MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS

Facts:
The Marcos family sought to return to the Philippines after their three years exile in
Hawaii. But President Cory Aquino issued an order to respondent Secretary of Foreign
Affairs to stop the issuance of travel documents to the former first family. The petitioner
assert their right of movement and freedom of abode provided under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
They also contend that the President has no power under the constitution in making such
decision.
This is a petition asking the Court to allow the petitioners’ return and to enjoin the
President’s order in refusing to issue their travel documents.
Issues:
 Whether or not the return of the Marcoses is a right guaranteed under international
law.
 Whether or not President Aquino’s decision in prohibiting the return of the Marcos
family is granted under the Constitution under the powers given to the executive.
Decision:
Yes. The rights provided in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights only pertain to right of movement within and to
leave from one’s country. The right to return to one’s country or, alternatively, enter a
particular country is of a distinct right and an independent discussion.
Although such power was not mentioned in Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution which
provides, among others, the power to control all executive departments; grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons; etc., it cannot be said to be limited to such. For it is a well
establish rule whatever inherent powers of the government that is not legislative nor
judicial, may belong to the executive.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS

Facts:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, the Government Insurance
Service System (GSIS) conducted a public bidding of selling 30% - 51% of the shares of
Manila Hotel Corporation. Only two bidders contended, the Manila Prince Hotel, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% or 15,300,000 shares at P41.48 each. While the
other, Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm which bid for the same number of share but at
P44.00 which is P2.42 higher than Manila Prince Hotel’s.
Meanwhile, prior to the declaration of Renong Berhad as winner, its competitor matched
the winning bid and sent a manager’s check as bid security but GSIS refused to accept
it.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution, stating that at least 60% of
ownership of company investments shall be reserved to Filipino citizens. That the
Congress shall even encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital
is wholly owned by Filipinos.
However, respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and
requires implementing legislation(s).

Issues:
 Whether or not Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is self-executory.
 Whether or not GSIS committed grave abused of discretion in refusing the matching
bid of the petitioner.

Decision:
Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without
the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to
match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other
ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement,
regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the
Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while
there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting
that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
(Rephrase)

LAMBINO VS COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the
petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the
constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art
6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the
present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary.
COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions
and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement
the initiative petitions.
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL
TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?

Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to the Lambino Group’s petition.
Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements
for conducting a people’s initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave
abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on Direct Proposal by the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the
time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading”
which renders the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and
“revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may
propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive
is a radical change, therefore constitutes a revision.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present
petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution
before complying with RA 6735.
Petition is dismissed.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA) is assailed on its constitutionality. This
document prepared by the joint efforts of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace
Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached between both parties and
the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland.

Issue:
When the Executive Department pronounced to abandon the MOA, is the issue of its
constitutionality merely moot and academic and therefore no longer justiciable by the
Court?

Held:
Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into effect.
The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more
than a piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor
be capable of violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all other
oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer present an actual
case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this Court.
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion
of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching
on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy
admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an
opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the
great public interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and not
of public opinion. The power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and existent
dispute, it is not for allaying fears or addressing public clamor. In acting on supposed
abuses by other branches of government, the Court must be careful that it is not
committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of constitutional law.

CO KIM CHAM VS TAN KEH

FACTS
Co Kim Cham had a pending civil case initiated during the Japanese occupation with the
CFI of Manila. After the liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, respondent
Judge Dizon refused to continue hearings, saying that a proclamation issued by General
Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments
of the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines.

ISSUES
I. Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings made under Japanese occupation
were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation.
II. Whether or not it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the American Forces
to annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts established
in the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation.
III. Whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth have jurisdiction to continue now the
proceedings in actions pending in the courts at the time the Philippine Islands were
reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino forces

HELD
I
AFFIRMATIVE. [A]ll acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good and valid. If [the governments established
in these Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic
of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto
governments], the judicial acts and proceedings of those governments remain good and
valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces.
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it
necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those
governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue
of the well-known principle of postliminy in international law, remained good and valid
after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces
under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.

II
NEGATIVE. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not
only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as
constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental
agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation.
[I]t should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General
Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said
proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international
law.
[T]he legislative power of a commander in chief of military forces who liberates or
reoccupies his own territory which has been occupied by an enemy, during the military
and before the restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the commander in
chief of the military forces of invasion and occupation, it is to be presumed that General
Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government
and the President of the United States, constitutional commander in chief of the United
States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by
the Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by
the Presidents of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of
1907.

III
AFFIRMATIVE. Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial
administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes
place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his
own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the
country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect.
[I]n the Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War, “in practice, they
(the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to
be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the
occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the
present occasion.”
From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right
to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive
and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the
provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and
institution so far as military necessity will permit.

REPUBLIC VS VILLASOR
November 28, 1973
Fernando, J:

Facts:
The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino
Unchuan and International Construction Corporation was declared final and executory by
Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor.
Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued.
And for the strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of garnishment with
several banks, especially on the 'monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the
form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment.

The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated and
allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and
civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of AFP.
Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of
AFP, hence the notices and garnishments are null and void.

Issue:
Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.

Held:
No. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the
Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic
concept of sovereignty that the state and its government is immune from suit unless it
gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal conception
or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
SEAFDEC VS. NLRC
G.R. Nos. 97468-70, September 2 1993, 241 SCRA 580

FACTS
Two labor cases were filed by the herein private respondents against the petitioner,
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In these cases,
the private respondents claim having been wrongfully terminated from their employment
by the petitioner. The petitioner, who claims to be an international inter-government
organization composed of various Southeast Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss,
challenged the jurisdiction of the public respondent in taking cognizance of the above
cases. The private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter, allege that the
petitioner is not immune from suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international
organization, it has, however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly
raising the issue of jurisdiction.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.

RULING
The Court ruled for the petitioner. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an
international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. It has already been held in Southeast
Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department vs. National Labor
Relations Commission (G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA 283/1992). Petitioner Southeast
Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an
international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. Being an
intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys
functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office
is located. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from
local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the
tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection
of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient
medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even
influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such objection
to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities
impartially on behalf of its member-states.
MOST REVEREND PEDRO ARIGO VS SCOTT SWIFT
Villarama

FACTS:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In
December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for
the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at
the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and
crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on
January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the
ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80
miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been
no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to
affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental,
Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events
violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS
Guardian.
Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD:
First issue: YES.
Petitioners have legal standing
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”
Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls
for more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural
matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject
matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of citizens
to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history,
is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other
civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of
mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court
ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of
environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations.
Second issue: YES.
The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the
US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The
alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on
the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering
that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the
US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this
Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that
the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation
of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within
the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in
cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State
regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.
In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign
immunity subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance
therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea
immediately.
Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal
State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated
for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention
or other rules of international law.
Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing
in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships
operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into our
internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the
above provisions may apply.
But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a
matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international
rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.
Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was
centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI)
which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,” pointing
out that such “has nothing to do with its the US’ acceptance of customary international
rules on navigation.”
The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the
UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a
Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear
“international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding
which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our
long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country’s efforts
to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the
damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we
comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to
comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect
and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS.
Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly
or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating
international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent
with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment,
taking into account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute.
Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal
States while navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave
the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State,
and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government
vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.

Third issue: NO.

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not
to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In
fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a
person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.
The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the
grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a
petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State
immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have
resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of
damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a
separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same
violation of an environmental law.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO VS JUDGE FIRME

Facts:
The case was filed by petitioner, which is a municipal corporation existing under and in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate of Macario
Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of
the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the
impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result
of the injuries they sustained and four others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
The private respondents instituted a compliant for damages against the Estate of Macario
Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger
jeepney. However, the defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and
the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative
defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause
of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the
proximate cause of the collision.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioner and Bislig to pay the plaintiffs.
The owner and driver of the jeepney were absolved from liability. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration which was dismissed for having been filed out of time.

Issues:
Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred
and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.

Discussions:
The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver acting in behalf
of the municipality is performing governmental or proprietary functions. Municipal
corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be
sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown
that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the
State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its
governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.

Rulings:
Yes. In the case at bar, the judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability
of the State until trial. However, the respondent judge failed to resolve such defense,
proceeded with the trial and thereafter rendered a decision against the municipality and
its driver.
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise of
its judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the
guise of the municipality. However, the judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in
his decision, he held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular
employee.
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law
and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily
mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first
consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed
itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. Anent the issue of
whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test
of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the
municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions.

SHAUFS VS COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Although married to an American, Loida Shauf is a Filipino by origin her husband being a
member of the United States Air Force. She served as a Guidance Counsellor for four
years since 1971 for the US Air Base in Clark until the sam e position for a different
level was declared vacant in 1976. Loida was amongst who applied for the said position
and hence was the most qualified. However, respondent civilian personnel officer, Det
Detwiler, did not consider her qualification when it referred the appointment to the vacant
position to the Central Overseas Rotation and Recruitment Office (CORRO) which in turn
have selected a different candidate in the name of Mr. Isakson.
Aggrieved by her non-selection, petitioner filed a complaint against the civilian personnel
officer. It connection to her complaint, a Notice of Proposed Disposition was issued upon
her allowing her to avail a temporary (180 days) position as Assistant Education Director
until a notice of vacancy will again be posted in which she will be automatically appointed.
During this time, Mrs. Abalateo, an existing Guidance Counsellor appointee requested for
a career extension to the Education Director Anthony Persi which the latter already denied
long before. But it took a different turn when Loida Shauf was serving the temporarily
serving as Assistant Education Director and waiting for vacancy in the Guidance
Counselling Office because Mrs. Abalateo’s career extension was granted.
Petitioner filed a complaint for moral and exemplary damages which the trial court
favoured. Private respondents appealed that the trial court had no jurisdiction upon them
since they are acting in their official function and as member of the Armed Forces of the
United States being exempted by the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines
and the U.S. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, hence this petition.

Issues:
Whether or not respondents are immune from suit.

Decision:
No. The private respondents are not immune from suit. A well-established principle is that
foreigners acting in their official function as representatives of their states, and if the
instituted suit would result to remedial actions by the subject sovereign state such as
appropriation to reimburse the damages sought before it.
In the case at bar, the cloak of immunity is removed since private respondents were acting
in their private and personal capacity as ordinary citizens. The facts presented by the
lower court are unmistakable. Detwiler could have just decided on selecting Shauf for the
vacant Guidance Counsellor position instead of turning to Mr. Isakson following the
Administration Rule that allows military dependents to be preferred over non-dependents
in the event of work employment in the civilian administration office of the air base. While
Mr. Persi also denied Shauf of the same position when he deliberately extended the stay
of Mrs. Abalateo in office when it was due for expiration as he already denied its request
for extension way before Loida was designated as a substituting candidate for it.

US VS RUIZ
G.R. No. L-35645 136 scra 487 May 22, 1985
Facts:
Company Eligio de Guzman & Co. was one of the participated in the bidding for the wharf
repair of the United States Military Base in Subic, Zambales. It was alleged that the United
States sent two telegrams to confirm the company’s pricing proposal. The said company
interpreted this as an acceptance on the part of the U.S. to their bid to do the repair in the
military base’s structures. However, the repair contract was awarded to a third party
company under the consideration that Eligio de Guzman & Co. had already a poor rating
on its previous repair works at the base. The latter filed a complaint to order the US to
allow them perform the repair works while also issuing a writ of preliminary injunction to
refrain the US from contracting with third party companies.
The US assailed the decision by filing to dismiss the complaint, questioning the court’s
jurisdiction over the case stating that they are immune from suit as they represent the
sovereignty of the United States. The lower court, respondent judge, dismissed their
petition and issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining them to entertain third party
companies to operate in the repairs.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower Court erred in granting the respondents motion.
Whether or not the petitioners are immune from suit.

Decision:
The respondent judge erred in invoking the doctrine that when the State enters into a
contract with an individual means the former have descended into the latter’s level and
allows itself to be sued. It does not follow that a State enters into a contract with a citizen
the state of immunity from suit is automatically invoke. The nature of the contract in which
the State entered has to be first examined. Immunity from suit is only removed once the
contract was entered in private, commercial or proprietary capacity.
In the case at bar, the bidding was held for a repair project within the military base for the
official military function of the United States Military, and also requires fund appropriation
from the US Government. Thus, the acts of the petitioner authorities is considered to be
well within doctrine of jure imperii or governmental acts.

CITY OF CALOOCAN VS ALLARDE

G.R. No. 107271; September 10, 2003
CORONA,
J.
FACTS
Delfina Hernandez Santiago, then Assistant City Administrator of Caloocan City, along
with other 17 positions in the plantilla of the local government of Caloocan, contended the
abolishment of their positions by then City Mayor Marcial Samson. The aggrieved parties
assailed the legality of the abolition. They turned to the court which then ruled in their
favour ordering the city to pay their emoluments.
Santiago was paid P75, 083.37 as partial payment of her back-wages. However, the City
Government instituted several counter complaints before the Appellate Court and the Civil
Service Commission against the lower court’s judgement which did not prosper and only
caused the delay of payment for the remaining balance to Santiago. Later the city council
passed an ordinance appropriating the funds in the amount of P439, 377.14 for the
fulfilment of the city’s remaining debt to Santiago, the respondent judge issued an order
to deliver the check of payment but the City Mayor refused to sign the check. The Sherriff
of the Court was ordered to garnish the funds of city for the satisfaction of Santiago. The
city government questioned the legality of the order stating that the city’s public funds
may not be subject to garnishments.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Allarde was right in ordering to garnish the funds of the City of
Caloocan for the satisfaction of Santiago’s remaining balance of her back-wages.

Decision:
Yes. The general rule is that government funds deposited in the Philippine National Bank
and other depository of the Philippine Government whether general or specific
appropriation is considered government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or
reimbursement unless there exist legal appropriation of funds for such purpose. In the
case at bar, there already was an enacted law which entitle Santiago to the city’s payment
of the remaining balance due to her. The city mayor’s refusal to sign the check instigated
the garnishment order by the respondent judge.

TORIO VS FONTANILLA
G.R. No. L-29993 October 23, 1978
Facts:
On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed resolutions
for managing the 1959 town fiesta and creating an executive committee in charge. The
council appropriated P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for “zarzuela” (play
show) and other for the “cancionan” (sing and dance). The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas
Extravaganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila
Railroad Company in Caloocan, Rizal. Unfortunately, on the evening the of show, the
stage collapsed while the zarzuela was being held causing Vincent Fontanilla, one of the
stage performers, to be pinned underneath that led to his death the afternoon of the
following day.
Fontanilla’s heirs filed a complaint for damages against the defendants who were the
municipality, the municipal council and the municipal council members. The defendants
argued that the municipality, as a public corporation, was performing governmental
function when it held the event as part of the town fiesta’s listed activities. They averred
that as agents in the performance of their official functions they cannot be held liable for
damages as the event was not for commercial or private purpose. Adding that they
exercised due care and diligence in constructing the stage, the lower court ruled in their
favour. However, the Appellate Court reversed the decision and held all defendants
likewise liable for damages.

Issues:
1. Is the municipality liable for the death of Fontanilla?
2. Are the municipal councilors who enacted the ordinance and created the fiesta
committee liable for the death of Fontanilla?

Held:
-Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is liable for damages
for the death of Vicente Fontanilla because the accident was attributable to the negligence
of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents.
Considering that only P100.00 was appropriate for the construction of two stages with
light bamboo materials, it was considerably not enough to support the base and
foundation of the stage which led to its collapse. The municipality and/or its agents had
the necessary means within its command to prevent such an occurrence. But they failed
take the necessary steps to maintain the safety of the stage, particularly, in preventing
non-participants or spectators from mounting and accumulating on the stage.
The Municipality will still be liable for the death of Fontanilla even when it was Jose
Macaraeg the person who headed the construction of the stage, who was responsible for
it. Macaraeg was merely acting as an agent and under the doctrine of respondent and
superior liability, the Municipality is responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent
acting within his assigned tasks.
-After all, the fiesta celebration was not a governmental function. Although the law
provides authority to local government in holding fiesta celebration, in accordance with
religious or customary practices, it does not provide that it must do so. It being a non-
profit event, held as a defense by the petitioner, cannot be invoked as it was only held for
the special benefit of the community and not as a means for public welfare. An example
is the maintenance of public parks, which is private in nature, is distinguished from
operation of schools, jails or hospitals of which are meant for public function.
As a consequence, the fiesta celebration being a non-governmental function, the
Municipality descends on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation with the
municipal council acting as its board of directors. The law provides that a corporation has
a personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it,
unless the latter is shown to have acted in bad faith or gross wanton negligence on their
part. The records do not show that municipal councilors directly participated in the
defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted spectators
to go up the platform. Thus, they are absolved from liability.

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTHCARE VS DUQUE

FACTS:
Facts:
Milk Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on
Oct.1986. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to
give effect to Art 11 of the Int’l Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes (ICBMS), a
code adopted by the World Health Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also
adopted severe resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, hence,
it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued a Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations
(RIRR).
This is a petition to review in seeking to nullify the RIRR as it contains provisions that are
not constitutional and had gone beyond what it is intended to, alleging that:
1. The Milk Code limits its coverage to children 0-12 months old, but the RIRR
extended its coverage to "young children" or those from ages two years old and
beyond:
2. The Milk Code recognizes that infant formula may be a proper and possible
substitute for breastmilk in certain instances; but the RIRR provides "exclusive
breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months" and declares that "there is no substitute
nor replacement for breastmilk":
3. The Milk Code only regulates and does not impose unreasonable requirements for
advertising and promotion; RIRR imposes an absolute ban on such activities for
breastmilk substitutes intended for infants from 0-24 months old or beyond, and
forbids the use of health and nutritional claims. Section 13 of the RIRR, which
provides for a "total effect" in the promotion of products within the scope of the
Code, is vague:
4. The RIRR imposes additional labeling requirements not found in the Milk Code:
5. The Milk Code allows dissemination of information on infant formula to health
professionals; the RIRR totally prohibits such activity:
 6. The Milk Code permits milk manufacturers and distributors to extend assistance in
research and continuing education of health professionals; RIRR absolutely
forbids the same.
7. The Milk Code regulates the giving of donations; RIRR absolutely prohibits it.
8. The RIRR provides for administrative sanctions not imposed by the Milk Code.
9. The RIRR provides for repeal of existing laws to the contrary.

Issue:
Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent int’l agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law
of the land and may be implemented by DOH through the RIRR. If yes, W/N the RIRR is
in accord with int’l agreements
MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution
by promulgating the RIRR.

Held:
Sub-issue:
Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, int’l law can become domestic law by transformation
(thru constitutional mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation (mere
constitutional declaration i.e treaties) The ICBMS and WHA resolutions were not treaties
as they have not been concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as required under
Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the ICBMS had been transformed into domestic law through a
local legislation such as the Milk Code. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction
of ICBMS.
Yes. For an int’l rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such
rule is being followed by states because they consider it as obligatory to comply with such
rules (opinion juris). The DOH failed to establish that the provisions pertinent WHA
resolutions are customary int’l law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. The
WHO resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were enforced or
practiced by at least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature
enacted most of the provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions
(specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to
24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have not been
adopted as domestic law nor are they followed in our country as well. The WHA is not a
binding norm, principles and practices that influence state behaviour and just be classified
as a soft law.
CALALANG VS WILLIAMS

Facts:
This is a case challenging the constitutionality of the prohibition of animal-drawn vehicles
along Rosario Street from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas Street and also
along Rizal Avenue upon specific time from a period of one year from the date of the
opening of Colgante Bridge to traffic. The assailed rule was issued by the Manila City
Council as enforce by the City Mayor under the recommendation of the National Traffic
Commission and the Department of Public Works and Communication.
Issue:
Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringes
upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice

Held:
The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy
towards any given group. It is the promotion of the welfare of all people. It is neither
communism, despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the state so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.

OPOSA VS FACTORAN
Facts:

The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of,
inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and
natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), continued approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous
commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the country.
Petitioners request the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting
in his behalf to:
Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be
submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This act of defendant constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for
the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have exhausted all
administrative remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served
upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country. Defendant,
however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage
and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

Issues:

Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the
Court.
Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled
without the requisite hearing violates the requirements of due process.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely
identified in his opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by
the Court. According to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest,
making this civil case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual controversy. He
strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987
Constitution.
The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created world in its
entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as future generations.
Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for
the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.
The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege
with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong
committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions
based on unverified data.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of
the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it
is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a
right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners —
the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.
The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement.
The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment
clause. If he had done so, Justice Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to the
Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber
license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect
the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy
and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed
out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry
Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides that when the national interest so requires,
the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit,
licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein .
All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent
Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned
timber license agreements.\

TANADA VS ANGARA

Facts:
This is a petitionPetitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the
concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines
of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for
brevity) and afor the prohibition on the part of theof its implementation and enforcement
through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and
employees involved or taking part in accordance with such , as well as the use of
government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices
concerned therewith.
They contended that WTO agreement. The petition rests on the question of
constitutionality of the WTO Agreement. Accordingly, violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods” as (1)
the WTO requires the Philippines “to place nationals and products of member-countries
on the same footing as Filipinos and local products” and (2) that the WTO “intrudes, limits
and/or impairs” the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court.
Petitioners alleged that the WTO agreement violated mandate of the 1987 Constitution in
developing a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos; give preference to qualified Filipinos; and to promote the preferential use of
Filipino labor, domestics materials and locally produced goods.
Issue:
Whether or notprovisions of the WTO Agreement violatesEstablishing the mandate of the
World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty
specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine
Constitution is ‘vested in the Congress of the Philippines.

Held:
No, the WTO Agreementagreement does not violateunduly limit, restrict, and impair the
mandate of the 1987Philippine sovereignty, particularly the legislative power granted by
the Philippine Constitution. Our constitutional framersThe Senate was acting in the proper
manner when it concurred with the President’s ratification of the agreement.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the
domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by
the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.
Unquestionably, the Constitution did not intend to envision a hermit-type of isolation of
the country from the others.
Sovereignty is still subject to restrictions although generally it is meant to encompass
absolute power of the state within its territory, and the recognition of its right by its
neighbour and the family of nations. An express statement in the Constitution providing
“the adoption of generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land, and adhering to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and
amity, with all nations.” The WTO is a treaty governed by municipal and international law.
Upon entering to such treaty, the Philippines is bound to the provisions of the agreement
as treated with the same by the other nations.
The WTO agreement mandate is clear as it is for equality and reciprocity. It seeks for
better economic cooperation among countries in this fast changing world. The WTO will
allow gradual development in the domestic market as foreign competition will be possible.
Gone are the days of a self-sufficient economy as we now live in a world of
interdependency. The petition is dismissed in lack of merit.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNDERS VS SECRETARY OF AGRAGRIAN
REFORM

Facts:
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or
R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights
includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State
shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and
regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or,
in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844
was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory
acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their
payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program
(CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s)
implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657,
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the
earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they
are not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the
land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of
landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares.
They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be
forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have
shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian
reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.

G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)

Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and
229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform
program and that the specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which
provides that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also
violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their
land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has
always been in the form of money and not in bonds.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms
of cash.

HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class
exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined
as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and
different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the
following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not
shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The
argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to
share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial
distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who
will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is
allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused
to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in
classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts.
However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from
determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed
upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long
as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and
if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by
law however that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body is is
merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation
by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall
be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court
of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional
exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of
eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation
have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the government will not have
sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used
for just compensation.

PAMATONG VS COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent
COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage
a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported
by a registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the
COMELEC violated his right to “equal access to opportunities for public service” under
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified
candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since
he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the
constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of
waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his
leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has
practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege
subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the
privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the
provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
“Declaration of Principles and State Policies.” The provisions under the Article are
generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a
different treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The
disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures
that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the
provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of
positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation
since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad
of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words
and phrases such as “equal access,” “opportunities,” and “public service” are susceptible
to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not
the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation
from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are
found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on “Nuisance Candidates.” As long
as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal
access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered
by the limitations are meant to be borne by anyone who is minded to file a certificate of
candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the
limitations or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification
of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine.
The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational,
objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates,
the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased
allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an
election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix
candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would
actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are
palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged
by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed
at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part
of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and
factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand
of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the
COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether
petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section
69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong’s contentions was that he was an international lawyer
and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school
dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the
following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read
and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was
disqualified.

PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL

In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities

– this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides in part:

The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and
may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require…
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to
prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said
municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68
of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that
barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except
by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even
create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios,
since barrios are units of municipalities?”
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred
from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a
municipality can be created without creating barrios. He further maintains that through
Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the
President.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by
virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.

HELD:
No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch
of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation
of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such
standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect,
make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may
require” – which would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public
welfare may require – is present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a
proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase “as the public welfare may
require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation
is “the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require.” Only the seat of government may be changed
by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and
eminently legislative in character not administrative (not executive).