Track 2 and Back Channel Diplomacy in India-Pakistan Relations

By: G Parthasarathy
Date: Oct 26, 2010
Vanue: Panjab University, Chandigarh

Traditional Diplomacy has, for centuries, involved talks in closed chambers between the
rulers of countries, or their designated representatives, to resolve differences, forge alliances
and put in place new architecture for cooperation and coexistence, after conflicts. But, in the
contemporary world, civil society activists, academics, politicians, corporate business
representatives and persons well versed in the conduct of international relations play an
increasingly important role in influencing and moulding the foreign and security policies of
nations. In the present day, therefore, contacts between designated Government
representatives are very often complemented by inputs resulting from meetings between non-
official representatives of countries. On many occasions, when Governments wish to avoid
publicity, or seek to informally ascertain the positions of others, before entering into the realm
of official and formal talks, they utilize informal channels, using trusted and reliable individuals
and institutions for planning out their negotiating strategies. Equally, when civil society
institutions feel adequately concerned about situations getting out of hand, they take the
initiative for contacting counterparts abroad, to ascertain whether they can contribute to
easing tensions, or promoting cooperation. Such moves are the basis for what is now popularly
known as Track 2 Diplomacy.

Track 2 Diplomacy has an invaluable role to play when traditional instruments of

negotiation, mediation and conflict management become ineffective and need to be
supplemented. In some cases, the causes of the conflict are so deep rooted that official
negotiators do not have negotiating room politically, to seek de-escalation or resolution. This is
especially so, when a society may be too divided to permit bold initiatives for de-escalation, or
the conflict itself may be intertwined with other global or regional conflicts. Traditional
negotiation and mediation may be suited for resolving issues like power sharing, poverty and
equitable distribution of resources and wealth. But on issues where the very identity of nations
are involved, as in the case of Jammu and Kashmir, it is necessary to have mechanisms and
groups which can seek to change the parameters of existing discourse, by influencing public
opinion on the need to look at imaginative alternatives to what is regarded as conventional
wisdom. But it is important, here, to emphasize the limitations of such efforts and initiatives,

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especially when important and influential sections of State machinery develop a vested interest
in perpetuating, promoting and prolonging differences, tensions and conflict.

Track 2 meetings between India and Pakistan came to public attention when the
international focus of attention on Jammu and Kashmir increased in the 1990s, and separatist
sentiment in the Kashmir Valley became a focus of international attention. The first attempt at
a Track 2 approach to problems in Jammu and Kashmir was undertaken by the U.S. based
Kashmir Study Group, headed by an American national who originally lived in Srinagar, Farookh
Kathwari. Prominent American and Pakistani diplomats were associated with this effort, with
India being represented by former Foreign Secretary S.K. Singh and former Vice Chief of Naval
Staff, Vice Admiral Nayyar. Given the then prevailing situation of widespread Pakistan
sponsored militancy, the antipathy of the US State Department and indeed the Clinton
Administration towards India and the absence of any formal dialogue process after Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto ended dialogue with India in 1994, this effort could make little
headway, as its thrust was seen as being insensitive to Indian concerns and imperatives. It was
quite evident that the time was not propitious for any meaningful and new political approach,
as the Pakistan army, and even sections of political establishment evidently believed that India
would wilt under the pressure of American antipathy and the escalating and seemingly endless
militancy, which appeared to enjoy support widely in the Kashmir valley.

Following the Kargil conflict and the tensions that followed the attack on the Indian
Parliament, on December 13, 2001, President Musharraf and Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee agreed on January 6, 2004 that they would resume the “Composite Dialogue Process”
between India and Pakistan, based on an explicit assurance from President Musharraf that he
would not allow “territory under Pakistan’s control” to be used for terrorism against India.
President Musharraf’s assurance came in the aftermath of terrorist strikes in New York and
Washington on September 9, 2001, after he had been forced to ban groups like the Lashkar e
Taiba and the Jaish e Mohammed by American actions, which led to the U.N. Security Council
banning these groups as international terrorist organizations, under U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1373. Moreover, President Musharraf’s actions against these groups was taken after
the Jaish e Mohammed attempted to assassinate him, leading to the former Director General of
the ISI Lieutenant General Javed Ashraf Qazi admitting to the Pakistan Senate in March 2004
that the Jaish was responsible not only for attempts to assassinate President Musharraf, but
also for the attack on the Indian Parliament.

The improving climate for bilateral relations led to the Nobel Prize winning Pugwash
International organizing an important Track 2 meeting in Kathmandu in December 2004. This
meeting brought together, for the first time, politicians, journalists and civil society

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representatives from both sides of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, together with
former diplomats, military officials and journalists from across India and Pakistan. While the
representatives from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir included the President of the Muslim
Conference Sardar Attique Khan, the Pakistan Government did not permit representatives from
the Northern Areas of Gilgit-Baltistan to participate, quite evidently because of concerns that
these representatives would speak out against the denial of any meaningful freedoms to them.
In contrast, the representatives from Jammu and Kashmir who participated in the dialogue
ranged from separatist leader Sajjad Lone to the leader of the Panthers Party Mr. Bhim Singh.
From the Indian side with whom I participated, were Mr. Hamid Ansari, now the Vice President
of India and Mr. Satinder Lambah who was subsequently appointed as the Indian
representative in the extensive “back channel” negotiations, which focused predominantly on
evolving a framework to resolve the Kashmir issue.

The Pugwash Report issued after the December 2004 meeting noted that although no
consensus was reached in identifying the starting point for evolving conflict resolution
mechanisms, all participants acknowledged that the human dimension of the conflict should
take priority over geo-strategic considerations. Key approaches were developed by some
participants, stressing the need for ‘change’ mainly in developing a people-centred approach
and making the human dimension of the Kashmir problem part and parcel of the political
dialogue at all levels. Some participants also felt that ‘time’ is a fundamental factor in
establishing a durable peace between India and Pakistan, but most importantly for the whole of
Kashmir, in its regional environment. What is needed, it was felt, is a prolonged period of non-
violence, coupled with genuine social and economic reforms that could deflate a great number
of problems and help establish a durable and sustainable peace. One cannot expect a society to
shift instantly from profound trauma to peace, the report emphasized. At the outset, there
seemed to be much agreement that the UN Resolutions proposing a plebiscite to express the
political choices of Kashmiris, of acceding to either India or Pakistan, was now obsolete. The
need for developing a multi-level approach was generally agreed to by the participants,
stressing the need for an intra-Kashmiri dialogue and process of reconciliation within both sides
of Jammu and Kashmir and across the Line of Control; and between people of Jammu and
Kashmir and both capitals. To that end, while participants appreciated the efforts of both India
and Pakistan to sustain a composite dialogue, it was nonetheless emphasized that the bilateral
process should arrive at Kashmiri-specific CBMs. A general consensus developed at meeting
that all forms of violence should end, irrespective of their form or origin. Civil society
throughout the state should de-legitimize violence through massive demonstrations. Whereas
the ceasefire between Pakistan and India on the LoC was already paying dividends, the cease-
fire should be extended within J&K. Proselytizing should be banned; training camps and

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recruitment networks should be dismantled. All parties and individuals should refrain from
statements and actions that incite or promote hatred and violence.

In terms of specific measures to be implemented across the Line of Control and within both
Indian and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, the following measures were recommended:

 Bus services should be activated linking different parts of the state.

 Multiple land routes should be opened or constructed within J&K and across the LoC
and infrastructure should be developed to link all parts of J&K to the rest of the region.
 Border markets and meeting points could be set up at possible crossing-points along the
LoC, for example at Neelam Valley and at Uri-Chakhoti.
 Trade in goods and services should be developed across the LoC and at a regional level.
 Kashmir’s water resources should be the subject of closer studies and in depth
discussions, as the State holds a great potential to benefit itself and the whole region.
 It would be desirable to identify and initiate joint developmental and environment
projects in areas of mutual interest across the LoC

The dialogue between representatives from both sides of the LOC also led to
participants welcoming the reduction of security forces in Jammu and Kashmir and hoped that
a continuation of the process of normalization would lead to further reduction of forces. It was
also stressed that basic political freedoms are necessary in Pakistan Administered Kashmir so
that no military overt or covert operations can gratuitously hijack the dialogue and peace
process by making use of these areas.The cease-fire should be extended and maintained within
the State, and should be accompanied by the de-mining of border areas in order to facilitate
people-to-people initiatives and the overall strengthening of CBMs. It was agreed that the role
of various intelligence agencies operating in J&K was generally perceived as distorting people’s
wishes, creating fear psychosis and working against people’s interests. Such conduct could only
undermine the long-term viability of a solution to the J&K issue.

The Pugwash meeting in Kathmandu took place when a cease fire was in place along the
Line of Control and the some of the Jihadi groups (other than the Lashkar e Taiba) were
threatening Pakistan’s rulers in the aftermath of the American led Operation Enduring
Freedom” in Afghanistan, which ousted the Taliban Regime, using facilities provided on
Pakistani territory. President Musharraf appeared to have calculated that while he would not
entirely defang the Jihadi groups, he would be well advised to seek progress in reducing
tensions on Pakistan’s eastern borders, by seeking more innovative ways to address differences
on Jammu and Kashmir. In the meantime, the Kashmir Study Group in Washington came out
with a new proposal in February 2005 which proposed a solution to the issue of J&K on the
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basis of self-governance and demilitarization. A number of Track 2 initiatives by institutions like
the Jamia Millia Islamia University and the Observer Research Foundation led to substantively
increased civil society interaction and visits across the LOC by prominent leaders from Pakistan
Occupied Kashmir like veteran Muslim Conference leader Sardar Qayyum Khan, and even
leaders from Groups like the Gilgit-Baltistan Democratic Alliance in the Northern Areas.

These developments came alongside the establishment of a “back channel”

comprising initially National Security Advised J.N. Dixit on the one side and President
Musharraf’s aide Tariq Aziz on the other. Following Mr. Dixit’s demise in 2005 his position was
taken over by Special Envoy Satinder Lambah who held around 15 rounds of negotiations with
his counterpart between 2005 and 2007.These negotiations evidently flowed from proposals
articulated by President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. President Musharraf
proposed that:

(1) J&K should be divided into seven regions.

(2) There should be a process of “demilitarization” in identified regions. He

subsequently asked for the withdrawal of Indian forces from three urban centres-
Srinagar, Kupwara and Baramulla.

(3) There should be “self-governance” in Jammu and Kashmir. He did not indicate
whether this would be equally applicable to Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and the
Northern Areas of J&K, under Pakistan’s control.

(4) India and Pakistan should agree to “Joint Management” of the State. He did not
specify whether “Joint Management” would equally apply to POK and the Northern
Areas.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in turn, outlined his vision on how to move forward in
resolving the issue of Jammu and Kashmir on March 24, 2006. Dr. Singh made the following
points:

(1) Borders cannot be redrawn but we can move towards making them irrelevant-
towards making them “just lines on a map”.
(2) People on both sides of the Line of Control (LOC) should be able to move freely and
trade with each other.
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 (3) A situation can be envisaged where the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir can, with
active encouragement from the Governments of India and Pakistan, work out
cooperative and consultative mechanisms, so as to maximize the gains of
cooperation in solving problems of social and economic development of the region.

While the discussions on Jammu and Kashmir were conducted on a “back channel” with
a substantial measure of secrecy, there have been indications from reports in the media and in
comments by Pakistan’ former Foreign Minister Mr. Khurshid Kasuri that there had been
significant progress in finding common ground on proposals made by the two sides. Speaking to
a gathering during his visit to India in 2006, Mr. Kasuri called on opposition leaders in India to
support the efforts, which were underway to resolve that issue of Jammu and Kashmir, while
asserting that differences had been significantly narrowed. While the exact contours of the
framework which were then discussed are not known publicly, reports in the media indicate
that there was agreement on harmonizing the nature of self-governance and devolution of
powers on both sides of the Line of Control. Responding to General Musharraf’s proposal for
“demilitarization,” India had indicated its readiness to reduce and redeploy forces in Jammu
and Kashmir on a reciprocal basis, once it is reassured that there is an irrevocable end to
infiltration across the Line of Control. There also appears to have been understanding on the
need for mechanisms and institutions to promote cooperation in areas like trade, travel,
tourism, education, health, environment and water resources. Details of what reportedly
transpired in “back channel” negotiations were also published by an article in the New Yorker
Magazine by Steve Coll. Much will depend on the political climate in the two countries and the
prospects for political consensus within India and Pakistan, for this process to resume from
where it was halted in 2007, because of the domestic political uncertainty and transition in
Pakistan.

There have been a series of measures to promote travel, trade and dialogue across the
LOC after the Pugwash Meeting of 2004. For the first time after five decades, people in Jammu
and Kashmir are being given facilities to travel across the LOC to meet friends and relatives. In
the Kashmir valley, a bus service has been instituted between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad and in
the Jammu Region, between Poonch and Rawalkot. Five crossing points have, in addition, been
opened to enable people to meet friends and relatives across the LOC. Trade across the LOC has
been permitted for the first time, with goods carried by trucks on the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad
road. There are also proposals under discussion to establish bus links between Jammu and
Sialkot in the Jammu Region and between Kargil and Skardu linking the valley of Kashmir with
the Northern Areas, under Pakistan’s control. While the goods presently traded are restricted
to locally produced products, this trade can be vastly expanded as India and Pakistan move
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towards their stated goal of establishing a South Asian Economic Union. There are, however,
still misgivings and grievances that despite the new openings for trade and travel, the
procedures for such cross LOC links have been made so cumbersome and restrictive that there
are numerous complaints from people, who find permission to travel either delayed, or
effectively denied. Many of these confidence building measures figured in recommendations
made during the Pugwash meeting in Kathmandu and several other Track 2 meetings held
between 2004 and 2007.

During subsequent meeting organized by the Pugwash International in Islamabad in

March 2006 in which participants from India included not only separatist leaders but also
representatives from mainstream Parties like Mr. Omar Abdullah, there was widespread
agreement on the need for carrying the ongoing peace process in which people from both sides
of the Loc participated. This Conference focused attention on: “Prospects for self-governance in
Jammu and Kashmir and Present Status of Cooperation and Communications across the LoC”.
There was an interesting question and answer session when participants met President
Musharraf. There was recognition that considerable ground needed to be covered on more
clearly outlining the parameters of what precisely would emerge from the principles like self-
governance, demilitarization and an irrevocable end to terrorism. Interestingly, President
Musharraf referred to his proposals for demilitarisation and self-governance. He told
participants that “an ultimate solution on these lines would make the Loc irrelevant,” thereby
signalling his move away from Pakistan’s traditional position of demanding a plebiscite in
accordance with UN Resolutions and endorsing Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s belief that
while borders could not be changed, they could be made “irrelevant”.

Political turmoil in Pakistan following the dismissal of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhury,
the attack on the Lal Masjid in Islamabad and growing terrorist attacks within Pakistan, resulted
in the suspension of “back channel” meetings in 2007. India Pakistan relations thereafter, went
into a tailspin, following the 26/11 terrorist attack on Mumbai. Under pressure from the
military establishment the newly elected Government led by Prime Minster Gilani has disowned
the agreements reached in back channel negotiations between the two Governments in 2005-
2007, though former Foreign Secretary Riaz Mohammed Khan has been appointed as a
successor to Tariq Aziz. The climate for relations has been further vitiated by terrorist attacks,
reliably reported to have been undertaken with backing and support of the ISI on the Indian
Embassy in Kabul and on other Indian interests in Afghanistan. Meetings between the Prime
Ministers and Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan have ended in controversy with India
insisting on meaningful action being taken by Pakistan to bring the perpetrators of 26/11 to
Justice and more and more evidence emerging that the Pakistan military establishment

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continues to be recalcitrant on this score. There is now growing evidence confirming that
Pakistan’s present Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani is forcing the weak civilian
Government to adopt a hard line and recalcitrant posture towards India and keeping options
open for terrorist strikes on Indian soil and on Indian interests in Afghanistan.

Despite these serious differences between the two Governments, there has been a
continuing series of Track 2 engagements between India and Pakistan. There is little doubt that
participants from both sides keep their respective Governments informed of thinking in
different circles in the neighbouring country. Moreover, there has now been an increasing focus
of attention in such meetings on whether political and diplomatic space exists to move away
from adversarial positions on developments in Afghanistan. Interestingly, countries like the US,
UK and Canada which have forces deployed in Afghanistan appear to be growingly interested in
seeing if some common ground can be found for India and Pakistan to agree to a measure of
cooperation, by understanding and addressing each other’s basic security concerns on
developments in Afghanistan. Interestingly, at a recent Tack 2 meeting organized by the
Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi and the Jinnah Institute in Karachi, the
participants who included former Pakistan Information Minister and PPP leader Sherry Rehman
agreed that the aspirations of the Afghan people for stability should be fulfilled as soon as
possible within an “Afghan owned multi-ethnic and broad based framework.” While it is evident
that given the Pakistan army establishment’s obsession with aiding and abetting the Taliban, it
will take considerable effort to get the army to quit interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs,
the exchanges on Track 2 do provide an opening to let the international community and
sections of public opinion in Pakistan know where India stands on developments in Afghanistan.
At the present moment, the Pakistani media and even some of their diplomats, not to speak of
former army officials like Generals Aslam Beg and Hamid Gul, put out baseless and fanciful
statements and reports about India allegedly having over a dozen Consulates in Afghanistan
and alleging that there are thousands of Indian military personnel being deployed there.

An interesting feature of the Track 2 meetings has been that in unofficial settings, where
participants get to know each other on an informal and relaxed basis, one gets a more informal
and realistic insight into thinking in different sections of society and different strands of political
and public opinion. In the recent Track 2 meeting in Bangkok on August 28-30, organized by the
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in India and the Jinnah Institute in Karachi, there was a
very frank discussion on Jammu and Kashmir. The meeting came at a time when the Pakistan
Government had not only disowned what had transpired in “Back Channel” meetings, but also
expressed reluctance to resume “Back Chanel” talks. Despite this, the Pakistani participants
agreed that “New Delhi and Islamabad should consider activating the back channel on Jammu
and Kashmir to complement bilateral talks’. Moreover, while the Pakistan Government has
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taken the position that Confidence Building Measures are no substitute for a “result oriented”
dialogue on Jammu and Kashmir, the Pakistani participants agreed that India and Pakistan
should “implement in letter and spirit, the series of existing Confidence Building Measures,
particularly those relating to easing travel and trade across the Line of Control. The security
establishments in both India and Pakistan have been averse to seeing these CBMs implemented
in letter and spirit.

It must be mentioned that Track 2 dialogue between India and Pakistan evokes interest
not just in India and Pakistan, but also internationally. I have attended Track dialogues with
Pakistani participants organized by influential foreign thin tanks in cities ranging from Bangkok,
Colombo, Dubai and Moscow to Berlin, Brussels, London and Washington. The meetings in
Brussels, for example, were very useful in moulding opinion in the European Parliament on
developments in Jammu and Kashmir and the contours of a possible settlement to the vexed
issue. On May 24, 2007 the European Parliament passed a Resolution which noted that Gilgit
and Baltistan, suffers from extreme poverty and neglect, with enormous deficiencies in basic
literacy and in access to healthcare, a lack of democratic structures and major deficiencies in
the rule of law and justice. The Resolution also noted that there is considerable evidence that
over many years Pakistan has provided Kashmiri militants with training, weapons, funding and
sanctuary and has failed to hold militants for atrocities they have committed on the Indian-
administered side. The Resolution welcomed the Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh’s
“ideas related to making boundaries permanently irrelevant, a system of self-governance, and
institutional arrangements for joint or cooperative management”. It strongly encouraged both
India and Pakistan to further explore these concepts in joint discussions and with Kashmiris on
both sides of the LoC and in Gilgit and Baltistan. This Resolution was welcomed in India and was
seen as a setback to Pakistan’s frenzied diplomatic efforts in Europe to get India condemned for
alleged human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir, while demanding a solution based on
defunct UN Resolutions.

This paper primarily gives an idea of what transpired in Track 2 meetings the author was
associated with. It is, however, heartening that as the number of academic institutions and
private and Government funded Think Tanks taking an increasing interest in issues of foreign
policy and national security in India has grown, a large number of forums have now emerged in
India and abroad promoting Track 2 exchanges on issues related to India-Pakistan relations.
Some of the forums for Track 2 meetings include the Observer Research Foundation, the Jamia
Milia Islamia University, the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi, the Delhi
Policy Group, the Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation in Gurgaon and the Centre for Rural
and Integrated Development in Chandigarh. Moreover, even Track 2 meetings covering wider
issues of foreign and national security policies almost invariably include a session where
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reference is made to India-Pakistan relations. Our active participation in such meetings has
helped to promote better understanding on issues pertaining to our relations with Pakistan.
But, in an ultimate analysis, decisions on such issues are predominantly influenced by domestic
political, geopolitical and national security considerations. The Track 2 process can primarily
seek avenues to share concerns, correct misperceptions, bridge differences, influence public
opinion and keep channels of communication open.

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