To what extent was foreign intervention the main reason for the Nationalist

victory in the Spanish Civil War?

The bitterly fought civil war in Spain between 1936 and 1939 was no local affair.

Notwithstanding attempts by the then international community initially to apply a

policy of non-intervention, the Spanish Civil War saw countries, interest groups and

individuals within and outside Europe overtly and covertly provide support to the

Republican and Nationalist causes, typically reflecting their respective political

allegiances to socialism or fascism.

It is estimated that at the time of the military coup in July 1936 the Republicans had

available about 87,000 troops and the Nationalists about 77,000 troops.1 By the Civil

War’s end, it is estimated that well over 1 million men had been involved in fighting.2

Whilst both sides made use of conscription, the indigenous Spaniards were joined by

volunteers from supporters from both sides such as the International Brigade and

Germany’s Legion Condor. In addition to troops, the conflict saw significant escalation

in arms and equipment. Having successfully imposed units in such areas as Pamplona,

Burgos and Seville, the Nationalists laid siege to Madrid for 3 years and, during this

time from their western strongholds, swept across Spain, taking control of areas and

effectively isolating Barcelona and Madrid until, eventually, Republican Madrid fell.

What enabled the Nationalists to secure this victory?

That foreign intervention was the main reason for the Nationalists’ success is the most

1 Payne, S (1969). The Spanish Revolution. New York: W W Norton, p315

2 Payne , S (1969). The Spanish Revolution. New York: W W Norton, p343
compelling argument put forward and notably adopted by Brown, Brennan and

Thomas, with Brennan emphasising how there was ‘little to choose’ in terms of the

political and strategic capability in either side.3 The Nationalists and the Republicans

were in need of assistance because Spain had not undergone the massive industrial

and economic reform experienced by most other European countries by the 1930s,

which meant that they could not mass produce weapons and equipment needed for

a major conflict. In his seminal work, Brown noted how important foreign military

equipment proved to be in an ‘industrially underdeveloped country such as Spain’,

indicating that whichever side could gain and make use of the greatest foreign aid

would win the War. 4 Both sides were able to access aid from sources sympathetic to

or supportive of them: the Nationalists received aid from Germany, Italy and Portugal;

whilst the Republicans received support from the Soviet Union, Mexico and

international brigades. This occurred against the backdrop of the Non-Intervention

Agreement, which proscribed the sale of arms and the provision of troops to the

warring sides in the Spanish Civil War. This Agreement, famously honoured more in

the breach by some nations, was relevant to the outcome of events given that three

of the signatories, Britain, France and the United States, whilst recognizing the

legitimacy of the Republican Government did adhere to the policy of non-

intervention, thereby depriving the Republic of potentially critical sources of support

throughout the conflict.

Other commentators argue that the role of foreign intervention has been

3 Brennan, G (1950). The Spanish Labyrinth Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.518
4 Brown, Harry. ‘Spain’s Civil War 2nd Edition’ Addison Wesley Longman 1983, New York, p.77

2
exaggerated. Some place greater focus and emphasis on the Republicans’ military

inexperience, lack of cohesion and common purpose, and poor leadership. Borkeneau,

for example, is critical of the Republican rear guard and its failure to gain popular

support, and the infighting between the various political parties and ideologies

constituting the Republican cause, which represented an inefficient and unstable War

entity. Others, including Preston, contend that the leadership and strategy of General

Francisco Franco was in fact key to the Nationalists’ success. Alternatively, Raguer has

placed great emphasis on the Church’s role in the War and its influence upon

Spaniards, quoting the French historian, Hermet, that the Spanish Civil War should be

considered ‘the last war of religion’.5

Notwithstanding these other arguments and theses, it is considered that the

Nationalists’ victory in the Spanish Civil War is best explained by the non-intervention

of some countries, the unsuccessful intervention of the Soviet Union and the

successful intervention of the Nazi / Fascist European powers.

The Non-Intervention Agreement can be considered as defeating the Republicans

before the War had really begun. To understand what led to the decision being made,

one must look at the context of Europe at the time. Preston writes of how to a

contemporary statesman the Spanish Civil War was only the latest conflict in twenty

years of ‘European Civil War’ and that since the Russian Revolution, the main goal of

European states had been to prevent the spread of radical left thought however

possible; thus explaining the reluctance of France and Great Britain to risk any

5 Raguer, H Gunpowder and Incense: The Catholic Church and the Spanish Civil War. (2007) New York: Routledge. 2007, p.1

3
involvement in the Spanish Civil War 6 albeit that the French Prime Minister, Leon

Blum, had originally planned to aid the Republicans because he feared a fascist Spain,

as it could ally with fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.7

Toward the mid-point of the War, in January 1937, Great Britain’s Secretary of State

for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, wrote in a Memorandum to the Cabinet:

“The Spanish civil war has ceased to be an internal Spanish issue and has become an

international battle-ground. The Character of the future Government of Spain has now

become less important to the peace of Europe than that the dictators should not be

victorious in that country. The extent and character of the intervention now practised

by Germany and Italy have made it clear to the world that the object of these Powers

is to secure General Franco’s victory whether or not it represents the will of the Spanish

people.”8

This analysis shows that the British were fully aware of the situation in Spain and the

threat it poses to Europe. The fact that this is ignored should be attributed to the Non-

Intervention Agreement, which the British were determined to keep to regardless.

Other countries found a way to get around the Agreement to intervene in the conflict.

Early in the War, the Germans disguised their support for the Nationalists by providing

resources through Portugal. Lacking the assistance of France, Britain and the United

States, the Republic relied on the Soviet Union for help as well as the volunteers from

6Preston, P (2006). The Spanish Civil War London: Harper, p.135

7Knight, P ‘The Spanish Civil War’, Hodder & Stoughton 1998, London, p.4
42 Eden, A (1937). ‘Spain’ National Archives CAB 24/267/7

4
the International Brigade9. Thus, the Republicans had the support of one superpower,

which demanded payment, as well as a group of well intentioned, untrained soldiers

who lacked organisation and came to lose morale and interest; whilst the Nationalists

had the full support of two great powers, Italy and Germany, at no financial cost. Non-

intervention would prove to be critical: as Anthony Beevor put it, the Non-

Intervention Agreement would prove to be ‘a betrayal of the Republicans’10 because,

had Britain and France become involved, it is assumed that they would have assisted

the Republic, perhaps swinging the entire momentum of the War. Thus, the impact of

non-intervention on the Spanish Civil War as strictly applied by certain, key foreign

powers including Britain, France and the USA appears to be that the Nationalists had

significantly more comprehensive, consistent foreign assistance for the entire

duration of the Civil War.

In terms of the provision of assistance, whether or not in breach of the Non-

Intervention Agreement, Hitler himself stated to the Italian Foreign Minister (Count

Galleazzo Ciano) in September 1940 ‘Italy and Germany did a great deal for Spain in

1936… without the aid of both countries there would be no Franco today’,11. Hitler

would typically seek to accentuate his own role; however, his contribution, as

Germany’s head of state, must be considered significant. Patricia Knight, has

established that Franco was granted approximately ‘…600-800 aircraft, 10,000

personnel, and 200 tanks’, 12 from the Germans excluding the near 12,000 strong

9
Borkeneau, Franz. The Spanish Cockpit An Eyewitness Account of the Political and Social Conflicts of the Spanish Civil War.
London: Faber & Faber, 1937. Print,. p.266
10 Anthony Beevor interview: http://www.historyextra.com/feature/spain%E2%80%99s-very-international-civil-War
11 Casanova, J (2010). The Spanish Republic and Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.208
12 Knight, P ‘The Spanish Civil War’, Hodder & Stoughton 1998, London, p.74

5
Condor Legion. 13 In addition to the sheer quantity of hardware and personnel,

consideration must be given to the quality of what was provided by Germany. Sources

have noted the relative differences between German and Soviet supplied hardware;

the experience of the volunteers; and the training provided, with reference being

made to Germany’s ‘superb signalling equipment, technicians and instructors’ 14 .

Indeed, it is notable that de Men has written positively and in great detail about the

impact of German assistance particularly given the fact that the subject of his book is

Franco, and, thus, it is to be expected that foreign intervention would take a lesser

role when considering Franco and the reasons for the Nationalist’s victory.

The Italian intervention had a massive impact on the Spanish Civil war in terms of

sheer numbers. Despite Mussolini initially pledging minimal assistance, hoping that

the rebellion would succeed within weeks and that he would gain an important ally

and propaganda victory ‘on the cheap’. 15 Italy would ultimately contribute up to

80,000 volunteers including 30,000 of his elite Black Shirts division. The Italians also

made significant material contributions, including: 2,500 tons of bombs, and 1,200

machine guns. 16 As with the German contribution, those fighting on the Nationalists’

side were professionals with extensive military experience and training. Andrew

Forrest has written of how the Republic won a ‘propaganda coup’ when it was

discovered that the Corpo di Truppe Volontarie was mainly made up of professional

Italian units and Fascist Blackshirts.17 Whilst Forrest seeks to argue that this detracts

13
De Men, R ‘Franco and the Spanish Civil War’ (2001) Routledge, London, p.94
14 Carr, R (1993). ’The Spanish Tragedy’ London: Weidenfield, p.139.
15 Carr, R (1993). ’The Spanish Tragedy’ London: Weidenfield, p.137.
16 Blinkhorn, M (1996). Democracy and Civil War in Spain 4th ed. London: Routledge, p.49
17 ‘The Spanish Civil War’ by Andrew Forrest. Routledge, 2000, London, UK, p.60

6
from the merit of the intervention as it perhaps led to scepticism against the

Nationalists from non-combatants and non-interventionists; the greater, more

significant point is that the Nationalists had experienced fighters on their side,

whereas the Republicans had mostly volunteers with no military background, many of

who joined the conflict because of their personal ideologies. Accordingly, and if it is

accepted that the nationalists secured victory principally because of their military

resources, understanding and skill; it must follow that foreign intervention was

fundamental to this because of the significant assistance that they provided.

It incorrect to say that the Republicans received limited foreign assistance. The reality

is that the Republic received many men and supplies mostly from, but not limited, to

the Soviet Union. Soviet aid started in late autumn of 1936 and would ultimately

amount to around 350 tanks, 1200 to 1500 artillery pieces, 600–800 aircraft, and

500,000 rifles by the end of the War.18 Prior to the 1930s, the Soviets had had limited

dealings with the Spanish Government. In addition to the hardware already referred

to, the Republicans were provided with military advisors and support – the People’s

Commissariat for Internal Affairs (the NKVD) – as well as receiving support from the

International Brigade, which was a group numbering 40-60,000 volunteers from

Britain France, The United States among other countries, all ready to fight for the

protection of socialism against fascism. 19 This is interesting given the fact that

officially speaking non of these countries were supposed to be involved in the war

18 Preston, P (2006). The Spanish Civil War London: Harper, pp.169-170

19 Blinkhorn, M (1996). Democracy and Civil War in Spain 4th ed. London: Routledge, p.48

7
undermining the negative effect that the non-intervention agreement was supposed

to have on the Republican war effort.

Whilst this would seem to demonstrate that foreign intervention was not so important

to outcome, because both sides of the Civil War were reasonably well matched in

terms of military hardware and troops, separate to quantities, there were qualitative

differences. Most of the volunteers in the International Brigade had volunteered

because of socialist / democratic sympathies, believing the War to be an effort to

prevent fascism / tyranny. Consequently many were idealists and artists lacking

military and organisational experience. Furthermore, Soviet supplies could be of poor

quality and inconsistent supply given the difficulties with the route from the Soviet

Union to Spain. In contrast, supplies and support from Germany, Italy and others

remained reliable, constant and of good quality. Additionally, and ultimately, through

1938 as the Nationalists appeared to be emerging victorious in the conflict, the

support from the International Brigades diminished and the Soviet supply shipments

began to irrevocably decline, highlighted in March 1938 when the Prime Minister,

Largo Caballero, wrote in desperation to the Soviet foreign minister promising a

deposit of 500 metric tons of gold in exchange for continued aid, which the Soviets

refused.20 Accordingly, and specifically in terms of foreign intervention and support,

the Nationalists benefitted consistently throughout the Civil War; a factor that must

be seen to be directly relevant to ultimate outcome.

Turning away from foreign intervention, Borkeneau and Seidman considers that the

20Preston, P (2006). The Spanish Civil War London: Harper, p.190

8
seeds of defeat lay in the Republic itself, which was simply too chaotic and divided to

present a sufficiently strong resistance. It is argued that the Socialist Government, led

by Francisco Largo Caballero, was ineffective; and that, as its power diminished, an

unsuitable and awkward coalition of various parties and unions was formed. ‘The

Madrid Government and general staff have shown a startling incapacity for the

elementary organisation of defence. So far they have not achieved agreement

between the parties.’21 Orwell also wrote of the divisions:

The worker and the bourgeois, in reality deadly enemies, are fighting side by

side. This uneasy alliance is known as the Popular Front (or, in the Communist

press, to give it a spuriously democratic appeal, People’s Front). It is a

combination with about as much vitality, and about as much right to exist, as

a pig with two heads or some other Barnum and Bailey monstrosity.22

This writing shows how disunited the Republicans were and that due to their opposing

ideologies they were unable to mount a war effort that would prove functional.

When Negrin came to power he fatally underestimated the Nationalist strengths

claiming that his government was “master of the situation” 23 The lack of cohesion and

united purpose is highlighted by Borkeneau, who highlighted how lucky Franco was

This would seem to indicate that it was the Republic’s mistakes that cost them than

the Nationalists who won it.

21
Letter from Andre Marty to the General Consul of the Soviet Union (11th Oct. 1936) http://spartacus-
educational.com/FRmarty.htm
22“Spilling the Spanish beans” George Orwell notes from New English Weekly,

http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/scw/orwell2.htm
23 Preston, P (2006). The Spanish Civil War London: Harper, p.101

9
According to Seidman a lack of organisational acumen in the logistical and economic

aspects of the Republican government also lies at the root of the failed defense of the

Republic. This is recognized by Seidman, who wrote of how the Republic were

“incapable” of maintaining the gritty, trench based warfare the Spanish Civil War

involved. That despite inheriting all of Spain’s existing industry and finances the

Nationalists proved “logistically superior”, that despite the great victories at Teruel

and Ebro their economy made victory impossible.

The absence of significant victories over the Nationalists over the course of the War

does tend to point toward the conclusion that the Republicans themselves lost the

Civil War rather than the nationalists winning it. Indeed, the limitations of the

Republicans appeared to be apparent by 1937: “The way the north was lost, especially

the lack of commitment by the rank and file to the grand causes of the Republic

anticipated the rest of the conflict … individuals would be more concerned with the

fate of the patrias chicas of home, family and friends than with the larger entities of

state and nation”.24 Furthermore, George Orwell suspected that the Government was

not committed to achieving outright victory and that what it was “playing for is a

compromise that would leave the war situation essentially in being” on the basis that

“the Spanish Government (including the semi-autonomous Catalan Government) is far

more afraid of the revolution than of the Fascists”.25 Whilst this criticism would seem

to imply that the Republic’s own faults gifted the war to the Nationalists, Orwell also

24Seidman, M (2002). Republic of Egos . Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, p.154

25“Spilling
the Spanish beans” George Orwell notes from New English Weekly,
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/scw/orwell2.htm

10
concedes that the rebellion would “have gone less far” had it not been for foreign

intervention. 26 Orwell spent significant time on the front lines and thus clearly

recognised the impact of foreign intervention due to the disparity in equipment and

supplies between the two sides.

What, then, of the Generalissimo? Much has been written about the ineffectiveness

of Franco’s military strategy, his failing to seal victory in the early stages of the War

and his prolonging the conflict at some points, even casting into doubt his ability to

win the War at all. Indeed, whilst his leftist enemies labelled him as a “slow witted

mediocrity”, Franco’s own allies and associates have criticised his military

competency.27 Hitler described Franco as “very lucky” to have the benefit of German

and Italian assistance;28 and Mussolini went as far as to predict the defeat of Franco

to his Foreign Minister, Ciano, saying “the reds are fighters. Franco is not.”29 Given

(unusually) that these are not public boastings on behalf of Mussolini or Hitler to

attempt to show off their own strengths, these comments would tend to demonstrate

a genuine lack of faith in Franco’s ability to win the War for the Nationalists. Early in

the conflict there was a consensus in the foreign press that the Civil War would be

over before the start of 1937.30 There did seem to be a clear aim in Franco’s mind, he

claimed: ‘Madrid is the heart’. 31 Despite this, on numerous occasions Franco

determined to consolidate territory rather than deal the ‘final blow’.32 An example of

this is in the fall of Bilbao in July 1937, where Franco did not use the momentum of his

26 Orwell, G ibid.
27Preston, Paul (1994) General Franco as a military leader. The transactions of the Royal Historical Society: sixth serie,s p. 21
28
Trevor-Roper, H.R. (2000) Hitler's Table Talk 1941–1944. New York: Enigma Books, p.569
29 Ciano, Diary 37-38, p.148
30 Ribeiro de Menses (2001). Franco and the Spanish Civil War. London: Routledge, p.40
31 Quoted in Preston, P (2006). The Spanish Civil War London: Harper, p.160
32 Preston, Paul (1994) General Franco as a military leader. The transactions of the Royal Historical Society: sixth series, p.23

11
overwhelming victory to conquer the North. This drew harsh criticism from one of his

closest aides, Alfredo Kindelán, one of the original generals involved in planning the

revolution with Franco,33 who said “The enemy was defeated but was not pursued; the

success was not exploited, the withdrawal was not turned into a disaster.”34

This substantial criticism, and Franco’s inability to secure an early victory would tend

to suggest not only that Franco was not intrinsic to the Nationalist victory, but that

he may well have possibly hindered it. Preston has argued that whilst foreign

intervention must be recognised, Franco’s role was crucial because of his actions in

coordinating and channeling the aid and assistance into an effective effort within

Spain. He is also credited with strategic acumen. Preston argues that the early delays

were intended by Franco, in Preston’s words: “Franco had fought a political war, he

did not set out to emulate Napoleon”35, meaning that Franco considered that a more

effective and long lasting victory would be secured by decimating the Republican

forces and securing his position through the spread of terror. Preston does concede,

however, that Franco was only able to do so thanks to the efforts of foreign

intervention. Franco was able to earn credit unquestionable victory, but this was

owed to the aid he received, the Germans had the “decisive voice” in the hugely

important Northern campaign. With German general Wolfram von Richthofen

writing 'we are practically in charge of the entire business without any of the

responsibility”36 This would seem to demonstrate that whilst Franco is portrayed by

33
Preston, P (1993). Franco. London: Harper, p. 192
34 [Alfredo Kindelán] quoted in Preston, Paul (1994) General Franco as a military leader. The transactions of the Royal Historical
Society: sixth serie,s p.22
35 Preston, Paul (1994) General Franco as a military leader. The transactions of the Royal Historical Society: sixth series, p.40

36 Preston,P Franco as a military leader,p.35

12
some as a military genius who’s tactics led to an undisputable victory he was

dependent on Foreign aid for practical results.

Additionally, and according to Preston, Franco is to be credited for solving divisions in

and uniting the Nationalist movement, of which he then secured control. Franco

recognised that there were two factions within the Nationalists who posed a threat:

the Falangists, founded by Jose Primo de Rivera and the Confederación Española de

Derechas Autónomas (CEDA), led by Jose María Gil Robles, aimed at defending

‘Christian civilisation’ and committed to preventing antimonarchist legislation. 37

Franco allowed the Falangist leadership crisis to play out, with Manuel Hedilla

eventually defeating Agustín Aznar for the leadership becoming ‘el Jefe’ before

releasing a decree of unification forming the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las

Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (FET y de las JONS).

Linked to Franco’s popularity, gained through his reputation, as a traditional, patriotic

Spaniard is the Nationalist cause’s links with the Church, which, Raguer has argued,

would prove vital to be victorious in a war in a heavily Catholic country. Despite the

uprising not being called in the name of protecting the faith, the Catholic Church

quickly took the Nationalists’ side lending them their “not inconsiderable”38 influence

over the people to Franco’s cause. The Republicans’ persecution of Catholics, led to

levels of extreme antipathy towards them. A senior Spanish Clergyman, Cardinal

37 Casanova, J (2010). The Spanish Republic and Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.344
38 Casanova, J (2010). The Spanish Republic and Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.210

13
Goma, saw “Franco’s cause as God’s cause” 39 and believed that the enthusiastic

approach the Church took in the conflict had a key role in Nationalist victory, as it

helped capture the hearts and minds of the people, a vital asset in any rebellion. He

wrote, “The Church has applied the full weight of her prestige, which has been placed

at the service of truth and justice, to bring about the triumph of the National Cause.”40

It has to be recognised that the Church and its supporters is likely to emphasise, even

over emphasise, the significance of its role and involvement. Historians such as

Casanova and Brown have sought to put into context the assessment of the Spanish

Church and its actions, suggesting that the Church’s role is somewhat insignificant

especially compared to the more quantifiable impact of foreign intervention; indeed

seeing it as “more like a chorus than of any of the leading characters”41.

To conclude, the Nationalist victory in the Spanish civil war can be explained by a range

of different reasons. The Republicans were successful at the beginning of the War,

however, as the War progressed, Soviet and International Brigade support began to

lessen numerically and in effectiveness and the course of the War changed.

Furthermore, it has to be credited that the Nationalists became politically and

militarily more effective in terms of organisation and unity, and had the benefit of a

strong general in Francisco Franco. The strongest argument, however, is that the

Nationalists would not have succeeded without the intervention of foreign states,

39 Preston, P The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain (2012)
London, Harper Press, p.210
40 Raguer, H Gunpowder and Incense: The Catholic Church and the Spanish Civil War. (2007) New York: Routledge. 2007, p55
41 Raguer, H Gunpowder and Incense: The Catholic Church and the Spanish Civil War. (2007) New York: Routledge. 2007, p1

14
principally, Germany and Italy. It was this foreign intervention that was ultimately the

most important reason for the Nationalists victory on the 1st of April 1939.

Bibliography

Primary Sources
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and Social Conflicts of the Spanish Civil War London: Faber & Faber, 1937.
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2. Ciano, Galleazzo. ‘Diary 37-38’

3. Marty, Andre ‘Letter to the General Consul of the Soviet Union’ (11th Oct.
1936) http://spartacus-educational.com/FRmarty.htm

4. Orwell, George. ‘Homage to Catalonia’ Houghton Mifflin Books, 1952

5. Orwell, George “Spilling the Spanish beans” (1937) notes from New English
Weekly, http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/scw/orwell2.htm

6. Trevor-Roper, Hugh. ‘Hitler's Table Talk 1941–1944’ New York: Enigma Books,
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7. Eden, Anthony (1937). ‘Spain’ National Archives CAB 24/267/7

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17
18