1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011, the Court dismissed the complaint for
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declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court's
Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.

xxxx

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were
premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.
Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong
sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the
detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a
psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions
of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting
these allegations of the petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their
children as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she
engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife.
Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five times a week. She
maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the permission of her husband
and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they
were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did not
present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that
respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second
grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could
have been done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years
when these two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no
dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on
the children were not proven.
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Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof
whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons orher frequent partying with
friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out)
in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that
respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendothat petitioner was able
to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual
infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual
infidelity per seis a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described
as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair
assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that
they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them,
was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent
made real efforts tosee and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father.
There was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties.
While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary
level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic short comings to Malyn’s
actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of
psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there
was psychological incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely summarized the allegations,
testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of
these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court
did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusionof psychological
incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have
constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children.
There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a
marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27,
2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 2

In his Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough second
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look into what constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as
supported by the testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find that the
respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically incapacitated to perform their respective
essential marital obligation.

Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.

Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the
marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume. Although the Family
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Code has not defined the term psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its
meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee
that had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the
members of the Family Code Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in
the end they decided to adopt the provision "with less specificity than expected" in order to have
the law "allow some resiliency in its application." Illustrative of the "less specificity than
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expected" has been the omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give any examples
of psychological incapacity that would have limited the applicability of the provision conformably
with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired that the courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had
persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law. 5

On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals, the deliberations of
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the Family Code Revision Committee and the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a
ground for the nullity of marriage have rendered it obvious that the term psychological incapacity
as used in Article 36 of the Family Code"has not been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances," and could not be taken and construed
independently of "but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage."
Thus correlated:-

x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68
of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be "legitimate."
7

In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court set some guidelines for the interpretation and
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application of Article 36 of the Family Code, as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological — not physical, althoughits manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
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thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — whatis decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect.
Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from
each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting
and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
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(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. 9

The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance
practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the
clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to
enable "some resiliency in its application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of
nullity "not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to
its own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in
the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial
judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, asmuch as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."
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In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology,
must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and
thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions
for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by
experts.11

II

The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a party’s
psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation
of the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly
erroneous. In every situation where the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by
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the facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from
substituting its own judgment. It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by
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the trial court and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and
the Family Code regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the
fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social
institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accordedto a marriage that is
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null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence. 15

In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really assiduously defend
and promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our
society is thereby made all the more strong and solid.

Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it
was in the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were
testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the
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psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and
respect.

Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions tendered by Dr.
Cristina Gates,a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were
solely based on the petitioner’s version of the events.
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After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such
expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their
value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that
said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the
respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions
reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and
affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of
the petitioner’s factual premises. 17

Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioner’s testimony, as well as
on her interviews of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings
would seem to be unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to disregard the findings
on that basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into consideration other factors extant in the
records, including the own opinions of another expert who had analyzed the issue from the side
of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled that the courts must accord weight to
expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration
of the nullityof marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts,
"despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead,
must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties." 18

The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court to
properly determine the issue of psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not alsoof the
petitioner). Consequently, the lack of personal examination and interview of the person
diagnosed with personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of
the experts. The Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos that there is no requirement for one to
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bedeclared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because

what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s
psychological incapacity. Hence, "if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to." 20

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing
that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record,
the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting
such other evidence on the causation. Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity
21

should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the
absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such
circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence. This22

is so, considering that any ruling that brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by
Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation
had been based on the parties’ upbringing and psychodynamics. In that context, Dr. Gates’
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expertopinion should be considered not in isolation but along with the other evidence presented
here.

Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial court was
expectedto compare the expert findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondent’s
own witness, and those of Dr. Gates.

In her Psychological Evaluation Report, Dr. Dayan impressed that the respondent had
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"compulsive and dependent tendencies" to the extent of being "relationship dependent." Based
from the respondent’s psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:

In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly detached in her
ways. Although she likes to be around people, she may keep her emotional distance. She, too,
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values her relationship but she may not be that demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may be
quite difficult for her since she tries to maintain a certain distance to minimize opportunities for
rejection. To others, Malyne may appear, critical and demanding in her ways. She can be
assertive when opinions contrary to those of her own are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a
dependent person. At a less conscious level, Malyne fears that others will abandon her. Malyne,
who always felt a bit lonely, placed an enormous value on having significant others would depend
on most times.

xxxx

But the minute she started to care, she became a different person— clingy and immature,
doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in
his life. She became relationship-dependent. 25

Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory
test conducted on the respondent, observing that the respondent obtained high scores on
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dependency, narcissism and compulsiveness, to wit:

Atty. Bretania

Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?

A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73 percental round and there are
several scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score and these are on the score of
dependency, narcissism and compulsion.

Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the acceptable score?

A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very significant. So, if 72 and below, it
will be considered as acceptable.

Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?

A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it is 84. 27

It is notable that Dr. Dayan’s findings did not contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates
to the effect that the respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well
as with AntiSocial Disorder. Dr. Gates relevantly testified:

ATTY. GONONG

Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar with psychology terms.
So, more or less, could you please tell me in more layman’s terms how you arrived at your
findings that the respondent is self-centered or narcissistic?

A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her childhood background,
her fatherdied in a vehicular accident when she was in her teens and thereafter she was
prompted to look for a job to partly assume the breadwinner’s role in her family. I gathered that
paternal grandmother partly took care of her and her siblings against the fact that her own
mother was unable to carry out her respective duties and responsibilities towards Elena
Fernandez and her siblings considering that the husband died prematurely. And there was an
indication that Elena Fernandez on several occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot blame
her for being negligent as a mother because she herself never experienced the care and
affection of her own mother herself. So, there is a precedent in her background, in her childhood,
and indeed this seems to indicate a particular script, we call it in psychology a script, the
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tendency to repeat somekind of experience or the lack of care, let’s say some kind of deprivation,
there is a tendency to sustain it even on to your own life when you have your own family. I did
interview the son because I was not satisfied with what I gathered from both Trinidad and Valerio
and even though as a young son at the age of fourteen already expressed the he could not see,
according to the child, the sincerity of maternal care on the part of Elena and that he preferred to
live with the father actually.

Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is self-centered and
narcissistic?

A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood and she is
still insearch of this. In her several boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one boyfriend
to another. There is this need for attention, this need for love on other people.

Q : And that led you to conclude?

A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of neglecting her duty as a
wife and as a mother. 28

The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory
or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that
serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is
founded. Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative value of the findings of the expert
29

witnesses vis-à-vis the other evidence available.

The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate before the
Manila Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code Revision
Committee. Regarding Father Healy’s expert testimony, we have once declared that judicial
understanding of psychological incapacity could be informed by evolving standards, taking into
account the particulars of each case, by current trends in psychological and even by canonical
thought, and by experience. It is prudent for us to do so because the concept of psychological
30

incapacity adopted under Article 36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon Law.

Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the respondent’s level of immaturity and
irresponsibility with regard to her own children and to her husband constituted psychological
incapacity, testifying thusly:

ATTY. MADRID

Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not psychologically incapacitated.
On the facts as you read it based on the records of this case before this Honorable Court, what
can you say to that claim of respondent?

A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of her immaturity and
traumatic irresponsibility with regards to her own children.

Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is not psychologically
incapacitated is not true?

A : Yes. It should be rejected.

Q : Why do you say so?

A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been
manifested running through their life made a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility
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because her family was dysfunctional and then her being a model in her early life and being the
bread winner of the family put her in an unusual position of prominence and then begun to inflate
her own ego and she begun to concentrate her own beauty and that became an obsession and
that led to her few responsibility of subordinating to her children to this lifestyle that she had
embraced.

Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact. How about the impact on
the relationship of the respondent with her husband?

A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her husband
and toher children. She had her own priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong
and associating with friends. They were the priorities of her life.

Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?

A : Secondary.

Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?

A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of marriage which everybody
takes for granted. The concentration on the husband and the children before everything else
would be subordinated to the marriage withher. It’s the other way around.

Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were their priorities in her life.

Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call this?

A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from a myt[h]ical case in
Roman history.

Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?

A : It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a dear friend as in the
case of Narcissus, the myth, and then that became known in clinical terminology as narcissism.
When a person is so concern[ed] with her own beauty and prolonging and protecting it, then it
becomes the top priority in her life.

xxxx

Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How do you consider this
narcissism afflicting respondent, it is grave, slight or ….?

A : I would say it’s grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family and that causes serious
obligations which she has ignored and not properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed]
with herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.

Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting respondent was already
existing at the time or marriage or even thereafter?

xxxx

A : When you get married you don’t develop narcissism or psychological incapacity. You bring
with you into the marriage and then it becomes manifested because in marriage you accept
these responsibilities. And now you show that you don’t accept them and you are not capable of
fulfilling them and you don’t care about them.
 10

Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or what?

A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the family was depended
[sic] upon her and she was a model at Hyatt and then Rustan’s, it began to inflate her ego so
much that this became the top priority in her life. It’s her lifestyle.

Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even expanded after the marriage?

A : That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the marriage because she
was neglecting such fundamental obligations.

Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically curable, this narcissism
that you mentioned?

A : Let’s say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found in her family
background situation. Say, almost for sure would be incurable now.

Q : What specific background are you referring to?

A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and her beauty was so
important to give in her job and money and influence and so on. But this is a very unusual
situation for a young girl and her position in the family was exalted in a very very unusual manner
and therefore she had that pressure on her and in her accepting the pressure, in going along
with it and putting it in top priority.
31

Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healy’s opinions and
findings commanded respect. The contribution that his opinions and findings could add to the
judicial determination of the parties’ psychological incapacity was substantive and instructive. He
could thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of the malady that would warrant the nullity of
marriage, and he could as well thereby provideto the trial court an analytical insight upon a
subject as esoteric to the courts as psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly
disregard his opinions and findings. Appreciating them together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr.
Dayan would advance more the cause of justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te: 32

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after
the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked togive professional opinions
about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the
advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide
the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract
to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment
cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could
necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations
 11

of a mature, lifelong commitmentare now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid

matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is
not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for hetero sexual acts,
but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing
lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or
psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as
meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as
a distinct person; that the spouses must be `other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are
rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining
of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations ofmarriage depends, according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal
sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but
in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:

"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent
and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary
stresses and strains of marriage, etc."

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:

"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the
best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his orher inability
to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of
loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real
freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently
fall short of reasonable expectations.

xxxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has
a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the
time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised(lack
of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the
time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof
of someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promisedat the time the marriage was
entered into."

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to

establish the precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at
the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no requirement that the
 12

person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if

the totalityof evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily,
the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.33

Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly applying the
standards set in Molina, the courts should consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating
34

petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:

xxxx

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in the
ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred "in the result" and another three--including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero--took pains
to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized
that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as
much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid
standards, without too much regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals."

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the
one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was
then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to
the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites,
consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far
fromwhat was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has
allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like,
tocontinuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for
there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the
State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases
involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
 13

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court isnot
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage,
because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply
with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be
stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psycho sexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic
personality anomaly. Let itbe noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first
place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of
nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

xxxx

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We
simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need
to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the
principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. 35

III

In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as follows:

Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s
allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three
times a week and always withthe permission of her husband and without abandoning her
children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that theywere with their mother when
she played mahjong in their relatives home.Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his
own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family.
While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this
episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the
frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in
second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played
mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not
proven. (Emphasis supplied)
36

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination
of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her
obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she
made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would
have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would
expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.

Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely
impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children. We do find to be revealing the
disclosures made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw – the parties’ eldest son – in his deposition, whereby
37

the son confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had been hooked on playing mahjong,
viz:

ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parent’s separation, do you remember any habit or
activity or practice which your mother engaged in, before the separation?
 14

WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play mahjong a lot, and I can’t
remember.

xxxx

ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How frequent, do you
remember?

WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I can’t, I can’t…

ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one session?

WITNESS : Really long cuz’we would go to my aunt’s house in White Plains and I think we would
get there by lunch then leave, we fall asleep. I think it was like one in the morning. ATTY. PISON:
You, you went there? She brought you?

WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my brothers & sisters.

ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?

WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess she’d go out by herself. 38

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only
point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a
culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every
occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs
for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This was the
observation of Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that
the current psychological state of the respondent had been rooted on her own childhood
experience.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development.
This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly
defined under Article 209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:

Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall includethe caring for and
rearing of such children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their
moral, mental and physical character and well-being.

Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their
unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept
and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;

(2) x x x x

(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity,
self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and
inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;

(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all
times;
 15

(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their
activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and
prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;

(6) x x x x

(7) x x x x

(8) x x x x

(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)

The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of the RTC
to the effect that both the petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically incapacitated,
and thus could not assume the essential obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have found
so without the allegation to that effect by the respondent in her answer, whereby she averred
39

that it was not she but the petitioner who had suffered from psychological incapacity.

The allegation of the petitioner’spsychological incapacity was substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as

follows:

ATTY. BRETAÑA:

Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : What is your basis for your statement that respondent was behaviorally immature?

A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed already some of those
short temper of the petitioner but she was very much in love and so she lived-in with him and
even the time that they were together, that they were living in, she also had noticed some of his
psychological deficits if we may say so. But as I said, because she is also dependent and she
was one who determined to make the relationship work, she was denying even those kinds of
problems that she had seen.

Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, I’m talking here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to
conclude that Mr. Kalaw was behaviorally immature?

A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly stable then. He was not
really thinking of marriage except that his wife got pregnant and so he thought that he had to
marry her. And even that time he was not also a monogamous person.

Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry lied on the petitioner? A
: I think so, Sir.

Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the petitioner admitted to you
that in his younger years he was often out seeking other women. I’m referring specifically to page
18. He also admitted to you that the thought of commitment scared him, the petitioner. Now,
given these admissions by petitioner to you, my questions is, is it possible for such a person to
 16

enter into marriage despite this fear of commitment and given his admission that he was a
womanizer? Is it possible for this person to stop his womanizing ways during the marriage?

A : Sir, it’s difficult.

Q : It would be difficult for that person?

A : Yes, Sir.

Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after marriage?

A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.

Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his marriage with the
respondent?

A : Yes, Sir.

Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the part of the petitioner insofar as his
psychological capacity to perform his duties as a husband is concerned?

A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be fully committed to the role
of husband to Malyn.

Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether the petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his duty as a husband. You only said that the petitioner
was behaviorally immature and that the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I asked [sic] you that
question again and request you to answer that directly?

A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated. 40

Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the
respondent, as the defendant spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of her
husband because she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are justified in declaring a
marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the
petitioner or the respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the
imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one
party alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the
marriage has to be deemed null and void.

More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now, they must have
already accepted and come to terms with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed
in the eyes of the law, was already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage not
only to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a greater
injustice should we insist on still recognizing their void marriage, and then force them and their
children to endure some more damage. This was the very same injustice that Justice Romero
decried in her erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals: 41

It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive
interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for
purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. It is
1âwphi1

not, in effect, directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual
tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging
 17

problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the
companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and towhich he is legally
entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce
but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny
to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a
nullity by reason of his wife’s psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
In this case, the marriage never existed from the beginning because the respondent was afflicted
with psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage. Hence, the Court should
not hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage between the parties.

To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our
society does not preclude striking down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family
life," thus:

Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the
kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively
state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development[t]," and that [m]arriage,
as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection
accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a
social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to
define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it,
based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the
qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional
provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through
the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as
prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may
appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory
definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity. Indeed,
Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically
incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional
protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation
of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding
interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio
marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and
family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are
not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis
42

supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological
incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
 18

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 19

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various
petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had
interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos
vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel
provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be
sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal
divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present
case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25,
1993 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May
1 2

14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, which declared the
3

marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground
of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of
a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the
petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Church in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo
4

showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986,
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result
of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in
Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that
he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served;
and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in
order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
 20

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer
live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent
quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of
friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such
as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of
St. Augustine, Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was
born on July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center.
She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any
evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence,
the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world
which is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied heavily on the trial court's
5

findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee
(hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on
personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a

broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse
indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul
for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason
to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
 21

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by
the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological
nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled
6

that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . .
and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr.
Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be
7

characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties
as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological (nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get
along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:
8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on

your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are

psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit
with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

 22

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive
of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was
made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at
all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this
case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code
and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided
to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, Vicar Judicial (Presiding
9

Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court
10

takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting
discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written
memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
11

"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
12

the permanence, inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not
physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
13

incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
 23

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby comlying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is
clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject
to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other —
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such
ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
 24

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

VALERIO E. KALAW, G.R. No. 166357

Petitioner,

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ,⃰ JJ.

MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Promulgated:

Respondent. September 19, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------------------
-----x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established facts. It

is the plaintiffs burden to convince the court of the existence of these facts.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) May 27,
2004 Decision[2] and December 15, 2004 Resolution[3] in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240,
which reversed the trial courts declaration of nullity of the herein parties
marriage. The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFOREthe appeal is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision

is SET ASIDE and VACATED while the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[4]
 25

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn)
met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong on
November 4, 1976.They had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon
Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay).
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with
Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to a son in March 1983.[5]

In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws) and her
four children with Tyrone.[6] Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore
him three more children.[7]

In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He
left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde
with only a househelp and a driver.[8] The househelp would just call Malyn to take
care of the children whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with their
custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.[9]

In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyns permission to go to
Japan for a one-week vacation. Malyn acceded only to learn later that Tyrone brought
the children to the US.[10] After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines and chose
to live with Malyn.
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and resumed
physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn,
from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of
alleged weekend plans with their father.[11]

Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage

On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.
[12]
He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply
with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her
 26

immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-
habitation, as shown by Malyns following acts:

1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she
played mahjong all day and all night;

2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the
early hours of the following day; and

3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone

discovered in flagrante delicto.[13]

During trial,[14] Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyns alleged

infidelity. According to him, on June 9, 1985, he and his brother-in-law, Ronald
Fernandez (Malyns brother), proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and learned that Malyn was
occupying a room with a certain Benjie Guevarra (Benjie). When he proceeded to the
said room, he saw Benjie and Malyn inside. [15] At rebuttal, Tyrone elaborated that
Benjie was wearing only a towel around his waist, while Malyn was lying in bed in
her underwear. After an exchange of words, he agreed not to charge Malyn with
adultery when the latter agreed to relinquish all her marital and parental rights.
[16]
They put their agreement in writing before Atty. Jose Palarca.

Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon
law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological
incapacity.

Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns
behavior her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out
with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD). [17] NPD is present
when a person is obsessed to meet her wants and needs in utter disregard of her
significant others.[18] Malyns NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a
mother.[19]

Dr. Gates reported that Malyns personality disorder may have been evident even prior
to her marriage because it is rooted in her family background and upbringing, which
the psychologist gathered to be materially deprived and without a proper maternal role
model.[20]
 27

Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with Tyrone,
Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrones sister-in-law), and the son Miggy. She also read the
transcript of Tyrones court testimony.[21]

Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates assessment. He concluded that Malyn was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties. [22] He explained that her
psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This
role allegedly inflated Malyns ego to the point that her needs became priority, while
her kids and husbands needs became secondary.Malyn is so self-absorbed that she is
incapable of prioritizing her familys needs.

Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with friends are not
disorders by themselves. They only constitute psychological incapacity whenever
inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to the detriment of ones
familial duties.[23] Fr. Healy characterized Malyns psychological incapacity as grave
and incurable.[24]

He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as the
report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyns expert witness.[25] He clarified that
he did not verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding Malyns habits
because he believed it is the courts duty to do so.[26] Instead, he formed his opinion on
the assumption that the factual allegations are indeed true.

Malyns version

Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated.[27] While she admitted playing

mahjong, she denied playing as frequently as Tyrone alleged. She maintained that she
did so only two to three times a week and always between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only.
[28]
And in those instances, she always had Tyrones permission and would often bring
the children and their respective yayaswith her.[29] She maintained that she did not
neglect her duties as mother and wife.

Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She, however, explained
that she did so only to escape her physically abusive husband. [30] On the day she left,
Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a housewife, was upset that Malyn was
preparing to go to work. He called up the security guards and instructed them not to
let Malyn out of the house. Tyrone then placed cigarette ashes on Malyns head and
proceeded to lock the bedroom doors. Fearing another beating, Malyn rushed out of
 28

their bedroom and into her mother-in-laws room. She blurted that Tyrone would beat
her up again so her mother-in-law gave her P300 to leave the house.[31] She never
returned to their conjugal home.

Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrones wishes, because she
wanted to be self-sufficient. Her resolve came from her discovery that Tyrone had a
son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to the US with Jocelyn.[32]

Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only booked a
room at the Hyatt Hotel for her because she was so drunk after partying with
friends. She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at the door of the Hyatt
Hotel room, but maintained being fully clothed at that time.[33] Malyn insisted that she
wrote the letter relinquishing all her spousal and parental rights under duress.[34]

After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by surreptitiously visiting
them in school. She later obtained partial custody of the children as an incident to the
legal separation action filed by Tyrone against her (which action was subsequently
dismissed for lack of interest).

As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was suffering
from psychological incapacity, as manifested by his drug dependence, habitual
drinking, womanizing, and physical violence.[35] Malyn presented Dr. Dayan a clinical
psychologist, as her expert witness.

Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her
psychological evaluation of the spouses. The factual narrations culled from these
interviews reveal that Tyrone found Malyn a lousy mother because of her mahjong
habit,[36] while Malyn was fed up with Tyrones sexual infidelity, drug habit, and
physical abuse.[37] Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone and Malyn were
behaviorally immature. They encountered problems because of their personality
differences, which ultimately led to the demise of their marriage. Her diagnostic
impressions are summarized below:

The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from the very
beginning. Both of them were not truly ready for marriage even after two
years of living together and having a child. When Malyn first met Tyrone
who showered her with gifts, flowers, and affection she resisted his
overtures. She made it clear that she could take him or leave him. But the
minute she started to care, she became a different person clingy and
 29

immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she

was the most important person in his life. She became relationship-
dependent. It appears that her style then was when she begins to care for a
man, she puts all her energy into him and loses focus on herself. This
imbalance between thinking and feeling was overwhelming to Tyrone who
admitted that the thought of commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted that
when he was in his younger years, he was often out seeking other
women. His interest in them was not necessarily for sex, just for fun
dancing, drinking, or simply flirting.

Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some time, Malyn adapted
to her husband who was a moody man with short temper and unresolved
issues with parents and siblings. He was a distancer, concerned more about
his work and friends tha[n] he was about spending time with his
family. Because of Malyns and Tyrones backgrounds (both came from
families with high conflicts) they experienced turmoil and chaos in their
marriage. The conflicts they had struggled to avoid suddenly galloped out
of control Their individual personalities broke through, precipitating the
demise of their marriage.[38]

Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn
exhibited significant, but not severe, dependency, narcissism, and
compulsiveness.[39]

On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had relationship problems
with Tyrone, she appeared to have a good relationship with her kids.[40] As for Tyrone,
he has commitment issues which prevent him from committing himself to his duties
as a husband. He is unable to remain faithful to Malyn and is psychologically
incapacitated to perform this duty.[41]

Childrens version

The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for their
needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they would accompany their mother to White
Plains on days that she played mahjong with her friends. None of them reported being
neglected or feeling abandoned.

The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was only Ria
who admitted actually witnessing physical abuse inflicted on her mother. [42] The two
 30

elder kids also recalled that, after the separation, their mother would visit them only in
school.[43]

The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and driver during
the time that their dad was abroad.[44] While they did not live with their mother while
they were housed in Valle Verde, the kids were in agreement that their mother took
care of them on weekends and would see to their needs. They had a common
recollection that the househelp would call their mother to come and take care of them
in Valle Verde whenever any of them was sick.[45]
Other witnesses

Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrones attending psychiatrist at the Manila Sanitarium, testified
that, for the duration of Tyrones confinement, the couple appeared happy and the wife
was commendable for the support she gave to her spouse.[46] He likewise testified that
Tyrone tested negative for drugs and was not a drug dependent.[47]

Malyns brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrones allegation that they found
Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt hotel room. Contrary to Tyrones version, he testified
that neither he nor Tyrone entered the room, but stayed in the hallway. He likewise did
not recall seeing Benjie or Malyn half-naked.[48]

Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of Malyns group
of friends. He stated on the stand that they would go on nights-out as a group and
Malyn would meet with a male musician-friend afterwards.[49]

Social worker

The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to conduct a
social case study on the parties as well as the minor children. Arre interviewed the
parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor children Miggy/Mickey and Jay; Tyrones live-in
partner, Jocelyn;[50] and Tyrone and Malyns only daughter, Ria. While both parents are
financially stable and have positive relationships with their children, she
recommended that the custody of the minor children be awarded to Malyn. Based on
the interviews of family members themselves, Malyn was shown to be more available
to the children and to exercise better supervision and care. The social worker
commended the fact that even after Malyn left the conjugal home in 1985, she made
efforts to visit her children clandestinely in their respective schools. And while she
 31

was only granted weekend custody of the children, it appeared that she made efforts to
personally attend to their needs and to devote time with them.[51]
On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since the couples de
facto separation, simply left the children for several years with only a maid and a
driver to care for them while he lived with his second family abroad. [52] The social
worker found that Tyrone tended to prioritize his second family to the detriment of his
children with Malyn. Given this history during the formative years of the children, the
social worker did not find Tyrone a reliable parent to whom custody of adolescents
may be awarded.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court[53]

After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court concluded
that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code. The courts Decision is encapsulated in this
paragraph:

From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from
psychological incapacity to perform their essential marital obligations
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties entered into a marriage
without as much as understanding what it entails. They failed to commit
themselves to its essential obligations: the conjugal act, the community of
life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of
their children to become responsible individuals. Parties psychological
incapacity is grave, and serious such that both are incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in marriage. The incapacity has been clinically
established and was found to be pervasive, grave and incurable.[54]
The trial court then declared the parties marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code.[55]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals[56]

Malyn appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA. The CA reversed the trial courts
ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record. Both parties allegations and
incriminations against each other do not support a finding of psychological
incapacity. The parties faults tend only to picture their immaturity and irresponsibility
in performing their marital and familial obligations.At most, there may be sufficient
grounds for a legal separation.[57] Moreover, the psychological report submitted by
petitioners expert witness, Dr. Gates, does not explain how the diagnosis of NPD
 32

came to be drawn from the sources. It failed to satisfy the legal and jurisprudential
requirements for the declaration of nullity of marriage.[58]

Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration[59] but the same was denied on December
15, 2004.[60]

Petitioners arguments

Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of the
trial court, which is the court that is in the best position to appreciate the evidence. He
opines that he has presented preponderant evidence to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations, to wit:

a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved on the stand that
respondents egocentric attitude, immaturity, self-obsession and self-
centeredness were manifestations of respondents NPD;[61]

b) these expert witnesses proved that respondents NPD is grave and

incurable and prevents her from performing her essential martial obligations;
[62]
and

c) that respondents NPD existed at the time of the celebration of the

marriage because it is rooted in her upbringing, family background, and
socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage.[63]

Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void because of
psychological incapacity, albeit on petitioners part.[64]

Respondents arguments

Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving her
alleged psychological incapacity.[65] She argues that the testimonies of her children and
the findings of the court social worker to the effect that she was a good, loving, and
attentive mother are sufficient to rebut Tyrones allegation that she was negligent and
irresponsible.[66]

She assails Dr. Gatess report as one-sided and lacking in depth. Dr. Gates did not
interview her, their common children, or even Jocelyn. Moreover, her report failed to
 33

state that Malyns alleged psychological incapacity was grave and incurable. [67] Fr.
Healys testimony, on the other hand, was based only on Tyrones version of the facts.
[68]

Malyn reiterates the appellate courts ruling that the trial court Decision is intrinsically
defective for failing to support its conclusion of psychological incapacity with factual
findings.

Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently had a change
of heart and filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Withdraw Comment and
Memorandum.[69]She manifested that she was no longer disputing the possibility that
their marriage may really be void on the basis of Tyrones psychological
incapacity. She then asked the Court to dispose of the case with justice. [70] Her
manifestation and motion were noted by the Court in its January 20, 2010 Resolution.
[71]

Issue

Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological
incapacity

Our Ruling

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the
trial courts Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the

Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of

and to assume the basic marital obligations. [72] The burden of proving psychological
incapacity is on the plaintiff.[73] The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party,
based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that
completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential
 34

obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have
existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.[74]

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from
psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert
witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the
conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of
respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.Petitioners experts heavily relied
on petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the
beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly
to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and
wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of

the conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented
contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and
neglected their children as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was
not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as
a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that she played four to
five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always
with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at
home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when
she played mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other
than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent
neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second
grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least
that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-
playing during the years when these two children were in second grade. This was not
done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged
debilitati`ng frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits to the
beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other
men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her
frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of
respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with
 35

other men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other
men. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had
an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot,
by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual
infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors
described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed
psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the
opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was
not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and
parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected by their
mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was around when
they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real
efforts to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their
father.There was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of
familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both
failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their
academic shortcomings to Malyns actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the
conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CAs reversal of the
trial courts ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The trial courts Decision
merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective
parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of
the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual
findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which
may have constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and
to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not
psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of

Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R.
CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.
 36

SO ORDERED.
 37

SECOND DIVISION

November 14, 2016

G.R. No. 203284

NICOLAS S. MATUDAN, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARILYN B. MATUDAN, Respondents.
**

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to set aside the January 31, 2012 Decision and
1 2

August 23, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the Petition in CA·G.R. CV No.
3

95392 and the Motion for Reconsideration, thus affirming the December 18, 2009 Decision of
4 5

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Nicolas S, Matudan (petitioner) and respondent Marilyn B. Matudan (Marilyn) were
married in Laoang, Northern Samar on October 26, 1976. They had four children.

In 1985, Marilyn left to work abroad. From then on, petitioner and the children lost contact with
her; she had not been seen nor heard from again.

Twenty-three years later, or on June 20, 2008, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94.
6

Petitioner alleged that before, during, and after his marriage to Marilyn, the latter was
psychologically incapable of fulfilling her obligations as a wife and mother; that she consistently
neglected and failed to provide petitioner and her children with the necessary emotional and
financial care, support, and sustenance, and even so after leaving for work abroad; that based
on expert evaluation conducted by Clinical Psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), Marilyn's
psychological incapacity is grave, permanent, and incurable; that petitioner's consent to the
marriage was obtained by Marilyn through misrepresentation as she concealed her condition
from him; and that Marilyn is "not ready for a lasting and pennanent commitment like
marriage" as she "never (gave) him and their children financial and emotional support x x x and
7

for being selfish through their six (6) years of cohabitation;" that Marilyn became "so despicably
8

irresponsible as she has not shown love and care upon her husband, x x x and that she cannot
properly and morally take on the responsibility of a loving and caring wife x x x."
9

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed
the Petition.
 38

The Quezon City Office of the City Prosecutor having determined that there is no collusion
between the parties, proceedings were conducted in due course. However, trial proceeded in
Marilyn's absence.

Apart from the testimonies of the petitioner, his daughter Maricel B. Matudan (Maricel), and Dr.
Tayag, the following documents were submitted in evidence:

1. Petitioner's Judicial Affidavit (Exhibit "A") which was adopted as his testimony on direct
10

examination;

2. The Judicial Aftidavit of Maricel (Exhibit "D"), which was adopted as part of her testimony on
11

direct examination;

3. The Sworn Affidavit of Dr. Tayag (Exhibit "B"), which was considered part of her testimony on
12

direct examination;

4. Dr. Tayag's evaluation report entitled "A Report on the Psychological Condition of NICOLAS T.
MATUDAN, the petitioner for Nullity of Marriage against respondent MARILYN BORJA-
MATUDAN'' (Exhibit "C"); and
13

5. Other relevant evidence, such as petitioner's marriage contract/certificate and respective birth
certificates of his children, and a Letter/Notice, with Registry Return Receipt, sent by Dr. Tayag to
Marilyn requesting evaluation/interview relative to petitioner's desire to file a petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage (Exhibits "E" to "G").

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On December 18, 2009, the RTC issued its Decision dismissing the Petition in Civil Case No. Q-
14

08-62827 on the ground that petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove Marilyn's claimed
psychological incapacity. It held, thus:

Petitioner, his daughter Maricel Matudan and psychologist Nedy L. Tayag testified. Petitioner
offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to ''G" which were admitted by the Court.

The State and the respondent did not present any evidence.

From the testimonial and documentary evidence of the petitioner, the Court gathered the
following:

Petitioner and respondent were roamed on October 26, 1976 x x x. They begot four (4) children x
x x. Petitioner and respondent lived together with their children. On June 25, 1985, petitioner
asked respondent [sic] for permission to work and left the conjugal dwelling. Since then she was
never heard of [sic]. Respondent never communicated with the petitioner and her children.
Petitioner inquired from the relatives of the respondent but they did not tell him her whereabouts.

In his Affidavit which was considered as his direct testimony, petitioner claimed that respondent
failed to perform her duties as a wife to him. Respondent never gave petitioner and their children
financial and emotional support, love and care during their cohabitation. She was irresponsible,
immature and exhibited irrational behavior towards petitioner and their children. She was self-
centered, had no remorse and involved herself in activities defying social and moral ethics.

On cross-examination, petitioner testified that he and the respondent had a happy married life
and they never had a fight. The only reason why he filed this case was because respondent
abandoned him and their children.
 39

Maricel Matudan was only two (2) years old when respondent left them. She corroborated the
testimony of the petitioner that since respondent left the conjugal dwelling she never provided
financial support to the family and never communicated with them.

Nedy L. Tayag, Psychologist, testified on the 'Report on the Psychological Condition of Nicolas
Matudan' which she prepared (Exhibit "C''). She subjected petitioner to psychological test and
interview. She likewise interviewed Maricel Matudan. She came up with the findings that
petitioner is suffering from Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder and respondent has
Narcissistic Personality Disorder with Antisocial Traits. The features of petitioner's disorder are
the following: negativistic attitude, passive resistance, lacks the ability to assert his opinions and
has great difficulty expressing his feelings.

The root cause of his personality condition can be attributed to his being an abandoned child. At
a young age, his parents separated and he was left in the custody of his paternal grandmother.
He lacked a support system and felt rejected. He developed a strong need for nurturance, love
and attention and that he would do anything to attain such.

As for respondent, the manifestation of her disorder are as follows: Preoccupation with pursuing
matters that would make her happy; has a high sense of self-importance; wants to have her way
and disregards her husband's opinions; lacks empathy; wants to have a good life.

Her personality condition is rooted on her unhealthy familial environment. She came from an
impoverished family. Her parents were more pre-occupied with finding ways to make ends meet
to such extent that they failed to give adequate attention and emotional support to their children.

Ms. Tayag further testified that the psychological condition of the parties are grave and
characterized by juridical antecedence as the same already existed before they got married, their
disorders having been in existence since their childhood years are permanent and severe.

The sole issue to be resolved is whether x x x respondent is psychologically incapacitated to

perform her marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Article 36 of the Family Code as amended, states:

'A marriage contracted by any party who at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapicity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.'

Article 68 of the same Code provides:

'The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.'

In the case of Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, January 4, 1995, G.R. No. 112019, the
Honorable Supreme Court held:

'Justice Alicia Sempio Dy, in her commentaries on the Family Code cites with approval the work
of Dr. Gerardo Veloso a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila x x x, who opines that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
 40

For psychological incapacity however to be appreciated, the same must be serious, grave and
'so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.' x x x.

In the case of Santos, it was also held that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.'

It must be emphasized that the cause of action of petitioner is the alleged psychological
incapacity of the respondent. During the pre-trial, the sole issue raised is whether or not
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations under Article 36 of
the Family Code. The alleged personality disorder of the petitioner is clearly not an issue in this
case.

Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds that the totality of the evidence adduced by
petitioner has not established the requisites of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
Again, it must be emphasized that this petition was filed on the ground of the psychological
incapacity of respondent and not the petitioner.

Respondent is said to be suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder with antisocial traits.
The salient features of her disorder were enumerated by Nedy Tayag in her report as follows:
pre-occupation with pursuing matters that would make her happy; has a high sense of self-
importance; wants to have her way and disregards her husband's opinions; lacks empathy;
wants to have a good life. Her personality disorder is considered permanent, grave and
incurable. It has its root cause in her unhealthy familial environment during her early
developmental years.

In petitions for declaration of marriage (sic), the testimony of the petitioner as to the physical
manifestation of the psychological incapacity is of utmost importance. Unfortunately, petitioner's
testimony particularly his affidavit which was considered as his direct examination contained only
general statements on the supposed manifestations of respondent's incapacity. Respondent was
described therein as irresponsible, immature, self -centered, lacks remorse, got involved with
activities defying social and moral ethics. Petitioner however miserably failed to expound on
these allegations. In fact during his cross-examination, he even contradicted the allegations in his
petition and affidavit. He clearly stated that he had a happy marital relationship with the
respondent and never had a fight with her (TSN, December 5, 2008, page 8).

Petitioner harped on the abandonment of respondent. He even admitted that this the [sic] only
reason why he wants their marriage dissolved (TSN, December 5, 2008, page 9). Abandonment
of spouse however is not psychological incapacity. It is only a ground for legal separation.

Petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage are sui generis, the allegations therein must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence that would warrant the dissolution of the marriage
bond. Absent such proof, the Court will uphold the validity of the marriage for 'the rule is settled
that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of
the marriage bond.' (Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006).

In a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage is on the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is dismissed for insufficiency of

evidence.

SO ORDERED. 15
 41

Petitioner moved to reconsider, but in a May 12, 2010 Order, the RTC held its ground
16 17

reiterating its pronouncement that petitioner failed to demonstrate Marilyn's psychological

incapacity, and that the petition is anchored merely on Marilyn's abandonment of the marriage
and family, which by itself is not equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R CV No. 95392. However, in its
assailed January 31, 2012 Decision, the CA instead affirmed the RTC judgment, declaring thus:

Petitioner-appellant asserts that the ETC should not have denied the petition for declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Marilyn x x x. He maintains that, contrary to the conclusion reached by
the trial court, he was able to establish by the quantum of evidence required, the claimed
psychological incapacity of his wife.

The argument of Nicolas R. Matudan fails to persuade Us.

Verily, instead or substantiating the alleged psychological incapacity his wife, petitioner-appellant
revealed during his cross examination that it was actually his wife's act of abandoning the family
that led him to seek the nullification of their marriage. In fact, during his cross-examination, he
readily admitted that they were happily married and that they never engaged in bickering with
each other.

xxxx

Q: But how would you describe your marital relations [sic]? Were there moments that you were
happy with your wife?

A: Yes, ma' am, that is why we begot four children.

COURT

And so, you so you [sic] had a happy married life then?

FISCAL

I would presume that you had a happy married life, how come your wife just left you like that? Do
you have any idea why your wife just left you like that?

A: She did not communicate with us to tell her whereabouts.

Q: Did you ever have a fight with your wife?

A: None, ma'am.

xxxx

COURT

All right, you stated in this Affidavit that you are filing this case for the declaration of nullity of
marriage because of the psychological incapacity of your wife, what do you mean by that?

WITNESS
 42

'Pinabayaan lang kmning pamilya niya, hindi naman niya sinasabi kung saan siya hahanapin.'
She did not inform us of her whereabouts.

COURT

Is that the only reason why you want your marriage with her dissolved?

WITNESS

Yes, your honor.

As correctly observed by the RTC, abandonment by a spouse, by itself, however, does not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must
be shown that such abandonment is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes the
spouse concerned completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

Indeed, the term 'psychological incapacity' to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Rorodel Glaviano Molina, the following definitive guidelines
were laid down in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of
the Family Code:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff: Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.

(3) Tue incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage,

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements established in Santos v. Court of

Appeals that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical
 43

antecedence; and (c) incurability. These requisites must be strictly complied with, as the grant of
a petition for nu1lity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

Using the above standards, We find the totality of the petitioner-appellant's evidence insufficient
to prove that the respondent-appellee is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of
her as a wife.

Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and finding of the clinical
psychologist cannot be relied upon to substantiate the petitioner-appellant's theory of the
psychological incapacity of his wife.

It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the proceedings below. The clinical
psychologist's evaluation of the respondent-appellee's condition was based mainly on the
information supplied by her husband, the petitioner, and to some extent from their daughter,
Maricel. It is noteworthy, however, that Maricel was only around two (2) years of age at the time
the respondent left and therefore cannot be expected to know her mother well. Also, Maricel
would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because she could not have
been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what
was happening between her parents until long after her birth. On the other hand; as the
petitioning spouse, Nicolas' description of Marilyn's nature would certainly be biased, and a
psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description can hardly be considered as
credible. The ruling in Jocelyn Suazo v.Angelita Suazo, et al., is illuminating on this score:

We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence - the
psychologist's testimony and the psychological evaluation report - that Jocelyn presented. Based
on her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological condition
only in an indirect manner - she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn
whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon
which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the
opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards
outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave,
severe and incurable.

xxxx

From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using meager information coming
from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could
not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelita's psychological
condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn's
psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito's. The methodology employed simply cannot
satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report
that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.

In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward Rumbaua, it was similarly declared
that '[t]o make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition
based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.'

At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical psychologist on the psychological
condition of the respondent-appellee to be insufficient to warrant the conclusion that a
psychological incapacity existed that prevented Marilyn from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. In said report, Dr. Tayag merely concluded that Marilyn suffers from
 44

Narcissistic Personality Disorder with antisocial traits on the basis of what she perceives as
manifestations of the same. The report neither explained the incapacitating nature of the alleged
disorder, nor showed that the respondent-appellee was really incapable of fulfilling her duties due
to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature.

xxxx

Dr. Tayag's testimony during her cross-examination as well as her statements in the Sworn
Affidavit are no different.

When asked to explain the personality disorder of Marilyn, Dr. Tayag simply replied:

Q: On her case you assessed her as, likewise, suffering from a personality disorder
characterized by Narcissistic Personality Disorder with Anti-Social Trait. Will you please tell to the
Court what do you mean by that personality disorder?

A: In layman's term, once you are being labeled as a narcissistic [sic], this is a person whose
preoccupation are all toward his own self satisfaction both materially or emotionally at the
expense of somebody. They have what you called [sic] strong sense of entitlement thinking that
she can get away whatever [sic] she wants to in pursuit of her own satisfaction at the expense of
somebody. And this is what happened to the respondent. She gave more consideration to her
own satisfaction material wise at the expense of social embarrassment of the children because of
what happened to her.

On the other hand, in her Sworn Affidavit, Dr. Tayag stated:

7. Without a doubt, Marilyn is suffering from a form of personality disorder that rooted [sic] the
downfall of their marriage. As based on the DSM-IV, respondent's behavioral disposition fits with
individuals with NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER with Anti-social traits, as
characterized by her disregard for and violation of the rights of others as well as her failure to
conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing
acts that are clearly immoral and socially despised. Such is also depicted through his [sic]
deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying and conning methods she used upon others in
order to achieve personal profit or pleasure. In addition, her consistent irresponsibility, as
indicated by her repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial
obligations and her lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having
hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another. x x x. And such condition is considered to [sic] grave,
severe, long lasting and incurable by any treatment available.

Accordingly, even if We assume that Marilyn is really afflicted with Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with anti-social traits, in the absence of any showing that the same actually
incapacitated her from fulfilling her essential marital obligations, such disorder cannot be a valid
basis for declaring Nicolas' marriage to Marilyn as null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code. To be sure, jurisprudence has declared that not every psychological
illness/disorder/condition is a ground for declaring the marriage a nullity under Article 36. '[T]he
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' [is confined] to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.'

All told, We find that no reversible error was committed by the trial court in rendering its assailed
Decision:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 94, in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827, is AFFIRMED.
 45

SO ORDERED. (Citations omitted)

18

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its assailed August 23, 2012 Resolution, the CA
stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition.

In a November 19, 2014 Resolution, this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition.
19

Issue

Petitioner mainly questions the CA's appreciation of the case, insisting that he was able to prove
Marilyn's psychological incapacity.1âwphi1

Petitioner's Arguments

In his Petition and Reply, petitioner argues that contrary to the CA's findings, he was able to
20

prove Marilyn's psychological incapacity which is rooted in Dr. Tayag's diagnosis that she was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which existed even before their marriage, and
continued to subsist thereafter; that her illness is grave, serious, incurable, and permanent as to
render her incapable of assuming her marriage obligations; that the nullification of his marriage to
Marilyn is not an affront to the institutions of marriage and family, but will actually protect the
sanctity thereof because in effect, it will discourage individuals with psychological disorders that
prevent them from assuming marital obligations from remaining in the sacred bond; that the 21

issue of whether psychological incapacity exists as a ground to nullify one's marriage is a legal
question; and that the totality of his evidence and Marilyn's failure to refute the same despite due
notice demonstrate that he is entitled to a declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

Respondent's Arguments

In its Comment praying for denial, the Republic argues that the Petition calls for an evaluation of
22

facts, thus violating the rule that a petition for review on certiorari should be confined to legal
questions. Citing Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, which decrees as follows-
23

Tue issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment
of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Such
factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the
Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination. It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and
cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case,
run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation
of facts, which are unavailing in the instant case. (Citations omitted)

the State argues that the instant case should be dismissed instead.

The public respondent adds that allegations and proof of irresponsibility, immaturity, selfishness,
indifference, and abandonment of the family do not automatically justify a conclusion of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code; that the intent of the law is to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders - existing at the time of the marriage - clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage, and depriving the spouse of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the marital bond he/she is about to assume; that
petitioner failed to show how each of Marilyn's claimed negative traits affected her ability to
perform her essential marital obligations; that the supposed psychological evaluation of Marilyn
 46

was in fact based on the one-sided, self-serving, and biased information supplied by petitioner
and Maricel - which renders the same unreliable and without credibility; that petitioner's real
reason for seeking nullification is Marilyn's abandonment of the family; and that all in all,
petitioner failed to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of Marilyn's claimed
psychological incapacity.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

The landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals taught us that psychological incapacity under
24

Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability. Thus, the incapacity "must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved." In this connection, the burden of proving psychological incapacity
25

is on the petitioner, pursuant to Republic v. Court of Appeals, or the Molina case.

26

The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides
in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has
declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of
each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations. Indeed, the
incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making it
incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity. 27

Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the petition in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 on the
ground that the totality of petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove that Marilyn was
psychologically unfit to enter marriage - in short, while petitioner professed psychological
incapacity, he could not establish its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.

The Court agrees.

Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of his judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial affidavits
and testimonies of his daughter Maricel and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological evaluation
report on the psychological condition both petitioner and Marilyn. The supposed evaluation of
Marilyn's psychological condition was based solely on petitioner's account, since Marilyn did not
participate in the proceedings.

Indeed, "[w]hat is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's
psychological condition." "[T]he complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any,
28

as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the

marriage." Petitioner's judicial affidavit and testimony during trial, however, fail to show gravity
29

and juridical antecedence. While he complained that Marilyn lacked a sense of guilt and was
involved in "activities defying social and moral ethics," and that she was, among others,
30

irrational, irresponsible, immature, and self-centered, he nonetheless failed to sufficiently and

particularly elaborate on these allegations, particularly the degree of Marilyn's claimed
irresponsibility, immaturity, or selfishness. This is compounded by the fact that petitioner
contradicted his own claims by testifying that he and Marilyn were happily married and never had
a fight, which is why they begot four children; and the only reason for his filing Civil Case No. Q-
08-62827 was Marilyn's complete abandonment of the marriage and family when she left to work
abroad.

'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental-- not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
 47

discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family
Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. 31

If any, petitioner's accusations against Marilyn are untrue, at the very least. At most, they fail to
sufficiently establish the degree of Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity.

On the other hand, Maricel cannot be of help either. She was only two years old when Marilyn left
the family. Growing up, she may have seen the effects of Marilyn's abandonment - such as the
lack of emotional and financial support; but she could not have any idea of her mother's claimed
psychological incapacity, as well as the nature, history, and gravity thereof.

Just as well, Dr. Tayag's supposed expert findings regarding Marilyn's psychological condition
were not based on actual tests or interviews conducted upon Marilyn herself; they are based on
the personal accounts of petitioner. This fact gave more significance and importance to
petitioner's other pieces of evidence, which could have compensated for the deficiency in the
expert opinion which resulted from its being based solely on petitioner's one-sided account. But
since these other pieces of evidence could not be relied upon, Dr. Tayag's testimony and report
must fail as well. In one decided case with a similar factual backdrop and involving the very same
expert witness, this Court held:

It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or less seven years
from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact shows that living together as spouses under
one roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace's departure from their home in 2006 indicates either
a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live with her
husband.

Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a
greater burden to present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability of the former's condition. Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenn's testimony
is wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenn's
statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to MaryGrace's
traits and acts, which she exhibited during the marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof on the
antecedence of Mary Grace's alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six months before
they got married, they saw each other almost everyday. Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring and well[-]
educated person" in Mary Grace.

Anent Dr. Tayag's assessment of Mary Grace's condition, the Court finds the same as
unfounded. Rumbaua provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the
testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, viz.:

We' cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's psychological
incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side - the petitioner - whose bias
in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the
psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of
a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively,
Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not
actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded
to the doctor's probes.

Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's narrations, and on this basis
characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who
 48

'believes that the world revolves around him'; and who 'used love as a . . . deceptive tactic for
exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him.' x x x

We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant
the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from
complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the
respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that
the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's
conclusion in her Report --i.e., that the respondent suffered 'Narcissistic Personality Disorder with
traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable' -is an unfounded
statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the
respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair
gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with
respect to the respondent's condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the
respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our
mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
such evidence. 32

Finally, the identical rulings of the trial and appellate courts should be given due respect and
finality. This Court is not a trier of facts.

The issue of whether or not psychological inq1pacity exists in a given case calling for annulment
of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Such
factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the
Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination. It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and
cogent reasons x x x. 33

With the foregoing disquisition, there is no need to resolve the other issues raised. They have
become irrelevant.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The January 31, 2012 Decision and August 23, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95392 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 49

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over
troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in
the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to
respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision
November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals its decision are as follows:
1

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila
Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati,
they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their
married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they
were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the
defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to
sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same
thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together
during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so
together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by
 50

the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this
period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her
by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at
the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May
22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private
parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a
virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time.
While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her
husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her
husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not
show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil
and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the
defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here
in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled
by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.

But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he
is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very
young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled
and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be
cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.

The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation
on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with
his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she
always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex
with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like
it. So he stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case
against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the
pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will
consummate their marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very
young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by
Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result
thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there,
 51

that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh.
"2-C")

The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he
has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5)
centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter.
Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in
its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the
parties and that the evidence is not fabricated." 2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered

into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica
of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de
Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse
between the parties without making any findings of fact.

II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner
is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to
have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.

IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower
court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has
the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent
evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for
 52

the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts
intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the
conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their
pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of
collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved. 3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always
be proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court
and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse
party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their
marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
intercourse between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil
Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such
annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).

The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled.
This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he
and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have
been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate
Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a
stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically
incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both
the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not
have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears
that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36
of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995). 4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both
the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical
finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for
such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might
have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts,
— why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to
March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
 53

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action
to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties
is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with
private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but
physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent
or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have
sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he
had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in
evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is
capable of erection. Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps
5

physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such
a claim.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage
tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity. 6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the
basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity
or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of
the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did
not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically
impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22,
1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of
symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right
seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil
Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity,
the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his
claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage
were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the
Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public
scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her
life in order and put to rest her marital status.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the
unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological
incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten
months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to
perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has
not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a
hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological
 54

incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the
Family Code. 7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have
cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but
himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness.
Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is
— a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-
way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other
can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but
for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social
institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.