JOSON v.

TORRES
Petition: Validity of the suspension from office of petitioner. Review a resolution of the
Executive Secretary
Petitioner: HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON
Respondent: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN D. TORRES

FACTS:
Eduardo Joson, Governor of Nueva Ecija, was charged with grave misconduct and abuse of
discretion. According to the respondents, in one of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan(SP) meeting, Joson
barged into the hall in order to harass them into approving the loan of 150 million pesos from the
PNB. they did not approve the loan for there is still a pending obligation of 70million pesos and they
cannot afford to enter into another obligation. Torres et al, then prayed for Ramos (President) for the
removal or suspension of Joson. Ramos then ordered the Secretary of Interior and Local Government
Barbers to take preemptive and investigative actions, but to “not break the peace” since he thinks that
the use of force will not be justified. Petitioner failed to file his Answer to the complaint thus he was
considered to have waived his right and with this, Executive Secretary Torres issued an Order, by
authority of the President, placing petitioner under preventive suspension for 60 days. The case was
elevated to the Court of Appeals by the petitioner via certiorari. This was dismissed. Hence, this
present petition.

ISSUES:
Whether or not, the suspension was valid and constitutional.

HELD
Disciplining vs Investigative Authority
HELD:
Yes. The suspension was valid and constitutional. Preventive suspension may be imposed by the
Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt
is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the respondent,
who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence.
Executive Secretary Torres, on behalf of the President, imposed preventive suspension on
petitioner Joson
1.
A.O. NO. 23 Section 2 – Disciplining Authority: All administrative complaints,
duly verified, against elective local officials mentioned in the preceding Section
shall be acted upon by the President. The President, who may act through the
Executive Secretary, shall hereinafter be referred to as the Disciplining Authority.
a. President by himself or through the Executive Secretary;
Investigating Authority: Secretary of Interior and Local
Government or a constituted Investigating Committee.

b. Granted the power of the President over administrative

disciplinary cases against elective officials. This is the power of
general supervision over local governments.

The power of supervision means “overseeing or the authority of an officer to see

that the subordinate officers perform their duties.”
Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline and
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the
President to order an investigation of the conduct of local officials when in his
opinion the good of the public service so requires.
The power to discipline and ensuring that laws of the land are properly executed
are vested upon the President as the Chief Executive. With the power to
discipline comes the power to supervise since supervision is not at all
incompatible with discipline. Consequently, it is well within the President’s
power to order an investigation regarding the conduct of local officials as long as
it is for the good of the public.
Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is
based on the doctrine of qualified political agency where the heads of
departments are considered as alter egos of the President himself. This doctrine is
rooted from the control power of the President provided in Section 17, Article VII
of the Constitution.
Under the alter-ego principle, the members of the Cabinet may act for and in
behalf of the President in certain matters because the president cannot be
expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time.