Joe Dennis A.

Tagudin
Intellectual Property

Copyright

Manly Sportswear Manufacturing Inc. vs Dadodette Enterprises

1. What is the gist of the controversy?

Search warrant was issued to Dadotte Ent. after finding reasonable grounds that a violation of
Sections 172 and 217 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293.
2. Who are the parties involved?
Manly Sportswear (plaintiff), Dadotte (respondent)
3. What was the action filed?
Issuance of search warrant
4. What was the respondents answer?
moved to quash and annul the search warrant contending that the same is invalid since the
requisites for its issuance have not been complied with. . They insisted that the sporting goods
manufactured by and/or registered in the name of MANLY are ordinary and common hence, not
among the classes of work protected under Section 172 of RA 8293.
5. How did the RTC rule on the motion?
trial court granted the motion to quash based on its finding that the copyrighted products of
MANLY do not appear to be original creations and were being manufactured and distributed by
different companies locally and abroad under various brands, and therefore unqualified for
protection under Section 172 of RA 8293.
6. How did the CA rule on appeal?
The appellate court found that the trial court correctly granted the motion to quash and that its
ruling in the ancillary proceeding did not preempt the findings of the intellectual property court
as it did not resolve with finality the status or character of the seized items.
7. Issue:
Whether or not the subject goods are copyrightable
8. What does to Section 2, Rule 7 of the Copyrights Safeguards and Regulations provide?
Sec. 2 Effects of Registration and Deposit of Work. The registration and deposit of the work is
purely for recording the date of registration and deposit of the work and shall not be conclusive
as to copyright ownership or the term of the copyrights or the rights of the copyright owner,
including neighboring rights.
9. What is the effect of having a Copyright certificate?
The copyright certificates issued in favor of MANLY constitute merely prima facie evidence of
validity and ownership. However, no presumption of validity is created where other evidence
exist that may cast doubt on the copyright validity. Hence, where there is sufficient proof that
the copyrighted products are not original creations but are readily available in the market under
various brands, as in this case, validity and originality will not be presumed and the trial court
may properly quash the issued warrant for lack of probable cause.
10. How did the SC rule?
 At most, the certificates of registration and deposit issued by the National Library and the
Supreme Court Library serve merely as a notice of recording and registration of the work but do
not confer any right or title upon the registered copyright owner or automatically put his work
under the protective mantle of the copyright law. It is not a conclusive proof of copyright
ownership. As it is, non-registration and deposit of the work within the prescribed period only
makes the copyright owner liable to pay a fine.

United Feature Syndicate vs Munsingwer Creation

1. What is the gist of the controversy?

This case arose from petition filed by petitioner for the cancellation of the registration of
trademark CHARLIE BROWN under class 25 of the NICE classification in protection of its right
which has a registered copyright of Charlie Brown.
2. What are the goods covered by class 25 that is the object of this case?
Clothings, headgear, (shirts)
3. Who are the parties involved?
United Feature (plaintiff), Munsingwear (respondent)
4. What was the action filed?
Cancellation of registration of Trademark Charlie Brown
5. What were the allegations by United against Munsingwear?
(1) that respondent was not entitled to the registration of the mark CHARLIE BROWN, & DEVICE
at the time of application for registration; (2) that CHARLIE BROWN is a character creation or a
pictorial illustration, the copyright to which is exclusively owned worldwide by the petitioner; (3)
that as the owner of the pictorial illustration CHARLIE BROWN, petitioner has since 1950 and
continuously up to the present, used and reproduced the same to the exclusion of others; (4)
that the respondent-registrant has no bona fide use of the trademark in commerce in the
Philippines prior to its application for registration.
6. How did the PPO rule?
Director of the Philippine Patent Office rendered a decision in this case holding that a copyright
registration like that of the name and likeness of CHARLIE BROWN may not provide a cause of
action for the cancellation of a trademark registration
7. How did the CA rule?
The appeal was denied for lack of merit
8. Issue:
Whether or not a copyright registration also includes protection against trademark registration
9. What is Section 2 of P.D 49?
Section 2. The rights granted by this Decree shall, from the moment of creation, subsist with
respect to any of the following classes of works:
(O) Prints, pictorial illustrations, advertising copies, labels, tags and box wraps. ...
10. How did the SC rule?
Therefore, since the name "CHARLIE BROWN" and its pictorial representation were covered by a
copyright registration way back in 1950 the same are entitled to protection under PD No. 49.
 Aside from its copyright registration, petitioner is also the owner of several trademark
registrations and application for the name and likeness of "CHARLIE BROWN" which is the duly
registered trademark and copyright of petitioner United Feature Syndicate Inc.
It is undeniable from the records that petitioner is the actual owner of said trademark due to its
prior registration with the Patent's Office.

Joaquin vs Drilon

1. What is the gist of the controversy?

petitioner Francisco Joaquin, Jr., president of BJPI, a registered copyright owner of Rhoda and
ME, saw on RPN Channel 9 an episode of It's a Date, which was produced by IXL Productions,
Inc. (IXL). On July 18, 1991, he wrote a letter to private respondent Gabriel M. Zosa, president
and general manager of IXL, informing Zosa that BJPI had a copyright to Rhoda and Me and
demanding that IXL discontinue airing It's a Date.
2. Who are the parties involved?
Joaquin (plaintiff), Zosa (respondent)
3. What was the action filed?
An information for violation of P.D. No. 49 was filed against private respondent Zosa
4. How did the Assistant City Prosecutor rule?
It ruled in favor of the petitioners action and forwarded the case for trial on RTC branch 104.
5. How did the DOJ Secretary rule?
DOJ Sec. Drilon dismissed the case.
6. What was the private respondents contention?
private respondents maintain that petitioners failed to establish the existence of probable cause
due to their failure to present the copyrighted master videotape of Rhoda and Me. They
contend that petitioner BJPI's copyright covers only a specific episode of Rhoda and Me and that
the formats or concepts of dating game shows are not covered by copyright protection under
P.D. No. 49.
7. Issue:
Whether or not the format or mechanics of a show is entitled to copyright protection.
8. What does Section 2 of P.D 49 enumerate?
Sec. 2. The rights granted by this Decree shall, from the moment of creation, subsist with
respect to any of the following classes of works:
(A) Books, including composite and cyclopedic works, manuscripts, directories, and gazetteers:
(B) Periodicals, including pamphlets and newspapers;
(C) Lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery;
(D) Letters;
(E) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions; choreographic works and entertainments in
dumb shows, the acting form of which is fixed in writing or otherwise;
(F) Musical compositions, with or without words;
(G) Works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving, lithography, and other works
of art; models or designs for works of art;
(H) Reproductions of a work of art;
 (I) Original ornamental designs or models for articles of manufacture, whether or not
patentable, and other works of applied art;
(J) Maps, plans, sketches, and charts;
(K) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character;
(I) Photographic works and works produced by a process analogous to photography lantern
slides;
(M) Cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to cinematography or
any process for making audio-visual recordings;
(N) Computer programs;
(O) Prints, pictorial illustrations advertising copies, labels tags, and box wraps;
(P) Dramatizations, translations, adaptations, abridgements, arrangements and other alterations
of literary, musical or artistic works or of works of the Philippine government as herein defined,
which shall be protected as provided in Section 8 of this Decree.
(Q) Collections of literary, scholarly, or artistic works or of works referred to in Section 9 of this
Decree which by reason of the selection and arrangement of their contents constitute
intellectual creations, the same to be protected as such in accordance with Section 8 of this
Decree.
(R) Other literary, scholarly, scientific and artistic works.
9. What is a Copyright?
Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new or independent
right granted by the statute, and not simply a pre-existing right regulated by the statute. Being a
statutory grant, the rights are only such as the statute confers, and may be obtained and
enjoyed only with respect to the subjects and by the persons and on terms and conditions
specified in the statute.
10. How did the SC rule?
In enumerating what are subject to copyright, refers to finished works and not to concepts. The
copyright does not extend to an idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work, the new INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES provides:
Sec. 175. Unprotected Subject Matter. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 172 and
173, no protection shall extend, under this law, to any idea, procedure, system, method or
operation, concept, principle, discovery or mere data as such, even if they are expressed,
explained, illustrated or embodied in a work; news of the day and other miscellaneous facts
having the character of mere items of press information; or any official text of a legislative,
administrative or legal nature, as well as any official translation thereof. The copyright does not
extend to the general concept or format of its dating game show. Accordingly, by the very
nature of the subject of petitioner BJPI's copyright, the investigating prosecutor should have the
opportunity to compare the videotapes of the two shows.
Mere description by words of the general format of the two dating game shows is insufficient;
the presentation of the master videotape in evidence was indispensable to the determination of
the existence of probable cause. As aptly observed by respondent Secretary of Justice:
 A television show includes more than mere words can describe because it involves a whole
spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio, such that no similarity or dissimilarity may be
found by merely describing the general copyright/format of both dating game shows.

Pearl and Deean vs Shoemart

1. What is the gist of the controversy?

Petitioner prohibited the usage of light boxes or poster ads used for advertisements by the
private respondents under the contention that they were copyright registered and thus
protected and excluded from usage of others without the petitioners’ authorization.
2. Who are the parties involved?
Pearl and Dean (copyright owner-plaintiff), Shoemart and NEMI (respondents)
3. What was the action filed?
Pearl and Dean filed this instant case for infringement of trademark and copyright, unfair
competition and damages.
4. What was SMI’s defense?
according to SMI, the word "Poster Ads" is a generic term which cannot be appropriated as a
trademark, and, as such, registration of such mark is invalid. It also stressed that Pearl and Dean
is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for in its complaint since its advertising display units
contained no copyright notice, in violation of Section 27 of P.D. 49. SMI alleged that Pearl and
Dean had no cause of action against it and that the suit was purely intended to malign SMI’s
good name. On this basis, SMI, aside from praying for the dismissal of the case, also
counterclaimed for moral, actual and exemplary damages and for the cancellation of Pearl and
Dean’s Certification of Copyright Registration
5. How did the RTC rule?
SMI and NEMI are found jointly and severally liable for infringement of copyright under Section
2 of PD 49, as amended, and infringement of trademark under Section 22 of RA No. 166, as
amended, and are hereby penalized under Section 28 of PD 49, as amended, and Sections 23
and 24 of RA 166, as amended.
6. How did the CA rule?
It reversed the RTC’s decision. Since the light boxes cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be
considered as either prints, pictorial illustrations, advertising copies, labels, tags or box wraps, to
be properly classified as a copyrightable class "O" work, we have to agree with SMI when it
posited that what was copyrighted were the technical drawings only, and not the light boxes
themselves, thus:
When a drawing is technical and depicts a utilitarian object, a copyright over the
drawings like plaintiff-appellant’s will not extend to the actual object.
7. Issue:
Whether or not the protection of copyright extends over the actual object, patentable or to
marks subject to Trademark Law.
8. What does Section 20 of R.A 166 provide?
SEC. 20. Certification of registration prima facie evidence of validity.- A certificate of registration
of a mark or trade-name shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, the
registrant’s ownership of the mark or trade-name, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use
 the same in connection with the goods, business or services specified in the certificate, subject
to any conditions and limitations stated therein.
9. What does Section 2 of P.D 49 provide?
SEC. 2. The rights granted by this Decree shall, from the moment of creation, subsist with
respect to any of the following works:
(O) Prints, pictorial illustrations, advertising copies, labels, tags, and box wraps;
10. How did the SC rule?
Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. Being a mere
statutory grant, the rights are limited to what the statute confers. It may be obtained and
enjoyed only with respect to the subjects and by the persons, and on terms and conditions
specified in the statute. Accordingly, it can cover only the works falling within the statutory
enumeration or description.
Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual property rights that cannot
be interchanged with one another. A trademark is any visible sign capable of distinguishing the
goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a stamped or
marked container of goods. In relation thereto, a trade name means the name or designation
identifying or distinguishing an enterprise. Meanwhile, the scope of a copyright is confined to
literary and artistic works which are original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic
domain protected from the moment of their creation. Patentable inventions, on the other hand,
refer to any technical solution of a problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves
an inventive step and is industrially applicable.

Columbia Pictures vs CA

1. What is the gist of the controversy?

NBI issued 3 search warrants against private respondents for violation of Section 56 of P.D 49.
2. Who are the parties involved?
Columbia Pictures (plaintiff), Tube Video et at (defendants)
3. What was the action filed?
An issuance of search warrant upon request of the private complainant-petitioners
4. What were the objects of the said search warrant?
That allegedly, respondents were pirating, selling, reproducing the copyrighted works of
petitioner.
5. How did the private respondent respond?
Moved to quash the issued search warrant for lack of probable cause
6. How did the RTC rule on the motion?
The motion was granted and the seized items were ordered to be returned
7. How did the CA rule on appeal?
It affirmed the quashal of the said warrants.
8. Issue:
Whether or not the questioned decision of the lower court is tenable?
9. What is the essence of copyright infringement?
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the
 court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes
allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the
former.
10. How did the SC rule?
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were
allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in
their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation
of the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely
evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify
the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate
or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which allegedly
were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the
petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the
court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes
allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the
former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy
the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted
films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
It is not correct to say that "the basic fact" to be proven to establish probable cause in the
instant cases is not the "unauthorized transfer" of a motion picture that has been recorded but
the "sale, lease, or distribution of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films.

ABS-CBN vs Phil. Multi-Media System

1. What is the gist of the controversy?

ABS-CBN demanded for PMSI to cease and desist from rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23. Both
parties negotiated in an effort to reach a settlement; however, the negotiations were
terminated CBN allegedly due to PMSI’s inability to ensure the prevention of illegal
retransmission and further rebroadcast of its signals, as well as the adverse effect of the
rebroadcasts on the business operations of its regional television stations.
2. Who are the parties involved?
ABS-CBN (plaintiff), PMSI (respondent)
3. What was the action filed?
CBN filed with the IPO a complaint for “Violation of Laws Involving Property Rights, with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
4. How did the BLA rule?
Found that PMSI infringed the broadcasting rights and copyright of ABS-CBN and ordering it to
permanently cease and desist from rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23.
5. How did the Director of IPO rule on appeal?
It reversed the BLA’s ruling and the appeal was granted
6. How did the CA rule?
 It ruled in favor of the PMSI, it sustained the questioned decision and dismissed ABS’ petition
7. What was petitioners’ contention?
ABS-CBN contends that PMSI’s unauthorized rebroadcasting of Channels 2 and 23 is an
infringement of its broadcasting rights and copyright under the Intellectual Property Code (IP
Code); that Memorandum Circular No. 04-08-88 excludes DTH satellite television operators; that
the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the must-carry rule violates Section 9 of Article III of the
Constitution because it allows the taking of property for public use without payment of just
compensation and that that PMSI violated its broadcaster’s rights under Section 211 of the IP
Code
8. What is Section 211 in relation to Section 202 of the IP code?
Sec. 211. Scope of Right. - Subject to the provisions of Section 212, broadcasting organizations
shall enjoy the exclusive right to carry out, authorize or prevent any of the following acts:
211.1. The rebroadcasting of their broadcasts,
Section 202.7 of the IP Code defines broadcasting as “the transmission by wireless means for the
public reception of sounds or of images or of representations thereof; such transmission by
satellite is also ‘broadcasting’ where the means for decrypting are provided to the public by the
broadcasting organization or with its consent.”
On the other hand, rebroadcasting as defined in Article 3(g) of the International Convention for
the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations,
otherwise known as the 1961 Rome Convention, of which the Republic of the Philippines is a
signatory, is “the simultaneous broadcasting by one broadcasting organization of the broadcast
of another broadcasting organization.”
9. What are the limitations on copyright?
It must be emphasized that the law on copyright is not absolute. The IP Code provides that:
Sec. 184. Limitations on Copyright. -
184.1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter V, the following acts shall not constitute
infringement of copyright:
(h) The use made of a work by or under the direction or control of the Government, by the
National Library or by educational, scientific or professional institutions where such use is in the
public interest and is compatible with fair use;
10. On the issue of whether or not rebroadcasting is a violation of ABS-CBN’s right
The SC held that the retransmission of ABS-CBN’s signals by PMSI – which functions essentially
as a cable television – does not therefore constitute rebroadcasting in violation of the former’s
intellectual property rights under the IP Code.
Indeed, intellectual property protection is merely a means towards the end of making society
benefit from the creation of its men and women of talent and genius. This is the essence of
intellectual property laws, and it explains why certain products of ingenuity that are concealed
from the public are outside the pale of protection afforded by the law. It also explains why the
author or the creator enjoys no more rights than are consistent with public welfare.
The Filipino people must be given wider access to more sources of news, information,
education, sports event and entertainment programs other than those provided for by mass
media and afforded television programs to attain a well-informed, well-versed and culturally
refined citizenry and enhance their socio-economic growth.
GMA Network vs Central CATV

1. What is the gist of the controversy?

the petitioner, together with the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas, Audiovisual
Communicators, Incorporated, Filipinas Broadcasting Network and Rajah Broadcasting Network,
Inc. (complainants), filed with the NTC a complaint against the respondent to stop it from
soliciting and showing advertisements in its cable television (CATV)system, pursuant to Section 2
of Executive Order (EO) No. 205. Under this provision, a grantee’s authority to operate a CATV
system shall not infringe on the television and broadcast markets. The petitioner alleged that
the phrase "television and broadcast markets" includes the commercial or advertising market
2. Who are the parties involved?
GMA Networks et al (rights holder/plaintiff), Central (respondent)
3. What was the action filed?
Filed with the NTC a complaint against the respondent to stop it from soliciting and showing
advertisements in its cable television (CATV)system
4. What was the respondents answer?
the respondent admitted the airing of commercial advertisement on its CATV network but
alleged that Section 3 of EO No. 436, which was issued by former President Fidel V. Ramos on
September 9, 1997, expressly allowed CATV providers to carry advertisements and other similar
paid segments provided there is consent from their program providers. And after the petitioner
presented and offered its evidence, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss by demurrer to
evidence claiming that the evidence presented by the complainants failed to show how the
respondent’s acts of soliciting and/or showing advertisements infringed upon the television and
broadcast market
5. How did the NTC rule?
Respondents motion was granted and dismissed the complaint. The NTC granted the
respondent’s demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint. It ruled that since EO No. 205
does not define "infringement," EO No. 436 merely clarified or filled-in the details of the term to
mean that the CATV operators may show advertisements, provided that they secure the consent
of their program providers. In the present case, the documents attached to the respondent’s
demurrer to evidence showed that its program providers have given such consent. Although the
respondent did not formally offer these documents as evidence, the NTC could still consider
them since they formed part of the records and the NTC is not bound by the strict application of
technical rules
6. What is the must-carry rule?
It requires the CATV operators within the Grade A or B contours of a television broadcast station
to carry the latter’s television broadcast signals in full, without alteration or deletion.
7. What is the function of the National Tecommunications commission?
This Commission, as the governing agency vested by laws with the jurisdiction, supervision and
control over all public services, which includes direct broadcast satellite operators, and taking
into consideration the paramount interest of the public in general.
8. How did the CA rule?
It affirmed the NTC’s decision. Due to the failure of EO No. 205 to define what constitutes
"infringement," EO No. 436 merely filled-in the details without expanding, modifying and/or
 repealing EO No. 205. The NTC was also correct in modifying or amending the must-carryrule
under MC 4-08-88 as the NTC merely implemented the directive of EO No. 436
9. Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is prohibited from showing advertisements under Section 2 of
EO No. 205, in relation to paragraph 2, Section 3 of EO No. 436.
10. How did the SC rule?
The CATV operators are not prohibited from showing advertisements under EO No. 205 and its
implementing rules and regulations, MC 4-08-88
Section 631 of EO No. 205 expressly and unequivocally vests with the NTC the delegated
legislative authority to issue its implementing rules and regulations.
It is clear from this provision that the phrase "television market" connotes "audience" or
"viewers" in geographic areas and not the commercial or advertising marketas what the
petitioner claims. Second, the kind of infringement prohibited by Section 2 of EO No. 205 was
particularly clarified under Sections 6.2, 6.2.1, 6.4(a)(1) and 6.4(b) of MC 04-08-88, which
embody the "must-carry rule." This rule mandates that the local TV broadcast signals of an
authorized TV broadcast station, such as the petitioner, should be carried in full by the CATV
operator, without alteration or deletion. These sections provide as follows:
6.2 Mandatory Coverage
6.2.1 A cable TV system operating in a community which is within the Grade A or Grade B
contours of an authorized TV broadcast station or stations must carry the TV signals of these
stations.
6.4 Manner of Carriage
a. Where a television broadcast signal is required to be carried by a community unit, pursuant
to the rules in this sub-part:
1. The signal shall be carried without material degradation in quality (within the limitations
imposed by the technical state of the art), and where applicable, in accordance with the
technical standards.
The implementing rules and regulations embodied in this circular, whose validity is undisputed
by the parties, "partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been
written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an
appropriate case by a competent court."

Filipino Society of Composers vs Benjamin Tan

1. What is the gist of the controversy?

The defendant-appellee is the operator of a restaurant known as "Alex Soda Foundation and
Restaurant" where a combo with professional singers, hired to play and sing musical
compositions to entertain and amuse customers therein, were playing and singing the above-
mentioned compositions without any license or permission from the appellant to play or sing
the same. Accordingly, appellant demanded from the appellee payment of the necessary license
fee for the playing and singing of aforesaid compositions but the demand was ignored.
2. Who are the parties involved?
FSC (plaintiff), Benjamin Tan (defendant)
3. What was the action filed?
appellant filed a complaint with the lower court for infringement of copyright against
defendant-appellee for allowing the playing in defendant-appellee's restaurant of said songs
copyrighted in the name of the former.
4. What was the respondents defense?
He countered that the complaint states no cause of action. While not denying the playing of said
copyrighted compositions in his establishment, appellee maintains that the mere singing and
playing of songs and popular tunes even if they are copyrighted do not constitute an
infringement under the provisions of Section 3 of the Copyright Law
5. How did the RTC rule?
It dismissed the complaint in favor of the defendant
6. How did the CA rule?
The Court of Appeals which, as already stated certified the case to the Supreme Court for
adjudication on the legal question involved
7. What is Section 3 of the Copyright Law?
SEC. 3. The proprietor of a copyright or his heirs or assigns shall have the exclusive right:
(c) To exhibit, perform, represent, produce, or reproduce the copyrighted work in any manner
or by any method whatever for profit or otherwise; if not reproduced in copies for sale, to sell
any manuscripts or any record whatsoever thereof;
8. Issue:
Whether or not defendant has violated the aforestated Copyright law?
9. How was the term “perform” defined by the SC?
The word "perform" as used in the Act has been applied to "One who plays a musical
composition on a piano, thereby producing in the air sound waves which are heard as music ...
and if the instrument he plays on is a piano plus a broadcasting apparatus, so that waves are
thrown out, not only upon the air, but upon the other, then also he is performing the musical
composition."
In relation thereto, it has been held that "The playing of music in dine and dance establishment
which was paid for by the public in purchases of food and drink constituted "performance for
profit" within a Copyright Law."
10. How did the SC rule?
If the rights under the copyright are infringed only by a performance where money is taken at
the door, they are very imperfectly protected. Performances not different in kind from those of
the defendants could be given that might compete with and even destroy the success of the
monopoly that the law intends the plaintiffs to have. It is enough to say that there is no need to
construe the statute so narrowly. The defendants' performances are not eleemosynary. They
are part of a total for which the public pays, and the fact that the price of the whole is attributed
to a particular item which those present are expected to order is not important. It is true that
the music is not the sole object, but neither is the food, which probably could be got cheaper
elsewhere. The object is a repast in surroundings that to people having limited power of
conversation or disliking the rival noise, give a luxurious pleasure not to be had from eating a
silent meal. If music did not pay, it would be given up. If it pays, it pays out of the public's
pocket. Whether it pays or not, the purpose of employing it is profit, and that is enough.
 In the case at bar, it is admitted that the patrons of the restaurant in question pay only for the
food and drinks and apparently not for listening to the music. As found by the trial court, the
music provided is for the purpose of entertaining and amusing the customers in order to make
the establishment more attractive and desirable. That the expenses entailed thereby are added
to the overhead of the restaurant which are either eventually charged in the price of the food
and drinks or to the overall total of additional income produced by the bigger volume of
business which the entertainment was programmed to attract. Consequently, it is beyond
question that the playing and singing of the combo in defendant-appellee's restaurant
constituted performance for profit contemplated by the Copyright Law.

Columbia Pictures vs CA

1. What is the gist of the controversy?

Complainants thru counsel lodged a formal complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation
for violation of PD No. 49, as amended, and sought its assistance in their anti-film piracy drive.
Agents of the NBI and private researchers made discreet surveillance on various video
establishments in Metro Manila including Sunshine Home Video Inc. (Sunshine for brevity),
owned and operated by Danilo A. Pelindario with address at No. 6 Mayfair Center, Magallanes,
Makati, Metro Manila.
2. Who are the parties involved?
Columbia Pictures (plaintiff), Sunshine (respondent)
3. What was the action filed?
Issuance of search warrant in relation to the violation of PD 49
4. How did the respondent answer?
It filed a Motion To Lift the Order of Search Warrant
5. How did the RTC rule on the motion?
It granted the respondents motion for complainants failure to produce the master tapes of the
copyrighted films.
6. How did the CA rule on appeal?
The appeal was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration thereof was denied.
7. Issue:
Whether or not the determination of probable cause to support the issuance of a search
warrant in copyright infringement cases involving videograms, the production of the master
tape for comparison with the allegedly pirate copies is necessary.
8. What is probable cause?
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
9. How did the SC rule?
The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of
probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. As found out by the court, the NBI
agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their
testimony which was the alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents. Only
the petitioner's counsel who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of the
 search warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the
private respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner.
However, the lower court did not give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that
the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the
application. The passages readily expose the reason why the trial court therein required the
presentation of the master tapes of the allegedly pirated films in order to convince itself of the
existence of probable cause under the factual milieu peculiar to that case. In the case at bar,
respondent appellate court itself observed:
We feel that the rationale behind the aforequoted doctrine is that the pirated copies as well as
the master tapes, unlike the other types of personal properties which may be seized, were
available for presentation to the court at the time of the application for a search warrant to
determine the existence of the linkage of the copyrighted films with the pirated ones. Thus,
there is no reason not the present them
10. What is the relevance of registration and deposit of copyrightable works in the national library?
The registration and deposit of two complete copies or reproductions of the work with the
National Library within three weeks after the first public dissemination or performance of the
work, as provided for in Section 26 (P.D. No. 49, as amended), is not for the purpose of securing
a copyright of the work, but rather to avoid the penalty for non-compliance of the deposit of
said two copies and in order to recover damages in an infringement suit.

Pacita Habana vs Robles

1. What is the gist of the controversy?

In the course of revising their published works, petitioners scouted and looked around various
bookstores to check on other textbooks dealing with the same subject matter. By chance they
came upon the book of respondent Robles and upon perusal of said book they were surprised to
see that the book was strikingly similar to the contents, scheme of presentation, illustrations
and illustrative examples in their own book, CET.
2. Who are the parties involved?
Habana (copyright owner of CET/plaintiff), Robles (respondent)
3. What was the action filed?
4. What was the respondents’ defense?
and denied the allegations of plagiarism and copying that petitioners claimed. Respondent
stressed that (1) the book DEP is the product of her independent researches, studies and
experiences, and was not a copy of any existing valid copyrighted book; (2) DEP followed the
scope and sequence or syllabus which are common to all English grammar writers as
recommended by the Association of Philippine Colleges of Arts and Sciences (APCAS), so any
similarity between the respondents book and that of the petitioners was due to the orientation
of the authors to both works and standards and syllabus; and (3) the similarities may be due to
the authors' exercise of the right to fair use of copyrigthed materials, as guides.
5. How did the RTC rule?
It dismissed the complaint filed against the defendant
6. How did the CA rule?
 It likewise ruled in favor of the defendant: It must be noted, however, that similarity of the
allegedly infringed work to the author's or proprietor's copyrighted work does not of itself
establish copyright infringement, especially if the similarity results from the fact that both works
deal with the same subject or have the same common source, as in this case.
7. Issue:
Whether or not, despite the apparent textual, thematic and sequential similarity between DEP
and CET, respondents committed no copyright infringement
8. What does Section 177 of RA 8293 provide?
Sec. 177. Copy or Economic rights. — Subject to the provisions of chapter VIII, copyright or
economic rights shall consist of the exclusive right to carry out, authorize or prevent the
following acts:
177.1 Reproduction of the work or substanlial portion of the work;
177.2 Dramatization, translation, adaptation, abridgement, arrangement or other
transformation of the work;
177.3 The first public distribution of the original and each copy of the work by sale or other
forms of transfer of ownership;
177.4 Rental of the original or a copy of an audiovisual or cinematographic work, a work
embodied in a sound recording, a computer program, a compilation of data and other materials
or a musical work in graphic form, irrespective of the ownership of the original or the copy
which is the subject of the rental; (n)
177.5 Public display of the original or copy of the work;
177.6 Public performance of the work; and
177.7 Other communication to the public of the work
9. What are the limitations on copyright as provided under Section 184.1 of the same Act.?
Sec. 184.1 Limitations on copyright. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter V, the
following acts shall not constitute infringement of copyright:
(a) the recitation or performance of a work, once it has been lawfully made accessible to the
public, if done privately and free of charge or if made strictly for a charitable or religious
institution or society; [Sec. 10(1), P.D. No. 49]
(b) The making of quotations from a published work if they are compatible with fair use and only
to the extent justified for the purpose, including quotations from newspaper articles and
periodicals in the form of press summaries; Provided, that the source and the name of the
author, if appearing on the work are mentioned; (Sec. 11 third par. P.D. 49)
(e) The inclusion of a work in a publication, broadcast, or other communication to the public,
sound recording of film, if such inclusion is made by way of illustration for teaching purposes
and is compatible with fair use: Provided, That the source and the name of the author, if
appearing in the work is mentioned.
10. How did the SC rule?
A copy of a piracy is an infringement of the original, and it is no defense that the pirate, in such
cases, did not know whether or not he was infringing any copyright; he at least knew that what
he was copying was not his, and he copied at his peril. In the case at bar, there is no question
that petitioners presented several pages of the books CET and DEP that more or less had the
same contents. It may be correct that the books being grammar books may contain materials
similar as to some technical contents with other grammar books, such as the segment about the
 "Author Card". However, the numerous pages that the petitioners presented showing similarity
in the style and the manner the books were presented and the identical examples can not pass
as similarities merely because of technical consideration.
In cases of infringement, copying alone is not what is prohibited. The copying must
produce an "injurious effect". Here, the injury consists in that respondent Robles lifted from
petitioners' book materials that were the result of the latter's research work and compilation
and misrepresented them as her own. She circulated the book DEP for commercial use did not
acknowledged petitioners as her source. Hence, there is a clear case of appropriation of
copyrighted work for her benefit that respondent Robles committed. Petitioners' work as
authors is the product of their long and assiduous research and for another to represent it as
her own is injury enough. In copyrighting books the purpose is to give protection to the
intellectual product of an author. This is precisely what the law on copyright protected, under
Section 184.1 (b). Quotations from a published work if they are compatible with fair use and
only to the extent justified by the purpose, including quotations from newspaper articles and
periodicals in the form of press summaries are allowed provided that the source and the name
of the author, if appearing on the work, are mentioned.

NBI-Microsoft Corporation vs Hwang et. al,

1. What is the gist of the controversy?

Microsoft learned that respondents were illegally copying and selling Microsoft software.
2. Who are the parties involved?
Microsoft (plaintiff/copyright and TM owner), Hwang et. al, (respondents)
3. What was the action filed?
Microsoft applied for search warrants against respondents in the Regional Trial Court
4. What was the respondents defense?
In their joint counter-affidavit, respondents Yvonne Keh ("respondent Keh") and Emily K. Chua
("respondent Chua") denied the charges against respondents. Respondents Keh and Chua
alleged that: (1) Microsoft’s real intention in filing the complaint under I.S. No. 96-193 was to
pressure Beltron to pay its alleged unpaid royalties, thus Microsoft should have filed a collection
suit instead of a criminal complaint; (2) TMTC bought the confiscated 59 boxes of MS-DOS CDs
from a Microsoft dealer in Singapore (R.R. Donnelly); (3) respondents are not the "source" of the
Microsoft Windows 3.1 software pre-installed in the CPU bought by Sacriz and Samiano, but
only of the MS-DOS software; (4) Microsoft’s alleged proof of purchase (receipt) for the 12 CD-
ROMs is inconclusive because the receipt does not indicate its source; and (5) respondents
Benito Keh, Jonathan K. Chua, Alfonso Chua, Alberto Chua, Judy K. Chua Hwang, Sophia Ong,
and Deanna Chua are stockholders of Beltron and TMTC in name only and thus cannot be held
criminally liable.
5. How did the RTC rule?
It partially granted the respondents motion
6. How did the CA rule?
The Court of Appeals granted Microsoft’s appeal and set aside the RTC Orders
7. What was the DOJ’s ruling?
 In its resolution it recommended the dismissal of Microsoft’s complaint for lack of merit and
insufficiency of evidence. State Prosecutor Ong also recommended the dismissal of Lotus
Corporation’s complaint for lack of interest to prosecute and for insufficiency of evidence.
8. Issue:
Whether or not the respondents are liable for violation of the copyright law
9. How was PD 49 given light in this case?
Section 5 of PD 49 ("Section 5") enumerates the rights vested exclusively on the copyright
owner. Contrary to the DOJ’s ruling, the gravamen of copyright infringement is not merely the
unauthorized "manufacturing" of intellectual works but rather the unauthorized performance of
any of the acts covered by Section 5. Hence, any person who performs any of the acts under
Section 5 without obtaining the copyright owner’s prior consent renders himself civilly and
criminally liable for copyright infringement. We held in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals:
Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by
the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or
piracy, which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists in the doing by any person,
without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is
conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright.
10. How did the SC rule?
Being the copyright and trademark owner of Microsoft software, Microsoft acted well within its
rights in filing the complaint. In relation thereto, the elements of unfair competition under
Article 189(1) of the Revised Penal Code are:
(a) That the offender gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of another
manufacturer or dealer;
(b) That the general appearance is shown in the (1) goods themselves, or in the (2) wrapping of
their packages, or in the (3) device or words therein, or in (4) any other feature of their
appearance;
(c) That the offender offers to sell or sells those goods or gives other persons a chance or
opportunity to do the same with a like purpose; and
(d) That there is actual intent to deceive the public or defraud a competitor.
The element of intent to deceive may be inferred from the similarity of the goods or their
appearance.
Hence, any person who performs any of the acts under Section 5 without obtaining the
copyright owner’s prior consent renders himself civilly40 and criminally liable for copyright
infringement.