MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village [328 SCRA 836; G.R. No.

135962; 27 Mar 2000]

Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency tasked
with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein,
received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the
public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to
regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the
same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and Kalayaan
Avenue would be demolished.

The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a preliminary injunction
and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower
court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that
it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice
police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.

Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its
regulatory and police powers.

Held: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police power is
primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government units.
Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot
exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of the government.
Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA
police power.

It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various national
government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.

MMDA V. GARIN

Facts: The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a
traffic violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara
Street, Binondo, Manila, on August 1995.

Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman
Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case to be
filed in court.

Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary injunction,
contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924
grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial
determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution.

The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified — and therefore
unlimited — fines and other penalties on erring motorists.
The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein respondent.

Issue:

1. WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly exercise police power.

HELD: Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot be exercised by any
group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative
powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. 15 A local
government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial
control of local affairs." 16 Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays,
which exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the passage of Rep.
Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region"
and the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development
authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus: The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development
authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various
national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector
for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are
administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself
* Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila Development
Authority." The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and administer a single
ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and
regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses
in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136 and P.D. No. 1605
to the contrary notwithstanding," and that "(f)or this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and
regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic
enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental
organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the
Authority may impose."

Alvarez v. Guingona
G.R. No. 118303 January 31, 1996
Hermosisima, Jr., J.

Facts:

HB 8817, entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component
City to be known as the City of Santiago,” was filed in the House of Representatives, subsequently passed by
the House of Representatives, and transmitted to the Senate. A counterpart of HB 8817, SB 1243 was filed in
the Senate, and was passed as well. The enrolled bill was submitted to and signed by the Chief Executive as
RA 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of
Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.

Issue:

whether or not considering that the Senate passed SB 1243, its own version of HB 8817, RA 7720 can
be said to have originated in the House of Representatives

Held:
 Yes. Bills of local application are required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives.
Petitioners contend that since a bill of the same import was passed in the Senate, it cannot be said to have
originated in the House of Representatives.

Such is untenable because it cannot be denied that the HB was filed first (18 Apr 1993). The SB
was filed 19 May. The HB was approved on third reading 17 Dec, and was transmitted to the Senate 28 Jan
1994.

The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does
not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of
Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.

The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House of
Representatives, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should
originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the
House bill.

In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court said that what the Constitution simply means is that the
initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and
bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are
from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and
problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same
problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the
bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

Badua Vs. Cordillera Bodong Admin

Facts: Spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua allegedly own farm land from which they were forcibly ejected
through the decision of the Cordillera Bodong Administration, with the case entitled David Quema v. Leonor
Badua. The background of this case reveals that David Quema owns the parcels of land evidenced by Tax
Declarations 4997 and 4998. The parcels of land were purchased from Dr. Erotida Valera. Twenty-two (22)
years later, he was able to redeem the parcels of land through payment of 10,000 to the vendor's heir, Jessie
Macaraeg. Quema was prevented from tilling the land by Rosa Badua. Prompted by such turn of events, David
Quema filed a case in the Baranggay Council but failed to have the dispute settled. A judge advised Quema to
file his case in the provincial courts. However, Quema did not, and filed it in the tribal court of the Maeng Tribe.
Due to several warnings from the tribe, spouses Badua filed a petition for special relief, with the following to be
settled: a. That the respondents be enjoined from enforcing the decision of the tribal court in the pending case.
b. The respondents be prohibited from usurping judicial power. c. That the legal personality of the Cordillera
Bodong Administration be clarified. The Baduas also allege that they were denied due process (or hearing)
and that the tribal court has NO jurisdiction over the case, since neither they nor the respondent are members
of the Maeng tribe. The respondents contend that the SC has no jurisdiction over the case since the tribal court
is NOT a part of the judicial system.

Issue: Whether the tribal court has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: No. Tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme Court and
the lower courts which have been established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). They do not possess
judicial power. Like the pangkats or conciliation panels created by P.D. No. 1508 in the barangays, they are
advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal objective is to bring together the parties to a dispute and
persuade them to make peace, settle, and compromise. An amicable settlement, compromise, and arbitration
award rendered by a pangkat, if not seasonably repudiated, has the force and effect of a final judgment of a
court (Sec. 11, P.D. 1508), but it can be enforced only through the local city or municipal court to which the
secretary of the Lupon transmits the compromise settlement or arbitration award upon expiration of the period
to annul or repudiate it (Sec. 14, P.D. 1508). Similarly, the decisions of a tribal court based on compromise or
arbitration, as provided in P.D. 1508, may be enforced or set aside, in and through the regular courts today.

Umali vs. COMELEC, 723 SCRA 170 (2014)

Salient Feature:
2016 Bar Examination; Question No. 3

Facts:
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No. 183-2011,
requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province
of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the President issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to “ratification in
a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of
1991.”
Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution No. 12-
0797 which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that for purposes of the
plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city to highly-urbanized city, only those
registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite.

The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), citing
conversion cases involving Puerto Princesa City in Palawan, Tacloban City in Southern Leyte, and Lapu-Lapu
City in Cebu, where only the residents of the city proposed to be converted were allowed to vote in the
corresponding plebiscite.

Petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration,
maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily and directly affect the mother province of
Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec.
10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the conversion in question does not involve the creation of a
new or the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of the
LGU directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and
responsibilities. The phrase “qualified voters therein” used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be interpreted to
refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just those in the component
city proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by enumerating the various adverse effects
of the Cabanatuan City’s conversion and how it will cause material change not only in the political and
economic rights of the city and its residents but also of the province as a whole.

On October 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc on October 16, 2012, in E.M No. 12-045 (PLEB), by a
vote of 5-2 ruled in favor of respondent Vergara through the assailed Minute Resolution 12-0925.

Issue:
Whether the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija or only those in
Cabanatuan City can participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a
component city into a Highly Urbanized City (HUC).

Held:
Entire province of Nueva Ecija

Ratio: The upward conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan City, into an HUC will come at a
steep price. It can be gleaned from the above-cited rule that the province will inevitably suffer a corresponding
decrease in territory brought about by Cabanatuan City’s gain of independence. With the city’s newfound
autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial
jurisdiction of the latter. What once formed part of Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the
province. In more concrete terms, Nueva Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with
Cabanatuan City’s severance from its mother province. This is equivalent to carving out almost 5% of Nueva
Ecija’s 5,751.3 sq. km. area. This sufficiently satisfies the requirement that the alteration be “substantial.”

Bai Sandra Sema vs. COMELEC and Didagen Dilangalen, G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008.

Facts: The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created under Republic Act (“R.A.”) No.
6734, as amended by Republic Act No. 9054. The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City,
on the other hand, voted against inclusion in the ARMM during the plebiscite in November 1989.
There are two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district of Maguindanao
consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities. However, for the reason noted above, Cotabato City is not
part of the ARMM but of Region XII.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA
Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite held on 29
October 2006.
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, renaming the first
legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City).”
Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan with
Cotabato City,” prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from
canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled
to one representative in Congress.

Issue: There are a number of issues resolved, but the main issue is this — Whether Section 19, Article VI
of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays, is constitutional.

Ruling: The power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays was delegated by Congress to the
ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. However, pursuant to the Constitution, the
power to create a province is with Congress and may not be validly delegated. Section 19 is, therefore,
unconstitutional. MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan, is void. The creation of Shariff Kabunsuan is invalid.

Discussion: The creation of local government units (LGUs) is governed by Section 10, Article Xof
the Constitution. There are three conditions that must be complied with in creating any of the four local
government units – province, city, municipality or barangay – to wit:
1. The creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code.
2. Such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution.
3. There must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
In this case, the creation of a province by the Regional Assembly is contrary to the Constitution.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to
delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs, subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution.
When it comes to the creation of municipalities and barangays, there is no provision in the Constitution that
conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies (like the ARMM Regional Assembly) of the power to
create such LGUs. The creation of provinces and cities is another matter.
The power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. This is clear
under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution (“Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative” in the House of Representatives) and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution (“ “Any province that may hereafter be created, or any
city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.”) In other words, for Congress to delegate validly
the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a
legislative district.
However, Congress CANNOT validly delegate the power to create legislative districts. The power to increase
the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested
exclusively in Congress.
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the
allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion
legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create
legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself
enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the
House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only
through a national law passed by Congress.
The exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature
and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of
legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be
anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national
legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the
membership of the superior legislative body.
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a
Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous for a regional
legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers
extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and
the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative
powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively,
and it can never create a national office. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is
to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMM’s territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assembly’s legislative powers
“[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x.”

SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID, petitioner,

vs.
THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, DEPARTMENT of FINANCE, DEPARTMENT of
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
(HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE), respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari presents this Court with the prospect of our own Brigadoon1 —the municipality of
Andong, Lanao del Sur―which like its counterpart in filmdom, is a town that is not supposed to exist yet is
anyway insisted by some as actually alive and thriving. Yet unlike in the movies, there is nothing mystical,
ghostly or anything even remotely charming about the purported existence of Andong. The creation of the
putative municipality was declared void ab initio by this Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists
that in spite of this insurmountable obstacle Andong thrives on, and hence, its legal personality should be given
judicial affirmation. We disagree.
The factual antecedents derive from the promulgation of our ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General2 in 1965. As
discussed therein, then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders3 creating thirty-three
(33) municipalities in Mindanao. Among them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of
Executive Order No. 107.4
These executive orders were issued after legislative bills for the creation of municipalities involved in that case
had failed to pass Congress.5 President Diosdado Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities
citing his powers under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Then Vice-President Emmanuel
Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of prohibition, alleging in main that the Executive Orders were null
and void, Section 68 having been repealed by Republic Act No. 2370,6 and said orders constituting an undue
delegation of legislative power.7
After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the challenged Executive Orders were null and void. A
majority of five justices, led by the ponente, Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion, ruled that
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation
of legislative power to the executive branch,8 while three justices opined that the nullity of the issuances was
the consequence of the enactment of the 1935 Constitution, which reduced the power of the Chief Executive
over local governments.9Pelaez was disposed in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.10
Among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No. 107 which created the Municipality of Andong.
Nevertheless, the core issue presented in the present petition is the continued efficacy of the judicial
annulment of the Municipality of Andong.
Petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid (Camid) represents himself as a current resident of Andong, 11 suing as a
private citizen and taxpayer whose locus standi "is of public and paramount interest especially to the people of
the Municipality of Andong, Province of Lanao del Sur."12 He alleges that Andong "has metamorphosed into a
full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the
municipality and its constituents,"13 even though he concedes that since 1968, no person has been appointed,
elected or qualified to serve any of the elective local government positions of Andong.14 Nonetheless, the
municipality of Andong has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, a Department of Education, Culture and
Sports office, and at least seventeen (17) "barangay units" with their own respective chairmen. 15 From 1964
until 1972, according to Camid, the public officials of Andong "have been serving their constituents through the
minimal means and resources with least (sic) honorarium and recognition from the Office of the then former
President Diosdado Macapagal." Since the time of Martial Law in 1972, Andong has allegedly been getting by
despite the absence of public funds, with the "Interim Officials" serving their constituents "in their own little
ways and means."16
In support of his claim that Andong remains in existence, Camid presents to this Court a Certification issued by
the Office of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) certifying the total land area of the Municipality of Andong, "created under
Executive Order No. 107 issued [last] October 1, 1964."17 He also submits a Certification issued by the
Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi City concerning the population of Andong, which is pegged at fourteen
thousand fifty nine (14,059) strong. Camid also enumerates a list of governmental agencies and private groups
that allegedly recognize Andong, and notes that other municipalities have recommended to the Speaker of the
Regional Legislative Assembly for the immediate implementation of the revival or re-establishment of
Andong.18
The petition assails a Certification dated 21 November 2003, issued by the Bureau of Local Government
Supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).19 The Certification enumerates
eighteen (18) municipalities certified as "existing," per DILG records. Notably, these eighteen (18)
municipalities are among the thirty-three (33), along with Andong, whose creations were voided by this Court
in Pelaez. These municipalities are Midaslip, Pitogo, Naga, and Bayog in Zamboanga del Sur; Siayan and
Pres. Manuel A. Roxas in Zamboanga del Norte; Magsaysay, Sta. Maria and New Corella in Davao;
Badiangan and Mina in Iloilo; Maguing in Lanao del Sur; Gloria in Oriental Mindoro; Maasim in Sarangani;
Kalilangan and Lantapan in Bukidnon; and Maco in Compostela Valley.20
Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG "in not classifying [Andong] as a regular
existing municipality and in not including said municipality in its records and official database as [an] existing
regular municipality."21 He characterizes such non-classification as unequal treatment to the detriment of
Andong, especially in light of the current recognition given to the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly annulled
by reason of Pelaez. As appropriate relief, Camid prays that the Court annul the DILG Certification dated 21
November 2003; direct the DILG to classify Andong as a "regular existing municipality;" all public respondents,
to extend full recognition and support to Andong; the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget
and Management, to immediately release the internal revenue allotments of Andong; and the public
respondents, particularly the DILG, to recognize the "Interim Local Officials" of Andong.22
Moreover, Camid insists on the continuing validity of Executive Order No. 107. He argues that Pelaez has
already been modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence. Particularly
cited is our Decision in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez,23 wherein the Court affirmed the unique
status of the municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a "de facto municipal corporation."24 Similar to Andong,
the municipality of San Andres was created by way of executive order, precisely the manner which the Court in
Pelaez had declared as unconstitutional. Moreover, San Narciso cited, as Camid does, Section 442(d) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 as basis for the current recognition of the impugned municipality. The
provision reads:
Section 442. Requisites for Creation. - xxx
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as
such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which
have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code
shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.25
There are several reasons why the petition must be dismissed. These can be better discerned upon
examination of the proper scope and application of Section 442(d), which does not sanction the recognition of
just any municipality. This point shall be further explained further on.
Notably, as pointed out by the public respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the case
is not a fit subject for the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the de
novo appreciation of factual questions. There is indeed no way to confirm several of Camid’s astonishing
factual allegations pertaining to the purported continuing operation of Andong in the decades since it was
annulled by this Court. No trial court has had the opportunity to ascertain the validity of these factual claims,
the appreciation of which is beyond the function of this Court since it is not a trier of facts.
The importance of proper factual ascertainment cannot be gainsaid, especially in light of the legal principles
governing the recognition of de facto municipal corporations. It has been opined that municipal corporations
may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions,
with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long
enough to afford title by prescription.26 These municipal corporations have exercised their powers for a long
period without objection on the part of the government that although no charter is in existence, it is presumed
that they were duly incorporated in the first place and that their charters had been lost.27 They are especially
common in England, which, as well-worth noting, has existed as a state for over a thousand years. The reason
for the development of that rule in England is understandable, since that country was settled long before the
Roman conquest by nomadic Celtic tribes, which could have hardly been expected to obtain a municipal
charter in the absence of a national legal authority.
In the United States, municipal corporations by prescription are less common, but it has been held that when
no charter or act of incorporation of a town can be found, it may be shown to have claimed and exercised the
powers of a town with the knowledge and assent of the legislature, and without objection or interruption for so
long a period as to furnish evidence of a prescriptive right.28
What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of
its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by the other instrumentalities of the state. Camid
does not have the opportunity to make an initial factual demonstration of those circumstances before this
Court. Indeed, the factual deficiencies aside, Camid’s plaint should have undergone the usual administrative
gauntlet and, once that was done, should have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least would
have had the power to make the necessary factual determinations. Camid’s seeming ignorance of the
principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant
prematurity of the present petition, cannot be countenanced.
It is also difficult to capture the sense and viability of Camid’s present action. The assailed issuance is
the Certification issued by the DILG. But such Certification does not pretend to bear the authority to create or
revalidate a municipality. Certainly, the annulment of the Certification will really do nothing to serve Camid’s
ultimate cause- the recognition of Andong. Neither does the Certification even expressly refute the claim that
Andong still exists, as there is nothing in the document that comments on the present status of Andong.
Perhaps the Certification is assailed before this Court if only to present an actual issuance, rather than a long-
standing habit or pattern of action that can be annulled through the special civil action of certiorari. Still, the
relation of the Certification to Camid’s central argument is forlornly strained.
These disquisitions aside, the central issue remains whether a municipality whose creation by executive fiat
was previously voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing
statute. Apparently, the question has never been decided before, San Narciso and its kindred cases pertaining
as they did to municipalities whose bases of creation were dubious yet were never judicially nullified. The effect
of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as Andong warrants explanation.
Besides, the residents of Andong who belabor under the impression that their town still exists, much less those
who may comport themselves as the municipality’s "Interim Government," would be well served by a rude
awakening.
The Court can employ a simplistic approach in resolving the substantive aspect of the petition, merely by
pointing out that the Municipality of Andong never existed.29 Executive Order No. 107, which established
Andong, was declared "null and void ab initio" in 1965 by this Court in Pelaez, along with thirty-three (33) other
executive orders. The phrase "ab initio" means "from the beginning,"30 "at first,"31 "from the
inception."32 Pelaez was never reversed by this Court but rather it was expressly affirmed in the cases
of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva,33 Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,34 and Municipality of Kapalong v.
Moya.35 No subsequent ruling by this Court declared Pelaez as overturned or inoperative. No subsequent
legislation has been passed since 1965 creating a Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly
any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted municipality.
This ratiocination does not admit to patent legal errors and has the additional virtue of blessed austerity. Still,
its sweeping adoption may not be advisedly appropriate in light of Section 442(d) of the Local Government
Code and our ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, both of which admit to the possibility of de facto municipal
corporations.
To understand the applicability of Municipality of San Narciso and Section 442(b) of the Local Government
Code to the situation of Andong, it is necessary again to consider the ramifications of our decision in Pelaez.
The eminent legal doctrine enunciated in Pelaez was that the President was then, and still is, not empowered
to create municipalities through executive issuances. The Court therein recognized "that the President has, for
many years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations, and that the same have been organized
and in actual operation . . . ."36 However, the Court ultimately nullified only those thirty-three (33) municipalities,
including Andong, created during the period from 4 September to 29 October 1964 whose existence petitioner
Vice-President Pelaez had specifically assailed before this Court. No pronouncement was made as to the other
municipalities which had been previously created by the President in the exercise of power the Court deemed
unlawful.
Two years after Pelaez was decided, the issue again came to fore in Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva.37 The
Municipality of Lawigan was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 436 in 1961. Lawigan was not one of the
municipalities ordered annulled in Pelaez. A petition for prohibition was filed contesting the legality of the
executive order, again on the ground that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code was unconstitutional.
The trial court dismissed the petition, but the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and entered a new decision
declaring Executive Order No. 436 void ab initio. The Court reasoned without elaboration that the issue had
already been squarely taken up and settled in Pelaez which agreed with the argument posed by the
challengers to Lawigan’s validity.38
In the 1969 case of Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,39 what was challenged is the validity of the constitution
of the Municipality of Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, also created by an executive order, 40 and which, similar to
Lawigan, was not one of the municipalities annulled in Pelaez. This time, the officials of Balabagan invoked de
facto status as a municipal corporation in order to dissuade the Court from nullifying action. They alleged that
its status as a de facto corporation cannot be collaterally attacked but should be inquired into directly in an
action for quo warranto at the instance of the State, and not by a private individual as it was in that case. In
response, the Court conceded that an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State
in a proceeding for quo warranto, but only if the municipal corporation is a de facto corporation.41
Ultimately, the Court refused to acknowledge Balabagan as a de facto corporation, even though it had been
organized prior to the Court’s decision in Pelaez. The Court declared void the executive order creating
Balabagan and restrained its municipal officials from performing their official duties and functions.42 It cited
conflicting American authorities on whether a de facto corporation can exist where the statute or charter
creating it is unconstitutional.43But the Court’s final conclusion was unequivocal that Balabagan was not a de
facto corporation.1awphi1.nét
In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute
creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was
some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that
Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de
factocorporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid
statute to give color of authority to its creation.44
The Court did clarify in Malabang that the previous acts done by the municipality in the exercise of its corporate
powers were not necessarily a nullity.45 Camid devotes several pages of his petition in citing this point,46 yet
the relevance of the citation is unclear considering that Camid does not assert the validity of any corporate act
of Andong prior to its judicial dissolution. Notwithstanding, the Court in Malabang retained an emphatic attitude
as to the unconstitutionality of the power of the President to create municipal corporations by way of
presidential promulgations, as authorized under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code.
This principle was most recently affirmed in 1988, in Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya.47 The municipality of
Santo Tomas, created by President Carlos P. Garcia, filed a complaint against another municipality, who
challenged Santo Tomas’s legal personality to institute suit. Again, Santo Tomas had not been expressly
nullified by prior judicial action, yet the Court refused to recognize its legal existence. The blunt but simple
ruling: "Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to create a municipality.
Since [Santo Tomas] has no legal personality, it can not be a party to any civil action…." 48
Nevertheless, when the Court decided Municipality of San Narciso49 in 1995, it indicated a shift in the
jurisprudential treatment of municipalities created through presidential issuances. The questioned municipality
of San Andres, Quezon was created on 20 August 1959 by Executive Order No. 353 issued by President
Carlos P. Garcia. Executive Order No. 353 was not one of the thirty-three issuances annulled by Pelaez in
1965. The legal status of the Municipality of San Andres was first challenged only in 1989, through a petition
for quo warranto filed with the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, which did cite Pelaez as
authority.50 The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action, and the petitioners therein elevated the
matter to this Court.
In dismissing the petition, the Court delved in the merits of the petition, if only to resolve further doubt on the
legal status of San Andres. It noted a circumstance which is not present in the case at bar—that San Andres
was in existence for nearly thirty (30) years before its legality was challenged. The Court did not declare the
executive order creating San Andres null and void. Still, acting on the premise that the said executive order
was a complete nullity, the Court noted "peculiar circumstances" that led to the conclusion that San Andres
had attained the unique status of a "de facto municipal corporation."51 It noted that Pelaez limited its
nullificatory effect only to those executive orders specifically challenged therein, despite the fact that the Court
then could have very well extended the decision to invalidate San Andres as well.52 This statement squarely
contradicts Camid’s reading of San Narcisothat the creation of San Andres, just like Andong, had been
declared a complete nullity on the same ground of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power found
in Pelaez.53
The Court also considered the applicability of Section 442(d)54 of the Local Government Code of 1991. It
clarified the implication of the provision as follows:
Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts
"organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of
elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local
Government Code is preferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power
to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has
incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at
giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been
complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of
vested rights. (Emphasis supplied)55
The holding in San Narciso was subsequently affirmed in Municipality of Candijay v. Court of Appeals56 and
Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz57 In Candijay, the juridical personality of the Municipality of Alicia, created in a
1949 executive order, was attacked only beginning in 1984. Pelaez was again invoked in support of the
challenge, but the Court refused to invalidate the municipality, citing San Narciso at length. The Court noted
that the situation of the Municipality of Alicia was strikingly similar to that in San Narciso; hence, the town
should likewise "benefit from the effects of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code, and should [be]
considered as a regular, de juremunicipality." 58
The valid existence of Municipality of Sinacaban, created in a 1949 executive order, was among the issues
raised in Jimenez. The Court, through Justice Mendoza, provided an expert summation of the evolution of the
rule.
The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling
in Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and
therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The
ruling in this case has been reiterated in a number of cases later decided. However, we have since held that
where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded
legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr.,
this Court considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which,
like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez
v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never
been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the
validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later
classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a
legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was
held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have
been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), §442(d) of which provides that
"municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities."
Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal
corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.
Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December
24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only
40 years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is
desired for its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, §16 of the Rules of Court,
a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five (5) years
from the time the act complained of was done or committed. On the contrary, the State and even the
Municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacaban's corporate existence. Under Administrative Order
No. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated by §31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.
P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering
into an agreement with it regarding their common boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution No.
77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.
Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution,
apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second
District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v.
Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the
creation of Sinacaban….591awphi1.nét
From this survey of relevant jurisprudence, we can gather the applicable rules. Pelaez and its offspring cases
ruled that the President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular
municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local
Government Code in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive
order but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and
Sinacaban was recognized by this Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed curative
whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored under.
Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation? It is not. There are eminent
differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is
the fact that the executive order creating Andong was expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If we
were to affirm Andong’s de facto status by reason of its alleged continued existence despite its nullification, we
would in effect be condoning defiance of a valid order of this Court.l^vvphi1.net Court decisions cannot
obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved.
It bears noting that based on Camid’s own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by
Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality
created by executive order may receive recognition, they must "have their respective set of elective municipal
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code." Camid admits that Andong
has never elected its municipal officers at all.60 This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially
annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the national government ceased to recognize the
existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections
for the void municipality.
The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality in the last four
decades are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town. The certifications
relied upon by Camid, issued by the DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the
purpose of attesting to Andong’s legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications qualify that they were issued
upon the request of Camid, "to support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of Andong, Lanao del
Sur,"61 thus obviously conceding that the municipality is at present inoperative.1awphi1.nét
We may likewise pay attention to the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, which had also been relied
upon in Jimenez and San Narciso. This Ordinance, which apportioned the seats of the House of
Representatives to the different legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities
that are encompassed by the various legislative districts. Andong is not listed therein as among the
municipalities of Lanao del Sur, or of any other province for that matter. 62 On the other hand, the municipalities
of San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban are mentioned in the Ordinance as part of Quezon,63 Bohol,64 and
Misamis Occidental65 respectively.
How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified in Pelaez but certified as existing in the
DILG Certification presented by Camid? The petition fails to mention that subsequent to the ruling
in Pelaez, legislation was enacted to reconstitute these municipalities.66 It is thus not surprising that the DILG
certified the existence of these eighteen (18) municipalities, or that these towns are among the municipalities
enumerated in the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Andong has not been similarly reestablished
through statute. Clearly then, the fact that there are valid organic statutes passed by legislation recreating
these eighteen (18) municipalities is sufficient legal basis to accord a different legal treatment to Andong as
against these eighteen (18) other municipalities.
We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code—that it does not serve to
affirm or reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been previously created
by presidential issuances or executive orders. The provision affirms the legal personalities only of those
municipalities such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have been created using the same
infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the
municipalities judicially dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent,
unless recreated through specific legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified
by the DILG. Those municipalities derive their legal personality not from the presidential issuances or executive
orders which originally created them or from Section 442(d), but from the respective legislative statutes which
were enacted to revive them.1a\^/phi1.net
And what now of Andong and its residents? Certainly, neither Pelaez or this decision has obliterated Andong
into a hole on the ground. The legal effect of the nullification of Andong in Pelaez was to revert the constituent
barrios of the voided town back into their original municipalities, namely the municipalities of Lumbatan, Butig
and Tubaran.67These three municipalities subsist to this day as part of Lanao del Sur,68 and presumably
continue to exercise corporate powers over the barrios which once belonged to Andong.
If there is truly a strong impulse calling for the reconstitution of Andong, the solution is through the legislature
and not judicial confirmation of void title. If indeed the residents of Andong have, all these years, been
governed not by their proper municipal governments but by a ragtag "Interim Government," then an expedient
political and legislative solution is perhaps necessary. Yet we can hardly sanction the retention of Andong’s
legal personality solely on the basis of collective amnesia that may have allowed Andong to somehow pretend
itself into existence despite its judicial dissolution. Maybe those who insist Andong still exists prefer to remain
unperturbed in their blissful ignorance, like the inhabitants of the cave in Plato’s famed allegory. But the time
has come for the light to seep in, and for the petitioner and like-minded persons to awaken to legal reality.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ vs. BAZ

Facts: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO 258 of then Pres. Quirino pursuant to Sec. 68 of the
Revised Admin. Code.Sinacaban laid claim to several barrios based on the technical description in EO 258.
The Municipality of Jimenez asserted jurisdiction based on an agreement with Sinacaban which was approved
by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez.
The Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the earlier resolution
approving the agreement between the municipalities was void since the Board had no power to alter the
boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258. Jimenez argued that the power to create municipalities is
essentially legislative (as held in Pelaez v Auditor General), then Sinacaban, which was created thru and EO,
had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim. Issue: Whether or not Sinacaban has juridical
personality. YES Held: Where a municipality created as such by EO is later impliedly recognized and its acts
are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In the case of Municipality of San Narciso
v Mendez, the SC laid the factors to consider in validating the creation of a municipal corporation: 1. The fact
that for 30 years, the validity of the corporation has not been challenged; 2. The fact that no quo warranto suit
was filed to question the validity of the EO creating the municipality; and 3. The fact that the municipality was
later classified as a 5th class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of
a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House. In this case, the following factors
are present:

1. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was decided in 1965 and yet the validity of EO
258 creating it had never been questioned. 2. It was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned. 3.
Rule 66, Sec. 16 of the Rules of COurt provides that a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of
its charter must be commenced within 5 years from the time the act complaned of was done or committed. 4.
The State and even Jimenez recognized Sinacaban’s corporate existence by entering into an agreement with it
regarding the boundary. Ex.: AO 33, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, etc. 5. Sinacaban is constituted as
part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of MTCs in the country. Moreover, the LGC of
1991, Sec. 442(d) provides that “municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive
orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.” Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue
of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country,
which considered Sinacaban as part of the 2nd District of Misamis Occidental. II. Sinacaban had attained de
facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. It is not subject to the plebiscite requirement. It
applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution. The requirement of plebiscite
was originally contained in Art. XI, Section 3 of the previous Constitution. It cannot be applied to municipal
corporations created before, such as Sinacaban.

MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
Posted by kaye lee on 12:46 PM
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999

FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent
component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No.
8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the
lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.

Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely reclassified the City
of Santiago from an independent component city into a component city. It allegedly did not involve any
“creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units,”
therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of
petitioners to file the petition and argued that the petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks
jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.

RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over said petition
because it involves not a political question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide
whether or not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was the mayor of Santiago
City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and
voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city through a plebiscite to be
conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike
down the law as unconstitutional.
Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instru-mentality of the Government.

GANZON VS CA
Posted by kaye lee on 10:50 PM
G.R. No. 93252 August 5 1991

FACTS:
Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-day of suspension order by Secretary of Local
Government, filed a petition for prohibition with the CA to bar Secretary Santos from implementing the said
orders. Ganzon was faced with 10 administrative complaints on various charges on abuse of authority and
grave misconduct.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the President) has the authority to
suspend and remove local officials.

RULING:
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the
Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no
prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did
not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.

In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because that the
President cannot exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere.
But in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little
difficulty in sustaining him.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal
power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising that power oppressively, and
needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to
all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents
and purposes, his suspension permanent.

Limbona vs. Mangelin

GR No. 80391 28 February 1989

Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or
Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid
Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in
his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government
officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly
Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee
hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the
Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be
declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further
proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's
membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against
some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the
Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because
its resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What
is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is

decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments
"more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general
supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of
power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units
declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and
shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is
subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the
supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local
Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts
are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the
Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it
comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the
second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall
have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction.
And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the
petitioner's removal as Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most

important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on
local autonomy.

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other
beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under
Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by
direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still
invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled
matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also,
assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to
this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an
apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the
"recess" called on the ground of good faith.

PROVINCE OF BATANGAS v. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, GR No. 152774, 2004-05-27

Facts:
On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 48 entitled
"ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION." The program was
established to "facilitate the process of enhancing the capacities of local government... units (LGUs) in the
discharge of the functions and services devolved to them by the National Government Agencies concerned
pursuant to the Local Government Code."[1] The Oversight Committee (referred to as the Devolution
Committee in E.O. No. 48)... constituted under Section 533(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local
Government Code of 1991) has been tasked to formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations
necessary for its effective implementation.[2] Further, to address the funding... shortfalls of functions and
services devolved to the LGUs and other funding requirements of the program, the "Devolution Adjustment and
Equalization Fund" was created.[3] For 1998, the DBM was directed to set aside an amount to be determined
by the
Oversight Committee based on the devolution status appraisal surveys undertaken by the DILG.[4] The initial
fund was to be sourced from the available savings of the national government for CY 1998. [5] For 1999 and
the succeeding... years, the corresponding amount required to sustain the program was to be incorporated in
the annual GAA.[6] The Oversight Committee has been authorized to issue the implementing rules and
regulations governing the equitable allocation and distribution of... said fund to the LGUs.
The petitioner now comes to this Court assailing as unconstitutional and void the provisos in the GAAs of 1999,
2000 and 2001, relating to the LGSEF. Similarly assailed are the Oversight Committee's Resolutions Nos.
OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029... and OCD-2002-001 issued
pursuant thereto. The petitioner submits that the assailed provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions,
insofar as they earmarked the amount of five billion pesos of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and 2001 for
the LGSEF and imposed conditions for the... release thereof, violate the Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991.
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is invoked as it mandates that the "just share" of the LGUs shall be
automatically released to them. Sections 18 and 286 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which enjoin that
the "just share" of the LGUs shall be "automatically and... directly" released to them "without need of further
action" are, likewise, cited.
The petitioner posits that to subject the distribution and release of the five- billion-peso portion of the IRA,
classified as the LGSEF, to compliance by the LGUs with the implementing rules and regulations, including the
mechanisms and guidelines prescribed by the Oversight
Committee, contravenes the explicit directive of the Constitution that the LGUs' share in the national taxes
"shall be automatically released to them." The petitioner maintains that the use of the word "shall" must be
given a compulsory meaning.
To further buttress this argument, the petitioner contends that to vest the Oversight Committee with the
authority to determine the distribution and release of the LGSEF, which is a part of the IRA of the LGUs, is an
anathema to the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Another infringement alleged to be occasioned by the assailed OCD resolutions is the improper amendment to
Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991 on the percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs
Issues:
whether the issue had been rendered moot and academic.
(1) whether the petitioner has legal standing or locus standi to file the present suit; (2) whether the petition
involves factual questions that... are properly cognizable by the lower courts; and (3) whether the issue had
been rendered moot and academic.
Ruling:
The petitioner has locus standi... to maintain the present suit
Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a party assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be
direct and personal. Such party must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid,
but... also that he has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person
complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or... privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that
he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of
.
The Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite standing to maintain the present suit. The
petitioner, a local government unit, seeks relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the
other LGUs.
The petition involves a significant... legal issue
The crucial legal issue submitted for resolution of this Court entails the proper legal interpretation of
constitutional and statutory provisions. Moreover, the "transcendental importance" of the case, as it necessarily
involves the application of the constitutional principle on... local autonomy, cannot be gainsaid. The nature of
the present controversy, therefore, warrants the relaxation by this Court of procedural rules in order to resolve
the case forthwith.
The substantive issue needs to be resolved... notwithstanding the supervening events
S... upervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if
there is a grave violation of the
Constitution.
Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the
legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public.
Another reason justifying the resolution by this Court of the substantive issue now before it is the rule that
courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
For the GAAs in the coming... years may contain provisos similar to those now being sought to be invalidated,
and yet, the question may not be decided before another GAA is enacted. It, thus, behooves this Court to
make a categorical ruling on the substantive issue now.
In Article II of the Constitution, the State has expressly... adopted as a policy that:
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
C... onsistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the President's power over the
LGUs to one of general supervision.

Lino Vs Pano

G.R. No. 129093

FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto
Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by
Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on
September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint,
respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs:
(1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing
or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to
issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño,
promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan
Blg. 508, T. 1995.

ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid.
This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national
government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may
actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed
resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the
operation of lotto.n our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact
ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac,
ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as
elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp
Pimentel v. Aguirre
G.R. No. 132988 (July 19, 2000)

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order No.
372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25%
of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents from
implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.
HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any
manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs,
fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by
the President consistent with his powers of supervision over local governments. A directory order cannot be
characterized as an exercise of the power of control. The AO is intended only to advise all government
agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability
in the country. It does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.

The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters, provided that certain
requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with
the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local
leagues; (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and
Local Government, and Budget and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be
less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current
one.

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by the Constitution and the Local
Government Code. Section 4 which orders the withholding of 10% of the LGU’s IRA clearly contravenes the
Constitution and the