G.R. No. 144025. December 27, 2002.

*
SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
Second Division, Manila, HON. QUIRICO G. DEFENSOR, Judge, RTC, Branch 36, Sixth Judicial
Region, Iloilo City, and LUCKY HOMES, INC., represented by WILSON JESENA, JR., as
Manager, respondents.
Remedial Law; Estoppel; While an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total
nullity and may be assailed at any stage, active participation in the proceedings in the court which
rendered the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction.—Petitioners claim
that the recent decisions of this Court have already abandoned the doctrine laid down in Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy. We do not agree. In countless decisions, this Court has consistently held that, while an
order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage,
active participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered the order or decision will bar such
party from attacking its jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment but only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction if not.—Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. They cannot be allowed to
profit from their omission to the damage and prejudice of the private respondent. This Court frowns
upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment but only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not.

No. L-75919. May 7, 1987.*

MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, CITYLAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW
LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Complaint; Filing Fees; Environmental facts of Magaspi vs.
Ramolete case, different from case at bar.—ln the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only
one for recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that the filing fee for the damages should be
the basis of assessment. Although the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be
insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since the payment was the result of an "honest difference
of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired jurisdiction over
the case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular." Hence, as the amended
complaint superseded the original complaint, the allegations of damages in the amended complaint
should be the basis of the computation of the filing fee. In the present case no such honest difference
of opinion was possible as the allegations of the complaint, the designation and the prayer show
clearly that it is an action for damages and specific performance. The docketing fee should be
assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless
of actual date of filing in court.—As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case
is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court."
Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of
only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction
upon the Court. For all legal purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which
could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent
proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of
damages in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.—The Court of Appeals
therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the
amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; Court frowns at practice of counsel who filed the original
complaint of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount
of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint which is clearly intended to thwart
payment of correct filing fees.—The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that
it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any
specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P 78 million is
alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the
payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee.
This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the
anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended
complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the body of the
complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial
court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners'
counsel wrote the damages sought in the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the
complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket f ee is
obvious.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Warning of Supreme Court that drastic action will be taken
upon a repetition of the unethical practice.—The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action
upon a repetition of this unethical practice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirement that henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and
other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and that the damages should be considered in the assessment of the
filing fees; Any pleading that fails to comply with the requirement shall not be accepted or
admitted.—To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other
similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing
fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
payment of the prescribed docket fee; An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
vest jurisdiction in the court, much less payment of the docket fee based on amount in the amended
pleading Magaspi vs. Ramolete case which is inconsistent with this decision, is reversed.—The Court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much
less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling
in the Magaspi case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.

G.R. No. 182435. August 13, 2012.*

LILIA B. ADA, LUZ B. ADANZA, FLORA C. BAYLON, REMO BAYLON, JOSE BAYLON,
ERIC BAYLON, FLORENTINO BAYLON, and MA. RUBY BAYLON,
petitioners, vs. FLORANTE BAYLON, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Joinder of Causes of Actions; By a joinder of actions, or more
properly, a joinder of causes of action is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of
action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration.—By a joinder
of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action is meant the uniting of two or more
demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a
declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the
basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain
circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration,
complaint or petition.
Same; Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for
dismissal.—Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. Indeed, the courts have the
power, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to order the severance of the
misjoined cause of action to be proceeded with separately. However, if there is no objection to the
improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a severance, then there exists no bar in the
simultaneous adjudication of all the erroneously joined causes of action.
Same; Same; Supplemental Pleadings; As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only
serves to bolster or add something to the primary pleading; Its usual office is to set up new facts
which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the
controversy referred to in the original complaint.—Section 6, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 6. Supplemental Pleadings.—Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and
upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions,
occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be
supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order
admitting the supplemental pleading. In Young v. Spouses Sy, 503 SCRA 151 (2006), this Court had
the opportunity to elucidate on the purpose of a supplemental pleading. Thus: As its very name
denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add something to the primary pleading. A
supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it supplements.
Moreover, a supplemental pleading assumes that the original pleading is to stand and that the issues
joined with the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the action. It is but a continuation of
the complaint. Its usualoffice is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of
relief with respect to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original
complaint. The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new facts
which will enlarge or change the kind of relief to which the plaintiff is entitled; hence, any
supplemental facts which further develop the original right of action, or extend to vary the
relief, are available by way of supplemental complaint even though they themselves constitute a
right of action.
Civil Law; Contracts; Rescission; Words and Phrases; Rescission is a remedy granted by law to
the contracting parties and even to third persons, to secure the reparation of damages caused to
them by a contract, even if it should be valid, by means of the restoration of things to their condition
at the moment prior to the celebration of said contract.—Rescission is a remedy granted by law to
the contracting parties and even to third persons, to secure the reparation of damages caused to them
by a contract, even if it should be valid, by means of the restoration of things to their condition at the
moment prior to the celebration of said contract. It is a remedy to make ineffective a contract, validly
entered into and therefore obligatory under normal conditions, by reason of external causes resulting
in a pecuniary prejudice to one of the contracting parties or their creditors.
 Same; Same; Same; Requisites of a Valid Rescission of Contracts.—The rescission of a contract
under Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code only requires the concurrence of the following: first, the
defendant, during the pendency of the case, enters into a contract which refers to the thing subject of
litigation; and second, the said contract was entered into without the knowledge and approval of the
litigants or of a competent judicial authority. As long as the foregoing requisites concur, it becomes
the duty of the court to order the rescission of the said contract
No. L-40428. December 17, 1976.*
FRANCISCO T. KOH, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.,
District Judge, Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Branch I, and JOSE P. COLOMA,
respondents.
Actions; Venue; Venue of actions fixed by Rules of Court.—It is fundamental in the law
governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal
civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties litigants
by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice.
Same; Same; Personal actions commenced and tried where defendant resides or may be found
or where plaintiff resides, ‘at the election of plaintiff.—The law on venue in courts of first instance
(Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words “resides or may
be found,” and not “is domiciled,” thus: “Sec. 2 (b) Personal actions. All other actions may be
commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or
where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.”
Same; Same; Residence differentiated from domicile.—The term domicile is not exactly
synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in
Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person
while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact this distinction is
very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the
Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons. “There is a difference between domicile and
residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man
may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile
is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one
domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence.
His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so
since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.”
Pleadings and practice; Cause of action; Action for damages;Where complaint in criminal case
filed by fiscal, action for damages against offended party without basis; Reasons; Case at bar.—The
petitioner was not the one who filed the criminal case against the private respondent, the former
being merely the offended party. The criminal complaint against the private respondent could hardly
be termed “baseless and unfounded” because he himself admitted that he issued a post-dated check
that was dishonored. If the criminal complaint against him was dismissed by the CFI of Rizal upon
his own motion and perchance by some reason of technicality or by reason of reasonable doubt, the
private respondent is by no means absolved from the civil liability of refunding the amount written in
the dishonored check to the petitioner. The logical conclusion that could be derived from all the
foregoing is that the criminal complaint filed against the private respondent for estafa by the fiscal of
Rizal is by no means “malicious,” “baseless,” and “unfounded” and therefore, the action for damages
is without any basis and that the private respondent’s civil complaint for damages filed in the CFI of
Ilocos Norte was without sufficient cause of action.

G.R. No. 167545. August 17, 2011.*

ATIKO TRANS, INC. and CHENG LIE NAVIGATION CO., LTD., petitioners, vs. PRUDENTIAL
GUARANTEE AND ASSURANCE, INC., respondent.
Civil Procedure; Summons; Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired not
only by proper service of summons but also by defendant’s voluntary appearance without expressly
objecting to the court’s jurisdiction.—When the defendant is a domestic corporation, service of
summons may be made only upon the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. However, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired not only by proper
service of summons but also by defendant’s voluntary appearance without expressly objecting to the
court’s jurisdiction, as embodied in Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, viz.: SEC.
20. Voluntary appearance.—The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent
to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
Same; Same; Voluntary Submission; The filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to
admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift
order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.—In the case at bench, when Atiko filed its Notice of Appeal, Memorandum
of Appeal, Motion for Reconsideration of the April 8, 2003 Decision of the RTC, and Petition for
Review, it never questioned the jurisdiction of the MeTC over its person. The filing of these
pleadings seeking affirmative relief amounted to voluntary appearance and, hence, rendered the
alleged lack of jurisdiction moot. In Palma v. Galvez, 615 SCRA 86 (2010), this Court reiterated the
oft-repeated rule that “the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default
with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court.”
Same; Same; The issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be seasonably
raised.—Petitioners’ contention is a mere afterthought. It was only in their Memorandum filed with
this Court where they claimed, for the first time, that Atiko was not properly served with summons.
In La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 78 (1994), it was held that the issue
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be seasonably raised. Failing to do so, a party
who invoked the jurisdiction of a court to secure an affirmative relief cannot be allowed to disavow
such jurisdiction after unsuccessfully trying to obtain such relief.
Same; Same; Settled is the rule a defendant cannot be declared in default unless such
declaration is preceded by a valid service of summons.—Applying the above disquisition, the MeTC
likewise erred in declaring Cheng Lie in default. Settled is the rule that a defendant cannot be
declared in default unless such declaration is preceded by a valid service of summons.
G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013.*
OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC.,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant may be acquired either by service of summons or by the defendant’s voluntary
appearance in court and submission to its authority.—In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant may be acquired either by service of summons or by the defendant’s voluntary
appearance in court and submission to its authority. In this case, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over
the person of respondent Hertz by reason of the latter’s voluntary appearance in court. In Philippine
Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy, 588 SCRA 612 (2009), we had occasion to state:
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power
of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general
proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to
admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to
lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the
court’s jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a
party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his
person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
Same; Same; Litis Pendentia; Elements of.—Litis pendentiarequires the concurrence of the
following elements: (1) Identity of parties, or at least their representation of the same interests in both
actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (3) Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to resjudicata in the other case.

G.R. No. 190071. August 15, 2012.*

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.MAUNLAD HOMES, INC. and all other
persons or entities claiming rights under it, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; Unlawful Detainer; Words and Phrases;
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who unlawfully
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied.―Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property
from one who unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful
detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to expiration or termination of the right to possess.
Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the action must be filed “within one (1) year after
[the] unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession[.]”
Civil Law; Sales; Contract to Sell; In a contract to sell, the full payment of the purchase price is
a positive suspensive condition whose non-fulfillment is not a breach of contract, but merely an event
that prevents the seller from conveying title to the purchaser.―In a contract to sell, the full payment
of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition whose non-fulfillment is not a breach of
contract, but merely an event that prevents the seller from conveying title to the purchaser. “The non-
payment of the purchase price renders the contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect.”
Maunlad Homes’ act of withholding the installment payments rendered the contract ineffective and
without force and effect, and ultimately deprived itself of the right to continue possessing Maunlad
Shopping Mall.
Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; Venue; The Supreme Court upheld the validity of a stipulation
in a contract providing for a venue for ejectment actions other than that stated in the Rules of
Court.―While Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court states that ejectment actions shall be filed in
“the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real property involved x x x is
situated[,]” Section 4 of the same Rule provides that the rule shall not apply “[w]here the parties
have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.”
Precisely, in this case, the parties provided for a different venue. In Villanueva v. Judge Mosqueda,
etc., et al., 115 SCRA 904 (1982), the Court upheld the validity of a stipulation in a contract
providing for a venue for ejectment actions other than that stated in the Rules of Court. Since the
unlawful detainer action is connected with the contract, Union Bank rightfully filed the complaint
with the MeTC of Makati City.
G.R. No. 108538. January 22, 1996.*
LOURDES A. VALMONTE and ALFREDO D. VALMONTE, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION and ROSITA DIMALANTA, respondents.
Actions; Summons; Jurisdiction; Parties; Pleadings and Practice; A resident defendant in an
action in personam who cannot be personally served with summons may be summoned either by
means of substituted service in accordance with Rule 14, §8 or by publication as provided in §§17
and 18 of the same Rule.—In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not
possible and he cannot be personally served, substituted service, as provided in Rule 14, §§7-8 is
essential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who does not
voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. If defendant cannot be served with summons
because he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons may,
by leave of court, be made by publication. Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action in
personam, who cannot be personally served with summons, may be summoned either by means of
substituted service in accordance with Rule 14, §8 or by publication as provided in §§ 17 and 18 of
the same Rule.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res.—On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country,
summons may be served exterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, §17.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; What gives the court jurisdiction in an action in
rem or quasi in rem is that it has jurisdiction over the res, and the service of summons in the manner
provided in §17 is not for the purpose of vesting it with jurisdiction but for complying with the
requirements of fair play or due process.—In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in an
action in rem or quasi in rem is that it has jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the personal status of the
plaintiff who is domiciled in the Philippines or the property litigated or attached. Service of
summons in the manner provided in §17 is not for the purpose of vesting it with jurisdiction but for
complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so that he will be informed of the
pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to
him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and he can
thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded.
Same; Same; Same; Partition; An action for partition and accounting under Rule 69 is in the
nature of an action quasi in rem.—Applying the foregoing rules to the case at bar, private
respondent’s action, which is for partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in the nature of an action
quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant’s interest in a
specific property and not to render a judgment against him.

Same; Same; Same; Service of summons upon a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines
must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.—As petitioner Lourdes
A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be
in accordance with Rule 14, §17. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made
either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places
and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court
should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other
manner which the court may deem sufficient.
Same; Same; Same; The three modes of service of summons upon a nonresident must be made
outside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the
defendant resides.—Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte was not done by means of any of the first two modes, the question is whether the service
on her attorney, petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, can be justified under the third mode, namely, “in
any . . . manner the court may deem sufficient.” We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the
first two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the
foreign country where the defendant resides.
Same; Same; Same; The period to file an Answer in an action against a resident defendant
differs from the period given in an action filed against a nonresident defendant who is not found in
the Philippines.—It must be noted that the period to file an Answer in an action against a resident
defendant differs from the period given in an action filed against a nonresident defendant who is not
found in the Philippines. In the former, the period is fifteen (15) days from service of summons,
while in the latter, it is at least sixty (60) days from notice.
Same; Same; Same; Agency; Attorneys; The authority given by a wife to her husband to
negotiate cannot be construed as also including an authority to represent her in any litigation.—In
contrast, in the case at bar, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte did not appoint her husband as her
attorney-in-fact. Although she wrote private respondent’s attorney that “all communications”
intended for her should be addressed to her husband who is also her lawyer at the latter’s address in
Manila, no power of attorney to receive summons for her can be inferred therefrom. In fact the letter
was written seven months before the filing of this case below, and it appears that it was written in
connection with the negotiations between her and her sister, respondent Rosita Dimalanta,
concerning the partition of the property in question. As is usual in negotiations of this kind, the
exchange of correspondence was carried on by counsel for the parties. But the authority given to
petitioner’s husband in these negotiations certainly cannot be construed as also including an authority
to represent her in any litigation.
G.R. No. 175507. October 8, 2014.*

RAMON CHING and PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., petitioners, vs. JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME
CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE** and LUCINA SANTOS, respondents.
Actions; Dismissal of Actions; Two-Dismissal Rule; As a general rule, dismissals under Section
1 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court are without prejudice except when it is the second time that the
plaintiff caused its dismissal.—As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without
prejudice except when it is the second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal. Accordingly, for a
dismissal to operate as an adjudication upon the merits, i.e., with prejudice to the re-filing of the
same claim, the following requisites must be present: (1) There was a previous case that was
dismissed by a competent court; (2) Both cases were based on or include the same claim; (3) Both
notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and (4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the
plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the ground that the latter paid and satisfied all the
claims of the former. The purpose of the “two-dismissal rule” is “to avoid vexatious litigation.”
When a complaint is dismissed a second time, the plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief on the
same claim.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Parties resort to forum shopping when they
file several actions of the same claim in different forums in the hope of obtaining a favorable
result.—The rule essentially penalizes the forum shopper by dismissing all pending actions on the
same claim filed in any court. Accordingly, the grant of this petition would inevitably result in the
summary dismissal of the third case. Any action, therefore, which originates from the third case
pending with any court would be barred by res judicata. Because of the severity of the penalty of the
rule, an examination must first be made on the purpose of the rule. Parties resort to forum shopping
when they file several actions of the same claim in different forums in the hope of obtaining a
favorable result. It is prohibited by the courts as it “trifle[s] with the orderly administration of
justice.”
Same; Same; Same; The rule on forum shopping will not strictly apply when it can be shown that
(1) the original case has been dismissed upon request of the plaintiff for valid procedural reasons;
(2) the only pending matter is a motion for reconsideration; and (3) there are valid procedural
reasons that serve the goal of substantial justice for the fresh new case to proceed.—The rule on
forum shopping will not strictly apply when it can be shown that (1) the original case has been
dismissed upon request of the plaintiff for valid procedural reasons; (2) the only pending matter is a
motion for reconsideration; and (3) there are valid procedural reasons that serve the goal of
substantial justice for the fresh new case to proceed.

G.R. No. 130974. August 16, 2006.*

MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
AGAPITA TRAJANO on behalf of the Estate of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO, respondents.
Courts; Jurisdictions; Summons; Substituted Service; While substituted service of summons is
permitted, since it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of service, it
must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by
the rules.—Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the
defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the
court’s jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, “any judgment of the court which
has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.” In an action strictly in
personam, personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a
copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be
served with the summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to.
While substituted service of summons is permitted, “it is extraordinary in character and in derogation
of the usual method of service.” Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed
requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed, “compliance with the rules
regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due process as of
jurisdiction.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The party relying on substituted service or the
sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
service; “Reasonable time” is defined as so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a
reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that
should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any, to the other party; One
month from the issuance of summons can be considered “reasonable time” with regard to personal
service on the defendant.—The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that
defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14
provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a “reasonable time” to serve the summons to the
defendant in person, but no specific time frame is mentioned. “Reasonable time” is defined as “so
much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do,
conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights
and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party.” Under the Rules, the service of summons has no
set period. However, when the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return
of the summons and the latter submits the return of summons, then the validity of the summons
lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if the service of summons has failed. What
then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to demonstrate
impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff, “reasonable time” means no more than seven (7)
days since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff,
“reasonable time” means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch
clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for
service. The Sheriff’s Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the
Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten
(10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be
considered “reasonable time” with regard to personal service on the defendant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Sheriffs; Sheriffs are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish
personal service on defendant, and since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service
of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process
on the defendant; “Several attempts” means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two
different dates.—Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due
care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious
dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish personal service
on defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of
summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, perse-vering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on
the defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by
the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which
eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. “Several attempts” means at
least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why
such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or
accepted.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts
and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service—the efforts made to find the
defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return.—The
sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the
attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure
must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal
service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged
residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on
defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriff’s Return
of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the
Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally
and the fact of failure. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989
requires that “impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the
defendant personally and the failure of such efforts,” which should be made in the proof of service.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; A person of suitable age and discretion is one
who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough
discernment to understand the importance of a summons; “Discretion” is defined as the ability to
make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is
lawful, right or wise may be presupposed; The person upon whom substituted service is made must
have the “relation of confidence” to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least
be notified of the receipt of the summons.—If the substituted service will be effected at defendant’s
house or residence, it should be left with a person of “suitable age and discretion then residing
therein.” A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity
(18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a
summons. “Discre-tion” is defined as “the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible
choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed”. Thus,
to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and understand English to
comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and
complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate action.
Thus, the person must have the “relation of confidence” to the defendant, ensuring that the latter
would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore
determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what
the recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the
significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or
at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and
specifically described in the Return of Summons.
Same; Same; Same; Same; If the substituted service will be done at de-fendant’s office or
regular place of business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place.—If
the substituted service will be done at defendant’s office or regular place of business, then it should
be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted
service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant, such as the
president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the
obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from
inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Given the fact that the substituted service of summons may be
assailed by a Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative that the pertinent facts and circumstances
surrounding the service of summons be described with more particularity in the Return or Certificate
of Service.—A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence of
material data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is
no clear valid reason cited in the Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion
that personal service has become impossible or unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of
“on many occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons x x x personally,” “at
reasonable hours during the day,” and “to no avail for the reason that the said defendant is usually
out of her place and/or residence or premises.” Wanting in detailed information, the Return deviates
from the ruling—in Domagas v. Jensen, and other related cases—that the pertinent facts and
circumstances on the efforts exerted to serve the summons personally must be narrated in the Return.
It cannot be determined how many times, on what specific dates, and at what hours of the day the
attempts were made. Given the fact that the substituted service of summons may be assailed, as in the
present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative that the pertinent facts and circumstances
surrounding the service of summons be described with more particularity in the Return or Certificate
of Service.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must demonstrate
an effort in good faith to locate the defendant through direct means.—Apart from the allegation of
petitioner’s address in the Complaint, it has not been shown that respondent Trajano or Sheriff
Cañelas, who served such summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to locate petitioner. Certainly, the
second paragraph of the Complaint only states that respondents were “informed, and so [they]
allege” about the address and whereabouts of petitioner. Before resorting to substituted service, a
plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the defendant through more direct means.
More so, in the case in hand, when the alleged petitioner’s residence or house is doubtful or has not
been clearly ascertained, it would have been better for personal service to have been pursued
persistently.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In view of the numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service
which have spawned the filing of a great number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari
and appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses, the
narration of the efforts made to find the defendant and the fact of failure written in broad and
imprecise words will not suffice—the facts and circumstances should be stated with more
particularity and detail on the number of attempts made at personal service, dates and times of the
attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of occupants of the alleged residence, and the reasons
for failure should be included in the Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken; To allow
sheriffs to describe the facts and circumstances in inexact terms would encourage routine
performance of their precise duties relating to substituted service—for it would be quite easy to
shroud or conceal carelessness or laxity in such broad terms.—In the case Umandap v. Sabio, Jr.,
339 SCRA 243 (2000), it may be true that the Court held that a Sheriff’s Return, which states that
“despite efforts exerted to serve said process personally upon the defendant on several occasions the
same proved futile,” conforms to the requirements of valid substituted service. However, in view of
the numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great
number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and ap-peals to higher courts, resulting in
prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses, the Court rules in the case at bar that the narration
of the efforts made to find the defendant and the fact of failure written in broad and imprecise words
will not suffice. The facts and circumstances should be stated with more particularity and detail on
the number of attempts made at personal service, dates and times of the attempts, inquiries to locate
defendant, names of occupants of the alleged residence, and the reasons for failure should be
included in the Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken. That such efforts were made to
personally serve summons on defendant, and those resulted in failure, would prove impossibility of
prompt personal service. Moreover, to allow sheriffs to describe the facts and circumstances in
inexact terms would encourage routine performance of their precise duties relating to substituted
service—for it would be quite easy to shroud or conceal carelessness or laxity in such broad terms.
Lastly, considering that monies and properties worth millions may be lost by a defendant because of
an irregular or void substituted service, it is but only fair that the Sheriff’s Return should clearly and
convincingly show the impracticability or hopelessness of personal service.
Jurisdictions; Summons; Substituted Service; There are two requirements under the Rules
regarding leaving summons with a “person of suitable age and discretion” residing in defendant’s
house or residence, namely, (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and discretion, and, (2)
recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant; To protect a defendant’s right to due
process by being accorded proper notice of a case against her, the substituted service of summons
must be shown to clearly comply with the rules.—Granting that such a general description be
considered adequate, there is still a serious nonconformity from the requirement that the summons
must be left with a “person of suitable age and discretion” residing in defen-dant’s house or
residence. Thus, there are two (2) requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of
suitable age and discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant. Both
requirements were not met. In this case, the Sheriff’s Return lacks information as to residence, age,
and discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sher-iff’s general assertion that de la Cruz is
the “resident caretaker” of petitioner as pointed out by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged receptionist
and telephone operator of Alexandra Homes. It is doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with
petitioner Manotoc in the condominium unit considering that a married woman of her stature in
society would unlikely hire a male caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With the petitioner’s
allegation that Macky de la Cruz is not her employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary to
have additional information in the Return of Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruz’s refusal to
sign the Receipt for the summons is a strong indication that he did not have the necessary “relation of
confidence” with petitioner. To protect petitioner’s right to due process by being accorded proper
notice of a case against her, the substituted service of summons must be shown to clearly comply
with the rules. It has been stated and restated that substituted service of summons must faithfully and
strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and in the circumstances authorized by the rules.
Same; Same; Same; Sheriffs; For the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty by a sheriff, the Sheriff’s Return must show that serious efforts or attempts were exerted to
personally serve the summons and that said efforts failed; The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions by the sheriff is not applicable where it is patent that the sheriff’s
return is defective.—The court a quo heavily relied on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty. It reasons out that “[t]he certificate of service by the proper officer
is prima facie evidence of the facts set out herein, and to overcome the presumption arising from said
certificate, the evidence must be clear and convincing.” The Court acknowledges that this ruling is
still a valid doctrine. However, for the presumption to apply, the Sheriff’s Return must show that
serious efforts or attempts were exerted to personally serve the summons and that said efforts failed.
These facts must be specifically narrated in the Return. To reiterate, it must clearly show that the
substituted service must be made on a person of suitable age and discretion living in the dwelling or
residence of defendant. Otherwise, the Return is flawed and the presumption cannot be availed of. As
previously explained, the Return of Sheriff Cañelas did not comply with the stringent requirements
of Rule 14, Section 8 on substituted service. In the case of Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, 156
SCRA 305 (1987), it was held that “x x x the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions by the sheriff is not applicable in this case where it is patent that the sher-iff’s return is
defective (emphasis supplied).” While the Sheriff’s Return in the Venturanza case had no statement
on the effort or attempt to personally serve the summons, the Return of Sheriff Cañelas in the case at
bar merely described the efforts or attempts in general terms lacking in details as required by the
ruling in the case of Domagas v. Jensen and other cases. It is as if Cañelas’ Return did not mention
any effort to accomplish personal service. Thus, the substituted service is void.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even assuming that the indicated address is defendant’s actual
residence, such fact would not make an irregular and void substituted service valid and effective.—
On the issue whether petitioner Manotoc is a resident of Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, at No. 29
Meralco Avenue, Pasig City, our findings that the substituted service is void has rendered the matter
moot and academic. Even assuming that Alexandra Homes Room 104 is her actual residence, such
fact would not make an irregular and void substituted service valid and effective.

G.R. No. 193420. October 14, 2015.*

7107 ISLANDS PUBLISHING, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE PRINTERS CORPORATION,
respondent.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Service of Summons; Service of summons on an officer other
than those enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is invalid.—Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court provides: SEC. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity.—When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical
personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. (emphasis supplied) We have long established
that this enumeration is an exclusive list under the principle of expresso unius est exclusio alterius.
Under the present Rules of Court, the rule of substantial compliance invoked by the respondent is no
longer applicable. To quote our decision in Sps. Mason v. Court of Appeals, 413 SCRA 303 (2003):
The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11, Rule 14
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. v. Benito,
312 SCRA 65 (1999),which applies squarely to the instant case. In the said case, petitioner E.B.
Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa) with principal office address at 102 Juan Luna St.,
Davao City, and with branches at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila, and
Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, entered into a sale with development agreement with
private respondent Imperial Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed to comply with its
contractual obligation, private respondent initiated a suit for breach of contract and damages at the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. Summons, together with the complaint, was served upon Villarosa
through its branch manager at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarosa filed a Special
Appearance with Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons and lack of
jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that there was substantial compliance with
the rule, thus, it acquired jurisdiction over Villarosa. The latter questioned the denial before us in its
petition for certiorari. We decided in Villarosa’s favor and declared the trial court without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. We held that there was no valid service of summons on
Villarosa as service was made through a person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule
14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which revised the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of
Court. We discarded the trial court’s basis for denying the motion to dismiss, namely, private
respondents’ substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons, and fully agreed with
petitioners’ assertions that the enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive,
following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules
of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, we said, it could
have easily done so by clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, we
stressed strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Neither can
herein petitioners invoke our ruling in Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation v. Tan, 326
SCRA 563 (2000), to support their position for said case is not on all fours with the instant case. We
must stress that Millenium was decided when the 1964 Rules of Court were still in force and
effect, unlike the instant case which falls under the new rule. Hence, the cases cited by
petitioners where we upheld the doctrine of substantial compliance must be deemed
overturned by Villarosa, which is the later case. (emphasis supplied) Therefore, the petitioner’s
argument is meritorious; service of summons on an officer other than those enumerated in Section 11
is invalid.
Same; Docket Fees; Certiorari; The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory for the filing of a petition for certiorari. The court acquires jurisdiction over the case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.—Although the petition before the CA was
meritorious, the petitioner failed to pay the required docket fees and other legal fees. The payment of
docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the filing of a petition for certiorari. The
court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees. The
payment of the full amount of the docket fee is a condition sine qua non for jurisdiction to rest.
Same; Same; Due Process; The payment of docket fees, like the rule of strict compliance in the
service of summons, is not a mere technicality of procedure but is an essential requirement of due
process.—The payment of docket fees, like the rule of strict compliance in the service of summons,
is not a mere technicality of procedure but is an essential requirement of due process. Procedural
rules are not to be set aside simply because their strict application would prejudice a party’s
substantive rights. Like all rules, they must be observed. They can only be relaxed for the most
persuasive of reasons where a litigant’s degree of noncompliance with the rules is severely
disproportionate to the injustice he is bound to suffer as a consequence.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they
ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat
against substantive rights, and not the other way around.—In rendering justice, courts have always
been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take
a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. As the petitioner itself said, the
ends of justice would be best served if we do away with the technicalities as we dispense substantial
justice. We thus believe that the best course of action under the circumstances is to allow the RTC to
decide the case on the merits.

MANUEL M. SERRANO, petitioner, vs. EUGENIO C. DELICA, respondent.

Actions; Docket Fees; Docket fees are intended to take care of court expenses in the handling of
cases in terms of cost of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, etc.,
computed as to man-hours used in the handling of each case; It is not simply the filing of the
complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fees that vests
a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.—We cannot
overemphasize the importance of paying the correct docket fees. Such fees are intended to take care
of court expenses in the handling of cases in terms of cost of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and
fringe benefits of personnel, etc., computed as to man-hours used in the handling of each case. The
payment of said fees, therefore, cannot be made dependent on the result of the action taken, without
entailing tremendous losses to the government and to the judiciary in particular. Thus, the rule is that
“upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an action or proceeding, the fees
prescribed therefor shall be paid in full.” However, a litigant who is a pauper is exempt from the
payment of the docket fees. But the fees shall be a lien on the judgment rendered in favor of said
pauper litigant, unless the court otherwise provides. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fees that vests a trial court
with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; The allegations in the complaint and the character of the
reliefs sought are the criteria in determining the nature of an action.—In the case at bar, petitioner
impugns the Court of Appeals’ ruling that respondent’s complaint in Civil Case No. 97-120 is not
capable of pecuniary estimation and that, therefore, the docket fee is fixed at P600.00 pursuant to
Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court. We agree with petitioner that the Court of
Appeals erred in issuing such ruling. It should have considered the allegations of the complaint and
the character of the reliefs sought, the criteria in determining the nature of an action. A careful
examination of respondent’s complaint is that it is a real action. In Paderanga vs. Buissan, we held
that “in a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as stated in Section 2(a),
Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, a real action is one ‘affecting title to real property or for the
recovery of possession of, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on a real
property.’ ”
Same; Same; Same; It is the assessed value of the realty, not the “BIR zonal valuation” that is
the kind of valuation required by the Rule to be the basis for the computation of the docket fees;
Where the correct docket fee is not paid, the court does not acquire jurisdiction over the case.—
Considering that respondent’s complaint is a real action, the Rule requires that “the assessed value of
the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and
shall be the basis in computing the fees.” We note, however, that neither the “assessed value” nor the
“estimated value” of the questioned parcels of land were alleged by respondent in both his original
and amended complaint. What he stated in his amended complaint is that the disputed realties have a
“BIR zonal valuation” of P1,200.00 per square meter. However, the alleged “BIR zonal valuation” is
not the kind of valuation required by the Rule. It is the assessed value of the realty. Having utterly
failed to comply with the requirement of the Rule that he shall allege in his complaint the assessed
value of his real properties in controversy, the correct docket fee cannot be computed. As such, his
complaint should not have been accepted by the trial court. We thus rule that it has not acquired
jurisdiction over the present case for failure of herein respondent to pay the required docket fee. On
this ground alone, respondent’s complaint is vulnerable to dismissal.

G.R. No. 181676. June 11, 2014.*

ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SANNAEDLE
CO., LTD., respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Judgment on the Pleadings; Judgment on the
pleadings is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleading.—Judgment on the pleadings is proper when an answer
fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading.
An answer fails to tender an issue if it does not comply with the requirements of a specific denial as
set out in Sections 8 and 10, Rule 8 of the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure, resulting in the admission
of the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings.