Scandinavian Economic History Review

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Royalist finances during the English Civil War

1642–1646

Jens Engberg

To cite this article: Jens Engberg (1966) Royalist finances during the English
Civil War 1642–1646, Scandinavian Economic History Review, 14:2, 73-96, DOI:
10.1080/03585522.1966.10407649

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 The
SCANDINAVIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY
REVIEW
VOLUME XIV· No.2' 1966

Royalist Finances During the English Civil War

1642 - 1646*
By JENS ENGBERG, COPENHAGEN

During the English Civil War 1641-46 both sides were surprised that the
King was able to maintain an army in the field against Parliament. King
Charles was 'robbed of his revenues, arms, ships and magazines, and above all
of the love of his people', while Parliament was 'supplied not only with the
money, plate and other contributions of the most disloyal city of London, and
the rest of their faction throughout the Kingdom; with the money raised for
suppressing the rebellion in Ireland, the twentieth part of all men's estates, the
excise on all commodities, and lastly with he sequestration of the estates and
plundering of all in their power';' According to Edward Hyde (later Lord Cla-
rendon) who, as the King's Chancellor of the Exchequer, ought to have known,
only God's providence secured the means. Whether divine help was given to the
Cavaliers or not, they themselves were certainly not idle. It is, however, impossible
to give an exact survey of the state of the King's finances during the war. In
the first place, money was needed for men, horses, arms and ammunition to
such a degree that these things were the equivalent of money. What was it worth
to the King that one man sent him his black horse and another sent his third
son? Further, no accounts record the voluntary help, while, of the many new
kinds of income, only local accounts were kept. Many records are now lost or
dispersed. Before the surrender of Oxford the papers of the Privy Council and
the Oxford Parliament were burnt, both groups of archives of importance for
* I wish to thank Dr. D. C. Coleman, London of Economics and Political Science, and Dr.
1. Roy, King's College, London, for help and advice given with this work.
1 Edward Walker, Historical Discourse, (London, 1705), p. 5.

6 Scand. Econ. Hi.t. Rev.

74 JENS ENGBERG

the history of the Royalist finances. The rest of the King's papers were either
seized by Parliament and are now mainly in the Public Record Office, or were
incorporated in the private archives of Royalist families, of which sources many
have now gone to the British Museum or the Bodleian Library. Exact accounts
are scarce, but on the other hand information on the administration of the
King's finances is abundant, though scattered.
The outlines of the history of the Royalist finances were as follows. At the
beginning of the war when the Cavaliers thought that it might quickly be finished
with, no attempts were made to create a financial organisation. Money was
raised abroad or came in as more or less free gifts. Later, in the winter of 1642-43
when it was realised that more money was needed and that the struggle might
be long, a great effort was made to create new revenues.

The work of raising money abroad had started already before the outbreak
of the war. It was led by Queen Henrietta Maria, who had fled to Holland in
fear of her life, and by her closest followers, the Lords Digby and Goring and
Henry Jermyn. Where dispatches are preserved from the English residents in
the states they approached, very little evidence can be found of their activities:
a need for secrecy might have made them avoid implicating the residents. It
may have been deemed wise to stress the importance of the applications by sending
special envoys, while rivalries between the factions of the Cavaliers made them
keep matters in their own hands. The best sources are to be found in the archives
of the states approached. Besides that, those of Henrietta Maria's letters to Charles
among the Harleian Mss. in the British Museum are of importance." So are the
letters to the King taken by Parliament at Naseby and those to Digby taken at
Sherburn in Yorkshire, as well as the many letters intercepted during the war. The
main part of the Naseby papers was publishedin 1645, the Sherburn papers in
1646. The originals are now in the Public Record Office and the House of Lords'
Record Office. s

2 British Museum (BM) Harl. Mss. 7379, published by C. de Baillon, Henriette- Marie

(Paris, 1877) and in English translation in M. A. Everett-Green, Letters of Queen Henrietta

Maria (London,1857).
a Calendar of State Papers Domestic Series (CSPD) J 1644-5 and 1645-7, (London, 1890-1);
Report of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts (HMC)J 1: Ist RII: House of
Lords, pp. 1-10; HMC J 5: 6th R: House of Lords, pp. viii and 219-21; The King's Cabinet
Opened, (London, 1645); The Lord George Digby's Cabinet, (London, 1646).
 ROYALIST FINANCES 75
Henrietta Maria took with her to Holland besides her personal jewels the
jewels of the English queens. Her first endeavours were to try to pawn them.
Although the jewels were very valuable, she found it difficult to dispose of
them. The money-lenders feared that she had no legal right to the crown jewels
and were unwilling to take them as security. Their fears were reinforced when
Parliament passed an act against selling or pawning them. The Queen did not
succeed in raising considerable sums until Digby in June 1642 had negotiated
with her son-in-law, the Prince of Orange. The Prince himself lent money to
Henrietta Maria, 300,000 florins, and acted as guarantor for the loans on the
jewels. From the city of Amsterdam she was presented with 40,000 florins and
from the Dutch East India Company with 50,000 florins. On the jewels and
the Prince's security she borrowed in Amsterdam about 1,280,000 florins, and
in Rotterdam 425,000 florins. Altogether she seems to have raised in the Nether-
lands about £ 180,000. Some of the money was sent to the King and some to
the Earl of Newcastle, but most was used for buying arms and ammunition in
Holland and France. Not all of it reached the Royalists, several of the transports
being captured by the Parliamentary fleet. The interest on the loans was be-
tween 8 and 12 per cent per annum." During the war the Queen fought hard
to pay the interest, so as not to have the loans called in, which would have been a
fatal blow to the King's credit. In 1642 the Royal prerogative of the tin pre-
emption in Cornwall, i.e. the right to purchase all tin produced and dispose of it
at will, was given to the Queen. Together with the customs on the tin this gave
her, even in the troubled times, a steady income of some £ 5-6000 a year,
which she used for interest payments. Henrietta Maria's tin-business was managed
by Edward Hyde and one of the former farmers of the Great Farm of the Cu-
stoms, Nicolas Crispe,"
When it proved difficult to pawn the jewels in Holland Henrietta Maria had
thought of sending them to the King's uncle, Christian IV of Denmark. In June
1642 Colonel John Cochrane was sent to Copenhagen. Charles sought a loan
of £ 100,000, a fleet, 4000 German soldiers and arms for 12,000 men. He
promised to return this service if his uncle should ever need it. In reply, Chri-
stian sent his special ambassador, Korfitz Ulfeldt, to England in October 1642.

4 G. Groen van Prinsterer, Archives au correspondance inedite de la maison d'Orange-Nassau,

(Utrecht, 1857), 2. Series IV pp. 37-92; P. Geyl, 'Frederick Henry of Orange and King Char-
les 1', English Historical Review 38, (1923).
5 M. Coate, Cornwall in the Great Civil War (Oxford, 1933), pp. 38-9, 117, 184; G. R. Le-

wis, The Stannaries, (London, 1908), pp, 255, 262; CSPD (1644--5), pp. 387-8, 430, 448,
470, 502.

6-
76 JENS ENGBERG

It was said that he was accompanied by two men-of-war and two transports
loaded with arms for 10,000 foot and 1500 horse, with a train of artillery
completely equipped down to drums and halberds, but no proof of this has been
found. Korfitz Ulfeldt was to see if the King had sufficient strength to resist
until further help could be sent next spring, and was instructed to demand the
transfer of the Orkney and Shetland islands to Denmark, pawned to Scotland
by Christian I in 1469. This demand met with resistance from Charles who
feared that it might displease his subjects, although Henrietta Maria urged that
because these islands belonged to Scotland they were of no concern to the Eng-
lish. In the summer of 1643 when the difficulties over money were increasing
the King consented, and an envoy was sent to Denmark with a formal offer of
the islands. Christian IV sent a new shipment of arms to England, but the ship,
the Ark Christian, was captured and the arms seized by Parliament. Christian
IV accordingly seized some English clothships on the Elbe, had them redeemed
by a London merchant in Hamburg, and sent the money to the Queen in
Holland." Before further steps could be taken the Danish-Swedish war of 1643-45
prevented more help from being given by Denmark; Christian tried to obtain
ships from Charles, and in 1647 he gladly accepted a loan of 25,000 rix-dollars
from Parliament, in return for which he had to acknowledge its authority."
In May 1642 the Queen had thought it proper to assure herself of the support
of her brother, Louis XIII of France. Nothing was done, however, partly because
help from a Catholic sovereign against the King's own subjects would be even
more harmful to his cause than was the support from the Protestant states of
Holland and Denmark, and partly because France was already engaged against
England by supporting the rebellious Catholics in Ireland. Not until January
1644, when money was needed more than ever, was Lord Goring sent to Paris.
Louis XIII had died in 1643, but the Queen Regent, Anna of Austria, and
Cardinal Mazarin gave promises of money or arms, though they emphasised the
difficulties of the moment, France being engaged in Germany. Goring soon
found, however, that France did not want to declare for Charles for fear that
the burden of war should rest solely on her. It was believed that the Queen

6 Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen, TKUA England 15; W. D. Macray, 'Third Report on the Royal

Archives of Denmark', 47th Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records (London,
1886); J. A. Fridericia, Danmarks ydre politiske Historie 1635--45, (Kebenhavn, 1881), pp.
314-5; Public Record Office (PRO), SP. 75/16, 157-70; House of Commons' Journal (Cn
July 29th, 31th, Aug. 23rd, 1643.
7 BM Add Mss. 36533.
 ROYALIST FINANCES 77
Regent was in favour of economic help to Charles, but that Cardinal Mazarin
persuaded her that the state of the French Treasury did not allow it. When
Henrietta Maria arrived in Paris in November 1644 she renewed her requests.
She was herself, as a princess of France, given a pension out of which she was
able to send small sums to England, but she could not obtain any effective assi-
stance. She entreated Charles to give more favourable conditions to his Catholic
subjects in order to please the French. Meanwhile Mazarin put her off by a
wild project of enlisting the Duke of Lorraine for her support. After the King's
defeat at Naseby she found all doors shut."
Other attempts were made at raising money in Portugal," Venice'? and from
the Pope in Rome;" all of them equally futile. Even the Duke of Courland was
asked, and he sent some barrels of powder to Amsterdam, in return for which he
hoped to be given the island of Tobago in the West Indies." The failure of
all this diplomatic activity to enlist financial help was due to the fact that none
of the states approached had any interest in putting an end to the difficulties
of England. Besides, the negotiations were carried out in a half-hearted way
by the King, in spite of Henrietta Maria's zeal. Charles hesitated to part with
the Orkney and Shetland Islands until too late, and he dared not engage with
the Catholic powers for fear of losing the support of his Protestant followers.

II
Although an official was appointed in August 1642 to receive money and plate
given for the King's service," no records were kept. 'I have seen some of the
papers written by the King with his own hand to the well-affected', a witness

S Dispatches from the French ministers in England 1642-6 are in vols, 49-51 Correspondance

politique d'Angleterre, Archives Diplomatiques, Ministere Des Affaires Etrangeres: Transcrip-

tions of the dispatches 1644-6 are in BM: Sloane Mss. 5460-1; Goring to Henrietta Maria,
Lords' Journal (LJ) Jan. 10th, 1644; D. A. Bigby, Anglo-French Relations, 1641--49, (London,
1933); G. Ascoli, La Grande-Bretagne devant l'opinion [ranqaise au XVlIeme siecle, (Paris,
1930).
9 E..Prestage, 0 Dr. Antonio de Sousa, (1916); idem, Diplomatic Relations between Portu-

gal and England, (Watford, 1925).

10 Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs, Existing in the
Archives and Collections of Venice, (C.S.P. Venetian), 1642-43 (London, 1925).
11 B. O'Ferral et D. O'Connell, Commentarius Rinuccinianus, ed. J. Kavanagh, I (Dublin,

1932); A. Hutton, The Embassy in Ireland, (Dublin, 1873).

12 H. F. Morland-Simpson, Civil War Papers. Correspondence of John Cochrane and others
with James, Duke of Courland, (1893).
13 HMC, 29: Portland I, p. 47, Aug. 3rd, 1642.
78 JENS ENGBERG

reported after the war, 'which were things always privately carried on'." An
example of these letters is the following from the King to the Earl of Kingston:
'1 most earnestly desire you to lend me £ 5000, without any noise; I shall as
justly repay it as if you had all my Crown land engaged for it'." Scattered
among the State Papers Domestic and in the Reports of the Historical Manu-
scripts Commission are similar letters, but they are too casual and too few to
give anything but a hint of the manner in which the assistance was given. The
many biographies and memoirs written after 1660 contain plenty of information
on free gifts. They are, however, hardly to be trusted. The hope of obtaining
favours from the new King or simply a wish to boast sufferings in a righteous
cause no doubt influenced the recollections of the authors. When, for instance, it
was maintained after the war by the families of the King's two principal suppor-
ters, the Marquises of Newcastle and Worcester, that they each had spent more
than £ 900,000 in assistance to the King, it is evident that they include in this
sum their losses by the plundering and sequestration of their estates. The best
sources for the history of the voluntary help are no doubt the long series of
affidavits kept by the Parliamentary commissioners for settling with the King's
supporters." The Royalists were called before the commissioners and had to give
evidence on their assistance to king Charles. But here, on the other hand, more
modesty was shown than in the memoirs, and again it is impossible to trace any
exact figures. However, after reading the Calendars of the commission one is left
with an impression of a massive support to the King from the nobility and the
gentry. The particulars of the estates of the Royalists form, in the words of the
editor of the Calendars, 'a rent-roll of most of the great landed estates in England,
because the majority of landed proprietors embraced the King's cause'. The
argument used by Charles in his requests for assistance were that his well-affected
subjects might rather help him with a small part of their money than have all of it
seized by the rebels, and that as soon as possible he would repay and reward
all who assisted him." This appeal seems to have been successful in the beginning.
A group of 39 lords and officers of the court promised for a period of three
months to put at the King's disposal a force of 1375 horse. Besides that, several

14 Calendar of the Proceedings of the Committee for Advance of Money (C.A.M.), (London,
1888), p, 1002.
15 HMC, 2: 3rd R: Webster, p.420, Sep. 9th, 1642.
16 C.A.M.; Calendar of the Proceedings of the Committee for Compounding etc., (London,
1889-92).
17 Thomason ColIn., BM 669 f 5, 63, 83; John Rushworth, Historical Collections, (1721),
IV p. 774.
 ROYALIST FINANCES 79
of them raised troops with commissions from the King, but at their own expense.
Information on groups of gentry who charged themselves with men and horses
for the King's use has been found for thirteen English and all the Welsh counties;
from Kent a regular emigration took place to the King at York. Very consider-
able sums were given to the King; in the county of Worcester, between 10
December 1642 and 15 May 1643, £ 31,018 was lent by the gentry and others.
The Venetian Ambassador in England observed on 4 July 1642, that 'in the
provinces the disposition of the lower nobility to support the interests of the King
shows itself constantly on the increase and from every part of the Kingdom they
are hastening to York to offer him their personal service"."
In the case of the Earl of Worcester, the richest man in England, it is possible
to see how he was won for the King's cause. His son, Lord Herbert, already
an ardent adherent, corresponded with Edward Hyde on how to bring his father
round. Treated in the right way it would be easy, Herbert told Hyde, especially
if the King would visit the Earl, and if he would make some propositions which
might assure the Earl of his will to preserve Parliament, the Laws of the Realm
and established liberties; in which case the Earl would himself come to the aid
of the King and would use his power to influence some other lords. In March,
1643, the Earl was created a marquis in return for more than £ 100,000 given
directly to the King or spent on soldiers for his use, and a vague promise of a
dukedom was held before him as an inducement to further contributions. It
is most likely that Lord Herbert was right in saying that he had laid out
£ 318,000 for the King during the war; the Queen recognised a debt of that
size." The Earl of Newcastle, also created a marquis in March 1643, the second
major supporter of the King, was approached by a group of lords and gentry
of Yorkshire asking him to raise and lead an army for the defence of the king.
The Earl consented on condition that an assessment be laid on the county for
the payment of the soldiers, and that the group would answer for the money in
case it did not come in through the assessment. The lords and gentry accordingly
gave a promise to guarantee the payment until a sum of £ 8,000 could be levied
in the county. In February 1643 this was renewed in the 'Yorkshire Engagement'
when a document was signed, nicknamed 'Magna Carta', by which the subscri-
bers pledged themselves that if the money borrowed upon bond for the county's

18 J. Willis-Bund, Diary of Henry Townshend, (1920), ii, p. 138; C.S.P. Venetian, 1642-3,
p.91.
19 Bodleian Library, Clarendon State Papers (Clar. Pap), 1630, 1632, 1644; HMC, 27: 12th

R. IX: Beaufort, p. 27; HMC, 8: 9th R. II: Morrison, p, 434.

80 JENS ENGBERG

army could not otherwise be repaid, they would repay it in sums proportional to
their estates."
At the end of 1642 the war was not won, the means put at the King's disposal
were used up, and the flow of voluntary contribution slowed down. The King had
established his headquarters at Oxford. Here, on 29 December, he made a speech
to his Privy Council. He gratefully acknowledged the great sums already received,
but either more had to be advanced to keep the army from mutinying, or he
would have to beg Parliament for a peace. The Earl of Dorset answered on
behalf of the lords of the Privy Council that they did not want to discontinue the
war, but that they had exhausted both their ready money and that raised on their
lands; besides they were exhausted because their tenants, sympathising with
Parliament, refused to pay them their rents. The only authority for the Earl of
Dorset's speech is a London pamphlet. Whether the speech is spurious or not, it
seems, however, to express existing weariness among the King's followers." The
King could squeeze £ 25,000 out of the universities of Cambridge and Oxford
and could sell a peerage for £ 6,000, but expedients like these did not produce
the necessary steady income.

III
The administration of the King's finances might have been improved, had it
been possible to make it the responsibility of a single person. Instead it became
a major point at issue between the contending parties among the King's followers.
Even when they succeeded in establishing certain principles concerning the finan-
cial administration it was only possible to enforce these in the areas nearest to the
administrative centre at Oxford. The almost independent armies in the North
and the West followed these principles only reluctantly and without rendering
accounts to Oxford. The military leaders had their independence to defend, and
probably also disliked the whole civilian way of administration. It was force-
fully put by the Marquis of Newcastle to one of his commanders: 'When the
care of any public business is left in the hands of many, it is commonly thought
the particular of none, and though the work of raising money and increasing
your force be committed to the care of a committee, yet it is more than con-
venient that someone in particular takes the whole business to heart, ... I shall

20 A new Discovery of Hidden Secrets, (1645); C.A.M. pp. 895-914; HMC, 6th R: Graham,
pp. 334-5; letters from Charles and Henrietta Maria to Newcastle in BM Harl. Mss. 6988.
21 Thomason Colln. BM E 83, 47; C. J. Philips, History of the Sackville Family, (London,

1930), vol. i, pp. 345-6.

 ROYALIST FINANCES 81

therefore desire you .. .'.22 There was thus a gap to be bridged between the
theorists in Oxford and the military commanders. It can be seen in the corres-
pondence of the officers, either in the scattered letters in the Reports of the
Historical Manuscripts Commission, or in the large collection of Prince Rupert's
letters in the British Museum," where one thing is common, i.e. the continual
complaints of financial difficulties. The commanders of garrisons requested
powder and arms, or they would have to surrender at the first attack by the rebels;
the colonels of regiments begged for pay for their troops or mutiny would break
out, if they did not take the attitude of the Governor of Lichfield who declared:
'I will never be so much a slave to my command as to be torn in pieces both
by officers and soldiers for want of pay'. 24 The administration at Oxford was
able to raise money for the forces under the direct command of the King, but
since at best it could only contribute small sums to the leaders of the independent
armies, it had to remain merely advisory to them.
The organisation of the financial administration set up at Oxford may be
regarded as being divided into the following parts: the decision-making body, the
advisory body, and the two executive bodies. At the top of the decision-making
body was the King. He might act alone, away from Oxford for instance, in his
capacity of general of the army. Mostly, however, the orders regarding questions
of finance were made in concurrence with either the Privy Councilor the
Council of War. The activities of the Privy Council are known only from a few
reports on its meetings," which by some accident have survived the burning
of the papers, and from a few printed speeches. The Privy Council seems to
have been of some importance during the first months of the war, but its in-
fluence dwindled with the free gifts from its members, and it was ousted by
the Council of War; 26 this was smaller than the Privy Council and easier to
control, its members being military and administrative experts rather than dig-
nitaries of state. The functions of the Council of War were twofold, viz. to
advise the King on strategic questions, and to discuss and decide questions con-
cerning the supply of the army with money and other necessities of war. Nothing
has survived of the papers of the Council itself, but luckily some of the papers

22 HMC, 78: Hastings II, p. 115, Jan. 14th, 1644.

23 BM Add Mss. 18980-2. Partly published in E. Warburton, Memoirs of Prince Rupert,
I-III, (London, 1849).
24 HMC, 78: Hastings II, p. 115, Jan. 16th. 1644.
25 PRO PC 2, 53.

26 On the Council of War, see I. Roy, 'The Royalist Council of War 1642-46', Bulletin of
the Institute of Historical Research XXV, (1962).
82 JENS ENGBERG

of its secretary, Edward Walker, are preserved, mainly in the British Museum."
They consist of drafts of council minutes, a few letters to the Council or its
secretary, and drafts of outgoing letters. This material is difficult to use, since
many of the drafts are un-dated, and whether a letter was actually given the form
of Walker's draft or not remains an open question. Studied in connection with
the Royal patents" and those of the printed proclamations preserved in the Bod-
leian Library and British Museum, the Walker manuscripts, however, gain in
importance." They make it possible to discern the motives underlying the procla-
mations and to follow the course of decision-making.
The advisory body of the financial administration was the Oxford Parlia-
ment. In June 1643 the King had decided to summon Parliament to Oxford,
hoping that those members who obeyed his command would help to ease the
economic difficulties. Of the lords only 12-15 remained at Westminster, of the
commons about 125 attended the Oxford Parliament. This 'Parliament assembled
at Oxford', as it was called, agreed to raise £ 100,000 in compulsory loans and
impose an excise on certain goods. Otherwise, the Oxford Parliament proved
mainly to be a disappointment, at it concentrated on complaining about the
inadequacies of and controlling existing means of income, through a committee
created for negotiating with the Council of War. At the prorogation of the
Oxford Parliament its members petitioned the King that several taxes and loans
should not continue longer than necessary or make a precedent. They further
requested that the rules for taxation should be observed and that the King would
take care that his soldiers did not plunder and see to it that offenders were
punished. The King, for his part, asked them to 'expedite those supplies of
moneys, which he had sent for, whether by subscription or excise, remembering
that moneys are the nerves of war'. 30

27 BM Harl. Mss, 6802, 6804, 6851-2, see Roy, op, cit.

28 W. H. Black, Docquets of Letters Patent and Other Instruments Passed under the Great
Seal of King Charles at Oxford in the Years 1642-1646, (Printed, but never published, 1837,
the only existing copy is at PRO).
29 See F. Madan, Oxford Books. A Bibliography of Printed Works Relating to the University
and City of Oxford, (Oxford, 1912), vol. II; R. Steele, Tudor and Stuart Proclamations 1485-
1714, (1910), vol. i.
30 Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in Eng-

land, ed. W. D. Macray, (Oxford, 1888), iii. pp. 289-93; BM Harl. Mss, 6892, 86, 104;
BM Harl. Mas. 6804, 156-7; Thomason Colin. BM E 44, 12; Madan, op, cit., no. 1612; E.
Walker, op. cit., pp.9-lO.
 ROYALIST FINANCES 83

IV
At the outbreak of the war the only instrument of financial administration in
the King's hands had been the Treasury of War. This office had been established
in 1640 as an expansion of the office of the Treasurer of the army in Scotland.
The office, however, had a wider range than the strictly military. It was closely
connected to the King's person and the administration of his personal finances;
its holder, William Uvedale, had been the King's Treasurer of the Chamber
since 1618. Uvedale was still acting as Treasurer of War in August 1642, but
later he joined Parliament." His successor, John Ashburnham, seems to have
been an assistant to U vedale and was probably the actual head of the office
from November 1642, being responsible for the accounts of the office from that
date. Ashburnham had also been working in the King's Chamber, where he
is mentioned for the first time in 1623. Charles had a very high opinion of
Ashburnham's gifts for administration and trusted him to such a degree that it
was openly said at the court at Oxford that he was completely governed by
him. Henrietta Maria called Ashburnham the only reliable man in Charles'
closest entourage." Ashburnham seems to have been officially appointed Trea-
surer of War only on 14 November 1643. On that date he was given a patent
of the office with an allowance of £ 2 a day and further £ 12.10.0 for every
£ 1000 that might come to his hand. He was to have two deputies and six
clerks." His duties were not stated. An account of the office from November
1642 to October 1643 has been preserved." During that period Ashburnham
received £ 180,768. About £ 8000 was paid by Custom-officers, £ 12,000 was
given by the cities of Bristol and Oxford, £ 7800 from the Court of Wards and
£ 13,000 from the King's Mint, £ 17,000 came from the Universities of Oxford
and Cambridge, £ 2200 was paid as clerical tenths, and £ 5700 derived from
other sources. The rest was presented to the King by private persons. Of this in-
come about £ 117,000 was used for the army and about £ 22,000 for the Royal
household. The rest was given as fees or gifts to officers of the court, as pensions
to wounded soldiers or widows, for services done by private persons, or was used

31 M.F.Keeler, The Long Parliament, (Philadelphia, 1954); HAlC, 78: Hastings II, Aug.
10th, 1642.
32 George, Lord Ashburnham, Narrative by John Ashburnham, (London, 1830) j M. F. Kee-
ler, op. cit.; HMC, 3: 4th R: De la Warr, p. 311; HMC, 4: 5th R: Sutherland, p. 178; The
Life of Edward Earl of Clarendon, (1759), pp. 49, 95---6, Baillon, op. cit.
33 Black, op. cit., p. 368.

34 George, Lord Ashburnham, op, cit., II. Appendix.

84 JENS ENGBERG

for the King's personal expenditure, for instance, for money lost at play. Only
in a few cases was the money for the army paid by Ashburnham to the comman-
ders, payment being normally made to the Paymaster-General, Matthew Brad-
ley, who, assisted by the Muster-Master-General, was directly responsible for
the payment." It appears that Ashburnham's duties were those of the Treasurer
of the Chamber rather than those of the Treasurer of War. He received the
money given privately to the King and spent it according to the orders given
him by his master. The many small sums dispensed indicate that he was con-
stantly close to the King's person, ready to pay where necessary. The many new
revenues created in and after the month of January 1643, were not received
by Ashburnham in the period of his first account. Being unrestricted by instruc-
tions concerning his sphere of operation, having for a long time been solely
responsible for the management of the King's finances, and being paid 1 ~ per
cent of all money that came to his hand, it was inevitable that Ashburnham
should clash with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when the Exchequer, the
second of the executive bodies, had been re-established at Oxford.

v
When Charles left London, the Exchequer and the Court of Wards and
Liveries, the offices administering his revenues, were left behind. The office
of Lord Treasurer of the Exchequer was vacant at the time of the outbreak
of the war. Henrietta Maria had told the King to take his time over making an
appointment as the office was, in her own words, 'a bone that would make the
dogs fight': much could be gained from the dissension amongst the contestants. 36
Instead the Lord Treasurer's duties were attended to by a commission, all mem-
bers of which followed the King. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was John
Culpepper, also a Royalist. After the King's departure the Exchequer stopped
its work; no money was received or disbursed and no accounts were audited. In
December 1642 Parliament ordered the empty rooms to be searched and the
boxes to be opened, in the hope of finding money and plate. They found
£ 1600, 'which they took away, and contrary to all rules of housewifery, left not
an egg for the hen to sit on', as M ercurius Aulicus, the Royalist newspaper at

35 Some warrants for payments to the paymaster general are in BM Add Mss.. 5752.
36 Baillon, op. cit., p. 366.
 ROYALIST FINANCES 85
Oxford put it." It was a logical step to re-establish the Exchequer at Oxford
and demand the payment of the proceeds of taxes which had accumulated in the
parts of the country in Royalist hands. Some money had already been paid the
Exchequer from Westminster; this had been done in 1625 during an epidemic,
and it was still the King's undoubted right to remove it to what place he pleased,
if he had still any undoubted rights, as Charles told Parliament." On 28 De-
cember 1642 a proclamation was issued announcing the movement of the Ex-
chequer to Oxford. The officers were commanded to attend there, and all
payments made at Westminster were declared to be void." Only 10-12 of the
officers did go, defying the prohibition of Parliament and the guards posted
on the Oxford road in order to stop them;" They did not bring any of the
records. The only man in a key position among them was the Clerk of the Pells,
Edward Wardour. Of the four Tellers of the Receipt, whom it was very difficult
to do without, one was imprisoned by Parliament, another by the King, and
a third absented himself." Though hampered by this, Wardour succeeded in
establishing the Receipt at Oxford. A carpenter made the necessary office furni-
ture; ink, quills, parchment and paper were bought, and on 11 February 1643
work started.
In 1643 Edward Hyde became Chancellor of the Exchequer after a compli-
cated intrigue. Culpepper had been superseded in the King's favour by the
Lords Digby and Falkland and was most unwillingly promoted to the more
dignified, but less profitable post of Master of the Rolls. It was intended that
Ashburnham should be given the vacant post. At the same time the King
wanted to make his Secretary of State, Edward Nicholas, Master of the Court
of Wards. The Secretaryship was to be given to Edward Hyde. Nicholas wanted
to become Master of Wards, but Hyde succeeded in persuading him that he
would be better placed as Secretary. So Nicholas refused, and instead Lord
Cottington was designated Master of Wards, a post he had held for seven years
previous to the war. Hyde's two patrons, Digby and Falkland, then pointed
out that the best way of finding a use for the unemployed Hyde would be
to make him Chancellor of the Exchequer, while Ashburnham kept his office
as Treasurer of War. Ashburnham's friends could delay but not hinder the

37 ct.
Dec. 9th, 1642; Mercurius Aulicus, Jan. 25th, 1643.
38L], Jan. 18th, 1643.
39 F. Madan, op, cii., no. 1140.

40 The names of the officers are in the records of the Exchequer when paid their fees;
Mercurius Aulicus, Jan. 18th, 1643.
41 BM Add Mss. 29974, 364-88.
86 JENS ENGBERG

appointment of Hyde. On 3 March 1643 he was knighted, sworn of the Privy

Council and had his patent sealed for the office of Chancellor of the Exche-
quer." Hyde's victory over Ashburnham was not complete. He had to compete
with the Treasurer of War who administered sums much larger than he ever
saw and who successfully claimed money which traditionally ought to have
been received in the Exchequer. The struggle came into the open over the
question of the customs of Bristol, the only port in the King's power likely
to yield a considerable sum. Hyde had gone to Bristol in order to organise the
payment of the customs, but found that Ashburnham already had collected
them with the assistance of Culpepper. Hyde had Falkland appeal to the King,
but Charles did not want to alter what had been done. The Chancellor later
argued that the disagreement between Ashburnham and himself did not harm
the King's cause. He was undoubtedly wrong. The existence of an office like
Ashburnham's, virtually a re-creation of what had been the King's Chamber,
in open struggle with the Exchequer, was clearly retrogressive. It put the clock
back to the situation before the reforms of the early Tudors, but, on the other
hand, it tended to augment the King's powers in financial matters.
The procedure of the Receipt at Oxford was as complicated as it had been
at Westminster. Nearly the same number of books were kept. These books were
probably surrendered to the Parliamentary forces in June 1646 together with the
seal of the Exchequer, which had to be handed over according to the act of capi-
tulation. Some of them are severely damaged by damp, but sufficient have
survived to show the income and expenditure of the Exchequer." Information
from these books may be augmented by several valuable papers in the Hyde
Collection at the Bodleian," Income came from the same sources as before the
war, but in much smaller quantities. Relatively large sums were paid in by the
farmers of the Great Farm of the Customs, by the receivers-general of the
counties, and by the clergy as clerical tenths, were transferred from the Court
of Wards, or paid for baronetcies. During the years 1642-45 67 baronets were
created, each of whom had to pay the King £ 1095. About one-third of the

42 Life of Clarendon, pp. 71-3; Black, op, cit., p. 351.

43 PRO: Receipt Books (E 401, 1928-9); Declaration Books (E 405, 285); Certificate Books
(E 405, 221); Warrant Books (E 403, 2985); Patent Books (E 403, 2522); Order Books (E 403,
2760 and E403, 1755); Issue Books (E403, 1755) Issues, writs and warrants (E404, 156);
Entry Books of Warrants (SP 16,498); See F. C. Dietz, The Receipts and Issues of the Exche-
quer During the Reigns of James I and Charles I, Smith College Studies in History, 13, (1928).
44 See O. Ogle and W. H. Bliss, Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers Preserved in the

Bodleian Library, I, (Oxford, 1872).

 ROYALIST FINANCES 87
money shown as income did not actually corne into the hands of the tellers, but
was drawn on assignments from authorities or persons who would otherwise
have paid it directly to the Receipt. Among Hyde's papers are some calculations
of assignments upon the King's revenue which had been given before and were
likely to be continued in 1643. 4 5 They are mainly wages due to the officers of
the court to an amount of over £ 200,000. Very little of this was ever paid,
according to the accounts of the Exchequer, where no receipts were given for
sums of that size. The table below shows the amounts received in the seven terms
the Exchequer functioned, either as cash, or as sums paid on assignments out-
side the Exchequer but registered there as received.

Tenn Amount received

£
11 Feb-l April 164-3 6,384-
7 April-23 Sept. 1643 11,257
28 Sept.-20 April 1644- 40,322
20 April-2 Sept. 1644- 8,083
27 Sept.-5 April 1645 11,839
5 April-27 Sept. 1645 7,995
27 Sept.-28 March 194-6 11,952
Total £ 97,832

Before the war the Exchequer had received sums of up to £ 500,000 for
which the income at the Oxford Receipt in the first full year was only about
10 per cent, and in the following two years about 3-4 per cent. This poor result
was mainly due to the unwillingness of the people to pay at Oxford. A stream
of royal proclamations was issued, demanding payment of the great sums
due to the King, and expressing Charles' astonishment that his commands were
disobeyed while his subjects gladly sent more money to Parliament than they
had ever been willing to give him. Even where the Royalists were in control
the money was only paid when overdue and in small instalments. Edward Hyde
was not satisfied when in March 1644 the diocese of Oxford paid a sum due
since 1641. 'What are we the better for this?' he wrote, 'by this I suppose the
bishop is 100 pounds in arrear'. 46 Although the income of the Exchequer was
tiny compared with what it had been, nearly £ 100,000 was received during

45 Claro Pap. 1717.

46 Claro Pap. 1750.
88 JENS ENGBERG

the war. This money provided the King's table and cellar at Oxford," kept
his stables in horses, and in addition left a sum to be handed over to Ash-
burnham or to be used to purchase war supplies.
The Exchequer had always consisted of two parts, the Exchequers of Account
and of Receipt. The duty of the former was to audit the accounts of the money
paid to the Receipt. As no attempt was made to re-establish the Account at
Oxford it was necessary to find other ways of having the accounts audited. This
was done by the creation of a number of commissions on a local basis each
responsible for one or more counties. The members of these commissions were
locally trusted and influential Royalists. A draft of instructions" to them also
shows that the commissions had a propaganda purpose. They were described as
being the means of ensuring a just keeping of the accounts, and also of providing
the King's followers with an insight into what their money was used for. The
commissions were established at the time of the Oxford Parliament, and pro-
bably with a view to satisfying its members. The commissioners were to control
not only the traditional accounts hitherto audited at the Exchequer, but also all
other accounts of free gifts and the other new sources of income to be mentioned
below. They were given far-reaching powers. They could send for any of the
King's servants receiving or spending money, also military commanders, examine
their accounts and demand their oaths if they wanted to. Their findings were to
be reported to the Lord Treasurers or the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is
unlikely that these rights were widely exercised. If they had been, it would have
led to violent conflicts with the army and no traces of this seem to exist.
The Court of Wards and Liveries was adjourned to Oxford on 27 December
1642. 4 9 In the last year before the war it had yielded £ 80,000, and much im-
portance was attached to its removal from Westminster. The transfer met with
more difficulties than in the case of the Exchequer. The Master of the court fol-
lowed Parliament and refused to part with the seal, and the greater part of the
officers in lower posts stayed on in Westminster. At Oxford Cottington was, as
already mentioned, appointed Master instead of the Parliamentarian and a new
seal was made, but the Royalists did not succeed in giving the Court of Wards
the same degree of legality as their Exchequer. Whereas Parliament made no

47 A 'Table and Cellar Book of Charles I, Oxford, A.D. 1643-1644', is preserved, HMC, 36:

Ormonde N.S. II.

48 BM Harl. Mss. 6804, 109.
49 See H. E. Bell, An Introduction to the History and Records of the Court of Wards and

Liveries, (Cambridge, 1953).

 ROYALIST FINANCES 89
attempts to keep the Exchequer working at Westminster, the Court of Wards
was continued, in possession of the seal and the records and led by the ordinary
officers and the Master. No income accounts have survived from the Oxford
Court of Wards. It can, however, be seen from the accounts of the Exchequer
and the Treasurer of War that they received £ 15,000 and £ 7,800, respectively.
This was probably because the money of the Court of Wards was derived from
the class most loyal to the King, the possessors of landed estates.

VI
When the Royalist were short of money in December 1642 it might have been
tempting to let the troops live off the land in the way commonly done on the
Continent. For obvious reasons this could not be done. The King's soldier were
not constantly on the march but were stationed in limited areas for long per-
iods, the population consisted not of enemies but of the soldiers' countrymen, and
the King had to maintain the fiction that he had the support of his subjects.
Prince Rupert, brought up in the tradition of the Thirty Years War, had in
September 1642 tried to have his army fed at the expense of the citizens of Lei-
cester, but they appealed to the King, and Rupert was openly rebuked. Later,
however, having been created Duke of Cumberland, Rupert was, not without
some justice, called the Duke of Plunderland." On the other hand, several Royal
proclamations warned the officers and soldiers of the King's army against plun-
dering his subjects, and offenders were punished. In one instance a soldier was
hanged for plundering and his regiment was marched under the gallows."
When it proved necessary to take money from the population in the occupied
areas for the maintenance of the army, it was therefore done under the pretence
of loan, and in the same way as done by Parliament, viz. by agreements with the
inhabitants of the counties. Some of these agreements were printed and a few
are preserved in the Bodleian Library; others are known from the papers of the
secretary of the Council of War or from the patents appointing commissioners
for levying the loans. The first agreement was made on 21 December 1642 be-
tween the gentlemen and freeholders of Oxford and a commission of lords and
others of his Majesty's commissioners. 52 The former agreed to pay a weekly
loan of £ 1176. This sum was to be used for providing the six regiments of

50 Warburton, op. cit., 1. p. 393; Mercurius Ciuicus, July, 25th, 1644.

51 C. E. Long, Diary of the Marches of the Royal Army, (London, 1859), pp.41, 56.
52 Madan, op. cit., no. 1134.

7 Scand. Econ, Hist, Rev.

90 JENS ENGBERG

horse quartered in the county. The £ 1176 was to be divided according to the
sizes of the hundreds of the county, and, in the hundreds, subdivided between
the townships and villages. Payment was to be made through the Petty Con-
stables to the High Constables, and from them to the Receivers General, who
were to hand it over directly to the officers of the regiments. If any inhabitant
should refuse to pay his part, his name was to be noted in order that action
could be taken against him. In return, the people of the county were promised
that they should be free from all other payments to the soldiers, and that a
security would be given for the loans. In the following months a number of
similar agreements were made with other countries, under the direction of the
Council of War with sums ranging from £ 200 monthly from the county of
Radnor to £ 6000 from the county of Gloucestershire. Agreements are known to
have been made in 15 counties for loans amounting to about £ 45,000 a month.
The commissions appointed for administering the subscriptions were given
powers enabling them to act independently of the administration at Oxford. The
commission of Worcestershire, the papers of which are preserved," was led by
the High Sheriff of the county. An instruction from the Council of War dated
5 March 1643 ordered the commissioners to view the muster-rolls of the
governors and officers in the county in order to see how much money was
needed. The commission was then to appoint collectors of the money, divide the
burden among the inhabitants and the income among the regiments, and sum-
mon together the gentlemen, clergy and substantial freeholders of the county
and move them to assist the King. The commissioners were instructed to meet
every Saturday at Worcester but were otherwise to act as they thought most fit
for maintaining regular payments. In addition to their financial duties they were
to watch over the peace of the county and especially to look out for persons
suspected of sympathising with the rebels. As can be seen from the papers of
the Worcestershire commission it became in the course of the war the instru-
ment through which all orders from the Council of War, not only those con-
cerning the subscriptions, were carried out in the county. In the case of Wor-
cestershire the money levied was to be used inside the county. In other counties,
especially Oxfordshire, the money was assigned to Ashburnham, and the billeting
of the soldiers was arranged by the Council of War. If the inhabitants were not
able to pay in money they might do so in provisions, the rates being fixed in the
agreements. The stores from Oxfordshire were brought to the city and disposed
53 See J. Willis-Bund, op, cit.; instruction for the Worcester commission, BM Harl. MSJ.
6951, 129-30.
 ROYALIST FINANCES 91
of by Ashburnham. It is characteristic that it was necessary for the Council of
War to order the officers in Oxfordshire not to commandeer the horses or barges
of the farmers bringing stores in to the city of Oxford. 54 There can be no doubt
that the agreements were not strictly observed. The papers of the secretary of
the Council of War abound with complaints from officers who had not been
paid their money, as well as from the inhabitants complaining that they were
still subject to the depredations of the soldiers. If the results from Worcester-
shire were representative, only a very small part of the huge sums was ever
received. In that county the monthly quota was set at £ 3000, to start in January
1643. In fact, the sums received in the first four months for which accounts
exist were as follows:
January £ 2313
February £ 2055
March £ 1361
April £ 51

It is likely, however, that the result in Worcestershire was unusually poor,

since the High Sheriff was accused of having neglected his duties." In the papers
of the secretary of the Council of War is an estimate of anticipated revenue from
the contribution." It is dated 17 August 1643, bears no signatures, but has evi-
dently been drawn up in the secretariat of the Council. It states that the number
of the horse of the King's army 'except those in the North or constantly in the
West', was 4000, costing £ 2100 a week. The foot numbered 10,000 and cost
£ 2000 a week, and the artillery and the officers cost £ 1900 per week-altoge-
ther £ 6000 a week. This could be paid by the contributions from the counties
nearest to the King's quarters at Oxford. Oxfordshire, although complaining,
paid £ 1600 per week, Berkshire ought to have paid £ 1400 but only £ 1000
might be expected. Gloucestershire was rated at £ 1800, but it was estimated
that only £ 1200 would actually be paid. In Hampshire only £ 800 might come
in out of £ 1400, and Northampton would yield only £ 600. This would
amount to £ 6700 weekly, giving a surplus of £ 600. If for any reason this in-
come should not be received, substantial sums could still be drawn out of the
estates of the rebels. If this estimate was too optimistic, on the other hand, more
counties could be brought under the contribution. Although the system of the con-
tribution did not work without difficulties, it did, however, supply the Royalist

54 Madan, op. cit., no. 1693.

55 J. Willis-Bund, op, cit., p. 139.
56 BM Harl, Mss. 6852, 175-8.

7·
92 JENS ENGBERG

army with money sufficient for its maintenance until about January-February
1645, after which time complaints from both officers and inhabitants grew numer-
ous, and plans were made in the Council of War for calling in the arrears. Three
complaints of April and May 1645 to the King from the people of the villages of
Bampton, Kidlington and Deddington in Oxfordshire'" give a gloomy picture of
the situation. The villagers had been assessed with large sums in contribution but
had nevertheless suffered great injuries from the King's soldiers, who, in the event,
had not been able to protect them from plundering by the rebels. Many families
had simply left their homes and taken themselves off to more secure places, leaving
a heavier burden on those who remained. Their miseries were now being crowned,
and the payment of the contribution would be completely stopped, by the fact that
the military commanders were conscripting all men between 16 and 60 years of
age for work on the fortifications. The King probably summarised the situation
well, when, writing to the Queen on 15 May 1645, he declared that it was impos-
sible to raise more money, 'but a sharp sword can at least prevent starvation'. 58
Parliament had started confiscating the estates of the Royalists in September
1642. In March 1643 it had so organised its sequestration system so that it be-
came one of its best sources of income. Both political and economic reasons made
it urgent for the Royalists to imitate it. A start was made in March 1643 when
tenants and debtors of rebels were forbidden to pay rents or debts. Instead the
money was to be retained for the purpose of compensating victims of the re-
bels." Although this might harm the King's enemies it did not benefit his finan-
ces. In June 1643 the King therefore made a proposition to his Council of War,
'whether he should not give authority to some persons of quality and honesty to
enquire of and seize the rents, revenues, debts and estates of such as were in
open rebellion'. 60 The first commission for inquiring into the estates of delinqu-
ents was issued for Oxfordshire in July, followed by similar commissions for all
counties in the King's power." In the instruction for the Oxfordshire commission
a definition was given of the expression 'rebel'. It comprised not only all who
had fought for or given financial support to Parliament or encouraged others
to do so or served Parliament in any capacity as, for instance, tax-collector, but
also persons who had paid taxes to Parliament, refused to pay rents to their

51 PRO 31/8/197 p. 236, 245-7.

58 The King's Cabinet Opened, p. 10.
59 Thomason Colin., BM 21. h. 1 (64).
60 BM Had. Mss. 6804, 158.
61 See Black, op. cit.
 ROYALIST FINANCES 93

landbords because told to do so by Parliament, or who had simply fled to towns

held by Parliament. The commissioners were to value all the delinquents' be-
longings-money, plate, estates, horses, cattle, etc.-and draw up an inventory
in three copies, one to be sent to the Chancery at Oxford, another to be given
to the former owner of the goods, and the third to be kept by themselves. Then
the sequestered goods were to be sold and the money handed over as ordered
by the King. If they met with resistance they were authorised to call in the
military. The delinquents had the right to bring their case before a judge. This did
not, however, stop the procedure of sequestration, but if they won their case
they could demand the restoration of their property."
The Royalists' policy when dealing with delinquents was harder than that of
Parliament, which only demanded a part of the estates of Royalists who were
forced to compound, usually a sixth. The inconsistency of the Royalists' organi-
sation of their finances is, however, clearly demonstrated in their treatment of
the delinquents. In the cases of well-known Parliamentarians such as Vis-
count Saye and Sele or the Earl of Rutland, everything was confiscated, whereas
other delinquents seem often to have been let off without a fine. In some cases
a nominal purchase of a delinquent's estate by a relative could prevent the
confiscation. It might, in any case, have been difficult to sell all the lands
confiscated at a reasonable price, prospective buyers being hesitant for fear that
the former owners would return if Parliament won. Even where the purchases
seemed secure because of the presence of the King's army the new owners were
in a difficult situation, as the soldiers regarded the delinquents' former estates
as their rightful loot and did not recognise the new owners." The money raised
by sequestration was used in all parts of the financial administration. It might be
ordered that it was to be delivered to Ashburnham or the Receipt at Oxford,
but generally the commissions for inquiring into the estates of delinquents were
ordered to pass it on to the garrisons in their county. In Worcestershire the
money was administered by the High Sheriff in his capacity as head of the
commission for contribution." In Cornwall Nicholas Crispe was given a war-
rant to receive and audit the accounts of the sequestered estates." The Royalists'
sequestration system certainly did not yield the same amounts as did that of

62 BM Had. Mss. 6851, 157-8.

63 Madan, op. cit., no. 1553.
64 BM Had. Mss. 6802, 255; Black, op, cit. pp. 112, 115; J. Willis-Bund, op. cit., pp. 105,
139.
65 O. Ogle and W. H. Bliss, op. cit.
94 JENS ENGBERG

Parliament. In Gloucestershire, Warwickshire and Worcestershire between 10

December 1642 and 17 October 1643, £ 761 was registered by the commission
as received from sequestrations, but more may have been taken directly from the
delinquents by the military commanders. In Cornwall the confiscation of the
estates of leading Parliamentarians ought to have helped in the maintenance of
the Cornish army, but in fact it did more harm, as the people refused to pay
contribution arguing that they were unnecessary, the rents from the confiscated
lands being sufficient." The casual way in which the sequestration was carried
out probably added to the poorness of the result, but the main reason is to be
found in that fact that the Parliamentarians did not possess properties to the
same extent as Royalists.
When in the summer of 1643 Parliament imposed an excise on certain goods,
Hyde characterised it as 'a burden the people of England had hitherto reproached
other nations with, as a mark of slavery, and as never feared by themeslves', but
later Hyde noted that the members of the Oxford Parliament thought it a 'good
expedient to be followed by the King, ... in the same method as it was done in
London'." The initiative seems, however, to have been taken by the Council of
War in December 1643, after which the excise was proposed to Parliament. The
members approved of it, as they had to maintain the King's army and 'could
not find any way whereby that charge might be so equally born'. The proclama-
tion announcing the excise to be paid by the first buyer of certain goods was
issued in April 1644. 68 The excise imposed at Westminster was laid on certain
foreign commodities--wine and tobacco, for example, and on some English
produced luxuries. The rates of the Royalists' excise were lower on foreign com-
modities, but it was levied on home-produced necessities such as salt, soap, wool,
butchers-meat, wheat-bread, butter and cheese. The excise had to assume the
character of a comprehensive tax rather than an import-duty, since all the great
ports, with the exception of Bristol, were in the power of Parliament. The excise
was to be administered by an Office of Excise at Oxford. This was to be led by
a Treasurer-General authorised to appoint his own staff. In each county there
was to be a commission of excise, responsible to the Treasurer-General at Oxford,
and with a staff of registrars, collectors, clerks, surveyors, deputies and searchers.
The commissioners in the counties were to take an oath before two local Justices
of the Peace and were then to establish an office to be kept open all day f01

66 Coate, op, cit., p. 103.

67 History of the Rebellion, III. pp.34, 307.
68 Proclamations on Excise, see Madan, op, cit., no. 1616, 1638-9.
 ROYALIST FINANCES 95

registration of the names of sellers, buyers and manufacturers of goods on which

excise was to be paid, and for receiving the excise-money. All merchants and
others responsible for the payment of the excise were to render weekly accounts
to these offices on their purchases and sales, and the officers of the excise were
from time to time to search the shops, cellars and warehouses belonging to people
trading in goods liable to excise.
This ambitious scheme did not lead to much. The Office of Excise at Oxford
was not established and no Treasurer-General was appointed. Members were
appointed for the commissions of excise in several counties, but their activities,
if any, did little to benefit the King's finances, if the pattern given in a report
from two commissioners of excise for Somerset may be considered as typical.
When about to start their work the two commissioners found that their colleagues
in the commission refused to attend, and that no Justice of the Peace would
receive their oaths as commissioners. Only after several months' delay and with the
assistance of a military commander were they able to force a Justice to administer
the oath. They were afraid of starting except in towns with a Royalist garrison,
and began in Bridgewater where the governor had promised to help them. On the
market-day in Bridgwater they demanded the payment of the excise but were
met with refusals from the tradespeople. They therefore required the assistance of
the governor, but he declared that he dared not help them, his garrison being
too weak. In fact, one of his officers was knocked down although he did not help
the commissioners, but just happened to be present at the market-place. All hopes
the two commissioners had had of getting help from the governor disappeared
when the latter realised than the excise-money was not intended to be given to
him. He then directly opposed them. The commissioners then proceeded to Bath.
Here the Mayor refused to publish the proclamation concerning the excise, and
one of the aldermen addressed the people at the market-place, explaining that
the two commissioners had come to plunder them. Without having attained their
object the commissioners left Bath." Hyde found that the excise of Bristol gave
a reasonable supply, which was used for the provision of arms and ammunition.
Among his papers is an account of the excise of Bristol from 20 February to
26 March 1645, showing an income of £ 1324. 7 0 This was probably derived
from the excise on the foreign commodities.

69 BM Had. Mss. 6804, 285-7.

70 History of the Rebellion, III, p. 307; Claro Pap. 1844.
96 JENS ENGBERG

VII
The Cavaliers managed to maintain their army throughout several years of
civil war. In the first short period it was mainly at their own expense: later they
shifted part of the burden on to the shoulders of the inhabitants of the areas they
had occupied. Exact figures for the proportion between the free gifts or loans and
the forced contribution are impossible to obtain. The existing evidence seems to
show that the voluntary aid was the most important. In the case of the county of
Worcester,71 between 10 December 1642 and 17 October 1643 the figures were
as follows:

£ Percentage

Lent by gentry and others 31,018 77.3

Contribution 5,813 14.5
City and Diocese of Worcester, Tewkesbury 1,070 2.6
Delinquents 761 1.9
Other revenues 1,434 3.6

Total 40,096 99.9

It must, however, be emphasised that Worcester was only one county out of
many in the King's possession and further that the sheriff was accused of neglect-
ing his duties.
The attempts to establish a centre of financial administration at Oxford were
not successful. Neither the Treasury of War nor the Exchequer had any influence
except closest to Oxford, partly because they competed with each other, and
partly because the military commanders had to get their money from elsewhere.
The Council of War succeeded in creating the contribution system as a main
factor in the Royalist finances, but it lost its grip when the commissions in the
counties, headed by the leading Royalists, made the raising of money for the
army a local affair. The Royalists' finances were exhausted in the spring of 1645;
their army had not yet disintegrated, but only the blow of the battle of Naseby
was required to shatter it beyond repair.

71 J. Willis-Bund op. cit., pp. 138-9.