was thus separately indicted for violation of RA 9165 and for illegal
possession of firearm.
According to the defense, accused-appellant was at Boy Bicols house having been asked to do a welding
job for Boy Bicols motorcycle. While accused-appellant was there, persons who identified themselves as
police officers approached the place, prompting accused-appellant to scamper away. He lied face down
when gunshots rang. The buy-bust team then helped him get up. He saw the police officers searching the
premises and finding shabu and firearms, which were on top of a table or drawer. [2] When he asked the
reason for his apprehension, he was told that it was because he was a companion of Boy Bicol. He
denied under oath that the gun and drugs seized were found in his possession and testified that he was
only invited by Boy Bicol to get the motorcycle from his house. [3]
The RTC acquitted accused-appellant of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition but convicted him
of possession of dangerous drugs. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court based on insufficiency of evidence hereby ACQUITS accused CARLOS DELA CRUZ
Y VICTORINO in Criminal Case No. 6517 for violation of P.D. 1866 as amended by RA 8294.
In Criminal Case No. 6518 for Possession of Dangerous Drug under Section 11, 2 nd paragraph of Republic
Act 9165, the Court finds said accused CARLOS DELA CRUZ Y VICTORINO, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt and is hereby sentenced to Life Imprisonment and to Pay a Fine of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P400,000.00).
SO ORDERED.[4]
On December 7, 2005, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the RTC Decision.
In his appeal to the CA, accused-appellant claimed that: (1) the version of the prosecution should not
have been given full credence; (2) the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was
guilty of possession of an illegal drug; (3) his arrest was patently illegal; and (4) the prosecution failed to
establish the chain of custody of the illegal drug allegedly in his possession.
The CA sustained accused-appellants conviction. [5] It pointed out that accused-appellant was positively
identified by prosecution witnesses, rendering his uncorroborated denial and allegation of frame-up
weak. As to accused-appellants alleged illegal arrest, the CA held that he is deemed to have waived his
objection when he entered his plea, applied for bail, and actively participated in the trial without
questioning such arrest.
On the supposedly broken chain of custody of the illegal drug, the appellate court held that accused-
appellants claim is unpersuasive absent any evidence showing that the plastic sachet of shabu had been
tampered or meddled with.
On December 20, 2007, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal of the CA Decision.
On June 25, 2008, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. The
parties later signified their willingness to submit the case on the basis of the records already with the
Court.
Accused-appellant presents the following issues before us:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 11, ARTICLE II, RA 9165 DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED DESPITE THE PATENT ILLEGALITY OF HIS ARREST
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION
11, ARTICLE II, RA 9165 DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF
CUSTODY OF THE ILLEGAL DRUG ALLEGEDLY FOUND IN HIS POSSESSION
Accused-appellant claims that the presence of all the elements of the offense of possession of
dangerous drug was not proved beyond reasonable doubt since both actual and constructive
possessions were not proved. He asserts that the shabu was not found in his actual possession, for which
reason the prosecution was required to establish that he had constructive possession over the shabu. He
maintains that as he had no control and dominion over the drug or over the place where it was found,
the prosecution likewise failed to prove constructive possession.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal has merit.
The elements in illegal possession of dangerous drug are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. [6] On the third element, we have held that
the possession must be with knowledge of the accused or that animus possidendi existed with the
possession or control of said articles.[7] Considering that as to this knowledge, a persons mental state of
awareness of a fact is involved, we have ruled that:
Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its perceptions with certainty,
resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a
case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well
as the surrounding circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from the attendant
events in each particular case.[8]
The prior or contemporaneous acts of accused-appellant show that: he was inside the nipa hut at the
time the buy-bust operation was taking place; he was talking to Boy Bicol inside the nipa hut; he was
seen holding a shotgun; when PO1 Calanoga, Jr. pointed his firearm at accused-appellant, the latter
dropped his shotgun; and when apprehended, he was in a room which had the seized shabu, digital
weighing scale, drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and magazines. Accused-appellant later admitted that
he knew what the content of the seized plastic bag was. [9]
Given the circumstances, we find that the prosecution failed to establish possession of the shabu,
whether in its actual or constructive sense, on the part of accused-appellant.
The two buy-bust team members corroborated each others testimonies on how they saw Boy Bicol
talking to accused-appellant by a table inside the nipa hut. That table, they testified, was the same table
where they saw the shabu once inside the nipa hut. This fact was used by the prosecution to show that
accused-appellant exercised dominion and control over the shabu on the table. We, however, find this
too broad an application of the concept of constructive possession.
In People v. Torres,[10] we held there was constructive possession of prohibited drugs even when the
accused was not home when the prohibited drugs were found in the masters bedroom of his house.
In People v. Tira,[11] we sustained the conviction of the accused husband and wife for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Their residence was searched and their bed was found to be concealing illegal drugs
underneath. We held that the wife cannot feign ignorance of the drugs existence as she had full access
to the room, including the space under the bed.
In Abuan v. People,[12] we affirmed the finding that the accused was in constructive possession of
prohibited drugs which had been found in the drawer located in her bedroom.
In all these cases, the accused was held to be in constructive possession of illegal drugs since they were
shown to enjoy dominion and control over the premises where these drugs were found.
In the instant case, however, there is no question that accused-appellant was not the owner of the nipa
hut that was subject of the buy-bust operation. He did not have dominion or control over the nipa hut.
Neither was accused-appellant a tenant or occupant of the nipa hut, a fact not disputed by the
prosecution. The target of the operation was Boy Bicol. Accused-appellant was merely a guest of Boy
Bicol. But in spite of the lack of evidence pinning accused-appellant to illegal possession of drugs, the
trial court declared the following:
It cannot be denied that when the accused was talking with Boy Bicol he knew that the shabu was on the
table with other items that were confiscated by the police operatives. The court [surmises] that the
accused and boy Bicol were members of a gang hiding in that nipa hut where they were caught red-
handed with prohibited items and dangerous [drugs]. [13]
The trial court cannot assume, based on the prosecutions evidence, that accused-appellant was part of a
gang dealing in illegal activities. Apart from his presence in Boy Bicols nipa hut, the prosecution was not
able to show his participation in any drug-dealing. He was not even in possession of drugs in his person.
He was merely found inside a room with shabu, not as the rooms owner or occupant but as a guest.
While he allegedly pointed a firearm at the buy-bust team, the prosecution curiously failed to produce
the firearm that accused-appellant supposedly used.
The prosecution in this case clearly failed to show all the elements of the crime absent a showing of
either actual or constructive possession by the accused-appellant.
Since accused-appellant was not in possession of the illegal drugs in Boy Bicols nipa hut, his subsequent
arrest was also invalid. Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was effected under Sec. 5(a), arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.[14]
Accused-appellants act of pointing a firearm at the buy-bust team would have been sufficient basis for
his arrest in flagrante delicto; however, the prosecution was not able to adequately prove that accused-
appellant was committing an offense. Although accused-appellant merely denied possessing the firearm,
the prosecutions charge was weak absent the presentation of the alleged firearm. He was eventually
acquitted by the trial court because of this gaffe. His arrest, independent of the buy-bust operation
targeting Boy Bicol, was therefore not lawful as he was not proved to be committing any offense.
In sum, we find that there is insufficient evidence to show accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Having ruled on the lack of material or constructive possession by accused-appellant of the
seized shabu and his succeeding illegal arrest, we deem it unnecessary to deal with the other issue
raised.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The CA Decision dated November 29, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02286 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Carlos Dela Cruz is ACQUITTED of violation of Sec.
11(2) of RA 9165 in Criminal Case No. 6518 of the RTC, Branch 77 in San Mateo, Rizal.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, p. 3.
[2]
Id. at 5.
[3]
CA rollo, p. 17.
[4]
Id. at 26. Penned by Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez, Jr.
[5]
Rollo, p. 18. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr. and concurred in by
Associate Justices Mario L. Guaria III and Japar B. Dimaampao.
[6]
People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, July 28, 2008.
[7]
People v. Lagata, G.R. No. 135323, June 25, 2003, 404 SCRA 671, 676; citing People v. Tee, G.R. Nos.
140546-47, January 20, 2003, 395 SCRA 419.
[8]
Lagata, supra; citing People v. Burton, 335 Phil. 1003, 1024-1025 (2000).
[9]
Rollo, p. 50.
[10]
G.R. No. 170837, September 12, 2006, 501 SCRA 591, 610-611.
[11]
G.R. No. 139615, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 134, 152-153.
[12]
G.R. No. 168773, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 799, 818-819.
[13]
CA rollo, p. 25.
[14]
People v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 128587, March 16, 2007, 518 SCRA 393, 422.
Top of Form

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 204603 September 24, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 204603 PHILIPPINES, represented by THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONALDEFENSE,
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT THE TREASURER OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE CHIEFOF
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Petitioners,
vs.
HERMINIO HARRY ROQUE, MORO CHRISTIAN PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE, FR. JOE DIZON, RODINIE SORIANO,
STEPHANIE ABIERA, MARIA LOURDES ALCAIN, VOLTAIRE ALFEREZ, CZARINA MAYALTEZ, SHERYL BALOT,
RENIZZA BATACAN, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE, LEANA CARAMOAN, ALDWIN CAMANCE, RENE DELORINO,
PAULYN MAY DUMAN, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, ANNAMARIE GO, ANNA ARMINDA JIMENEZ, MARY ANN
LEE,LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, NORMAN ROLAND OCANA III,
WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, CHERRY LOU REYES, MELISSA ANN SICAT, CRISTINE MAE
TABING, VANESSA TORNO, and HON. JUDGE ELEUTERIO L. BATHAN, as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 92, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari 1 are the April 23, 20122 and July 31, 20123 Orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92(RTC) in Special Civil Action (SCA) No. Q-07-60778, denying
petitioners’ motion to dismiss (subject motion to dismiss) based on the following grounds: (a) that the
Court had yet to pass upon the constitutionality of Republic Act No. (RA) 9372, 4 otherwise known as the
"Human Security Act of 2007," in the consolidated cases of Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network,
Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council5 (Southern Hemisphere); and (b) that private respondents’ petition for
declaratory relief was proper.
The Facts
On July 17, 2007, private respondents filed a Petition 6 for declaratory relief before the RTC, assailing the
constitutionality of the following sections of RA 9372: (a) Section 3, 7 for being void for vagueness;8 (b)
Section 7,9for violating the right to privacy of communication and due process and the privileged nature
of priest-penitent relationships;10 (c)Section 18,11 for violating due process, the prohibition against ex
post facto laws or bills of attainder, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as for contradicting Article 125 12 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended;13 (d) Section 26,14 for violating the right to travel; 15 and (e) Section 27,16 for violating the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 17
Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings, 18 averring that certain petitions (SC petitions) raising the
issue of RA 9372’s constitutionality have been lodged before the Court. 19 The said motion was granted in
an Order dated October 19, 2007.20
On October 5, 2010, the Court promulgated its Decision 21 in the Southern Hemisphere cases and thereby
dismissed the SC petitions.
On February 27, 2012, petitioners filed the subject motion to dismiss, 22 contending that private
respondents failed to satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief. Likewise, they averred that the
constitutionality of RA 9372 had already been upheld by the Court in the Southern Hemisphere cases.
In their Comment/Opposition,23 private respondents countered that: (a) the Court did not resolve the
issue of RA 9372’s constitutionality in Southern Hemisphere as the SC petitions were dismissed based
purely on technical grounds; and (b) the requisites for declaratory relief were met.
The RTC Ruling
On April 23, 2012, the RTC issued an Order 24 which denied the subject motion to dismiss, finding that the
Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 and that private respondents’ petition for
declaratory relief was properly filed.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration 25 which was, however, denied by the RTC in an Order dated July
31, 2012.26The RTC observed that private respondents have personal and substantial interests in the case
and that it would be illogical to await the adverse consequences of the aforesaid law’s implementation
considering that the case is of paramount impact to the Filipino people. 27
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its
discretion when it denied the subject motion to dismiss.
Asserting the affirmative, petitioners argue that private respondents failed to satisfy the requirements
for declaratory relief and that the Court had already sustained with finality the constitutionality of RA
9372.
On the contrary, private respondents maintain that the requirements for declaratory relief have been
satisfied and that the Court has yet to resolve the constitutionality of RA 9372, negating any grave abuse
of discretion on the RTC’s part.
The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.
An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is
done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 28 It is well-
settled that the abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so patent or gross as to constitute
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of
law.29 In this relation, case law states that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous
conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 30The degree of gravity, as above-
described, must be met.
Applying these principles, the Court observes that while no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed
on the part of the RTC when it found that the Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 in
the Southern Hemisphere cases, it, however, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled that private
respondents’ petition had met all the requisites for an action for declaratory relief. Consequently, its
denial of the subject motion to dismiss was altogether improper.
To elucidate, it is clear that the Court, in Southern Hemisphere, did not make any definitive ruling on the
constitutionality of RA 9372. The certiorari petitions in those consolidated cases were dismissed based
solely on procedural grounds, namely: (a) the remedy of certiorari was improper; 31 (b) petitioners
therein lack locus standi;32and (c) petitioners therein failed to present an actual case or
controversy.33 Therefore, there was no grave abuse of discretion.
The same conclusion cannot, however, be reached with regard to the RTC’s ruling on the sufficiency of
private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief.
Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief:
first , the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second , the terms of said documents and the
validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third , there must have been no breach of
the documents in question; fourth , there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening
seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth , the issue must be ripe for judicial
determination; and sixth , adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action
or proceeding.34
Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that while the first, 35 second,36 and
third37requirements appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements, however,
remain wanting.
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening
seeds" of one exists in this case.
Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe
for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. 38 Corollary thereto, by
"ripening seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute
may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and
violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. The concept describes a state of facts indicating
imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing
declaration.39
A perusal of private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed to
demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far removed from the factual milieu
in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and
taxpayers and infractions which the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the
said law would remain untrammeled. As their petition would disclose, private respondents’ fear of
prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which were addressed to the
general public.40 They, however, failed to show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or
governmental action geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there
was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. As held in Southern Hemisphere:
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which
the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double
contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to
it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.1âwphi1
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372does not avail to take the present petitions out
of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the
exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real
events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.41 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed the SC petitions in the Southern Hemisphere cases on
the basis of, among others, lack of actual justiciable controversy (or the ripening seeds of one), the RTC
should have dismissed private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief all the same.
It is well to note that private respondents also lack the required locus standi to mount their
constitutional challenge against the implementation of the above-stated provisions of RA 9372 since
they have not shown any direct and personal interest in the case. 42 While it has been previously held that
transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement that the petitioner has experienced or
is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, 43 it must be stressed that cases involving the
constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional
litigation.44 Towards this end, compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful
conduct necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi, 45 as in this case. To rule otherwise, would be
to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general
public.46
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the controversy
at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the above-discussed allegations in
private respondents’ petition, remain highly-speculative and merely theorized.1âwphi1 It is well-settled
that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it.47 This private respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at bar.
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on the
availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the private respondents exists in
the first place.
All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifth requisites for an action for declaratory relief, as
well as the irrelevance of the sixth requisite, private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief should
have been dismissed. Thus, by giving due course to the same, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the April23, 2012 and July 31, 2012 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92 in SCA No. Q-07-60778 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the petition for declaratory relief before the said court is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

On Leave
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
On Official Leave On Official Leave

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA** LUCAS P. BERSAMIN**
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

On Leave
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
On Official Leave
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
* On leave.
** On Official leave.
1
Rollo, pp. 2-29.
2
Id. at 31-32. Penned by Presiding Judge Eleuterio L. Bathan.
3
Id. at 33-35.
4
"AN ACT TO SECURE THE STATE AND PROTECT OUR PEOPLE FROM TERRORISM."
5
G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157 & 179461, October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA 146.
6
Rollo , pp. 51-91.
7
SEC. 3. Terrorism.- Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the following provisions of
the Revised Penal Code:
a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine Waters);
b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
c. Article 134-a (Coup d' Etat), including acts committed by private persons;
d. Article 248 (Murder);
e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under
1. Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
2. Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990);
3. Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968);
4. Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
5. Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974); and,
6. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful
Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)
thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the
crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of
parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended.
8
Rollo, pp. 72-77.
9
SEC. 7. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording of Communications. - The provisions of
Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law) to the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law
enforcement official and the members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals,
listen to, intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other
surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways
and means for that purpose, any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or
written words between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization,
association, or group of persons or of any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism. Provided, That surveillance, interception and recording of
communications between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and
confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized.
10
Rollo, pp. 77-79.
11
SEC. 18. Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. - The provisions of Article 125of the
Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel, who,
having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall,
without incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities, deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within a period of
three days counted from the moment the said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or
arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided,
That the arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must
result from the surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits under Section 27 of this
Act.
The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining the person suspected of the
crime of terrorism, present him or her before any judge at the latter's residence or office nearest the
place where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge, among
other things, to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement personnel and the person or
persons they have arrested and presented before him or her, to inquire of them the reasons why they
have arrested the person and determine by questioning and personal observation whether or not the
suspect has been subjected to any physical, moral or psychological torture by whom and why. The judge
shall then submit a written report of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before
him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested. The judge shall
forthwith submit his/her report within three calendar days from the time the suspect was brought to
his/her residence or office.
Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement personnel shall notify in writing the judge
of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest: Provided, That where the arrest is made during
Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice shall be served at the residence of
the judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested.
The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon
the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify any judge as provided in the preceding
paragraph.
12
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The penalties
provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall
detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties,
or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or
their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed
upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel. (As amended by
Executive Order Nos. 59 and 272, November 7, 1986 and July 25, 1987, respectively.)
13
Rollo, pp. 79-85.
14
SEC. 26. Restriction on Travel. - In cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the person charged
with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is entitled to bail and is granted the same,
the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the right of travel of the accused to within the
municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security
and public safety, consistent with Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution. Travel outside of said
municipality or city, without the authorization of the court, shall be deemed a violation of the terms and
conditions of his bail, which shall then be forfeited as provided under the Rules of Court. He/she may
also be placed under house arrest by order of the court at his or her usual place of residence.
While under house arrest, he or she may not use telephones, cellphones, e-mails, computers, the
internet or other means of communications with people outside the residence until otherwise ordered
by the court.
The restrictions abovementioned shall be terminated upon the acquittal of the accused or of the
dismissal of the case filed against him or earlier upon the discretion of the court on motion of the
prosecutor or of the accused.
15
Rollo, pp. 85-86.
16
SEC. 27. Judicial Authorization Required to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. -The
provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 as amended, to the contrary notwithstanding, the justices of the
Court of Appeals designated as a special court to handle anti-terrorism cases after satisfying themselves
of the existence of probable cause in a hearing called for that purpose that: (1) a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, (2) of a judicially declared and
outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; and (3) of a member of such judicially
declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons, may authorize in writing any
police or law enforcement officer and the members of his/her team duly authorized in writing by the
anti-terrorism council to: (a) examine, or cause the examination of, the deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records in a bank or financial institution; and (b) gather or cause the gathering of
any relevant information about such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records from a
bank or financial institution. The bank or financial institution concerned, shall not refuse to allow such
examination or to provide the desired information, when so ordered by and served with the written
order of the Court of Appeals.
17
Rollo, pp. 86-88.
18
Id. at 95-99. Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings in Deference to Supreme Court dated
September 3, 2007.
19
Pertaining to the petitions for certiorari in the Southern Hemisphere cases.
20
Rollo, pp. 104-105. Penned by then Presiding Judge (now Court of Appeals Associate Justice) Samuel H.
Gaerlan.
21
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, supra note 5.
22
Rollo, pp. 107-117.
23
Id. at 118-132. Dated March 23, 2012.
24
Id. at 31-32.
25
Id. at 37-48. Dated June 13, 2012.
26
Id. at 33-35.
27
Id. at 35.
28
Yu v. Reyes-Carpio, G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 341, 348.
29
Chua Huat v. Court of Appeals, 276 Phil. 1, 18 (1991).
30
See Tavera-Luna, Inc. v. Nable, 67 Phil. 340, 344 (1939).
31
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, supra note 5, at 166-167.
32
Id. at 167-175.
33
Id. at 175-179.
34
Almeda v. Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., 566 Phil. 458, 467 (2008).
35
The subject matter of the controversy is a law, in particular, Sections 3, 7, 18, 26, and 27 of RA 9372.
36
Private respondents assert that the validity of Sections 3, 7, 18, 26, and 27 of RA 9372 remain doubtful
on grounds of, among others, void for vagueness, lack of due process, and for being violative of various
constitutional rights.
37
Private respondents admit that they have yet to suffer any injury from the implementation of the said
law. See rollo, pp. 162-164.
38
Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 283, 291.
39
HERRERA, OSCAR M., Remedial Law, Volume III, Special Civil Actions Rule 57-71, p. 193 (1999), citing
Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, 90 Phil. 83 (1951) and In re: Pablo Y. Sen. v. Republic of the
Philippines, 96 Phil. 987 (1955).
40
Rollo, pp. 62-65.
41
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, supra note 5, at 179.
42
"x x x A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It
must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right
or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action." (Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Exec. Sec. Ermita, 558 Phil.338, 351
[2007]; citations omitted.)
43
See Chavez v. PCGG, 360 Phil. 133, 155-156 (1998).
44
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, supra note 5, at 168.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 174.
47
Guingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 415, 427 (1998).

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EN BANC

BRICCIO Ricky A. POLLO, G.R. No. 181881

- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, PEREZ,

DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN MENDOZA,

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

The factual antecedents:

The letter-complaint reads:

Civil Service Commission

Batasan Hills, Quezon City

Dear Madam Chairwoman,

Belated Merry Christmas and Advance Happy New Year!

Concerned Govt employee[3]

We cant do anything about it its a directive from chair.

On the matter of government employees reasonable expectations of privacy in their

We come to a similar conclusion for searches conducted pursuant to an investigation of work-related

x x x x[47] (Emphasis supplied.)

Rule II Disciplinary Cases

With costs against the petitioner.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Today is Friday, January 11, 2019

Republic of the Philippines

G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

Q When did you receive this intelligence report?

Q What were those activities?

A Purely marijuana trafficking.

Q From whom did you get that information?

Q But you received it from your regular informer?

A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.

Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?

Q Are you sure of that?

A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.

A Only on the 23rd of June.

A Search warrant is not necessary. 23

Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

5 "Exh. 1," Original Records, p. 204.

6 Original Records, p. 26.

7 TSN, Sept. 19, 1984, p. 5; Oct. 25, 1984, p. 31.

8 TSN, Oct. 25, 1984, p. 29.

9 TSN, Sept. 19, 1984, pp. 6-7.

10 TSN, Sept. 5, 1984, pp. 8-10.

11 TSN, Aug. 15, 1985, p. 3.

12 Ibid., pp. 8-9; 19-20.

13 Id., pp. 10 & 13.

14 Brief for the Appellant, p. 22.

16 TSN, Aug. 15, 1985, pp. 17-18; 22-24.

21 TSN, Sept. 19, 1984, p. 19.

22 TSN, Oct. 25, 1984, p. 12.

23 TSN, Oct. 25, 1984, pp. 31-33.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

International Legal Resources

Today is Friday, January 11, 2019

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing

The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights: