[No. 35694. December 23, 1933]
20880, 28336 and
ALLISON D. GIBBS, petitioner and appellee, vs. THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, oppositor
and appellant. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF
MANILA, respondent and appellant.
1.HUSBAND AND WlFE; RlGHT OF A CALIFORNIA MARRIED
WOMAN TO ACQUIRE LANDS IN FOREIGN
JURISDICTIONS.—The attention of the court has not been
called to any law of California that incapacitates a married
woman from acquiring or holding land in a foreign jurisdiction in
accordance with the lex rei sitæ.
2.ID. ; ARTICLE 9, CIVIL CODE, CONSTRUED.—Article 9 of
the Civil Code treats of purely personal relations and status
and capacity for juristic acts, the rules relating to property, both
personal and real, being governed by article 10 of the Civil
Code. Furthermore, article 9, by its very terms, is applicable
only to "Spaniards" (now, by construction, to citizens of the
Philippine Islands).
3.JONES LAW; PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW.—The
Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (Act of Congress, August
29, 1916, known as the "Jones Law") as regards the
determination of private rights, grants practical autonomy to the
Government of the Philippine Islands. This Government,
therefore, may apply the principles and rules of private
international law (conflict of laws) on the same footing as an
organized territory or state of the United States.
4.ARTICLE 10, CIVIL CODE, CONSTRUED.—The second
paragraph of article 10, Civil Code, applies only when a legal
or testamentary succession has taken place in the Philippines
in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the
foreign law is consulted only in regard to the order of
succession or the extent of the successional rights; in other
words, the second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only
when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in
property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
5.HUSBAND AND WIFE; CONJUGAL PROPERTY.—Under
the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence
prevailing here, the wife, upon the acquisition of any conjugal
property, becomes immediately vested with an interest and title
therein equal to that of her husband, subject to the power of
management and disposition which the law vests in the
husband. Immediately upon her death, if there are no
obligations of the decedent, as is true in the present case, her
share in the conjugal property is transmitted to her heirs by
succession. (Articles 657, 659, 661, Civil Code; cf. also
Coronel vs. Ona, 33 Phil., 456, 469.)
6.ID.; ID.—The wife of the appellee was, by the law of the
Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to
that of her husband, in the Philippine lands covered by
certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the date
of their acquisition to the date of her death.
7.ID. ; ID. ; INHERITANCE TAX.—The descendible interest
here in question in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her
heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls
within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40
of the Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Imperial, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Solicitor-General Hilado for appellants.
Allison D. Gibbs in his own behalf.
BUTTE, J.:
This is an appeal from a final order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, requiring the register of deeds of the City of
Manila to cancel certificates of title Nos.
28331, covering lands located in the City of Manila, Philippine
Islands, and issue in lieu thereof new certificates of transfer of
title in favor of Allison D. Gibbs without requiring him to present
any document showing that the succession tax due under
Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code has been
paid.
The said order of court of March 10, 1931, recites that the
parcels of land covered by said certificates of title formerly
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and
Eva Johnson Gibbs; that the latter died intestate in Palo Alto,
California, on November 28, 1929; that at the time of her death
she and her husband were citizens of the State of California
and domiciled therein.
It appears further from said order that Allison D. Gibbs was
appointed administrator of the estate of his said deceased wife
in case No. 36795 in the same court, entitled 'ln the Matter of
the Intestate Estate of Eva Johnson Gibbs, Deceased"; that in
said intestate proceedings, the said Allison D. Gibbs, on
September 22, 1930, filed an ex parte petition in which he
alleged "that the parcels of land hereunder described belong to
the conjugal partnership of your petitioner and his wife, Eva
Johnson Gibbs", describing in detail the three tracts here
involved; and further alleging that his said wife, a citizen and
resident of California, died on November 28, 1929; that in
accordance with the law of California, the community property
of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the
wife previous to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the
surviving husband without administration; that the conjugal
partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs,
deceased, has no obligations or debts and no one will be
prejudiced by adjudicating said parcels of land (and seventeen
others not here involved) to be the absolute property of the
said Allison D. Gibbs as sole owner. The court granted said
petition and on September 22, 1930, entered a decree
adjudicating the said Allison D. Gibbs to be the sole and
absolute owner of said lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil
Code of California. Gibbs presented this decree to the register
of deeds of Manila and demanded that the latter issue to him a
"transfer certificate of title".
Section 1547 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative
Code provides in part that:
"Registers of deeds shall not register in the registry of property
any document transferring real property or real rights therein or
any chattel mortgage, by way of gifts mortis causa, legacy or
inheritance, unless the payment of the tax fixed in this article
and actually due thereon shall be shown. And they shall
immediately notify the Collector of Internal Revenue or the
corresponding provincial treasurer of the non-payment of the
tax discovered by them. * * *"
Acting upon the authority of said section, the register of deeds
of the City of Manila, declined to accept as binding said decree
of court of September 22, 1930, and refused to register the
transfer of title of the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs,
on the ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had not
been paid. Thereupon, under date of December 26, 1930,
Allison D. Gibbs filed in the said court a petition for an order
requiring the said register of deeds "to issue the corresponding
titles" to the petitioner without requiring previous payment of
any inheritance tax. After due hearing of the parties, the court
reaffirmed said order of September 22, 1930, and entered the
order of March 10, 1931, which is under review on this appeal.
On January 3, 1933, this court remanded the case to the court
of origin for new trial upon additional evidence in regard to the
pertinent law of California in force at the time of the death of
Mrs. Gibbs, also authorizing the introduction of evidence with
reference to the dates of the acquisition of the property
involved in this suit and with reference to the California law in
force at the time of such acquisition. The case is now before us
with the supplementary evidence.
For the purposes of this case, we shall consider the following
facts as established by the evidence or the admissions of the
parties: Allison D. Gibbs has been continuously, since the year
1902, a citizen of the State of California and domiciled therein;
that he and Eva Johnson Gibbs were married ed at Columbus,
Ohio, in July, 1906; that there wa no antenuptial marriage
contract between the parties; that during the existence of said
marriage, the spouses acquired the following lands, among
others, in the Philippine Islands, as conjugal property:
1. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer
certificate of title No. 20880, dated March 16, 1920, and
registered in the name of "Allison D. Gibbs casado con Eva
Johnson Gibbs"."
2. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer
certificate of title No. 28336, dated May 14, 1927, in which it is
certified "that the spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson
Gibbs are the owners in fee simple" of the land therein
described.
3. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer
certificate of title No. 28331, dated April 6, 1927, which states
"that Allison D. Gibbs married to Eva Johnson Gibbs" is the
owner of the land described therein; that said Eva Johnson
Gibbs died intestate on November 28, 1929, leaving surviving
her her husband, the appellee, and two sons, Allison J. Gibbs,
now aged 25, and Finley J. Gibbs, now aged 22, as her sole
heirs at law.
Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code entitled "Tax
on inheritances, legacies, and other acquisitions mortis causa"
provides in section 1536 that "Every transmission by virtue of
inheritance * * * of real property * * * shall be subject to the
following tax." It results that the question for determination in
this case is as follows: Was Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of
her death the owner of a descendible interest in the Philippine
lands above-mentioned?
The appellee contends that the law of California should
determine the nature and extent of the title, if any, that vested
in Eva Johnson Gibbs under the three certificates of title Nos.
20880, 28336 and 28331 above referred to, citing article 9 of
the Civil Code. But that, even if the nature and extent of her
title under said certificates be governed by the law of the
Philippine Islands, the laws of California govern the succession
to such title, citing the second paragraph of article 10 of the
Civil Code.
Article 9 of the Civil Code is as f ollows:
"The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition, and legal capacity of persons, are binding upon
Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country." It is
argued that the conjugal right of the California wife in
community real estate in the Philippine Islands is a personal
right and must, therefore, be settled by the law governing her
personal status, that is, the law of California. But our attention
has not been called to any law of California that incapacitates a
married woman from acquiring or holding land in a foreign
jurisdiction in accordance with the lex rei sitæ. There is not the
slightest doubt that a California married woman can acquire
title to land in a common law jurisdiction like the State of Illinois
or the District of Columbia, subject to the common-law estate
by the curtesy which would vest in her husband. Nor is there
any doubt that if a California husband acquired land in such a
jurisdiction his wife would be vested with the common law right
of dower, the prerequisite conditions obtaining. Article 9 of the
Civil Code treats of purely personal relations and status and
capacity for juristic acts, the rules relating to property, both
personal and real, being governed by article 10 of the Civil
Code. Furthermore, article 9, by its very terms, is applicable
only to "Spaniards" (now, by construction, to citizens of the
Philippine Islands).
The Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (Act of Congress,
August 29, 1916, known as the "Jones Law") as regards the
determination of private rights, grants practical autonomy to the
Government of the Philippine Islands. This Government,
therefore, may apply the principles and rules of private
international law (conflict of laws) on the same footing as an
organized territory or state of the United States. We should,
therefore, resort to the law of California, the nationality and
domicile of Mrs. Gibbs, to ascertain the norm which would be
applied here as law were there any question as to her status.
But the appellant's chief argument and the sole basis of the
lower court's decision rests upon the second paragraph of
article 10 of the Civil Code which is as follows:
"Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect
to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law ,of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property or the country in which it may be situated."
In construing the above language we are met at the outset with
some difficulty by the expression "the national law of the
person whose succession is in question", by reason of the
rather anomalous political status of the Philippine Islands. (Cf.
Manresa, vol. 1, Código Civil, pp. 103, 104.) We encountered
no difficulty in applying article 10 in the case of a citizen of
Turkey. (Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil, 867.) Having regard to the
practical autonomy of the Philippine Islands, as above stated,
we have concluded that if article 10 is applicable and the
estate in question is that of a deceased American citizen, the
succession shall be regulated in accordance with the norms of
the State of his domicile in the United States. (Cf. Babcock
Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil., 130, 137; In re Estate
of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156, 166.)
The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the
death of the wife, the entire community property without
administration belongs to the surviving husband; that he is the
absolute owner of all the community property from the moment
of the death of his wife, not by virtue of succession or by virtue
of her death, but by virtue of the fact that when the death of the
wife precedes that of the husband he acquires the community
property, not as an heir or as the beneficiary of his deceased
wife, but because she never had more than an inchoate
interest or expectancy which is extinguished upon her death.
Quoting the case of Estate of Klumpke (167 Cal., 415, 419),
the court said: "The decisions under this section (1401 Civil
Code of California) are uniform to the effect that the husband
does not take the community property upon the death of the
wife by succession, but that he holds it all from the moment of
her death as though acquired by himself. * * * It never
belonged to the estate of the deceased wife."
The argument of the appellee apparently leads to this dilemma:
If he takes nothing by succession from his deceased wife, how
can the second paragraph of article 10 be invoked? Can the
appellee be heard to say that there is a legal succession under
the law of the Philippine Islands and no legal succession under
the law of California? It seems clear that the second paragraph
of article 10 applies only when a legal or testamentary
succession has taken place in the Philippines in accordance
with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is
consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the
extent of the successional rights; in other words, the second
paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the
deceased was vested with a descendible interest in property
within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke (178 U. S., 186, 191; 44 Law.
ed., 1028, 1031), the court said:
"It is a principle firmly established that to the law of the state in
which the land is situated we must look for the rules which
govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect
and construction of wills and other conveyances. (United
States vs. Crosby, 7 Cranch, 115; 3 L. ed., 287; Clark vs.
Graham, 6 Wheat, 577; 5 L. ed., 334; McGoon vs. Scales, 9
Wall., 23; 19 L. ed., 545; Brine vs. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 96 U.
S., 627; 24 L. ed., 858.)" (See also Estate of Lloyd, 175 Cal.,
704, 705.) This fundamental principle is stated in the first
paragraph of article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal
property is subject to the laws of the nation of the owner
thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it is
situated."
It is stated in 5 Cal. Jur., 478:
It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the
Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to
that of her husband, in the Philippine lands covered by
certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the date
of their acquisition to the date of her death. That appellee
himself believed that his wife was vested of such a title and
interest is manifest from the second of said certificates, No.
28336, dated May 14, 1927, introduced by him in evidence, in
which it is certified that "the spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva
Johnson Gibbs are the owners in fee simple of the conjugal
lands therein described."
The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands
aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance
and this transmission plainly falls within the language of
section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative
Code which levies a tax on inheritances. (Cf. Re Estate of
Majot, 199 N. Y., 29; 92 N. E., 402; 29 L. R. A. [N. S.], 780.) It
is unnecessary in this proceeding to determine the "order of
succession" or the "extent of the successional rights" (article
10, Civil Code, supra) which would be regulated by section
1386 of the Civil Code of California which was in effect at the
time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.

"In accord with the rule that real property is subject to the lex
The record does not show what the proper amount of the
rei sitæ, the respective rights of husband and wife in such
inheritance tax in this case would be nor that the appellee
property, in the absence of an antenuptial contract, are
(petitioner below) in any way challenged the power of the
determined by the law of the place where the property is
Government to levy an inheritance tax or the validity of the
situated, irrespective of" the domicile of the parties or of the
statute under which the register of deeds refused to issue a
place where the marriage was celebrated." (See also Saul vs.
certificate of transfer reciting that the appellee is the exclusive
His Creditors, 5 Martin [N. S.], 569; 16 Am. Dec., 212 [La.] ;
owner of the Philippine lands included in the three certificates
Heidenheimer vs. Loring, 26 S. W., 99 [Texas].)
of title here involved.

Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title
The judgment of the court below of March 10, 1931, is
which vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the
reversed with directions to dismiss the petition, without special
community lands here in question must be determined in
pronouncement as to the costs.
accordance with the lex rei sitæ.

Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, and

It is admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were
Vickers, JJ., concur.
acquired as community property of the conjugal partnership of
the appellee and his wife. Under the law of the Philippine
Islands, she was vested of a title equal to that of her husband.
Article 1407 of the Civil Code provides: Street, J., dissents.

"All the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership Order reversed. Gibbs vs. Government of the Philippine
property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to Islands, 59 Phil. 293, No. 35694 December 23, 1933
the husband or to the wife." Article 1395 provides:

'The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules of law

applicable to the contract of partnership in all matters in which
such rules do not conflict with the express provisions of this
chapter." Article 1414 provides that "the husband may dispose
by will of his half only of the property of the conjugal
partnership." Article 1426 provides that upon dissolution of the
conjugal partnership and after inventory and liquidation, "the
net remainder of the partnership property shall be divided
share and share alike between the husband and wife, or their
respective heirs." Under the provisions of the Civil Code and
the jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife, upon the acquisition
of any conjugal property, becomes immediately vested with an
interest and title therein equal to that of her husband, subject to
the power of management and disposition which the law vests
in the husband. Immediately upon her death, if there are no
No. L-16749. January 31, 1963.
obligations of the decedent, as is true in the present case, her
share in the conjugal property is transmitted to her heirs by
succession. (Articles 657, 659, 661, Civil Code; cf. also
Coronel vs. Ona, 33 Phil., 456, 469.) IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor
and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor
and Heir-appellees, vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA,
oppositor-appellant.
Private International Law; Determination of citizenship; U.S.
citizenship not lost by stay in Philippines before independence.
—The citizenship that the deceased acquired in California
when he resided there from 1904 to 1913 was never lost by his
stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the
United States until 1946, and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that
when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a
citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended
to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another.
Same; Validity of testamentary provisions; Meaning of “national
law” in Article 16, Civil Code; Conflict of law rules in California
to be applied in case at bar.—The “national law” indicated in
Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to any
general American Law, because there is no such law governing
the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States,
each state of the union having its own private law applicable to
its citizens only and in force only within the state. It can
therefore refer to no other than the private law of the state of
which the decedent was a citizen. In the case at bar, the State
of California prescribes two sets of laws for its citizens, an
internal law for its citizens residing therein and a conflict of law
rules for its citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions. Hence,
reason demands that the California conflict of law rules should
be applied in this jurisdiction in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Domicile; Factors considered in determining
aliens’ domicile in the Philippines.—An American citizen who
was born in New York, migrated to California, resided there for
nine years, came to the Philippines in 1913, and very rarely re-
turned to California and only for short visits, and who appears
to have never owned or acquired a home or properties in that
state, shall be considered to have his domicile in the Philip-
pines.
Same; Same; Same; Rule of resorting to the law of the
domicile in determining matters with foreign element involved.
—The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in
the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American law that the
domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which
follow the person of the owner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court of domicile bound to apply
its own law as directed in the conflict of law rule of decedents
state; Application of the renvoi doctrine.—The conflict of law
rule in California, Article 946 Civil Code, refers back the case,
when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his
domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of
domicile can not and should not refer the case back to
California, as such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination, because the case will then be tossed back and
forth between the two states. If the question has to be decided,
the Philippine court must apply its own law as the Philippines
was the domicile of the decedent, as directed in the conflict of
law rule of the state of the decedent, California, and especially
because the internal law of California provides no legitime for
natural children, while the Philippine law (Articles 887(4) and
894, Civil Code of the Philippines makes natural children
legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Philippine law to be
applied in case at bar.—As the domicile of the deceased, who
was a citizen of California, was the Philippines, the validity of
the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural
child of the latter’s legacy, should be governed by the
Philippine law, pursuant to Article 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Intsance of
Davao, Cusi, Jr., J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-
appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special
Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949,
approving among things the final accounts of the executor,
directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the
amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as
her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to
the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime,
and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to
be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance
with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E.
Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5,
1951 and contains the following provisions:
“3. I declare x x x that I have but ONE (1) child, named
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who
was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and
who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A.
“4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and
no descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
x x x x x
“7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about
eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that
she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me,
nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all
information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao,
Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be
deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the
Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her
at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine
Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any
interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
x x x x x
“12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-
beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at
No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.,
all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of
which I may be possessed at my death and which may have
come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime:
x x x”
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the
executor in his final account and project of partition ratified the
payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and
proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed
by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen)
of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having
been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the
distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines,
and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar
as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged
natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In
amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law
that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen
should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire
law thereof because several foreign elements are involved,
that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were
decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code,
which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply,
should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen
Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural
child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate
from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a
citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the
time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity
of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to
dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right
of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable
(In re McDaniel’s Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952,
and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page
179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen,
through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but
these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I Philippines for the United States and came back here the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION
OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS
THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER
OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING
AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF
SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY
UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY
OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY
THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE
EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN
GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE
IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen
of the United States and of the State of California at the time of
his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his
death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the
following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee’s
brief:
“In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the
facts of record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen
was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y.,
U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed
school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army
Transport “Sheridan” with Port of Embarkation as the City of
San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in
the Philippines until 1904.
“In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United
States and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913,
during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in
Sacramento, California.
“Mr. Christensen’s next arrival in the Philippines was in July of
the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the
following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again
returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines
the following year, 1939.
“Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by
the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World
War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United
States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945.
Appellees Collective Exhibits “6”, CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as
Exhibits “AA”, “BB” and “CC-Daney”; Exhs. “MM”, “MM-l”, “MM-
2-Daney” and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
“In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to
California shortly after the making of his last will and testament
(now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers’
offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke’s
Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953.” (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased
is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was
born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for
nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he
returned to California very rarely and only for short visits
(perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never
to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state,
which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
Philippines and make home in the State of California.

“Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of
meaning from mere temporary presence to the most
permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote
something more than mere physical presence.” (Goodrich on
Conflict of Laws, p. 29).
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that
he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento,
California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the
Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States
(not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that
when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a
citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended
to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This
conclusion is in accordance with the following principle
expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
“The terms ‘residence’ and ‘domicile’ might well be taken to
mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But
domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical
meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has
never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no
domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides
his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if
he went on business which would require his presence for
several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have
sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is
clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing
only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his
former ‘home,’ he could not be a domiciled New Yorker.
Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of
intention as well as physical presence. ‘Residence simply
requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one’s domicile.’ Residence, however, is
a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest
temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not
safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one.”
(Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary
dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is as follows:
“ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
“However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country where
said property may be found.”
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the
determination of the meaning of the term “national law” is used
therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the
Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only
and in force only within the state. The “national law” indicated
in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore,
possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can
refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing
the disposition of personal property? The decision of the court
below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that
under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of
his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing
the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d
952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the
Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
“If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its
owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.”
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant’s
opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other
hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by
a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is
argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen
was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof,
which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen’s will, such law being in force in the State of
California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the
other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in
accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi,
the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in
question should be referred back to the law of the decedent’s
domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various
authors, thus:
“The problem has been stated in this way: ‘When the Conflict
of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law
for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law
of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law
minus its Conflict of Laws rules?’
“On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court
chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws
rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law.
But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle
is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back
should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would
have resulted in the ‘endless chain of references’ which has so
often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the
renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois,
thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there
seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference
should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws
rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-
round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid
this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference
and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents
of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to
internal law as the rule of reference.
“Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to
the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption
of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that
the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem
is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal
basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should
be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the
result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In
the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the
renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the
suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too
rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The
same result would happen, though the courts would switch with
respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the
renvoi.
“The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances:
where the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a
decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of
Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties
in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further
reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person’s title to
land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every
court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties,
will be valid everywhere.” (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7,
pp. 13-14.)
of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take
into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its
rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual
question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This
may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has
generally been repudiated by the American authorities.” (2 Am.
Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and
the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof.
Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-
1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted
herein below:
“The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of
the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not
only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country,
but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this
theory ‘the law of a country’ means the whole of its law.

“X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in

x x x x x x x
France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England,
and France. The question arises as to how this property is to
be distributed among X’s next of kin.
“Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of
International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the
following theses:
“Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court.
There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession
to movables calls for an application of the law of the
deceased’s last domicile. Since by hypothesis X’s last domicile “(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as
was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do regards the application of foreign laws.
would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever
corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution
accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would “(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists,
show that if a French court were called upon to determine how the court shall respect:
this property should be distributed, it would refer the
distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying
the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of
things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative “(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right
course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute,
intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by
and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where
assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it the act in question occurred.
accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter
course, thus applying its own law.
“(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law,
provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily
“This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a
the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the question to the same system of law.
conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back
“If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute
again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower
the personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled
sense. The German term for this judicial process is
in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must
‘Ruckverweisung.’” (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-
first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute
571.)
personal property upon death in accordance with the law of
domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the
distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is
“After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be the English law — he must accept this reference back to his
resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question own law.”
may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in
such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question
which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its
instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by
conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman,
textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been
Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict
descriptively designated by them as the ‘Renvoyer’ to send
of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its
back, or the ‘Ruchversweisung’, or the ‘Weiterverweisung’,
own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re
since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the
Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article
operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in
946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in
many cases result in returning the main controversy to be
California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of
decided according to the law of the forum. x x x (16 C.J.S.
resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of
872.)
matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the
“Another theory, known as the “doctrine of renvoi”, has been general principle of American law that the domiciliary law
advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court
should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156;
of the owner. Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and
Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to
support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar,
“When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more
for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does
states, and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of
not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but
the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the
with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each
time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions
case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a
about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is
citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the
consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical
California Civil Code.
that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the
personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules
should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary
dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased
domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the
state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged
by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the
reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil
succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The Code of California, not by the internal law of California.
New York court has said on the point: ‘The general principle
that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of
the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed
application. It had its origin in that international comity which
and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that
was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession
business intercourse and the process of accumulating property
provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom
and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever.’” (Goodrich, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera,
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.) Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of
California. But as above explained the laws of California have
prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents
therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
Reason demands that We should enforce the California
internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and
enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled
abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity
we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil
Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above
explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and
its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
Decision reversed and case returned to lower court with
instructions that partition be made as the Philippine law on
succession applies.
Notes.—The words “amount of successional rights” used in
Article 16 of the Civil Code refer to the extent or amount of
property that each heir is legally entitled to inherit from the
estate available for distribution (Collector v. Fisher, et al., L-
11622 and L-11668, Jan, 23, 1960).
The doctrine of renvoi is usually pertinent where the decedent
is a national of one country and is domiciled in another. It does
not apply to a case where the decedent was a citizen of Texas
and was domiciled therein at the time of his death. (Bellis vs.
Bellis, et al., L-23678, June 6, 1967, 20 SCRA 358). Aznar vs.
Garcia, 7 SCRA 95, No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

It is argued on appellees’ behalf that the clause “if there is no

law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated”
in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the
contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that
the national law of the deceased should govern. This
contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various
authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16
of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California
Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or
return of the question to the law of the testator’s domicile. The
conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not
domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
and should not refer the case back to California; such action Bellis vs. Bellis
would leave the issue incapable of determination because the
case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between No. L-23678. June 6, 1967.
the two states, between the country of which the decedent was
a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of PEOPLE'S BANK & TRUST COMPANY, executor. MARIA
the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-
especially as the application of the internal law of California appellants, vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts.
Wills; Succession; Conflict of laws; Renvoi doctrine.—The
887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural
doctrine of renvoi is usually pertinent where the decedent is a
children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
national of one country and is domiciled in another. It does not
recognizing them.
apply to a case where the decedent was a citizen of Texas and
was domiciled therein at the time of his death. So that, even
assuming that Texas has a conflicts rule providing that the
domiciliary law should govern successional rights, the same
would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law,
but it would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a
conflicts rule, adopting the rule of lex rei sitae, which calls for
the application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, where the properties involved are
found in the Philippines.
Same; Foreign laws.—In the absence of proof as to the
conflicts rule of Texas, it would be presumed to be the same as
our local conflicts rule.
Same; Applicability of national law to succession; Capacity to
succeed—The decedent's national law governs the order of
succession, the amount of successional rights, the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will and capacity to succeed.
Same; Third paragraph of article 17 of New Civil Code does
not modify article 16.—The third paragraph of article 17 of the
New Civil Code is not an exception to the second paragraph of
article 16. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding
article," when it incorporated article 11 of the old Civil Code as
article 17, while reproducing without substantial change the
second paragraph of article 10 of the old Civil Code, as article
16. The legislative intent must have been to make the second
paragraph of article 176 a specific provision in itself which must
be applied in testate and intestate succession. As a further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new
provision, under article 1039, which decrees that capacity to
succeed is governed by the decedent's national law,
Same; Legitimes; Statutes; Special and general provisions.—
Whatever public policy and good customs may be involved in
our system of legitimes, Congres has not intended to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals. It has
specifically chosen the decedent's national law to govern, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
Same; Testamentary provision that successional right to
decedent's estate would be governed by law other than his
national law is void.—A provision in a foreigner's will that his
properties should be distributed in accordance with Philippine
law and not in accordance with his national law is void, being
contrary to article 16 of the New Civil Code.
Same; System of legitimes does not apply to estate of a citizen
of Texas.—Where the decedent was a citizen of Texas and
under Texas laws there are no forced heirs, the system of
legitimes in Philippine law cannot be applied to the succession
to the decedent's testate because the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the decedent's will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for
oppositorsappellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A.
Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON. J.P., J,:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law,
from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated
April 30, 1964. approving the project of partition f iled by the
executor in 'Civil Case No. 37089 therein.
The. facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of
Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis. Walter
S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid f or, his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following
order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, or
P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have
been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving
children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis, and Anna Bellis
Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E.
Bellis, in equal shares.
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died, a
resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to
probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September
15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will,
paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen
and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts
totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective
legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time
to time accordingly as the lower court approved and allowed
the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three
requesting partial advances on account of their respective
legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration,
the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E.
Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to
$240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of
P40,000.00 each or a total of ?120,000.00. In the project of
partition, the executor—pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the
testator's Last Will and Testament—divided the residuary
estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's
seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition
on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the
deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him,
proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt
submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1 After the parties
filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent
pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order
overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of partition.
Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national
law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did
not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been
denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964,
oppositorsappellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue
of which law must apply—Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even
discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v.
Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine
is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not
disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even
assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the
same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine
law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has
a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex
________________
1 He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be
included in this case as one of the oppositors-appellants; to file
or adopt the opposition of his sisters to the project of partition;
to submit his brief after paying his proportionate share in the
expenses incurred in the printing of the record on appeal; or to
allow him to adopt the briefs filed by his sisters—but this Court
resolved to deny the motion where the properties are situated,
renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are
found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as
to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed
different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested
on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor
even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that
their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c)
the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. They provide that—
"ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject
to the law of the country where it is situated. "However,
intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature
of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found."
"ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent."
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17. paragraph
three, of the Civil Code, stating that—
"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,
and those which have for their object public order, public policy
and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country."
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code
afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted
the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing
without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of
the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their
purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate
succes-sions. As further indication of this legislative intent.
Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which
decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the
national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter.
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general
ones,
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two
wills—one to govern his Texas estate and the other his
Philippine estate—arguing from this that he intended Philippine
law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was
the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will,
it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void.
for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10—now Article 16—of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since
the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount
of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy
of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in
toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
Allied Workers' Association of the Philippines vs. Court of
Industrial Relations
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes.—In Philippine Trust Company vs. Bohanan, 60 O.G.
4615, it was held that the validity of the provisions of the will of
a citizen of Nevada should be governed by his national law, the
law of Nevada. Since the Nevada law allows a citizen of
Nevada to dispose of all his property according to his will, the
testamentary provisions therein, depriving his wife and children
of what should be their legitimes under Philippine law should
be respected and the project of partition made in accordance
with. his will should be approved,

In Aznar vs. Christensen Garcia, 61 O.G. 7302, it was held

that, where the deceased citizen of California was domiciled in
the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will should
be governed by Philippine law, pursuant to article 946 of the
California Civil Code, and not by the internal law of California.
Bellis vs. Bellis, 20 SCRA 358, No. L-23678 June 6, 1967