THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 190515. November 15, 2010.]

CIRTEK EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION-FEDERATION OF FREE

WORKERS , petitioner, vs . CIRTEK ELECTRONICS, INC. , respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES , J : p

Cirtek Electronics, Inc. (respondent), an electronics and semi-conductor rm

situated inside the Laguna Technopark, had an existing Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) with Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers
(petitioner) for the period January 1, 2001 up to December 31, 2005. Prior to the 3rd
year of the CBA, the parties renegotiated its economic provisions but failed to reach a
settlement, particularly on the issue of wage increases. Petitioner thereupon declared a
bargaining deadlock and led a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board-Regional O ce No. IV (NCMB-RO IV) on April 26, 2004. Respondent,
upon the other hand, filed a Notice of Lockout on June 16, 2004.
While the conciliation proceedings were ongoing, respondent placed seven union
o cers including the President, a Vice President, the Secretary and the Chairman of the
Board of Directors under preventive suspension for allegedly spearheading a boycott of
overtime work. The o cers were eventually dismissed from employment, prompting
petitioner to le another Notice of Strike which was, after conciliation meetings,
converted to a voluntary arbitration case. The dismissal of the o cers was later found
to be legal, hence, petitioner appealed.
In the meantime, as amicable settlement of the CBA was deadlocked, petitioner
went on strike on June 20, 2005. By Order 1 dated June 23, 2005, the Secretary of
Labor assumed jurisdiction over the controversy and issued a Return to Work Order
which was complied with.
Before the Secretary of Labor could rule on the controversy, respondent created
a Labor Management Council (LMC) through which it concluded with the remaining
o cers of petitioner a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 2 providing for daily wage
increases of P6.00 per day effective January 1, 2004 and P9.00 per day effective
January 1, 2005. Petitioner submitted the MOA via Motion and Manifestation 3 to the
Secretary of Labor, alleging that the remaining o cers signed the MOA under
respondent's assurance that should the Secretary order a higher award of wage
increase, respondent would comply. aHSAIT

By Order 4 dated March 16, 2006, the Secretary of Labor resolved the CBA
deadlock by awarding a wage increase of from P6.00 to P10.00 per day effective
January 1, 2004 and from P9.00 to P15.00 per day effective January 1, 2005, and
adopting all other benefits as embodied in the MOA.
Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the Decision as petitioner's vice-
president submitted a "Muling Pagpapatibay ng Pagsang-ayon sa Kasunduan na may
Petsang ika-4 ng Agosto 2005," 5 stating that the union members were waiving their
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 rights and bene ts under the Secretary's Decision. Reconsideration of the Decision was
denied by Resolution 6 of August 12, 2008, hence, respondent led a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
By Decision 7 of September 24, 2009, the appellate court ruled in favor of
respondent and accordingly set aside the Decision of the Secretary of Labor. It held
that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion in not respecting the MOA. It
did not give credence to the minutes of the meeting 8 that attended the forging of the
MOA as it was not veri ed, nor to the "Paliwanag" 9 submitted by respondent union
members explaining why they signed the MOA as it was not notarized.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution 1 0 of
December 2, 2009, the present petition was led, maintaining that the Secretary of
Labor's award is in order, being in accord with the parties' CBA history — respondent
having already granted P15.00 per day for 2001, P10.00 per day for 2002, and P10.00
per day for 2003, and that the Secretary has the power to grant awards higher than
what are stated in the CBA.
Respecting the MOA, petitioner posits that it was "surreptitiously entered into [in]
bad faith," it having been forged without the assistance of the Federation of Free
Workers or counsel, adding that respondent could have waited for the Secretary's
resolution of the pending CBA deadlock or that the MOA could have been concluded
before representatives of the Secretary of Labor.
The relevant issues for resolution are 1) whether the Secretary of Labor is
authorized to give an award higher than that agreed upon in the MOA, and 2) whether
the MOA was entered into and rati ed by the remaining o cers of petitioner under the
condition, which was not incorporated in the MOA, that respondent would honor the
Secretary of Labor's award in the event that it is higher.
The Court resolves both issues in the affirmative.
It is well-settled that the Secretary of Labor, in the exercise of his power to
assume jurisdiction under Art. 263 (g) 1 1 of the Labor Code, may resolve all issues
involved in the controversy including the award of wage increases and bene ts. 1 2
While an arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an agreement voluntarily
entered into by the parties because it requires the intervention and imposing power of
the State thru the Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction, the arbitral award
can be considered an approximation of a collective bargaining agreement which
would otherwise have been entered into by the parties, hence, it has the force and effect
of a valid contract obligation. 1 3 ADTEaI

That the arbitral award was higher than that which was purportedly agreed upon
in the MOA is of no moment. For the Secretary, in resolving the CBA deadlock, is not
limited to considering the MOA as basis in computing the wage increases. He could, as
he did, consider the nancial documents 1 4 submitted by respondent as well as the
parties' bargaining history and respondent's nancial outlook and improvements as
stated in its website. 1 5
It bears noting that since the ling and submission of the MOA did not
have the effect of divesting the Secretary of his jurisdiction , or of automatically
disposing the controversy, then neither should the provisions of the MOA restrict
the Secretary's leeway in deciding the matters before him.
The appellate court's brushing aside of the "Paliwanag" and the minutes of the
meeting that resulted in the conclusion of the MOA because they were not veri ed and
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 notarized, thus violating, so the appellate court reasoned, the rules on parol evidence,
does not lie. Like any other rule on evidence, parol evidence should not be strictly
applied in labor cases.
T h e reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. In labor
cases pending before the Commission or the Labor Arbiter, the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling . Rules
of procedure and evidence are not applied in a very rigid and technical sense in
labor cases. Hence, the Labor Arbiter is not precluded from accepting and
evaluating evidence other than, and even contrary to, what is stated in the CBA. 1 6
(emphasis supplied)

While a contract constitutes the law between the parties, this is so in the present
case with respect to the CBA, not to the MOA in which even the union's signatories had
expressed reservations thereto. But even assuming arguendo that the MOA is treated
as a new CBA, since it is imbued with public interest, it must be construed liberally and
yield to the common good.
While the terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the law
between the parties, it is not, however, an ordinary contract to which is
applied the principles of law governing ordinary contracts . A CBA, as a
labor contract within the contemplation of Article 1700 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which governs the relations between labor and capital, is not merely
contractual in nature but impressed with public interest, thus, it must
yield to the common good . As such, it must be construed liberally rather than
narrowly and technically, and the courts must place a practical and realistic
construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is
negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve. 1 7 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED . The Decision dated September 24,

2009 and the Resolution dated December 2, 2009 of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Order dated March 16, 2006 and Resolution dated
August 12, 2008 of the Secretary of Labor are REINSTATED . TDAHCS

SO ORDERED .
Leonardo-de Castro, * Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Sereno, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
*Additional member per Raffle dated November 15, 2010 in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D.
Brion.

1.DOLE records, pp. 20-22. Penned by Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas.

2.Id. at 251-289.

3.Id. at 290-293.
4.CA rollo, pp. 47-51.

5.DOLE records, p. 383.

6.Id. at 393-403. Penned by Undersecretary Romeo C. Lagman.
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 7.CA rollo, pp. 312-323. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza and concurred in by
Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Isaias P. Dicdican.

8.Id. at 340.
9.Id. at 216-222.

10.Id. at 368-369. Ibid.

11.(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor
and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or
certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification
order . If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all
striking or locked out employees shall immediately return-to-work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies
to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to
enforce the same.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

12.International Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Labor and Associated Labor Union,
G.R. Nos. 92981-83, January 8, 1992, 205 SCRA 59.
13.Vide Manila Electric Company v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 127598, February 22, 2000, citing
Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v. Confesor, 338 Phil. 671.
14.DOLE records, pp. 303-305; 129-250; 32-48.
15.Id. at 306-307.

16.Interphil Laboratories Employees Union-FFW v. Interphil Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No. 142824,
December 19, 2001, 372 SCRA 658.

17.Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring v. Abarquez, G.R. No. 102132, March 19, 1993, 220 SCRA
197-198.

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