SENIOR THESIS: ASSIGNMENT

THE PAST REGIME AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN PARTY

PROGRAMS

The Spanish Case

1. Introduction

This assignment focuses on changes of attitude towards the past authoritarian

regime and transitional justice among political parties in Spain and Chile. This part of

the assignment will only be focusing on Spain, and will be completed with the same

analysis with Chile. The work done will be an important part of the final project, since

comparing the results with a series of opinion polls and subjects will help us see the

relationship between the attitude of political parties and the global attitude of the public

opinion on issues of historical memory and transitional justice. After briefly explaining

the methodology used, I will analyze the mobilization of the past and of issues linked to

transitional justice in the two historical Spanish parties. First, I will focus on the Partido

Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE, Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party), the main left-wing

political group, before analyzing the Alianza/Partido Popular (AP/PP1, People’s

Alliance/Party), the main right-wing party in the country.

Since I am interested in the evolution of a party’s position on a very particular

issue over time, this analysis is based on party programs (Programa Electoral), issued

before every general election. The Spanish parliamentary system organizes such

elections every four years, unless there is an anticipated election. Since 1977, there have
1 Alianza Popular changed their name to Partido Popular in the late 1980s, as the party’s electoral
results were improving
been 13 general elections in Spain (fig. 1). The first one, in 1977, was organized by the

Francoist parliament, following the principles established in the Law for Political

Reform, at a crucial time for the Spanish Transition. The particularity of this election is

that the elected parliament worked as a constituent assembly in charge of drafting a new

Constitution, approved in December 1978, which led to new elections in 1979. After

this date and under the new constitutional frame, general elections were held in 1982,

1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015 and 2016. The only strong

irregularity can be noticed between 2015 and 2016. Due to the break-up of the two-

party system, the parliament was not able to designate a new head of government, which

lead to new elections the following year. In this analysis, the 2015 and 2016 elections

are treated as one and it will use the 2016 party programs, for the latter are merely a

copy of the 2015 ones with insignificant additions.

2. Methodological considerations

These party programs are divided by themes, sections and sub-sections. My goal

is to determine the general attitude of the PSOE and the AP/PP towards the Franco

regime, its legacy, and the role of justice and memory. Since in both Spain and Chile

there was a tacit pact between the incumbent regime and “democratic” right-wing

parties, it is also extremely interesting to focus on how this pact or consensus is

envisioned by the political parties, and if they are willing to break this pact, in the case

of right-wing parties.

For Spain, I analyzed 24 party programs: 12 for the PSOE and 12 for the AP/PP.

These programs vary in length and presentation of ideas, but give us a good idea of a

party’s objectives and priorities at a given time. The first strategy was to skim through

the documents looking for sections that could be particularly interesting. The first
section usually includes governing principles and a declaration by the leader, and was

always analyzed carefully. Sections on democratic and political practices, justice,

education, culture, and even foreign relations (for Spain’s image) were carefully

analyzed, while economy, employment, social welfare, environmental policy,

infrastructure, etc. were only skimmed through. In addition to this, I was looking for

specific words that appeared often, either through close reading for older programs, or

using the search tool for more recent ones. These words include dictadura

(dictatorship), Franco, Franquismo (Francoism), autoritario (authoritarian), memoria

histórica (historical memory), derechos humanos (human rights), transición (transition),

etc. This helped me make sure I had not forgotten anything and it made me notice

certain patterns in the way these two parties use or not certain words.

3. The PSOE

The PSOE was founded by Pablo Iglesias in 1879 and has thus a long history in

Spanish politics. During the Second Republic, it was part of the left-wing Frente

Popular (Popular Front) and it became one the main supporters of the Republican

system during the Spanish Civil War. Illegal under the Franco regime, its members were

either victims of repression or exiled in France and Mexico. It maintained a clandestine

structure in France until it was legalized again in 1977, becoming the core of the

unofficial opposition in the elections that year.

A. 1977

The 30-page document focuses mostly on structural issues regarding the

transition process and their priorities for post-authoritarian Spain. The PSOE explicitly

mentions the 40-year dictatorship (PSOE, 1977, 1) and explicitly supports the Transition
to democracy in order to get rid of the “oligarchic residues from the past regime” (4). It

self-identifies with the democratic system, creating a strong opposition with their

political opponents, mainly pro-reform members of the regime. They ambiguously call

for a political rupture with the past by openly doubting the regime’s will to democratize

the country. The program asserts that “voting PSOE is a guarantee of democracy” (7).

The nature of the 1977 election makes it difficult for the party to mention

transitional justice measures. Yet, it still presents itself as the only viable option for a

true democracy, which implicitly means that the party does not believe in the “transition

from above” formula. Interestingly, it mentions the importance of getting past the

trauma of the dictatorship (8) and of avoiding future ones (13). Although this remains

ambiguous, it supports the idea that during the first years of democracy, the PSOE

advocated a strong and fast democratization at the expense of revisiting past traumas.

Hence, this underlines the importance of the Spanish “Pacto del Olvido” (Pact of

Forgetting), legally embodied by the 1977 Amnesty Law, not even mentioned in the

party’s manifesto. In other words, if the PSOE clearly opposed any kind of continuity

with the regime, it did not support measures for the victims or against the perpetrators

of abuses.

B. 1979

The 34-page program, the first under the new constitutional frame, starts by

asserting that the party’s objective of drafting a new constitution is complete (2). The

tone is much less aggressive against the opposition, and the party’s doubts regarding the

democratic allegiance of pro-reform members of the regime disappeared. The only

source of worry seems to be the army (17). As the main cause of the Civil War and the

later establishment of Franco’s regime, the PSOE actively seeks more discipline and

wants to make the armed forces abide by the new constitutional principles.
 Surprisingly, the PSOE does not mention justice even once, while AP starts

mentioning needed reforms as soon as 1979. Overall, the PSOE seems to have fully

entered the democratic game, not mentioning the past or possible ways to deal with the

legacy of Francoism

C. 1982

The 47-page document was drafted right after a critical juncture in Spain’s

young democracy. In February 1981, an attempted coup organized by a part of the army

sought to overthrow the still fragile democracy. This interrupted the “pact of forgetting”,

since it highlighted the incomplete democratization and the ideological and institutional

persistence of the regime through the army.

In the introduction, the PSOE blames the right for not having consolidated the

democratic system (the left had not won any single election since the Transition) and for

flirting with extremist forces (5). The party reiterates the importance of disciplining the

army and add a judicial component, promising to make stricter laws against rebellion

and insurrection. The 1982 electoral program focuses on justice for the first time,

although more on the procedural aspect of it. The other addition to the party’s agenda is

the section on human and fundamental individual rights (34), probably because of the

growing international focus on such issues, relevant for Spain after decades of abuses.

D. 1986

In 1986, the electoral program became much longer and more detailed (118

pages). However, the document remains free of any reference to the legacy of the past,

except in the introduction, where it explicitly asserts that “the past is merely a historical

reference thanks to the democratic consolidation” (11). Such a sentence clearly shows
the persistent refusal to engage in public discussions on the abuses committed by the

regime, even among left-wing sectors.

Instead, the PSOE insisted on the human rights agenda but abroad (73). They

even mention the slow democratization process happening in Chile (75). Historical

memory and transitional justice seem out of the question in a country affected by a

trauma and conditioned by the institutional Pacto del Olvido.

E. 1989

In 1989, the PSOE’s electoral program was surprisingly short and simple (89

pages). Even after two socialist mandates, the party did not seem to expand their

program on new issues. The human rights agenda is particularly strong in the 1989

program, especially with the imminent collapse of the Eastern Bloc. The only new

addition to the program is a somewhat strong focus on European policy, after joining the

EC in 1986. References to the past become less and less visible.

F. 1993

The 118-page document is relatively similar to its predecessor although there is a

symbolic change that seems to precede an actual change of attitude later in the 1990s

and 2000s. The PSOE’s program continues insisting on the human rights agenda

worldwide, but recognizing for the first time that history has made Spain responsible for

defending basic rights worldwide. Because the country went through a long and

repressive military dictatorship, socialists promise to support human rights in Spain, in

the European Union and worldwide (97). Although not really significant policy-wise,

this statement marks the “comeback” of the past in the public sphere. This shows that

the PSOE became openly aware of the legacy of Francoism, and like in the earlier

political programs, there can be a discussion about the issue.

 G. 1996

The 1996 program is significantly longer than the others (225 pages). This might

have to do with the emergence of new issues such as new technologies, the

environment, European integration, mass immigration, etc. For the first time, the PSOE

mentions democratic disenchantment and parts of the population who wish to go back to

the past, probably the Franco era (1-2). It is true that since the 1990s, there is a growing

nostalgia of the last years of the dictatorship for a variety of reasons, although mostly

economic ones.

The symbolic change in the 1993 program is deepened in this document. The

PSOE insists on educating using democratic values, as if the Transition and subsequent

consolidation of the democratic regime were not to be taken for granted like before. We

could even suggest that the PSOE has realized that something had to be done in order to

anchor democracy in Spanish culture once and for all.

Interestingly, the expression “historical memory” appears for the first time in a

Spanish party program. In the section on how to help elderly people, the PSOE

expresses their wish to support their role in public life and especially in associations,

since their role is to transmit “ethical values and historical memory” (74). Although this

remains ambiguous, the 1990s corresponds to a time of generational renewal: people

who were born during the Civil War are in their late sixties and 20 years after the

Transition, a new generation of young Spaniards grew up under a democratic regime for

the first time.

H. 2000

The 90-page document is surprisingly short and contradicts the trend observed in

the late 1990s. The past is not mentioned, nor is historical memory. There is a complete
vacuum on the issue. We could suggest that this has to do with the outcome of the 1996

election, the first socialist defeat in 14 years. The PSOE might have reacted by focusing

only on the most salient issues, closer to the years of socialist rule in the early 1980s.

I. 2004

The 209-page program for the 2004 elections embodies a real change in the

PSOE’s approach to the past regime and its legacy. Although the document

acknowledges that the Transition is now over and the democracy consolidated (7), it

also deals with the main challenges, notably by mentioning for the first time the

attempted coup of 1981 (7) and the party’s role in preserving democracy. Their 2004

program revolves around revitalizing democratic values in the population, especially

through education (32). This could highlight an interesting issue in Spain, where the

levels of political engagement and support for democracy are not as high as the PSOE

would want.

However, the most interesting aspect of the program is the first proposition to

work on historical memory and thus to revisit the past. In the culture section, the PSOE

expressed its will to create a State Center for Research and Documentation on the Civil

War and Francoism (202). There already was an archives center on the Civil War in the

city of Salamanca. However, it was strongly criticized since it was created by the

Franco regime and used for repressive actions. In the 2000s, as we will see later with the

PP, this center became politicized since it could hardly be seen as a symbol of

reconciliation and truth. In their 2004 program, the PSOE expresses their will to merge

these archives with the new center and to financially support the project. The aim is to

gather every document referring to the Civil War and Francoism (1936-1975).

Moreover, the party asserts that the National Heritage should serve the purpose of a

“reconciliatory memory” (Ibid.).

 J. 2008

This new trend becomes even stronger in the 2008 program (317 pages). It is

important to mention a major change in policy in the 2007. The Socialist Party managed

to pass the Ley de Memoria Histórica (Law of Historical Memory) in 2007, only

opposed by the PP and by Catalan nationalist ERC (Esquerra Republicana de

Catalunya, Catalonia’s Republican Left). Thanks to this new frame, a Center of

Historical Memory was created instead of the Salamanca Archives. The PSOE promises

to further develop both the law and the center (257).

Moreover, the party also mentions a few restitutive measures in the program. In

the years following the Transition, some measures to restore rights and compensate

victims (from all sides) were voted. However, this was done “behind the scenes”, with

very little public discussion, and it served the purpose of “rehabilitating” part of the

population after 40 years of repression. The interesting point is that for the first time the

measure appears explicitly on a party program: the PSOE promises to return property to

labor unions. (36). The Francoist state had seized capital that initially belonged to these

clandestine organizations. Therefore, the PSOE has been expanding their historical

memory and transitional justice agenda in the 2000s.

K. 2011

The same trend is confirmed in the 2011 program (150 pages). Even though the

Socialist Party has lost most of its support because of its management of the financial

2008, which particularly devastated the Spanish economy, the party still mentions

historical memory towards the end of the manifesto. A short chapter is dedicated to this

issue (132).
 The PSOE adds a new “moral” component to this section, asserting that

“victims’ memory is moral progress in the life of a people and a measure of quality in a

democratic system” (Ibid.). The party insists on the necessity to further develop the Law

of Historical Memory in order to fully compensate the victims and promote

reconciliation.

L. 2015-6

After losing the 2011 election, the PSOE stopped being the main left-wing party.

The two-party system was replaced by a three, then four-party system with the

emergence of Podemos and Ciudadanos at the national level. The PP won the elections

and Mariano Rajoy became president of the Government. During this mandate, the PP

stopped funding the Center of Historical Memory and other provisions in the Law of

Historical Memory. Even though the law was never repealed, it was de facto made

useless.

In the 2015/2016 party programs (387 pages), there is a full section dedicated to

issues of historical memory and transitional justice, clearly criticizing the PP’s decision.

Interestingly, such issues are not in the “culture” section anymore, but they appear as an

independent section within the chapter on “defending the public sphere”. The section is

three pages long, the longest in any PSOE program, and the themes tackled go beyond

the initial Law for Historical Memory. For the first time, the PSOE mentions the three

universally recognized pillars of transitional justice: truth, justice and reparation (137).

The PSOE proposes several additions to the existing law to make truth a priority:

facilitating state-sponsored investigation to find and open mass graves, the

establishment of a truth commission, etc. (Ibid.). The party also wants to work on

symbolic reparation by removing Francoist symbols and changing street names. They

specifically mention the Valle de los Caídos (Valley of the Fallen), a monumental
complex and mausoleum for Franco’s remains near Madrid. Built by the regime and

conceived as a monument of reconciliation by the dictatorship, the complex is today

highly controversial. The PSOE wanted to move Franco’s remains in order to make the

complex a real place and reconciliation and not a memorial honoring the Nationalists.

This is particularly important since it is still a highly debated issue today, with the PSOE

working on the displacement of Franco’s remains.

Finally, the justice part is also tackled in two aspects. First, the PSOE wants to work

towards the nullity of the sentences dictated by Francoist tribunals, still valid today.

Second, the party is clearly considering using legal processes to study many abuses

committed during the dictatorship, especially the kidnapping of babies born to

Republican mothers.

Even though the PP won the 2015 and 2016 elections, a censure motion – a sort of

Spanish impeachment – removed Rajoy from power last year. As Pedro Sánchez, the

socialist leader, became President of the Government, the issues of historical memory

and transitional justice emerged again, with growing controversies on street names, the

Valle de los Caídos and failed trials of perpetrators of abuses.

4. The PP

The party’s history is very different from the PSOE’s. The Alianza Popular was

founded by Manuel Fraga, a reformist minister of Franco. During the first years of

democracy, the party was not particularly important. The Unión del Centro

Democrático (Union of the Democratic Center), a transitional center-right alliance made

of “moderates” monopolized power during the first 5 years. However, most sectors of
UCD merged with the AP in the 1980s. Eventually, the party grew stronger until

becoming the only important right-wing party in Spain and changing its name to

Partido Popular in 1989. Because the party was founded within the regime by some of

its members who wished a certain degree of continuity, the AP/PP embodies the

Transition pact, negotiated between moderates and soft-liners for a reformed pacted

transition.

A. 1977

The first party program is relatively short but longer than the PSOE’s (43 pages).

They acknowledge a positive political change in the country, but they warn voters that

some political groups are seeking revenge (13). They describe themselves are

constructive, moderate and realistic actors open to the future (14). This program

embodies the tacit transition pact for it calls for moderate reforms towards

democratization, supporting the monarchy and refusing any kind of political rupture

(15, 16).

As opposed to the PSOE, they do not mention the dictatorship per se and do not

openly identify as democrats. They advocate a strong state with social welfare, which is

surprising for an economically liberal party. Surprisingly, they mention much needed

justice reforms (21), but focus on procedural aspects and wish to make it purely

independent, which might be a way to guarantee that it will not turn against them in

case of a left-wing government.

B. 1979

The past is completely absent from this 87-page electoral program. Moreover,

issues of democratic consolidation are largely ignored. The AP does not seem to
position itself although it has fully embraced the new constitutional frame. It is almost

as if nothing had happened, and thus the party focuses mostly on economic issues as

well as justice reforms, social welfare, counter-terrorism and foreign policy.

C. 1982

This program is surprisingly long (176 pages) but completely free of references

to the issues on which this work focuses. In spite of the attempted coup d’état organized

in 1981, the AP does not mention it, which might cast doubt upon the party’s allegiance

to the democratic system. Nonetheless, they still work within the 1978 constitutional

frame and base their program on reforms of the judiciary. Ironically, the words amnesty

and pardon appear in the program but for issues related to terrorism in the Basque

Country.

D. 1986

Although it does not involve the issue of historical memory, an interesting turn

seems to have taken place in the mid-1980s. In their 1986 electoral program (64 pages),

the AP is taking a liberal turn, sounding more and more like other European Christian

democrats. The Socialists were in power between 1982 and 1996, which probably

triggered a reaction in right-wing parties, which decided in turn to embrace democratic

practices. They mention the “spirit of the constitutional pact” (14) and accuse the PSOE

of attacking it by trying to interfere on the judiciary and on the administration (5).

In spite of this liberal turn and the acknowledgment of the constitutional

principles that allowed the democratic transition, the AP still refuses to mention the

dictatorship or any policy towards memory, embodying the spirit of the “pact of

forgetting”, to an even greater extent than the PSOE at the same time.

E. 1989
 There is not much to say about the 1989 electoral program (79 pages). The party

has become the main right-wing political group in the country and changed its name to

Partido Popular. Apart from showing a full support to the constitutional and democratic

pact, they do not mention the issues that are being studied in this project.

F. 1993

We can notice a slight change in the 1990s. After a decade of ambiguity and

silence regarding the new democratic system, the PP starts openly defending the

transition pact and the 1978 Constitution. This might be due to the change of attitude

among the Left and their several electoral victories. The right could need to show they a

pro-democracy political group, but they could also be trying to protect further

democratization by sticking to the initial transition pact.

In this program, the party asserts that “it is necessary to go back to the spirit of

the democratic transition that allowed dialogue and consensus and that favored an

institutional balance” (91). In other words, the PP started to see threats to the

contemporary order, although the reasons are not mentioned in the document.

Finally, a few years after the PSOE, the PP started including the international

human rights agenda in their program. They mention human rights four times (114) in

the sections on the penitentiary system and foreign relations. However, unlike the

PSOE, they do not have a dedicated section and they do not mention Spain’s history

regarding human rights.

G. 1996

This new focus on the importance of the constitutional culture implies has two

main implications. On the one hand, it shows the success of the transition and the

consolidation processes in Spain, since all main parties adhere to the system. On the
other hand, sticking to the Transition pact also shows that the PP is interesting in the

moderate aspect of it, notably regarding the “protections” provided by the 1977

Amnesty Law.

This 251-page document shows how this new immobilism and will to return to

the 1978 foundations have become central in the PPs objectives. The program states that

the Constitution is a “symbol of national concord” (117). Since the 1996 program,

words like Concordia (concord), Convivencia (Coexistence), Consenso (Consensus)

have become important in the party’s documents, implying that the only way for Spain

is to hold on to the principles of the Constitution with little political evolution.

Interestingly, the word Dictadura (dictatorship) appears for the first time, but

only in the foreign policy section (232), in order to describe Cuba and to show support

for the Cuban opposition. Denial regarding Spanish recent history persists in the PP’s

official documents.

H. 2000

In the 207-page program, the PP openly mentions Spain’s authoritarian and

violent past for the first time since the Transition. However, they do so in order to

strengthen the idea that the transition pact is the only viable way for the country. The

PP’s ambition is to “turn Spain into a plural place of political coexistence, in which the

scourges of the past can be overcome” (7). The party further explains that “beyond its

paramount normative value, the Constitution is the historical expression of a great pact

of concord [bold in the original text], which overcame many conflicts, exclusions and

impositions like those that characterize our past” (181). Moreover, words like

coexistence and comprise appear more than once (1, 7, 180, 181), showing that any

attempt to contradict the initial democratic Spain is dangerous for Spain.

 Another interesting point in this document is that the PP, almost universally seen

as a right-wing party, introduces itself as a “compromise of the center” (1), recalling the

early years of the Transition, led by a center/center-right coalition. This shows how the

party does not approve of political change, perceived as too aggressive compared to the

negotiated pact of the 1970s.

I. 2004

The PP’s program for the 2004 election is the longest document analyzed in Spain (363

pages). In spite of this level of detail, there is only one addition worth mentioning. In

the culture section, they openly express their support for cultural projects such as the

Salamanca Archives of the Civil War, mentioned earlier. Thanks to this statement, the

words “Civil War” and the vague idea of memory appear for the first time.

Nevertheless, this archive was founded by the regime and served political repression

during decades. Far from an archival center aimed at reconciliation, the Salamanca

center is almost an insignificant point in the conversation.

The same patterns of language observed since the late 1990s persist when it

comes to the importance of the initial consensus on the transition and the Constitution

as a justification for political immobilism.

J. 2008

The same patterns are repeated here but they might even be taken to an extreme.

In this 326-page document, the PP mentions the primary challenge of returning to the

basic consensuses of the coexistence project (8). However, they are never truly explicit

on the source of this threat. We can suggest that armed violence in the Basque Country

and the growth of Catalan nationalism in the 2000s are important factors. Yet, with the
Law of Historical Memory, a strong controversy on how to deal with the past emerged,

which might have also encouraged the PP to insist on going back to the basic principles

of forgetting and moving on.

Something really interesting is that it is unclear whether they want to go back to

the 1978 model or if they want to create a new consensus that copies it. On the one

hand, the party explains that they will “restore the consensus policy” (30) and on the

other they wish to “build a great agreement” (Ibid.). They remain relatively ambiguous

on how they intend to do this.

There is one last potentially significant point in the section on the judiciary. The

PP plans on raising the number of years of experience required to become a

constitutional judge (30 years). Moreover, the proposed bill would also raise the

retirement age within the Constitutional Court. This measure can be interpreted as a way

to preserve the status quo by hindering generational renewal. Old judges will remain in

court, and younger ones won’t be able to join.

K. 2011

The 214-page party manifesto continues focusing on words like consensus,

concord, coexistence and pact. However, the party has become much more explicit

about how it sees policies towards historical memory and transitional justice. In the

program, they clearly attack the PSOE for “opening files that were already closed” and

“renouncing to the national concord” (13). The PP clearly wants to improve patriotic

feelings around the Constitutional pact. The party mentions a vague bill on national

symbols and how to regulate them, but little can be extrapolated from such a statement.

The first time the word memory appears does not refer to the Civil War and

Francoist Spain, but to victims of ETA’s violent actions (133). The PP believes that the
state and the Spanish society have the moral responsibility of honoring the victims’

memories, “for those whose lives were taken away by the authoritarian fantasy of those

who do not tolerate the ones who live and think in a different wat” (Ibid.). Although this

passage can almost be seen as ironic, it still underlines the PP’s refusal to recognize the

victims of the past.

L. 2015-6

This 226-page party program, the most recent one, does not provide further

information on the issues of historical memory and transitional justice. The Catalan

conflict, particularly strong in 2014 with the celebration of a first illegitimate

referendum of self-determination, has become the PP’s priority, calling for the unity of

Spain as established in the 1978 Constitution (7).

In other words, the PP uses the same rhetoric of constitutionalism and consensus

to defend the unity of Spain. In the program, this leads to a patriotic and nationalistic

discourse that was not present before. The PP believes Spaniards should feel “a patriotic

pride” (131) and pictures of Spanish flags appear twice in the section on the unity of

Spain (140, 172). While this is not necessarily relevant per se, it is important to

remember that the Spanish flag is highly controversial, and that the PP had never used

such pictures before in their programs.

In this patriotic turn, historical memory, transitional justice, or even pre-1978

events are completely ignored. The only past the PP is interested in is the constitutional

pact that allowed the Transition, and the party continues expressing political

immobilism regarding the 1978 pact.

5. General Conclusions
a. THE PSOE

- In 1977, after decades of exile and repression, the PSOE appeared as the only

viable democratic option and even though the party accepted the initial transition

pact negotiated between liberals and moderate Francoists, it remained unclear

whether they advocated for a rupture or not.

- With the fast democratization, between 1979 and 1993, the PSOE completely

embraced the new democratic frame, without referring to the past. This

highlights the importance of the Pacto del Olvido, and the rapid consolidation

without historical memory.

- However, the PSOE opened the conversation on the past in the 1990s, at first

with symbolic statements, without explicit implications in policy. This trend was

interrupted in 2000, probably because of an electoral defeat four years earlier.

- After this short interruption, the PSOE developed a more detailed vision on

historical memory and transitional justice, starting with symbolic and reparation

measures and a truth commission, suggesting the possibility of using legal

instruments in 2016. However, the Law of Historical Memory is still failing to

change things and legal processes have not been mobilized yet. International

organizations continuously denounce Spain for its management of the issue,

highlighting the failure of transitional justice in the country.

b. THE AP/PP
- The AP, founded by a moderate Francoist, clearly advocated for a negotiated,

slow and conservative democratization. The party clearly embodied this

continuity between authoritarianism and democracy. Unsurprisingly, they did not

mention the “dark” past nor its legacy.

- With the institutionalization of the Pacto del Olvido, the attitude of the AP/PP

became similar to the PSOE’s. The right-wing party completely ignored the past

and handled political competition like in any other democratic system, as if

nothing had happened. Slowly, the party took a Christian-democrat turn,

advocating economic liberalism.

- In the 1990s, probably due to the several crises Spain is facing (economy,

regionalism and terrorism), the PP started supporting a return to the foundations

of the constitutional pact. Such a political immobilism ignored issues of

acknowledgment of the past.

- With this “extreme constitutionalism”, the party started openly opposing the

PSOE’s propositions to carry out transitional justice. Since the early 2000s, the

PP’s priorities have been the unity of Spain and the return to the policies of

consensus and concord that existed in the late 1970s.