OSHT1316 Research Assignment.

Industrial Accident Involving Poison.

The Graniteville Train Accident.

The Graniteville train crash was an American rail disaster that occurred on January 6,
2005, in Graniteville, South Carolina. At roughly 2:40am EST, two Norfolk
Southern trains collided near the Avondale Mills plant in Graniteville. Nine people were
killed and over 250 people were treated for toxic chlorine exposure. The accident was
determined to be caused by a misaligned railroad switch.

Material
Chlorine is a chemical element with symbol Cl and atomic number 17. The second-
lightest of the halogens, it appears between fluorine and bromine in the periodic table
and its properties are mostly intermediate between them. Chlorine is a yellow-green gas
at room temperature. It is an extremely reactive element and a strong oxidizing agent. It
is a very toxic product, a respiratory irritant that attacks the eyes and mucous
membranes. Contact with the skin causes severe burns and prolonged inhalation
causes lung damage. It can be fatal after a few breaths at 1000 ppm. Therefore, users
of chlorine gas must exercise extreme caution to ensure that it is safely injected.

Specific Gravity (Density) of Material

The yellowish green, nonflammable and liquefied gas with an unpleasant and irritating
smell is a clear amber-colored liquid about 1.5 times heavier than water.
Gaseous chlorine is greenish-yellow, and is about 2.5 times as heavier than air.

Storage of Material

Train 192 was transporting chlorine gas, sodium hydroxide and cresol. One of
192's tank cars were loaded with 90 tons of chlorine

Tank cars are types of railroad cars designed to carry liquid and gaseous commodities.
The tank cars used to transport chlorine are insulated with ceramic fiber of 2-inch
thickness covered with 2-inch fiberglass. A number of different options for the top
operating platform, top fittings housing and loading/unloading valve configurations are
available.
Discovery of the Leak
On January 5, 2005, NS local train P22 began its daily operation. The regularly
assigned conductor and engineer were both off duty on January 5, and the jobs were
filled for the day from a list of available standby employees. At the end of their
scheduled run, train P22's crew parked the train on a siding near the Avondale Mills
plant. The train crew contacted the local train dispatcher to clear two track warrants that
were protecting train P22's use of the tracks. Although the railroad switch for the
Avondale Mills siding was supposed to be set for mainline operation before P22's crew

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departed for the night, the train's brakeman later told the NTSB (National Transportation
Safety Board) that he was "not 100 percent sure" he had aligned the switch for mainline
operation, and that he "might have made a mistake." No train operated through the area
or used the affected tracks for the rest of the day.
On January 6, 2005, NS freight train 192 approached Graniteville at approximately 48
miles per hour. Train 192 entered emergency braking when the engineer saw the
improperly aligned switch, but there was not sufficient distance for Train 192 to stop.
Train 192 was diverted by the improperly lined switch onto the siding and collided with
P22. The collision derailed both lead engines, 16 of 192's 42 freight cars, and one of
P22's freight cars. One of 192's tank cars (loaded with 90 tons of chlorine) ruptured,
releasing about 60 tons of the gas. About 30% of the load was recovered by industrial
responders.

Preventative Controls
On November 29, 2005, the NTSB issued a report officially blaming the accident on the
P22 train crew's failure to reline the switch for mainline operations. The report
concluded that neither equipment failure nor crew fatigue or drug or alcohol use was a
factor in the accident.
As a result of this accident the United States Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
released to railroads a reminder of federal regulations on procedures for turnout
operation and safety procedures. I believe some of the controls that could have
prevented this accident are as follows:

 There should be engineering controls on switches. They should include a successful

switch and lock indicator, also indications of a malfunction, so sufficient warning can
be issued to scheduled traffic.
 There should be adequate checklists for detailed inspections, ensuring switches are
properly aligned should engineering controls fail.
 Recurrent training should be consistent with both regular and standby employees on
all procedures.
 Tracks cleared confirmation should only be accepted by dispatcher only when all
checklists and engineering controls have been cleared and tracks are set for the
correct operation.

Citations
Lamb, S. Graniteville, South Carolina, train crash. Wikipedia(2018). Available at:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graniteville,_South_Carolina,_train_crash. (Accessed: 1st
March 2018)
Christe, K., Schneider, S. & Gutmann, V. Halogen element. Encyclopædia
Britannica(2017). Available at: https://www.britannica.com/science/halogen-element.
(Accessed: 1st March 2018)