1. Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales
However, respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying the clear
GR No. 168338, 15 February 2008
FACTS: A year following the 2004 national and local elections, Press
Secretary Ignacio Bunye disclosed to the public how the opposition
planned to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of
a mobile phone conversation allegedly between President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo and Commissioner Garcillano of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC). The conversation was alleged to have
been audio-taped through wire-tapping. On June 8, 2005, respondent
Secretary Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice (DOJ) warned
reporters who are in possession of copies of the said conversation, as
well as those broadcasting companies and/or publishers that they
may be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. Consequently, the
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued a press
release strengthening the prohibition on the dissemination of the
same – that the broadcasting/airing of such information shall be just
cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the
licenses or authorizations issued by the Commission. Petitioner
Francisco Chavez filed a petition against respondent Chavez and
NTC, praying for the issuance of writs of certiorari and prohibition for
the nullification of the acts, issuances and orders of respondents – as
they were outright violations of the freedom of expression and of the
press, and the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the respondents abridge freedom
of speech and of the press.
HELD: Yes. Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and
expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three
tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine, which limits speech
once a rational connection has been established between the speech
restrained and the danger contemplated; (b) the balancing of
interests tests, a standard when courts balance conflicting social
values and individual interests, and (c) the clear and present
danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be
restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will
likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent.
It appears that the great evil which government wants to prevent is the
airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping
law.
and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press
Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape
recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also
suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one
supposed to be a “complete” version and the other, an “altered”
version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the who’s and
the how’s of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering
the tape’s different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the
manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are
some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled
facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate
the anti-wiretapping law.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the
press. The need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump
the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right
whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the
respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present
danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free
speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation
of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of
the State.
2. EDGARDO A. GAANAN VS. IAC, G.R. No. L-69809 October 16,
1986
FACTS: Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel
Montebonoffered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed
against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was
heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested
by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment
operation upon receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to
the telephone conversation without complainant''s consent,
complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).The lower courtfound both Gaanan and
Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The
Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not an extension telephone is among the
prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to
overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception
of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
HELD: No, An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same
category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated
in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered
as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone
extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory
construction that in order to determine the true intent of the
legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should
not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of
its parts.Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be
construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in
the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included
in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be
construed as not including an extension telephone. The mere act of
listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the
enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature.
The petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation
of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
3. Socorro Ramirez vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Ester S. Garcia
GR No. 93833, September 25, 1995
Violated Law- RA 4200 - An Act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping
and other related violations of private communication,
and other purposes."
FACTS:
1. A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D.
Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon City alleging that the private
respondent Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and
furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity
and personality, “contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy.
2. In support of the petitioner’s claim, she produced a verbatim
transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney’s
fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs
awardable at the trial court’s discretion.
3. As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and the act of
secretly recording the said event was illegal, private
respondent (Garcia) filed a criminal case before RTC of Pasay
City for violation of RA 4200.
4. Upon arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, particularly a violation of RA 4200. In an
order dated May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to
Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do
not constitute an offense under 4200; and that 2) the violation
punished by RA 4200 refers to a taping of a communication by
a person other than a participant to the communication.
5. From the trial court’s order, the private respondent filed a
petition for review on certiorari with this court, which forthwith
referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by
the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
6. On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court’s
order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
“The allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable
under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information
based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an
offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari.”
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4200 applies to taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to a conversation.
1. Whether or not the substance must be alleged in the
information. Whether or not RA 4200 applies to a private
conversation.
RULING:
1. First, legislative intent is determined principally from the
language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
 terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a
literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurb or
would lead to an injustice.
2. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and
Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
3. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it
illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any
private communication to secretly record such communication
by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as
to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved
in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize
all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently,
as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter
(will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200.
4. The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken
together with the abovequoted deliberations from the
Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held
by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize
even those privy to the private communications. Where the law
makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
5. Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a
violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not
be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200
penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual
made a secret recording of a private communication by means
of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under
Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in
his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the
said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a
violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed."
6. Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private
communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
"private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the
word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare,
meaning "to share or to impart." These definitions are broad
enough to include verbal or nonverbal, written or expressive
communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to
include the emotionally charged exchange, on February 22,
1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the
privacy of the latter's office.
7. WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at
bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no
discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
4. NAVARRO vs CA, G.R. No. 121087 ,August 26, 1999
Admissibility of a recorded altercation between the accused and the
deceased
FACTS: Navarro was charged with homicide with the RTC. The trial
court convicted him of the crime charged. The court admitted in
evidence the recorded tape allegedly containing the heated exchange
between Navarro and the deceased Lingan in the police station. The
exchange in the voice recording was confirmed by the testimony of
Jalbuena, one who took the recording and witness for the prosecution.
ISSUE: WON the tape is admissible in evidence under RA No. 4200.
RULING: Yes, the tape is admissible in evidence. RA No. 4200
prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and
Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited or is there
any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is
authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally
recorded the conversations; (2) that the tape played in the court was
the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of
the persons such are claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena
testified that he personally made the voice recording; that the tape
played in the court was the one he recorded; and that the speakers on
the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation
was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the
prosecution.The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1)
that there was a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro and
Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and
Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving
petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.
5. SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V. CA
FACTS:
 Private Respondent Rafael Ortanez filed a complaint before
the RTC for annulment of marriage against petitioner Teresota
Salcedo-Ortanez on the grounds of lack of marrage license
and psychological incapacity.
 Private Respondent offered in evidence three cassette tapes
of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and
unidentified persons. The petitioner objected, but the trial court
admitted all of private respondent’s evidence.
 A petition for certiorari was then filed to the CA questioning the
admissibility of such evidence.
 CA ruled for the validity of the admission, for two basic
reasons:
o Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and
any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence
for certain purposes, depending on how they are
presented and offered and on how the trial judge
utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and the
even handed administration of justice.
o A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to
rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced
during trial.
ISSUE: WON the cassette tapes containing the conversation of the
petitioner is admissible as evidence.
RULING: NO.
 Unauthorized tape recordings of telephone conversations not
admissible in evidence. — RA 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit
and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes”
expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in
evidence.
The relevant provisions of RA 4200 are as follows:
 Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however
otherwise described. . . .
 Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any
part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or
secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of
this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to
consider the provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the
cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to
the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the
inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No.
4200.