EN BANC

[B.M. No. 914. October 1, 1999]

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly
elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the
question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to the
Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a
Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in
the Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in
Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated
September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must
submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following
documents:

1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the Professional Regulations
Commission showing that Ching is a certified public accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao, La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the
said place; and

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth E. Cerezo, showing that Ching was
elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992
synchronized elections.

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the
successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May
1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his
oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further
proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to
file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his
Philippine citizenship.

The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be
so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship[1] in strict compliance with
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the
Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen."
The OSG adds that (w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could
perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority."[2] In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2)
conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a)
the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election
must be made 'upon reaching the age of majority.[3] The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase
"upon reaching the age of majority:"

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after
reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years
(VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be
extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself
a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was
held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever
he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However,
due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the
standing rule on the construction of the phrase reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the
Philippine Bar.

On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine
Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:

1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;

2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school records and other
official document;

3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;

4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;

5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to
1995;

6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625;

7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a notary public;

8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
the Government of the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of
Tubao La Union, and

10.I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps 10.00) as filing fees.

Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is whether he
has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship
by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV,
Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and
an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child
elected Philippine citizenship.[4] This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973
Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines.[5] Likewise, this
recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that
"(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens.[6] It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and
1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as
having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935
Constitution.[7] If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains
subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced
before the effectivity of the new Constitution.[8]

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes
the procedure that should be followed in order to made a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under
Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by
expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election
should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon
reaching twenty-one (21) years.[9] In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the
validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the
decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper
period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department
of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made within a
"reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority.[10] The phrase reasonable time" has been
interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority.[11] However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice,[12] that the three (3) year period is
not an inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of
majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect
Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be
extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino.[13]

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not
indefinite:

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February
16,1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28)
years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said
election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority.[14]

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years
after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase upon reaching the
age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period
within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his
being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in
him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as
informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare,[15] the
pertinent portion of which reads:

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise
of the right of suffrage when he cane of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and
that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the
elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for
Philippine citizenship.[16]

Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very
different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born
before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the
requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing
Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since,
as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine
citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard,
the Court stated:

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act
would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S.
vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic,
L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino
divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.[17]

The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives,[18] where we held:

We have jurisprudence that defines 'election' as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]) the Court held that the exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court we held:

Esteban s exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes a positive act of Philippine
citizenship (p. 52: emphasis supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life
here in the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected Philippine
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.

xxx

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate
choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office
where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other
categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is
doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being
a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not
only have bean superfluous but would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect
Philippine citizenship?[19]

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the
special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines, all his life and his
consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with
the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine
citizenship. The span Of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority
until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the
contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has
offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of
the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and thereafter, file the same
with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot
be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient.[20] One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an
inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a
result, this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to
the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000]

CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ,
respondents.

DECISION

PURISIMA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the
herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998
elections for governor of Davao Oriental.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez,
an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.

On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in
Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a
candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao
Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by
her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as
ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent
had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition,
ratiocinating thus:

A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution shows that respondent
was able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late father... and
consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the
perorations of the petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding.
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no other evidence
substantial in nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of petitioner that respondent is an Australian
citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under
Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequence. The evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that
respondent contemplated renunciation of her Filipino citizenship.[1]

In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao
Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066
before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise
dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.

The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as
governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein
petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.

On July 17, 1998, the COMELECs First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the petition, and
disposing as follows:

Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the instant case on the
merits trying it de novo, the above table definitely shows that petitioner herein has presented no new
evidence to disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066. The present petition merely
restates the same matters and incidents already passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995
Resolution but likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth any new evidence and
matter substantial in nature, persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to compel reversal of
such Resolutions, the dismissal of the present petition follows as a matter of course.

xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issues tendered, We find no
convincing reason or impressive explanation to disturb and reverse the Resolutions promulgated by this
Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to
DISMISS the present petition.
SO ORDERED.[2]

Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but to no avail. The same
was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition; questioning the citizenship of
private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.

The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen
and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino
citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine
Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January
15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian
passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4)
furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring
her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.

Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing
reliance on the admitted facts that:

a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian
national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;

b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and

c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.

Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private respondent had
renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate of registration
and immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent expressly declared under oath that she was a
citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated to
disqualify her to run for elective office.

As regards the COMELECs finding that private respondent had renounced her Australian citizenship on
January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her
Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy here in
Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did not automatically restore the status of private
respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire
Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under
Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to public office did not mean the restoration
of her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled with her
alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively become a stateless
person and as such, is disqualified to run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.

Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the principle of res
judicata to the case under consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration,[3] that:

xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand. xxx

The petition is unmeritorious.

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows
the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the
doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome,
Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines
Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution
took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal
organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1,
1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands. The
Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:

SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the
Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens
of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall
have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)

The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:

SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could
become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.
(underscoring ours)

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899
and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents
father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced
by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws,
which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as
basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution
had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 1973[4] and 1987[5] Constitutions. Thus, the herein private
respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of
her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows
the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting
to her possession of dual citizenship.

Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen,
she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited
private respondents application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate
of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March
3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:

(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;

(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;

(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon
attaining twenty-one years of age or more;

(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;

(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;

(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of
war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and

(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her
husbands country, she acquires his nationality.

In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioners
contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her
Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC[6] and
in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.[7]

In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a
certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an
application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an
American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor
of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship.

Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian
passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of
citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively
result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.[8] As held by this court in the aforecited case
of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express
renunciation or repudiation of ones citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an
alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs.
Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the
same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino,
as well.

Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another
country has not been included as a ground for losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since private
respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that respondent must
go through the process of repatriation does not hold water.

Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual citizenship,
still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:

xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
Again, petitioners contention is untenable.

In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified dual citizenship as used in the Local
Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual
allegiance.[9] Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as
an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another
state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual
allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:

xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification.

Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from
running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is
enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.[10] The filing of a certificate of candidacy
sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.[11]
This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that
he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of
foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in
1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.

Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of
private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy
of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle
the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective,
petitioners claim that private respondent must go through the whole process of repatriation holds no
water.

Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative
proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any
subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration.[12] He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally
does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs.
Republic,[13] an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order
that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:

1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;

2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and

3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the
weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these
antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler.[14] Indeed,
there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-
066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The
evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior cases.
Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior
resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition
cannot prosper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and
January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao
Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., abroad on official business.

 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice
mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The
results of the election were as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894

Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275[1]

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification
filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,[2] the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of
Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the
ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The COMELECs Second Division said:

What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano
as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is
based on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of
Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered as a
foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged
that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was
born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an
American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not
lose his Filipino citizenship.

Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and a US
citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.

The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which he filed
his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?

Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective local position.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED
as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.

On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.[3] The motion remained
pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.

Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board
of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of
the winner.

On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.[4] Petitioners motion
was opposed by private respondent.

The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its
resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling
of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.[5] The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en
banc read:

As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He
acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of
jus soli.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father
and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the
Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien
with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,
however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.

It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a
voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship
under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.

At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7,
1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among the
candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty
three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand
eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959)
votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275)
votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be
embroiled in complex legal issues involving private international law which may well be settled before
the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).

WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division, adopted
on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the respondents certificate of candidacy.

We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position
of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice to the
parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning
candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of August
31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and
to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner
contends that

[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:

A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:

1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already 37 years
old; and,

2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;

C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May
1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming
that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano whether
petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the
case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioners motion for leave to intervene
granted.

I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC in
support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set
aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:

Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed to initiate an
action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by the
Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so
situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.

....

Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the

Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and
whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.

Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an
interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who]
cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately
disqualified by final and executory judgment.

The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election
for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to
private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly,
petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he
sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,[6] reiterated in several cases,[7] only applies to cases
in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed
second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time
petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998, there had been no
proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was precisely to have private respondent
disqualified from running for [an] elective local position under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril
(who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was
competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of
Makati City.

Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention
only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number
of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of
the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election
if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.

The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for intervention was tantamount to a
denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en
banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial
of petitioners motion for intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting private
respondents alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.

This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual
citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as disqualified from running for any elective local position:
. . . (d) Those with dual citizenship. This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati.[8]

Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with him in
this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has command[ed] in
explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office.

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of
the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states.[9] For instance, such a situation may arise when a person
whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his
part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of
our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus
soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers
country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be
also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional
provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individuals volition.

With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This provision was included in the 1987
Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows:[10]

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have circulated a
memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual allegiance - and I reiterate a dual
allegiance - is larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom
intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or
of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.

What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the problem of
dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of
Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country.
There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese
community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently,
the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the Peoples Republic of China, they have the Associated
Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and
Latin countries were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction.
At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council.

When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of
citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a second allegiance,
either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners
yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of
thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about
minority claims on our natural resources.

Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and
this is already happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned,
owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow
when we have to endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.

And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new section,
probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS
INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.

In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual allegiance,
thus:[11]

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in the sense
that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a
freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution
and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in
terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to
the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the
concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result
of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to
Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a
foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun
Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double
citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and
national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a
future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the security of this
country, arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double
allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in
effect, or regulate double citizenship?

Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not
with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in
R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere
dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with
dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is
the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the
most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: [D]ual citizenship is just a
reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We
recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country
is something completely beyond our control.[12]

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be
that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d) between
Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:[13]

SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: Any person with dual
citizenship is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr.
President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-
born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the
age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.

On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or
her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the
person to run for a local government position?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want
to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.

SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the country
of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are such
countries in the world.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an
election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under the
Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt
act to claim the citizenship.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemans example, if he
does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really
interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: I am a Filipino
citizen, and I have only one citizenship.

SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always
have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the
Republic.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also
acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.

This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty[14] of which at the time he is a subject or
citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v.
Republic,[15] it was held:

[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to
any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether
such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the
province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by
the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization
Law, we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what
a foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by
all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the
people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955,
of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States
follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the
Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in
Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent effectively renounced his U.S.
citizenship under American law, so that now he is solely a Philippine national.

Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient
evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private
respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached
the age of majority.

In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American citizenship,
the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which
provided that A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall
lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an
election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. To be sure this provision was
declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk[16] as beyond the power given
to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he
ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his
American citizenship. Private respondents certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained
the following statements made under oath:

6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR NATURALIZED) NATURAL-BORN

....

10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY
OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .

11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT
I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED
AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON
MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY
THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.

The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was
held:[17]

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his
repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code
would disqualify him from running for any elective local position? We answer this question in the
negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said
oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo
wrote that he had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship-long before May 8,
1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim-when he abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath
of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995.
Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have
not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are
conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private
respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his American citizenship.
Equally without merit is petitioners contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been
made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of
Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.

Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an American
citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he
used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of
his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be
considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC[18] applies mutatis mutandis to private
respondent in the case at bar:

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that
he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he
Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of
both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship;
truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the
renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be express, it stands to reason that there can be
no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either express or implied.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution
of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should
he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,[19] we sustained the
denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some
act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., on leave.

Pardo, J., no part.

 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 183110 October 7, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.

AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of
its citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of allegiance among the members
of the family."1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assails the May 23, 2008 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
G.R. CV No. 00523, which affirmed the January 31, 2005 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 29, Zamboanga del Sur that granted the Petition for Naturalization5 of respondent Azucena
Saavedra Batuigas (Azucena).

Factual Antecedents
On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur.
The case was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 03-001 and raffled to Branch 29 of said court.

Azucena alleged in her Petition that she believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution;
that she has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the period of her stay in
the Philippines, as well as in her relations with the constituted Government and with the community in
which she is living; that she has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire to
learn and embrace their customs, traditions, and ideals; that she has all the qualifications required
under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
473 (CA473);6 that she is not opposed to organized government nor is affiliated with any association or
group of persons that uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; that she is not
defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the
success and predominance of men’s ideas; that she is neither a polygamist nor believes in polygamy;
that the nation of which she is a subject is not at war with the Philippines; that she intends in good faith
to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity
to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and that she will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the time of the filing of her Petition up to the time of her
naturalization.

After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 97 of CA 473had been complied with, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss8 on the ground that Azucena failed to
allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade. Finding the grounds
relied upon by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said Motion.9 Thereafter, the
hearing for the reception of Azucena’s evidence was then set on May 18, 2004.10

Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor appeared on the day of the hearing. Hence,
Azucena’s counsel moved that the evidence be presented ex-parte, which the RTC granted. Accordingly,
the RTC designated its Clerk of Court as Commissioner to receive Azucena’s evidence.11 During the
November 5, 2004 ex-parte hearing, no representative from the OSG appeared despite due notice.12

Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents,13 Azucena has never
departed the Philippines since birth. She has resided in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur from 1941-1942;
in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur from 1942-1968; in Bogo City for nine months; in Ipil, Zamboanga
del Sur from 1969-1972; in Talisayan, Misamis Oriental from 1972-1976; and, in Margosatubig,
Zamboanga del Sur, thereafter, up to the filing of her Petition.
Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary, secondary, and tertiary
education were taken in Philippine schools,i.e., Margosatubig Central Elementary School in 1955,14
Margosatubig Academy in1959,15 and the Ateneo de Zamboanga in 1963,16 graduating with a degree in
Bachelor of Science in Education. She then practiced her teaching profession at the Pax High School for
five years, in the Marian Academy in Ipil for two years, and in Talisayan High School in Misamis Oriental
for another two years.17

In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas18 (Santiago),a natural-born Filipino
citizen.19 They have five children, namely Cynthia, Brenda, Aileen, Dennis Emmanuel, and Edsel
James.20 All of them studied in Philippine public and private schools and are all professionals, three of
whom are now working abroad.21

After her stint in Talisayan High School, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the
retail business of and later on in milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of their income,
Azucena submitted their joint annual tax returns and balance sheets from 2000-200222 and from 2004-
2005.23 The business name and the business permits issued to the spouses’ store, ‘Azucena’s General
Merchandising,’ are registered in Santiago’s name,24 and he is also the National Food Authority licensee
for their rice and corn business.25 During their marital union, the Batuigas spouses bought parcels of
land in Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig.26

To prove that she has no criminal record, Azucena submitted clearances issued by the Philippine
National Police of Zamboanga del Sur Provincial Office and by the National Bureau of Investigation.27
She also presented her Health Examination Record28 declaring her as physically and mentally fit.

To further support Azucena’s Petition, Santiago and witnesses Eufemio Miniao and Irineo Alfaro
testified.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On January 31, 2005, the RTC found that Azucena has amply supported the allegations in her Petition.
Among these are her lack of a derogatory record, her support for an organized government, that she is
in perfect health, that she has mingled with Filipinos since birth and can speak their language, that she
has never had any transgressions and has been a law abiding citizen, that she has complied with her
obligations to the government involving her business operations, and that the business and real
properties she and Santiago own provide sufficient income for her and her family. Thus, the RTC ruled:

x x x In sum, the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to be admitted as
citizen of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of the Naturalization Law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted.

SO ORDERED.29

In its Omnibus Motion,30 the OSG argued that the ex-parte presentation of evidence before the Branch
Clerk of Court violates Section 10 of CA 473,31 as the law mandates public hearing in naturalization
cases.

Rejecting this argument in its March 21, 2005 Order,32 the RTC held that the public has been fully
apprised of the naturalization proceedings and was free to intervene. The OSG and its delegate, the
Provincial Prosecutor, are the only officers authorized by law to appear on behalf of the State, which
represents the public. Thus, when the OSG was furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing for the
reception of evidence ex-parte, there was already a sufficient compliance with the requirement of a
public hearing.

The OSG then appealed the RTC judgment to the CA,33 contending that Azucena failed to comply with
the income requirement under CA 473. The OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed under the
Retail Trade Law (Republic Act No. 1180) to engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade. Hence, she
cannot possibly meet the income requirement. And even if she is allowed, her business is not a
"lucrative trade" within the contemplation of the law or that which has an appreciable margin of income
over expenses in order to provide for adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work. The OSG likewise disputed Azucena’s claim that she owns real property because aliens
are precluded from owning lands in the country.

The OSG further asserted that the ex-parte proceeding before the commissioner is not a "public
hearing" as ex-parte hearings are usually done in chambers, without the public in attendance. It claimed
that the State was denied its day in court because the RTC, during the May 18, 2004 initial hearing,
immediately allowed the proceeding to be conducted ex-parte without even giving the State ample
opportunity to be present.

Azucena countered that although she is a teacher by profession, she had to quit to help in the retail
business of her husband, and they were able to send all their children to school.34 It is highly unlikely
that she will become a public charge as she and her spouse have enough savings and could even be
given sufficient support by their children. She contended that the definition of "lucrative trade/income"
should not be strictly applied to her. Being the wife and following Filipino tradition, she should not be
treated like male applicants for naturalization who are required to have their own "lucrative trade."

Azucena denied that the hearing for her Petition was not made public, as the hearing before the Clerk of
Court was conducted in the court’s session hall. Besides, the OSG cannot claim that it was denied its day
in court as notices have always been sent to it. Hence, its failure to attend is not the fault of the RTC.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In dismissing the OSG’s appeal,35 the CA found that Azucena’s financial condition permits her and her
family to live with reasonable comfort in accordance with the prevailing standard of living and
consistent with the demands of human dignity. It said:

Considering the present high cost of living, which cost of living tends to increase rather than decrease,
and the low purchasing power of the Philippine currency, petitioner-appellee, together with her Filipino
husband, nonetheless, was able to send all her children to college, pursue a lucrative business and
maintain a decent existence. The Supreme Court, in recent decisions, adopted a higher standard in
determining whether a petitioner for Philippine citizenship has a lucrative trade or profession that
would qualify him/her for admission to Philippine citizenship and to which petitioner has successfully
convinced this Court of her ability to provide for herself and avoid becoming a public charge or a
financial burden to her community. x x x36

As for the other issue the OSG raised, the CA held that the RTC had complied with the mandate of the
law requiring notice to the OSG and the Provincial Prosecutor of its scheduled hearing for the Petition.
Thus, the instant Petition wherein the OSG recapitulates the same arguments it raised before the CA,
i.e., the alleged failure of Azucena to meet the income and public hearing requirements of CA 473.

Our Ruling

The Petition lacks merit.

Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization
under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative
Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien
women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:

"any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines."

Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto
Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications for
naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial
naturalization. Copying from similar laws in the United States which has since been amended, the
Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473, which then reflects its intent to confer Filipino
citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative naturalization.37

Thus, the Court categorically declared in Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration:38

Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that
under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said
Section 4.39
As stated in Moy Ya Lim Yao, the procedure for an alien wife to formalize the conferment of Filipino
citizenship is as follows:

Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to
acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The
alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging,
among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from
acquiring her husband’s citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the
petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups
disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen x x x, the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or
denying the petition.40

Records however show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No.
03070541 by reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID granted her application. However, the
Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it found no sufficient evidence that Azucena’s
husband is a Filipino citizen42 as only their marriage certificate was presented to establish his
citizenship.

Having been denied of the process in the CID, Azucena was constrained to file a Petition for judicial
naturalization based on CA 473. While this would have been unnecessary if the process at the CID was
granted in her favor, there is nothing that prevents her from seeking acquisition of Philippine citizenship
through regular naturalization proceedings available to all qualified foreign nationals. The choice of
what option to take in order to acquire Philippine citizenship rests with the applicant. In this case,
Azucena has chosen to file a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. The fact that her
application for derivative naturalization under Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not prevent her
from seeking judicial naturalization under the same law. It is to be remembered that her application at
the CID was denied not because she was found to be disqualified, but because her husband’s citizenship
was not proven. Even if the denial was based on other grounds, it is proper, in a judicial naturalization
proceeding, for the courts to determine whether there are in fact grounds to deny her of Philippine
citizenship based on regular judicial naturalization proceedings.

As the records before this Court show, Santiago’s Filipino citizenship has been adequately proven. Under
judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth certificate indicating therein that he and his parents are
Filipinos. He also submitted voter’s registration, land titles, and business registrations/licenses, all of
which are public records. He has always comported himself as a Filipino citizen, an operative fact that
should have enabled Azucena to avail of Section 15 of CA473. On the submitted evidence, nothing
would show that Azucena suffers from any of the disqualifications under Section 4 of the same Act.

However, the case before us is a Petition for judicial naturalization and is not based on Section 15 of CA
473 which was denied by the then Ministry of Justice. The lower court which heard the petition and
received evidence of her qualifications and absence of disqualifications to acquire Philippine citizenship,
has granted the Petition, which was affirmed by the CA. We will not disturb the findings of the lower
court which had the opportunity to hear and scrutinize the evidence presented during the hearings on
the Petition, as well as determine, based on Azucena’s testimony and deportment during the hearings,
that she indeed possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship.

The OSG has filed this instant Petition on the ground that Azucena does not have the qualification
required in no. 4 of Section 2 of CA 473 as she does not have any lucrative income, and that the
proceeding in the lower court was not in the nature of a public hearing. The OSG had the opportunity to
contest the qualifications of Azucena during the initial hearing scheduled on May 18, 2004.However, the
OSG or the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor failed to appear in said hearing, prompting the lower
court to order ex parte presentation of evidence before the Clerk of Court on November 5, 2004. The
OSG was also notified of the ex parte proceeding, but despite notice, again failed to appear. The OSG
had raised this same issue at the CA and was denied for the reasons stated in its Decision. We find no
reason to disturb the findings of the CA on this issue. Neither should this issue further delay the grant of
Philippine citizenship to a woman who was born and lived all her life, in the Philippines, and devoted all
her life to the care of her Filipino family. She has more than demonstrated, under judicial scrutiny, her
being a qualified Philippine citizen. On the second issue, we also affirm the findings of the CA that since
the government who has an interest in, and the only one who can contest, the citizenship of a person,
was duly notified through the OSG and the Provincial Prosecutor’s office, the proceedings have complied
with the public hearing requirement under CA 473.

No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as qualification to become a Philippine citizen:

4. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine
currency, or must have known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.
Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her profession before she had to quit her
teaching job to assume her family duties and take on her role as joint provider, together with her
husband, in order to support her family. Together, husband and wife were able to raise all their five
children, provided them with education, and have all become professionals and responsible citizens of
this country. Certainly, this is proof enough of both husband and wife’s lucrative trade. Azucena herself
is a professional and can resume teaching at anytime. Her profession never leaves her, and this is more
than sufficient guarantee that she will not be a charge to the only country she has known since birth.

Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an
alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family members, thus:

It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a husband
should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different
from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband’s interests in property and business activities
reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife,
nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such
interests. Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition, and we
submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where the wife suffers
from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law.43

We are not unmindful of precedents to the effect that there is no proceeding authorized by the law or
by the Rules of Court, for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual.44 "Such judicial
declaration of citizenship cannot even be decreed pursuant to an alternative prayer therefor in a
naturalization proceeding."45

This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship but rather a Petition
for judicial naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and
asks a court to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the second, the petitioner
acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege of be coming a
Philippine citizen based on requirements required under CA 473.Azucena has clearly proven, under strict
judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this Court will not stand in the
way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 23, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 00523 which affirmed the January 31,2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29,
Zamboanga del Sur that granted the Petition for Naturalization, is hereby

AFFIRMED. Subject to compliance with the period and the requirements under Republic Act No.
530which supplements the Revised Naturalization Law, let a Certificate of Naturalization be issued to
AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS after taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Thereafter, her Alien Certificate of Registration should be cancelled.

SO ORDERED.