Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ABSTRACT
This study was conducted to determine which characteristics of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
affects firm value. Specifically, this study used age, sex, tenure and field of specialization based
on education as independent variables and Tobin's Q as the dependent variable representing firm
value. Due to limitations such as having a presentational currency other than Philippines Peso
and lack of information about their CEOs, the entire population of the firms listed in the
Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) has been narrowed down to one hundred fifty-seven firms
(157). Data regarding firms are gathered from PSE Edge Portal. A bootstrapped robust linear
regression was used to determine the relationships among variables holding firm size and
leverage constant. Results showed that among the independent variables mentioned, only sex has
a significant effect on Tobin's Q. This study showed that male CEOs of Philippine firms
outperform their female counterparts.
1. Introduction
The number of shareholders has increased to a point where influencing business outcome was
difficult. In response to decreasing shareholder oversight, managers were appointed to take care
of the business, thus the creation of the Board of Directors (BOD) vested with corporate
governance and powers such as providing independent check and balance on the management, as
provided in The Corporation Code of the Philippines and the Revised Code of Corporate
Governance.
The separation of ownership from control results in potential conflicts due to the
divergence between management and shareholder interest. The top management is generally
responsible for suggesting and implementing major policy initiatives, while shareholders who are
the owners of the corporation assumes a substantial portion of risk associated with those
decisions. This agency problem between management and equity made the monitoring role of the
board of directors a crucial component of corporate governance (Prevost, Ramesh, & Hossain,
2002).
According to Letza, Sun, and Kirkbride (2004), the stakeholder perspective is a relevant
approach for analyzing the firm’s corporate governance. It is reasonable to believe that this point
of view is valid as they are the ones who hold the greatest interest in a company. Through this
perspective, it can be inferred that the effectiveness of the boards in monitoring the management
Though governance was instituted to include division of labor between the board and
management, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) influence was clear to affect board decision
making. According to Lockhart and Crow (2016), CEOs hold considerable amount of knowledge
about the company that even the “most well-intentioned” has a power advantage over non-
executive directors. A prior study by Cheng, Gao, Lawrence, and Smith (2014) suggests that the
corporate governance characteristics of a firm depends on the power of CEO in relation to the
power of the board. This gives the idea that the CEO position pose a significant impact on the
board’s effectiveness of corporate oversight and in achieving company targets and objectives.
CEO impacts on firm performance have long been studied widely but still have shown
inconsistent results. Serra, Tres, and Ferreira (2016) associates this inconsistency to the
complexity and differences in context. According to Olie, Van Iterson, and Simsek (2012) there
is a need to observe the context to understand the effect that leaders have on their respective
environments. This builds the argument that the actions of a CEO (Elbanna, 2012) and the
effects in company performance (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007) vary depending on the national
context in which it operates. The effects in each country is important to consider in order to
remedy the unsettled differences among prior studies, thus this paper was made to find out the
2. Literature Review
A research conducted by Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) showed that in relation to board
leadership, the CEO and Chairman of the Board posts were combined, especially for large firms.
For most instances, a CEO assumes the board chairmanship when the CEO is older and has a
4
longer tenure. The study of Westphal and Zajac (1995), reinforced by Krause, Withers, and
Semadeni (2017), further describes the impact of CEO on the board decision-making processes,
e.g., BOD selection, director compensation scheme, etc. The study revealed that the social
psychological mechanism, by which the CEO’s preference can influence, affect subsequent
decision making intentionally or unintentionally. That being the case, it can be inferred that the
CEO inherently holds a significant influence on the board of directors for large firms. This
assertion is supported by the study of Papadakis and Barwise (2002) suggesting that the CEO has
an influence on the strategic decision-making process, over and above the influence of external
environment, firm size, and decision characteristics, making CEOs natural research targets for
firm performance.
With the corporate goal of maximizing shareholder’s wealth, studies conducted relating
to the characteristics of the board of directors mostly focused on analyzing its relationship with
firm performance. For instance, a multi-country study conducted about board diversity showed
that firms with more female directors records a higher performance (Terjesen, Couto, &
Francisco, 2015). This reinforced the findings of Campbell and Vera (2008) that board diversity,
in the context of sex provides a competitive advantage as against companies without any female
directors in their board. Another study about the effects of BOD characteristics to firm
performance was regarding the supervisory quality. Lin, Yeh, and Yang (2014) concluded that
accounting performance. These results, considering the impact of CEOs on the BOD, indicate
The theory of human capital goes back to Adam Smith (1776) in his fourth definition of
apprenticeship, costs a real expense, which is capital in [a] person. Those talents [are] part of his
fortune [and] likewise that of society”. This concept has stayed dynamic over time as
Jacobsen, and Roos (1999) defines human capital as “the human factor in the organization; the
combined intelligence, skills and expertise that gives the organization its distinctive character.”
In a more recent definition by Thomas, Smith, and Diez (2013) defining human capital as “the
people, their performance and their potential in the organization”, it can be inferred that
employees can develop their skill and abilities over time, as to be noted with inclusion of the
Human capital theory categorizes learned skills, and human capital more generally,
reflecting the degree of transferability of human capital between firms (Becker, 1964). Becker's
analysis dealt with comparing general and specific training for a job. The results showed that
general training increases the marginal productivity of workers by the same amount in the firm
providing the training as in other firms. Meanwhile, specific training was shown to have no
Top managers have traditionally been viewed as making a positive contribution to the
firm in the field of strategic management. Aside from tangible assets, human capabilities can
accumulate and become capital stock, as argued by Schultz (1961) along with Becker (1962) and
Ben-Porath (1967). An individual’s knowledge, skills, and experience can turn into sustainable
capital. Ben-Porath’s model was one of the first that incorporated a law of motion for human
6
capital. According to the model, sustainable growth can be achieved through storable human
The CEO has become the face of the company and any event pertaining to the CEO will
create changes in the market. These changes were illustrated by a study of Clayton, Hartzell, and
Rosenberg (2005) showing the increase in stock price volatility after a turnover. The research
further argued that market expectations about firm value was revised more frequently than in the
past, as the market now evaluates the characteristics of the new CEO’s strategy and ability.
Both the board and CEO make high-level decisions. In some firms, the CEO makes all
the major decisions, making the CEO more powerful. However, a study conducted by Bebchuk,
Cremers, and Peyer (2011) associates this power with agency problems and to firm value
negatively. Lee, Park, J., and Park, S. (2015) argued that labelling CEO power as an agency
problem was premature and that the optimal level of power may vary for every firm or CEO
depending on every dimension. The study revealed that the optimal level of CEO power is
positively associated with firm value, while any excess of deficiency is negatively associated,
illustrating the inverse U-shaped relationship of CEO power and firm value.
performance will be more variable (Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2005). It is stressed that there
is a positive relationship between CEO power and stock return variability. These prompted
researchers to study CEOs and the impacts they might have on firm value.
7
Firm value (FV), also called Enterprise Value (EV), is a metric that attempts to reflect the
market value of the firm, as an alternative to market capitalization. Sauaia and Castro (2002)
demonstrated how Tobin’s Q can be used as proxy for the value of the firm and a measure for
firm performance from the stakeholder’s point of view. Tobin’s Q, by definition, is the ratio
between the market value of the firm’s assets and the replacement value of its assets. It answers
the question of how much more a company is worth on the stock market compared to the costs it
will bear if it chooses to replace all assets (Diks, Rodriguez, & Driessen, 2016). If the ratio is
between 0 and 1, it means that the costs to replace all assets is higher than the market value,
implying that the stock is undervalued and vice versa if the ratio is greater than 1.
The variables to the equation is relatively subjective, as different analysts will have
different views on what market value and replacement value is. Although there are several
formulae available to compute Tobin’s Q, its purpose of reflecting firm value still holds the
same. In a study done by Bolinger, Brookman, and Thistle (2017), Tobin’s Q was decomposed
into return on assets (ROA), equity multiplier (EM), and price/earnings (P/E) ratio, all of which
explains the firm’s current status, e.g., current firm performance, leverage, and market valuation,
thus strongly supporting the idea of using Tobin’s Q as an indicator of firm value.
CEO characteristics.
While some argue that CEO characteristics are merely components of a knowledge base
for top executives and do not affect firm performance (Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998) others still
believe that, in one way or another, CEO characteristics will have an impact on firm performance
and firm value as a whole. For instance, in 2015, Vintila, Onofrei, and Gherghina showed that in
8
the Bucharest Stock Exchange, CEO tenure and firm value have a positive relationship. In their
study, however, other variables, e.g., CEO duality, age, sex, residency, did not show a
mergers and acquisition transaction, especially if they have access to internal financing
(Malmendier & Tate, 2008). This relationship was explained by Heaton in 2002 by showing that
optimistic managers tend to overvalue their own corporate projects as they believe that the
capital market undervalue their securities. The findings of their research greatly contributed to
the search for characteristics that will impact the firm value.
Company actions affecting a CEO’s motivation have also been studied throughout the
years. A research conducted by Matolcsy and Wright (2011) introduced two distinct types of
CEO compensation- those with equity-based incentives and those with not. Equity incentives
includes stock options or stock bonus. They concluded that firms having a compensation
structure inconsistent with its characteristics yields a lower performance compared to those with
strategically fit compensation mechanism. Further study by Yang, Dolar, and Mo (2014) found a
stock-based compensation, and total compensation. In a separate study, Li, Yang, and Yu (2015)
tells us that there is a positive impact of CEO stock-based compensation on performance. The
study further suggested that, based on robustness checks, the impact of stock-based
Despite the many attempts to examine the effects of executive characteristics on various
aspects of the firm, the existing literature has yet to show us what possible influences these
9
characteristics could have on a varying context. Given the number of characteristics which might
affect firm performance and firm value, this paper, however, focuses only on field of
Hypothesis 1: CEO’s field of specialization significantly affects the firm value of listed
Education, without a doubt, provide CEOs the capacity necessary to understand and adapt
to changing business environments, new technologies, and emerging trends. This flexibility to
change is what increases their capability as an executive to manage business outcomes, i.e., firm
performance. The field of specialization based on the education that the CEO has accomplished
may provide us with hints about his management style. For instance, an examination of Chinese
firms by Lin, Yeh, and Yang (2014) showed that CEOs with college education are more likely to
invest in R & D and to invest more than those without such attainment. The same results were
also achieved by Iqbal (2015) in his research regarding the use of financial derivatives in the
petroleum industry. It can be inferred from his study that a higher proportion of CEOs with
petroleum related degree, compared to those with business degree, took advantage of a hedging
program for risk management. The fact that CEOs with different fields of specialization take
different business choices gives us an idea that this might affect firm performance.
Hypothesis 2: CEO’s tenure significantly affects the firm value of listed corporations in the
Philippines
Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) revealed that CEOs with longer tenure maintains a
higher power within the firm. Although it results to a higher stock return volatility, more CEO
power leads to a better stock performance. In 2004, Huson, Malatesta, and Parrina argued that
hiring a new top executive may have a positive effect on firm performance in an expectation that
10
such turnover will prompt performance improvements. The CEO tenure and performance-
turnover relation showed that CEO survival is associated with superior firm performance,
making favorable performance a motivation for longer tenure (Dikolli, Mayew, & Nanda, 2014).
The results of this study revealed that longer tenured CEOs outperform their replaced
counterparts within their first four years. Furthermore, Peni (2014) also suggested that there is a
positive relationship between the CEO’s tenure and the firm’s Tobin’s Q. Diks, Rodriguez, and
Driessen (2016) supports this claim by showing in their study that tenure is positively related to
Hypothesis 3: CEO’s age significantly affects the firm value of listed corporations in the
Philippines
The study of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) suggested that older generation executives are
relatively more conservative in terms of decision-making, which may have a significant impact
on firm performance. In a separate study, Davidson III, Xie, Xu, and Ning (2007) examined the
impact of executive career horizon on the firm’s earnings management and found out that older
CEOs, those nearing retirement age, increase earnings management in the two years prior to their
retirement in the hopes for a greater pay in their final years, greater value for their options,
increased retirement income and more board seats in other companies. Reinforced by the notion
of Huang, Ryan Jr., and Wiggins III (2007), the study showed that tenured CEOs faced with
shorter horizons, take actions in pursuit for the protection of their wealth, hampering firm
performance.
Hypothesis 4: CEO’s sex significantly affects the firm value of listed corporations in the
Philippines
11
Sex is the most widely researched characteristic in relation to firm value and firm
performance. Literature related to this topic has consistently shown how female CEOs contribute
better effects on firm performance. For example, Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, and Simpson (2010)
suggested that the inclusion of women and ethnic minorities on corporate boards has no negative
effect to firm performance. Campbell and Vera (2008) believes that female board membership is
significantly and positively related to Tobin’s Q. Diks et al. (2016) further supported this claim
when his study revealed that female CEOs improve firm value. Also, in Peni’s (2014) study,
the findings showed that, in terms of performance, firms with female CEOs are better than those
with male CEOs. The results of their studies support the movement of giving women the
opportunity to participate in the board of directors and upper management as they possess
external networks, information, and other characteristics which could benefit the firm.
3. Methodology
Data.
This study used two different sets of data: the CEO characteristics and the firm
characteristics. Data regarding CEO and firm characteristics were gathered from the companies’
2016 SEC filings accessed through the PSE EDGE Portal. The foregoing paragraphs will discuss
what specific data is gathered, accompanied by their descriptive statistics. Moreover, the
The CEOs from companies registered in the Philippine Stock Exchange were used for
this study. The researchers gathered the parameters of different CEO characteristics and control
12
variables from SEC Filings of Annual Report 17-1 with some being substantiated by Bloomberg
Ph. Firm characteristics were also gathered from companies’ filings to SEC, except for data
concerning market values which can be found in other features provided in the PSE EDGE
portal. The filings contain the financial statements data such as book value of assets and book
value of liabilities. For the purpose of this study, Tobin’s Q was calculated using the formula:
Market value of equity used was based on the stock price of common shares as of the closing
date of 2016.
As of April 2018, the total number of companies registered in the PSE reached two
hundred seventy-nine (279). The population size was decreased to one hundred fifty-seven (157)
due to some CEO data that could not be obtained and data concerning companies with dollar-
denominated operations. Also, those companies with CEOs having a tenure of less than four
years were removed, since a new CEO outperforms its predecessor only after this said duration,
Table 1
Female 11
Male 146
13
Non-business 36
Business 121
Table 1 gives an overview of the descriptive statistics of the independent variables that
correlates with CEO characteristics. The average age of CEOs is 62 years old, the oldest CEO is
86 while the youngest is 39. Average tenure is 13 years, with the maximum being 50 years and
the minimum being 4. The parameter of CEOs used for the listed companies in the Philippine
Stock Exchange has proven to be male-dominated with 146 in number compared to only 11
female CEOs.
The researchers examined the relationship between the independent, dependent and
control variables in order to determine whether there is an underlying influence on firm value in
an identifiable confidence level. A correlation matrix was used to investigate the dependence
In this study, sex and field of specialization will use dummy variables. The dummy
variables will be 1 for female and 2 for male, while for the field of specialization, non-business
will use 1 and business will use 2. The researchers consider the fact that firm value may also be
affected by other variables aside from CEO characteristics. Thus, control variables are
incorporated in the formula for a more thorough view on how Tobin’s Q is affected. The same
variables in the study of Diks et al. (2016) are used in the attempt to further explain the impacts
of CEO characteristics on firm value. His study, however, used five control variables compared
to this study’s two variables. The control variables that will be used in this research are:
Table 2
Table 2 describes the dependent variable Tobin’s Q with controlling variables, i.e., firm
size and leverage. As suggested by Cheung et al. (2014), firm size is computed as the natural
logarithm of total assets whereas leverage denotes the debt ratio computed as total interest-
bearing debt divided by total assets. Firm size has a low standard deviation compared to the
mean, this may suggest that companies involved have nearly the same size. However, with a
standard deviation greater than the mean, this suggest that the Tobin’s Q is skewed, which could
performed a robust regression which resulted after 500 Bootstrap repetitions. Ordinary Least
Square [OLS] regression, which was used in the paper of Diks et al. (2016) was not possible due
of data. The prob>chi2 is significant which means that the model is acceptable. This also means
that the model used does not suffer multicollinearity based on Variance Inflation Factor (VIF).
15
Table 3
Correlation Matrix
Age 0.01 1
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix between variables. As expected, the highest
correlation is that of age and tenure, implying that the longer the CEO is in his position the
older he gets. Tenure and field of specialization are negatively correlated which implies either
or both of the following: (1) that CEOs with non-business degree may have a longer tenure
and/or (2) CEOs with business degree may have shorter tenure. Furthermore, it can be implied
that the firms expand through issuance of debt as observed through the positive correlation
between firm size (as represented by the natural logarithm of the book value of the assets) and
the leverage (as represented by debt-to-equity ratios). Grimm and Smith (1991) and Chen, Hsu,
and Huang (2010), in their study, argued that as CEOs stay longer in their position, they tend to
16
fall into a ‘competency trap’, becoming more conservative and risk averse. This can be
As noted earlier, the firm size and leverage has a positive relationship, thus concluding
that the smaller the firm size is, the lower will the leverage be. This also implies that the longer
the tenure of the CEO, the lesser risk it is willing to assume for the company. Hence, a CEO
might be reluctant to the idea of expansion and may even decline issuing debts and ultimately
Table 4
Observations= 157
Replications = 500
Table 4 shows the results of the bootstrapped robust regression. The betas represent the
proportion that CEO characteristics influence firm value. Furthermore, the betas are tested for
reliability using z-test at different significant levels which are represented by the number of
asterisk; (*) means significant at 90% confidence level, (**) means significant at 95%
Results in table 4 showed that after controlling for firm-specific differences such as firm
size and leverage, only sex has a significant relationship to Tobin’s Q. The results further show
that male CEOs relative to female CEOs, have higher Tobin’s Q by 0.710 at 95% confidence
level. This opposes the study of Diks et al. (2016) and Peni (2012), which showed that
companies with female CEOs outperform companies with male CEOs and that of Vintila, et al.
(2015) which showed that the performance of the firms with male CEOs do not differ
significantly from that with a female CEO. However, the study mentioned above used companies
in the S&P 500 (United States) and Bucharest Stock Exchange (Bucharest, Romania)
respectively. Thus, the researchers argue that the effect of the sex of the CEO on the firm value
may differ per country. Also, the population used in the study was dominated by male CEOs,
which could have driven the result as it is. As for the Philippines, investors may put their trust on
The age of the CEO showed no significant effect on Tobin’s Q as also discussed in the
studies of Vintila et al. (2015) and Peni (2012). Similar to the study of Bhagat, Bolton and
specialization and firm performance. The field of specialization may be a factor considered by
directors in hiring their CEOs, but it may not influence the views of the investors and the value
of the firm. As opposed to the studies of Vintila et al. (2015), Serra et al. (2016), Limbach,
18
Schmid, and Scholz (2015), Peni (2012) and Diks et al. (2016), which showed either a positive
linear or a negative curvilinear (inverted U-shape) relationship between tenure and Tobin’s Q,
the results of this study showed that tenure does not significantly affect the Tobin’s Q of the
company.
It can be inferred from the study that investors might put higher values on companies
based on CEOs sex and ignore other CEO characteristics in making investment decisions. As
provided in The Corporation Code of the Philippines, there is still a significant amount of power
left for the BOD and shareholders, causing the firm value to be influenced by said parties.
Theories such as risk-averseness of CEOs, as they grow old from the experimentation period up
to the competency trap, may not apply effectively as it does in other countries because some, if
not most, significant decisions for the firm are still required to be approved by the BOD and the
shareholders.
Among the four CEO characteristics studied, only sex showed a significant effect on firm
value. This may mean that no matter what field of discipline a CEO took or how old a CEO is,
firm value would not be affected, and that the BOD, if it deems fit, may no longer consider
tenure in making decisions such as retaining a current CEO or hiring a new one. Also, the BOD
can afford to be less stringent in terms of the field of specialization and age when hiring
executives.
The researchers recommend further studies similar to this one and include other CEO
characteristics such as CEO experience in varying industries and CEO quality. The study focused
on Tobin’s Q as indicator of firm value, making it the sole dependent variable considered. Thus,
19
the researchers suggest that future studies consider Tobin’s Q into components, namely ROA,
equity multiplier and P/E ratio, and use these components as dependent variables. Lastly, the
researchers also suggest considering CEO attitude as a potential independent variable knowing
References:
Adams, R. B., Almeida, H., & Ferreira, D. (2005). Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate
Bebchuk, Cremers, & Peyer. (2011). The CEO pay slice. Journal of Financial Economics,
102(1), 199-221.
Becker, G. (1964). Human capital: a theoretical and empirical analysis, with special reference
Ben-Porath, Y. (1967). The production of human capital and the life cycle of earnings. Journal
Bertrand, M., & Schoar, A. (2003). Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm
Bolinger, A., Brookman, J., & Thistle, P. (2017). CEO effects on firm value and its components.
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4d8f/2aec17b315f241a28684cca1c20b69475e4f.pdf
Bontis, N., Dragonetti, N., Jacobsen, K., & Roos, G. (1999). The knowledge toolbox: a review of
Campbell, K., & Vera, A. M. (2008). Gender diversity in the boardroom and firm financial
Carter, D. A., D'Souza, F., Simkins, B., & Simpson, W. (2010). The gender and ethnic diversity
Chen, H.-L., Hsu, W.-T., & Huang, Y.-S. (2010). Top management team characteristics, R&D
investment and capital structure in the IT industry. Small Business Economics, 35(3),
319-333.
Cheng, X., Gao, L., Lawrence, J. E., & Smith, D. B. (2014). SEC division of corporation finance
monitoring and CEO power. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 33(1), 29-56.
Cheung, Y.-L., Connelly, J., Estanislao, J. P., Limpaphayom, P., Lu, T., & Utama, S. (2014).
Sustainability, Ethics & Governance (pp. 27-53). Berlin Heidelberg: Springer Science &
Clayton, M. C., Hartzell, J. C., & Rosenberg, J. (2005). The impact of CEO turnover on equity
Crossland, C., & Hambrick, D. C. (2007). How national systems differ in their constraints on
Datta, D. K., & Rajagopalan, N. (1998). Industry structure and CEO characteristics: An
Davidson III, W. N., Xie, B., Xu, W., & Ning, Y. (2007). The influence of executive age, career
Dikolli, S. S., Mayew, W. J., & Nanda, D. (2014). CEO tenure and the performance-turnover
Diks, J., Rodriguez, J. C., & Driessen, J. (2016). The impact of CEO characteristics on firm
Management, Netherlands.
Elbanna, S. (2012). Slack, planning and organizational performance: Evidence from the Arab
Grimm, C. M., & Smith, K. G. (1991). Management and organizational change: A note on the
Heaton, J. (2002). Managerial optimism and corporate finance. Financial Management, 31(2),
33-45.
Huang, P., Ryan Jr., H. E., & Wiggins III, R. A. (2007). The influence of firm- and CEO-specific
Huson, M. R., Malatesta, P. H., & Parrina, R. (2004). Managerial succession and firm
Iqbal, Z. (2015). CEO age, education, and introduction of hedging in the oil and gas industry.
Krause, R., Withers, M. C., & Semadeni, M. (2017). Compromise on the board investigating the
Lee, J., Park, J., & Park, S. (2015). Revisiting CEO power and firm value. Applied Economics
Letza, S., Sun, X., & Kirkbride, J. (2004). Shareholding versus stakeholding: A critical review of
Li, M.-Y. L., Yang, T.-H., & Yu, S.-E. (2015). CEO stock-based incentive compensation and
Limbach, P., Schmid, M., & Scholz, M. (2015). All good things come to an end: CEO tenure and
Lin, Y.-f., Yeh, Y. C., & Yang, F.-m. (2014). Supervisory quality of board and firm
25(3), 264-279.
Linck, J. S., Netter, J. M., & Yang, T. (2008). The determinants of board structure. Journal of
Lockhart, J., & Crow, P. (2013). An exploration of the board management nexus: From agency
Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2008). Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the
Matolcsy, Z., & Wright, A. (2011). CEO compensation structure and firm performance.
Olie, R., Van Iterson, A., & Simsek, Z. (2012). When do CEOs versus top management teams
Papadakis, V. M., & Barwise, P. (2002). How much do CEOs and top managers matter in
Peni, E. (2014). CEO and chairperson characteristics and firm performance. Journal of
Prevost, A. K., Ramesh, P. R., & Hossain, M. (2002). Board composition in New Zealand: An
Sauaia, A. A., & Castro, H. (2002). Is tobin's q a good indicator of a company's performance?
Schultz, T. (1961). Investment in human capital. American Economic Review, 51(1), 1-17.
Serra, F. R., Tres, G., & Ferreira, M. P. (2016). The ‘CEO’ effect on the performance of brazilian
Smith, A. (1776). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (2 ed.).
25
Terjesen, S., Couto, E. B., & Francisco, P. M. (2015, January 13). Does the presence of
Thomas, H., Smith, R., & Diez, F. (2013). Human capital and global business strategy. New
Vintila, G., Onofrei, M., & Gherghina, S. (2015). The effects of corporate board and CEO
characteristics on firm value: Empirical evidence from listed companies on the Bucharest
Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. (1995). Who shall govern? CEO/Board power, demographic
similarity, and new director selection. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(1), 60-83.
Yang, F., Dolar, B., & Mo, L. (2014). CEO compensation and firm performance: Did the 2007-
2008 financial crisis matter? Journal of Accounting & Finance, 14(1), 137-146.