Professional Documents
Culture Documents
C. Testimonial Evidence expense, trouble, inconvenience, and the trauma of a public trial
unless she was in fact raped.
1. Qualification of witnesses
In determining the competency of a child witness, the court must
Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications consider his capacity (a) at the time the fact to be testified to occurred
such that he could receive correct impressions thereof; (b) to
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. comprehend the obligation of an oath; and (c) to relate those facts truly
MANUEL PRUNA y RAMIREZ or ERMAN PRUNA y to the court at the time he is offered as a witness.The examination
RAMIREZ, accused-appellant. [G.R. No. 138471. October 10, should show that the child has some understanding of the punishment
2002.] -> which may result from false swearing. The requisite appreciation of
consequences is disclosed where the child states that he knows that it
FACTS: On 27 January 1995, an information for rape was filed against is wrong to tell a lie, and that he would be punished if he does so, or
accused-appellant Manuel Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez that he uses language which is equivalent to saying that he would be
for sexually violating Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, a 3-year-old minor, on sent to hell for false swearing. 30 A child can be disqualified only if it
January 3, 1995. Pruna denied the charge against him and interposed can be shown that his mental maturity renders him incapable of
the defense of alibi. perceiving facts respecting which he is being examined and of relating
them truthfully.
TRIAL COURT RULING: Gave credence to the testimony of the
complainant and rejected Pruna's defense. It convicted Pruna of rape in As a general rule, when a witness takes the witness stand, the law, on
its qualified form and sentenced him to death. ground of public policy, presumes that he is competent. The court
cannot reject the witness in the absence of proof of his incompetency.
ISSUE: Whether Lizette is a qualified witness? The burden is, therefore, upon the party objecting to the competency of
a witness to establish the ground of incompetency.
RULING: YES, Lizette is a qualified witness. In this case, appellant
questions the competency of LIZETTE as a witness solely on the Section 21 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence enumerates the
ground of her age. He failed to discharge the burden of showing persons who are disqualified to be witnesses. Among those disqualified
her mental immaturity. From the above-quoted testimony, it can be are "[c]hildren whose mental maturity is such as to render them
gleaned that LIZETTE had the capacity of observation, incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined
recollection, and communication34 and that she could discern the and relating them truthfully."
consequence of telling a lie. We, therefore, sustain the trial court
in admitting her testimony and according it great weight. In a No precise minimum age can be fixed at which children shall be
string of cases, we have said that the testimony of a rape victim excluded from testifying. The intelligence, not the age, of a young child
who is of young or tender age is credible and deserves full
is the test of the competency as a witness. It is settled that a child,
credit, especially where no motive is attributed to the victim that
regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive and,
would make her testify falsely against the accused. Indeed, a girl
in perceiving, can make known his perception to others and that he is
of such age as LIZETTE would not concoct a story of defloration;
capable of relating truthfully the facts for which he is examined.
allow the examination of her private parts; and undergo the
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 2 of 34
We are not persuaded by appellant's assertion that LIZETTE should not Banzuela said, even BBB's actions were highly unusual, considering
be allowed to testify two years after the alleged rape "when the the circumstances of her situation. First, Banzuela said, BBB continued
interplay of frail memory combines with the imagination of earlier to follow him and AAA despite being blindfolded, instead of turning back
years." It must be noted that it is a most natural reaction for victims of and calling for help. Second, in view of what BBB witnessed happened
criminal violence to have a lasting impression of the manner in which to AAA earlier that month, it was contrary to human nature, Banzuela
the crime was committed and the identity of the person responsible averred, that she did not resist or try to attract the attention of her
therefor. neighbors when he brought her to the cemetery. Finally, Banzuela
reasoned, the prosecution cannot profit from the weakness of his
defense in light of their failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. doubt. Thus, he said, he should be acquitted of the charges against
FERDINAND BANZUELA, accused-appellant. [G.R. No. him.
202060. December 11, 2013.] ->
ISSUE: Whether AAA and BBB are qualified as witnesses?
FACTS: On July 25, 2003, Banzuela was charged with Rape
and Attempted Rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal RULING: YES, AAA and BBB are qualified as witnesses. In the
Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 2 before Branch 209, case at bar, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City. testimonies of the witnesses to be credible. Furthermore, this
Court's own independent examination of the records leads us to
RTC RULING: Convicted Banzuela of the crimes of rape of AAA the same conclusion. As the Court of Appeals said, both AAA's
and attempted rape of BBB. and BBB's testimonies were straightforward, detailed, and
consistent. Their credibility is further strengthened by their clear
CA RULING: Affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA said that Banzuela lack of ill motive to falsify such a charge against their cousin, who
failed to destroy the victims' credibility or taint their straightforward and shattered their youth and innocence. The inconsistencies in AAA's
categorical testimonies. testimony, as catalogued by Banzuela in his brief, have no bearing
in the determination of his guilt or innocence, and are too trivial in
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Banzuela is attacking the credibility character to damage AAA's credibility. The material details of the
of the witnesses for being "highly inconsistent, unusual, doubtful and rape were clearly established, and BBB corroborated AAA's
thus insufficient to sustain a conviction". Banzuela claimed that AAA's testimony on every relevant point. As this Court stated in People v.
testimony was full of inconsistencies and contradictions, such as how Saludo: Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not
she managed to remove his hand from her mouth and yet she did not remembered in detail. For such an offense is not analogous to a
shout for help, how Banzuela managed to blindfold BBB while still person's achievement or accomplishment as to be worth recalling
carrying her, and more importantly, how confused she was as to or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep
whether his penis actually penetrated her or simply touched her groin psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim,
area. Banzuela argued that the fact that AAA was still a virgin was scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and
confirmed by the medico- legal examination, and as the medico legal subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim
officer said during his testimony, although the consensus was that it is cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an
possible for a woman to remain a virgin physically despite penetration, accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying experience she
he himself has had no personal encounter of such a case. Moreover, had undergone. (Citation omitted.) BBB was likewise candid,
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 3 of 34
straightforward, and detailed in her narration of not only how AAA
was raped, but also of how she almost suffered the same fate. Her
alleged unusual actions during AAA's ordeal, and later hers, are
not enough to discredit her. It has been established that a victim
of a heinous crime such as rape cannot be expected to act with
reason or in conformity with society's expectations. This acquires
greater significance where the victim is a child of tender age. The
workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress cannot Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity
be predicted; and people cannot be expected to act as usual in an
unfamiliar situation. Furthermore, it is not accurate to say that • PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JONIE
there is a standard reaction or norm of behavior among rape DOMINGUEZ, accused-appellant. [G.R. No. 191065. June 13,
victims, as each of them had to deal with different circumstances. 2011.] ->
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Rosales contends that AAA's We have thoroughly examined AAA's testimony and found no reason to
testimony is incredible on the lone argument that the latter did not make depart from the legal adage that this Court accords the trial judge's
an outcry when the alleged lustful advances were made against her. assessment of the credibility of witnesses great respect in the absence
of any attendant of grave abuse of discretion on the account that the
trial court had the advantage of actually examining both real and
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 7 of 34
testimonial pieces of evidence, including the demeanor of the testified to occurred affects only her credibility. As long as the
witnesses, and is in the best position to rule on the matter. The rule witness can convey ideas by words or signs and give sufficiently
finds an even greater application when the trial court's findings are intelligent answers to questions propounded, she is a competent
sustained by the Court of Appeals. witness even if she is a mental retardate. Indeed, it is difficult to
believe that complainant, whose intelligence is admittedly low,
could have concocted so grave a charge against accused-
• THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. appellant or that she and her mother would go into the trouble of
EDGARDO MACEDA, accused-appellant. [G.R. No. 138805. having her medically examined and undergo trial had she merely
February 28, 2001.] ->
invented the charge.
FACTS: An information for rape of 32-year-old Maribeth Quinto, A reading of complainant's testimony in its entirety shows that she
a mental retardate was filed with the Regional Trial Court of repeatedly stated what accused-appellant had done to her. Only if such
Quezon City against accused-appellant Edgardo Maceda. testimony is read in parts and the portions thereof are isolated or taken
out of context and no allowance is made for complainant's mental
RTC RULING: Finding the accused Edgardo Maceda guilty beyond condition can Maceda's reading of it be justified. Inconsistencies or
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape now penalized under Art. 266-A lapses in her testimonies do not affect the substance of her statements.
and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code in accordance with RA 8353, They do not damage the essential integrity of the evidence in its
with the aggravating circumstance that the offender knew of the mental material whole nor reflect adversely on complainant's credibility.
disability of the complainant Maribeth Quinto at the time of the
commission of the crime, the Court hereby imposes the death penalty Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provide:
on the said accused. He is also ordered to indemnify the offended party
in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs. SECTION 20. Witnesses; their quali cations. — Except as provided in
the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Maceda says that complainant's perceiving, can make known their perception to another, may be
mental condition rendered her testimony so vague, uncertain, and witnesses.
incoherent that it cannot be understood.
xxx xxx xxx
ISSUE: Whether Maribeth should be disqualified as a witness by
reason of mental incapacity or immaturity? SECTION 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. — The following persons cannot be witnesses:
RULING: NO, Maribeth should not be disqualified as a witness by
reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The defense and the (a) Those whose mental conditions, at the time of their production for
prosecution stipulated during pre-trial that complainant is a examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making
mental retardate. But, although the trial court observed that she known their perception to others;
had some difficulty expressing herself, she was nonetheless able
to intelligently and clearly make known to the court, beyond
dispute, that she was raped by Maceda. It has been held that the
mental unsoundness of the witness at the time the fact to be
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 8 of 34
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ISSUE: Whether Analie should be disqualified as a witness?
ROBERTO PANSENSOY, accused-appellant. [G.R. No.
140634. September 12, 2002.] ->
RULING: NO, Analie should not be disqualified. As the legitimate
wife of Pansensoy, Analie's testimony would have been
disregarded had appellant timely objected to her competency to
testify under the marital disqualification rule. Under this rule,
FACTS: An Information was filed charging Robertp Pansensoy with the neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the
crime of murder. Pansensoy shot the victim, Hilario Reyes, who is other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil
allegedly the lover of Pansensoy’s wife, Analie. case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter's direct
RTC RULING: The trial court accorded full faith and credence to the descendants or ascendants. However, objections to the
testimony of Analie and rejected the version of Pansensoy that he acted competency of a husband and wife to testify in a criminal
in self-defense. It found the testimony of Analie credible and observed prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of
that she remained unperturbed during the cross-examination. The trial other witnesses generally. The objection to the competency of the
court also noted that Pansensoy, who was then a security guard, was spouse must be made when he or she is first offered as a
charged by his employer with the crime of qualified theft for the loss of witness. In this case, the incompetency was waived by appellant's
a .38 caliber revolver. Pansensoy allegedly committed the theft on May failure to make a timely objection to the admission of Analie's
8, 1994, the very same day the shooting incident happened. The gun testimony. From Analie's testimony, it is all too apparent that the
used in shooting Hilario was not found at the scene of the crime but the rst requisite of self-defense is absent. The unlawful aggression did
slug recovered was that of a .38 caliber revolver. Although Pansensoy not come from the victim but from appellant himself. The
was subsequently acquitted of the charge, the trial court considered this aggression not having come from the victim, appellant's claim of
as "evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime." The trial self-defense cannot prosper. The trial court relied on Analie's
court further noted that Pansensoy went into hiding from the time the testimony to convict appellant and we find that her testimony is
shooting incident happened until the case was filed in court on August sufficient to support appellant's conviction.
24, 1994.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Undeterred, Pansensoy's first WHEREFORE, the judgment of Branch 73 of the Regional Trial Court
assignment of error is focused on the sufficiency of the evidence for the of Antipolo City in Criminal Case No. 94-11527 is MODIFIED. Appellant
prosecution, questioning in particular the trial court's assessment of the ROBERTO PANSENSOY is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
credibility of the prosecution's eyewitness, Analie. According to him, the crime of HOMICIDE as de ned and penalized under Article 249 of
Analie's testimony is flawed as she insisted that she and Pansensoy the Revised Penal Code, instead of murder. Applying the Indeterminate
had been separated for more than three years but this is belied by the Sentence Law and taking into account the mitigating circumstance of
fact that their youngest daughter is barely a year old. He also points out passion and obfuscation, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an
that his version when he dragged his wife outside by pulling her hair indeterminate penalty ranging from Eight (8) years of prision mayor
was more believable and in accord with human behavior rather than minimum, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8) months of
Analie's version that Pansensoy took time to interrogate the victim reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum. The award of actual
regarding how much the latter loved his wife and other personal damages of P40,000.00 is DELETED, but appellant is ordered to pay
circumstances before shooting him. the heirs of the victim moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and
loss of earning capacity in the amount of P3,379,200.00.
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 9 of 34
marital disqualification rule. As correctly observed by the court a
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. quo, the disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not
BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR., accused-appellant. [G.R. No. precluding the wife from testifying when it involves other parties
117401. October 1, 1998.]->
or accused. Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in the murder case
against Reynaldo and Eddie, which was jointly tried with accused-
appellant's case. This testimony cannot, however, be used against
FACTS: On January 17, 1989, accused-appellant Bernardo Quidato Jr accused-appellant directly or through the guise of taking judicial
was charged with the crime of parricide before the Regional Trial Court notice of the proceedings in the murder case without violating the
of Davao for killing his father, Bernardo Quidato Sr using a bolo. marital disqualification rule. "What cannot be done directly cannot
The prosecution, in offering its version of the facts, presented as its be done indirectly" is a rule familiar even to law students.
witnesses accused-appellant's brother Leo Quidato, appellant's wife
Gina Quidato, as well as Patrolman Lucrecio Mara. Likewise, the In indicting accused-appellant, the prosecution relied heavily on the a
prosecution offered in evidence a davits containing the extrajudicial davits executed by Reynaldo and Eddie. The two brothers were,
confessions of Eddie Malita and Reynaldo Malita. The two brothers however, not presented on the witness stand to testify on their
were, however, not presented by the prosecution on the witness stand. extrajudicial confessions. The failure to present the two gives these a
Instead, it presented Atty. Jonathan Jocom to prove that the two were davits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the a
assisted by counsel when they made their confessions. Similarly, the ants themselves take the witness stand to a rm the averments in their a
prosecution presented MTC Judge George Omelio who attested to the davits, the a davits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding,
due and voluntary execution of the sworn statements by the Malita being inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused
brothers. made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against his co-
accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him
According to Gina Quidato, on the evening of the next day, September testify and cross-examine him.
17, 1988, accused-appellant and the Malita brothers were drinking tuba
at their house. She overheard the trio planning to go to her father-in- The Solicitor General, in advocating the admissibility of the sworn
law's house to get money from the latter. She had no idea, however, as statements of the Malita brothers, cites Section 30, Rule 130 of the
to what later transpired because she had fallen asleep before 10:00 Rules of Court which provides that "[t]he act or declaration of a
p.m. Accused-appellant objected to Gina Quidato's testimony on the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
ground that the same was prohibited by the marital disquali cation rule given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
found in Section 22 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The judge, shown by evidence other than such act or declaration." The
acknowledging the applicability of the so-called rule, allowed said inapplicability of this provision is clearly apparent. The confessions
testimony only against accused-appellant's co-accused, Reynaldo and were made after the conspiracy had ended and after the consummation
Eddie. of the crime. Hence, it cannot be said that the execution of the a davits
were acts or declarations made during the conspiracy's existence.
ISSUE: Whether Gina should be disqualified as witness?
Likewise, the manner by which the affidavits were obtained by the
RULING: YES, Gina should be disqualified as witness. With regard police render the same inadmissible in evidence even if they were
to Gina Quidato's testimony, the same must also be disregarded, voluntarily given. The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial
accused-appellant having timely objected thereto under the confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 10 of 34
writing and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence. It Ramirez filed an opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the
is undisputed that the Malita brothers gave their statements to motion, the trial court directed the prosecution to proceed with the
Patrolman Mara in the absence of counsel, although they signed the presentation of the other witnesses.
same in the presence of counsel the next day.
TRIAL COURT RULING: Issued the questioned Order disqualifying
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her testimony
Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Criminal Case No. 89-9 dated from the records.
March 2, 1994, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
Bernardo Quidato, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable CA RULING: rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the
doubt. Consequently, let the accused be immediately released from his assailed Orders issued by the trial court
place of confinement unless there is reason to detain him further for
any other legal or valid cause. With costs de oficio. ISSUE: Whether Esperanza should be disqualified as witness?
'The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the
person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 12 of 34
On May 31, 1993, Felisa and the other heirs of Venancio (Heirs, for
brevity),9 executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Deed of Absolute
• HEIRS OF VENANCIO BAJENTING and FELISA S. Sale over Lot 23. They alleged therein that when Venancio died
BAJENTING, NAMELY: Teresita A. Bajenting, Ruel A. intestate, they had agreed to adjudicate unto themselves as heirs of the
Bajenting, Gilbert A. Bajenting, Cresilda B. Puebla, Imelda deceased the aforesaid property, as follows:
B. Salac, Benedictina B. Ravina, Margarita B. Reusora,
Renato A. Bajenting, Lorena A. Bajenting, Elizalde A. TO: FELISA S. BAJENTING, One half (1/2) share of the whole of Oct.
Bajenting, Francisco Malda, Jr., B. Selecio Bajenting, No. P-5677, as her conjugal share; and the remaining one-half (1/2) of
Trinidad M. Antinola, Roland B. Malda, Luisa B. Malda, OCT No. P-5677.
Arsenia C. Ramirez, Angelina Ricarte, Editha Esteban,
Lourdes M. Garcia, Nora M. Alivio, Francisca B. Espina, TO: FELISA S. BAJENTING, MARGARITA BAJENTING, FRANCISCA
Francisco Malda, Sr., and Venencio A. Bajenting, BAJENTING, SILVERIO BAJENTING (Deceased) represented by his
represented by VENENCIO A. BAJENTING, Attorney-in- wife and children: Teresita Apas-Bajenting, Renato Bajenting, Gilbert
Fact, petitioners, vs. ROMEO F. BAÑEZ, SPOUSES Bajenting, Criselda Bejenting, Imelda Bajenting, Venancio Bajenting
JONATHAN and SONIA LUZ ALFAFARA, respondents. [G.R. and Elizalde Bajenting; MAXIMA BAJENTING (Deceased) represented
No. 166190. September 20, 2006.] ->
by her husband, Francisco Malda, and children: Lee B. Malda, Angelina
B. Malda, Milagros B. Malda, Editha B. Malda and Susana B. Malda;
FACTS: Venancio Bajenting applied for a free patent over a BENEDICTINA BAJENTING, ARSENIA BAJENTING; and CELECISO
parcel of land, Lot 23 (Sgs. 546 D), Davao Cadastre, located in BAJENTING, in equal share pro-indiviso.
Langub, Davao City, with an area of 104,140 square meters.
The application was docketed as Free Patent Application No. In the same deed, a 50,000 square meter portion of the property was
IV-45340. In the meantime, Venancio planted fruit trees in the sold to the spouses Sonia Luz Alfafara; and the 54,140 square meter
property 3 such as mango, lanzones, coconut and santol. He portion to Engr. Romeo F. Bañez. The share of Felisa was included in
and his wife, Felisa Bajenting, along with their children, also the portion sold to Engr. Bañez. However, the deed was not notarized;
resided in a house which stood on the property. neither was the sale approved by the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources. In the Agreement/Receipt executed by Felisa
On February 18, 1974, Venancio died intestate. His application for a Bajenting and Romeo Bañez, the parties declared that the price of
free patent was thereafter approved, and on December 18, 1975, Free property was P500,000.00; P350,000.00 was paid by the vendees, the
Patent No. 577244 was issued in his favor. On February 6, 1976, the balance of P150,000.00 to be due and payable on or before December
Register of Deeds issued Original Certi cate of Title (OCT) No. P-5677 31, 1993 at the residence of the vendors. The owner's duplicate of title
over the property in the name of "Venancio Bajenting, married to Felisa was turned over to the vendees. However, the deed was not led with
Sultan." Selecio Bajenting continued cultivating the land. the Office of the Register of Deeds.
In the meantime, the Sangguniang Panglunsod approved City The Heirs, including Felisa, tried to repurchase the property as provided
Ordinance No. 263, Series of 1982 and Resolution No. 10254 declaring under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, but Romeo Bañez
the properties in Langub as a low density residential zone. and Sonia Alfafara did not allow them to exercise their right.
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 13 of 34
On May 31, 1995, the Heirs, through Venencio Bajenting, filed a apply to the testimonies of Reyes and Oyco, being as they were, mere
Complaint for recovery of title against Romeo Bañez and the spouses witnesses not parties to the case.
Alfafara in the Office of the Barangay Captain. When no settlement was
reached, the Heirs led a complaint for Quieting of Title, Repurchase of PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: The collective testimonies of Reyes
Property, Recovery of Title plus Damages with the Regional Trial Court, and Oyco were hearsay and inadmissible in evidence under the dead
claiming that they had tried to repurchase the property from the man's statute, Margarita Reusora having died on August 24, 1997
defendants and that the latter had ignored the summons from the before the witnesses had even testi ed. Neither Margarita nor Venencio
Barangay Captain for an amicable settlement of the case. Bajenting could have informed Reyes and Oyco that the petitioners
were selling the property for P10,000,000.00 because petitioners,
TRIAL COURT RULING: On March 1, 2002, the trial court rendered through Venencio Bajenting, had led a case against the respondents in
judgment in favor of the Heirs. The RTC ruled that while there is the Office of the Barangay Captain.
evidence that first-class subdivisions are being developed in the vicinity,
no budget had been appropriated for the plans to construct the ISSUE: Whether Reyes and Oyco should be disqualified as witnesses?
government center and the sports complex. However, it declared that
the defendants failed to present any evidence that the plaintiffs were RULING: NO, Reyes and Oyco should not be disqualified as
repurchasing the property for and in behalf of a financier. Ordering the witnesses. Contrary to the allegations of petitioners, the collective
defendants to vacate subject property covered by Original Certificate of testimonies of Reyes and Oyco are admissible in evidence despite
Title No. T-5677 and deliver said Certificate of Title to plaintiffs within the fact that when they testified, Margarita Reusora was already
ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Accordingly, the Clerk of Court of the dead. Section 20(a), Rule 130 applies only to parties to a case, or
Regional Trial Court, Davao City, is hereby ordered to release the assignors of parties to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
amount of P350,000.00 deposited by plaintiffs in favor of defendants, prosecuted. Reyes and Oyco were mere witnesses for
representing the repurchase money of subject property, evidenced by respondents, not parties in the court a quo, nor assignors of any
Official Receipt No. 6547953, dated October 11, 1996. Further, the of the parties in whose behalf the case was prosecuted. Their
compulsory counter-claim filed by defendants against plaintiffs is testimonies were presented only to prove that the petitioners
hereby DISMISSED. intended to repurchase the property for profit, and not for the
purpose of preserving it for their and their families' use and
CA RULING: On February 27, 2004, the CA rendered judgment enjoyment.
granting the appeal, and reversed the Decision of the trial court. The
CA ruled that as gleaned from the evidence on record and the Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
pleadings of the Heirs, the property was sought to be repurchased for
profit, and not to preserve it for themselves and their families. Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. — The
following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: As found by the CA, the testimonies interested, directly or indirectly as herein enumerated:
of Reyes and Oyco were credible and deserving of full probative
weight. Indeed, their testimonies are buttressed by the trial court's (a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf
Order dated January 19, 1998. They add that the findings of the CA a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
are binding on this Court, and that the dead man's statute does not representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound
mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 14 of 34
person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to setoff of the amount of its claim of P63,868.67 from the amount of
any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person P64,500 returnable to the estate.
or before such became of unsound mind.
In his answer to the amended claim the administrator denied the
alleged indebtedness of the deceased to the claimant, expressed his
conformity to the refund of P64,500 by the claimant to the estate and
the retransfer by the latter to the former of the 545 shares of stock, and
set up a counterclaim of P90,000 for salaries allegedly due the
• Testate estate of RICHARD THOMAS FITZSIMMONS, deceased from the claimant corresponding to the years 1942, 1943,
deceased. MARCIAL P. LICHAUCO, administrator-appellee, and the first half of 1944, at P36,000 per annum.
vs. ATLANTIC, GULF & PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA,
claimant-appellant. [G.R. No. L-2016. August 23, 1949.]
CFI RULING: Denying appellant's claim of P63,868.67 against the
estate of the deceased Richard T. Fitzsimmons, and granting appellee's
counterclaim of P90,000 against the appellant. It rejected the
FACTS: The appellant Atlantic, Gulf & Paci c Company of Manila is a testimonies of the witnesses Mr. Henry J. Belden (Vice-President-
foreign corporation duly registered and licensed to do business in the Treasurer) and Mr. Samuel Garmezy (President) of Atlantic Gulf &
Philippines, with its office and principal place of business in the City of Pacific Company of Manila.
Manila.
Richard T. Fitzsimmons was the president and one of the largest ISSUE: Whether Belden and Garmezy should be disqualified as
stockholders of said company when the Paci c war broke out on witnesses?
December 8, 1941.
RULING: NO, Belden and Garmezy should not be disqualified as
Richard T. Fitzsimmons died on June 27, 1944, in the Santo Tomas witness. As officers of a corporation (Belden and Garmezy) which
internment camp, and special proceeding No. 70139 was subsequently is a party to an action against an executor or administrator (Atty
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the settlement of Lichuaco) of a deceased person (Fitzsimmons), they are not
his estate. disqualified from testifying as to any matter occurring before the
death of such deceased person. Inasmuch as section 26(c) of
The Atlantic, Gulf & Paci c Company of Manila resumed business Rule 123 disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties, we are
operations in March, 1945. constrained to hold that the officers and/or stockholders of a
corporation are not disqualified from testifying, for or against the
In due course the said company filed a claim against the estate of corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand
Richard T. Fitzsimmons totalling to P63,868.67 with the Court of First against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact
Instance of Manila. occurring before the death of such deceased person.
In the same claim the company offered to reacquire the 545 shares It results that the trial court erred in not admitting the testimony of
sold to the deceased Fitzsimmons upon return to his estate of the Messrs. Belden and Garmezy. It is not necessary, however, to remand
amount of P64,500 paid thereon, and asked the court to authorize the the case for the purpose of taking the testimony of said witnesses
because it would be merely corroborative, if at all, and in any event
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 15 of 34
what said witnesses would have testified, if permitted, already appears The same view is sustained in Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Vol.
in the record as hereinabove set forth, and we can consider it together 9, pages 535-538; in Jones on Evidence, 1938 Ed. Vol. 3, page 1448;
with the testimony of the chief accountant and the assistant accountant and in Moran on the Law of Evidence in the Philippines, 1939 Ed.
who, according to the appellant itself, were "the only ones in the best of pages 141-142.
position to testify on the status of the personal account" of the
deceased Fitzsimmons. The appellee admits in his brief that in those states where the "dead
man's statute" disqualifies only parties to an action, officers and
Under Rule 123, section 26(c), of the Rules of Court, which provides: stockholders of a corporation have been allowed to testify in favor of
the corporation, while in those states where "parties and persons
"Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a interested in the outcome of the litigation" are disqualified under the
case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other statute, officers and stockholders of the corporation have been held to
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound be incompetent to testify against the estate of a deceased person.
mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to
any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person
or before such person became of unsound mind."
This provision was taken from section 383, paragraph 7, of our former • ONG CHUA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWARD CARR ET AL.,
Code of Civil Procedure, which in turn was derived from section 1880 of defendants- appellants. [G.R. No. 29512. January 17, 1929.]
the Code of Civil Procedure of California. ->
In the case of City Savings Bank vs. Enos, 135 Cal., 167; 67 Pac., 52,
55, the Supreme Court of California, interpreting said article 1880, FACTS: Lots Nos. 136 and 137 and the house on lot No. 132 originally
said:". . . The provision applies only to parties or assignors of parties, belonged to one Henry E. Teck, and lot No. 135 was the property of
and Haslam was neither the one nor the other. If he was a stockholder, Teck's wife, Magdalena Lim. Sometime prior to June 20, 1923, it seems
which it is claimed he was, that fact would make no difference, for that the spouses sold the property in question to petitioner Ong Chua,
interest no longer disqualifies under our law, Civ. Code Proc. sec. 1879. and on June 17, 1923, Chua executed a public document granting to
Appellant cites section 14, Civ. Code, to the effect that the word Magdalena Lim the right to repurchase lot 135 for the sum of P6,500
'person' includes a corporation; and claims that, as the corporation can within four years from that date, and on the 20th of the same month,
only speak through its officers, the section must be held to apply to all Chua executed another public document in which he agreed to sell lots
who are officially related to the corporation. A corporation may be Nos. 136, 137, and the house on lot 132 to Henry E. Teck for the sum
conceded to be a person, but the concession does not help appellant. of P13,500 at any time within four years from date. Neither one of the
To hold that the statute disqualifies all persons from testifying who are documents was placed on record with the register of deeds. Later on,
officers or stockholders of a corporation would be equivalent to respondent Edward Carr came to Zamboanga, bringing with him letters
materially amending the statute by judicial interpretation. Plainly the law of introduction addressed to P. J. Moore, a practicing attorney in that
disqualifies only 'parties or assignors of parties,' and does not apply to town. Carr became interested in buying the aforementioned lots., he
persons who are merely employed by such parties or assignors of was told by Moore that Teck and his wife had the right to repurchase
parties." the property in question from Ong Chua and that such rights would
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 16 of 34
expire in June, 1927, to which he agreed and later on December 14, then learned, for the first time, that the deed in question contained no
1925, the draft for the deed of sale of property was prepared and Ong reference to the rights of Teck and Lim to repurchase the property. On
Chua stated to Moore that he consented to sell the properties to Carr July 23, 1926, this action was brought, the plaintiff alleging in substance
on the condition that the sale should be subject to the rights of Teck and the principal facts hereinbefore stated and demanding that the deed in
Lim to have the property reconveyed to them and that said rights were question be reformed in accordance therewith. The defendant
to be respected by the vendee, Carr still agreed. During the drafting of demurred, but the demurrer was overruled. The defendant thereupon
the Deed, Carr’s money was insufficient, so he applied for loans with filed an answer pleading the general issue and setting up as special
several banks.After the deed was prepared and signed, Ong Chua told defenses that the deed in question contained no stipulation as to rights
Carr and Moore that lot No. 137 was mortgaged by him to the Bank of of repurchase and that if there was any agreement or promise on the
the Philippine Islands for P6,500, the rate of interest being 10 per cent part of the defendant to convey the property to Henry E. Teck and
per annum. Moore stated that the Zamboanga Building and Loan Magdalena Lim or to the plaintiff, as alleged in the complaint, such
Association could not lend money at less than 13 per cent per annum. agreement and promise was for the sale of real property, or an interest
Ong Chua then stated that he was willing to let the mortgage on the lot therein, and that neither said agreement or promise, nor any note or
given to the bank stand until the expiration of the term for the memorandum was made in writing or subscribed by the defendant or by
repurchases. As this arrangement would save Carr a considerable sum any authorized person for him. Subsequent to the filing of the answer,
of money, he agreed to the proposition and paid only P13,500 in cash Carr died, and the administrator of his estate, Manuel Igual, was
and promised, in writing, to pay to the vendor the balance of the substituted as defendant.
purchase price, P6,500, with interest at 10 per cent per annum, on or
before July 1, 1927. The loan from the Building and Loan Association TRIAL COURT RULING: No evidence was offered by Carr, and,
thus became unnecessary, but instead of redrafting the deed, it was consequently, the facts hereinbefore stated stand uncontradicted. Upon
agreed that Moore would keep the deed and the other documents in his such facts the court below ordered the reformation of the deed, Exhibit
custody and would not deliver them to any one until the expiration of A, in accordance with the Chua's demand.
the period for repurchase.
In September, 1926, Moore was taken critically ill, and while he was RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The court erred in permitting the
under medical treatment in the Zamboanga Hospital, Carr came to him plaintiff, Ong Chua, to testify, over the defendant's objections, to facts
on various occasions and demanded that the documents be delivered occurring prior to the death of the defendant Carr,
to him. At first Moore refused to make the delivery on the ground that it ISSUE: Whether Ong Chua should be disqualified to be a witness?
was contrary to their agreement and might result to the prejudice of the
rights of Teck and Lim, but Carr continued to molest Moore with his RULING: NO, Ong Chua should not be disqualified to be a
demand for the delivery of the papers, and nally, in order to escape witness. In this case a number of credible witnesses testified to
further annoyances and insinuations of Carr, he surrendered the deed facts which conclusively showed that Carr's conduct was tainted
to the latter, who almost immediately presented it to the register of with fraud. Chua did not take the witness stand until after the
deeds for registration. existence of fraud on the part of Carr had been established
beyond a doubt and not by a mere preponderance of evidence. In
In July, 1926, Teck offered to repurchase the property in question from these circumstances, we cannot hold that the trial court erred in
Ong Chua who thereupon demanded of Carr the reconveyance of the not excluding Chua's testimony.
property to the spouses, Teck and Lim, but Carr refused to do so,
claiming that he had an absolute title to said property, and Ong Chua
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 17 of 34
The first proposition rests on subsection 7 of section 383 of the Code of • GO CHI GUN alias CHIPBUN GOCHECO, GO AWAY alias
Civil Procedure, which bars parties to an action or proceeding against LIM KOC and FEDERICO M. CHUA HIONG, plaintiffs-
an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased appellees, vs. CO CHO, GO TECSON, DONATO GO TIAK
person upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased GIAP, CESAREO GO TEK HONG, ALFONSO GO TEK BIO,
person from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the MARIANO GO TEK LIONG, DOMINGO GO TEK LUNG, GO
death of such deceased person. GIOK TE, GO CHUN TE AND PACIFICO YAP, defendants-
appellants. [G.R. No. L-5208. February 28, 1955.] ->
Similar provisions are to be found in the statutes of practically all of the
states of the Union, and the rule thus laid down is now unquestioned.
But it has generally been given a liberal construction to promote justice,
and it is held that it never was intended to serve as a shield for fraud. FACTS: Go Checo, a chinaman, died in Saigon, Indo China, on
As stated in Jones on Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 774: February 19, 1914, leaving real and personal properties in the
Philippines. On March 7, 1914, his son Paulino Gocheco instituted
judicial proceedings for the distribution of his estate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. The intestate left children by two marriages. The
"The evidence of an adverse party is absolutely excluded by an estate left by the intestate was, according to assessments made by the
independent, affirmative enactment making him incompetent as to commissioners on appraisal, valued at P44,017.00. Each of his 8
transactions or communications with a deceased or incompetent children received properties or cash amounting to P3,995.56. The
person. These statutes, however, do not render the adverse party project of partition is signed by one Joaquin A. Go Cuay as guardian ad
incompetent to testify to fraudulent transactions of the deceased, as the litem of the minors and was approved by the court on May 11, 1916.
statutes are not designed to shield wrongdoers but the courts compel Upon the termination of the intestate proceedings, Paulino Gocheco
the adverse party to clearly establish the alleged fraudulent acts before instituted guardianship proceedings for his minor brothers and sisters,
admitting such testimony." and he was appointed guardian for their persons and properties on May
20, 1916. These guardianship proceedings continued until September
And in the case of Tongco vs. Vianzon (50 Phil., 698, 702) this court 15, 1931 when all the wards had become of age. The proceedings were
said: "Counsel is eminently correct in emphasizing that the object and closed on said date and the guardian relieved of liability as such.
purpose of this statute is to guard against the temptation to give false Paulino Gocheco died on April 24, 1943, and on January 10, 1944 his
testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the eldest son instituted intestate proceedings for the settlement of his
surviving party. He has, however, neglected the equally important rule estate. These were terminated on March 23, 1947. Later on,
that the law was designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not an action was instituted by Go Chi Gun and Go Away on July 31, 1948.
designed to suppress the truth."
TRIAL COURT RULING: Annulled the project of partition in the
intestate proceedings of the deceased Gocheco, as the same was
found to have been procured through fraud, collusion and connivance
to the prejudice of the plaintiffs; declared that the properties obtained by
the deceased Paulino Gocheco in the said partition proceedings are the
common properties of plaintiffs Go Chi Gun and Go Away and the
deceased Paulino Gocheco in the proportion of 1/3 for each of them;
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 18 of 34
and ordered defendants to render a correct and detailed accounting of prohibition contained in the rule. We find, therefore, that the trial
the said properties and business interest of said deceased Paulino court committed an error in allowing the plaintiffs- appellees, over
Gocheco to the plaintiffs from 1916 up to the present. It also dismissed the objections of the attorneys for the defendants-appellants, to
the defendants' counterclaim. testify as to the supposed statements made to them by the
deceased Paulino Gocheco.
ISSUE: Whether Go Chi Gun and Go Away should be disqualified as
witnesses? Section 26(c) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court which provides:
RULING: YES, Go Chi Gun and Go Away should be disqualified as "SEC. 26. Persons who cannot testify generally, or because of certain
witnesses. In the case at bar, the testimonies of the plaintiffs as to relations to parties the following persons cannot be witnesses:
the alleged statements of the deceased to him are well within the
purpose and intent of the prohibition. The reason for the rule is xxx xxx xxx
that if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased
or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed (c) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf
statements made by him (deceased person), many would be a case is prosecuted against an executor or administrator or other
tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound
latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to
demands. The purpose of the law is to "guard against the any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in or before such person became of unsound mind;"
question on the part of the surviving party." (Tongco vs. Vianzon,
50 Phil., 698.) The administration of the properties of plaintiffs'
father was judicially made, and the existence thereof and of the
properties he left were in public records. For 40 years during
which Paulino Gocheco was living, plaintiffs herein had remained • Intestate estate of Marcelino Tongco, represented by
silent and had done nothing to check the truth of the supposed JOSEFA TONGCO, administratrix, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
statements of their deceased brother, which could easily be done ANASTACIA VIANZON, defendant-appellee. [G.R. No.
because the facts they had interest in were in public records. It 27498. September 20, 1927. 1 ]->
was only after Go Checo had died, such that he can no longer
deny their statements, and after all possible witnesses or papers FACTS: Marcelino Tongco and respondent Anastacia Vianzon
or circumstances have already gone beyond recall because of the contracted marriage on July 5, 1984. Marcelino died on July 8, 1925,
destruction of the public records, that the supposed statement is leaving Anastacia as a widower. The niece of Marcelino, petitioner
now brought forth and made the basis of the plaintiffs' action. We Josefa Tongco, was named administratrix of the estate. It appears that
cannot help but induced to believe that it is the death of the shortly before the death of Marcelino, he had presented claims in
decedent, and the latter's inability to deny the supposed statement a cadastral case in which he had asked for titles to certain properties in
made by him, as well as the destruction of the records of the the name of the conjugal partnership consisting of himself and his wife,
judicial proceedings, that must have tempted plaintiffs to bring the and that corresponding decrees for these lots were issued in the name
action. The case clearly falls within the spirit and terms of the
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 19 of 34
of the conjugal partnership not long after his death, to which the judge RULING: NO, Anastacia should not be disqualified as a witness.
in that case ruled in favor of Anastasia. While the appellant’s counsel is eminently correct in emphasizing
On July 19, 1926, Josefa began an action against Anastacia Vianzon that the object and purpose of this statute is to guard against the
for the recovery of specified property and for damages. The issue was temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in
practically the same as in the cadastral case. question on the part of the surviving party. He has, however,
neglected the equally important rule that the law was designed to
(Note: 1st case = cadastral proceedings, which ruled in favor of aid in arriving at the truth and was not designed to suppress the
Anastacia; and 2nd case = recovery of specified property which is the truth. The law twice makes use of the word "against." The actions
subject of the cadastral proceedings and for damages, which again were not brought "against" the administratrix of the estate, nor
ruled in favor or Anastacia) were they brought upon claims "against" the estate. In the first
case at bar, the action is one by the administratrix to enforce a
CFI RULING: Judgment was rendered by Judge Rovira couched in the demand "by" the estate. In the second case at bar, the same
following language: "Therefore, the court renders judgment absolving analogy holds true for the claim was presented in cadastral
the defendant from the complaint in this case, and only declares that proceedings where in one sense there is no plaintiff and there is
one-half of the value of the shares in the Sociedad Cooperativa de no defendant. Moreover, a waiver was accomplished when the
Credito Rural de Orani, to the amount of ten pesos (P10), belong to the adverse party undertook to cross-examination the interested
intestate estate of Marcelino Tongco, which one-half interest must person with respect to the prohibited matter. We are of the opinion
appear in the inventory of the property of the estate of the deceased that the witness was competent. It is true that by reason of the
Marcelino Tongco." The motion for a new trial was denied by His Honor, provisions of article 1407 of the Civil Code the presumption is that
the trial judge. all the property of the spouses is partnership property in the
absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: The Estate of Marcelino attacks the the wife. But even proceeding on this assumption, we still think
ruling of the trial judge to the effect that the widow was competent to that the widow has proved in a decisive and conclusive manner
testify. Counsel for the appellant, asserts that if the testimony of the that the property in question belonged exclusively to her, that is, it
widow be discarded, as it should be, then the presumption of the Civil would, unless we are forced to disregard her testimony. No
Code, fortified by the unassailable character of Torrens titles, arises, reversible error was committed in the denial of the motion for a
which means that the entire fabric of appellee's case is punctured. new trial for it is not at all certain that it rested on a legal
Counsel relies on that portion of section 383 of the Code of Civil foundation, or that if it had been granted it would have changed
Procedure as provides that "Partied or assignors of parties to an action the result.
or proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, . . ., upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person . . ., cannot testify as to
any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person .
. .”
FACTS: Petitioners Leonor Mendezona and Valentina Izaguirre y RULING: NO, Mendezona and Izaguirre should not be disqualified
Nazabal, filed separate claims with the committee of claims and as witnesses. In the case before us there has been no such
appraisal against the intestate estate of Benigno Goitia y Lazaga with liquidation between the plaintiffs and the deceased Goitia. They
the Court of First Instance of Manila. Respondent Encarnacion C. Viuda testify, denying any such liquidation. To apply to them the rule that
De Goitia was appointed as judicial administratrix of Benigno Goitia’s "if death has sealed the lips of one of the parties, the law seals
estate. those of the other," would be to exclude all possibility of a claim
LOWER COURT RULING: Ordered Encarnacion as judicial against the testamentary estate. We do not believe that this was
administratrix of the estate of the deceased Benigno Goitia, to pay the legislator's intention. We are of the opinion that the claimants'
plaintiff Leonor Mendezona the sum of P13,140 with legal interest from denial that a certain fact occurred before the death of their
the date of the ling of the complaint, and to pay the plaintiff Valentina attorney-in-fact Benigno Goitia does not come within the legal
Izaguirre P5,256 likewise with legal interest from the date of the filing of prohibitions (section 383, No. 7, Code of Civil Procedure). The law
the complaint, and moreover, to pay the costs of both instances prohibits a witness directly interested in a claim against the estate
of a decedent from testifying upon a matter of fact which took
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The fourth assignment of error place before the death of the deceased. The underlying principle
relates to Exhibits A and B, being the Mendezona and Izaguirre's of this prohibition is to protect the intestate estate from ctitious
depositions made before the American consul at Bilbao, Spain, in claims. But this protection should not be treated as an absolute
accordance with section 356 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Counsel bar or prohibition from the filing of just claims against the
for the appellant was notified of the taking of these depositions, and he decedent's estate.
did not suggest any other interrogatory in addition to the questions of
the committee. When these depositions were read in court, The first of these questions tends to show the relationship between the
Encarnacion objected to their admission, invoking section 383, No. 7, of principals and their attorney-in-fact Benigno Goitia up to 1914.
the Code of Civil Procedure. Her objection referred mainly to the Supposing it was error to permit such a question, it would not be
following questions: reversible error, for that very relationship is proved by several exhibits.
As to the other two questions, it is to be noted that deponents deny
"1. Did Mr. Benigno Goitia render you an account of your partnership in having received from the deceased Benigno Goitia any money on
the "Tren de Aguadas?' — Yes, until the year 1914. account of profits on their shares, since 1915.
"2. From the year 1915, did Mr. Benigno Goitia send you any report or The plaintiffs-appellees did not testify to a fact which took place before
money on account of pro ts upon your shares? — He sent me nothing, their representative's death, but on the contrary denied that a
nor did he answer, my letters. liquidation had been made or any money remitted on account of their
shares in the "Tren de Aguadas" which is the ground of their claim. It
was incumbent upon the appellant to prove by proper evidence that the
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 21 of 34
affirmative proposition was true, either by bringing into court the books prejudice to the estate of the deceased, the law has certainly no
which attorney-in-fact was in duty bound to keep, or by introducing reason for its application Ratione cessante, cessat ipsa lex.
copies of the drafts kept by the banks which drew them, as was the
decedent's usual practice according to Exhibit I, or by other similar It is thus clear that Joseph K. Icard had an interest in the mining claims
evidence. of Antamok Central Group which was later sold to Big Wedge Mining
Company, as evidenced by the deed of sale executed in favor of the
Big Wedge Mining Company and the compromise agreement approved
• In the matter of the estate of George M. Icard, deceased, by the court in civil case No. 48186 of the Court of First Instance of
JOSEPH K. ICARD, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CLARO MASIGAN, Manila. The amount of this interest being undetermined, Joseph K.
as special administrator of the estate of George M. Icard; Icard may, if he wishes to, properly claim one-half of P39,478.16, under
and EFFIE CARLAND ICARD, defendants-appellants. [G.R. the legal provision that "the interest of the coowners shall be presumed
No. 47442. April 8, 1941.]-? to be equal until the contrary is prove." (Art. 393, C. C.). Instead, he
claims P2,000 only, and it is this reduced claim which he seeks to
establish by his oral testimony.
FACTS: For services rendered in connection with the development and
location of certain mining claims, petitioner Joseph K. Icard filed a claim
of P2,000 against the estate of his deceased father, George M. Icard. • GENARO GOÑI, RUFINA P. VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, VIOLA P.
The claim having been allowed by the commissioners on claims, the VILLANUEVA, OSCAR P. VILLANUEVA, MARINA P.
administrator, respondent Claro Masigan appealed to the Court of First VILLANUEVA, VERNA P. VILLANUEVA, PRAXEDES P.
Instance, where it was likewise allowed. Masigan's appeal to this Court VILLANUEVA, JR., JOSE P. VILLANUEVA, SAMUEL P.
rests mainly on the theory that the probate court erred in allowing the VILLANUEVA, LOURDES P. VILLANUEVA, MILAGROS P.
Joseph to testify to the services rendered by him in favor of his father, VILLANUEVA DE ARRIETA , petitioners-appellants, vs. THE
because the action being one against the administrator of a deceased COURT OF APPEALS and GASPAR VICENTE, respondents-
person, Joseph cannot be allowed to testify as to any matter of fact appellees. [G.R. No. L-27434. September 23, 1986.] ->
which occurred before the death of such deceased person, under
section 383, paragraph 7, of Act No. 190, now Rule 123, section 26
paragraph (c), of the Rules of Court. FACTS: Sometime in 1949, petitioner Paredes Villanueva negotiated
ISSUE: Whether Joseph Icard should be disqualified as witness? with TABACALERA for the purchase of three haciendas situated in the
Municipality of Bais, Negros Oriental. However, as Villanueva did not
RULING: NO, Joseph Icard should not be disqualified as have sufficient funds to pay the price, with the consent of
witness. Section 383, par. 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, which TABACALERA, Villanueva offered to sell one of the haciendas to a
is now Rule 123, section 26, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court, is Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by Joaquin Villegas.
designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has Allegedly because TABACALERA did not agree to the transaction
closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the between Villanueva and Villegas, without a guaranty private respondent
surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor for Villegas in favor of
fictitious claims against the deceased. Where, as in the instant TABACALERA. Either because the amount realized from the
case the purpose of the oral testimony is to prove a lesser claim transaction between Villanueva and Villegas still fell short of the
than what might be warranted by clear written evidence, to avoid purchase price of the three haciendas, or in consideration of the
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 22 of 34
guaranty undertaken by private respondent Vicente, Villanueva ISSUE: Whether Vicente should be disqualified as a witness?
contracted or promised to sell to the latter fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of
Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for the sum of P13,807.00. Private RULING: NO, Vicente should not be disqualified as a witness. The
respondent Vicente thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit from his case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes
account the amount of P13,807.00 as payment for the balance of the Villanueva after the estate of the latter had been distributed to
purchase price. However, as only the amount of P12,460.24 was them, remains within the ambit of the protection, The reason is
actually needed to complete the purchase price, only the latter amount that the defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives" of the
was debited from private respondent's account. The difference was deceased, not only because they succeeded to the decedent's
supposedly paid by private respondent to Villanueva, but as no receipt right by descent or operation of law, but more importantly because
evidencing such payment was presented in court, this fact was disputed they are so placed in litigation that they are called on to defend
by petitioners. which they have obtained from the deceased and make the
Later on, Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property and defense which the deceased might have made if living, or to
damages before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental establish a claim which deceased might have been interested to
against petitioner Gerardo Goñi in his capacity as administrator of the establish, if living. Such protection, however, was effectively
intestate estate of Praxedes Villanueva. In his complaint docketed as waived when counsel for petitioners cross- examined private
Civil Case No. 2990, Vicente sought to recover eld no. 3 of the respondent Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition
Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria, basing his entitlement thereto on the is taken by the representative of the estate or when counsel for
contract/promise to sell executed by the late Praxedes Villanueva in his the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters
favor on October 24, 1949. occurring during deceased's lifetime.” It must further be observed
that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private
TRIAL COURT RULING: In favor of Vicente. Rendered a decision respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it
ordering therein defendants- heirs to deliver to Gaspar Vicente field no was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of
3, to execute a formal deed of sale covering fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 in property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and
favor of Vicente, to pay the latter actual or compensatory damages in surrender of fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the
the amount of P81,204.48, representing 15% of the total gross income counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters
of field no. 3 for crop-years 1950-51 to 1958-59, and such other of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said
amounts as may be due from said eld for the crop years subsequent to action not having been brought against, but by the estate or
crop-year 1958-59, until the eld is delivered to Vicente, and to pay the representatives of the estate/deceased person. Likewise, under a
sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees plus costs. Therein defendant Goñi great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify
was relieved of any civil liability for damages, either personally or as to transactions or communications with the deceased or
administrator of the estate. incompetent person which were made with an agent of such
person in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to
CA RULING: Affirming that of the lower court, with the modification that testify. But the testimony of the adverse party must be con ned to
the amount of damages to be paid by defendant-heirs to the plaintiff those transactions or communications which were had with the
should be the total net income from field no. 3 from the crop year agent. The contract/promise to sell under consideration was
1950-51 until said field is finally delivered to the plaintiff plus interest signed by petitioner Goñi as attorney-in-fact (apoderado) of
thereon at the legal rate per annum Praxedes Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances
surrounding the execution of such contract and therefore could
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 23 of 34
either confirm or deny any allegations made by private respondent designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed
Vicente with respect to said contract. The inequality or injustice the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving
sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule 130, where one of party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims
the parties no longer has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut against the deceased.
the testimony of the other because death has permanently sealed
the former's lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the
reason that petitioner Goñi could and did not negate the binding
effect of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the
existence of the said contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goñi
testified that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal
contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce • GLICERIA MARELLA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTE
Nombre de Maria. REYES, administrator of the intestate estate of Filomeno
Encarnacion, and JOSE T. PATERNO, defendants-
We find that neither the trial nor appellate court erred in ruling for the appellees. [G.R. No. 4389. November 10, 1908.] ->
admissibility in evidence of private respondent Vicente's testimony.
Under ordinary circumstances, private respondent Vicente would be FACTS: In the inventory of the estate of Filomeno Encarnacion there
disqualified by reason of interest from testifying as to any matter of fact were included the four parcels of land which are the subject of this
occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, such action, which is brought against his administrator respondent Vicente
disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130, Reyes to have them excluded from the inventory as being the property
commonly known as the Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead of the petitioner Gliceria Marella. On his part, Reyes did not oppose
Man Statute, which provides as follows: the relief asked for, but private respondent Jose T. Paterno, who was a
creditor of the deceased for a claim allowed by the commissioners in
"Section 20. Disquali cation by reason of interest or relationship. — The the amount of P51,595.02, made two motions — one to be substituted
following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are in the administrator's place as defendant, and the other to be allowed to
interested, directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated: intervene as a co-defendant. The intervention was allowed and
judgment was rendered in the Court of First Instance of Batangas
"(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose adverse to Marella.
behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or
other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of CFI RULING: The evidence given by Marella in this suit can not be
unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such considered. (See subdivision 7 of section 383, Act No. 190.) All of the
deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot acts sworn to by her took place before the death of Filomeno
testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such Encarnacion, and the fact that his wife was present and is still living is
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind." not sufficient to render the plaintiff a competent witness, because it has
not been shown that the widow of the deceased herself took part in the
The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to liquidation of accounts or was a party to the transaction, inasmuch as
give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part the money which the plaintiff lent she lent to the deceased and not his
of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon Wife, Andrea Goco.
terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It is ISSUE: Whether Gliceria Marella should be disqualified as witness?
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 24 of 34
RULING: NO, Gliceria Marella should not be disqualified as deceased. Opponents, not in agreement with the judgment issued by
witness. Had either Reyes or Paterno interposed an objection to the appraisal and claims commission, appealed against it to the First
Marella being a witness on the ground of incompetency, Marella’s Instance Court of Camarines Sur.
testimony could not have been received. Paterno’s omission to
object to her operated as a waiver. The acceptance of However, the testimonies of Timoteo and Andrea are rejected on the
an incompetent witness to testify in a civil suit, as well as the grounds that, according to the law, they could not testify against the
allowance of improper questions that may be put to him while on intestate; and it is argued that if both testimonies were eliminated, there
the stand is a matter resting in the discretion of the litigant. He is no evidence in the record in favor of the claim.
may assert his right by timely objection or he may waive it, either
expressly or by silence. In any case the option rests with him. The objection against the widow's testimony is based on rule 123,
Once admitted, the testimony is in the case for what it is-worth article 26, subsection (d), Rules of the Courts, which reads as follows:
and the judge has no power to disregard it for the sole reason that "the husband can not be examined for or against his wife without
it could have been excluded, if it had been objected to, nor to the the wife's consent can not be examined in favor or against her
strike it out on his own motion. The disqualification of witnesses husband without his consent . “
found in rules of evidence of this character, is one not founded on
public policy but for the protection and convenience of litigants, There is now the objection against the plaintiff's testimony, based on
and which consequently lies within their control. rule 123, article 26, subsection (c), previously article 383, par. 7, Code
of Civil Procedure, which prescribes the following: "the parties or the
cause of these in a trial or action, or the persons in whose favor said
trial or action is followed against the executor or administrator or
• TIMOTEO ARROYO, claimant-appellant, vs. ANDREA AZUR, representative of a deceased person mentally incapacitated, about the
administrator of the intestate of Eleuterio Dura, LEONCIA claim or claim against the property of said deceased or mentally
DURAY AND OTHERS, opponents-appellees. [C.A. No. 9320. incapacitated person,
April 13, 1946.] ->
ISSUE: Whether both Timoteo and Andrea should be disqualified from
FACTS: Eleuterio Dura died on December 31, 1932 leaving a widow, being witnesses?
respondent Andrea Azur, and some collateral relatives as heirs. On the
occasion of his death, the proceedings on his intestacy were initiated RULING: NO, both Timoteo and Andrea should not be disqualified
before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, having been from being witnesses.
appointed the widow administrator of the assets. The corresponding
appraisal and claims commission was formed before which petitioner As to Andrea being disqualified, obviously, rule 123, article 26,
Timoteo Arroyo presented a claim for services rendered as a domestic subsection (d), Rules of the Courts is not applicable in the present
servant to the aforementioned spouses for a period of 12 years counted case, because the husband having died, the conjugal relationship
from the year 1921 until the aforementioned Eleuterio Dura died. The no longer exists, "the widow is not the wife and, therefore, can
appraisal and claims commission proceeded to consider Arroyo's claim testify like any other witness either in favor, well against the
at its session of January 16, 1939, and after the hearing issued a intestate of her husband "(Williams vs. Moore [Mo. App.], 203 SW,
payment order in favor of the claimant in the amount of P1,200, 824, 835.). (Sec. 151) (c) Death of one spouse . - As a general rule,
rejecting the opposition presented by the collateral relatives of the after the death of one spouse, the other is held a competent
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 25 of 34
witness for or against the decedent's interest in any litigation Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The
concerning the decedent's estate, except his or her jurisdiction case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as
was affected by the rules against the disclosure of confidential pairing judge.
communications, or testimony as to communications or
transactions with persons since deceased. (Corpus Juris, Vol. 70, Veneracion's counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request
p.124.). for Inhibition) dated 30 July 2001 ("30 July 2001 motion"), pertinent
portions of which read:
As to Timoteo, as things are now, the main evidence in favor of the
claim is the testimony of the administrator or legal representative II. PREFATORY STATEMENT
of the deceased who is Andrea, at the same time spouse
superstite. In fact, the testimony of Timoteo is no more than a This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it is
corroboration and can be perfectly suppressed, without suffering, entirely DEVOID of factual and legal basis. It is a Legal
in its absence, the substantivity and effectiveness of the right of MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL
action of Timoteo. COURT acted as if it were the DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian Reform
ADJUDICATION BOARD)! . . . HOW HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE! The
mistakes are very patent and glaring! . . .
The rule on this point is summarized as follows: "The predominating 3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the
view, with some scant authority otherwise, is that the statutory patient in his professional capacity;
physician-patient privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated by
permitting a physician to give expert opinion testimony in response to a 4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that
strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical mental capacity; and
condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where his
opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding
and disregarding any personal professional knowledge he may have 5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would
concerning such patient. But in order to avoid the bar of the physician- blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient."
patient privilege where it is asserted in such a case, the physician must
base his opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized in the question,
excluding from consideration his personal knowledge of the patient These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions
acquired through the physician and patient relationship. If he cannot or necessary for the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of
does not exclude from consideration his personal professional certain communications, to wit:
knowledge of the patient's condition he should not be permitted to
testify as to his expert opinion." "1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not
be disclosed.
This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and
make safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician 2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and
publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may form 3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his ought to be sedulously fostered
patient. It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the
community. 4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation.”
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 32 of 34
The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional
capacity when he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or x x x x x x x x x x x x
palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been
made to the physician to enable him "safely and ef caciously to treat his (e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or
patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is afterwards, as to communications made to him in official confidence,
the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by disclosure."
making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the ISSUE: Whether the Monetary Board officers may invoke the privilege
number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, communication rule as to disqualify them from testifying?
so long as the subject communicated is not stated.” One who claims
this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned RULING: NO, the Monetary Board officers may not invoke the
requisites. privilege communication rule as to disqualify them from testifying.
In the case at bar, the respondents have not established that
public interest would suffer by the disclosure of the papers and
documents sought by petitioner. Considering that petitioner bank
was already closed as of January 25, 1985, any disclosure of the
aforementioned letters, reports, and transcripts at this time pose
no danger or peril to our economy. Neither will it trigger any bank
• BANCO FILIPINO, petitioner, vs. MONETARY BOARD, ET run nor compromise state secrets. Respondent's reason for their
AL., respondents. [G.R. No. L-70054. July 8, 1986.] ->
resistance to the order of production are tenuous and specious. If
the respondents public official acted rightfully and prudently in
the performance of their duties, there should be nothing at all that
FACTS: On November 4, 1985, Petitioner Banco Filipino filed in the would provoke fear of disclosure.
instant case, a "Motion to Pay Back Salaries to All BF Officers and
Employees from February to August 29, 1985" in connection with its On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the disclosure of
"Opposition to Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration or for the documents. Not only the banks and its employees but also its
Clarification of the Resolution of the Court En Banc of October 8, numerous depositors and creditors are entitled to be informed as to
1985." On November 7, 1985, this Court referred said motion to pay whether or not there was a valid and legal justification for the
back salaries to Branch 136 (Judge Ricardo Francisco, presiding) of the petitioner's bank closure. It will be well to consider that - "Public
Makati Regional Trial Court, which this Court had earlier directed under interest means more than a mere curiosity; it means something in
our Resolution of October 8, 1985 issued in G.R. No. 70054, to conduct which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest
hearings on the matter of the closure of petitioner Bank and its alleged by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected" (State vs.
pre-planned liquidation. Crocket, 206, p. 816 cited in Words and Phrases, Vol. 35, p. 229).
On the other hand, respondents cite Section 21, Rule 130, Rules of But this privilege, as this Court notes, is intended not for the protection
Court which states: of public officers but for the protection of public interest (Vogel vs.
"Section 21. - Privileged Communications. - The following persons Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following 1980 Ed. Vol. 5, p. 211). Where there is no public interest that would
cases: be prejudiced, this invoked rule will not be applicable. "The rule that a
EVIDENCE FEB 20 ASSIGNMENT Page 33 of 34
public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in • People v. Fong, G.R. No. L-7615, 14 March 1956
official confidence does not apply when there is nothing to show that • Villanueva v. Balaguer, G.R. No. 180197, 23 June 2009
the public interest would suffer by the disclosure question. xxx", Sec. 33. Confession
(Agnew vs. Agnew, 52 SD 472, cited in Martin Rules of Court of the
Philippines, Third Edition, Vol. 5, p. 198). • People v. Domantay, G.R. No. 130612, 11 May 1999
• People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 180762, 4 March 2009
• People v. Garcia, 99 Phil 381
• People v. Sasota 91 Phil 111
• People v. Moro Ansang, 93 Phil 44
2. Testimonial privilege • People v. Niem, 75 Phil 668
• People v. Nocum, 77 Phil 1018
Sec. 25. Parental and filial privilege • Tamargo v. Awingan, G.R. No. 177727, 19 January 2010
• People v. Condemna, L-22426, 29 May 1968
• People v. Victor, G.R. No. 75154-55, 6 February 1990
• People v. Velarde, G.R. No. 139333, 18 July 2002
3. Admissions and confessions • People v. Tampus, G.R. No. L-44690, 28 March 1980.
• People v. Mantung, G.R. No. 130372, 20 July 1999
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party
• Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp. v. Redmonet
Consolidated Mines Corp., G.R. No. 195580, 21 April 2014. 4. Previous conduct as evidence
• Reyes v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212593-94, 15 March 2016 Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible
Sec. 35. Unaccepted offer
Sec. 28. Admission by third party
6. Exceptions to the hearsay rule • Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, G.R. No. 162243, 3 December
Sec. 37. Dying Declaration 2009
• Africa v. Caltex, 123 Phil 272
• People v. Serenas, G.R. No. 188124, 29 June 2010 • Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Alberto, G.R. No. 194320, 1
• People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 111149, 5 September 1997 February 2012
• People v. Gatarin, G.R. No. 198022, 7 April 2014 Sec. 45. Commercial lists and the like
• People v. Tanaman, et al., G.R. No. 71768, 28 July 1987
• People v. Ola, G.R. No. L-47147, 3 July 1987 • PNOC Shipping v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107518, 8
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest October 1998
Sec. 46. Learned treatises
• Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111692, 9 February 1996
• Parel v. Prudencio, G.R. No. 146556, 19 April 2006 Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding
• Unchuan v. Lozada, G.R. No. 172671, 16 April 2009
• Lazaro v. Agustin, G.R. No. 152364, 15 April 2010 • Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152375, 16 December
Sec. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree 2011