SECOND DIVISION following circumstances: (1) it was he who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did
not know how to keep order; (2)it was her mother who prepared their meal while her
G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015
ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Petitioner, v. LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN AND THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the November 20, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its June 1,
2010 Resolution,2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, which reversed and set aside the
September 20, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro
City(RTC-Br. 37), declaring the marriage between petitioner Robert F.
Mallilin (Robert) and private respondent Luz G. Jamesolamin (Luz) null and void.
The Facts:
Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.
On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before
the RTC, Branch 23, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC-Br. 23). On March 7, 1996, RTC-Br. 23
denied the petition. Robert appealed this judgment before the CA where it was docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 54261. On January 29, 1999, the CA reversed the RTC-Br. 23 decision
“due to lack of participation of the State as required under Article 48 of the Family
Code.”3 The case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings and its records were
thereafter transferred from RTC-Br. 23 to RTC-Br. 37, as the latter was designated as
Family Court pursuant to the Family Code Act of 1997.
In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz
was suffering from psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into
such marital life and to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities. Such
incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear
manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment,
and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.
Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it was
Robert who manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage. Despite due notice,
however, she did not appear during the trial. Assistant City Prosecutor IsabeloSabanal
appeared for the State.
When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was already living in California, USA, and had
married an American. He also revealed that when they were still engaged, Luz continued
seeing and dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that from the
outset, Luz had been remiss in her duties both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the
sister was the one who washed their clothes because she did not want her polished nails
destroyed; (3)it was also her sister who took care of their children while she spent her
time sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated
different men; (5) he received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male
students; (6) when he was not home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a certain Romy
Padua slept in their house when he was away; and (6) she would contract loans without
his knowledge.
In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva),
Guidance Psychologist II of Northern Mindanao Medical Center.
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a petition
for marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the
Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal).
On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their
marriage invalidab initio on the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both
parties as contemplated by the second paragraph of Canon 1095. This decision was
affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).
Prior to that,on September 20, 2002, the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the
marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she
failed to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal
with the CA. The OSG argued that Robert failed to make a case for declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Luz. It pointed out that the real cause of the marital discord was the
sexual infidelity of Luz. Such ground, the OSG contended, should not result in the
nullification of the marriage under the law, but merely constituted a ground for legal
separation.
The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision,4 granted the petition and reversed the RTC
decision. The decision, including the decretal portion, partiallym reads:
[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error. Closer scrutiny of the records
reveals, as correctly noted by the Solicitor General, sexual infidelity are not rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. x xx.
xxxx
In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving declarations, the evidence adduced by
Robert fell short of establishing the fact that at the time of their marriage, Luz was
suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived [her] of the ability to assume
the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
xxxx
We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellee’s undeserved marital plight. Yet, Our
paramount duty as a court compels Us to apply the law at all costs, however harsh it may
be on whomsoever is called upon to bear its unbiased brunt.
FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision dated September 20, 2002 in Civil Case
No. 94-178 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs
SO ORDERED.5
Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its June 1, 2010
Resolution,6stating that the arguments of Robert were mere rehash of the same ground,
arguments and discussion previously pointed out by him, and that no new substance was
brought out to warrant the reconsideration or reversal of its decision.
Hence, this petition.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
I psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. The OSG also
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ HOLDING THAT THE ABSENCE OF THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE WIFE UNDERSCORES THE EVIDENTIAL
GAP TO SUSTAIN THE DECISION OF THE RTC DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF
PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
II
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO DECLARED BY THE NATIONAL APPELLATE
MATRIMONIAL TRIBUNAL OF THE CATHOLIC BISHOP’S CONFERENCE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AS GUILTY OF GRAVE LACK OF DUE DISCRETION.
III
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND BY THE LOWER COURT AS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS.
Robert now argues that he has sufficiently proven the nullity of his marriage even in the
absence of any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination of the wife by a
competent and qualified professional. To bolster his claim, he avers that the Metropolitan
Tribunal already declared that Luz exhibited grave lack of discretion in
judgment concerning the essential rights and obligations mutually given and accepted in
marriage. The said decision was affirmed by the NAMT.
Robert further argues that the sexual indiscretion of Luz with different men coupled with
the fact that she failed to function as a home maker to her family and as a housewife to
him incapacitated her from accepting and complying with her essential marital obligations.
For said reason, he asserts that the case of Luz was not a mere case of sexual infidelity,
but clearly an illness that was rooted on some debilitating psychological condition which
incapacitated her to carry out the responsibilities of a married woman. Robert avers that
a sexmaniac is not just a mere sexual infidel but one who is suffering from a deep
psychological problem.
Position of the State
The OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled that the totality of evidence presented by
Robert was not sufficient to support a finding that Luz was psychologically incapacitated.
His evidence fell short of establishing his assertion that at the time of their marriage, Luz
was suffering from a psychological defect which deprived her of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan Tribunal and the NAMT, the OSG claims
that the same were only given persuasive value and were not controlling or decisive in
cases of nullity of marriage. Further, the decision was based on grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning matrimonial rights and obligations due to outside factors other than
raises the strong possibility of collusion between the parties as shown by the events that
took place after the issuance of the March 7, 1996 RTC Decision. The OSG wrote:
Significantly, the chronological events after the trial court issued its March 7, 1996
Decision unmistakably show the collusion between the parties to obtain the reliefs
pleaded. Among others, respondent’s Retraction of Testimony was executed without the
presence of counsel sometime in 1998, a few months before she married an American.
This irregularity was even noticed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54261:
cralawred
x xxx
The involvement and active participation of the Solicitor General became indispensable, in
the present recourse, when, in a whirlwind turn of events, the Appellee made a VOLTE
FACE executed a “Retraction of Testimony” and a “Waiver of Custody” waiving custody of
Franco Mark J Mallillin, still a minor, her son by the Appellant. It bears stressing that the
Appellee, in the Court a quo, obdurately denied the material allegations of the Appellant’s
complaint and declared that it was the Appellant who was psychologically
incapacitated. The sudden turn-about of the appellee, in the present recourse, to
the extent of disowning her testimony in the Court a quo and even praying for
the reversal of the Decision of the Trial Court is strongly suggestive, if not
constitutive, of collusion or a modus vivendi between the parties, outlawed by
the Family Code of the Philippines and the Constitution. x xx
The Court’s Ruling
The main issue is whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luzwas
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage
warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The petition is bereft of merit.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family
Code which provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligation of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
“Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36of the Family
Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article
68of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together;
observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. There is hardly a doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.7cralawlawlibrary
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage.
It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may only emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.8cralawlawlibrary
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos, Jr.,9the Court reiterated the
well-settled guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,
embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,10 based on Article 36 of the Family
Code.Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x xx.cralawred
x xxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x xx.
x xxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. x xx.
x xxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. x xx
x xxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. x xx.
x x xx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x xx
x xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. x xx.
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered view that Robert’s
evidence failed to establish the psychological incapacity of Luz.
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage. Other than his self-serving testimony, no other evidence was adduced to
show the alleged incapacity of Luz. He presented no other witnesses to corroborate his
allegations on her behavior. Thus, his testimony was self-serving and hadno serious value
as evidence.
Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically or
clinically identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial. Based on the records, Robert
failed to prove that her disposition of not cleaning the room, preparing their meal, washing
the clothes, and propensity for dating and receiving different male visitors, was grave,
deeply rooted, and incurable within the parameters of jurisprudence on psychological
incapacity.
The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother, as well as her
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity,cannot rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that justifies the nullification of the parties' marriage. The Court
has repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity
or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations," not merely
the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.11Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or
be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. Psychological incapacity refers only to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.12cralawlawlibrary
As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by
themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological
incapacity. Robert arguesthat the series of sexual indiscretion of Luz were external
manifestations of the psychological defect that she was suffering within her person, which
could be considered as nymphomania or “excessive sex hunger.” Other than his
allegations, however, no other convincing evidence was adduced to prove that these
sexual indiscretions were considered as nymphomania, and that it was grave, deeply
rooted, and incurable within the term of psychological incapacity embodied in Article 36.
To stress, Robert’s testimony alone is insufficient to prove the existence of psychological
incapacity.
In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the Republic of the
Philippines,13 the Court ruled that the respondent’s act ofliving an adulterous life
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no
specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception
of marriage. The petitioner must be able to establish that the respondent’s unfaithfulness
was a manifestation of a disordered personality, which made her completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern
Mindanao Medical Center, Cagayan de Oro City, was insufficient to prove the psychological
incapacity of Luz. There was nothing in the records that would indicate that Luz had either
been interviewed or was subjected to a psychological examination. The finding as to her
psychological incapacity was based entirely on hearsay and the self-serving information
provided by Robert.
Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological
incapacity of Luz. Although it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,14 the Court stated that interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts, still it is subject to the law on evidence. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence – what is decreed as [canonically]
invalid should be decreed civilly void x xx. (Emphasis supplied)
Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence provides
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of
which the evidence is offered must be specified.
In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of the NAMT cannot be given value
since it was not offered during the trial, and the Court has in no way of ascertaining the
evidence considered by the same tribunal.
Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out that the basis of the
declaration of nullity of marriage by the NAMT was not the third paragraph of Canon
1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature similar to Article 36 of the Family
Code, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer
from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial
rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent
portions of the NAMT decision are as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law that based on the
deposition of the petitioner – the respondent understandably ignored the proceedings
completely for which she was duly cited for Contempt of Court – and premised on the
substantially concordant testimonies of the Witnesses, the woman Respondent
demonstrated in the external forum through her action and reaction patterns, before and
after the marriage-in-fact, her grave lack of due discretion in judgement for marriage
intents and purposes basically by reason of her immaturity of judgement as manifested by
her emotional ambivalence x xx.
WHEREFORE, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF APPEALS, having invoked the Divine Name and
having in mind the Law, the Jurisprudence and the Facts pertaining to the Case, hereby
declares and decrees the confirmation of the nullity decision rendered by the Metropolitan
Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manil on the Marriage Case MALLILIN –
JAMISOLAMIN with Prot. N. 63/2000 on the ground provided by Canon 1095 par.
2CIC on the part of the woman Respondent – but NOT on the part of the man Petitioner
for lack of evidence. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)15
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Santos v. Santos,16the Court referred to the deliberations during the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the
import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It went out to state that a part of the provision is
similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
cralawred
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In Najera v. Najera,17the Court was also confronted with a similar issue of whether to
consider an annulment by the NAMT as also covering psychological incapacity, the only
ground recognized in our law.In the said case, the NAMT decision was also based on
the second paragraph of Canon 1095. The Court ruled that it was not similar to,
and only annulments under the third paragraph of, Canon 1095 should be
considered. Elucidating, the Court wrote:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Petitioner’s argument is without merit.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the
opportunity to consider the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial Tribunal’s
decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very
same issues now raised before this Court and correctly held that petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was devoid of merit. It stated:
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was
forwarded to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:
[T]he FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a
sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did
not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia
followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty
required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contracting
marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby
rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as
a child, he saw the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have
broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother with whom
[he] identified and on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was according to his
friends, already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar
kind: he could be very quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even
violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of his mother who now lives with her paramour,
also married and a policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his drugs and
alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat up his wife and attacked
her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final separation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the
Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the
Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the
sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground
contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself,
petitioner-appellant offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit:
AldanaCeledonia (petitioner-appellant’s mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP,
Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses testified,
in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made
an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before the
Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellant’s sister-in-law and friends of the opposing
parties were never presented before said Court. As to the contents and veracity of the
latter’s testimonies, this Court is without any clue.
True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme
Court held that the interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:
cralawred
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence – what is decreed as [canonically]
invalid should be decreed civilly void xxx.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:
cralawred
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of
which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give
credence to the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently,
it was made on a different set of evidence of which We have no way of ascertaining their
truthfulness.
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence
presented before the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the
evidence on record, We find no ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment of the
Trial Court.31cralawlawlibrary
Santos v. Santos18cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the
Family Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of
Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage
by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon
1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph
of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually
given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-
in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not
appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia
followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty
required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contacting
marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for declaration of nullity of
rendering nugatory his marital contract x xx. marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless
the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological
Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the illness existing at the time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the
Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the indissolubility of the marital tie.
sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground
contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.x x x. In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to adduce
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National sufficient and convincing evidence to prove the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz.
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the
trial court, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the petitioner make a case for legal separation.
decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on the psychological Hence, this decision is without prejudice to an action for legal separation if a party would
incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of want to pursue such proceedings. In this disposition, the Court cannot decree a legal
Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is separation because in such proceedings, there are matters and consequences like custody
supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. and separation of properties that need to be considered and settled.

In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC. (Emphases in WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
the original; Underscoring supplied) CV No. 78303-MIN, dated November 20, 2009, and its Resolution, dated June 1, 2010, are
hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice.
Hence, Robert’s reliance on the NAMT decision is misplaced. To repeat, the decision of the
NAMT was based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those No costs.
who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted, a cause not SO ORDERED.
of psychological nature under Article 36 of the Family Code. A cause of psychological Velasco, Jr.,*and Del Castillo, JJ.,concur.chanrobleslaw
nature similar to Article 36 is covered by the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Carpio, (Chairperson), J., I join the dissent of J. Leonen.
Code of Canon Law (Santos v. Santos19), which for ready reference Leonen, J., I dissent. see separate opinion.
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

x xxx

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under the second paragraph of
Canon 1095 should also be covered would be to expand what the lawmakers did not
intend to include. What would prevent members of other religious groups from invoking
their own interpretation of psychological incapacity? Would this not lead to multiple, if not
inconsistent, interpretations?

To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36

would be legislating from the bench. As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,20 interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines are
given great respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or decisive.

In Republic v. Galang,21it was written that the Constitution set out a policy of protecting
and strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and the marriage was the
foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State,
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 185286 August 18, 2010
MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
RAMON REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray.
In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before making a
finding of psychological incapacity or vicariously diagnosing personality disorders in
spouses where there are none. On the other hand, blind adherence by the courts to the
exhortation in the Constitution1 and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social
institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of
psychological incapacity, trenches on the very reason why a marriage that is doomed from
its inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon its hapless partners for life.
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA -G.R. CV No. 897612which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89,
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854.3
First, we unfurl the facts.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University
of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old.
They were simply classmates then in one university subject when respondent cross-
enrolled from the UP Los Baños campus. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed
into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who
she thought was free spirited and bright, although he did not follow conventions and
traditions.4 Since both resided in Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every day and
drove home together from the university.
Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondent’s style of courtship which included dining
out, unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a university student’s budget.
At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant.
Petitioner’s good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latter’s habit of
cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB
Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third year,
and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.
On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioner’s graduation and her father’s death,
petitioner and respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5)
months pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.
Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondent’s family in Mandaluyong City. All
living expenses were shouldered by respondent’s parents, and the couple’s respective
salaries were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a
monthly allowance of ₱1,500.00 from his salary.
When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a
child entailed expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of ₱1,500.00
from respondent stopped. Further, respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner.
When petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told
her that he had resigned due to slow advancement within the family business.
Respondent’s game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying
hotels and restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business
took respondent away from his young family for days on end without any communication.
Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that the situation will change.
To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live
separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further
financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income
earner of the household, respondent’s business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at
business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to
petitioner sporadically. Compounding the family’s financial woes and further straining the
parties’ relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his
business took him away from his family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not
exert any effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved
in with petitioner’s mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In
fact, the parties became more estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of
supporting a family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third
son. At that time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of
either the petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting
nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how the
hospital bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent’s fishpond business stopped operations.
Although without any means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work
for the family business. Respondent came up with another business venture, engaging in
scrap paper and carton trading. As with all of respondent’s business ventures, this did not
succeed and added to the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but
petitioner as well. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital
affair. She overheard respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary, over the
phone inquiring if the latter liked respondent’s gift to her. Petitioner soon realized that
respondent was not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he was, more
importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’ marriage was a surgical
operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be
operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the
newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she
was wheeled into the operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had
enough of respondent’s lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to
leave the recovery room.
Still, petitioner made a string of "final" attempts to salvage what was left of their
marriage. Petitioner approached respondent’s siblings and asked them to intervene,
confessing that she was near the end of her rope. Yet, even respondent’s siblings waved
the white flag on respondent.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that he was
psychologically incapacitated. Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in
performing his obligations to his family—both as a spouse to petitioner and father to their
children.
After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr.
EstrellaMagno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the
RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on
the ground of their psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled, thus:
Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both parties, the petition is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner MA. SOCORRO PERPETUA
CAMACHO and respondent RAMON REYES contracted on December 4, 1976 at the
Archbishop’s Chapel Villa San Miguel Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared null and void under
Art. 36 of the Family Code, as amended. Henceforth, their property relation is dissolved.
Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status.
Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH MICHAEL CAMACHO REYES,
who are already of age and have the full civil capacity and legal rights to decide for
themselves having finished their studies, are free to decide for themselves.
The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from notice to the
parties. Entry of Judgment shall be made if no Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial or
Appeal is filed by any of the parties, the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.

Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a
Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the corresponding Decree if
marriage encounter group, invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder
the parties have no properties[.] [O]therwise, the Court shall observe the procedure
couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not
prescribed in Section 21 of AM 02-11-10 SC.
improve the parties’ relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.

The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the Decision (Sec. 22 AM 02-11-10
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological
SC) shall be issued by the Court only after compliance with Articles 50 & 51 of the Family
assessment to "determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." As with all
Code as implemented under the Rules on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Property
other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical
(Sections 19 & 21, AM 02-11-10 SC) in a situation where the parties have properties.
psychologist’s recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.

The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be registered in the Local Civil Registry of
At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent’s siblings, told respondent
Mandaluyong and Quezon City.
to move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner.

Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their counsel, the Office of the
With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did
Solicitor General, the Public Prosecutor, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar,
respondent’s relationship with his children.
Mandaluyong City, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Quezon City and the Civil
Registrar General at their respective office addresses.
Finally, in 2001,5 petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the
SO ORDERED.6
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court, on motion for
reconsideration of the respondent, affirmed the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage.
Taking exception to the trial court’s rulings, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals,
adamant on the validity of his marriage to petitioner. The appellate court, agreeing with
the respondent, reversed the RTC and declared the parties’ marriage as valid and
subsisting. Significantly, a special division of five (two members dissenting from the
majority decision and voting to affirm the decision of the RTC) ruled, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 23,
2007 and Order dated July 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89
in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.7
Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court positing the following
issues:
I VALIDLY AMENDED TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE.8
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
MARRIAGE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIKEWISE
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
MARRIAGE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT ARE BINDING ON IT.
V fidelity, and render mutual help and support."
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED DULY ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO
COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
MARRIAGE WERE ESTABLISHED, NOT MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
VII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES’ MARRIAGE, WHICH
IS UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, DOES NOT
FURTHER THE INITIATIVES OF THE STATE CONCERNING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND
THEREFORE, NOT COVERED BY THE MANTLE OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE
PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE.
VIII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE AMENDED PETITION WAS
Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage between the
parties is void ab initio on the ground of both parties’ psychological incapacity, as provided
in Article 36 of the Family Code.
In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the oral and
documentary evidence obtained from the three (3) experts i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan
and Villegas. The RTC ratiocinated, thus:
After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence presented, the Court finds merit in the
petition.
Article 36 of the Family Code reads:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization."
and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:
"The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a marital partner towards
each other and Articles 220, 225 and 271 of the Family Code express the duties of parents
toward their children.
Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left the determination of
the same solely to the Court on a case to case basis.
x xxx
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological
incapacity in conjunction to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on the
pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent and outcome of the
assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on
the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the marriage between
the parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity termed "psychological incapacity"
which pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally,
intellectually and socially towards each other in relation to their essential duties to
mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and support,
(Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological
constellation of respondent which created the death of his marriage. There is no reason to
entertain any slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the
respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that
respondent is suffering from personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated him
to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage. Being professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties
to their profession, the Court considered their assessment/diagnos[is] as credible or a
product of an honest evaluation on the psychological status of the respondent. This
psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert
witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless
victim of his structural constellation. It is beyond the respondent’s impulse control. In
short, he is weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors
simply because he did not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from
his assertion that nothing was wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and considered
their relationship as a normal one. In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling
and efforts extended to them by his original family members to save his marriage. In
short, he was blind and too insensitive to the reality of his marital atmosphere. He totally
disregarded the feelings of petitioner who appeared to have been saturated already that
she finally revealed her misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly submitted to
counseling to save their marriage. However, the hard position of the respondent finally
constrained her to ask respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the
respondent were unanimous that separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage
of the parties. Respondent confirmed this stand of his siblings.
x xxx
The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take relationship and not a one
sided one. It also requires surrender to the fulfillment of the essential duties to the
marriage which must naturally be observed by the parties as a consequence of their
marriage. Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of marriage between the parties did not
create a monument of marital integrity, simply because the personality disorder of the
respondent which renders him psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to his
marriage, is deeply entombed in his structural system and cure is not possible due to his
belief that there is nothing wrong with them.
The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the respondent. Petitioner,
too, is to be blamed. Dra. Villegas was firm that she, too, is afflicted with psychological
incapacity as her personality cannot be harmonized with the personality of the respondent.
They are poles apart. Petitioner is a well-organized person or a perfectionist while
respondent is a free spirited or carefree person. Thus, the weakness of the respondent
cannot be catered by the petitioner and vice-versa.
Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both parties constitute the thunder bolt or
principal culprit on their inability to nurture and reward their marital life with meaning and
significance. So much so that it is a pity that though their marriage is intact for 21 years,
still it is an empty kingdom due to their psychological incapacity which is grave, incurable
and has origin from unhealthy event in their growing years.
Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human beings, they are entitled
to live in a peaceful and orderly environment conducive to a healthy life. In fact, Article 72
of the Family Code provides remedy to any party aggrieved by their marital reality. The
case of the parties is already a settled matter due to their psychological incapacity. In the
words of Dra.Magno, their marriage, at the very inception, was already at the funeral
parlor. Stated differently, there was no life at all in their marriage for it never existed at
all. The Court finds that with this reality, both parties suffer in agony by continuously
sustaining a marriage that exists in paper only. Hence, it could no longer chain or jail the
parties whose marriage remains in its crib with its boots and diaper due to factors beyond
the physical, emotional, intellectual and social ability of the parties to sustain.9
In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a divided decision, the
appellate court diverged from the findings of the RTC in this wise:
On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina] vis-à-vis the
totality of evidence presented by herein [petitioner], we find that the latter failed to
sufficiently establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband, as well as of
herself. There is thus no basis for declaring the nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is
psychologically incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as
purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social
Personality Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be
suffering from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features,
while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder of the
anti-social type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy especially along masculine
strivings and narcissistic features.
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in
character. A court may place whatever weight it chooses upon such testimonies. It may
even reject them, if it finds that they are inconsistent with the facts of the case or are
otherwise unreasonable. In the instant case, neither clinical psychologist Magno nor
psychiatrist Dr. Villegas conducted a psychological examination on the [respondent].
Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr. Villegas are
hearsay. They are "unscientific and unreliable" as they have no personal knowledge of the
psychological condition of the [respondent] as they never personally examined the
[respondent] himself.
x xxx
[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan that the purported psychological
incapacity of [respondent] is not incurable as the [petitioner] would like this Court to
think. It bears stressing that [respondent] was referred to Dayan for "psychological
evaluation to determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." The undeniable
fact is that based on Dayan’s personal examination of the [respondent], the assessment
procedures used, behavioral observations made, background information gathered and
interpretation of psychological data, the conclusion arrived at is that there is a way to help
the [respondent] through individual therapy and counseling sessions.
Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on [respondent], such as
his failure to give regular support, substance abuse, infidelity and "come and go" attitude
are true, the totality of the evidence presented still falls short of establishing that
[respondent] is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
x xxx
In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quo’s findings regarding the [respondent’s]
alleged mixed personality disorder, his "come and go" attitude, failed business ventures,
inadequate/delayed financial support to his family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to
[petitioner’s] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his business
pursuits, unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed business
activities, taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition
but on serious marital difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. [Respondent’s] "defects" were not present at the
inception of marriage. They were even able to live in harmony in the first few years of
their marriage, which bore them two children xxx. In fact, [petitioner] admitted in her
Amended Petition that initially they lived comfortably and [respondent] would give his
salary in keeping with the tradition in most Filipino households, but the situation changed
when [respondent] resigned from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter,
[respondent] failed in his business ventures. It appears, however, that [respondent] has
been gainfully employed with Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact was
stipulated upon by the [petitioner].
x xxx
As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petitioner], Dr. Villegas’ Psychiatric
Report states that [petitioner] "manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that
made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great
amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties
and responsibilities of marriage.
However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the
complete facts showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of celebration [thereof] even
if such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration xxx. In fact, what was merely
prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the
marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to
be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at
the time of the celebration of marriage x xx.
x xxx
What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a lot of difficulties in their marriage.
However, it is jurisprudentially settled that psychological incapacity must be more than
just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations,
it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
While [petitioner’s] marriage with [respondent] failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and
void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the
unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"
by the State.
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be
read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41
that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article
45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a
petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances
are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36
should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves. x xx
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in
its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.10
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the appellate
court’s ruling that the psychological incapacity of respondent was not sufficiently
established. We disagree with its decision declaring the marriage between the parties as
valid and subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.
Santos v. Court of Appeals11 solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that
the factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital
obligations are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. We explained:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved.12
As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing respondent with a
personality disorder, to wit:
1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE
[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents. Belonging to an average
social status, intellectual achievement is quite important to the family values (sic). All
children were equipped with high intellectual potentials (sic) which made their parents
proud of them. Father was disabled, but despite his handicap, he was able to assume his
financial and emotional responsibilities to his family and to a limited extent, his social
functions (sic). Despite this, he has been described as the unseen strength in the family.
Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the home. Doing
volunteer and community services, she was not the demonstrative, affectionate and the
emotional mother (sic). Her love and concern came in the form of positive attitudes,
advices (sic) and encouragements (sic), but not the caressing, sensitive and soothing
touches of an emotional reaction (sic). Psychological home environment did not permit
one to nurture a hurt feeling or depression, but one has to stand up and to help himself
(sic). This trained her to subjugate (sic) emotions to reasons.
Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for any undertakings
(sic). She is organized, planned (sic), reliable, dependable, systematic, prudent, loyal,
competent and has a strong sense of duty (sic). But emotionally, she is not as sensitive.
Her analytical resources and strong sense of objectivity predisposed her to a superficial
adjustments (sic). She acts on the dictates of her mind and reason, and less of how she
feels (sic). The above qualities are perfect for a leader, but less effective in a heterosexual
relationship, especially to her husband, who has deep seated sense of inadequacy,
insecurity, low self esteem and self-worth despite his intellectual assets (sic). Despite this,
[petitioner] remained in her marriage for more than 20 years, trying to reach out and
lending a hand for better understanding and relationship (sic). She was hoping for the
time when others, like her husband would make decision for her (sic), instead of being
depended upon. But the more [petitioner] tried to compensate for [respondent’s]
shortcomings, the bigger was the discrepancy in their coping mechanisms (sic). At the
end, [petitioner] felt unloved, unappreciated, uncared for and she characterized their
marriage as very much lacking in relationship (sic).
On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11 siblings and belonged to the second set
of brood (sic), where there were less bounds (sic) and limitations during his growing up
stage. Additionally, he was acknowledged as the favorite of his mother, and was described
to have a close relationship with her. At an early age, he manifested clinical behavior of
conduct disorder and was on marijuana regularly. Despite his apparent high intellectual
potentials (sic), he felt that he needed a "push" to keep him going. His being a "free
spirit", attracted [petitioner], who adored him for being able to do what he wanted,
without being bothered by untraditional, unacceptable norms and differing ideas from
other people. He presented no guilt feelings, no remorse, no anxiety for whatever
wrongdoings he has committed. His studies proved too much of a pressure for him, and
quit at the middle of his course, despite his apparent high intellectual resources (sic).
His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove his worth, he quit
work from his family employment and ventured on his own. With no much planning and
project study, his businesses failed. This became the sources (sic) of their marital
conflicts, the lack of relationships (sic) and consultations (sic) with each other, his
negativistic attitudes (sic) and sarcasm, stubbornness and insults, his spitting at her face
which impliedly meant "you are nothing as compared to me" were in reality, his defenses
for a strong sense of inadequacy (sic).
As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides. However, this seemed
not coupled with emotional attributes such as perseverance, patience, maturity, direction,
focus, adequacy, stability and confidence to make it work. He complained that he did not
feel the support of his wife regarding his decision to go into his own business. But when he
failed, the more he became negativistic and closed to suggestions especially from
[petitioner]. He was too careful not to let go or make known his strong sense of
inadequacy, ambivalence, doubts, lack of drive and motivation or even feelings of
inferiority, for fear of rejection or loss of pride. When things did not work out according to
his plans, he suppressed his hostilities in negative ways, such as stubbornness, sarcasm or
drug intake.
His decision making is characterized by poor impulse control, lack of insight and primitive
drives. He seemed to feel more comfortable in being untraditional and different from
others. Preoccupation is centered on himself, (sic) an unconscious wish for the
continuance of the gratification of his dependency needs, (sic) in his mother-son
relationship. From this stems his difficulties in heterosexual relationship with his wife, as
pressures, stresses, (sic) demands and expectations filled up in (sic) up in their marital
relationship. Strong masculine strivings is projected.
For an intelligent person like [respondent], he may sincerely want to be able to assume
his duties and responsibilities as a husband and father, but because of a severe
psychological deficit, he was unable to do so.
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner, that [petitioner]
manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the
emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
[Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested strong clinical evidences (sic), that he is
suffering from a Personality Disorder, of the antisocial type, associated with strong sense
of Inadequacy along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders him
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. This is
characterized by his inability to conform to the social norms that ordinarily govern many
aspects of adolescent and adult behavior. His being a "free spirit" associated with no
remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical condition. His
prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors
to boost his ego.
The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense
mechanisms, or the unconscious mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts.
His prolonged and closed attachments to his mother encouraged cross identification and
developed a severe sense of inadequacy specifically along masculine strivings. He
therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of authority, assertiveness, unilateral
and forceful decision making, aloofness and indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial
acts. His narcissistic supplies rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic).
It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration, due to marital
demands and stresses. It is considered as permanent in nature because it started early in
his psychological development, and therefore became so engrained into his personality
structures (sic). It is considered as severe in degree, because it hampered, interrupted
and interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis
supplied)13
2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan
Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]’s brothers, referred [respondent] to the clinic. According
to them, respondent has not really taken care of his wife and children. He does not seem
to have any direction in life. He seems to be full of bright ideas and good at starting things
but he never gets to accomplish anything. His brothers are suspecting (sic) that until now
[respondent] is still taking drugs. There are times when they see that [respondent] is not
himself. He likes to bum around and just spends the day at home doing nothing. They
wish that he’d be more responsible and try to give priority to his family. [Petitioner,] his
wife[,] is the breadwinner of the family because she has a stable job. [Respondent]’s
brothers learned from friends that [petitioner] is really disappointed with him. She has
discussed things with him but he always refused to listen. She does not know what to do
with him anymore. She has grown tired of him.
When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned that he stopped
taking it in 1993. His brothers think that he is not telling the truth. It is so hard for
[respondent] to stop taking drugs when he had been hooked to it for the past 22 years.
When [respondent] was also asked what his problems are at the moment, he mentioned
that he feels lonely and distressed. He does not have anyone to talk to. He feels that he
and his wife [have] drifted apart. He wants to be close to somebody and discuss things
with this person but he is not given the chance. He also mentioned that one of his weak
points is that he is very tolerant of people[,] that is why he is taken advantage of most of
the time. He wants to avoid conflict so he’d rather be submissive and compliant. He does
not want to hurt anyone [or] to cause anymore pain. He wants to make other people
happy.
x xxx
Interpretation of Psychological Data
A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning
x xxx
B. Vocational Preference
x xxx
C. Socio Emotional Functioning
x xxx
In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof and
detached attitude. [Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of
inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he tends to feel inferior and to exclude himself from
association with others. He feels that he is "different" and as a result is prone to anticipate
rejections. Because of the discomfort produced by these feelings, he is apt to avoid
personal and social involvement, which increases his preoccupation with himself and
accentuates his tendency to withdraw from interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt
to be the less dominant partner. He feels better when he has to follow than when he has
to take the lead. A self-contained person[,] he does not really need to interact with others
in order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He has a small need of companionship
and is most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels uncomfortable in expressing his more
tender feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he maybe very angry within but he may
choose to repress this feeling. [Respondent’s] strong need for social approval, which could
have stemmed from some deep seated insecurities makes him submissive and over
[compliant]. He tends to make extra effort to please people. Although at times[, he]
already feels victimized and taken advantage of, he still tolerates abusive behavior for fear
of interpersonal conflicts. Despite
his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of indifference and disapproval
[of] others. Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and frustrations
which is likewise apt to be repressed.
There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing considerable
tension and anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and nervousness. Likewise, he is
also entertaining feelings of hopelessness and is preoccupied with negative thought. He
feels that he is up in the air but with no sound foundation. He is striving [for] goals which
he knows he will never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and distressed, he has
difficulty concentrating and focusing on things which he needs to prioritize. He has many
plans but he can’t accomplish anything because he is unable to see which path to take.
This feeling of hopelessness is further aggravated by the lack of support from significant
others.
Diagnostic Impression
Axis I : Drug Dependence
Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder
[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]
Axis III : None
Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:
Severe
He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is unable to accomplish
anything; unable to give priority to the needs of his family; in social relationships.
Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning – Fair (Emphasis supplied)14
3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno
Summary and Conclusion
From the evidence available from [petitioner’s] case history and from her psychological
assessment, and despite the non-cooperation of the respondent, it is possible to infer with
certainty the nullity of this marriage. Based on the information available about the
respondent, he suffers from [an] antisocial personality disorder with narcissistic and
dependent features that renders him too immature and irresponsible to assume the
normal obligations of a marriage. As for the petitioner, she is a good, sincere, and
conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children.
Her achievements in
this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally immature and her comprehension of
human situations is very shallow for a woman of her academic and professional
competence. And this explains why she married RRR even when she knew he was a
pothead, then despite the abuse, took so long to do something about her situation.
Diagnosis for [petitioner]:
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouse’s immaturity, drug abuse,
and infidelity)
Severity: 4-severe
Diagnosis for [respondent]
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and
dependent features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife)
Severity: 4 (severe)
x xxx
One has to go back to [respondent’s] early childhood in order to understand the root
cause of his antisocial personality disorder. [Respondent] grew up the ninth child in a
brood of 11. His elder siblings were taken cared of by his grandmother. [Respondent’s]
father was kind, quiet and blind and [respondent] was [reared] by his mother.
Unfortunately, [respondent’s] mother grew up believing that she was not her mother’s
favorite child, so she felt "api, treated like poor relations." [Respondent’s] mother’s
reaction to her perceived rejection was to act out—with poor impulse control and poor
mood regulation (spent money like water, had terrible temper tantrums, etc.).
Unwittingly, his mother became [respondent’s] role model.
However, because [respondent] had to get on with the business of living, he learned to
use his good looks and his charms, and learned to size up the weaknesses of others, to lie
convincingly and to say what people wanted to hear (esp. his deprived mother who liked
admiration and attention, his siblings from whom he borrowed money, etc.). In the
process, his ability to love and to empathize with others was impaired so that he cannot
sustain a relationship with one person for a long time, which is devastating in a marriage.
[Respondent’s] narcissistic personality features were manifested by his self-centeredness
(e.g. moved to Mindoro and lived there for 10 years, leaving his family in Manila); his
grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. he would just "come and go," without telling his
wife his whereabouts, etc.); his sense of entitlement (e.g. felt entitled to a mistress
because [petitioner] deprived him of his marital rights, etc.); interpersonally exploitative
(e.g. let his wife spend for all the maintenance needs of the family, etc.); and lack of
empathy (e.g. when asked to choose between his mistress and his wife, he said he would
think about it, etc.) The aggressive sadistic personality features were manifested whom he
has physically, emotionally and verbally abusive [of] his wife when high on drugs; and his
dependent personality features were manifested by his need for others to assume
responsibility for most major areas of his life, and in his difficulty in doing things on his
own.
[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder with marked narcissistic
features and aggressive sadistic and dependent features, is psychologically incapacitated
to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage: to love, respect and render support for his
spouse and children. A personality disorder is not curable as it is permanent and stable
over time.
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage of
[petitioner] and [respondent is] null and void from the very beginning. (emphasis
supplied)15
Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of
Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally examined and
interviewed the respondent.
We do not agree with the CA.
The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person
diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the
doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in
their exclusion as evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition,16 necessarily involves only two persons. The
totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally
and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their
individual assessment of the present state of the parties’ marriage from the perception of
one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had
occasion to interact with, and experience, respondent’s pattern of behavior which she
could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.
For another, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s assessment were not based solely
on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as
respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified
on their own observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions with them, spanning
the period of time they knew him.17 These were also used as the basis of the doctors’
assessments.
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,18 citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV),19 instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria
for personality disorders:
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the
expectations of the individual's culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of
the following areas:
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and
events)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of emotional
response)
(3) interpersonal functioning
(4) impulse control
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and
social situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational or other important areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to
adolescence or early adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of
another mental disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a
drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma).
Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder:
A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others
occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following:
 (1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated
by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest
(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others
for personal profit or pleasure
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or
assaults
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain
consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations
(7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt,
mistreated, or stolen from another
B. The individual is at least 18 years.
C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years.
D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of
schizophrenia or a manic episode.20
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make
up of a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person
afflicted with a personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof.
In this case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior,
self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors’ separate
diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of
experts.
The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayan’s findings and recommendation, the
psychological incapacity of respondent is not incurable.
The appellate court is mistaken.
A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general,
recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to
manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddock’s textbook entitled Synopsis of
Psychiatry,21 treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed
kinds of personality disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayan’s recommendation
that respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that
respondent’s psychological incapacity is incurable.
Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.22 As aptly stated
by Justice Romero in her separate opinion in the ubiquitously cited case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals & Molina:23
[T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such
cases. Data about the person’s entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were
presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a
party’s mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged
and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
… [Because] of advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective
testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have
problems; and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize
and work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts;
substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses that a person has
personality disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of
nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s finding of a
personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and
not beset by one of the parties’ or both parties’ psychological incapacity.
On more than one occasion, we have rejected an expert’s opinion concerning the
supposed psychological incapacity of a party.24 In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,25 we ruled that,
even without delving into the non-exclusive list found in Republic v. Court of Appeals &
Molina,26 the stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of Appeals 27must be
independently met by the party alleging the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article 36
of the Family Code. We declared, thus:
It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with
nary a link drawn between the "psychodynamics of the case" and the factors
characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr. Villegas' sparse testimony does not lead to
the inevitable conclusion that the parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations. Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr. Villegas'
testimony did not illuminate on the parties' alleged personality disorders and their
incapacitating effect on their marriage x xx.
Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both parties' personality disorders was not
supported by psychological tests properly administered by clinical psychologists specifically
trained in the tests' use and interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the
parties, considering that such diagnoses were made, could have been fully established by
psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to measure specific aspects of
people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.
x xxx
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of
interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the
trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in this
case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of
his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in
showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the
logic of his conclusion is founded.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual
antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all
point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations.
Article 68 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality disorder
exhibit the following clinical features:
Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal and even
charming and ingratiating. Their histories, however, reveal many areas of disordered life
functioning. Lying, truancy, running away from home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and
illegal activities are typical experiences that patients report as beginning in childhood. x
xxTheir own explanations of their antisocial behavior make it seem mindless, but their
mental content reveals the complete absence of delusions and other signs of irrational
thinking. In fact, they frequently have a heightened sense of reality testing and often
impress observers as having good verbal intelligence.
x xxThose with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to carry out any
task or adhere to any conventional standard of morality. x xx A notable finding is a lack of
remorse for these actions; that is, they appear to lack a conscience.28
In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1)
sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed
business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not
connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
On the issue of the petitioner’s purported psychological incapacity, we agree with the CA’s
ruling thereon:
A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete
facts showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if
such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration x xx. In fact, what was merely
prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the
marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to
be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at
the time of the celebration of the marriage x xx
At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioner’s] Amended Petition was indeed
amended to conform to the evidence, as provided under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court, Dr. Villegas’ finding that [petitioner] is supposedly suffering from an Inadequate
Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area does not amount to psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Such alleged condition of [petitioner] is not
a debilitating psychological condition that incapacitates her from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage.1avvphi1 In fact, in the Psychological Evaluation
Report of clinical psychologist Magno, [petitioner] was given a glowing evaluation as she
was found to be a "good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best to
provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard are praiseworthy."
Even in Dr. Villegas’ psychiatric report, it was stated that [petitioner] was able to remain
in their marriage for more than 20 years "trying to reach out and lending a hand for better
understanding and relationship." With the foregoing evaluation made by no less than
[petitioner’s] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is psychologically
incapacitated within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.29
All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in
his separate statement in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina:30
x xx Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court."
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing
disquisition, we find ample basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV
No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City
in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is REINSTATED. No costs.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 167459 January 26, 2011
JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA, Petitioner,
vs.
BONA J. ALANO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set
aside the Decision1dated October 11, 2004 as well as the Resolution2 dated March 10,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65120, which reversed and set aside the
Decision3 dated January 11, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 in
Civil Case No. 97-2903. In the said January 11, 1999 Decision, the trial court granted
petitioner Jose Reynaldo Ochosa’s (Jose) petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between him and private respondent Bona J. Alano (Bona).
The relevant facts of this case, as outlined by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young lieutenant in the AFP
while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year college drop-out. They had a whirlwind
romance that culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on 27 October 1973
before the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any
property. Neither did they incur any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976,
however, they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later
registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste AlanoOchosa.
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine
archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring
to stay in her hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment,
except in one (1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days.
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security Escort
Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio,
Makati City where they resided with their military aides.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed coup
d’etat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of their marriage when
Jose was assigned in various parts of the country, she had illicit relations with other men.
Bona apparently did not change her ways when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio; she
entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was out of their living quarters.
On one occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex
with Jose’s driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bona’s sexual infidelity circulated in the
military community. When Jose could no longer bear these rumors, he got a military pass
from his jail warden and confronted Bona.
During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who also
made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their living quarters. Bona
left with Ramona and went to Basilan.
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently
supporting the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-
2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on
the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of
marriage.
Summons with a copy of the petition and its annexes were duly served upon Bona who
failed to file any responsive pleading during the reglementary period.
Pursuant to the order of the trial court, the Public Prosecutor conducted an investigation to
determine whether there was collusion between the parties. Said prosecutor submitted a
report that she issued a subpoena to both parties but only Jose appeared; hence, it can
not be reasonably determined whether or not there was collusion between them.
Trial on the merits of the case ensued. Petitioner along with his two military aides,
GertrudesHimpayanPadernal and Demetrio Bajet y Lita, testified about respondent’s
marital infidelity during the marriage.
The fourth and final witness was Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, who testified that
after conducting several tests, she reached the conclusion that respondent was suffering
from histrionic personality disorder which she described as follows:
"Her personality is that she has an excessive emotion and attention seeking
behavior.1âwphi1 So therefore they don’t develop sympathy in feelings and they have
difficulty in maintaining emotional intimacy. In the case of Mr. Ochosa he has been a
military man. It is his duty to be transferred in different areas in the Philippines. And while
he is being transferred from one place to another because of his assignments as a military
man, Mrs. Bona Alano refused to follow him in all his assignments. There were only few
occasions in which she followed him. And during those times that they were not living
together, because of the assignments of Mr. Ochosa she developed extra marital affair
with other man of which she denied in the beginning but in the latter part of their
relationship she admitted it to Mr. Ochosa that she had relationship with respondent’s
driver. I believe with this extra marital affair that is her way of seeking attention and
seeking emotions from other person and not from the husband. And of course, this is not
fulfilling the basic responsibility in a marriage."
According to Rondain, respondent’s psychological disorder was traceable to her family
history, having for a father a gambler and a womanizer and a mother who was a battered
wife. There was no possibility of a cure since respondent does not have an insight of what
is happening to her and refused to acknowledge the reality.
With the conclusion of the witnesses’ testimonies, petitioner formally offered his evidence
and rested his case.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its opposition to the petition on the
ground that "the factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come
close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20
[1995])."
In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition and
nullified the parties’ marriage on the following findings, viz:
x xxx
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides as follows:
‘A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.’
Such a ground to be invalidative (sic) of marriage, the degree of incapacity must exhibit
GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that the psychological incapacity of the
respondent exhibited GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.
It is grave because the respondent did not carry out the normal and ordinary duties of
marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under everyday
circumstances of life and work. The gravity was manifested in respondent’s infidelity as
testified to by the petitioner and his witnesses.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent could be traced back to respondent’s
history as testified to by the expert witness when she said that respondent’s bad
experience during her childhood resulted in her difficulty in achieving emotional intimacy,
hence, her continuous illicit relations with several men before and during the marriage.
Considering that persons suffering from this kind of personality disorder have no insight of
their condition, they will not submit to treatment at all. As in the case at bar, respondent’s
psychological incapacity clinically identified as Histrionic Personality Disorder will remain
incurable.4 (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the dispositive portion of the trial court Decision dated January 11, 1999 read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING the marriage
of JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA and BONA J. ALANO on October 27, 1973 at Basilan City
VOID AB INITIO on ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent under Article 36
of the Family Code as amended with all the effects and consequences provided for by all
applicable provisions of existing pertinent laws.
After this Decision becomes final, let copies thereof be sent to the Local Civil Registrar of
Basilan City who is directed to cancel the said marriage from its Civil Registry, and the
Local Civil Registrar of Makati City for its information and guidance.5
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said ruling to the Court of Appeals
which sided with the OSG’s contention that the trial court erred in granting the petition
despite Jose’s abject failure to discharge the burden of proving the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife, Bona, to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court Decision in its assailed
Decision dated October 11, 2004, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, the appealed Decision dated 11 January 1999 in
Civil Case No. 97-2903 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 140, is
accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another is entered DISMISSING the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage.6
Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of Appeals for lack
of merit in its assailed Resolution dated March 10, 2005.
Hence, this Petition.
The only issue before this Court is whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The petition is without merit.
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in the trial court hinges
on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,7 we observed that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of psychological incapacity as
mandated in Santos, we laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina8 the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing
it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outburst" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not
a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should
be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our
law on evidence – what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to
be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church – while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other – shall walk
 together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensorvinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.9 (Citations omitted.)
In Marcos v. Marcos,10 we previously held that the foregoing guidelines do not require that
a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the
root cause may be "medically or clinicallyidentified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For, indeed, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to.
It is also established in jurisprudence that from these requirements arise the concept that
Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that
there never was any marriage in the first place because the affliction – already then
existing – was so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had
assumed.11
A little over a decade since the promulgation of the Molina guidelines, we made a critical
assessment of the same in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,12 to wit:
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as
the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the
Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and
was sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce
procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its
toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic
personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of
their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the
Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it.
Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled
marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.13
However, our critique did not mean that we had declared an abandonment of
the Molina doctrine. On the contrary, we simply declared and, thus, clarified in the
same Te case that there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should
govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. Furthermore,
we reiterated in the same case the principle that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.14
In the case at bar, the trial court granted the petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage on the basis of Dr. Elizabeth Rondain’s testimony15 and her psychiatric evaluation
report16 as well as the individual testimonies of Jose17 and his military aides - Mrs.
GertrudesHimpayan Padernal18 and Corporal Demetrio Bajet.19
We are sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of the evidence presented in this
case, that Bona had been, on several occasions with several other men, sexually disloyal
to her spouse, Jose. Likewise, we are persuaded that Bona had indeed abandoned Jose.
However, we cannot apply the same conviction to Jose’s thesis that the totality of Bona’s
acts constituted psychological incapacity as determined by Article 36 of the Family Code.
There is inadequate credible evidence that her "defects" were already present at the
inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity
did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of "juridical antecedence."
With regard to Bona’s sexual promiscuity prior to her marriage to Jose, we have only the
uncorroborated testimony of Jose made in open court to support this allegation. To quote
the pertinent portion of the transcript:
Q: So, what was the reason why you have broken with your wife after several years -
A: Well, I finally broke up with my wife because I can no longer bear the torture because
of the gossips that she had an affair with other men, and finally, when I have a chance to
confront her she admitted that she had an affair with other men.
Q: With other men. And, of course this – her life with other men of course before the
marriage you have already known –
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: So, that this gossips – because you said that you thought that this affair would go to
end after your marriage?
A: Yes, I was thinking about that.
Q: So, that after several years she will not change so that’s why you can’t bear it
anymore?
A: Yes, ma’am.20
Dr. Rondain’s testimony and psychiatric evaluation report do not provide evidentiary
support to cure the doubtful veracity of Jose’s one-sided assertion. Even if we take into
account the psychiatrist’s conclusion that Bona harbors a Histrionic Personality Disorder
that existed prior to her marriage with Jose and this mental condition purportedly made
her helplessly prone to promiscuity and sexual infidelity, the same cannot be taken as
credible proof of antecedence since the method by which such an inference was reached
leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in
determining psychological incapacity.
The psychiatrist’s findings on Bona’s personality profile did not emanate from a personal
interview with the subject herself as admitted by Dr. Rondain in court, as follows:
Q: How about, you mentioned that the petitioner came for psychological test, how about
the respondent, did she come for interview and test?
A: No, ma’am.
Q: Did you try to take her for such?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And what did she tell you, did she come for an interview?
A: There was no response, ma’am.21
As a consequence thereof, Dr. Rondain merely relied on her interview with Jose and his
witness, Mrs. Padernal, as well as the court record of the testimonies of other witnesses,
to wit:
Q: And you said you did interviews. Who did the interview?
A: I interviewed Mr. Ochosa and their witness Padernal, ma’am.
Q: When you say Padernal are you referring to GertrudesHimpayanPadernal who testified
in this court?
A: Yes, ma’am.
x xxx
Q: Other than the interviews what else did you do in order to evaluate members of the
parties?
A: I also interviewed (sic) the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of other
witnesses, ma’am.
x xxx
Q: Was there also a psychological test conducted on the respondent?
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: It was on the basis of the psychological test in which you based your evaluation report?
A: It was based on the psychological test conducted and clinical interview with the other
witnesses, your Honor.22
Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bona’s psychological condition indirectly from the
information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. This factual circumstance evokes
the possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Jose’s
cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration.
Even if we give the benefit of the doubt to the testimonies at issue since the trial court
judge had found them to be credible enough after personally witnessing Jose and the
witnesses testify in court, we cannot lower the evidentiary benchmark with regard to
information on Bona’s pre-marital history which is crucial to the issue of antecedence in
this case because we have only the word of Jose to rely on. In fact, Bona’s dysfunctional
family portrait which brought about her Histrionic Personality Disorder as painted by Dr.
Rondain was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of Jose, the spouse who has
the most to gain if his wife is found to be indeed psychologically incapacitated. No other
witness testified to Bona’s family history or her behavior prior to or at the beginning of the
marriage. Both Mrs. Padernal and Corporal Bajet came to know Bona only during their
employment in petitioner’s household during the marriage. It is undisputed that Jose and
Bona were married in 1973 while Mrs. Padernal and Corporal Bajet started to live with
petitioner’s family only in 1980 and 1986, respectively.
We have previously held that, in employing a rigid and stringent level of evidentiary
scrutiny to cases like this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this
type of examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable,
we recognize that it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged
relations between the parties. For a determination though of a party’s complete
personality profile, information coming from persons with personal knowledge of the
juridical antecedents may be helpful. This is an approach in the application of Article 36
that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the
credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources
of information.23
However, we have also ruled in past decisions that to make conclusions and
generalizations on a spouse’s psychological condition based on the information fed by only
one side, similar to what we have pointed out in the case at bar, is, to the Court’s mind,
not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
such evidence.24
Anent the accusation that, even at the inception of their marriage, Bona did not wish to be
with Jose as a further manifestation of her psychological incapacity, we need only to look
at the testimonial records of Jose and his witnesses to be convinced otherwise, to wit:
JOSE OCHOSA’S TESTIMONY:
A: 1979.
Q: And you said that you have known the petitioner and the respondent in this case
because in fact, you lived with them together in the same quarters. Does the quarters
have different rooms?

Q: How long did you stay with your wife? A: Yes, ma’am.

A: We were married in 1973 and we separated in 1988 but in all those years there were Q: But very near each other?
only few occasions that we were staying together because most of the time I’m in the
field. A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: Now, you said most of the time you were in the field, did you not – your wife come with
you in any of your assignments?
A: Never, but sometimes she really visited me and stayed for one (1) day and then –
Q: And, where did your wife stayed when she leaves you?
Q: You know them because of the proximity of the quarters?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: It was only during this 1980 to 1983, three (3) years that you lived together that you
have a chance to be with the spouses?

A: She was staying with her mother in Basilan. x xxx

Q: Where were you assigned most of the time? A: Since 1980 to 1983 we lived together in the same house.

A: I was assigned in Davao, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Basilan. x xxx

Q: And, of course she would come to your place every now and then because it is not very Q: Now, Madam Witness, after 1983, where did you reside together with your husband?
far –
A: In Cagayan de Oro and in 1986 we came back to Manila, in Fort Bonifacio.
A: No, ma’am, once in a while only.
Q: You mean, in the same house where petitioner and the respondent lived together?
Q: Did you not go home to your conjugal home?
A: Yes. Ma’am.
A: I have a chanced also to go home because we were allowed to at least three (3) days
every other month.
Q: How long did you live in the house where the petitioner and the respondent stay?

Q: So, if you start from the marriage up to 1988 so that is 16 years you were supposed to
A: Twelve years now since 1983 to 1995.
have been living together?

Q: Where was the petitioner working at that time, from 1982 to 1995?
A: No, actually in 19 – middle of 1987 because in 1987 I was in x x x.25

A: He is a soldier, a Colonel.
GERTRUDES PADERNAL’S TESTIMONY:

Q: Do you know where he was assigned during this time?

Q: Now, do you know when they lived together as husband and wife?
A: Yes, ma’am, G-3.
Q: May we know where this G-3 is?
A: Fort Bonifacio, ma’am.
Q: What about the wife, where does she stay?
A: At Fort Bonifacio, in their house.26
DR. ELIZABETH E. RONDAIN’S TESTIMONY:
Q: Now, they got married in 1973, am I correct?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: But the matter of the work or assignment of the petitioner, he was assigned in different
Provinces or Barangays in the Philippines?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Now, when the wife or the respondent in this case did not go with the husband in
different places of his assignment did you ask her why what was the reason why she did
not like to go those places?
A: She just did not want to. The wife did not go with him because… by transferring from
one place to another, she just don’t want to go, she just wanted to stay in Basilan where
her hometown is, ma’am.
Q: Did the petitioner herein tell you why the respondent don’t want to go with him?
A: Yes, I asked, the answer of the petitioner was she simply did not want to go with him
because she did not want him to be appointed to far away places.
Q: And would it be that since she did not like to go with the husband in some far away
different assignments she also assumed that the assignments were in this war regions
they were always fighting considering the place in Basilan they were in fighting
atmosphere?
A: It is possible but he was transferred to Manila and she also refused to stay in Manila,
ma’am.
Q: When was that that she refused to come to Manila?
A: I think, sometime in 1983, ma’am. She did not follow immediately. She stayed with
him only for four (4) months, ma’am.
Q: Now, do you know if the petitioner and the respondent were living together as husband
and wife for this period of time during the relationship?
A: Yes, ma’am. After their marriage I believe their relationship was good for a few months
until he was transferred to Julu. I believe during that time when they were together the
husband was giving an attention to her. The husband was always there and when the
husband transferred to Basilan, the attention was not there anymore, ma’am.27
It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary to Jose’s assertion,
had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the beginning of their marriage and was, in
fact, living with him for the most part of their relationship from 1973 up to the time when
Jose drove her away from their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows
that it was Jose who was constantly away from Bona by reason of his military duties and
his later incarceration. A reasonable explanation for Bona’s refusal to accompany Jose in
his military assignments in other parts of Mindanao may be simply that those locations
were known conflict areas in the seventies. Any doubt as to Bona’s desire to live with Jose
would later be erased by the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort
Bonifacio during the following decade.
In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her
sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time
after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.
We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code.28
While we are not insensitive to petitioner’s suffering in view of the truly appalling and
shocking behavior of his wife, still, we are bound by judicial precedents regarding the
evidentiary requirements in psychological incapacity cases that must be applied to the
present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5955 September 19, 1952
JOSE L. LAXAMANA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE T. BALTAZAR, respondent.
Gerardo S. Limlingan and Jose L. Baltazar for petitioner.
Macapagal, Punzalan and Yabut for respondent.
Ramon Duterte and Pedro Lopez as amici curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
When in July 1952 the mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga, was suspended, the vice-mayor
Jose T. Salazar, assumed office as mayor by virtue of section 2195 of the Revised
Administrative Code. However, the provincial governor, acting under section 21 (a) of the
Revised Election Code (R.A. 180), with the consent of the provincial board appointed Jose
L. Laxamana, as mayor of Sexmoan, who immediately took the corresponding official
oath.
Result: this quo warranto proceeding, based solely on the petitioner's proposition that the
section first mentioned has been repealed by the subsequent provision of the Revised
Election Code.
If there was such repeal, this petition should be granted, and Laxamana declared the
lawful mayor of Sexmoan. Otherwise it must be denied.1
The two statutory provisions read as follows:
SEC. 2195. — Temporary disability of the mayor. Upon the occasion of the
absence, suspension, or other temporary disability of the Mayor, his duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-Mayor, or if there be no Vice-Mayor, by the councilor who
at the last general election received the highest number of votes.
SEC. 21 (a).Vacancy in elective provincial, city or municipal office. — Whenever a
temporary vacancy in any elective local office occurs, the same shall be filled by
appointment by the President if it is a provincial or city office, and by the
provincial governor, with the consent of the Provincial Board, if it is a municipal
office. (R.A. 180, the Revised Election Code.
SEC. 21 (a) — The portion relating to municipal offices — was taken from section 2180 of
the Revised Administrative Code, which partly provided:
SEC. 2180.Vacancies in municipal office. — (a) In case of a temporary vacancy in
any municipal office, the same shall be filled by appointment by the provincial
governor, with the consent of the provincial board.
(b) In case of a permanent vacancy in any municipal office, the same shall be
filled by appointment by the provincial board, except in case of a municipal
president, in which the permanent vacancy shall be filled by the municipal vice-
president. . . .
It will be seen that under this section, when the office of municipal president (now mayor)
become permanently vacant the vice-president stepped into the office. The section
omitted reference to temporary vacancy of such office because section 2195 governed that
contingency. In this regard sections 2180 and 2195 supplemented each other. Paragraph
(a) of section 2180 applied to municipal offices in general, other than that of the municipal
president.
Under the Revised Administrative Code, — specially the two sections indicated — there
was no doubt in Government circles that when the municipal president was suspended
from office, the vice-president took his place.
Temporary vacancy in office of municipal president. — Paragraph (a) of this
section (2180) should be construed to cover only municipal offices other than the
office of president. Section 2195 of the Administrative Code should be applied in
case of the absence, suspension, or other temporary disability of the municipal
president. (Op. Atty. Gen. Sept. 21, 1917; Ins. Aud. Oct. 23, 1927.) (Araneta,
Administrative Code Vol. IV p. 2838)
Municipal president cannot designate acting president. — There is no provision of
law expressly or implied authorizing the municipal president to designate any
person to act in his stead during his temporary absence or disability. From the
provision of section 2195 of the code, it is clear that the vice-president or, if there
be no vice-president, the councilor who at the last general election received the
highest number of votes, should automatically (without any formal designation)
discharge the duties of the president. (Op. Ins. Aud. March 2, 1926) (Araneta
Administrative Code Vol. IV, p. 2839)
Now it is reasonable to assume that the incorporation of the above section 2180 into the
Revised Election Law as section 21 (a) did not have the effect of enlarging its scope, 2 to
supersede or repeal section 2195, what with the presumption against implied
repeals.3 "Where a statute has received a contemporaneous and practical interpretation
and the statute as interpreted is re-enacted, the practical interpretation is accorded
greater weight than it ordinarily receives, and is regarded as presumptively the correct
interpretation of the law. The rule here is based upon the theory that the legislature is
acquainted with the contemporaneous interpretation of a statute, especially when made by
an administrative body or executive officers charged with the duty of administering or Consequently it is our ruling that when the mayor of a municipality is suspended, absent
enforcing the law, and therefore impliedly adopts the interpretation upon re-enactment." or temporarily unable, his duties should be discharged by the vice-mayor in accordance
(Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 5109.) with sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Indeed, even disregarding their origin, the allegedly conflicting sections, could be This quo warranto petition is dismissed with costs. So ordered.1âwphïl.nêt
interpreted in the light of the principle of statutory construction that when a general and a
particular provision are inconsistent the latter is paramount to the former (sec. 288, Act Paras, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
190). In other words, section 2195 referring particularly to vacancy in the office of mayor,
must prevail over the general terms of section 21 (a) as to vacancies of municipal (local)
offices. Otherwise stated, section 2195 may be deemed an exception to or qualification of
the latter.4 "Where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals
with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if
possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter will prevail, regardless of whether it was
passed prior to the general statute." (Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 5204)

In a recent decision,5 we had occasion to pass on a similar situation — repeal by

subsequent general provision of a prior special provision — and we said,:

It is well-settled that a special and local statute, providing for a particular case or
class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms,
provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest,
although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the cases
embraced in the special law. . . . It is a canon of statutory construction that a
later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior
special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions, of such earlier
statute. (Steamboat Company vs. Collector, 18 Wall. (U.S.), 478; Cass County vs.
Gillett, 100 U.S. 585; Minnesota vs. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 396.)

Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general — the terms
of the general brood enough to include the matter provided for in the special —
the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the
special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, one as a
general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. (State vs. Stoll,
17 Wall. (U.S.) 425)

In fact even after the Revised Election Code was enacted, the Department of the Interior
and the office of executive Secretary who are charged with the supervision of provincial
and municipal governments have "consistently held that in case of the suspension or other
temporary disability of the mayor, the vice-mayor shall, by operation of law, assume the
office of the mayor, and if the vice-mayor is not available, the said office shall be
discharged by the first councilor." (Annex 5 of the answer.)

Needless to say, the contemporaneous construction placed upon the statute by the
executive officers charged with its execution deserves great weight in the courts.6
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet
Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that
respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage
be declared null and void.1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of
Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The
Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead,"2 and second,Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in
the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage.3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met
Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port
calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent
Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's hometown of
San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15
January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic
rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained
another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose,
Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter
from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same
letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then
immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in
November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship
docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his
missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the
bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he
inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet
Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that
his wife continued to refuse to give him such information even after they were married. He
also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the
Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that
her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before
she had given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her daughter-
in-law might have wished to leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica
never got used to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that
she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her son just
fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica
P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22 December 1982 for England. She
further claimed that she had no information as to the missing person's present
whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by
Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court hereby declares as
presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her
reappearance.4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed
to show that there existed a well founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had
sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition for
Review where the following allegations are made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that
there existed a well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet
Monica Parker was already dead; and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration that
the petition was a proper case of the declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41, Family Code.5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a
well-founded belief that his wife is already dead."6
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or
two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger
of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements.11

The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to
which provides that: prove that he had complied with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-
founded belief" that the absent spouse is already dead.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provision
for a missing spouse. In that case, defendant MacarioBiasbas was charged with the crime
of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
of bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already died.
sufficient.
The Court held that defendant had not exercised due diligence to ascertain the
whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of whom he made such inquiries.
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
He did not even write to the parents of his first wife, who lived in the
the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied).
Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information concerning
her whereabouts. He admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it was dead. He admits that the only basis of his suspicion was the fact that
superseded,7 the following crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required she had been absent. . . . 13
for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need
for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by
remarry.8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil
respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to
Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such
form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he
absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to
arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking
be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil
the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he secured another seaman's
Code.9 The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the
contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her
absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
there.
granted.

Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert

As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of
efforts to inquire the whereabouts of your wife?
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
 A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
AI secured another contract with the ship and we had a
trip to London and I went to London to look for her I could
not find her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this
casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's
justification of the mistake, to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical
difference between London and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like
Gregorio the two places could mean one — place in England, the port
where his ship docked and where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks,
every time they leave home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City,
or Parañaque, would announce to friends and relatives, "We're going to
Manila." This apparent error in naming of places of destination does not
appear to be fatal. 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one
hand, and London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-
General, are around three hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that
walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow bumping
into one particular person there — which is in effect what Nolasco says he did — can be
regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any
information as to her personal background even after she had married respondent 17 too
convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss
of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all
returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified
circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had
inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not
identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the
prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of
evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous
with credibility. 18 As noted before, there are serious doubts to respondent's credibility.
Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely tended to show that the
missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and
not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in
January 1983, he cut short his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique.
However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he
allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally reached San
Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring
about her parents and their place of residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain why
he did not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities in London and
Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and
respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that
Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the
public is deeply interested. It is a relationship for life and the parties
cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they
make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis supplied)
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of
agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to
circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried
to have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when
they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for
maternal care, still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to
satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary
contract. Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and
a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the familyand an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.
. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the
preservation of which the State bas the strongest interest; the public
policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section
12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
 The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. . . .

The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the
Philippines in Article 149:

The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic

social institution which public policy cherishes and
protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by
law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of
the family shall be recognized or given effect. 24

In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law
that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the
trial court's decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby
REVERSED and both Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against
respondent.

Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr. J., is on leave.