In re: Cunanan
requisites for the practice of the law that should be
Resolution Cunanan, et. al
18 March 1954
FACTS:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar
of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino
Cunanan et. al petitioners.
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so
much public interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly
known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a
candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave
of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any
subject, although for the past few exams the passing
grades were changed depending on the strictness of the
correcting of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947-
69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 – 75%).
Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law
as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and
feeling that they have been discriminated against,
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a
few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar
went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill
no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was
given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the
senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill
then became law on June 21, 1953
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its
author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is
contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who had inadequate preparation for the
practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure
in the exams.
ISSUES:
Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have
on the legal profession and the administration of
justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is
CONSTITUTIONAL.
An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital
developed constantly and maintained firmly.
The Judicial system from which ours has been derived,
the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and
reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession is concededly judicial.
The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and
the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the admission
to the practice of law. The primary power and
responsibility which the constitution recognizes
continue to reside in this court.
Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the
law seeks to “cure” are not the rules set in place by the
S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the
court, and this power is not included in the power
granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively
w/in the judiciary.
Reasons for Unconstitutionality:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the
constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of
the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in
attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter,
and supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since
the rules made by congress must elevate the profession,
and those rules promulgated are considered the bare
minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the
law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and
being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the
entire law is void.
HELD:
Under the authority of the court:
1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the
said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and
w/o force and effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations
subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is
valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the
candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are
denied, and all the candidates who in the examination
of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a
grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as
having passed whether they have filed petitions for
admissions or not.)
IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as
the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was,
“An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations
from 1946 up to and including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no
grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who
obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed
to have already passed that subject and the
grade/grades shall be included in the computation of
the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional?
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal
defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As
per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers
of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes
a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also
struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to
take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are
not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared
unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was
declared in force and effect. The portion that was
stricken down was based under the following reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission
who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate
preparation due to the fact that this was very close to
the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution
of the court on the petitions of the said candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary
prerogative to determine who may be admitted to
practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative
power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of
Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this
power are only minimum norms, not designed to
substitute the judgment of the court on who can
practice law; and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to
class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court
could not muster enough votes to declare it void.
Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in
1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court
resolutions denying admission to the bar of an
petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the
power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules
of admission to the practice of law.
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU),
Enrique Entila and Victoriano Tenazas vs. Binalbagan
Isabela Sugar Company, Court of Industrial Relations
and Quintin Muning
FACTS:
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ORDERED
REINSTATEMENT WITH BACKWAGES FOR ENTILA AND
TENAZAS.
Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of Entila and Tenazas
filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the
total backwages.
i. Entila and Tenazas filed manifestation indicating
their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for
25% of their backwages
ii. Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of
Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the
backwages.
1. Opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground
that he is not a lawyer.
a. Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the
backwages as compensation for professional services
rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:
i. Cipriano 10%
ii. Quintin Muning 10%
iii. Atanacio Pacis 5%
iii. CANON 34: condemns an agreement providing for
the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer
union president is allowed to share in said fees with
lawyers
1. Sec 5(b) of RA 875 that —No justification for a
ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in
the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a
lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees
a. Duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer
to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of
the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of
evidence.
b. Representation should be exclusively entrusted to
duly qualified members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member does not entitle the
representative to compensation for such
representation.
Sec 24, Rule 138 Compensation of attorney's agreement
as to fees:
i. An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services.
a. Petition to take the Bar Exam in 1960 after failing in
the 1959 Bar Examination.
b. His uncle, TAPEL, opposed the petition alleging that
his nephew is not a person of good moral character for
having misrepresented, sometime in 1950, when he was
16 years old, that he was eligible for 3rd year high
school by utilizing the school records of his cousin and
name-sake, Juan M. Publico.
ii. PUBLICO has not completed Grade 4
iii. Tapel instituted an administrative case
against his nephew for falsification of school records or
credentials.
PUBLICO PASSED THE BAR, took the lawyer's oath, and
signed the Roll of Attorneys.
Legal Officer-Investigator, Ricardo Paras, Jr.,
investigated and reported:
September 1961, Dulcisimo Tapel dropped the
complaint on the ground that his witnesses had turned
hostile.
i. Motion denied, his witnesses had already testified.
Recommended PUBLICO’s name to be stricken off the
roll of attorneys.
i. Respondent falsified his school records
ii. Thereby violating the provisions of Sections 5 and 6,
Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, which require
completion by a bar examinee or candidate of the
prescribed courses in elementary, high, pre-law and law
school, prior to his admission to the practice of law.
11 years later, PUBLICO filed a Petition for
Reinstatement alleging that he had never received, for
had he been informed, nor did he have any knowledge
of the Resolution of the Court ordering the Bar Division
to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
He was advised to inquire into the outcome of the
disbarment case against him.
He resigned from all his positions in public and private
offices, and transferred to Manila.
Prayed that Court allow reinstatement taking into
consideration his exemplary conduct from the time he
became a lawyer, his services to the community the
numerous awards, resolutions and/'or commendations
he received,
i. Court denied the Petition.
ii. Petitioner moved for reconsideration was
denied by the Court for lack of merit.
5th plea avers that his enrollment in Third Year High
School in Manila was through the initiative of his uncle,
Dulcisimo B. Tapel who accompanied him to school and
enrolled him in a grade level above his qualifications in
spite of his demonstrations
i. Misrepresentation committed was
precipitated by his uncle; that being merely 16 year old,
he could not be expected to act with discernment as he
was still under the influence of his uncle, who later on
caused his disbarment
ii. No opposition has been filed to any of the
petitions.
ISSUE:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal
services rendered?
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a
lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided in
the present petition.
WON a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees
which are deductible from the backpay of some of its
members. YES.
It was PAFLU that moved for an extension of time to file
the present petition for review; union members Entila
and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were
included as petitioners in the present petition. Their
inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.
HELD:
ORDERS UNDER REVIEW ARE SET ASIDE AS THEY ARE
AWARDED 10% OF BACKWAGES AS ATTORNEY’S FEES
FOR MUNING. COSTS AGAINST MUNING.
Lawyer-client relationship is only possible if one is a
lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot
establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique
Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he
cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees.
Public policy demands that legal work in representation
of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those
possessing tested qualifications, for the ethics of the
profession and for the protection of courts, clients and
the public.
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession
should not be violated:
Acting as an attorney with authority constitutes
contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both,
Law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit
of an act or an act done in violation of law
If were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the
public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in
case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic
condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not
amenable to disciplinary measures.
In response to UNION may appeal an award of
attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay
of some of its members:
YES because such union or labor organization is
permitted to institute an action in the industrial court
on behalf of its members
If an award is disadvantageous to its members, the
union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party,
under Sec 6, RA 875:
i. Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases —
Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any
order of the Court may appeal to the
Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Usually, individual unionist is not in a position to bear
the financial burden of litigations.
A layman should confine his work to non-adversary
contentions. He should not undertake purely legal
work such as the examination or cross-examination of
witnesses or the presentation of evidence.
Villegas v. Legaspi G.R. No. L-53869 March 25, 1982
RAUL A. VILLEGAS, petitioner,
ASSEMBLYMAN VALENTINO L. LEGASPI respondents.
FACTS
L-53869
Assemblyman Valentino Legaspi a member of the
Batasang Pambansa from the province of Cebu, took
part as counsel of Vera Cruz in the case filed by Raul A.
Villegas (petitioner) v. Vera Cruz (respondent). Villegas
”challenged” the appearance of the Assemblyman on
the ground that he is barred under the Constitution
from appearing before Courts of First Instance.
L-51928
On a separate case filed in Pasig, Assemblyman
Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel
for Excelsior in the case of Edgardo P. Reyes v. N.V.
Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De Maas and
Eustaquio T.C. Acero. The appearance of Assemblyman
Fernandez was questioned on the ground that it was
barred by Sec. 11, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether or not members of the Batasang Pambansa,
like Attorneys Valentino L. Legaspi and Estanislao A.
Fernandez, can appear as counsel before Courts of First
Instance.
And What constitutes 'appearance as an advocate,"
Held
Under Section 17, Article VI of the 1935 Charter, it was
provided that members of the Commission on
Appointments shall not ""appear as counsel before any
Court inferior to a collegiate Court of appellate
jurisdiction." The intent was clear that members of the
Commission on Appointments shall not "appear as
counsel before any Court inferior to a collegiate Court
of appellate jurisdiction."
U nder Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution,
the scope of the prohibition was expanded to embrace
all members of the National Assembly who were barred
from "appear(ing) as counsel before any Court without
appellate jurisdiction."
'The prohibition against appearing as counsel is
necessary because of the under influence which
members of Congress enjoy when they practice before
the Courts and especially before administrative
agencies.
The objective of the prohibition, then and now, is
clearly to remove any possibility of undue influence
upon the administration of justice, to eliminate the
possible use of office for personal gain, to ensure
impartiality in trials and thus preserve the
independence of the Judiciary
Since the respective Courts of First Instance, before
which Assemblymen Legaspi and Fernandez appeared
as counsel, were acting in the exercise of original and
not appellate jurisdiction, they must be held barred
from appearing as counsel before said Courts in the two
cases involved herein.
"The inability to practice as counsel ... should be part of
the sacrifices entailed in running for the position of
lawmaker.
WHEREFORE, granting the Writs prayed for, the Order
issued on February 27, 1980 by the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch II, in Civil Case No. R-18857, is
hereby set aside, and Attorneys Estanislao A. Fernandez
and Valentino Legaspi hereby declared prohibited from
appearing as counsel before the Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, in Civil Case No. 33739, and
before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, in
Civil Case No. r-18857, respectively. The Restraining
Order issued heretofore in L-53869 is hereby made
permanent.
Mejia vs Reyes [A.C. No. 378. March 30, 1962]
Ponente: PADILLA, J.
FACTS:
Francisco S. Reyes, a practicing lawyer, was appointed
bank attorney and notary public for the Baguio Branch
of the Philippine National Bank. While still holding such
position his professional services were engaged by Jose
G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera, residents of Baguio City,
to bring an action in court against the Philippine
National Bank and the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation (now the Development Bank of the
Philippines) as successor-in-interest of the defunct
Agricultural and Industrial Bank for the cancellation of a
mortgage on a parcel of land situated in Baguio City.
Complainants Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera allege
that they had desired to take an appeal from the
judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Baguio but did not, upon the respondent’s advice; that
thereafter for the first time they learned that the
respondent was counsel and notary public of the Baguio
Branch of the Philippine National Bank; that his
representing them against the Philippine National Bank,
in whose Baguio Branch he was bank attorney and
notary public, without revealing to them such
connection with the Bank, constitutes malpractice; and
pray this Court to disbar him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Atty. Reyes is guilty of malpractice
and should be disbarred.
HELD:
YES. But the malpractice committed is not so serious.
Respondent was just admonished and warned not to
repeat it.
RATIO:
Lawyers are prohibited from representing conflicting
interests in a case. The respondent’s act of appearing
and acting as counsel for the complainants Jose G.
Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera in the civil case against the
Philippine National Bank, that had appointed him bank
attorney and notary public, constitutes malpractice.
However, it does not appear satisfactorily proven that
during the pendency of their case the complaints did
not know of the respondents connection with the bank
as attorney and notary public. Evidence shows that the
Philippine National Bank knew that the respondent was
appearing as counsel for the complainants, yet it did not
revoke or cancel his appointment as bank attorney and
notary public.
PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company
(GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK
had extended considerable financial support to
Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur
daily overdrawings on its current account with Central
Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to
recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued
a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to
resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors
and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A
public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where
Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor
General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI
praying for the assistance and supervision of the court
in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After
EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to
recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres
Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this
mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution
against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued
several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by them by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos.
The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are
represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General
Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with
Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol
Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in
the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently
acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently
became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to
disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment
in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to
disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the
existence of an inconsistency between respondent
Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present
employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs
recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The
prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in the said service.”
HELD:
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest”
aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is
conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he
acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents
et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still
the issue of whether there exists a “congruent-interest
conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza
from representing respondents et. al. The key is
unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the metes and
bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter.
Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of
respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at
bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed
with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court
held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on
the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter”
contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in
stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations and
laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts
which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter”
and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had
nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to
liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the
sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the
liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the
sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the
PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of
banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza
because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter
involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes
and bounds of the “intervention”. The applicable
meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional
Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power
to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to
be remedied by the Code do not exist where the
government lawyer does not act which can be
considered as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing,
or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of
law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza
is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions
that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of
GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of
justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in
determining the claims of creditors. In such a
proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the
usual court litigator protecting the interest of
government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is
denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once held public
office or having been in the public employ, should not
after his retirement accept employment in connection
with any matter which he has investigated or passed
upon while in such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from
using his public position as a vehicle to promote or
advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure
on certain matters in which he intervened as a public
official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically
applicable to lawyers who once held public office.” A
plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a
lawyer who once served in the government and 2.
relates to his accepting “engagement or employment”
in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the service.
Abella vs. Cruzabra
A.C. No. 5688 June 4, 2009
Facts:
Complainant Felipe E. Abella filed a complaint for
violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No.
6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees against respondent Atty.
Asteria E. Cruzabra. In his affidavit-complaint,
complainant charged respondent with engaging in
private practice of law while employed in the
government service.
Respondent was appointed at the Register of Deeds
of General Santos City. During her term of office, she
applied for a notarial commission and notarized 3, 000
documents. These acts were performed by respondent,
without obtaining a permission from the Secretary of
Justice.
Respondent invoke good faith as her defense.
Respondent insists that she cannot be punish because
she was given permission by her senior officer to
notarize. In fact, one of the agreement in her
appointment letter was that she will not imposed
charges on papers from their office that needs
notarization. Moreover, respondent argued that she is
new in the legal profession and she does know the
intricacies thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent's act merits disciplinary
action?
Ruling:
Yes, as per Civil Service rules, the authority to grant
permission to any official or employee shall be granted
by the head of the ministry or agency in accordance
with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service
Rules, which provides:
"Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly
in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or
industrial undertaking without a written permission
from the head of Department; Provided, That this
prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers
and employees whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, the
time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed
by the chief of the agency to the end that it will not
impair in any way the efficiency of the other officer or
employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer
or employee, which do not involve any real or apparent
conflict between his private interests and public duties,
or in any way influence him in the discharge of his
duties, and he shall not take part in the management of
the enterprise or become an officer or member of the
board of directors",
Subject to any additional conditions which the head
of the office deems necessary in each particular case in
the interest of the service, as expressed in the various
issuances of the Civil Service Commission.
It is clear in this case that when respondent filed her
petition for commission as a notary public, she did not
obtain a written permission from the Secretary of the
DOJ. Respondent’s superior, the Register of Deeds,
cannot issue any authorization because he is not the
head of the Department. And even assuming that the
Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent failed to
present any proof of that written permission.
Respondent cannot feign ignorance or good faith
because respondent filed her petition for commission as
a notary public after Memorandum Circular No. 17 was
issued in 1986.
Thus, under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service, engaging in the private practice of
profession, when unauthorized, is classified as a light
offense punishable by reprimand.
Wherefore, we find Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra guilty of
engaging in notarial practice without the written
authority from the Secretary of the Department of
Justice, and accordingly we REPRIMAND her. She is
warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in
the future shall merit a more severe sanction.
People vs. Villanueva
14 SCRA 109 (1965)
FACTS:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos,
Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the crime of
Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace
Court of said municipality. Said accused was
represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced
by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case
was represented by City AttorneyAriston Fule of San
Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private-
prosecutor, after securing the permission of the
Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as
such, was that every time he would appear at the trial
of the case, he would be considered on official leave of
absence, and that he would not receive any payment
for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as
private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for
the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the isolated appearance of Atty. Fule as
private prosecutor constitutes practice of law?
RULING:
No. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice
of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended
party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his
services or that his appearance was in a professional
capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of Sail Pablo he had
no control or intervention whatsoever in the
prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of
Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal
cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attorney of
San Pablo. As such, there could be no possible conflict in
the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule us Assistant
City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in
this criminal case. Furthermore, the isolated
appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute
private practice, within the meaning and contemplation
of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's
self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services. Thus, the appearance as
counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the private practice of
law. And, it has never been refuted that City Attorney
Fule had been given permission by his immediate
supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the
complaint in the case at bar who is a relative. Decision
affirmed.