FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 130277 May 9, 2002

MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her minor child, CHARLES
CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA, petitioner,
vs.
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and CARLOS VILLENA BORBON, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Order 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 89, which dismissed motu proprio the petition of Ma. Lourdes Eleosida to correct some
entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian. The birth certificate shows, among others,
that the child's full name is Charles Christian Eleosida Borbon. He was born on May 24, 1992 to Ma.
Lourdes Barrientos Eleosida and Carlos Villena Borbon. The birth certificate also indicates that the
child's parents were married on January 10, 1985 in Batangas City.2

On January 30, 1997, petitioner Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City seeking to correct the following entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles
Christian: first, the surname "Borbon" should be changed to "Eleosida;" second, the date of the
parents' wedding should be left blank; and third, the informant's name should be "Ma. Lourdes B.
Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of her petition, petitioner alleged that she
gave birth to her son out of wedlock on May 24, 1992; that she and the boy's father, Carlos Borbon,
were never married; and that the child is therefore illegitimate and should follow the mother's
surname. The petition impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City and Carlos Villena Borbon as
respondents.3

On April 23, 1997, the trial court issued a notice of hearing stating:

"Verified petition having been filed by petitioner Ma. Lourdes Barrientos Eleosida, praying
that the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of her minor child, Charles Christian Eleosida
Borbon, be changed and/or corrected, such that, his last name BORBON be deleted and
instead place therein the name ELEOSIDA, which is the surname of his mother-petitioner;
the entry "January 10, 1985 – Batangas City", be likewise deleted, since the petitioner and
respondent Carlos Villena Borbon, at the time of the minor's birth were not legally married;
and the surname BORBON of petitioner Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon under the column Informant,
be also deleted;

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that this petition is set for hearing on June 26, 1997 at 8:30
o'clock in the morning, in the Session Hall of this Court sitting at the Ground Floor, Room
118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City, which is ordered published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation and published in Metro Manila, to
be selected by raffle, at the expense of the petitioner, at which date, time and place, the
petitioner shall appear and prove her petition, in that all other persons having or claiming any
interest thereon shall also appear and show cause why, if any, they have, the petition shall
not be granted. 1âwphi1.nêt

Let copies of this notice be furnished the petitioner, and together with copies of the petition,
respondent Carlos Villena Borbon; the Offices of the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and
the Solicitor General, who are given fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the
last date of publication of such notice, within which to file their opposition thereto, if any. In
 the event that the Solicitor General may not be able to appear on the scheduled hearing, to
designate the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear for and in behalf of the State.

SO ORDERED."4

On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued another order setting the date for the presentation of
evidence on July 23, 1997. It stated:

"Considering that there is no opposition filed despite notice to the Solicitor General as
contained in the notice of hearing dated April 23, 1997 requiring that office to file their
opposition, if any, to the petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of minor child
Charles Christian Eleosida, the petitioner will be allowed to present compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements and at the same time initially present evidence on July 23, 1997,
at 8:30 o'clock in the morning." 5

On August 25, 1997, the trial court motu proprio dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It ruled:

"It is an established jurisprudence that, only CLERICAL ERRORS OF A HARMLESS AND

INNOCUOUS NATURE like: misspelled name, occupation of the parents, etc., may be the
subject of a judicial order (contemplated under Article 412 of the New Civil Code), authorizing
changes or corrections and: NOT as may affect the CIVIL STATUS, NATIONALITY OR
CITIZENSHIP OF THE PERSONS INVOLVED.

In the present case, it is very clear that the changes desired by the petitioner will ultimately
affect the CIVIL STATUS OF CHARLES CHRISTIAN, as she wants the Court to Direct the
Civil Registrar of Quezon City to substitute her maiden name, ELEOSIDA, with that of
BORBON; to delete the information supplied in ITEM 12, respecting the date and place of
marriage of parents, on the ground that she was never married to respondent CARLOS
VILLENA BORBON and amend the information in ITEM 14, respecting the name of the
informant, from MA. LOURDES E. BORBON to MA. LOURDES B. ELEOSIDA, and is
indicative of petitioner's intention and device to establish that CHARLES CHRISTIAN's civil
status as ILLEGITIMATE.

With the petition's ultimate purpose on the part of petitioner to secure judicial order, which
would authorize a change in the civil status of CHARLES CHRISTIAN, this Court, finds the
action improper. The matters desired to be cancelled and/or changed by petitioner cannot be
considered falling under the ambit of the words 'clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous
nature.'

WHEREFORE, for LACK OF MERIT, the petition is now MOTU PROPIO (sic) dismissed." 6

Petitioner fled the instant petition for review raising the issue of whether corrections of entries in the
certificate of live birth pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court may be allowed even if the errors to be corrected are substantial and not merely clerical errors
of a harmless and innocuous nature.7

The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment. The OSG submitted that even substantial errors in
the civil registry may be corrected provided that the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves
of the appropriate adversary proceeding. Thus it argued that even if the petition seeks the correction
and eventual change in the civil status of Charles Christian, the same can be ordered by the court as
long as all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified and represented. 8 Respondent
Carlos Borbon, on the other hand, failed to submit his comment on the petition despite several
notices from this Court. Hence, on January 24, 2001, the Court dispensed with the filing of
respondent Borbon's comment and gave due course to the petition. 9

We find merit in the petition. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either
be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical,
then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. 10 This is
our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia11 where we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by
the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or
proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have
been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered. The Court further laid down the procedural requirements to make the proceedings under
Rule 108 adversary, thus:

"The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:

SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is

sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. 1âwphi1.nêt

SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by
an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once in a week for three 93) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen
(15) days from notice, file his opposition thereto.

Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register are—(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it
becomes the duty of the court to—(1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing
of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are
likewise entitled to oppose the petition:--(1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or
cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as 'summary'. xxx" 12

It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical
or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage between
petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of
such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in accordance with our ruling in Republic
vs. Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. The records
show that upon receipt of the petition, the trial court issued a notice of hearing setting the hearing on
June 26, 1997 at 8:30 in the morning at Room 118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City. The trial court
likewise ordered the publication of said notice once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation and its posting in selected places in Metro Manila. The notice
stated that the petitioner shall prove her petition during said hearing and all other persons having or
claiming any interest thereon shall also appear and show if there is any reason why the petition
should not be granted. Respondents Carlos Villena Borbon, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City
and the Solicitor General were all furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing together with a copy
of the petition. On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued a second order giving the petitioner an
opportunity to show compliance with the jurisdictional requirements and to present evidence during
the hearing set on July 23, 1997. The foregoing satisfy all the requirements of Rule 108 to make it an
adversary proceeding. It was therefore an error for the trial court to dismiss the petition motu
proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support her petition and all the other
persons who have an interest over the matter to oppose the same. 1âwphi1.nêt

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and the Order dated August 25, 1997 of the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 89, subject of the petition at bar is set aside. The case is REMANDED to the
court a quo for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

Footnote

1
Rollo, pp. 19-20.

2
Rollo, p. 24.

3
Rollo, pp. 21-22.

4
Rollo, p. 25.

5
Rollo, p. 26.

6
Rollo, pp. 19-20.

7
Rollo, p. 5, Rollo, p. 13.

8
Rollo, pp. 70-73.

9
Rollo, pp. 134-135.

10
Republic vs. Bautista, 155 SCRA 1 (1987).

11
1
 SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF G.R. No. 170340

THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, Present:

QUISUMBING,* J., Chairperson

CARPIO,**
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

CARLITO I. KHO, MICHAEL PROMULGATED:

KHO, MERCY NONA KHO-
FORTUN, HEDDY MOIRA
KHO-SERRANO, KEVIN
DOGMOC KHO (Minor), and June 29, 2007
KELLY DOGMOC KHO
(Minor),
Respondents.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Challenged via petition for review on certiorari is the October 27,

2005 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78124 which
affirmed the September 4, 2002 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Butuan City, Branch 5 granting the prayer of respondents Carlito I. Kho (Carlito),
Michael Kho, Mercy Nona Kho-Fortun, and Heddy Moira Kho-Serrano for the
correction of entries in their birth certificates as well as those of Carlitos minor
children Kevin and Kelly Dogmoc Kho.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy
Moira filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for correction of
entries in the civil registry of ButuanCity to effect changes in their respective birth
certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his minor children, Kevin and
Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in their birth certificates.

In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of the
citizenship of his mother to Filipino instead of Chinese, as well as the deletion of
the word married opposite the phrase Date of marriage of parents because his
parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco (Epifania), were allegedly not legally
married.

The same request to delete the married status of their parents from their
respective birth certificates was made by Carlitos siblings Michael, Mercy Nona,
and Heddy Moira.

With respect to the birth certificates of Carlitos children, he prayed that the date of
his and his wifes marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000,
the date appearing in their marriage certificate.

The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent.

On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition [3] in which it was
additionally prayed that Carlitos second name of John be deleted from his record of
birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlitos father in his (Carlitos) marriage
certificate be corrected from John Kho to Juan Kho and Filipino to Chinese,
respectively.

As required, the petition was published for three consecutive weeks [4] in
Mindanao Daily Patrol-CARAGA, a newspaper of general circulation, after which
it was set for hearing on August 9, 2001.

In a letter of June 18, 2001 addressed to the trial court, the city civil
registrar[5] stated her observations and suggestions to the proposed corrections in
the birth records of Carlito and his siblings but interposed no objections to the
other amendments.
 On the scheduled hearing of the petition on August 9, 2001, only the counsel
for respondents appeared as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had yet to
enter its appearance for the city civil registrar. The trial court thus reset the hearing
to October 9, 2001.[6] On September 14, 2001,[7] the OSG entered its appearance
with an authorization to the city prosecutor of Butuan City to appear in the case
and render assistance to it (the OSG).

On January 31, 2002, respondents presented documentary evidence showing

compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the petition. They also
presented testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of Carlito and his
mother, Epifania. During the same hearing, an additional correction in the birth
certificates of Carlitos children was requested to the effect that the first name of
their mother be rectified from Maribel to Marivel.

By Decision[8] of September 4, 2002, the trial court directed the local civil
registrar of Butuan City to correct the entries in the record of birth of Carlito, as
follows: (1) change the citizenship of his mother from Chinese to Filipino; (2)
delete John from his name; and (3) delete the word married opposite the date of
marriage of his parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in
the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.

Additionally, the trial court ordered the correction of the birth certificates of
the minor children of Carlito to reflect the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel
Dogmoc (Marivel) as January 21, 2000, instead of April 27, 1989, and the name
Maribel as Marivel.

With respect to the marriage certificate of Carlito and Marivel, the

corrections ordered pertained to the alteration of the name of Carlitos father from
John Kho to Juan Kho and the latters citizenship from Filipino to Chinese.

Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the

CA, faulting the trial court in granting the petition for correction of entries in the
subject documents despite the failure of respondents to implead the minors mother,
Marivel, as an indispensable party and to offer sufficient evidence to warrant the
corrections with regard to the questioned married status of Carlito and his siblings
parents, and the latters citizenship.

Petitioner also faulted the trial court for ordering the change of the name
Carlito John Kho to Carlito Kho for non-compliance with jurisdictional
requirements for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA denied petitioners

appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

The CA found that Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which outlines
the proper procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry,
was observed in the case.

Regarding Carlitos minor children Kevin and Kelly, the appellate court held
that the correction of their mothers first name from Maribel to Marivel was made
to rectify an innocuous error.

As for the change in the date of the marriage of Carlito and Marivel, albeit
the CA conceded that it is a substantial alteration, it held that the date would not
affect the minors filiation from legitimate to illegitimate considering that at the
time of their respective births in 1991 and 1993, their father Carlitos first marriage
was still subsisting as it had been annulled only in 1999.

In light of Carlitos legal impediment to marry Marivel at the time they were
born, their children Kevin and Kelly were illegitimate. It followed, the CA went on
to state, that Marivel was not an indispensable party to the case, the minors having
been represented by their father as required under Section 5 of Rule 3 [9] of the
Revised Rules of Court.

Further, the CA ruled that although Carlito failed to observe the

requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, he had complied nonetheless with
the jurisdictional requirements for correction of entries in the civil registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The petition for correction of entry in Carlitos birth
record, it noted, falls under letter o of the enumeration under Section 2 of Rule
108.
 In the present petition, petitioner contends that since the changes sought by
respondents were substantial in nature, they could only be granted through an
adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel and
respondents parents, should have been notified or impleaded.

Petitioner further contends that the jurisdictional requirements to change

Carlitos name under Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court were not satisfied
because the Amended Petition failed to allege Carlitos prior three-year bona fide
residence in Butuan City, and that the title of the petition did not state Carlitos
aliases and his true name as Carlito John I. Kho. Petitioner concludes that the same
jurisdictional defects attached to the change of name of Carlitos father.

The petition fails.

It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the
citizenship of Carlitos mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the
married status of Carlitos parents in his and his siblings respective birth
certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves
the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature.
[10]
Rather, the changes entail substantial and controversial amendments.

For the change involving the nationality of Carlitos mother as reflected in

his birth certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on
the citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring.[11]

Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlitos and his siblings parents were
married alters their filiation from legitimate to illegitimate, with significant
implications on their successional and other rights.

Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary

proceeding. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic[12] explains the raison d etre:

x x x. The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that the books
making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts therein contained. If the entries in the civil register could
 be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not
through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the
entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would
be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far
reaching. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

In Republic v. Valencia,[13] however, this Court ruled, and has since

repeatedly ruled, that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected
through a petition filed under Rule 108.[14]

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the
correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving
nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in
nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a
wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This
Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected and the true facts established providedthe parties aggrieved
by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.

xxxx
What is meant by appropriate adversary proceeding? Blacks Law Dictionary
defines adversary proceeding[] as follows:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte

application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the
other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. x x
x [15] (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as AN
ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR
THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST
NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF
JUDICIAL ORDER, has been considered to lend legislative affirmation to the
judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of persons
recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a petition under
Rule 108.[16]
 Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito[17] observed that the obvious
effect of Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative correction
of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in
the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the
civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.

When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the
appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the
entries of the civil register is satisfied. [18] The pertinent provisions of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court read:

SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil

registrar is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or

claiming any interestunder the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought
may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

There is no dispute that the trial courts Order[19] setting the petition for
hearing and directing any person or entity having interest in the petition to oppose
it was posted[20] as well as published for the required period; that notices of
hearings were duly served on the Solicitor General, the city prosecutor of Butuan
and the local civil registrar; and that trial was conducted on January 31, 2002
during which the public prosecutor, acting in behalf of the OSG, actively
participated by cross-examining Carlito and Epifania.
 What surfaces as an issue is whether the failure to implead Marivel and
Carlitos parents rendered the trial short of the required adversary proceeding and
the trial courts judgment void.

A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of Appeals.[21] That case
stemmed from a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of a minor,
June Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect the name of her real father (Armando Gustilo)
and to correspondingly change her surname.The petition was granted by the trial
court.

Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly fathered also by Gustilo,

however, sought to annul the trial courts decision, claiming that she should have
been made a party to the petition for correction. Failure to implead her deprived the
RTC of jurisdiction, she contended.

In dismissing Barcos petition, this Court held that the publication of the
order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an
indispensable party.

The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of entries in the

civil registry is that the true facts be established in an appropriate adversarial
proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which
states:

Section 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil

register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

xxxx

Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule

108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial
determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her wards
share in the estate of her father. x x x.

Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of
Appeals correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with
Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication x x x.

xxxx
 The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to
the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover
even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but
were inadvertently left out. x x x

xxxx

Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a

thing and not against a person. The decision on the petition binds not only the
parties thereto but the whole world. An in remproceeding is validated essentially
through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding
has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection
of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such
notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court
with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.[22]

Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether Marivel or

respondents parents should have been impleaded as parties to the proceeding. It
may not be amiss to mention, however, that during the hearing on January 31,
2002, the city prosecutor who was acting as representative of the OSG did not raise
any objection to the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlitos parents as parties to the
proceeding.

Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of the

proceedings to correct the entries in her childrens birth certificates, especially since
the notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the
residence[23] she shared with Carlito and the children.

It is also well to remember that the role of the court in hearing a petition to
correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts
recorded therein.[24]

With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their certificate
of marriage[25]shows that indeed they were married on January 21, 2000, not
on April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito declared that the date April 27,
1989 was supplied by his helper, adding that he was not married to Marivel at the
time his sons were born because his previous marriage was annulled only in 1999.
[26]
Given the evidence presented by respondents, the CA observed that the minors
were illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction would bring about no change at all
in the nature of their filiation.

With respect to Carlitos mother, it bears noting that she declared at the
witness stand that she was not married to Juan Kho who died in 1959. [27] Again,
that testimony was not challenged by the city prosecutor.

The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlitos and his
siblings birth certificates of the entry Married opposite the date of marriage of their
parents, moreover, consisted of a certification issued on November 24, 1973 by St.
Joseph (Butuan City) Parish priest Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and
Epifania had been living together as common law couple since 1935 but have
never contracted marriage legally.[28]

A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was appended to
respondents Amended Petition, likewise stated that it has no record of marriage
between Juan Kho and Epifania.[29] Under the circumstances, the deletion of the
word Married opposite the date of marriage of parents is warranted.

With respect to the correction in Carlitos birth certificate of his name from
Carlito John to Carlito, the same was properly granted under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the cancellation or correction of
entries involving changes of name falls under letter o of the following provision of
Section 2 of Rule 108:[30]

Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and

valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e) judgments
of annulment of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of
a minor; and (o) changes of name. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs

petitions for change of name) were not complied with, observance of the
provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.
 More importantly, Carlitos official transcript of record from
the Urious College in ButuanCity,[31] certificate of eligibility from the Civil Service
Commission,[32] and voter registration record[33] satisfactorily show that he has been
known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus likely to arise from the dropping
of the second name.

The correction of the mothers citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as

appearing in Carlitos birth record was also proper. Of note is the fact that during
the cross examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he did not deem fit to
question her citizenship. Such failure to oppose the correction prayed for, which
certainly was not respondents fault, does not in any way change the adversarial
nature of the proceedings.

Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlitos siblings

uniformly stated the citizenship of Epifania as Filipino. To disallow the correction
in Carlitos birth record of his mothers citizenship would perpetuate an
inconsistency in the natal circumstances of the siblings who are unquestionably
born of the same mother and father.

Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction of

the name of Carlitos wife from Maribel to Marivel. The mistake is clearly clerical
or typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the
understanding[34] considering that the name reflected in the marriage certificate of
Carlito and his wife is Marivel.

Apropos is Yu v. Republic[35] which held that changing the appellants

Christian name of Sincio to Sencio amounts merely to the righting of a clerical
error. The change of name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz
Labayo was also held to be a mere innocuous alteration, which can be granted
through a summary proceeding.[36] The same ruling holds true with respect to the
correction in Carlitos marriage certificate of his fathers name from John Kho to
Juan Kho. Except in said marriage certificate, the name Juan Kho was uniformly
entered in the birth certificates of Carlitoand of his siblings.[37]
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
 I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Acting
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

*
On Official Leave.
**
Acting Chairperson.
[1]
CA rollo, pp. 50-63; penned by Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal and concurred in by Justices Romulo V. Borja
(then Chairman of the Twenty-Second Division) and Ricardo R. Rosario.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 45-48; penned by Judge Augustus L. Calo.
[3]
Id. at 39-43.
[4]
Records, pp. 62-64. The petition was published on June 1, 8, and 15, 2001 as shown by the copies of the
newspaper publications of even date, which were marked as Exhibits E, F and G.
[5]
Id. at 30-31, Soledad A. Cruz.
[6]
Id. at 34; Order of August 9, 2001.
[7]
Id. at 36.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 45-48.
[9]
SEC. 5. Minor or incompetent persons. A minor or a person alleged to be incompetent, may sue or be sued, with
the assistance of his father, mother, guardian, or if he has none, a guardian ad litem.
[10]
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-53417, December 8, 1988, 168 SCRA 294, 300-
301; Republic v. Valencia, 225 Phil. 408, 413 (1986); Baybayan v. Republic of the Philippines, 123 Phil. 230,
232 (1966); David v. Republic, 122 Phil. 848, 851 (1965).
[11]
Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, 94 Phil. 321, 324 (1954).
[12]
Supra note 10 at 299-300, citing Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, supra.
[13]
Supra note 10.
[14]
Vide Republic v. Lim, 464 Phil. 151, 157 (2004); Eloeosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, 431 Phil. 612,
619 (2002); Republic v. Labrador, 364 Phil. 934, 943-944 (1999).
[15]
Republic v. Valencia, supra note 10.
[16]
Barco v. Court of Appeals, 465 Phil. 39, 61 (2004).
[17]
G.R. No. 146963, March 15, 2004, 425 SCRA 488, 492-493.
[18]
Lee v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392 405 (2001).
[19]
Records, pp. 28-29. The Order was issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Victor A. Tomaneng.
[20]
Id. at 32. Affidavit of Posting.
[21]
Supra note 16.
[22]
Supra at 55-57. The ruling was reiterated in Alba v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164041, July 29, 2005, 465
SCRA 495, 506-508.
[23]
Records, p. 75. Copies of these Orders and of the Decision were mailed to 717 Molave Road, Guingona
Subdivision, Butuan City, which was reflected as the residence of both Carlito and Marivel in their Certificate
of Marriage. During the hearing on January 31, 2002, Carlito also testified that Marivel was still living with
him.
[24]
Republic v. Valencia, supra note 10 at 416.
[25]
Records, p. 55, Exhibit K.
[26]
Id. at 74-76. Transcript of Stenographic Notes, January 31, 2002.
[27]
Id. at 67.
[28]
Id. at 50, Exhibit I.
[29]
Id. at 20, Annex A to Amended Petition.
[30]
Vide Republic v. CA, 325 Phil. 361, 368 (1996).
[31]
Records, pp. 51-52, Exhibit J.
[32]
Id. at 53, Exhibit J-1.
[33]
Id. at 54, Exhibit J-2.
[34]
Leonor v. CA, 326 Phil. 74, 87 (1996); Black v. Republic, 104 Phil. 848, 849 (1958).
[35]
129 Phil. 248, 249 (1967).
[36]
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, supra note 10 at 300.
[37]
Records, pp. 7-10; Exhibits N to Q.
 [G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005]

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR

CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY
OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN
WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN
LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA
WANG, petitioner, vs.CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly
represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, respondent.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.

Revelation 3:5

On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented

by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of
name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and raffled
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.
The RTC established the following facts:

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents
Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other.
When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, ...they executed a
deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time
because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei
Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden
surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they anticipate that Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered
name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether
they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny
in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have the letter R but if there is,
they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang. [1]

On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. [2] The trial court
found that the reason given for the change of name sought in the petitionthat is, that
petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his
middle namedid not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that
the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an
interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of
the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to
bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right
should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial
court added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then
decide whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name. [3]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied in a
resolution dated 20 May 2004.[4] The trial court maintained that the Singaporean
practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle name
of a legitimate Filipino child who intends to study there. The dropping of the middle
name would be tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of the laws of
Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling. That the change of name would
not prejudice public interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not suffice
to grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is itself not reasonable. [5]
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45) [6] arguing
that the trial court has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by
the Court, that is: whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary
to Article 174[7] of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that [W]ith globalization and
mixed marriages, there is a need for the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of
dropping of family name for a child to adjust to his new environment, for consistency
and harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the best interest of the child. [8] It
is argued that convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing the name as long
as it will not prejudice the State and others. Petitioner points out that the middle name
Carulasan will cause him undue embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or
pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social acceptance and integration in the
Singaporean community. Petitioner also alleges that it is error for the trial court to have
denied the petition for change of name until he had reached the age of majority for him
to decide the name to use, contrary to previous cases [9] decided by this Court that
allowed a minor to petition for change of name. [10]
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the
petition. The OSG filed its Comment[11] positing that the trial court correctly denied the
petition for change of name. The OSG argues that under Article 174 of the Family Code,
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of their father and mother, and
such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the same. According to
the OSG, there is also no showing that the dropping of the middle name Carulasan is in
the best interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to support a
petition for change of name and/or cancellation of entry. [12] The OSG also adds that the
petitioner has not shown any compelling reason to justify the change of name or the
dropping of the middle name, for that matter. Petitioners allegation that the continued
use of the middle name may result in confusion and difficulty is allegedly more
imaginary than real. The OSG reiterates its argument raised before the trial court that
the dropping of the childs middle name could only trigger much deeper inquiries
regarding the true parentage of petitioner. Hence, while petitioner Julian has a sister
named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no confusion since both use the surname of their
father, Wang. Even assuming that it is customary in Singapore to drop the middle name,
it has also not been shown that the use of such middle name is actually proscribed by
Singaporean law.[13]
We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the
names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change
of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to
change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show
proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change.
Otherwise, the request should be denied. [14]
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and
reasonable cause for which the change is sought. [15] To justify a request for change of
name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but
also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the
grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will
avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood
by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest. [16]
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and
reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented
need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. What is
involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a
judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in
support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the
sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts. [17]
 The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not
simply seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt another, but instead
seeks to drop the middle name altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving
petitions for change of name usually deal with requests for change of surname. There
are only a handful of cases involving requests for change of the given name [18] and none
on requests for changing or dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow one to
drop the middle name from his registered name? We have to answer in the negative.
A discussion on the legal significance of a persons name is relevant at this point.
We quote, thus:

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is
known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined
as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of
the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are
used merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive
of persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has
frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the
name is immaterial.

The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and
the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or
family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the
child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.

A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to

protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain
respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or
immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by
judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable
and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.[19]

This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean
that middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to
identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him
from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father. [20] The Family Code gives legitimate children
the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, [21] while illegitimate children
shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in
which case they may bear the fathers surname.[22]
 Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the
father bears only a given name and his mothers surname, and does not have a middle
name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such.
It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his
parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten
instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers
surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged
illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals
requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a
legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper
name, a middle name, and a surname.
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as
this would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean
society. In support, he cites Oshita v. Republic[23] and Calderon v. Republic,[24] which,
however, are not apropos both.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother, Buena
Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to change her name from
Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The Court granted her petition based on the
following considerations: she had elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority; her other siblings who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been
using their mothers surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname there
still being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War; and there was no
showing that the change of name was motivated by a fraudulent purpose or that it will
prejudice public interest.
In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an
illegitimate minor child acting through her mother who filed the petition in her behalf, to
change her name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the surname of her stepfather,
Romeo C. Calderon, her mothers husband. The Court held that a petition for change of
name of an infant should be granted where to do is clearly for the best interest of the
child. The Court took into consideration the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner
to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she continued to use the
surname of her illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that justice dictates that every
person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social standing as long as
doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other
people.
Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,[25] in arguing that although Article 174 of the Family
Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames of the father and the
mother, it is not mandatory such that the child could use only one family name, even the
family name of the mother. In Alfon, the petitioner therein, the legitimate daughter of
Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon, sought to change her name from Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name as registered in the Local Civil Registry) to
Estrella S. Alfon (the name she had been using since childhood, in her school records
and in her voters registration). The trial court denied her petition but this Court
overturned the denial, ruling that while Article 364 of the Civil Code states that she, as a
legitimate child, should principally use the surname of her father, there is no legal
obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of herm other to which she is entitled. In
addition, the Court found that there was ample justification to grant her petition, i.e., to
avoid confusion.
Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name against the
standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention would show that his
justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could not warrant favorable action on his
petition.
The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are not at all
analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the cases
of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners were already of age when they filed their
petitions for change of name. Being of age, they are considered to have exercised their
discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to change their
surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the grant of the
petitions for change of name in these two cases was the presence of reasonable or
compelling grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity
most Filipinos had during that time against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in
addition to the fact of therein petitioners election of Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the
Court granted the petition since the petitioner had been known since childhood by a
name different from her registered name and she had not used her registered name in
her school records and voters registration records; thus, denying the petition would only
result to confusion.
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by a
mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case to buttress his
argument that he does not have to reach the age of majority to petition for change of
name. However, it is manifest in Calderon that the Court, in granting the petition for
change of name, gave paramount consideration to the best interests of the minor
petitioner therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his
middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his
integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established.
That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does
not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which
his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name
be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. [26] As he is of
tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his
name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under
our laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is
DENIED.
 SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

[1]
RTC Decision, penned by Judge Enriqueta Loquillano-Belarmino, Rollo, p. 21.
[2]
Id. at 20-23.
[3]
Ibid.
[4]
Id. at 24-25.
[5]
Ibid.
[6]
Id. at 3-58; with Annexes.
[7]
Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right: (1) To bear the surnames of the father and mother, in
conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames; .
[8]
Rollo, p. 5.
[9]
Petitioner cites the following cases: Tse v. Republic, No. L-20708, 31 August 1967, 20 SCRA 1261;
Calderon v. Republic, 126 Phil. 1 (1967); and Republic v. Lee Wai Lam, No. L-22607, 30 July
1969, 28 SCRA 1043. In these three cases, the Court allowed the minor to petition for change of
name. Ibid.
[10]
Ibid.
[11]
Rollo, pp. 63-80.
[12]
Ibid.
[13]
Id. at 71.
[14]
Republic v. Lee Wai Lam, No. L-22607, 30 July 1969, 28 SCRA 1040, 1047-48, citing Yu Chi
Han v. Republic, No. L-22040, 29 November 1965 and Yap Ek Siu v. Republic, No. L-25437, 28
April 1969.
[15]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88202, 14 December 1998, 300 SCRA 138.
[16]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, 21 May 1992, 209 SCRA 189.
See also Republic v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209, 9 February 1996, 253 SCRA 509.
[17]
Ibid.
[18]
Go v. Republic, No. L-20160, 29 November 1965; In re: Flaviano C. Zapanta v. Local Civil Register,
G.R. No. 55380, 26 September 1994; Republic v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209, 9 February 1996.
[19]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra at note 16.
[20]
Article 364, Civil Code.
[21]
Article 174, Family Code. Supra at note 7.
[22]
Article 176, Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255 (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children
to Use the Surname of Their Father, Amending for the Purpose Article 176 of Executive Order No.
209, Otherwise Known as the Family Code of the Philippines), which took effect on 19 March
2004, by allowing illegitimate children to use the surname of their father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or
when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.
[23]
125 Phil. 1098 (1967).
[24]
Supra note 9.
[25]
No. L-51201, 29 May 1980, 97 SCRA 858.

FIRST DIVISION

MA. CRISTINA TORRES G.R. No. 181174

BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T.
BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T. Present:
BRAZA,
Petitioners, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
- versus - VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR

OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY,
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, minor
PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR
BRAZA, represented by LEON
TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR Promulgated:
and LUCILLE C. TITULAR, December 4, 2009
Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr.
(Pablo), also known as Pablito Sicad Braza, were married [1] on January 4,
1978. The union bore Ma. Cristinas co-petitioners Paolo Josef [2] and Janelle
Ann[3] on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo [4] on June 4,
1980.
Pablo died[5] on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West
Java, Indonesia.
 During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines,
respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-respondent minor
Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina thereupon
made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate [6] from
the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with the
following entries:

Name of Child: PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL

TITULAR
Date of Birth: 01 January 1996
Mother: Lucille Celestial Titular
Father: Pablito S. Braza
Date Received at the
Local Civil Registrar: January 13, 1997
Annotation: "Late Registration"
Annotation/Remarks: "Acknowledge (sic) by the father
Pablito Braza on January 13, 1997"
Remarks: Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of
parents on April 22, 1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child
shall be known as Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy[7] of a marriage contract showing that Pablo
and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners to
file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental a petition[8] to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in
the Local Civil Register.

Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed
marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of
the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners
prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to
his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the
last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular,
as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his
paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of
Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the
marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
On Patricks Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by
[9]
Order of September 6, 2007, dismissed the petition without prejudice, it holding
that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as
a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul
the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order
Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated
in an ordinary adversarial action.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order [10] of

November 29, 2007, they filed the present petition for review.

Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of
marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the
civil registrar. Citing Cario v. Cario,[11] Lee v. Court of Appeals[12] and Republic v.
Kho,[13] they contend that even substantial errors, such as those sought to be
corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a petition under Rule 108.[14]

The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has
no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code [15] charts
the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or
corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to
correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or
writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or
contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which
all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.[16]

The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that
petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground
that it is bigamous and impugn Patricks filiation in connection with which they ask
the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.

Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction
of Patricks birth records[17] and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental
thereto.

Petitioners position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the
declaration of Pablo and Lucilles marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn
Patricks legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 [18] of the
Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as
expressly provided in said Code.

It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as

legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed
by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed
before the court a quo.
Petitioners reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.

Cario v. Cario was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for
the return of one-half of the death benefits received by the first after the death of
the husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage with the husband while the
latters marriage to the first wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity
of the two marriages, it being essential to the determination of who is rightfully
entitled to the death benefits.

In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that
the petitions filed by the therein petitioners before the lower courts were actions to
impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the petitioners are
illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their records of birth but to
establish that they are not the latters children, hence, there was nothing to impugn
as there was no blood relation at all between

the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the
cancellation of the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners mother and the
substitution thereof with Tiu Chuan who is their biological mother. Thus, the
collateral attack was allowed and the petition deemed as adversarial proceeding
contemplated under Rule 108.

In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the

correction of the entries in their respective birth records to reflect that they were
illegitimate and that their citizenship is Filipino, not Chinese, because their parents
were never legally married. Again, considering that the changes sought to be made
were substantial and not merely innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings
under Rule 108 to be adversarial in nature, upheld the lower courts grant of the
petition.

It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from
those obtaining in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Marriage Contract, records, p. 8.
[2]
Certificate of Live Birth, id. at 9.
[3]
Id. at 10.
[4]
Id. at 11.
[5]
Report of Death, id. at14-15.
[6]
Id. at 16-17.
[7]
Certificate of Marriage, id. at 19-20.
[8]
Id. at 1-7.
[9]
Penned by Presiding Judge Nilo M. Sarsaba; id. at 93-101.
[10]
Penned by Presiding Judge Nilo M. Sarsaba; id. at 122-123.
[11]
G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001, 351 SCRA 127.
[12]
G.R. No. 118387, October 11, 2001, 367 SCRA 110.
[13]
G.R. No. 170340, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 177.
[14]
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. ─ Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in
the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations;
(e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) change of name.
[15]
Art. 412 of the Civil Code. No entry in a civil registrar shall be changed or corrected without a judgment order.
[16]
Republic v. Benemerito, G.R. No. 146963. March 15, 2004, 425 SCRA 488.
[17]
See p. 11 of petition, rollo, p. 21.

[18]
Art. 171.

The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period
prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing
this action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted
therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and
female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from
inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She
pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out
came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the
man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and
Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex?
May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to
reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of
his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The
petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as
"male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts
as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in
a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery 2 in
Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to
have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from
"male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the order
were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American
fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof
or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible
with his present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance
with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has
always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female.
Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be
in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or
the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the
much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of
their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition
despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen
fit to interpose any [o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil
Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender
from "Male" to FEMALE. 5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals 7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled
that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name
or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court
of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex.
As found by the trial court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof
or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to
the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of
RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name
or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which
can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. 14 It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily
lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude
the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise lays down the
corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of
first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
 (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community;
or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended
to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through
surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048
does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding
confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or
any compelling reason justifying such change. 19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced
by the use of his true and official name. 20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was
not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth
certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does
not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s
petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA
9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule
108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. 23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance

of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register
that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of
birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can
 be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: 24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as
a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts,
events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status
and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized
nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities
and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status…
include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in
general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption,
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession. 28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is
fatal to petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife
in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the
newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such
declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil
registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at
the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date
and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of
parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e)
place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the
regulations to be issued.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at
the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is
no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of
his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in
the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In
this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a
male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female." 33Female is "the sex that
produces ova or bears young" 34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for
fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include
persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless
the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used
then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-
female transsexual to be included in the category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change
of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the
Ground of Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice
and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone.
This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, 41 among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s
petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to
make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what
proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer
on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to
conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion
a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can
only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and
[the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Petitioner went for his elementary and high school, as well as his Bachelor of Science in
Statistics and Master of Arts, in the University of the Philippines. He took up Population
Studies Program, Master of Arts in Sociology and Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology at the
University of Hawaii, in Manoa, Hawaii, U.S.A. Rollo, p. 48.

2
This consisted of "penectomy [surgical removal of penis] bilateral oschiectomy [or
orchiectomy which is the surgical excision of the testes] penile skin inversion vaginoplasty
[plastic surgery of the vagina] clitoral hood reconstruction and augmentation mammoplasty
[surgical enhancement of the size and shape of the breasts]." Id.

3
On January 23, 2003, January 30, 2003 and February 6, 2003.

4
Penned by Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr. Rollo, pp. 51-53.

5
Id., pp. 52-53 (citations omitted).

6
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78824.

7
Special Sixth Division.

8
Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with Associate Justices Marina
L. Buzon and Aurora Santiago-Lagman concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-33.

9
Resolution dated September 14, 2006, id., pp. 45-46.

10
An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a
Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the
Civil Register Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for the Purpose Articles 376 and
412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

11
Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966, 30 March 2005, 454 SCRA 155.

12
Id.

13
K v. Health Division, Department of Human Resources, 277 Or. 371, 560 P.2d 1070 (1977).

14
Under Section 2 (6) of RA 9048, "first name" refers to a name or nickname given to a
person which may consist of one or more names in addition to the middle names and last
names. Thus, the term "first name" will be used here to refer both to first name and
nickname.
15
The last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. – xxx xxx xxx

Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul
general, the petitioner may either appeal the decision to the civil registrar general or
file the appropriate petition with the proper court.

16
SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. – Any person having direct and
personal interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or
change of first name or nickname in the civil register may file, in person, a verified petition
with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where the record being sought to
be corrected or changed is kept.

In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country and it would not
be practical for such party, in terms of transportation expenses, time and effort to appear in
person before the local civil registrar keeping the documents to be corrected or changed, the
petition may be filed, in person, with the local civil registrar of the place where the interested
party is presently residing or domiciled. The two (2) local civil registrars concerned will then
communicate to facilitate the processing of the petition.

Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries may
file their petition, in person, with the nearest Philippine Consulates.

The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall be
processed in accordance with this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first names or nicknames
may be availed of only once.

17
SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. – The petition shall be in the form of an
affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any person authorized by the law to administer
oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts necessary to establish the merits of the petition and
shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is competent to testify to the matters stated. The
petitioner shall state the particular erroneous entry or entries, which are sought to be
corrected and/or the change sought to be made.

The petition shall be supported with the following documents:

(1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the registry book
containing the entry or entries sought to be corrected or changed;

(2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or entries
upon which the correction or change shall be based; and

(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil registrar or the
consul general may consider relevant and necessary for the approval of the petition.

In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall likewise be supported with the
documents mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph. In addition, the petition shall
be published at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation. Furthermore, the petitioner shall submit a certification from the appropriate law
enforcement agencies that he has no pending case or no criminal record.

18
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, 21 May 1992, 209 SCRA 189.

19
Supra note 11.

20
Id.

21
In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc.2d 6, 513 N.E.2d 828 (1987).

22
Lee v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392 (2001).

23
Id.

24
Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 420.

25
Id.

26
Id.

27
Beduya v. Republic of the Philippines, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).

28
Salonga, Jovito, Private International Law, 1995 Edition, Rex Bookstore, p. 238.

29
This, of course, should be taken in conjunction with Articles 407 and 412 of the Civil Code
which authorizes the recording of acts, events and judicial decrees or the correction or
change of errors including those that occur after birth. Nonetheless, in such cases, the
entries in the certificates of birth are not be corrected or changed. The decision of the court
granting the petition shall be annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of the
civil register in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. (Co v. Civil Register of
Manila, supra note 24)

30
The error pertains to one where the birth attendant writes "male" or "female" but the
genitals of the child are that of the opposite sex.

Moreover, petitioner’s female anatomy is all man-made. The body that he inhabits is a
31

male body in all aspects other than what the physicians have supplied.

32
Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edition (2004), p.1406.

33
Words and Phrases, volume 39, Permanent Edition, p. 106.

34
In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 2003-Ohio-7221 (No. 2002-T-0149, slip
op., Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio App. 11 Dist., December 31, 2003),
citing Webster’s II New College Dictionary (1999).

35
Id.

36
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619.
37
Article 1, Family Code.

38
Article 2(1), Id.

39
These are Articles 130 to 138 of the Labor Code which include nightwork prohibition,
facilities for women, prohibition on discrimination and stipulation against marriage, among
others.

40
These include Article 333 on adultery, Articles 337 to 339 on qualified seduction, simple
seduction and acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party and Articles 342
and 343 on forcible and consented abduction, among others.

41
Section 3(jj)(4).
 SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166676

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
- versus -
TINGA,

VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,

Respondent.
September 12, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely
questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision [1] dated January 12, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan
and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahans birth certificate: (1)
the name Jennifer Cagandahan changed to Jeff Cagandahan and (2) gender from
female to male.
 The facts are as follows.

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for

Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate [2] before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna.

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was
registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she
developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted
possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was
diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six,
underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At
age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has
stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then
alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she
has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be
corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first
name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three

(3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the
court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr.
Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of
the PhilippinesPhilippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical
certificate stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained that
genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones,
her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female
and male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is
not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no
monthly period. He further testified that respondents condition is permanent and
recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind,
adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be
advantageous to her.
 The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12,
2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled
to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear
and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven that
petitioners body produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his action and
feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants
to be acknowledged and identified as a male.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby

ordered to make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer
Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:

a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF

CAGANDAHAN; and

b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters registry, baptismal

certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the
foregoing corrected data.

[3]
SO ORDERED.

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a
reversal of the abovementioned ruling.

The issues raised by petitioner are:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN
COMPLIED WITH; AND,

II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF SEX OR GENDER
IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL
ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A MALE.[4]
 Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the
correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or
gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as
CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court.

The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local
civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction
of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition
before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar.[5] The OSG further
contends respondents petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that
respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for
at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section
2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.[6] The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not
allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents claimed
medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.[7]

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil
Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for
Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished
a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all
pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings, [8]respondent is
actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect
his true sex/gender,[9] change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108, [10] and
respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court.[11]

Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the
Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by
the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set
forth:

(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the
petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;

(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

(c) The name asked for.

SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the
court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the
hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing
at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the
hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4)
months after the last publication of the notice.

SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the
petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on
behalf of the Government of the Republic.

SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order
that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition
are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name
of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of
the petition.

SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule
shall be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing
the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.

Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located.
 SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions;
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery
of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought may make
orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same
in his record.

The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondents
petition did not implead the local civil registrar.Section 3, Rule 108 provides that
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil
registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name
in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final
determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties
were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling
much too short of the requirements of the rules. [13] The corresponding petition
should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who
may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.
[14]
Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which
states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of
securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters
brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108
when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.

The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a

legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412
of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.

Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended
by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are
involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register. [18]

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. [19]

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the
Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
 ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions;
(9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery
of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the
Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.[20]

Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or

inappropriate appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with
this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who
has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the
urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male
than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such
as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features
start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to
menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.

CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the
twentieth century, medicine adopted the term intersexuality to apply to human
beings who cannot be classified as either male or female.[22] The term is now of
widespread use. According to Wikipedia,intersexuality is the state of a living thing
of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary
sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An
organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and
female sexes.

Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In

most societies,intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a
male or female gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in
Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have
had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals.
[24]
More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a
disorder which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery
and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as
possible into the category of either male or female.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of

the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to
outright denial. It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between
the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who are neither truly male nor
truly female.[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a
person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not
controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such
rigid classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there

is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we
determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the

subjects birth certificate entry is in order.

Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently

and categorically female nor consistently and categorically male)
composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondents
body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a
result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or

naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be
what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with
good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male
and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen)
there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is
fixed.
 Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken
unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could
have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, [26] to
force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not
to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondents development to
reveal more fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle
preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to
reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as
having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain
as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to
take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly
currently knows this gender of the human species.Respondent is the one who has
to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of
happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what
courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and
maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent [27] and
in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will
harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the
law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position and his
personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature;

and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words,
we respect respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a
male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how
respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier,
considering the unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that
a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised
in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. [28] The
trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a
change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence
that respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find
merit in respondents change of name. Such a change will conform with the
change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January

12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna,
is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
 DANTE O. TINGA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice
 Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 29-32. Penned by Judge Florenio P. Bueser.
[2]
Id. at 33-37.
[3]
Id. at 31-32.
[4]
Id. at 97.
[5]
Id. at 99.
[6]
Id. at 103.
[7]
Id. at 104.
[8]
Id. at 136.
[9]
Id. at 127.
[10]
Id. at 134.
[11]
Id. at 136.
[12]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103695, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 99, 106.
[13]
Ceruila v. Delantar, G.R. No. 140305, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 134, 147.
[14]
Republic v. Benemerito, G.R. No. 146963, March 15, 2004, 425 SCRA 488, 492.
[15]
SEC. 6. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
[16]
Art. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
[17]
AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL
TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF
FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTRAR WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER,
AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES. APPROVED, MARCH 22, 2001.
[18]
Silverio v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 388.
[19]
Id. at 389.
[20]
Id. at 389.
[21]
(1) 5-alpha reductase deficiency; (2) androgen insensitivity syndrome; (3) aphallia; (4) clitoromegaly; (5)
congenital adrenal hyperplasia; (6) gonadal dysgenesis (partial & complete); (7) hypospadias;
(8) Kallmann syndrome; (9) Klinefelter syndrome; (10) micropenis; (11) mosaicism involving sex
chromosomes; (12) MRKH (mullerian agenesis; vaginal agenesis; congenital absence of vagina); (13) ovo-
testes (formerly called true hermaphroditism); (14) partial androgen insensitivity syndrome; (15) progestin
induced virilization; (16) Swyer syndrome; (17) Turner syndrome.
[Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15, 2008).]
[22]
Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15, 2008).
[23]
Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15, 2008), citing Gagnon and Simon
1973.
[24]
Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15, 2008).
[25]
M.T. v. J.T. 140 N.J. Super 77 355 A. 2d 204.
[26]
The goal of treatment is to return hormone levels to normal. This is done by taking a form
of cortisol (dexamethasone), fludrocortisone, or hydrocortisone) every day. Additional doses of medicine are
needed during times of stress, such as severe illness or surgery.
xxxx
Parents of children with congenital adrenal hyperplasia should be aware of the side effects of steroid therapy. They
should report signs of infection and stress to their health care provider because increases in medication may be
required. In additional, steroid medications cannot be stopped suddenly, or adrenal insufficiency will result.
xxxx
The outcome is usually associated with good health, but short stature may result even with treatment. Males have
normal fertility. Females may have a smaller opening of the vagina and lower fertility. Medication to treat this
disorder must be continued for life. (Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
<http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/encyclopedia.html>.)
[27]
The word incompetent includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers,
prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they
have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and
other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming
thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation. (See Sec. 2 of Rule 92 of the Rules of Court)
[28]
Yu v. Republic of the Philippines, 123 Phil. 1106, 1110 (1966).
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,

vs.
DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Court of
Appeals (CA)1Decision2 dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution3 dated July 27, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 00238-MIN. The assailed decision dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner Republic of the
Philippines and, consequently, affirmed in toto the June 28, 2004 Order 4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 27, Gingoog City in Special Proceedings No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for
Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy; while
the assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live
Birth.5 Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged that she
was born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay 6 Her
Certificate of Live Birth7 shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to
her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay." She further claimed that her school records,
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate, 8 and passport9 bear the
name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child considering that her
parents were never married, so she had to follow the surname of her mother. 10 She also contended
that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and
are all Filipinos.11

Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and citizenship which was
supposedly granted.12 However, the National Statistics Office (NSO) records did not bear such
changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC.

On May 13, 2004, the RTC issued an Order13 finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance and setting the case for hearing, with the directive that the said Order be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at least
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of respondent, and that the order and
petition be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutor’s Office for
their information and guidance.14 Pursuant to the RTC Order, respondent complied with the
publication requirement.

On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. THE CITY CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF GINGOOG CITY, or any person acting in his behalf is directed and ordered to
effect the correction or change of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner’s name and
citizenship so that the entries would be:

a) As to petitioner’s name :
First Name : NORMA
Middle Name : SY
Last Name : LUGSANAY
b) As to petitioner’s nationality/citizenship :
: FILIPINO

SO ORDERED.15

The RTC concluded that respondent’s petition would neither prejudice the government nor any third
party. It also held that the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer to one and the same
person, especially since the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City has effected the correction.
Considering that respondent has continuously used and has been known since childhood as "Norma
Sy Lugsanay" and as a Filipino citizen, the RTC granted the petition to avoid confusion. 16

On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that respondent’s failure
to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case
for hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by serving a
copy of the notice to the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutor’s Office. 17 As to
whether the petition is a collateral attack on respondent’s filiation, the CA ruled in favor of
respondent, considering that her parents were not legally married and that her siblings’ birth
certificates uniformly state that their surname is Lugsanay and their citizenship is
Filipino.18 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 27, 2011.

Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for failure to implead
indispensable parties.

Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:

SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the following
entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d)
legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the
time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceeding is brought may make orders
expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the
rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting
the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record. 19

In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those
pertaining to her first name, surname and citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect
the name which she has been known for since childhood, including her legal documents such as
passport and school and professional records. She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full
blood siblings who bear the surname "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship of "Filipino" instead
of "Chinese." The changes, however, are obviously not mere clerical as they touch on respondent’s
filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from "Sy" (which is the surname of her father) to
"Lugsanay" (which is the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate
to illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her rights
and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are substantial.

It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia 20 that even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. 21 The
pronouncement of the Court in that case is illuminating:

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors
of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably
substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in
nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as
long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x

What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black’s Law Dictionary defines "adversary
proceeding" as follows:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which
the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding. 22

In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Court’s conclusion in Republic v. Kho, 23 Alba v.
Court of Appeals,24 and Barco v. Court of Appeals,25 that the failure to implead indispensable parties
was cured by the publication of the notice of hearing pursuant to the provisions of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. In Republic v. Kho,26 petitioner therein appealed the RTC decision granting the
petition for correction of entries despite respondents’ failure to implead the minor’s mother as an
indispensable party. The Court, however, did not strictly apply the provisions of Rule 108, because it
opined that it was highly improbable that the mother was unaware of the proceedings to correct the
entries in her children’s birth certificates especially since the notices, orders and decision of the trial
court were all sent to the residence she shared with them. 27

In Alba v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court found nothing wrong with the trial court’s decision granting
the petition for correction of entries filed by respondent although the proceedings was not actually
known by petitioner. In that case, petitioner’s mother and guardian was impleaded in the petition for
correction of entries, and notices were sent to her address appearing in the subject birth certificate.
However, the notice was returned unserved, because apparently she no longer lived there. Thus,
when she allegedly learned of the granting of the petition, she sought the annulment of judgment
which the Court denied. Considering that the petition for correction of entries is a proceeding in rem,
the Court held that acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner is, therefore, not
required and the absence of personal service was cured by the trial court’s compliance with Rule
108 which requires notice by publication. 29

In Barco v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court addressed the question of whether the court acquired
jurisdiction over petitioner and all other indispensable parties to the petition for correction of entries
despite the failure to implead them in said case. While recognizing that petitioner was indeed an
indispensable party, the failure to implead her was cured by compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108
which requires notice by publication. In so ruling, the Court pointed out that the petitioner in a petition
for correction cannot be presumed to be aware of all the parties whose interests may be affected by
the granting of a petition. It emphasized that the petitioner therein exerted earnest effort to comply
with the provisions of Rule 108. Thus, the publication of the notice of hearing was considered to
have cured the failure to implead indispensable parties.

In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as respondent
in the petition below. This, notwithstanding, the RTC granted her petition and allowed the correction
sought by respondent, which decision was affirmed in toto by the CA.

We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.

This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue involved in this case. Aside from
Kho, Alba and Barco, the Court has addressed the same in Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, 31 Ceruila
v. Delantar,32 and Labayo-Rowe v. Republic.33

In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, 34 claiming that his parents were never legally married, respondent
therein filed a petition to change his name from "Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo," the
name appearing in his birth certificate to "Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng." The
notice setting the petition for hearing was published and there being no opposition thereto, the trial
court issued an order of general default and eventually granted respondent’s petition deleting the
entry on the date and place of marriage of parties; correcting his surname from "Magpayo" to
"Coseteng"; deleting the entry "Coseteng" for middle name; and deleting the entry "Fulvio Miranda
Magpayo, Jr." in the space for his father. The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, assailed
the RTC decision on the grounds that the corrections made on respondent’s birth certificate had the
effect of changing the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate and must only be effected through an
appropriate adversary proceeding. The Court nullified the RTC decision for respondent’s failure to
comply strictly with the procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Aside from the wrong
remedy availed of by respondent as he filed a petition for Change of Name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court, assuming that he filed a petition under Rule 108 which is the appropriate remedy, the
petition still failed because of improper venue and failure to implead the Civil Registrar of Makati City
and all affected parties as respondents in the case.

In Ceruila v. Delantar,35 the Ceruilas filed a petition for the cancellation and annulment of the birth
certificate of respondent on the ground that the same was made as an instrument of the crime of
simulation of birth and, therefore, invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein. The
RTC issued an order setting the case for hearing with a directive that the same be published and
that any person who is interested in the petition may interpose his comment or opposition on or
before the scheduled hearing. Summons was likewise sent to the Civil Register of Manila. After
which, the trial court granted the petition and nullified respondent’s birth certificate. Few months
after, respondent filed a petition for the annulment of judgment claiming that she and her guardian
were not notified of the petition and the trial court’s decision, hence, the latter was issued without
jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due process. The Court annulled the trial court’s decision
for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 108, especially the non-impleading of respondent
herself whose birth certificate was nullified.1âwphi1

In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,36 petitioner filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth
certificates of her children, specifically to change her name from Beatriz V. Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to
Emperatriz Labayo, her civil status from "married" to "single," and the date and place of marriage
from "1953-Bulan" to "No marriage." The Court modified the trial court’s decision by nullifying the
portion thereof which directs the change of petitioner’s civil status as well as the filiation of her child,
because it was the OSG only that was made respondent and the proceedings taken was summary in
nature which is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought.

Respondent’s birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and
a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she seeks the
correction of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her
citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not
only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and
are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.

The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice
thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. 37 A reading
of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of
notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another
given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered
interested or affected parties. 38 Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting
the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford
the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. 39

While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or
interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were
made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. 40 Such failure was likewise
excused where the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; 41 when there
is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; 42 or when a party is
inadvertently left out.43

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements
of Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court is mandated.44 If the entries in the civil register could be corrected
or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all
parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other
mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching. 45

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution dated July 27, 20011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-
MIN, are SET ASIDE. Consequently, the June 28, 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27,
Gingoog City, in Spl. Proc. No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of
Live Birth filed by respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy, is NULLIFIED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATT E STATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had en reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Mindanao Station, Cagayan de Oro City.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., with Associate Justices Angelita A.
Gacutan and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, concurring; rollo, pp. 47-61.

3
Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., with Associate Justices Pamela Ann Abella
Maxino and Zenaida T. Galapate Laguilles, concurring; rollo, pp. 62-63.

4
Penned by Presiding Judge Rexel N. Pacuribot; records, pp. 27-29.

5
Records, pp. 2-5.

6
Id. at 2.

7
Id. at 6.

8
Id. at 9.

9
Id. at 8.

10
Rollo, pp. 48-49.

11
Id. at 10.

12
Id.

13
Records, p. 13.

14
Id.

15
Id. at 28-29.

16
Id. at 27-28.

17
Rollo, p. 15.

18
Id. at 20.

19
Emphasis supplied.

20
225 Phil. 408 (1986).

21
Republic v. Valencia, supra, at 416.

22
Id. (Citation omitted; italics in the original)

23
G.R. No. 170340, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 177.

24
503 Phil. 451 (2005).

25
465 Phil. 39 (2004).
26
Supra note 23.

27
Republic v. Kho, supra note 23, at 191.

28
Supra note 24.

29
Alba v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24, at 460.

30
Supra note 25.

31
G.R. No. 189476, February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 533.

32
513 Phil. 237 (2005).

33
250 Phil. 300 (1988).

34
Supra note 31.

35
Supra note 32.

36
Supra note 33.

37
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, supra note 33, at 301.

38
Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, supra note 31, at 543.

39
Ceruila v. Delantar, supra note 32, at 252.

40
Id.

41
Republic v. Kho, supra note 23, at 193.

42
Barco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 25, at 172.

43
Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, supra note 31, at 545.

44
Id. at 546.

45
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, supra note 33, at 307.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON
CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City,
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of
law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in
the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and
41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The RTC cited the following provisions
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in
the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of
the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition." 8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or
the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void,
and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil action which is "for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 10 In other words, the
petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts. 12

In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because
only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult
to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the
husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the
personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning"
are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate
the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when,
on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be
confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction
which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case." 20Moreover, petitioner alleged that
the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution,
the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e.
lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" 22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in
the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It
only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,]
it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x." 24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza emphasized
that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition
[for correction of entry] x x x."27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the
"immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay
and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead
of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion. 31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the
petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave,
this Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had
already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder
of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by
the Constitution.34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object
of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in
the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by
Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x
x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and
should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that
"[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked." 41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-
Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or
wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy."48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment
as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody
of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification
may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan
and authenticated by the seal of office. 50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents
of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor, 53 the setting of
pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the
case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case
on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court
were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is
the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a
person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment
or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a
foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states. 62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to
capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
abroad.65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant
to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth,
death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General,
in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." 67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,
with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment
concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry,
which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right
of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances 68) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a spouse’s right in a
marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish,
increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In
any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning.
Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The
husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the
civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on
the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil
aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party
and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. 79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a
"trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can
be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing
the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute
for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds
for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children, 84 the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is
located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based
on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine
courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
"[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for
divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results
from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose
laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by
extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served." 91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino
spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The
principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign
spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws
of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse
will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to
correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is
free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already
have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case
of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as
a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has
the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights
and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to
the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is
able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency
with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the
parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of
the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to
prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93 The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent
from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively,
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated
2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition
for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Penned by Judge Jose L. Bautista Jr.

2
In Pasay City, Metro Manila.

3
See rollo, p. 88; Trial Family Court Decree No. 15 of 2009, Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage between Maria Paz Galela Marinay and Shinichi Maekara dated 18 August 2010.
Translated by Yoshiaki Kurisu, Kurisu Gyoseishoshi Lawyer’s Office (see rollo, p. 89).

4
Id.

5
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (E.O. No. 209 as amended):

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;

xxxx

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous

marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.

6
Rollo, pp. 79-80.

7
The dispositive portion stated:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED and WITHDRAWN from the
active civil docket of this Court. The RTC-OCC, Quezon City is directed to refund to the
petitioner the amount of One Thousand Pesos (₱1,000) to be taken from the Sheriff’s Trust
Fund.

8
Rollo, pp. 44-45. Section 5 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) provides:

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. – (1) The petition shall allege the complete
facts constituting the cause of action.

(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and
specify the regime governing their property relations, as well as the properties
involved.

If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the

petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal support, custody and support
of common children, visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal
property, and other matters similarly requiring urgent action.

(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping.

The verification and certification must be signed personally by the petitioner. No
petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.

If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum
shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine
embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said
country.

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on
the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor,
within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service
within the same period.

Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition.

9
RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c). See rollo, pp. 55-56 (Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration).

10
RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(a).

11
FAMILY CODE (E.O. No. 209 as amended), Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:

xxxx

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;

xxxx
12
Rollo, p. 56.

13
FAMILY CODE, Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.

14
Rollo, p. 68.

15
Enacted 26 November 1930.

16
CIVIL CODE, Art. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.

17
Act No. 3753, Sec. 7. Registration of marriage. - All civil officers and priests or ministers
authorized to solemnize marriages shall send a copy of each marriage contract solemnized
by them to the local civil registrar within the time limit specified in the existing Marriage Law.

In cases of divorce and annulment of marriage, it shall be the duty of the successful
petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of
the court to the local civil registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled
marriage was solemnized.

In the marriage register there shall be entered the full name and address of each of
the contracting parties, their ages, the place and date of the solemnization of the
marriage, the names and addresses of the witnesses, the full name, address, and
relationship of the minor contracting party or parties or the person or persons who
gave their consent to the marriage, and the full name, title, and address of the person
who solemnized the marriage.

In cases of divorce or annulment of marriages, there shall be recorded the names of

the parties divorced or whose marriage was annulled, the date of the decree of the
court, and such other details as the regulations to be issued may require.

18
RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. —
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

19
273 Phil. 1 (1991).

20
Id. at 7. See rollo, pp. 65 and 67.

21
Rollo, p. 47.

22
Id. at 46.

23
Id. at 48.
24
Id.

25
G.R. No. 181174, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 638.

26
Id. at 641.

27
Id. at 643.

28
See rollo, p. 49.

29
Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC states in part:

Contents and form of petition. – x x x

xxxx

(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping.

The verification and certification must be signed personally by the petitioner. No
petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.

If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum
shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine
embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said
country.

xxxx

Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition.

30
Resolution dated 30 May 2011. Rollo, p. 105.

31
Under Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz.

Rollo, p. 137. The "Conclusion and Prayer" of the "Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of
32

Comment)" of the Solicitor General stated:

In fine, the court a quo’s pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with the
requirements provided in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC should accordingly be set aside. It is, thus,
respectfully prayed that Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 be reinstated for further proceedings.

Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.

33
G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637.

34
Id. at 656. Quoted in the Manifestation and Motion of the Solicitor General, pp. 8-9. See
rollo, pp. 132-133.

35
Rollo, p. 133.
36
G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266.

37
Id. at 287.

38
Rollo, p. 133.

39
G.R. No. 160172, 13 February 2008, 545 SCRA 162.

40
384 Phil. 661 (2000).

41
De Castro v. De Castro, supra note 39 at 169.

42
Supra note 30.

43
See rollo, p. 120.

44
Id.

45
See rollo, p. 146.

46
Id.

47
Supra note 33.

48
Supra note 33 at 655.

49
RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may
be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as
the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of
such court.

Rule 39, Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. — The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render
the judgment or final order, is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
 (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order
is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.

50
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24-25. See also Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, supra
note 36 at 282.

51
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 5.

52
Id., Sec. 6.

53
Id., Sec. 9.

54
Id., Sec. 11-15.

55
Id., Sec. 17-18.

56
Id., Sec. 19 and 22-23.

57
Mijares v. Rañada, 495 Phil. 372, 386 (2005) citing Eugene Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of
Laws 916 (2nd ed., 1982).

58
Id.

59
Id. at 386.

60
Civil Code, Art. 17. x x x

xxxx

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.

61
Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 386. "Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it
seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the
harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending
litigation of the same disputes, and – in a larger sense – to promote what Lord Coke in the
Ferrer’s Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: ‘rest and quietness.’" (Citations
omitted)

62
Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 382. "The rules of comity, utility and convenience of
nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign
courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under
certain conditions that may vary in different countries." (Citations omitted)
63
43 Phil. 43 (1922).

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266, 280; Garcia v.
64

Recio, 418 Phil. 723 (2001); Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, supra.

65
FAMILY CODE, Art. 26. x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

66
Act No. 3753, Sec. 1. Civil Register. — A civil register is established for recording the civil
status of persons, in which shall be entered: (a) births; (b) deaths; (c) marriages; (d)
annulments of marriages; (e) divorces; (f) legitimations; (g) adoptions; (h) acknowledgment
of natural children; (i) naturalization; and (j) changes of name.

Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or

correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register
may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery
of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

67
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, supra note 36 at 287.

68
FAMILY CODE, Art. 35-67.

69
FAMILY CODE, Art. 74-148.

70
FAMILY CODE, Art. 195 in relation to Art. 194.

71
See supra note 69.

CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
72

without due process of law x x x."

73
FAMILY CODE, Art. 68-73.

74
CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. x x x
 x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

75
Emphasis supplied.

76
Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815, as amended), Art. 349. Bigamy. - The penalty of
prisión mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

77
See III RAMON AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE (1997), 518.

78
RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.

xxxx

79
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

80
Juliano-Llave v. Republic, supra note 33.

81
Supra note 25.

82
Supra note 25.

83
See supra note 68.

84
FAMILY CODE, Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate
provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the
support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court
shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and
their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall
also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent.

Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 61.

85
FAMILY CODE, Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are
declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had
been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
 All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.

In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 19. Decision.— (1) If the court renders a decision
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles
50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.

xxxx

86
FAMILY CODE, Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based

upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. — (1) Within
one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8
above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the
parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective
counsels, if any.

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof
in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of
collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report The court shall set the
report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the
petition.

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the
case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State
at the pre-trial.

87
RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 1.

88
509 Phil. 108 (2005).

89
Id. at 114.

90
223 Phil. 357 (1985).

91
Id. at 363.

92
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c).
93
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 72, Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. — In the
absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

Rule 111, Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — x x x

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the
latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal
action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action,
the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal
action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence
already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the
criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the
witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to
present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried
and decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription
of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has
been suspended shall be tolled.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No.
1 2 3

16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation
of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the assailed order denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG).

The facts of the case are as follows:

Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon
receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean
National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of
Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the
marriage certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage
4

Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. Respondent impleaded the Local Civil
5

Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.

During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared
before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was
allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao
Pharma. She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she
recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a
receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny
Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to
obtain a passport. Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee
6

of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their
office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent. Lastly, a
7

document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged. 8

On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the petitioner,
Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries in the
WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.

SO ORDERED. 9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of respondent, the
court found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible
mistake. 10

Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1)
there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it
to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all
the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage
void ab initio. 11

In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration couched
in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic of the
Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor General, the petitioner’s
counsel, and all concerned government agencies.

SO ORDERED. 12

Contrary to petitioner’s stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for
correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the
appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondent’s identity was used by an
unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent
to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages
under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code. 13

Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the following
grounds:

I.

RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS
IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.

II.

GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF THE
ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB
INITIO.14

Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or corrected, because
the entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided by the person who appeared
and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latter’s personal
circumstances. In directing the cancellation of the entries in the wife portion of the certificate of
15

marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage null and void ab initio. Thus, the petition
16

instituted by respondent is actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a
Rule 108 proceeding. 17

We deny the petition.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and final
orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a
question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does
not call for the examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties. Here, the issue
18

raised by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in
effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a
pure question of law.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry, to wit:

SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds,
the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)
changes of name.

SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is

sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice, file his opposition thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is brought

may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified
copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall
annotate the same in his record.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then
the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since
the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even
19

substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the
true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate
adversarial proceeding." An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court
20

has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where
opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. 21

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always
summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires
publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest
which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any
person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders
expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue
an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed,
it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of
the civil register.
22

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the
personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and
she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she
claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into
such contract. It must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO,
it appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of
entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.

In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar
of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise
undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of
the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the
City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where
respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as
well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With
the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in
the subject marriage certificate was different from respondent’s signature appearing in some of her
government issued identification cards. The court thus made a categorical conclusion that
23

respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it
was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.

Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela
Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General of the National Statistics Office that:
24

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute
for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds
for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is
also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is
located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into
1âwphi1

and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence
clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a
forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage,
we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the
opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not
the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of
such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the
correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court
did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial
Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATT E STATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

C E RTI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 131, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Branch 6, Cebu City.

2
Penned by Presiding Judge Ester M. Veloso; rollo, pp. 32-34.

3
Rollo, pp. 36-41.

4
Id. at 32.

5
Id.

6
Id. at 33.

7
Id.

8
Id. at 33-34.

9
Id. at 34.

10
Id.

11
Id. at 36.

12
Id. at 41. (Emphasis in the original)

13
Id. at 40-41.

14
Id. at 18.

15
Id. at 21.

16
Id. at 23.

17
Id. at 24.

18
Republic v. Sagun, G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 321, 329.

19
225 Phil. 408 (1986).
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 197174 September 10, 2014

FRANCLER P. ONDE, Petitioner,

vs.
THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRATION OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Orders dated October 7, 2010 and March 1,
1

2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 201, Las Piñas City, in Special Proceedings Case
No. 10-0043. The RTC dismissed the case filed by petitioner Francler P. Onde for correction of
entries in his certificate of live birth.

The antecedent facts follow:

Petitioner filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the R TC and
2

named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pifias City as sole respondent. Petitioner
alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan,
but his birth certificate stated that his parents were married. His birth certificate also stated that his
mother's first name is Tely and that his first name is Franc Ler. He prayed that the following entries
on his birth certificate be corrected as follows:

Entry From To
1) Date and place of marriage of his parents December 23, 1983 - Bicol Not Married
2) First name of his mother Tely Matilde
3) His first name Franc Ler Francler

In its Order dated October 7, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries on the
ground thatit is insufficient in form and substance. It ruled that the proceedings must be adversarial
since the first correction is substantial in nature and would affect petitioner’s status as a legitimate
child. It was further held that the correction in the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done
by the city civil registrar under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An Act Authorizing the City or
Municipal Civil Registrar or the ConsulGeneral to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an
Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Registrar Without Need of a Judicial
Order, Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

In its Order dated March 1, 2011,the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, as it found
no proof that petitioner’s parents were not married on December 23, 1983.

Essentially, the petition raises fourissues: (1) whether the RTC erred in ruling that the correction on
the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under R.A. No.
9048; (2) whether the RTC erred in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that
his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is substantial in nature
requiring adversarial proceedings; (3) whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for correction
of entries; and (4) whether the RTC erred in ruling that there is no proof that petitioner’s parents
were not married on December 23, 1983.

Petitioner argues that Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court allows a substantial correction of entries in the
civil registry, stating that in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, the case cited by the
3

RTC, we have actually ruled that substantial changes in the civil registry are now allowed under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. He likewise adds that proof that his parents were not married will be
presented during the trial, not during the filing of the petition for correction of entries.

In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the RTC correctly dismissed
the petition for correction of entries. It points out that the first names of petitioner and his mother can
be corrected thru administrative proceedings under R.A. No. 9048. Such correction of the entry on
petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not
married" is a substantial correction affecting his legitimacy. Hence, it must be dealt with in
adversarial proceedings where all interested parties are impleaded.

We deny the petition.

On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his mother as
appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048. We
note that petitioner no longer contested the RTC’s ruling on this point. Indeed, under Section 1 of
4 5

R.A. No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected and
changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial
order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended by R.A. No. 10172, now reads: SECTION 1. Authority to
Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil
register shall be changed or correctedwithout a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical
errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the dateof birth or sex of a
person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the
entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipalcivil registraror consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
(Emphasis supplied.)

In Silverio v. Republic, we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over applications for change of
6

first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The intent and effect of said law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. The remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. In
Republic v. Cagandahan, we said that under R.A.No. 9048, the correction of clerical or
7

typographical errors can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for
a judicial order. The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules ofCourt the correction of
clerical or typographical errors. Thus petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy for the
correction of his and his mother’s first name.

On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s
birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a
substantial correction requiring adversarial proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will affect
his legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate child to an illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy, we
8

held that corrections of entries in the civil register including those on citizenship, legitimacyof
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage,involve substantial alterations. Substantial errors in a
civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the appropriate adversaryproceedings. 9
On the third issue, we likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition for correction of entries. As
mentioned, petitioner no longer contested the RTC ruling that the correction he sought on his and his
mother’s first name can be done by the city civil registrar. Under the circumstances, we are
constrained to deny his prayer that the petition for correction of entries before the RTC bereinstated
since the same petition includes the correction he sought on his and his mother’s first name.

We clarify, however, that the RTC’s dismissal is without prejudice. As we said, petitioner can avail
ofthe administrative remedy for the correction of his and his mother’s first name. He can also file a
1âwphi1

new petition before the RTC to correct the alleged erroneous entry on his birth certificate that his
parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol. This substantial correction is allowed under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As we reiterated in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City: 10

x x x This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valenciawhere we held that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 [of the Rules of
Court]provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. x x x

xxxx

It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical
or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage between
petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of
such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs.
Valenciaprovided that the appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)

We also stress that a petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil register must
implead as parties to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar, as petitioner did in the
dismissed petition for correction of entries, but also all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected by the correction. This is required by Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Eleosida, we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as the
11

procedural requirements laid down by the Court to make the proceedings under Rule 108 adversary.
In Republic v. Uy, we have similarly ruled that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an
12

entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the
requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated. Thus, in his new petition, petitioner should at least
implead his father and mother as parties since the substantial correction he is seeking will also affect
them.

In view of the foregoing discussion, it is no longer necessary to dwell on the last issue as petitioner
will have his opportunity to prove his claim that his parents were not married on December 23, 1983
when he files the new petition for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Orders dated October 7, 2010 and March 1,
2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 201, Las Pifias City, in Special Proceedings Case No. 10-
0043. The dismissal ordered by the Regional Trial Court is, however, declared to be without
prejudice.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO*
Acting Chief Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATT E STATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of efe opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated additional member per Raffle dated September 3, 2014.

1
Rollo, pp. 15-17. Penned by Presiding Judge Lorna Navarro-Domingo.

2
Id. at 23-27.

3
431 Phil. 612, 619 (2002).

4
See Petition for Review on Certiorari, rollo, pp. 3-12.
5
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name
or Nickname.– No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which
can be corrected or changed by the concerned cityor municipal civil registraror consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)

6
562 Phil. 953, 964-965 (2007).

7
586 Phil. 637, 647-648 (2008).

8
G.R. No. 198010, August 12, 2013, 703 SCRA 425, 438.

9
Id. at 432.

10
Supra note 4, at 619-621.

11
Id. at 619-620.

12
Supra note 9.