RULE 129: WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED Respondents rejected the above valuation.

Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section 16(d) of R.A.
6657, as amended, a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before
G.R. No. 143276 (July 20, 2004) the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of
the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the Landbanks
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL valuation.
and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, designated as a Special
DECISION
Agrarian Court, a petition for determination of just compensation, docketed as Civil
Case No. 6806. Impleaded as respondents were the DAR and the Landbank.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Petitioners therein prayed for a compensation of P100,000.00 per hectare for both
coconut land and riceland, or an aggregate amount of P623,000.00.
Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of
19.3422 hectares of agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted to the RTC the
Norte covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6296. A portion of the land following admissions of facts: (1) the subject property is governed by the
consisting of 6.2330 hectares (5.4730 of which is planted to coconut and 0.7600 provisions of R.A. 6657, as amended; (2) it was distributed to the farmers-
planted to palay) was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform beneficiaries; and (3) the Landbank deposited the provisional compensation based
(DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,1 as amended, otherwise known on the valuation made by the DAR.5
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the
In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, hearing and directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda.6
Series of 1992,2 as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of
1994,3 the Land Bank of the Philippines4 (Landbank), petitioner, made the
following valuation of the property: In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial court computed the just
compensation for the coconut land at P657,137.00 and for the riceland at
P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00, which is beyond respondents valuation of
Acquired property Area in hectares Value P623,000.00. The court further awarded compounded interest at P79,732.00 in
Coconut land 5.4730 P148,675.19 cash. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
Riceland 0.7600 25,243.36

========== WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

P173,918.55
 1. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners, the spouses
Dr. Vicente Banal and Leonidas Arenas-Banal, for the 5.4730
hectares of coconut land the sum of SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-
SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN PESOS
(P657,137.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by
law;
2. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners for the .7600
hectares of riceland the sum of FORTY-SIX THOUSAND PESOS
(P46,000.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by
law; and
3. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners the sum of
SEVENTY-NINE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO
PESOS (P79,732.00) as the compounded interest in cash.
IT IS SO ORDERED.7
In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts
established in another case pending before it (Civil Case No. 6679, Luz Rodriguez
vs. DAR, et al.), using the following formula:
For the coconut land
1. Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per kilo of
coconut) = Net Income (NI)
For the riceland
1. 2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) = Land Value (LV)
or PPH (using the formula under Executive Order No. 2289)
2. AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP = Interest
(pursuant to DAR AO No. 13, Series of 1994)
Forthwith, the Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52163.
On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision10 affirming in toto
the judgment of the trial court. The Landbanks motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.11
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining the trial courts valuation of the land. As earlier mentioned, there was no
trial on the merits.
To begin with, under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405 (1990), the Landbank is
charged primarily with the determination of the land valuation and compensation
for all private lands suitable for agriculture under the Voluntary Offer to Sell or
Compulsory Acquisition arrangement For its part, the DAR relies on the
determination of the land valuation and compensation by the Landbank.12

2. NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the capitalization

formula under Republic Act No. 38448)
Based on the Landbanks valuation of the land, the DAR makes an offer to the
landowner.13 If the landowner accepts the offer, the Landbank shall pay him the
purchase price of the land after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and
surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the government.14 In case the
landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator15
conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for
the land by requiring the landowner, the Landbank and other interested parties to
submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land.16 These functions by the
DAR are in accordance with its quasi-judicial powers under Section 50 of R.A.
6657, as amended, which provides:
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
x x x.
A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the
matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court17 for final determination
of just compensation.18
In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of Court19
and, on its own initiative or at the instance of any of the parties, appoint one or
more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the
dispute, including the valuation of properties, and to file a written report thereof x x
x.20 In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider several
factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, thus:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation,
the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature,
actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and
the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social
and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.
These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative
Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11,
Series of 1994, issued pursuant to the DARs rule-making power to carry out the
object and purposes of R.A. 6657, as amended.21
The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as follows:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
 LV = Land Value Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be established only
CNI = Capitalized Net Income during a hearing wherein the contending parties present their respective evidence.
CS = Comparable Sales In fact, to underscore the intricate nature of determining the valuation of the land,
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration Section 58 of the same law even authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to appoint
commissioners for such purpose.
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and
applicable. Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents property is
P703,137.00, merely took judicial notice of the average production figures in the
A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the Rodriguez case pending before it and applied the same to this case without
formula shall be: conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of the parties,
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1) thus:

A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730 hectares,
formula shall be: defendants determined the average gross production per year at 506.95 kilos only,
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1) but in the very recent case of Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al., filed and decided
by this court in Civil Case No. 6679 also for just compensation for coconut lands
and Riceland situated at Basud, Camarines Norte wherein also the lands in the
A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the
above-entitled case are situated, the value fixed therein was 1,061.52 kilos per
formula shall be:
annum per hectare for coconut land and the price per kilo is P8.82, but in the
LV = MV x 2
instant case the price per kilo is P9.70. In the present case, we consider 506.95
kilos average gross production per year per hectare to be very low considering that
Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental farm practice for coconut lands is harvest every forty-five days. We cannot also
requirements in determining just compensation for the property. Firstly, it comprehended why in the Rodriguez case and in this case there is a great
dispensed with the hearing and merely ordered the parties to submit their variance in average production per year when in the two cases the lands are both
respective memoranda. Such action is grossly erroneous since the determination coconut lands and in the same place of Basud, Camarines Norte. We believe that
of just compensation involves the examination of the following factors specified in it is more fair to adapt the 1,061.52 kilos per hectare per year as average gross
Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended: production. In the Rodriguez case, the defendants fixed the average gross
production of palay at 3,000 kilos or 60 cavans per year. The court is also
1. the cost of the acquisition of the land; constrained to apply this yearly palay production in the Rodriguez case to
the case at bar.
2. the current value of like properties;
xxx xxx xxx
3. its nature, actual use and income;
As shown in the Memorandum of Landbank in this case, the area of the coconut
4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations; land taken under CARP is 5.4730 hectares. But as already noted, the average
gross production a year of 506.96 kilos per hectare fixed by Landbank is too
5. the assessment made by government assessors; low as compared to the Rodriguez case which was 1,061 kilos when the
coconut land in both cases are in the same town of Basud, Camarines Norte,
compelling this court then to adapt 1,061 kilos as the average gross
6. the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
production a year of the coconut land in this case. We have to apply also the
the farmworkers and by the government to the property; and
price of P9.70 per kilo as this is the value that Landbank fixed for this case.

7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government

The net income of the coconut land is equal to 70% of the gross income. So, the
financing institution on the said land, if any.
net income of the coconut land is 1,061 x .70 x 9.70 equals P7,204.19 per hectare.
Applying the capitalization formula of R.A. 3844 to the net income of P7,204.19
divided by 6%, the legal rate of interest, equals P120,069.00 per hectare.
Therefore, the just compensation for the 5.4730 hectares is P657,137.00.
The Riceland taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 as of October 21, 1972 has
an area of .7600 hectare. If in the Rodriguez case the Landbank fixed the
average gross production of 3000 kilos or 60 cavans of palay per year, then the
.7600 hectare in this case would be 46 cavans. The value of the riceland therefore
in this case is 46 cavans x 2.5 x P400.00 equals P46,000.00.22
PARC Resolution 94-24-1 of 25 October 1994, implemented by DAR AO 13,
granted interest on the compensation at 6% compounded annually. The
compounded interest on the 46 cavans for 26 years is 199.33 cavans. At P400.00
per cavan, the value of the compounded interest is P79,732.00.23 (emphasis
added)
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or
are pending in the same court or before the same judge.24 They may only do so in
the absence of objection and with the knowledge of the opposing party,25 which
are not obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court
takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its
own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow
the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in
the case. (emphasis added)
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive Order
(EO) No. 22826 and R.A. No. 3844,27 as amended, in determining the valuation of
the property; and in granting compounded interest pursuant to DAR Administrative
Order No. 13, Series of 1994.28 It must be stressed that EO No. 228 covers
private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn, while R.A. 3844
governs agricultural leasehold relation between the person who furnishes the
landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and
the person who personally cultivates the same.29 Here, the land is planted to
coconut and rice and does not involve agricultural leasehold relation. What the trial
court should have applied is the formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11 discussed earlier.
As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that DAR
Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994 does not apply to the subject land but
to those lands taken under Presidential Decree No. 2730 and Executive Order No.
228 whose owners have not been compensated. In this case, the property is
covered by R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents have been paid the
provisional compensation thereof, as stipulated during the pre-trial.
While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial
discretion, however, such discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the
law. Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its
implementing rules and regulations. (DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended
by DAR Administrative Order No.11).
In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in determining the
valuation of the subject land. Thus, we deem it proper to remand this case to the
RTC for trial on the merits wherein the parties may present their respective
evidence. In determining the valuation of the subject property, the trial court shall
consider the factors provided under Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended,
mentioned earlier. The formula prescribed by the DAR in Administrative Order No.
6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of
1994, shall be used in the valuation of the land. Furthermore, upon its own
initiative, or at the instance of any of the parties, the trial court may appoint one or
more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the
dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 52163 is REVERSED. Civil
Case No. 6806 is REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, for
trial on the merits with dispatch. The trial judge is directed to observe strictly the
procedures specified above in determining the proper valuation of the subject
property.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 100901-08 (July 16, 1998)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAILON KULAIS,
CARLOS FALCASANTOS @ Commander Falcasantos, AWALON KAMLON
HASSAN @ Commander Kamlon, MAJID SAMSON @ Commander Bungi,
JUMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS,
SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN
HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE
KAMMING, FREDDIE MANUEL @ Ajid and several JOHN and JANE DOES,
accused, JAILON KULAIS, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The trial courts erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness testimony in
another case, also pending before it, does not affect the conviction of the
appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt by other clear,
convincing and overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and documentary. The
Court takes this occasion also to remind the bench and the bar that reclusion
perpetua is not synonymous with life imprisonment.
The Case
On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case
Nos. 10060, 10061, 10062, 10063 and 10064) and three Informations for
kidnapping (Crim Case Nos. 10065, 10066 and 10067), all dated August 14, 1990,
were filei before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City against Carlos
Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina
Hassan de Kamming,ii Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan,
Imamiii Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel alias Ajid, and several John and Jane Does.
The Informations for kidnapping for ransom, which set forth identical allegations
save for the names of the victims, read as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of
Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being all private individuals,
conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting one
another, with threats to kill the person of FELIX ROSARIO [in Criminal
Case No. 10060]iv and for the purpose of extorting ransom from the said
Felix Rosario or his families or employer, did then and there, wilfully,
 unlawfully and feloniously, KIDNAP the person of said Felix Rosario, v a
male public officer of the City Government of Zamboanga, who was then
aboard a Cimarron vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976 which was being
ambushed by the herein accused at the highway of Sitio Tigbao Lisomo,
Zamboanga City, and brought said Felix Rosario vi to different
mountainous places of Zamboanga City and Zamboanga del Sur, where
he was detained, held hostage and deprived of his liberty until February
2, 1989, the day when he was released only after payment of the ransom
was made to herein accused, to the damage and prejudice of said victim;
there being present an aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited
offense was committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure
or afford impunity.
The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, likewise alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names
of the victims:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of
Zamboanga and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and
confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, by
means of threats and intimidation of person, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously KIDNAP, take and drag away and detain the
person of MONICO SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN [Criminal Case No. 10065] vii a
male public officer of the City Government of Zamboanga, against his
will, there being present an aggravating circumstance in that the
aforecited offense was committed with the aid of armed men or persons
who insure or afford impunity.
Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais,
Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin,
Jainuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Jalina Hassan and Freddie Manuel. viii
On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not
guilty. Joint trial on the merits ensued. On April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi
rendered the assailed 36-page Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into
consideration, this Court renders its judgment, ordering and finding:
1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias AJID and IMAM TARUK ALAH y
SALIH [n]ot [g]uilty of the eight charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and
for [k]idnapping, their guilt not having been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is
ordered, unless detained for some other offense besides these 8 cases
(Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).
2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS,
SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA and HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH
[g]uilty as principals by conspiracy in all these 8 cases for [k]idnapping
for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).
Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses with
the aid of armed men who insured impunity. Therefore, the penalties
imposed on them shall be at their maximum period.
WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom, and
pursuant to Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, five life imprisonments
are imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador
Mamaril y Mendoza and Kadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-
10064).
For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and public
officer and pursuant to Art. 267, Revised Penal Code (par. 4.), another
life imprisonment is imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon
Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim.
Case No. 10066)
For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco y
Gaspar, and their kidnapping not having lasted more than five days,
pursuant to Art. 268, Revised Penal Code, and the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the same four accused - Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad,
Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih -
are sentenced to serve two (2) jail terms ranging from ten (10) years of
prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal
as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065 and 10067).
3. JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the
three charges of [k]idnapping and she is acquitted of these charges.
(Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 and 10067).
But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the
five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom.
WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to
serve five (5) imprisonments, ranging from TEN (10) YEARS of prision
mayor as minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of reclusion temporal as
maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA
HUSSIN (charged as Jalina Hassan de Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot
[g]uilty in the three charges for [k]idnapping and are, therefore,
ACQUITTED of these three charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 &
10067).
 But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty To Virginia San Agustin-Gara
as accomplices in the five charges for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Being
minors, they are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of One (1) Wrist Watch P 850.00
minority which lowers the penalty imposable on them by one degree. The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive
WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are suspension, shall be extended to those sentenced.
sentenced to serve five imprisonments ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of The cases against Majid Samson, alias Commander Bungi Awalon
prision correccional as minimum to TEN YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF Kamlon a.k.a. Commander Kamlon Carlos Falcasantos and several John
prision mayor as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064). Does and Jane Does are ARCHIVED until their arrest.
Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful Costs against the accused convicted.
offenders convicted of an offense punishable by death or life by
Presidential Decree No. 1179 and Presidential Decree No. 1210 (of SO ORDERED.ix
which [k]idnapping for [r]ansom is such an offense) the sentences on
On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma
Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin de Kamming are NOT
Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin filed their joint Notice of Appeal. x In a letter
suspended but must be served by them.
dated February 6, 1997, the same appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their
Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul appeal because of their application for amnesty. In our March 19, 1997 Resolution,
Plasin are sentenced further to return the following personal effects we granted their motion. Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains for the
taken on December 12, 1988, the day of the kidnapping, or their value in consideration of this Court.xi
money, their liability being solidary.
To Jessica Calunod:
The Facts
One (1) Seiko wrist watch P 250.00 The Version of the Prosecution
One Bracelet P 2,400.00 The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as viewed by the
People:
One Shoulder Bag P 200.00
On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various
Cash P 200.00
government agencies, organized themselves as a monitoring team to
To Armado C. Bacarro: inspect government projects in Zamboanga City. The group was
composed of Virginia Gara, as the head of the team; Armando Bacarro,
One (1) wrist watch P 800.00 representing the Commission on Audit; Felix del Rosario, representing
One Necklace P 300.00 the non-government; Edilberto Perez, representing the City Assessors
Office; Jessica Calunod and Allan Basa of the City Budget Office and
One Calculator P 295.00 Monico Saavedra, the driver from the City Engineers Office. (p. 3, TSN,
October 22, 1990.)
Eyeglasses P 500.00
On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo Elementary
One Steel Tape P 250.00 School to check on two of its classrooms. After inspecting the same, they
To Edilberto S. Perez proceeded to the Talaga Footbridge. The group was not able to reach
the place because on their way, they were stopped by nine (9) armed
One (1) Rayban P 1,000.00 men who pointed their guns at them (p. 4, TSN, ibid.).
One Wrist Watch P 1,800.00 The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were
divested of their personal belongings. They were then ordered to walk to
Cash P 300.00
the mountain by the leader of the armed men who introduced himself as
 Commander Falcasantos (p. 5, TSN, ibid.)
While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered
government troops which caused their group to be divided. Finally, they
were able to regroup themselves. Commander Kamlon with his men
joined the others. (pp. 7-8, TSN, ibid.).
The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the
forest. During their captivity, the victims were able to recognize their
captors who were at all times armed with guns. The wives of the
kidnappers performed the basic chores like cooking. (pp.9-10. TSN, ibid.)
Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the
ransom notes which demanded a ransom of P100.000.00 and
P14,000.00 in exchange for twenty (20) sets of uniform. (p.15, TSN,
ibid.)
On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 oclock noontime, the victims
were informed that they would be released. They started walking until
around 7:00 o clock in the evening of that day. At around 12:00 o clock
midnight, the victims were released after Commander Falcasantos and
Kamlon received the ransom money. (p. 19, TSN, ibid.) The total amount
paid was P122,000.00. The same was reached after several negotiations
between Mayor Vitaliano Agan of Zamboanga City and the
representatives of the kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6, TSN, Nov. 11, 1990)
x x x.xii
The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap
victims themselves: Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia
San Agustin-Gara, Calixto Francisco, and Monico Saavedra.
The Version of the Defense
The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows:xiii
On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o clock in the morning, while
weeding their farm in Sinaburan, Zamboanga del Sur, accused-appellant
Jumatiya Amlani was picked up by soldiers and brought to a place where
one army battalion was stationed. Thereat, her five (5) co-accused,
namely Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassin, Imam Taruk
Alah and Freddie Manuel were already detained. In the afternoon of the
same day, appellants spouses Jailon Kulais and Norma Sahiddan were
brought to the battalion station and likewise detained thereat. On May
30, 1990, the eight (8) accused were transported to Metrodiscom,
Zamboanga City. Here on the same date, they were joined by accused-
appellant Jaliha Hussin.
At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just
escaped from the captivity of Carlos Falcasantos and company who in
1988 kidnapped and brought her to the mountains. Against their will, she
stayed with Falcasantos and his two wives for two months, during which
she slept with Falcasantos as aide of the wives and was made to cook
food, wash clothes, fetch water and run other errands for everybody. An
armed guard was assigned to watch her, so that, for sometime, she had
to bear the ill-treatment of Falcasantos other wives one of whom was
armed. After about two months, while she was cooking and Falcasantos
and his two wives were bathing in the river, and while her guard was not
looking, she took her chance and made a successful dash for freedom.
(TSN, January 29, 1992, pp. 2-15)
Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin,
who was thirteen years old at the time (she was fifteen years old when
the trial of the instant cases commenced). She was kidnapped by Daing
Kamming and brought to the mountains where he slept with her. She
stayed with him for less than a month sleeping on forest ground and
otherwise performing housekeeping errands for Kamming and his men.
She made good her escape during an encounter between the group of
Kamming and military troops. She hid in the bushes and came out at
Ligui-an where she took a bachelor bus in going back to her mothers
house at Pudos, Guiligan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. One day, at
around 2:00 o clock in the afternoon, while she was harvesting palay at
the neighboring village of Tigbalangao, military men picked her up to
Ticbanuang where there was an army battalion detachment. From
Ticbawuang, she was brought to Vitali, then to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga
City, where on her arrival, she met all the other accused for the first time
except Freddie Manuel. (Ibid., pp. 16-21)
Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of
Sinaburan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. At about 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon of a day in May, while she and her husband were in their farm,
soldiers arrested them. The soldiers did not tell them why they were
being arrested, neither were they shown any papers. The two of them
were just made to board a six by six truck. There were no other civilians
in the truck. The truck brought the spouses to the army battalion and
placed them inside the building where there were civilians and soldiers.
Among the civilians present were her six co-accused Hadjirul Plasin,
Salvador Mamaril, Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk Alah, Freddie
Manuel and Jumatiya Amlani. That night, the eight of them were brought
to Tictapul, Zamboanga City; then to Vitali; and, finally, to the
Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City where they stayed for six days and six
nights. On the seventh day, the accused were brought to the City Jail,
 Zamboanga City. (TSN, January 30, 1991, pp. 6-11)
The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as heretofore
narrated, was arrested with his wife the day the soldiers came to their
farm on May 28, 1990. He has shared with his wife the ordeals that
followed in the wake of their arrest and in the duration of their
confinement up to the present. (TSN, January 22, 1991 pp. 2-4).
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for
ransom and one count of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which
offenses it imposed upon him six terms of life imprisonment. It also found him
guilty of two counts of slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of Monico
Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. The trial court ratiocinated as follows:
Principally, the issue here is one of credibility - both of the witnesses
and their version of what had happened on December 12, 1988, to
February 3, 1989. On this pivotal issue, the Court gives credence to
[p]rosecution witnesses and their testimonies. Prosecution evidence is
positive, clear and convincing. No taint of evil or dishonest motive was
imputed or imputable to [p]rosecution witnesses. To this Court, who saw
all the witnesses testify, [p]rosecution witnesses testified only because
they were impelled by [a] sense of justice, of duty and of truth.
Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and
consisted only of alibis. The individual testimonies of the nine accused
dwel[t] principally on what happened to each of them on May 27, 28 and
29, 1990. None of the accused explained where he or she was on and
from December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989, when [p]rosecution
evidence show[ed] positively seven of the nine accused were keeping
the five or six hostages named by [p]rosecution evidence.
The seven accused positively identified to have been present during
the course of the captivity of the five kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1)
Jumatiya Amlani; (2) Jaliha Hussin; (3) Norma Sahiddan; (4) Jailon
Kulais; (5) Hadjirul Plasin; (6) Salvador Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin
Hassan.
The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias
Ajid, and Imam Taruk Alah. These two must, therefore, be declared
acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven
accused guilty as conspirators as charged in the eight Informations; or
only as accomplices? Prosecution evidence shows that the kidnapping
group to which the seven accused belonged had formed themselves into
an armed band for the purpose of kidnapping for ransom. This armed
band had cut themselves off from established communities, lived in the
mountains and forests, moved from place to place in order to hide their
hostages. The wives of these armed band moved along with their
husbands, attending to their needs, giving them material and moral
support. These wives also attended to the needs of the kidnap victims,
sleeping with them or comforting them.
xxx xxx xxx
II) The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril
and Hadjirul Plasin. The Court holds these four men guilty as
conspirators in the 8 cases of kidnapping. Unlike the three women-
accused, these male accused were armed. They actively participated in
keeping their hostages by fighting off the military and CAFGUS, in
transferring their hostages from place to place, and in guarding the
kidnap hostages. Salvador Mamaril and Jailon Kulais were positively
identified as among the nine armed men who had kidnapped the eight
kidnap victims on December 12, 1988.
The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four
accused is supported by the rulings of our Supreme Court quoted below.
(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not
essential to prove conspiracy. It may be shown by a number of infinite
acts, conditions and circumstances which may vary according to the
purposes to be accomplished and from which may logically be inferred
that there was a common design, understanding or agreement among
the conspirators to commit the offense charged. (People vs. Cabrera, 43
Phil 64; People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)
(2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and
intent which existed between the sixteen accused, be regarded as the
act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible for the murder in question. (U.S. vs. Bundal, et. al. 3 Phil 89,
98.)
(3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object,
whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally
or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contribute to the
wrongdoing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though
performed by himself alone. (People vs. Peralta, et. al. 25 SCRA 759,
772 (1968).)xiv
The Assigned Errors
 The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz:
I and his purported cohorts.xvi Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to
The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given
in another case by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team
leader of the government troops which allegedly captured the accused-
appellants in an encounter; thereby, depriving the accused-appellants
their right to cross-examine him.
II
On the assumption that Lt. Felicianos testimony could be validly taken
judicial notice of, the trial court, nevertheless, erred in not disregarding
the same for being highly improbable and contradictory.
III
The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani,
Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et. al.,
with material and moral comfort, hence, are guilty as accomplices in all
the kidnapping for ransom cases.
IV
The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and
Norma Sahiddan the benefits of suspension of sentence given to youth
offenders considering that they were minors at the time of the
commission of the offense.xv
As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had
withdrawn their appeal, and as such, the third and fourth assigned errors, which
pertain to them only, will no longer be dealt with. Only the following issues
pertaining to Appellant Jailon Kulais will be discussed: (1) judicial notice of other
pending cases, (2) sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, and (3) denial as a
defense. In addition, the Court will pass upon the propriety of the penalty imposed
by the trial court.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Issue:
Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process
Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court
took judicial notice of the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades
Feliciano, who was the team leader of the government troops that captured him
cross-examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he
contends that the latters testimony should not be used against him.xvii
True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence
presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the
same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the same
judge.xviii This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take
judicial notice of the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such
testimony in deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was
not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly on the positive
identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod,
Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to
meticulous cross-examinations conducted by appellants counsel. At best, then, the
trial courts mention of Lieutenant Felicianos testimony is a decisional surplusage
which neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced
Appellant Kulais.
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latters
testimony:
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q And how long were you in the custody of these persons?
A We stayed with them for fifty-four days.
Q And during those days did you come to know any of the persons who were
with the group?
A We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed there for fifty-
four days.
Q And can you please name to us some of them or how you know them?
A For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and Commander
Kamlon we came to know first our foster parents, those who were
assigned to give us some food.
Q You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men who will take
 care of you? Q Who?
A Yes. A Tangkong.
Q And to whom were you assigned? x x xx x x x x xxix
A To lla Abdurasa. Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarros testimony pointing to
appellant as one of the culprits:
Q And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom you are assigned
to, who else did you come to know? FISCAL CAJAYON:
A Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two (2) wives of x x xx x x xxx
Commander Falcasantos - Mating and Janira - another brother in-law of
Commander Kamlon, Usman, the wife of Kamlon, Tira. Q And what happened then?

x x xx x x xxx A Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or who will be the
one [to] g[i]ve food to us.
Q Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty-four days and you
really came to know them. Will you still be able to recognize these persons Q [To] whom were you assigned?
if you will see the[m] again? A I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana.
A Yes, maam. x x xx x x xxx
Q Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if any of those you Q Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his wife. [D]o you
mentioned are here? remember how he looks like?
A Yes, they are here. A Yes.
Q Some of them are here? Q Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if that said
A Some of them are here. Tangkong and his wife are here?

x x xx x x xxx A Yes, maam.

Q Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing? Q Could you please point this Tangkong to us?

A White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was one of those A Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his name he identified
nine armed men who took us from the highway. [himself] as Jailon Kulais.

RTC INTERPRETER: Q Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get that name?

Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of his name, he A Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the camp.
gave his name as JAILON KULAIS. x x xx x x xxx
CP CAJAYON D MS: ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)
Q Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the vehicle and made Q When did you first meet Tangkong?
you alight, what else was he doing while you were in their captivity?
A That was on December 11, because I remember he was the one who took
A He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the husband of Nana. us.
COURT: Q When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you stated that Mr.
Mamaril was one of those who stopped the bus and took you to the hill
 and you did not mention Tangkong? A Yes.
A I did not mention but I can remember his face. Q Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that group?
x x xx x x xxx A Yes.
Q And because Tangkong was always with you as your host even if he did Q Will you please identify?
not tell you that he [was] one of those who stopped you, you would not
recognize him? A That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed to a man sitting in court who
identified himself as Jailon Kulais.)
A No, I can recognize him because he was the one who took my shoes.
x x xx x x xxx
COURT:
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN
Q Who?
Q You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the camp?
A Tangkong, your Honor.
FISCAL CAJAYON:
x x xx x x x x xxx
Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he used the
Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez candid narration: word Tangkong.
FISCAL CAJAYON: ATTY. FABIAN
x x xx x x xxx Q You said Tangkong guarded you[. W]hat do you mean?
Q Who else? A He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have their time two
hours another will be on duty guarding us.
A The last man.
Q Where did you meet Tangkong?
Q Did you come to know his name?
A He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us.
A Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness pointed to a man in Court who
identified himself as Jailon Kulais.) x x xx x x x x xxxi
Q And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain? It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez
that kidnapping or detention did take place: the five victims were held, against their
A The same, guarding us. will, for fifty-three days from December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK evident that Appellant Kulais was a member of the group of armed men who
staged the kidnapping, and that he was one of those who guarded the victims
Q Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine armed men on during the entire period of their captivity. His participation gives credence to the
your way from [the] Licomo to [the] Talaga Foot Bridge. [W]hat do you conclusion of the trial court that he was a conspirator.
mean by ambushed?
A I mean that they blocked our way and stopped.
Kidnapping
Q They did not fire any shots? for Ransom
A But they were pointing their guns at us. That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting
Q And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to [the] Talaga ransom is also apparent from the testimony of Calunod, who was quite emphatic in
Footbridge, you stated [that] one of them [was] Commander Falcasantos? identifying the accused and narrating the circumstances surrounding the writing of
the ransom letters.
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said there were these
meetings for possible negotiation with the City Government. What do you
mean by this? What were you supposed to negotiate?
A Because they told us that they will be releasing us only after the terms.xxii
Q And what were the terms? Did you come to know the terms?
A I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered by Commander
Falcasantos to write the letter, the ransom letter.
Q At this point of time, you remember how many letters were you asked to
write for your ransom?
A I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify them.
Q Why will you able to identify the same?
A Because I was the one who wrote it.
Q And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship?
A Yes.
Q Now we have here some letters which were turned over to us by the
Honorable City Mayor Vitaliano Agan. 1,2,3,4,5 - there are five letters all
handwritten.
COURT:
Original?
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Original, your Honor.
Q And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if any of these
were the ones you were asked to write.
A (Witness going over [letters])
This one - 2 pages. This one - 2 pages. No more.
Q Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in these letters,
what else will make you remember that these are really the ones you
wrote while there?
A The signature is there.
Q There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod.
A And over it is a signature.
Q That is your signature?
A Yes, maam.
Q How about in the other letter, did you sign it also?
A Yes, there is the other signature.
Q There are names - other names here - Eddie Perez, Allan Basa, Armando
Bacarro, Felix Rosario, Jojie Ortuoste and there are signatures above the
same. Did you come up to know who signed this one?
A Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons. [sic]
Q And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon Hassan, and there
is the signature above the same. Did you come to know who signed it?
A [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that.
x x xx x x xxx
Q Jessica, I am going over this letter ... Could you please read to us the
portion here which says the terms? ...
A (Witness reading) Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo and kantidad
nga P100,000 ug P14,000 baylo sa 20 sets nga uniforms sa Biyernes
(Pebrero 3, 1989).xxiii
x x xx x x xxx
INTERPRETER (Translation):
This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of P100,000.00 and
P14,000.00 in exchange [for] 20 sets of uniform on Friday, February 3,
1989.
x x xx x x xxx
Q Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is dated January
21, 1988.xxiv Now, could you please explain to us why it is dated January
21 1988 and the other one Enero 31, 1989 or January 31, 1989?
A I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989.
Q January 21, 1989?
A Yes
x x xx x x xxx
Q Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned? Please go over this.
 A (Going over the letter)
Yes, maam.
Q Could you please read it aloud to us?
A (Witness reading)
Gusto nila and P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga completong
uniformer (7 colors marine type wala nay labot ang sapatos), tunga
medium ug tunga large size.xxv
x x xx x x xxx
INTERPRETER:
They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of complete uniform
(7 colors, marine-type not including the shoes), one half medium, one half
large.
x x xx x x xxx
Q After having written these letters, did you come to know after [they were]
signed by your companions and all of you, do you know if these letters
were sent? If you know only.
A I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to me by
Falcasantos to inform the City Mayor that initial as P500,000.00, and when
we were already - I was asked again to write, we were ordered to affix our
signature to serve as proof that all of us are alive. xxvi [sic]
Calunods testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando
Bacarroxxvii and Edilberto Perez.xxviii The receipt of the ransom letters, the efforts
made to raise and deliver the ransom, and the release of the hostages upon
payment of the money were testified to by Zamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano
Aganxxix and Teddy Mejia.xxx
The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code,xxxi having been sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a
private individual, having been clearly identified by the kidnap victims, this Court
thus affirms the trial courts finding of appellants guilt on five counts of kidnapping
for ransom.
Kidnapping of
Public Officers
Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco
were members of the government monitoring team abducted by appellants group.
The three testified to the fact of kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify
the appellant. Even so, appellants identity as one of the kidnappers was sufficiently
established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, who were with Gara, Saavedra and
Francisco when the abduction occurred.
That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours xxxii
does not matter. In People vs. Domasian,xxxiii the victim was similarly held for three
hours, and was released even before his parents received the ransom note. The
accused therein argued that they could not be held guilty of kidnapping as no
enclosure was involved, and that only grave coercion was committed, if at all.xxxiv
Convicting appellants of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Art. 267 (4)
of the Revised Penal Code, the Court found that the victim, an eight-year-old boy,
was deprived of his liberty when he was restrained from going home. The Court
justified the conviction by holding that the offense consisted not only in placing a
person in an enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving him, in any manner, of
his liberty.xxxv Likewise, in People vs. Santos,xxxvi the Court held that since the
appellant was charged and convicted under Article 267, paragraph 4, it was not the
duration of the deprivation of liberty which was important, but the fact that the
victim, a minor, was locked up.
Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for
only a few hours is immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims were public
officersxxxvii -- Gara was a fiscal analyst for the City of Zamboanga, Saavedra
worked at the City Engineers Office, and Francisco was a barangay councilman at
the time the kidnapping occurred. Appellant Kulais should be punished, therefore,
under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and not Art. 268, as the
trial court held.
The present case is different from People vs. Astorga,xxxviii which held that the
crime committed was not kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4, but only
grave coercion. The appellant in that case had tricked his seven-year-old victim
into going with him to a place he alone knew. His plans, however, were foiled,
when a group of people became suspicious and rescued the girl from him. The
Court noted that the victims testimony and the other pieces of evidence did not
indicate that the appellant wanted to detain her, or that he actually detained her.
In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably
established that the victims were detained, albeit for a few hours. There is proof
beyond reasonable doubt that kidnapping took place, and that appellant was a
member of the armed group which abducted the victims.
Third Issue:
Denial and Alibi
The appellants bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in
the face of the prosecution witnesses positive identification of him. Jurisprudence
gives greater weight to the positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the
negative testimonies of the defense.xxxix Between positive and categorical
testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare denial on the
other, the former generally prevails.xl Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and
Edilberto Perez testified in a clear, straightforward and frank manner; and their
testimonies were compatible on material points. Moreover, no ill motive was
attributed to the kidnap victims and none was found by this Court.
We agree with the trial courts observation that the appellant did not meet the
charges against him head on. His testimony dwelt on what happened to him on the
day he was arrested and on subsequent days thereafter. Appellant did not explain
where he was during the questioned dates (December 12, 1988 to February 3,
1989); neither did he rebut Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, when they identified him
as one of their kidnappers.
Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment
The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life
imprisonment. The penalty for kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised Penal
Code, is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the crimes happened in 1988, when
the capital penalty was proscribed by the Constitution, the maximum penalty that
could have been imposed was reclusion perpetua. Life imprisonment is not
synonymous with reclusion perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua
carries with it accessory penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a
definite extent or duration. Life imprisonment is invariably imposed for serious
offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed in
accordance with the Revised Penal Code.xli
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five
counts of kidnapping for ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED,
but the penalty imposed is hereby MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced to
five terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of his five convictions for kidnapping
for ransom; and to three terms of reclusion perpetua, one each for the kidnapping
of Public Officers Virginia Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. Like the
other accused who withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the personal
effects, or their monetary value, taken from the kidnap victims. Additionally, he is
ORDERED to pay the amount of P122,000 representing the ransom money paid to
the kidnappers. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 114776 (February 2, 2000)
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to
reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R.
No. CV 34476, as well as its Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied
the motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as
follows:
"Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein
petitioner], then Director of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air
Manila, applied for employment with defendant company [herein
private respondent] through its Area Manager in Manila.
On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview,
defendant wrote to plaintiff, offering a contract of employment as
an expatriate B-707 captain for an original period of two (2) years
commencing on January 21, 1978, Plaintiff accepted the offer and
commenced working on January 20, 1979. After passing the six-
month probation period, plaintiff's appointment was confirmed
effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).
On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his
two-year contract to five (5) years effective January 21, 1979 to
January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and conditions set forth in
the contract of employment, which the latter accepted (Annex "C",
p. 31, Rec.).
During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980,
while in command of a flight, committed a noise violation offense
at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff apologized. (Exh. "3", p.
307, Rec.).
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident
wherein the tail of the aircraft scraped or touched the runway
during landing. He was suspended for a few days until he was
investigated by a board headed by Capt. Choy. He was
reprimanded. Scjuris
On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-
300 conversion training at Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at
defendant's expense. Having successfully completed and passed
the training course, plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981 for solo
duty as captain of the Airbus A-300 and subsequently appointed
as captain of the A-300 fleet commanding an Airbus A-300 in
flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp. 34-38,
Rec.).
Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-
cutting measures. Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus
fleet were found in excess of the defendant's requirement (t.s.n.,
July 6, 1988. p. 11). Consequently, defendant informed its
expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised
them to take advance leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466, Rec.).
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time,
defendant decided to terminate its excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6,
1988, p. 17). It did not, however, immediately terminate it's A-300
pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the
B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve
were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the
twelve. Jurissc
On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination
effective November 1, 1982 and that he will be paid three (3)
months salary in lieu of three months notice (Annex "I", pp. 41-42,
Rec.). Because he could not uproot his family on such short
notice, plaintiff requested a three-month notice to afford him time
to exhaust all possible avenues for reconsideration and retention.
Defendant gave only two (2) months notice and one (1) month
salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal
dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on
jurisdictional grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the
complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case
for damages due to illegal termination of contract of services
before the court a quo (Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss
alleging inter alia: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts have no
jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant contends that the
complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money claim
arising out of and in the course of plaintiff's employment "thus it is
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction pursuant
to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff was
employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment
contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus,
defendant postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts
thereat shall have jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.). Misjuris
In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1)
where the items demanded in a complaint are the natural
consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation and not labor
benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil dispute; (2) the case
involves a question that is beyond the field of specialization of
labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded not on the
employee's dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal
and the consequence thereof, the case falls under the jurisdiction
of the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to
dismiss (pp. 82-84, Ibid). The motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid)
On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the
grounds relied upon in its motion to dismiss and further arguing
that plaintiff is barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel from
instituting the complaint and that he has no cause of action. (pp.
102-115)"31
On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
 "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
Menandro Laureano and against defendant Singapore Airlines
Limited, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts of -
SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the
current rate of exchange at the time of payment, as and for
unearned compensation with legal interest from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid; Jjlex
SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the
current rate of exchange at the time of payment; and the further
amounts of P67,500.00 as consequential damages with legal
interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and
for exemplary damages; and P100,000.00 as and for attorney's
fees.
Costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED."32
Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the
issues of jurisdiction, validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.
On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court,
thus,
"...In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal
termination was filed by plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987
or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action
has already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The complaint is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED."33 Newmiso
Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were
denied.
Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:
1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON
CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS UNDER
ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR
DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO THE RIGHTS OF
THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS
UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?
2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF
EMPLOYMENT BE RETRENCHED BY HIS EMPLOYER?
3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN
EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE THE EXPECTED
PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING
LOSSES?
At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of
jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly
ruled on the application of Philippine law, thus: Acctmis
"Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the
plaintiff is legal under the Singapore Laws because of the
defendant's failure to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws
apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the preceding
paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the
laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of
the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The
defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should
be applied."34
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal
before said court.35 On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred
defendant-appellant below from raising further the issue of jurisdiction. 36
Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144
or on Article 1146 of the Civil Code. According to him, his termination of
employment effective November 1, 1982, was based on an employment contract
which is under Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10 years as provided
for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate court based on Article
1146 where prescription is only four (4) years, is an error. The appellate court
concluded that the action for illegal dismissal originally filed before the Labor
Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but which was withdrawn, then filed again in 1987 before
the Regional Trial Court, had already prescribed.
In our view, neither Article 114437 nor Article 114638 of the Civil Code is here
pertinent. What is applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz:
"Article 291. Money claims. - All money claims arising from
employee-employer relations accruing during the effectivity of this
Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause
of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.
x x x" Misact
What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been
decided by this Court. In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive
period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for
the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the prescriptive period fixed in
Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW applicable to
claims arising from employee-employer relations.39
More recently in De Guzman. vs. Court of Appeals,40 where the money claim was
based on a written contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:
"...The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its
application only to 'money claims specifically recoverable under
said Code' but covers all money claims arising from an employee-
employer relations" (Citing Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238
SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). ...
It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a
special law applicable to money claims arising from employer-
employee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over Article 1144
of the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that 'where two statutes are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the one designed therefore should
prevail.' (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157
SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant."41
In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion
that petitioner's action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January
8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effective date of his dismissal on
November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.
"In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal
termination was filed by plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987
 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action
has already prescribed."
We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on Article 291 of
the Labor Code, which sets the prescription period at three (3) years and which
governs under this jurisdiction.
Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed
his complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor
Relations Commission. However, this claim deserves scant consideration; it has
no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we
held that "although the commencement of a civil action stops the running of the
statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by
plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly the same position as though no action had
been commenced at all."42
Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment
was valid, the appellate court found that the employment contract of petitioner
allowed for pre-termination of employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals
when it said, Sdjad
"It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the
parties. From the moment the same is perfected, the parties are
bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their
nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus,
when plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer of employment, he was
bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the contract, among
others, the right of mutual termination by giving three months
written notice or by payment of three months salary. Such
provision is clear and readily understandable, hence, there is no
room for interpretation."
xxx
Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the
provisions of the Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto,
deserves no merit. It must be noted that when plaintiff-appellee's
employment was confirmed, he applied for membership with the
Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the signatory to the
aforementioned Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped
from questioning the legality of the said agreement or any proviso
contained therein."43
Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's
decision is amply supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including
the reason for the retrenchment:
"When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide
recession of the airline industry resulting in a slow down in the
company's growth particularly in the regional operation (Asian
Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had no choice but to adopt
cost cutting measures, such as cutting down services, number of
frequencies of flights, and reduction of the number of flying points
for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18). As a result,
defendant-appellant had to layoff A-300 pilots, including plaintiff-
appellee, which it found to be in excess of what is reasonably
needed."44
All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that
petitioner's termination from employment was for an authorized cause, for which
he was given ample notice and opportunity to be heard, by respondent company.
No error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be attributed to respondent
appellate court. Sppedsc
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. CV No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 195649 (April 16, 2013)
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First
Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the
Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2
February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y
Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence
of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he
lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso,
USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July
2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition was issued in his favor.5chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.6chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which
states:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually
renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which
I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights
and privileges of the United States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of
my knowledge and belief.7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others, the following
statements:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with
the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as
"USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado's US citizenship, Balua
presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that
Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again
departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23
April 2010, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the
available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April
2010, with the following pertinent travel records:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 05778270012chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the
respondent to personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days
from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default
and to present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections
where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently
proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting
the following documents as evidence:14chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines dated 03 April 2009;cralawlibrary
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela,
Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado
is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and
continuously residing in his family's ancestral house in Kauswagan;cralawlibrary
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his
barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned
to the Philippines in 2009;cralawlibrary
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government
Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as
Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February
1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that
Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy based on misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered
it as one for disqualification. Balua's contention that Arnado is a resident of the
United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any
evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not
conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the
Local Government Code."17chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with
Arnado's claim that he is a Filipino citizen.18chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado's act of consistently using his US passport
after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his
Affidavit of Renunciation.
xxx
Arnado's continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had
no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye
to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado's unexplained use of a US passport
six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and
renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a
passport is defined as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a
person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one who truly
divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges
reserved solely for US nationals.19chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
First Division reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED.
Rommel C. Arnado's proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession
under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take
effect.20chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on
the ground that "the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the
said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the following
contentions:22chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence
consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show
that he has substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No.
9225;cralawlibrary
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American
citizenship is not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did
not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the
Philippines;cralawlibrary
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of
his Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained
it;cralawlibrary
4. Balua's petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of
time, and the First Division's treatment of the petition as one for disqualification
constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction;23chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
5. He is undoubtedly the people's choice as indicated by his winning the
elections;cralawlibrary
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from
jurisdiction over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo
warranto, which should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of
Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion
for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado's Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly
disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the
cancellation of Arnado's candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation,
Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful
votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention
and his Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling,
claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been rendered,
and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus
does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the
candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquiling's intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6646 which allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after
elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that
Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the
case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division
allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code
to take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the
petition as one for disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within
the period prescribed by law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not
later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First
Division and granted Arnado's Motion for Reconsideration, on the following
premises:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
First:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent
embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of
another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a
pure Philippine Citizen again.
xxx
The use of a US passport does not operate to revert back his status as a dual
citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the
use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on
renounced. The First Division's reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the
said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized
Filipino, applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is
maintained in the conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their
citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine State
expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the
present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who
chose greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to
supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport
after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at
bar.
xxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US
passport. Although he applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only
issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his
Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3) months
later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is
proven by the respondent's submission of a certified true copy of his passport
showing that he used the same for his travels on the following dates: January 31,
2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June
4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was because to his
knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As
probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is
within his control during that time.25chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited
that the use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may
be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is
more appropriate in this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a
citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to
be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or
expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his
use of his American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent
proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of
retention of citizenship."26chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented,
thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned
his allegiance to the United States. The latter's continued use of his US passport
and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation
of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to
retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondent's submission with the twin
requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the
requirements for running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10,
2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements;
once any of them is lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his
citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither
does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post
cure the latter's failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his
citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his
having received the highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has
been held that where a petition for disqualification was filed before election against
a candidate but was adversely resolved against him after election, his having
obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster
from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a
matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the
people who expressed it when they ratified the Constitution and when they elected
their representatives who enacted the law.27chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado
qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and
praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the
COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued
use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the
COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm
the First Division's disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of
the applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that the
COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the vice
mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be
addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification
case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a
foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one's qualifications to
run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local
Government Code is applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent
Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before
the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the disqualification
case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the
votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one
for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the
COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition
as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano28chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court
said:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry,
or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be
allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been
no final judgment rendered.29chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the
COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the
requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v.
COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of
the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this
Court.
Arnado's claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and
respondents therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc,
cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from
attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this
instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against
Arnado will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one's foreign citizenship is a
positive and voluntary act of representation as to one's nationality and
citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation
but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003
provides:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
xxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
x x x31chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He
took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no
question that after performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2)
of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he
became eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10
July 2008 when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with
the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however,
he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual
citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American
citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the
requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino
citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign
country.32chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to
attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive
acts showing his continued possession of a foreign
citizenship.33chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after
renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in
and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November
2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a
Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering
him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times,
actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By
using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as
an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries
that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by
the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and
political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court
declared:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring
the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the
country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine
citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another
country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he
renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation 36 that
he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full
employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of
America."38chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport
does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by
repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself
as an American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one's foreign citizenship is
fatal to Arnado's bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a
disqualification to run for an elective local position.
Arnado's category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is
acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from
those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to
take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy
already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. 39 Dual citizens
by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce
foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was
a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American
citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a
local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of
eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used
his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed
not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during
the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title
may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but
continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship
issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado's
act of consistently using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of
Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin
requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which
effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from
running for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a
person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently
represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he
was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a
result of which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months
later.43chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese
national who sought naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the
renewal of his Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport
after his renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less of an act that
violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of
representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in
possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his
subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months
from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as
he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US passport on 24
November 2009.
Besides, Arnado's subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the
fact that after he renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate
of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign
passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his
Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with
attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise
demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one's flag and country.
While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of
suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to
renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public
office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his
American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took.
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is
disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a
candidate in the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the
jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as
the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its
soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a
second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the
winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of
Cavite, to fill the office of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and
the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio
received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole
ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the
office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required
by Act No. 2045 having intervened.46chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory
prohibition for seeking a second re-election absent the four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots."47chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court
was comparing "the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office
because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and
contrast between the two situations, thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because
of fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case the court,
after an examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the
candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually
received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus
to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the
manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality
that it cannot be determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In
the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of
casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the
only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in
the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for
supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of
canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate
was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case,
there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In
the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast
ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal character and
circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case,
there is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the
former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing
parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court
of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the
eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election,
its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly
elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had
been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election
held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or
not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal
president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second
placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein
ruled:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent
judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was
elected municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last general election;
and that said order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and
void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on respondents'
answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and
additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So
ordered.49chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even
have a legal basis to stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court
comparing one process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an
independent statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to
any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to
another candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter
established, what stops the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who
received the next highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him
that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful
winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the
first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening
circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election
date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the
electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding
the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged.
Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily
affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot
cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of
eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain
qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by
persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be
met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is
voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the
electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications
of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very
law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might
as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole
determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in
our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC 50
when we pronounced:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this
patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to
the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot
be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. 51 (Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC 52
where the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted
without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to
bypass election eligibility requirements."53chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We have ruled in the past that a candidate's victory in the election may be
considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be
disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidate's certificate of
candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are
mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election
laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be
construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people.
We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v.
COMELEC:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune
our above ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified
reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for
the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified
reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election
requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make
an informed choice about a candidate's eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section
39 of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials.
Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets
out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as
mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC
can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins.
To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they
know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have.
Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility
requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid
COC, concealing any disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any
disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate
and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and
statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the
ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign
voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or
republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorate's voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it
precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.
Maquiling is not a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnado's disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election
as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v.
COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the
electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an
ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign
voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that
voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications
and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When
there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the
laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the
disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as
candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the
voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate's disqualification
and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate
obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is
also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates
who placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorate's awareness of the candidate's disqualification is not a prerequisite
for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a
disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the
electorate of a candidate's disqualification is not necessary before a qualified
candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the
winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the
qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed
office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive
ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only
the COC but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong.
There was no chance for Arnado's proclamation to be suspended under this rule
because Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification.
Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he
was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado's candidacy involves his
citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for
in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of
which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has
already been elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier
discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his
certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office
based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the
individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates
in the election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of
candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced
any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition
when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the
winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the
disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long after
the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is
declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been
counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of
the COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running
for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby
DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May
2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the
Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Statement of Facts
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188314
Plaintiff-Appellee,
The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as follows:
- versus

KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL Present: On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound
B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay,
route, from its Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio
ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu CARPIO MORALES, J.,
Khalil, GAPPAL BANNAH ASALI Chairperson, de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were
a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, JAINAL BRION,
about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus
SALI a.k.a. Abu Solaiman, BERSAMIN,
ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. VILLARAMA, JR., and conductor noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on
Jackie or Zaky, and other JOHN SERENO, JJ.
the bus, so the conductor obliged and let them in.
and JANE DOES,
Accused,
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a.
Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Promulgated: wary of the two men, because, even if they got on the bus together, the two sat
Abu Khalil, and ROHMAT
away from each other one sat two seats behind the driver, while the other sat at
ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie January 10, 2011
or Zaky, the back of the bus. At the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the bus. He
Accused-Appellants.
also noticed that the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he approached
x--------------------------------------------------x the person near the driver and asked him whether he was paying for two
passengers, the latter looked dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and
DECISION
said he was paying for two and gave PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when
SERENO, J.:
the other man seated at the back also paid for both passengers. At this point,
Andales said he became more certain that the two were up to no good, and that
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals
there might be a holdup.
(CA) dated 30 June 2008, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men
The latter Decision convicted the three accused-appellants namely, Gamal B.
kept on asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also
Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim
noticed that the man at the back appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched
a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple
out in front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if he was
frustrated murder, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by lethal
tinkering with something. When Andales would get near the man, the latter would
injection. The CA modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua as required by
glare at him. Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the suspicious
Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death Penalty).
characters to the police.

As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue
and EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the
bus driver initially did not want to let them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance
prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus
driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got
off the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an
explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus
towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw
their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few
hours after, he made a statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the
whole incident.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of
Justice, confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu
Sayyaf Group Abu Solaiman announced over radio station DZBB that the group
had a Valentines Day gift for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the
bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News
Network an exclusive interview some time after the incident, confessing his
participation in the Valentines Day bombing incident. In another exclusive interview
on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing
incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had
supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus
conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they
were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B.
Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim
a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other John and Jane Does were then charged with
multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and
Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain at-large.
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-
476), Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand,
upon arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-
477), accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty.
Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. During the pretrial hearing, the parties
stipulated the following:
1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.
2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad,
and Asali admitted knowing one another before February
14, 2005.
3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb
exploded in the RRCG bus while the bus was plying the
EDSA route fronting the MRT terminal which is in front of
the Makati Commercial Center.
4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias
Rohmat whom he claims taught him how to make
explosive devices.
5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat
before the February 14 bombing incident.
6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to
causing the bomb explosion inside the RRCG bus which
left four people dead and more or less forty persons
injured.
7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within
the period March 20-24 each gave separate interviews to
the ABS-CBN news network admitting their participation in
the commission of the said crimes, subject of these cases.
8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading
 guilty to these crimes, because they were guilt-stricken As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu
after seeing a man carrying a child in the first bus that they
Sayyaf leadership, specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of
had entered.
9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of TNT, a soldering gun, aluminum powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of
March 2005 he gave a television news interview in which
which he knew would be used to make a bomb. He then recalled that sometime in
he admitted that he supplied the explosive devices which
resulted in this explosion inside the RRCG bus and which November to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4 kilos of TNT that
resulted in the filing of these charges.
is, 2 kilos on two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm that
10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted Trinidad would get TNT from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was
that they are members of the Abu Sayyaf.45
allegedly placed in two buses sometime in December 2004, but neither one of
them exploded.
In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether
accused Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their not guilty pleas to
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentines Day bombing,
the charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled guilty to the
Trinidad and Baharan got another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the evening of
heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their
14 February, he received a call from Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to
pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and
leave home or go to crowded areas, since the TNT taken by Baharan and Trinidad
explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged
had already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later, Trinidad called Asali,
the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the
repeating the warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly received a
Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of
call from accused Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of the
multiple frustrated murder.46
mission.47 According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said, Sa wakas nag success
din yung tinuro ko sayo.
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while
under training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and
Assignment of Errors
two other persons taught him how to make bombs and explosives. The trainees
were told that they were to wage battles against the government in the city, and
Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:
that their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway Transit (LRT),
and other parts of Metro Manila.
I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-
 appellants plea of guilt despite insufficiency of searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
ATTY. PEA
the consequences of the said plea.
: Then we should be given enough time to talk
with them. I havent conferred with them about
this with regard to the multiple murder case.

II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of
accused-appellants for the crimes charged had been
COURT : Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Pea, can
proven beyond reasonable doubt.48 you assist the two accused because if they
are interested in withdrawing their [pleas], I
want to hear it from your lips.
First Assignment of Error
ATTY. PEA : Yes, your Honor.
(At this juncture, Atty. Pea confers with the
Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not two accused, namely Trinidad and Baharan)
I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have
conduct a searching inquiry after they had changed their plea from not guilty to
explained to them the consequence of their
guilty. The transcript of stenographic notes during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment pleas, your Honor, and that the plea of guilt to
the murder case and plea of not guilty to the
before the Makati Regional Trial Court is reproduced below:
frustrated multiple murder actually are
inconsistent with their pleas.
COURT : Anyway, I think what we should have to do,
COURT : With matters that they stipulated upon?
considering the stipulations that were agreed
upon during the last hearing, is to address this
ATTY. PEA : Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they
matter of pleas of not guilty entered for the
already plead guilt to the murder case, then
frustrated murder charges by the two
they are now changing their pleas, your
accused, Mr. Trinidad and Mr. Baharan,
Honor, from not guilty to the one of guilt. They
because if you will recall they entered pleas of
are now ready, your Honor, for re-
guilty to the multiple murder charges, but then
arraignment.
earlier pleas of not guilty for the frustrated
multiple murder charges remain [I]s that not
inconsistent considering the stipulations that
were entered into during the initial pretrial of
INTERPRETER: (Read again that portion [of the information] and
this case? [If] you will recall, they admitted to
translated it in Filipino in a clearer way and
have caused the bomb explosion that led to
asked both accused what their pleas are).
the death of at least four people and injury of
Your Honor, both accused are entering
about forty other persons and so under the
separate pleas of guilt to the crime charged.
circumstances, Atty Pea, have you discussed
this matter with your clients?
COURT : All right. So after the information was re-read
to the accused, they have withdrawn their
 pleas of not guilty and changed it to the pleas
of guilty to the charge of frustrated murder.
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt,
Thank you. Are there any matters you need to
especially in a case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon
address at pretrial now? If there are none,
the trial judge in order to leave no room for doubt on the possibility
then I will terminate pretrial and
that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the
accommodate49
charge and the consequences of the plea. 52

As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that all
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be
trial judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for
deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the
while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra
consequences of a guilty plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully
v. Alborida, this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even
the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.50 Thus, trial
if the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained
court judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule
the consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his
116 of the Rules of Court:
counsel; that the accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted
out to him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened. 53
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching
full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall
inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken
(Emphasis supplied)
impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences

The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases

of re-arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-
appellant's original plea was not guilty, the trial court should have exerted careful
effort in inquiring into why he changed his plea to guilty. 51 According to the Court:
of their guilty plea.54 This requirement is stringent and mandatory. 55 the offense charged.57 Thus, in People v. Nadera, the Court stated:

Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re- Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set
aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the
arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt
trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict
against the accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it
is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on
previously pled guilty to another charge multiple murder based on the same act
evidence proving his commission of the offense charged. 58
relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that (Emphasis supplied.)
prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two
In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt
other confessions of guilt one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of
television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the other
the conductor was merely circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy
via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing
was insufficient.
circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the searching
inquiry in this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted,
Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the
as the accuseds plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment
evidence for the prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from the
under consideration.56
stipulation of facts, primarily consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor,
Elmer Andales, and of the accused-turned-state-witness, Asali. Andales positively
identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men who had acted
Second Assignment of Error
suspiciously while inside the bus; who had insisted on getting off the bus in
violation of a Makati ordinance; and who had scampered away from the bus
In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of
moments before the bomb exploded. On the other hand, Asali testified that he had
conducting a searching inquiry was not complied with, [t]he manner by which the
given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in
plea of guilt is made loses much of great significance where the conviction can be
Makati City. The guilt of the accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently
based on independent evidence proving the commission by the person accused of
established by these corroborating testimonies, coupled with their respective
judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive
A : Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the
television interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed malls, LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila,
sir.60
the perpetrators of the Valentines Day bombing.59 Accordingly, the Court upholds
the findings of guilt made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for accused
Baharan and Trinidad.
Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the
testimony of accused-turned-state-witness Asali. Below is a reproduction of the Q : Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did
you know what happened to the 2 kilos of
transcript of stenographic notes on the state prosecutors direct examination of
bomb that Trinidad and Tapay took from you
state-witness Asali during the 26 May 2005 trial: sometime in November 2004?

A : That was the explosive that he planted in the

Q : You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. G-liner, which did not explode.
Under what circumstances did he train you,
Mr. Witness, to assemble those explosives, Q : How did you know, Mr. witness?
you and Trinidad?
A : He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo
A : Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, Trinidad, sir.
the three of them, that Angelo Trinidad and
myself be the one to be trained to make an
explosive, sir.
Q : What happened next, Mr. witness, when the
Q : Mr. witness, how long that training, or how bomb did not explode, as told to you by
long did it take that training? Trinidad?

A : If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make A : On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more
bomb about one month and two weeks. kilos of TNT bombs.

Q : Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, Q : Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another
while you were still in training at Mr. Cararao, amount of explosive on that date, December
is there any mission that you undertook, if 29, 2004? Will you kindly tell us the reason
any, with respect to that mission? why?

A : He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me
to get the TNT so that he could detonate a
bomb
Q : Were there any other person, besides Abu
Solaiman, who called you up, with respect to
the taking of the explosives from you?
A : There is, sir Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called
you up?
A : He told me that this is your first mission.
Q : Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What
is that mission you are referring to?
A : That is the first mission where we can show
our anger towards the Christians.
Q : The second time that he got a bomb from you,
Mr. witness, do you know if the bomb
explode?
A : I did not know what happened to the next 2
kilos taken by Angelo Trinidad from me until
after I was caught, because I was told by the
policeman that interviewed me after I was
arrested that the 2 kilos were planted in a bus,
which also did not explode.
Q : So besides these two incidents, were there
any other incidents that Angelo Trinidad and
Tapay get an explosive for you, Mr. witness?
A : If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005
at 6:30 p.m.
Q : Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?
A : Its Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.
Q : How many explosives did they get from you,
Mr. witness, at that time?
A : They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.
Q : Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they
going to use that explosive?
A : No, sir.
Q : Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to
the third batch of explosives, which were
taken from you by Trinidad and Tapay?
A : That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.
Q : Why did you know, Mr. witness?
A : Because I was called in the evening of
February 14 by Abu Solaiman. He told me not
to leave the house because the explosive that
were taken by Tapay and Angelo Trinidad
exploded.
Q : Was there any other call during that time, Mr.
Witness?
A : I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the
house because the explosive that he took
 exploded already, sir.
Q : How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time,
that indeed, the bomb exploded at Makati,
beside the call of Abu Solaiman and Trinidad?
A : It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing
in Makati should coincide with the bombing in
General Santos.
A : He told it to me, sir I cannot remember the
date anymore, but I know it was sometime in
February 2005.
Q : Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu
Solaiman and Trinidad after the bombing
exploded in Makati, any other call?
A : There is, sir The call came from Abu Zaky.
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?
A : He just greeted us congratulations, because
we have a successful mission.
A : He told me that sa wakas, nag success din
yung tinuro ko sayo.
Q : By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to
clarify this. You stated that Abu Zaky called
you up the following day, that was February
15, and congratulating you for the success of
the mission. My question to you, Mr. witness,
if you know what is the relation of that
mission, wherein you were congratulated by
Abu Zaky, to the mission, which have been
indoctrinated to you, while you were in Mt.
Cararao, Mr. witness?
A : They are connected, sir.
Q : Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?
A : Because when we were undergoing training,
we were told that the Abu Sayyaf should not
wage war to the forest, but also wage our
battles in the city.
Q : Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?
A : The government, sir.61
What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf
Group was determined to sow terror in Metro Manila, so that they could show their
anger towards the Christians.62 It can also be seen that Rohmat, together with
Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, had carefully planned the Valentines Day bombing
incident, months before it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali and Trinidad to
make bombs and explosives. While in training, Asali and others were told that their
mission was to plant bombs in malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila.
According to Asali, Rohmat called him on 29 December 2004 to confirm that
Trinidad would get two kilos of TNT from Asali, as they were about to commence
their first mission.63 They made two separate attempts to bomb a bus in Metro
Manila, but to no avail. The day before the Valentines Day bombing, Trinidad got
another two kilos of TNT from Asali. On Valentines Day, the Abu Sayyaf Group
announced that they had a gift for the former President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
On their third try, their plan finally succeeded. Right after the bomb exploded, the
Abu Sayyaf Group declared that there would be more bombings in the future. Asali
then received a call from Rohmat, praising the former: Sa wakas nag success din
yung tinuro ko sayo.64
In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt
against Rohmat. Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 17. Principals. The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished
Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or
the provision on principal by inducement. The instructions and training he had
given Asali on how to make bombs coupled with their careful planning and
persistent attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmats
confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of their mission
prove the finding that Rohmats co-inducement was the determining cause of the
commission of the crime.65 Such command or advice [was] of such nature that,
without it, the crime would not have materialized. 66
Further, the inducement was so influential in producing the criminal act
that without it, the act would not have been performed.67 In People v. Sanchez, et
al., the Court ruled that, notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at
the crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the criminal act
or the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal
and co-conspirator, and because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the
mayor was rendered liable for all the resulting crimes.68 The same finding must be
applied to the case at bar.
The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy involving
accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Rohmat. Conspiracy was clearly established from
the collective acts of the accused-appellants before, during and after the
commission of the crime. As correctly declared by the trial court in its Omnibus
Decision:
Asalis clear and categorical testimony, which remains
unrebutted on its major points, coupled with the judicial
admissions freely and voluntarily given by the two other accused,
are sufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy hatched
between and among the four accused, all members of the terrorist
group Abu Sayyaf, to wreak chaos and mayhem in the metropolis
by indiscriminately killing and injuring civilian victims by utilizing
bombs and other similar destructive explosive devices.
 While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has
not been expressly admitted by accused Baharan, Angelo
Trinidad, and Rohmat, more specifically with respect to the latters
participation in the commission of the crimes, nonetheless it has
been established by virtue of the aforementioned evidence, which
established the existence of the conspiracy itself and the
indispensable participation of accused Rohmat in seeing to it that
the conspirators criminal design would be realized.
It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from
the acts of the accused, which clearly manifests a concurrence of
wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime (People v.
Lenantud, 352 SCRA 544). Hence, where acts of the accused
collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a
common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful
purpose, conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators will be held
liable as principals (People v. Ellado, 353 SCRA 643).69
In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be justified in
concluding that the defendants therein were engaged in a conspiracy when the
defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and
the other performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the
attainment of the same object; and their acts, though apparently independent,
were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. 70
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to
Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements
made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made
during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v.
Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession
becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators.71 Thus, in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:
[W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial
confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence
against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial
confession is admissible against the declarants co-accused since
the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to
extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial
where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant. Mercenes admission implicating
his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in
evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several
accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a
co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence
against the latter.72
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, as affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119292 (July 31, 1998)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN,
IMELDA COJUANGCO, THE ESTATE OF RAMON COJUANGCO represented
by IMELDA COJUANGCO, and PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Should a sequestration order be deemed invalid and "automatically lifted" on the
grounds that (1) it was signed by only one PCGG Commissioner in contravention
of the Presidential Commission on Good Government Rules and Regulations
("PCGG Rules" or simply "Rules") requiring the authority of at least two
commissioners; and in any event, (2) the PCGG failed, within the prescribed
period, to institute or to implead or include private respondents in the proper
judicial action, as required by the 1987 Constitution?
The Case
The Sandiganbayan answered the foregoing question in the affirmative in two
Resolutions 1 dated December 17, 1993, 2 and August 29, 1994. 3 Declared
"automatically lifted" in the earlier Resolution were the writs of sequestration that
the PCGG had issued (a) against Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) and (b) over 111,415
shares of stock of the Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation
(PTIC) registered in the name of PHI. The later Resolution denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by the PCGG.
Disagreeing with the above rulings, the PCGG filed the instant petition for certiorari
before us, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the anti-graft court.
The Facts
The petition alleges that the PCGG issued the following communications, all dated
May 9, 1986: (1) an Order of Sequestration 4 directed against all properties,
assets, records and documents of PHI; (2) another Order 5 sequestering 111,415
shares of stock of PTIC registered in the books of PTIC in the name of PHI; and
(3) a letter 6 addressed to Siguion Reyna Montecillo & Ongsiako, advising the said
law firm that the PCGG, in its session on May 2, 1986, resolved inter alia "[t]o
order the sequestration of all the shareholdings of PRIME HOLDINGS, INC. (PHI),
which owns approximately 46% of PHILIPPINE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INVESTMENT CORPORATION (PTIC), which in turn owns approximately 26% of
PLDT [Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company]." The two Orders were
signed solely by the late PCGG Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista, while
the letter was signed by both Commissioner Bautista and then PCGG
Commissioner Raul Daza.
On July 16, 1987, petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan a Complaint for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting restitution and damages against Spouses
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, Spouses Imelda (Imee) and Tomas Manotoc,
Spouses Irene and Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr., Constante
Rubio, Nemesio G. Co, Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan.
Said Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 0002, principally sought to recover
from defendants their alleged ill-gotten wealth, consisting of funds and property
which were manifestly out of proportion to their salaries and other lawful income,
having been allegedly acquired during the incumbency of the Spouses Marcos as
public officers. Among such properties mentioned in the Complaint were shares of
stock in various corporation, including PTIC and PLDT, a list of which was
annexed to the Complaint.
An amended Complaint 7 filed on April 23, 1990, included in Civil Case No. 0002
as additional parties-defendants herein Private Respondents Imelda Cojuangco,
the estate of Ramon Cojuangco represented by its administratrix Imelda
Cojuangco, and Prime Holdings, Inc. The amended complaint further alleged inter
alia that these new defendants held shares of stock in PLDT, which "in truth and in
fact belong to defendants Ferdinand Marcos and his family."
Three years later, on May 4, 1993, private respondents filed in Civil Case No. 0002
a Motion 8 seeking to declare the order of sequestration against PHI automatically
lifted. In support of their Motion, private respondents cited (1) the non-observance
by PCGG of its own rules and regulations requiring the authority of at least two
commissioners for the issuance of sequestration orders; and (2) the failure of
PCGG to file the appropriate judicial action within the period prescribed under
Section 26, 9 Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, or "not later than 2 August
1987," since the sequestration order was issued on May 9, 1986, which was "a
date before the ratification of the Philippine Constitution on 2 February 1987."
On December 20, 1993, the first assailed Resolution of public respondent, which
granted the above-mentioned Motion, was promulgated. The sequestration orders
against PHI and its shares of stock in PTIC were declared "automatically lifted" by
the Sandiganbayan, which upheld the movants' contentions in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the Order of Sequestration dated May 9, 1986 directed (against)
defendant Prime Holdings, Inc. and the Order dated May 9, 1986 sequestering
111,415 shares of stock of Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation
registered in the name of Prime Holdings, Inc. are hereby declared automatically
lifted pursuant to Section 26 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Philippines Constitution. 10
Expectedly, PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 11 Noting that petitioner
raised no new issue or matter that might materially affect its findings in its previous
Resolution, public respondent denied said Motion "for lack of
merit." 12 Hence, the present recourse. 13
The Issues
Petitioner PCGG charges Respondent Sandiganbayan with "grave abuse of
discretion and act[ing] without jurisdiction," viz.:
I. In declaring the writs of sequestration as defective for not being authorized by at
least two commissioners pursuant to Section 3 of the PCGG Rules and
Regulations.
II. In declaring the writs of sequestration to have been automatically lifted for
alleged failure of petitioner to file the proper judicial action against private
respondent corporation within the period fixed in Section 26 of Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution.
III. In applying the rulings in PCGG vs. International Copra Export Corp. (G.R. No.
92755, July 26, 1991) and Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (200 SCRA 530 [1991])
that the filing by petitioner of the judicial action against a stockholder is not the
judicial action contemplated by the Constitution.
IV. By misinterpreting or misapplying the ruling in Filmerco vs. IAC (149 SCRA 193
[1987]) as said ruling, being a mere obiter dictum, had not overturned the
application of the doctrine of "piercing the veil of corporate fiction" as held in a long
line of decisions by this Honorable Court. 14
Simply stated, the principal issues being raised by petitioner are: (1) the validity of
the sequestration orders against PHI and PHI-held shares in PTIC; and (2) the
alleged failure of PCGG to file the proper judicial action as contemplated under
Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Before this Court, private respondents initially filed a motion 15 to dismiss the
petition on the ground of laches, the petition having been filed only after six and a
half months from petitioner's receipt of the public respondent's denial of its Motion
for Reconsideration. They assert that this interval of time was clearly beyond the
"reasonable period" allowed under Rule 65 for filing a petition for certiorari. 16 Prior
to the amendment of the Rules of Court on July 1, 1997, we had ruled in several
cases that three (3) months from receipt of the challenged decision, order or
resolution was a reasonable period within which to institute a certiorari proceeding.
17
Thus, in People vs. Magallanes, 18 the lapse of nine to ten months before
assailing a denial of bail was no longer considered reasonable. Furthermore, in
Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 19 where certiorari was sought after more than two
years, we held that there was unreasonable delay in the filing of the petition. We
also ruled that laches sets in after an interval of seven months 20 or of ninety-nine
days 21 has passed since the rendition of the order sought to be set aside.
Indeed, if "three months" is to be used as the yardstick for filing an action for
certiorari, the present petition should have been dismissed long ago. In view,
however, of this Court's past pronouncements 22 that cases involving sequestered
corporations are "endowed with public interest and involve a matter of public
policy"; and in order to dispose, once and for all, the recurring issues herein raised,
we (1) resolved on May 22, 1995, to note without action private respondents'
Motion to Dismiss and (2) reiterated the March 25, 1995 Resolution requiring them
to comment on the petition. In effect, the "three-month rule" was suspended, but
only in regard to this case.
The Court's Ruling
After a careful study and analysis of both parties' arguments, as well as the
applicable law and jurisprudence, we find the petition to be without merit.
First Issue: Validity of Sequestration Orders
Signed by Only One Commissioner
Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations, which took effect immediately after its
promulgation on April 11, 1986, explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. Who may issue. A writ of sequestration or a freeze or hold order may be
issued by the Commission upon the authority of at least two Commissioners,
based on the affirmation or complaint of an interested party or motu proprio when
the Commission has reasonable grounds to believe that the issuance thereof is
warranted.
Undisputed is the fact that only one commissioner, the late Mary Concepcion
Bautista, signed the two sequestration orders subject of this petition. To support its
contention that there is no need for the signatures of two commissioners
 23
authorizing said orders, petitioner submits this excerpt from the minutes of a
PCGG meeting held on October 15, 1987:
The authority of at least two commissioners which is required under Sec. 3 of the
PCGG Rules and Regulations may be written or verbal authority. Such authority
may be reflected in the Minutes of the Commission Meeting held en banc covering
the pertinent recommendation/approval on the issuance of the order; or the
Commissioner-in-charge intending to issue the Order may simply obtain the
concurrence of another Commissioner after explaining the evidence supporting
such order.
It is sufficient for only one Commissioner to sign the Order "FOR THE
COMMISSION". After April 11, 1986, the Commission has encouraged the practice
of two Commissioners signing the Order.
Generally, the interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is
tasked to implement a statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the
construction of the courts. 24 The reason behind this rule was explained in Nestle
Philippines, Inc vs. Court of Appeals 25 in this wise:
The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious
needs of a modern or modernizing society and the establishment of diverse
administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates
to the accumulation of experience and growth of specialized by the administrative
agency charged with implementing a particular statute. In Asturias Sugar Central,
Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs 26 the Court stressed that executive officials are
presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the considerations pertinent to
the meaning and purpose of the law, and to have formed an independent,
conscientious and competent expert opinion thereon. The courts give much weight
to the government agency or officials charged with the implementation of the law,
their competence expertness, experience and informed judgment, and the fact that
they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret.
As a general rule, contemporaneous construction is resorted to for certainty and
predictability in the laws, 27 especially those involving specific terms having
technical meanings.
However, courts will not hesitate to set aside such executive interpretation when it
is clearly erroneous, or when there is no ambiguity in the rule, 28 or when the
language or words used are clear and plain or readily understandable to any
ordinary reader 29 without need for interpretation or construction.
The construction advanced by petitioner creates rather than clears ambiguity. The
fair and sensible interpretation of the PCGG Rule in question is that the authority
given by two commissioners for the issuance of a sequestration, freeze or hold
order should be evident in the order itself. Simply stated, the writ must bear the
signatures of two commissioners, because their signatures are the best evidence
of their approval thereof. Otherwise, the validity of such order will be open to
question and the very evil sought to be avoided - the use of spurious or fictitious
sequestration orders - will persist. The corporation or entity against which such writ
is directed will not be able to visually determine its validity, unless the required
signatures of at least two commissioners authorizing its issuance appear on the
very document itself. The issuance of sequestration orders requires the existence
of a prima facie case. The two-commissioner rule is obviously intended to assure a
collegial determination of such fact. In this light, a writ bearing only one signature is
an obvious transgression of the PCGG Rules.
Inasmuch as sequestration tends to impede or limit the exercise of proprietary
rights by private citizens, 30 it should be construed strictly against the state,
pursuant to the legal maxim that statutes in derogation of common rights are in
general strictly construed and rigidly confined to cases clearly within their scope
and purpose. 31 As Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera aptly said:
Sequestration is an extraordinary, harsh, and even severe remedy. It should be
confined to its lawful parameters and exercised, with due regard, in the words of its
enabling laws, to the requirements of fairness, due process, and justice. 32
Concededly, even the exercise of the "inherent and plenary" police power of the
state to impose restrictions on property rights is subject to the conditions of
reasonableness, public welfare, and necessity. 33
Furthermore, petitioner's attempted clarification of Section 3 of the PCGG Rules
was made only on October 15, 1987, or a full year and six months from the
promulgation 34 of said Rules. Such clarification by the then commissioners was
obviously self-serving and cannot be given much value. Apparently, the
commissioners were simply trying to save face over their mistaken issuance of
sequestration orders contrary to the very Rules they themselves had crafted and
promulgated. Even conceding for the nonce that the adverted Rule is indeed
ambiguous, the dictum is that such ambiguity should be taken contra proferentem;
that is, it should be construed against the party who had caused the ambiguity and
who could have avoided it by the exercise of a little more care. 35
Significantly, in that same meeting where the strained clarification of the subject
Rule was made, the commissioners also affirmed that the signing of sequestration
orders by two commissioners had already been encouraged after April 11, 1986, 36
presumably pursuant to the PCGG Rules which took effect on said date. This
affirmation plainly bolsters the proposition that the real intent behind the Rule was
to require two commissioners to sign such orders. But still, on May 9, 1986, or only
four weeks after the Rules had been promulgated, the Commission failed to heed
its own declaration as proven by the signing of the questioned writs by only one
commissioner.
Republic vs. Dio Island Resort
and Republic vs. Provident
International Resources
Not Applicable to the Present Case
At this Point, the present case will be examined and compared with two others
involving the validity of sequestration orders issued by less than two PCGG
commissioners: Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, Romualdez and Dio Island Resort, 37
("Republic vs. Dio Island"), which voided the writ issued against the resort; and
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), Provident International Resources
Corp., and Phil. Casino Operators Corp. 38 ("Republic vs. Provident"), which
upheld the writs issued against the respondent corporations.
In Republic vs. Dio Island, the sequestration order was issued on April 14, 1986,
by the head of the PCGG Task Force in Region VIII. Ruling that such issuance by
a non-commissioner was not valid, the Court explained that Section 3 of the PCGG
Rules and Regulations, which is "couched in clear and simple language, leaves no
room for interpretation. On the basis thereof, it is indubitable that under no
circumstances can a sequestration or freeze order be validly issued by one not a
Commissioner of the PCGG." 39 Furthermore, "PCGG may not delegate to its
representatives and subordinates its authority to sequester, and any such
delegation is invalid and ineffective." 40 In sum, not only was the authority of the
official who issued the order absent; no such authority legally existed.
In Republic vs. Provident, on the other hand, the questioned writ bore the
signature of only one commissioner, as in this case. Yet, the Court upheld its
validity for the reason that the writ was issued on March 19, 1986, before the
promulgation of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. In refusing to lift the writ, we
reasoned that "we cannot reasonably expect the Commission to abide by said
rules which were nonexistent at the time the subject writ was issued by then
Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista. Basic is the rule that no statute, decree,
ordinance, rule or regulation (or even policy) shall be given retrospective effect
unless explicitly stated so. We find no provision in said Rules which expressly
gives them retroactive effect, or implies the abrogation of previous writs issued not
in accordance with the same Rules." 41 Thus, the writ signed by only one
commissioner was held valid.
The rationale in Provident has no relevance or application to the instant case,
since the writ bearing the sole signature of the late Commissioner Bautista was
issued after the promulgation and effectivity of the PCGG Rule requiring the
authority of at least two commissioners for the issuance of a sequestration order.
Obviously, Section 3 of the PCGG Rules was intended to protect the public from
improvident, reckless and needless sequestrations of private property. And since
these Rules were issued by Respondent Commission, it should be the first entity to
observe them.
Letter to Law Firm
Not a Sequestration Writ
Nor can we accord probative value to the communication signed by
Commissioners Data and Bautista and addressed to Siguion Reyna, Montecillo &
Ongsiako. First, this letter is definitely not a writ of sequestration; it does not even
purport to be one. It merely relays the information to the said law firm, and not to
PHI (the company purported to be sequestered), that the Commission has
resolved "(t)o order the sequestration of all the shareholdings of PRIME
HOLDINGS, INC." Second, the letter makes no reference to the questioned writ as
one that embodies the Resolution of the Commission ordering the sequestration of
the shareholdings of PHI. Third, nothing in the records shows that on the date the
letter was written (May 9, 1986), the law firm to which it was addressed was the
legal counsel of PHI on the matter at hand. And fourth, there is no proof that said
letter was received by the law firm for and on behalf of PHI. With all the above
considerations, private respondents cannot be presumed to have had constructive
knowledge of the alleged sequestration order against PHI.
EO 2 not a General
Writ of Sequestration
Petitioner also argues that Executive Order No. 2 42 (EO 2), issued on March 12,
1986 by then President Corazon C. Aquino by virtue of her revolutionary powers
under the Freedom Constitution, partakes of a general freeze and sequestration
order which cannot be lifted by this Court without. altogether nullifying the law. This
contention is utterly without merit.
The PCGG was created 43 precisely "with the task of assisting the President in
regard to . . . matters" among which was "[t]he recovery of all ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or
abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and
entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through
nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their
powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship." 44 More specifically, the
PCGG was granted this power and authority:
to sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession any
building or office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and any
records pertaining thereto, in order to prevent their destruction, concealment or
disappearance which would frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise
prevent the Commission from accomplishing its task. 45
It appears, therefore, that while then President Corazon C. Aquino, through EO 2,
froze all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos
and his wife, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies,
agents, or nominees had any interest or participation, EO 1 is more specific in
delegating to the PCGG the power to issue writs of sequestration While EO 2 is a
general policy statement affirming the right and duty of the government to recover
ill-gotten wealth, 46 as well as a general notice to the public that it is pursuing such
right, EO 1 gives authority to the PCGG to undertake the details to enable it to
achieve such purpose. This is but logical, because sequestration presupposes the
existence of a prima facie case, 47 the determination of which lies with the PCGG
which is vested with investigatory powers pursuant to its mandate. 48 Furthermore,
by virtue of the requirements of due process, EO 1, by itself, obviously cannot be
equated with an all-encompassing writ of sequestration, since it names no
particular person or property against whom or which it is directed.
Second Issue: Respondents Impleaded
Beyond Prescribed Period
Petitioner contends that there is no need (1) to file a separate action or (2) to
independently implead PHI in Civil Case No. 0002, because PTIC has already
been included in the list of alleged ill-gotten wealth of defendants in said case. To
buttress its position, petitioner cites Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (First
Division), 49 in which the Court, through Mr. Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, held:
1) Sec. 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution does not, by its terms or any fair
interpretation thereof, require that corporations or business enterprises alleged to
be repositories of "ill-gotten wealth," as the term is used in said provision, be
actually and formally impleaded in the actions for the recovery thereof, in order to
maintain in effect existing sequestrations thereof;
2) complaints for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth which merely identify and/or
allege said corporations or enterprises to be the instruments, repositories or the
fruits of ill-gotten wealth, without more, come within the meaning of the phrase
"corresponding judicial action or proceeding" contemplated by the constitutional
provision referred to; the more so, that normally, said corporations, as
distinguished from their stockholders or members, are not generally suable for the
latter's illegal or criminal actuations in the acquisition of the assets invested by
them in the former;
3) even assuming the impleading of said corporations to be necessary and proper
so that judgment may comprehensively and effectively be rendered in the actions,
amendment of the complaints to implead them as defendants may, under existing
rules of procedure, be done at any time during the pendency of the actions thereby
initiated, and even during the pendency of an appeal to the Supreme Court - a
procedure that, in any case, is not inconsistent with or proscribed by the
constitutional time limits to the filing of the corresponding complaints "for" - i.e.,
with regard or in relation to, in respect of, or in connection wit, or concerning -
orders of sequestration, freezing, or provisional takeover. 50
Petitioner misapplies our above-quoted pronouncements. The filing of an action
directly against a sequestered corporation, or its impleading in a complaint for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth, is not necessary when (1) a formal complaint has
already been filed against the persons alleged to have unlawfully amassed wealth;
(2) such complaint, whether in its body or in an attachment or annex, refers to
specific funds or properties, among which is the sequestered entity or asset; and
(3) such complaint was filed within the period prescribed in Section 26, Article XVIII
of the Constitution. These requisites do nor obtain in the case at bar.
First, the original Complaint for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth filed on July 16,
1987, did not implead any of private respondents as parties thereto. Neither were
they included in the annexed list of alleged ill-gotten wealth. It was only on April 23,
1990, via an amended Complaint, that Imelda Cojuangco, the estate of Ramon
Cojuangco, and Prime Holdings, Inc., were made parties-defendants. By then,
three years - well beyond the six months prescribed by the Constitution - had
passed since the issuance of the sequestration orders against the PHI and the
PTIC shares it owned.
Second, even if PTIC was listed in the Annex to the Complaint, it must be
understood that the case refers only to the extent of the shares in PTIC illegally
acquired by the original defendants. As we stated in the aforecited Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan (First Division): 51
As regards actions in which the complaints seek recovery of defendants' shares of
stock in existing corporations (e.g., San Miguel Corporation, Benguet Corporation,
Meralco, etc.) allegedly purchased with misappropriated public funds, in breach of
fiduciary duty, or otherwise under illicit or anomalous conditions, the impleading of
said firms would clearly appear to be unnecessary. If warranted by the evidence,
judgments may be handed against the corresponding defendants divesting them of
ownership of their stock, the acquisition thereof being illegal and consequently
burdened with a constructive trust, and imposing on them the obligation of
surrendering them to the Government.
Thus, whether PHI itself - an entirely different corporate entity, though a major
investor in PTIC - has shareholdings unlawfully or anomalously acquired, or
whether it was organized with ill-gotten wealth, is a different matter. Notably, the
individual respondents are the registered owners of PHI and, as earlier stated, they
had not been included as original defendants in Civil Case No. 0002. The judicial
action against them was belatedly instituted long after the lapse of the
constitutional time frame.
In its Memorandum, 52 petitioner vehemently argues that "although PHI was not
initially included in the enumeration of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses . . . in
Annex A of the original complaint," it is enough that "PTIC and PLDT were
included in said list of ill-gotten wealth of the principal defendants." This argument
is absolutely in contravention of the due process guarantee. PHI is a corporation
completely separate from PTIC and PLDT. Indeed, it has a personality distinct
from said entities. Petitioner has shown no commonality in shareholding,
management or operation among them. Neither has it alleged, much less proven,
any ground why the separate corporate personality of PHI should be set aside or
pierced. And definitely, the most basic considerations of due process prevent a suit
against PTIC and PLDT from adversely affecting and prejudicing the proprietary
rights of PHI and its likewise unimpleaded shareholders. 53
Third, the filing of the amended Complaint on April 23, 1990 for the purpose of
specifically impleading PHI, Imelda Cojuangco and the estate of Ramon
Cojuangco represented by its administratrix, as defendants, cannot be deemed to
date back to the filing of the original Complaint and to thereby imply compliance
with the constitutional provision. The filing of an amended pleading does not
retroact to the date of the filing of the original; hence, the statute of limitations runs
until the submission of the amendment. 54
While it has been held that "an amendment which merely supplements and
amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to the date of the
commencement of the action and is nor barred by the statute of limitations which
expired after the service of the original complaint," 55 such rule does not apply to a
party who is impleaded for the first time in the amended complaint that was filed
beyond the prescriptive period. 56
Prescription is a legal defense accorded any person against whom a judicial action
is belatedly brought after the lapse of the time specified by law. Here, it is the
Constitution itself which defines the period within which judicial proceedings may
be brought against sequestered entities. From the foregoing, it is clear that no
judicial action was instituted against the private respondents within the prescribed
period.
All in all, the sequestration orders issued against private respondents and the
111,415 shares of PTIC registered under the name of PHI must perforce be
deemed automatically lifted due to (1) the invalidity of the alleged sequestration
writs themselves, owing to the non-observance of the PCGG Rule requiring the
authority of at least two commissioners; and, in any event, (2) the failure of PCGG
to commence the proper judicial action, or to implead private respondents therein,
within the period prescribed by Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Corollary Matter: Disclosures
of Jose Yao Campos
Petitioner, in a desperate final attempt to justify the continued sequestration of PHI
and the subject shares it owns in PTIC, invokes an alleged deposition of Jose Yao
Campos declaring that former President Marcos was the true owner of PHI. This
argument is irrelevant and immaterial to the present petition.
The focal issues of this case pertain only to the validity of the sequestration order
signed by just one commissioner and the timeliness of the judicial action against
private respondents. The substantive issue on whether PHI or the PTIC shares are
ill-gotten wealth is another matter and should be litigated in the main case for
recovery and reconveyance (Civil Case No. 0002).
The lifting of the writs of sequestration will not necessarily be fatal to the main
case. It is in the latter proceeding that Campos' testimony may be properly offered
and its value and credit-worthiness appreciated. Even with the lifting of the
sequestration orders against PHI and the PTIC shares, these properties may still
be recovered by the government upon substantial proof, proffered in the proper
suit, that they indeed constitute unlawfully amassed wealth of the Marcoses and/or
their conduits. The lifting of the subject orders does not ipso facto mean that the
sequestered properties are not ill-gotten; neither does it preempt a finding to that
effect in the main action.
The effect of the lifting of the sequestration against PHI and the subject PTIC
shares will merely be the termination of the role of the government as conservator
thereof. In other words, the PCGG may no longer exercise administrative or
housekeeping powers, 57 and its nominees may no longer vote the heretofore
sequestered shares to enable them to sit on the corporate board of the subject
firm.
In brief, sequestration is not the be-all and end-all of the efforts of the government
to recover unlawfully amassed wealth. The PCGG may still proceed to prove in the
main suit who the real owners of these assets are. Besides, as we reasserted in
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 58 the PCGG may still avail itself of ancillary writs,
since "Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over the sequestration cases demands that it
should also have the authority to preserve the subject matter of the cases, the
alleged ill-gotten wealth properties . . . ."
With the use of proper remedies and upon substantial proof, properties in litigation
may, when necessary, be placed in custodia legis for the complete determination
of the controversy or for the effective enforcement of the judgment. However, for
violating the Constitution and its own Rules, the PCGG may no longer exercise
dominion and custody over Respondent Corporation and the shares it owns in
PTIC.
Epilogue
albeit conditionally, certain "criminally acquired" bank deposits; entering into
compromises with certain respondents in a number of cases; and transmitting
recovered ill-gotten funds to the national treasury. Petitioner Commission,
however, has yet to show its firm determination to prosecute to final resolution any
of the cases it. has dauntlessly filed in Philippine courts over a decade ago.
Time and again, 63 we have prodded the petitioner and the Sandiganbayan to
speedily proceed with the hearings and resolutions of the main cases for recovery
and reconveyance. It is about time that the PCGG, created with the primary and
paramount task of recovering ill-gotten wealth, act with deliberate dispatch on its
primordial work of substantiating its claims and, thereby, perform its bounden duty
to the Filipino people: to render justice to all.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for failure of petitioner to show
grave abuse of discretion on the part of Respondent Court. The assailed
Resolutions of Respondent Sandiganbayan are hereby AFFIRMED.

As stated earlier, sequestration is simply a provisional remedy; an extraordinary SO ORDERED.

measure intended to prevent the destruction, concealment or dissipation of
sequestered properties and, thereby, to conserve and preserve them, pending the
judicial determination in the appropriate proceeding of whether the property was in
truth ill-gotten. 59 Sequestration effectively deprives, to a considerable extent, the
ostensible or apparent owners of administrative powers and voting rights.
Essentially then, sequestration intrudes into private rights.

In the stead of the ostensible PCGG nominees vote the shares and sit on the
boards of private corporations supposedly for the purpose only of "safeguarding"
or "preserving" the sequestered assets until they are finally adjudicated. 60 But
beyond such custodial powers, the PCGG must hurdle its more important task: that
of proving the ill-gotten nature of the sequestered assets and of causing their
reversion or reconveyance to the people. 61
G.R. No. 200751 (August 17, 2015)
About twelve years have now passed since most of the sequestration orders
against corporations and assets, alleged to be unlawfully amassed by the MONICO LIGTAS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Marcoses and their cronies, were issued; and the so-called "ill-gotten wealth
cases" filed in the Sandiganbayan. Sadly, however, the substantiation of the claim DECISION
that they are in fact ill-gotten most often remains pendent. In the instant case
alone, the questioned sequestration orders were issued more than twelve years LEONEN, J.:
ago; and Civil Case No. 0002 has been pending before the Sandiganbayan for
about eleven years now. Yet, we are still discussing the validity of such orders. "Bakit niya babawiin ang aking saka?" tanong ni Tata Selo. "Dinaya ko na ba siya
sa partihan? Tinuso ko na ba siya? Siya ang may-ari ng lupa at kasama lang niya
Undoubtedly, the PCGG has, in the past, reportedly 62 shown some success in: ako. Hindi ba't kaya maraming nagagalit sa akin ay dahil sa ayaw kong
preventing improper dispositions of alleged ill-gotten properties in the United magpamigay ng kahit isang pinangko kung anihan?"
States; securing a landmark judgment in the Swiss Supreme Court turning over,
Hindi pa rin umaalis sa harap ng istaked si Tata Selo. Nakahawak pa rin siya sa
rehas. Nakatingin siya sa labas ngunit wala siyang sino mang tinitingnan.
"Binabawi po niya ang aking saka," sumbong ni Tata Selo. "Saan papo ako
pupunta kung wala na akong saka?"
Habang nakakapit sa rehas at nakatingin sa labas, sinasabi niyang lahat ay kinuha
na sa kanila, lahat, ay! ang lahat ay kinuha na sa kanila.
- "TataSelo" (1963) by Rogelio R. Sikat
The uncontested declaration of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board that Monico Ligtas was a tenant negates a finding of theft beyond
reasonable doubt. Tenants having rights to the harvest cannot be deemed to have
taken their own produce.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated March 16, 2010 and the
Resolution3 dated February 2, 2012.4 The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision5
of the Regional Trial Court finding Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of theft.6
Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code.7 The Information provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 29th day of June 2000 at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan,
Municipality of Sogod, Province of Southern Leyte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain,
entered into the abaca plantation belonging to one Anecita Pacate, and once
inside the plantation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca fibers, valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00 per
kilo, without the consent of said owner, Anecita Pacate, to her damage and
prejudice in the aforestated amount of Twenty Nine Thousand Pesos
(Php29,000.00), Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ligtas pleaded not guilty.9
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses during trial: Efren Cabero (Cabero),
Modesto Cipres (Cipres), Anecita Pacate, SPO2 Enrique Villaruel, and Ernesto
Pacate.10
According to the prosecution witnesses, Anecita Pacate was the owner of an
abaca plantation situated at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern
Leyte. On June 29, 2000, Cabero, the plantation's administrator, and several men,
including Cipres, went to the plantation to harvest abaca upon Anecita Pacate's
instructions. At about 10:00 a.m., Cabero and his men were surprised to find Ligtas
harvesting abaca at the plantation. Ligtas was accompanied by three (3)
unidentified men. Allegedly, Ligtas threatened that there would be loss of life if they
persisted in harvesting the abaca. Cabero reported the incident to Anecita Pacate
and the police.11
On July 2, 2000, Cabero and Cipres went back to the plantation and conducted a
survey on the condition of the plantation. They found that 1,000 kilos of abaca,
valued at P28.00 per kilo, were harvested by Ligtas.12
On July 3, 2000, Ligtas and Anecita Pacate confronted each other before the
Sogod Police Station.13 Ligtas admitted to harvesting the abaca but claimed that
he was the plantation owner.14
The defense presented three (3) witnesses during trial: Ligtas; Pablo Palo, his
neighbor; and Delia Ligtas, his wife.15 According to Ligtas, he had been a tenant of
Anecita Pacate and her late husband, Andres Pacate since 1993.16 Andres Pacate
installed him as tenant of the 1.5 to two hectares of land involved in the criminal
case.17
Ligtas allegedly "made his first harvest in 1997."18 He then gave Anecita Pacate
her share to the harvest.19 However, he could not remember the exact amount
anymore.20 Previously, Ligtas and Pablo Palo were workers in another land,
around 15 hectares, owned by Anecita Pacate and Andres Pacate.21
Ligtas alleged that on June 28, 2000, Anecita Pacate sent workers to harvest
abaca from the land he cultivated. Ligtas prevented the men from harvesting the
abaca since he was the rightful tenant of the land.22
Furthermore, Ligtas denied harvesting abaca at the plantation on June 29, 2000.
He claimed that he was with Cabero and Cipres attending a barangay fiesta at
Sitio Hubasan, San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, when the alleged harvesting
happened.23
Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of
Peaceful Possession on November 21, 2000.24 On January 22, 2002, the DARAB
rendered the Decision25 ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land.26
While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered as
evidence before the trial court, records are clear that the DARAB Decision was
considered by both the trial court27 and Court of Appeals28 and without any
objection on the part of the People of the Philippines.29
In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held that "the
prosecution was able to prove the elements of theft[.]"30 Ligtas' "defense of
tenancy was not supported by concrete and substantial evidence nor was his claim
of harvest sharing between him and [Anecita Pacate] duly corroborated by any
witness."31 His "defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification ... by
prosecution witnesses."32
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Monico Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Theft, this court hereby renders judgment, sentencing him:
1. To suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9)
months and ten (10) days as minimum to eight (8) years and eight
(8) months as maximum;cralawlawlibrary
2. To indemnify the offende[d] party:
a. The amount of P29,000.00 for the value of the abaca
stole[n];cralawlawlibrary
b. The amount of P5000.00 as moral
damages;cralawlawlibrary
c. The amount of P10,000.00 as litigation
expenses/attorney's fees;cralawlawlibrary
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.34 According to it, "the
burden to prove the existence of the tenancy relationship" 35 belonged to Ligtas. He
was not able to establish all the essential elements of a tenancy agreement. 36
The Court of Appeals declared that Ligtas' reliance on the DARAB Decision
"declaring him as a bonafide tenant of the . . . land is irrelevant in the case at
bar":37
Jurisprudence is replete with cases declaring that "findings of or certifications
issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a
given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship
between the contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not
binding upon the courts.["]38ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As to the ownership of the land, the Court of Appeals held that Ligtas had taken
conflicting positions. While he claimed to be a legitimate tenant, Ligtas also
assailed Anecita Pacate's title over the land. Under Rule 131, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court, a tenant cannot deny the title of his or her landlord at the time of
the commencement of the tenancy relation. 39
The Court of Appeals remained unconvinced as to Ligtas' allegations on
ownership. "He claims that the parcel of land owned by [Anecita Pacate] is
different from the subject abaca land. However, such assertion was based merely
on the testimony of the municipal assessor, not an expert competent to identify
parcels of land."40
More importantly, the Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas committed theft by
harvesting abaca from Anecita Pacate's plantation.41 Ligtas had constructive
possession of the subject of the theft without the owner's consent. 42 "The subject
of the crime need not be carried away or actually taken out from the land in order
to consummate the crime of theft."43
Furthermore, Ligtas' argument that the abaca did not constitute as personal
property under the meaning of Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code was
erroneous.44 Following the definition of personal property, the abaca hemp was
"capable of appropriation [and] [could] be sold and carried away from one place to
another."45 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that about 1,000
kilos of abaca were already harvested.46 Hence, all the elements of theft under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code were sufficiently established by the
prosecution.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas' defense of alibi could not excuse him from
criminal liability.47 His alibi was doubtfully established. "[W]here an accused's alibi
is established only by himself, his relatives and friends, his denial of culpability
should be accorded the strictest scrutiny."48
Ligtas' attack on the credibility of the witnesses did not prosper.49 He failed to show
that the case was initiated only through Anecita Pacate's quest for revenge or to
ensure that Ligtas would be evicted from the land.50
The Court of Appeals dismissed Ligtas' appeal and affirmed the trial court's
Decision finding Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft under Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code.51 The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed
Decision dated . . . August 16, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Sogod, Southern
Leyte, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. R-225, finding accused-appellant Monico
Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.

SO ORDERED.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ligtas filed a Motion for Reconsideration,53 which the Court of Appeals denied on
February 2, 2012.54
II
On April 4, 2012, Ligtas filed this Petition assailing the Court of Appeals Decision
and Resolution.55 This court required People of the Philippines to file its Comment
on the Petition within 10 days from notice.56
The issues for consideration of this court are:
First, whether questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court;cralawlawlibrary
Second, whether the DARAB Decision, finding petitioner Monico Ligtas as tenant
of the land owned by private complainant Anecita Pacate and located at Sitio
Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte is conclusive or can be taken
judicial notice of in a criminal case for theft; and
Third, whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it upheld the
conviction of petitioner Monico Ligtas for theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The Petition is meritorious.
III
Petitioner argues that the findings of fact of both the trial court and Court of
Appeals must be revisited for being "conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on record and premised on the supposed absence of evidence on the
claim of petitioner [as] tenant."57
Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 4558 of the
Rules of Court.59 Factual findings of the Regional Trial Court are conclusive and
binding on this court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.60 This court has
differentiated between a question of law and question of
fact:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the
truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as
well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation.61 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner admits that the Petition raises substantially factual issues that are
beyond the scope of the Rule he seeks redress from. 62 However, there are
exceptions to the rule that only questions of law should be the subject of a petition
for review under Rule 45:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures, (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6)
when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee, (7)
when the CA's findings are contrary to those by the trial court, (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based, (9) when the acts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent, (10) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.63 (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This court has held before that a re-examination of the facts of the case is justified
"when certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial
court which, if taken into account, would alter the result of the case in that they
would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused
to acquittal."64
The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not, is
generally a question of fact.65 To be precise, however, the existence of a tenancy
relationship is a legal conclusion based on facts presented corresponding to the
statutory elements of tenancy.66
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its assailed Decision when it
held that all the essential elements of the crime of theft were duly proven by the
prosecution despite petitioner having been pronounced a bona fide tenant of the
land from which he allegedly stole.67 A review of the records of the case is, thus,
proper to arrive at a just and equitable resolution.
IV
Petitioner claims that private complainant's filing of criminal charges was motivated
by ill will and revenge.68 The charges were designed to remove petitioner from the
land he has legitimately occupied as tenant.69 Telling is the fact that petitioner filed
his Complaint before the DARAB on November 21, 2000, while the Information for
Theft was filed on December 8, 2000.70
Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently established his status as private
complainant's tenant.71 The DARAB Decision is entitled to respect, even finality, as
the Department of Agrarian Reform is the administrative agency vested with
primary jurisdiction and has acquired expertise on matters relating to tenancy
relationship.72
The findings of the DARAB were also supported by substantial evidence. 73 To
require petitioner to prove tenancy relationship through evidence other than the
DARAB Decision and the testimonies of the witnesses is absurd and goes beyond
the required quantum of evidence, which is substantial evidence. 74
Also, according to petitioner, the DARAB Decision has attained finality since
private complainant did not file an appeal. The DARAB's finding as to the parties'
tenancy relationship constitutes as res judicata.75
On the other hand, respondent argues that the Court of Appeals correctly
disregarded the DARAB Decision.76 The trial court could not have taken judicial
notice of the DARAB Decision:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While the DARAB . . . ruled that petitioner is a bonafide tenant of Pacate, courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court,
and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually
pending before the same judge.77 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, according to respondent, petitioner invokes conflicting defenses: that
there is a legitimate tenancy relationship between him and private complainant and
that he did not take the abaca hemp.78 Nevertheless, respondent maintains that
petitioner failed to prove all the essential elements of a tenancy relationship
between him and private complainant.79 Private complainant did not consent to the
alleged tenancy relationship.80 Petitioner also failed to provide evidence as to any
sharing of harvest between the parties.81
We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship is
conclusive and binding on courts if supported by substantial evidence.
Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal
proceedings. This court has ruled in a number of cases
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases
are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an
absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or
vice versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is the criminal
liability for the same act.
....
Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the
procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative
proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding
on the other. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case may not
necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal cases. 82
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
However, this case does not involve an administrative charge stemming from the
same set of facts involved in a criminal proceeding. This is not a case where one
act results in both criminal and administrative liability. DARAB Case No. VIII-319-
SL-2000 involves a determination of whether there exists a tenancy relationship
between petitioner and private complainant, while Criminal Case No. R-225
involves determination of whether petitioner committed theft. However, the tenancy
relationship is a factor in determining whether all the elements of theft were proven
by the prosecution.
In its Decision dated January 22, 2002, the DARAB
found:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
All the necessary requisites in order to establish tenancy relationship as required in
the above-quoted Supreme Court ruling, has been established by the evidence
submitted by plaintiff; And these evidences were not controverted by any evidence
submitted by the respondent.
In fine, this board found plaintiff a bonafide tenant of the land in question and as
such is entitled to a security of tenure, in which case he shall not be dispossessed
of his holdings by the landowner except for any of the causes provided by law and
only after the same has been proved before, and the dispossession is authorized
by the Court and in the judgment that is final and executory[.]83 (Citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The dispositive portion of the DARAB Decision
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding
Monico Ligtas a bonafide tenant of the land subject in this case and well described
in paragraph three (3) in the complaint, and ordering as follows, to wit:
1. The respondent and all other persons acting for and in her behalf
to maintain plaintiff in the peaceful possession of the land in
dispute;cralawlawlibrary
2. The MARO of Sogod, Southern Leyte, and concurrently the cluster
Manager of Sogod Bay DAR Cluster to call the parties and assist
 them in the execution of a leasehold contract covering the land in
dispute, and for the parties to respect and obey such call of the
said MARO in compliance with the legal mandate.
3. Ordering the respondent to pay plaintiff the amount of Five
Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos representing the expenses incurred
by plaintiff in vindicating his right and other actual expenses
incurred in this litigation.
Other relief sought are hereby ordered dismissed for lack of evidence.
No cost.
SO DECIDED.84ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Private complainant did not appeal the DARAB's findings.
Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial
powers are entitled to respect if supported by substantial evidence.85 This court is
not tasked to weigh again "the evidence submitted before the administrative body
and to substitute its own judgment [as to] the sufficiency of evidence." 86
V Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature, as
The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to
determine whether there is a tenancy relationship between adverse parties.87 This
court has held that "judicial determinations [of the a DARAB] have the same
binding effect as judgments and orders of a regular judicial body."88 Disputes under
the jurisdiction of the DARAB include controversies relating
to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over
lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.89ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Salazar v. De Leon,90 this court upheld the Department of Agrarian Reform's
primary jurisdiction over agrarian disputes, which includes the relationship between
landowners and tenants.91 The DARAB Decision is conclusive and binding on
courts when supported by substantial evidence.92 This court ruled that
administrative res judicata exists in that case:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Significantly, respondent did not appeal the Decision dated 17 November 1995 of
the DARAB in DARAB Case # II-380-ISA'94; consequently, the same has attained
finality and constitutes res judicata on the issue of petitioner's status as a tenant of
respondent.
Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions in
accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the
rule of administrative res judicata: "The rule which forbids the reopening of a
matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the
judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and
boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general
judicial powers. It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons
invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is
examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari , such final
adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata." To be sure, early jurisprudence was
already mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively
to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts without
unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof; and that the more equitable
attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom
judicial powers have been conferred.93 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Encinas v. Agustin, Jr.,94 this court clarified that res judicata applies only to
decisions rendered by agencies in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to
purely administrative proceedings:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial
or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers.
opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating
evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c)
rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved. The exercise of
quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the matter in
controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the
contending parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication
of the respective rights and obligations of the parties.95 (Citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We find it necessary to clarify the two concepts of res judicata: bar by prior
judgment and conclusiveness of judgment. In Social Security Commission v. Rizal
Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc., et al.,96 this court discussed and
differentiated the two concepts of res judicata:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in
Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the
judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity
of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of
judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated
or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court
in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies, whether
or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the
same.
Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and
conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely
identity of issue.
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action
must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case
must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and
second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases,
then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If as
between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical
causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment" applies. 97
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Martillano v. Court of Appeals,98 the DARAB Decision finding for the existence of
a tenancy relationship between the parties was declared by this court as
conclusive on the parties.99 As in this case, the DARAB Decision100 in Martillano
attained finality when the landowner did not appeal the Decision.101 This court
ruled that the doctrine of res judicata applies:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under the afore-cited sections of RA 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform is
empowered, through its adjudicating arm the regional and provincial adjudication
boards, to resolve agrarian disputes and controversies on all matters pertaining to
the implementation of the agrarian law. Section 51 thereof provides that the
decision of the DARAB attains finality after the lapse of fifteen (15) days and no
appeal was interposed therefrom by any of the parties.
In the instant case, the determination of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 062-Bul
'89, there being no appeal interposed therefrom, attained finality. Accordingly, the
matter regarding the status of Martillano as a tenant farmer and the validity of the
CLT and Emancipation Patents issued in his favor are settled and no longer open
to doubt and controversy.
....
We recall that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 was for the cancellation of petitioner's
CLT and Emancipation patents. The same effect is sought with the institution of
DARAB Case No. 512-Bul '94, which is an action to withdraw and/or cancel
administratively the CLT and Emancipation Patents issued to petitioner.
Considering that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 has attained finality prior to the filing of
DARAB Case No. 512-Bul '94, no strenuous legal interpretation is necessary to
understand that the issues raised in the prior case, i.e., DARAB Case No. 062-Bul
'89, which have been resolved with finality, may not be litigated anew.
The instant case is complicated by the failure of the complainant to include
Martillano as party-defendant in the case before the adjudication board and the
DARAB, although he was finally impleaded on appeal before the Court of Appeals.
The belated inclusion of Martillano as respondent in the petition will not affect the
applicability of the doctrine of bar by prior judgment. What is decisive is that the
issues which have already been litigated in a final and executory judgment
precludes, by the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of
res judicata, and even under the doctrine of "law of the case," the re-litigation of
the same issue in another action. It is well established that when a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as
it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity
with them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was
once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision, continues to
be binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision
was predicated, continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the
binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be resurrected anew
since said issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the
principle of res judicata, at least by conclusiveness of judgment.102 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Co v. People, et al.,103 this court held that "the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment also applies in criminal cases."104 Petitioner in that case was charged
with the violation of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, for the alleged non-
remittance of Social Security System contributions.105 This court upheld the
findings of the National Labor Relations Commission in a separate case, which
declared the absence of an employer-employee relationship and had attained
finality.106 This court held that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The reasons for establishing the principle of "collusiveness of judgment" are
founded on sound public policy. ... It is allowable to reason back from a judgment
to the basis on which it stands, upon the obvious principle that where a conclusion
is indisputable, and could have been drawn only from certain premises, the
premises are equally indisputable with the conclusion. When a fact has been once
determined in the course of a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment has been
rendered in accordance therewith, it cannot be again litigated between the same
parties without virtually impeaching the correctness of the former decision, which,
from motives of public policy, the law does not permit to be done.
Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39,
Section 47 (b), and the second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39,
Section 47 (c). Both concepts are founded on the principle of estoppel, and are
based on the salutary public policy against unnecessary multiplicity of suits. Like
the splitting of causes of action, res judicata is in pursuance of such policy. Matters
settled by a Court's final judgment should not be litigated upon or invoked again.
Relitigation of issues already settled merely burdens the Courts and the taxpayers,
creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time and energy that
could be devoted to worthier cases.107 (Citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,108 this
court ruled that tenancy relationship must be duly
proven:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[A] tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove
this allegation. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship
exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the
alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. 109 (Citation
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The DARAB, in DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000, held that all the essential
elements of a tenancy relationship were proven by petitioner.110 It found that there
was substantial evidence to support petitioner's claim as tenant of the land. 111 In
rendering the Decision, the DARAB examined pleadings and affidavits of both
petitioner and private complainant.112 It was convinced by petitioner's evidence,
which consisted of sworn statements of petitioner's witnesses that petitioner was
installed as tenant by Andres Pacate sometime in 1993.113 Petitioner and Andres
Pacate had an agreement to share the produce after harvest.114 However, Andres
Pacate had died before the first harvest.115 Petitioner then gave the landowner's
share to private complainant, and had done so every harvest until he was
disturbed in his cultivation of the land on June 29, 2000.116
We emphasize that after filing her Answer before the DARAB, private complainant
failed to heed the Notices sent to her and refused to attend the scheduled
hearings.117 The DARAB even quoted in its Decision the reason offered by private
complainant's counsel in his Motion to Withdraw as
counsel:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That as early as the preliminary hearings of the case, the respondent has already
shown her intention not to participate the proceedings of the case for reasons
known only to her;cralawlawlibrary
That despite the advi[c]e of the undersigned, respondent stood pat with her
decision not to participate in the proceedings of the case;cralawlawlibrary
That in view of this predicament, the undersigned can do nothing except to
withdraw as he is now withdrawing as counsel for the respondent of the above-
entitled casef.]118ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of decisions of
other courts or even records of other cases that have been tried or are pending in
the same court or before the same judge.119 In declaring that the DARAB's findings
on the tenancy relationship between petitioner and private complainant are
immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the Court of Appeals 120 relied on Rollo, et
al. v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., et al.121
In Rollo, petitioners, who were farmers of a 21-hectare agricultural land in Tarlac
that was principally devoted to sugar and rice and who claim the rights of their
predecessors-in-interest, filed separate Complaints before the Provincial
Adjudication Board of Region III in Tarlac, Tarlac. They claimed that when the
registered owner of the land, Josefina Roxas Omaña, sold the land to
respondents, respondents were aware of the tenancy relationship between
petitioners and Josefina Roxas Omaña.122
Respondents offered a compensation package to petitioners in exchange for the
renunciation of their tenancy rights under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law. However, they failed to comply with their obligations under the terms of the
compensation package.123 Petitioners then filed a series of Complaints before the
DARAB. The cases were consolidated and resolved by the Provincial
Adjudicator.124
The Provincial Adjudicator ruled, among other things, that "there was no tenancy
relationship [that] existed between the parties."125 He found that petitioners and
their predecessors-in-interest were mere hired laborers, not tenants. Tenancy
cannot be presumed from respondents' offer of a compensation package. 126
On appeal, the DARAB reversed the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator. It
found that there was an implied tenancy between the parties. Petitioners were
deemed tenants of the land for more than 30 years. They were entitled to security
of tenure.127
The Court of Appeals reversed the DARAB Decision and reinstated the Provincial
Adjudicator's Decision. It held that there was no substantial evidence to prove that
all the requisites of tenancy relationship existed. However, despite the lack of
tenancy relationship, the compensation package agreement must be upheld.128
This court affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision.129 It held that petitioners failed
to overcome the burden of proving the existence of a tenancy indispensable elements of tenancy.130 (Emphasis supplied, citations
relationship:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
At the outset, the parties do not appear to be the landowner and the tenants. While Thus, in Rollo, this court did not categorically hold that the DARAB's findings were
it appears that there was personal cultivation by petitioners and their
merely provisional and, thus, not binding on courts. What was deemed as a
predecessors-in-interest of the subject landholding, what was established was that
preliminary determination of tenancy was the testimony of the Department of
petitioners' claim of tenancy was founded on the self-serving testimony of
Agrarian Reform employee stating that the land involved was tenanted. Further,
petitioner Rodolfo Rollo that his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
the tribunals had conflicting findings on whether petitioners were bona fide tenants.
of the landholding for more than 30 years and had engaged in a "50-50" sharing
scheme with JOSEFINA and JOSEFINA's grandmother, the previous owner In this case, records are bereft as to whether private complainant appealed the
thereof. Self-serving statements in pleadings are inadequate; proof must be
DARAB Decision. Thus, it is presumed that the Decision has long lapsed into
adduced. Such claims do not suffice absent concrete evidence to support them.
finality.131 It is also established that private complainant participated in the initial
The burden rests on the shoulders of petitioners to prove their affirmative
stages of the DARAB proceedings.132 Therefore, the issue of the existence of a
allegation of tenancy, which burden they failed to discharge with substantial
tenancy relationship is final as between the parties. We cannot collaterally review
evidence. Such a juridical tie must be aptly shown. Simply put, he who alleges the the DARAB's findings at this stage. The existence of the final Decision that tenancy
affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and from the plaintiff in a civil exists creates serious doubts as to the guilt of the accused.
case, the burden of proof never parts. The same rule applies to administrative
cases. In fact, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause
VI
of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his
claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense....
According to petitioner, the elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code were not established since he was a bona fide tenant of the land. 133
Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of this Court that there existed a sharing of
The DARAB's recognition of petitioner as a legitimate tenant necessarily "implie[d]
harvests in the context of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and/or their
that he ha[d] the authority to harvest the abaca hemp from [private complainant's
predecessors-in-interest and JOSEFINA. Jurisprudence is illuminating to the effect
land]."134 This shows that petitioner had no criminal intent.
that to prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be
presented. None was shown. No receipts were presented as testaments to the
As to the existence of another element of theft—that the taking was done without
claimed sharing of harvests. The only evidence submitted to establish the
the consent of the owner—petitioner argues that this, too, was negated by his
purported sharing of harvests was the testimony of petitioner Rodolfo Rollo. The
status as private complainant's tenant:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
sharing arrangement cannot be deemed to have existed on the basis alone of
The purported lack of consent on the part of the private complainant as alleged by
petitioner Rodolfo Rollo's claim. It is self-serving and is without evidentiary value.
the prosecution, is misplaced. In fact, it was even improper for Anecita Pacate to
Self-serving statements are deemed inadequate; competent proof must be
stop or prevent petitioner from harvesting the produce of the landholding because
adduced. If at all, the fact alone of sharing is not sufficient to establish a tenancy
as tenant, petitioner is entitled to security of tenure. This right entitled him to
relationship.
continue working on his landholding until the leasehold relation is terminated or
until his eviction is authorized by the DARAB in a judgment that is final and
We also sustain the conclusion reached by the Provincial Adjudicator and the
executory.135 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Court of Appeals that the testimony of Araceli Pascua, an employee of the DAR in
Victoria, Tarlac, that the subject landholding was tenanted cannot overcome Petitioner argues that the constitutional presumption of innocence must be
substantial evidence to the contrary. To prove the alleged tenancy no reliance may upheld:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
be made upon the said public officer's testimony. What cannot be ignored is the Well-settled is the rule that where "inculpatory facts and circumstances are
precedent ruling of this Court that the findings of or certifications issued by the capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given locality of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction." In
contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not binding upon acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven
the courts. This ruling holds with greater effect in the instant case in light of the fact snow. Rather, we are declaring his innocence because the prosecution's evidence
that petitioners, as herein shown, were not able to prove the presence of all the failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic law
requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful
obeisance to the fundamental law."136 (Citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the findings of the trial court finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE. 308. Who are Liable for Theft. — Theft is committed by any person who,
with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force
upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter's consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the
same to the local authorities or to its owner;cralawlawlibrary
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of
another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the
damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where
trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the
consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall
gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.
The essential elements of theft are: (1) taking of personal property; (2) the property
taken belongs to another; (3) the taking was done without the owner's consent; (4)
there was intent to gain; and (5) the taking was done without violence against or
intimidation of the person or force upon things.137
Tenants have been defined as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from within their
immediate farm households — cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by
another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce
with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a
price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under the leasehold
tenancy system.138 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under this definition, a tenant is entitled to the products of the land he or she
cultivates. The landowner's share in the produce depends on the agreement
between the parties. Hence, the harvesting done by the tenant is with the
landowner's consent.
The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between
petitioner and private complainant negates the existence of the element that the
taking was done without the owner's consent. The DARAB Decision implies that
petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The prosecution, therefore,
failed to establish all the elements of theft.
In Pit-og v. People,139 this court acquitted petitioner of theft of sugarcane and
banana crops on the basis of reasonable doubt.140 The prosecution failed to prove
lack of criminal intent on petitioner's part.141 It failed to clearly identify "the person
who, as a result of a criminal act, without his knowledge and consent, was
wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him."142 There were doubts as to
whether the plants taken by petitioner were indeed planted on private
complainant's lot when petitioner had planted her own plants adjacent to it.143
Thus, it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the property belonged to
private complainant. This court found that petitioner "took the sugarcane and
bananas believing them to be her own. That being the case, she could not have
had a criminal intent."144
In this case, petitioner harvested the abaca, believing that he was entitled to the
produce as a legitimate tenant cultivating the land owned by private complainant.
Personal property may have been taken, but it is with the consent of the owner.
No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be presumed
innocent of the crime until proven guilty.145 "[I]t is better to acquit ten guilty
individuals than to convict one innocent person."146 Thus, courts must consider
"[e]very circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence[.]"147 Equally settled is
that "[w]here the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent
with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of
doubt and should be acquitted."148
In view of petitioner's acquittal based on reasonable doubt, we find it unnecessary
to discuss further the other errors raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
March 16, 2010 and the Resolution dated February 2, 2012 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioner Monico Ligtas is ACQUITTED of the crime of theft under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. If detained, he is ordered immediately
RELEASED, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause. Any amount paid by
way of a bailbond is ordered RETURNED.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary