1 JARQUE VS. DESIERTO (A.C. No.

4509, En Banc Resolution December 5, 1995), that the

Ombudsman or his deputies must first be removed from office via impeachment before they
may be held to answer for any wrong or misbehavior which may be proven against them in
disbarment proceedings.

2. FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE (November 10,2003)

Facts:
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices
of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other
high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.
Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to
the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

On October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the
second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House, founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House
of Representatives.
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year."

The House of Representatives argues that sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the present Constitution,
contending that the term "initiate" does not mean " to file", and concludes that the one year
bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could
not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and the 7
Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the
collective body, has yet to act on it.

Ruling: Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father
Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word
"initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing
must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate,"
appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The
object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is
"impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term
"cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal
controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the
House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that
sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body
can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding"
must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which
comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a
progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but
in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by
a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the
House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper
Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of
the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the
House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the
House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or
overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of
all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted
to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this
point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is
successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the
complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding
and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment
proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the
Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding
is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement
of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least
one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the
House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
3.BINAY VS SANDIGANBAYAN
TOPIC:
1. SEC. 4, ART. XIII, 1973 Constitution – now SEC. 4, ART. XI, 1987 Constitution:
“The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function
and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.”
2. BILL OF RIGHTS: Right to speedy disposition of cases

FACTS:
Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan (SB) against Mayor Binay of
Makati for ‘Illegal Use of Public Funds’(RPC A220) and ‘Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act’ (RA 3019) on September 1994. The informations filed constituted crimes which
were committed by the petitioner in his incumbency in the year 1987. The petitioner filed a
motion to quash alleging that the delay of more than 6 years constituted a violation of his
constitutional right of due process. His arraignment therefore was held in abeyance pending
the resolution of the motions. Subsequently, the SB issued a resolution denying petitioner’s
motion to quash and further the latter’s motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the
prosecution filed a motion to suspend the accused ‘pendente lite’ (benefits) which was later
granted and ordered for a 90-day suspension. Petition for certiorari was filed by Mayor Binay in
the SC praying that the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration be set aside and
claimed that he was denied of his rights when the suspension was ordered even before he
could file his reply to the petitioner’s opposition. SC then, directed the SB to permit petitioner
to file said reply. The SB nonetheless reiterated its previous resolutions and order after the
submission of the reply.
Meanwhile, RA 7975 redefining the jurisdiction of SB took effect on May 1995 so much
so that the petitioner filed before SB a motion to refer his cases to the RTC of Makati alleging
that the SB has no jurisdiction over said cases when it issued its resolutions and suspension
order on June 1995. The SB in a follow-up resolution denied the petitioner’s motion. Hence this
present petition, prohibition and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of SB over the criminal
cases.

RULING:
RA 7975 which was further amended by RA 8249 states that the SB shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting
or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the offense: 1. Officials of the executive
branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade
"27" and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 Under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, mayors are "local officials classified as
Grade ‘27’ and higher.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative
cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the
Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked
with the administration of justice. However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the
right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for
and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to
determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy
disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay,
the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the
delay. The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be
sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of
cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

SYNOPSIS
In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay sought the annulment, among others, of
the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer Criminal Cases filed against
him, one for illegal use of public funds and two for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, to the Regional Trial Court of Makati and declaring that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over said cases despite the enactment of R.A. No. 7975.
In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay, et al. assailed the October 22, 1996
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of June 21, 1996 which suspended the
proceedings in the criminal case filed against them for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A.
No. 3019 in deference to whatever ruling the Supreme Court will lay down in the Binay cases.
The Court resolved the consolidated G.R. No. 128136 with G.R. Nos. 120681-83.
To determine whether an official is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
reference should be made to R.A. No. 6758 and the Index of Occupational Services, Position
Titles and Salary Grades. Salary level is not determinative. As both the 1989 and 1997 versions
of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades list the Municipal Mayor
under Salary Grade 27, petitioner mayors come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner mayors are local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, under the catchall provision, Section
4a(5) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. More accurately, petitioner mayors are
officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989, under Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.
The phrase specifically including after officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 necessarily conveys the very idea of non-
exclusivity of the enumeration. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not
apply where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be
exclusive, or where the enumeration is by way of example only. Should there be any doubt as
to whether petitioner mayors are under the category of Grade 27, Section 444 (d) of the Local
Government Code settles the matter.
Petitioner Binay cited previous bills in Congress dealing with the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The resort to congressional records to determine the proper application of the
law in this case was unwarranted for the same reason that the resort to the rule of inclusio
unius est expressio alterius was inappropriate. From the foregoing, it is clear that the cases
against petitioner Binay cannot be referred to the regular courts under Section 7 of R.A. No.
7975. The provision is transitory in nature and expresses the legislatures intention to apply its
provisions on jurisdiction to criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan.
The term proper court, as used in Section 7, is not restricted to regular courts but includes as
well the Sandiganbayan, a special court.
The Supreme Court dismissed the consolidated petitions.
4.ORAP VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Three informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan by Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor
Rodolfo B. Aquino, charging petitioner Vicente S. Orap Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court
of Mangatarem, Pangasinan, with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information, duly approved by Hon.
Juan A. Sison, then Chief Special Prosecutor of the Tanodbayan, were docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. SB-020, 021 and 022. Likewise charged under Criminal Case No. 020 was Melanio B.
Fernandez, petitioner's Clerk of Court. Before his scheduled arraignment, petitioner filed a
motion to quash the informations on the ground that the officer who signed the same had no
authority to do so and that, corollarily, the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over the
offenses charged. After due hearing, the respondent court denied petitioner's motion to quash.
Petitioner verbally moved for the reconsideration of the order but the relief sought was denied.

ISSUE: Whether tanodbayan has power to conduct preliminary investigations, file informations
and prosecute criminal cases against judges and their appurtenant judicial staff?

RULING:
YES
As prosecutor, the authority of the Tanodbayan is primary and without exceptions. His powers
are defined in Sections 17 and 19 of P.D. 1607,
SEC. 17. Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor.—There is hereby created in the Office of the
Tanodbayan an Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor composed of a Chief Special Prosecutor,
an Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor, and nine (9) Special Prosecutors, who shall have the same
qualifications as provincial and city fiscals and L who shall be appointed by the President; ..
The Chief Special Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor and the Special
Prosecutors shall have the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases
cognizable, by the Sandiganbayan: to file informations therefor and to direct and control the
prosecution of said cases therein Provided, however that the Tanodbayan may upon
recommendation of the Chief Special Prosecutor, designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or
lawyer in the government service to act as Special Prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan who shall not receive any additional
compensation except such allowances, per diems and travelling expenses as the Tanodbayan
may determine in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations.
SEC. 19. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other Person.—If the Tanodbayan has reason to
believe that any public official employee, or other person has acted in a manner warranting
criminal or disciplinary action or proceedings, he shall cause him to be investigated by the
Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor who shall file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or
administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the proper
administrative agency. In case of failure of justice, the Tanodbayan shall make the appropriate
recommendations to the administrative agency concerned.
If, as petitioner contends, judges, and other court personnel lie outside the investigatory power
of the Tanodbayan, then no judge or court employee could ever be brought to justice for crimes
and offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, for lack of proper officer or entity authorized to
conduct the preliminary investigation on complaints of such nature against them.
ADDITION: In Administrative complaints , the courts, judges and their appurtenant judicial staff
are outside the Tanodbayan's investigatory power. Under Section 6, Article 10 of the
Constitution, it is the Supreme Court that exercises administrative supervision over all courts
and their personnel and, therefore, is the proper forum to which an administrative complaints
involving judges and the court's personnel should be lodged,

5. BUENASEDA V. FLAVIER
In 1992, the NCMH Nurses Association (NCMH) filed a case of graft and corruption
against Dr. Brigida Buenaseda and several other government officials of the Department of
Health (DOH). The Ombudsman (then Conrado Vasquez), ordered the suspension of
Buenaseda et al. The suspension was carried on by then DOH Secretary Juan Flavier, being the
officer in charge over Buenaseda et al. Buenaseda et al then filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, questioning the suspension order. NCMH
submitted its Comment on the Petition where they attached a Motion for Disbarment against
the lawyers of Buenaseda et al.
Allegedly, the lawyers of Buenaseda et al advised them not to obey the suspension
order, which is a lawful order from a duly constituted authority. NCMH maintains that such
advice from the lawyers constitute a violation against the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Solicitor General, commenting on the case, agreed with Buenaseda’s lawyers as he
maintained that all the Ombudsman can do is to recommend suspensions not impose them.
The Sol-Gen based his argument on Section 13 (3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that
the Office of the Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function, and duty to:
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials

HELD:
Yes, the Ombudsman may impose suspension orders. The Supreme Court clarifies that what the
Ombudsman issued is an order of preventive suspension pending the resolution of the case or
investigation thereof. It is not imposing suspension as a penalty (not punitive suspension). What
the Constitution contemplates that the Ombudsman may recommend are punitive suspensions.
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the
appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. In order
to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman
has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct such investigation in an
expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.
The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among them, the
danger of tampering or destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent; the
intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide when
the persons facing administrative charges should be preventively suspended.
Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the questioned order of the Ombudsman was
validly issued even without a full-blown hearing and the formal presentation of evidence by the
parties. In Nera, supra, petitioner therein also claimed that the Secretary of Health could not
preventively suspend him before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint. The
contention of petitioners herein can be dismissed perfunctorily by holding that the suspension
meted out was merely preventive.
6.PDIC vs CASIMIRO

FACTS:
The Bicol Development Bank, Inc. (BDBI) closed. PDIC became the receiver. In the course of
the receivership, Gomez - a former Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI until its
closure - went to the PDIC and submitted an Affidavit outlining the alleged irregularities when
BDBI was still in operation. These are:

1. Apelo (BSP’s Bank Officer-In-Charge that examined BDBI's books and records) provides
Cu (BDBI owner) an "advance warning" of any impending surprise bank examinations on
BDBI by BSP;
2. Upon receipt of the "advance warning," Cu would then make the necessary steps to
misrepresent BDBI's status, such as instructing BDBI employees on how to cover the
possible findings/exceptions of the BSP examiner on the books of BDBI, as well as
infusing cash into BDBI's vault in order to make it appear that the cash listed in the
books reflect the actual cash in vault, and thereafter returning such cash to the source;
3. In exchange for such "advance warnings," Cu and/or Zate (Chairman/President of BDBI)
gave Apelo as "professional fees" the aggregate amount of P140,000.00 by depositing
the same to the latter's bank account; and
4. To cover up such amounts given to Apelo, Cu and/or Zate, instructed Gomez to initially
cover the unofficial and unbooked cash disbursements in favor of Apelo by placing such
amounts in BDBI's books as "Other Cash Items," and thereafter, regularize and remove
from BDBI's books such disbursements by including them in the other accounts of BDBI
until they were completely covered. To support such statements, Gomez provided
copies of deposit slips showing that such amount was indeed deposited to Apelo's bank
account. She likewise asserted that in the course of her employment at BDBI, she does
not know of any official or legitimate transactions that BDBI had with Apelo that would
warrant the disbursement of the aforesaid amount in the latter's favor.

PDIC filed a criminal complaint of Direct Bribery and Corruption of Public Officials, and
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019.

The ombudsman dismissed the complaint. No proof that Apelo withdrew the deposited
amount. The “advance warnings” are hearsay.

ISSUE: Is the Ombudsman correct in dismissing the case?

RULING: NO.
The Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the
Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not an
Information should be filed. Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the
Ombudsman's action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion.
The conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings - whether by the Ombudsman or
by a public prosecutor - is geared only to determine whether or not probable cause exists to
hold an accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he committed.
 Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not
there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person
charged should be held responsible for it.
Assuming arguendo that Gomez's statements, as written in her affidavit are indeed
hearsay, there is nevertheless substantial basis to credit the same, considering that she was a
former Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI - a high-ranking officer that may be privy
to delicate transactions such as the purported "under-the-table" deal involving
private respondents. In this regard, it must be emphasized that in determining the elements of
the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to
support a prima facie case against the respondents are required, not absolute
certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than
bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction.
In sum, the Court is convinced that there is probable cause to indict private respondents
of the crimes charged against them. Hence, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ordered the dismissal of the
criminal complaint against private respondents.

7.EFREN G. AMIT, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI, OFFICE
OF THEOMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), and THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, Respondents, G.R.
No. 176172 November 20, 2012

Facts:
The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a special audit on the Multi-Purpose Drying
Pavement (MPDP) projects, under the Grains Production Enhancement Program of the
Department of Agriculture Regional Field Unit No. (DA RFU) 6. COA discovered that 19 MPDP
projects in the Province of Iloilo do not exist, resulting to the loss of P1,130,000.00 on the part
of the government. The construction of 101 MPDP projects in the Province of Iloilo falls short of
the standard measurement of 420 square meters as per approved plan and specifications of DA
RFU 6, Iloilo City, resulting in an estimated loss of P879,301.00 on the part of the government.
The checks representing the reimbursement for the cost of materials for the construction of the
MPDP projects were released to persons other than the payee, without authority from the
recipient, MCPI, in violation of COA Circular 92-386 and Article 1240 of the Revised Penal Code.
The supplies and materials for the construction of the MPDP projects were procured by DA RFU
6, in violation of the Memorandum of Agreement. For these irregularities, eleven (11)
government employees , including Amit, were administratively charged before the Ombudsman
for being allegedly responsible for the ghost projects and the misappropriation.
Amit was a Senior Agriculturist of DA RFU 6, designated to hold the concurrent positions
of Chief of the Regional Agricultural Engineering Group, Iloilo City, and DA Provincial
Coordinator of the Province of Antique for Infrastructure Projects. He approved five issue slips
of materials for the construction of MPDP units and signed the disbursement voucher for the
MPDP project in one of the MPDP units.
The Ombudsman found all the officials so charged guilty of grave misconduct and
dishonesty for conspiring in the falsification of documents to facilitate the disbursement and
misappropriation of the funds intended for the MPDP projects. It imposed on all of the officials
the penalty of dismissal from the public service, with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification
from holding public office. Sixteen (16) of the subject MPDP projects were not implemented,
but the funds intended therefor were disbursed and released. In other words, these projects
turned out to be "ghosts". In some vouchers, the signatures of the MCPI chairpersons and
officers affixed in the memoranda of agreement differ from those attributed to them in the
documents attached to the vouchers.
 Amit argued that he cannot be held liable for falsification because the issue slips, which
were ordinarily used in the requisition and procurement of supplies and materials by the DA
RFU 6, were unnecessary in the implementation of the MPDP projects. He also argued that the
issue slips were not intended to facilitate the release of funds
Issue: Is Amit liable for grave misconduct?
Ruling: Yes.
First, Amit’s acts did not result from a mere failure to exercise the necessary prudence in
complying with the proper procedure. The performance of the complained acts was
discretionary on his part. Amit’s acts were done willfully and deliberately. They were done
without regard to the high positions that he occupied, which impose upon him greater
responsibility, and obliged him to be more circumspect in his actions or in the discharge of his
official duties. Amit inexplicably signed the issue slips despite his alleged knowledge that these
documents were unnecessary. With Amit’s signing of the documents, however, the immediate
release of the funds was facilitated. This indicates shortsightedness on the part of Amit which is
so gross that it cannot be considered a result of indifference or carelessness. Amit simply failed
to conduct himself in the manner expected of an occupant of a high office. In other words, he
failed to act in accordance with the demands of the responsibility that attaches to the office he
was occupying.
Second, the Ombudsman’s finding of conspiracy reveals the crucial role which Amit
played in the commission of fraud with other officials. Amit’s acts were one of the more, if not
the most, indispensable, final, and operative acts that ultimately led to the consummation of
the fraud. No disbursement or release of government funds could happen without Amit’s
imprimatur. The irregularities will not see their fruition if Amit and the other officials involved in
the fraud did not consent to its implementation by making it appear that there were valid
requisitions, deliveries, inspections, pre-auditing and approval of the vouchers and checks paid
to the contractors/suppliers.
Third, Amit’s defense – the alleged reliance on the acts of his subordinates in good
faith – is simply unacceptable. Public office is a public trust and public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives. This
high constitutional standard of conduct is not intended to be mere rhetoric; those in the
public service are enjoined to fully comply with this standard or run the risk of facing
administrative sanctions ranging from reprimand to the extreme penalty of dismissal from
the service. As such, Amit has the duty to supervise his subordinates – he must see to it that his
subordinates have performed their functions in accordance with the law. Hecannot be allowed
to simply interpose this defense, as he is precisely duty-bound to check whether these acts are
regular, lawful and valid, and his full reliance on the acts of his subordinates is antithetical to
the duties imposed by his position on them. The excuse or defense is totally unacceptable, too,
given that the transaction relates to disbursement of public funds, over which great
responsibility attaches.
Fourth, Amit did not wholly rely on the acts of his subordinates. As earlier mentioned,
he performed functions using independent judgment. Amit signed the issue slips despite the
absence of some of the required documents for the release of government funds for the MPDP
projects..
Viewed in these lights, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error of law in
affirming the Ombudsman’s decision. "Misconduct is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
officer. As differentiated from simple misconduct, in grave misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest." "Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the official’s unlawful and
wrongful use of his station or character [reputation] to procure some benefit for himself or for
another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others."
In Manuel v. Judge Calimag, Jr., it was held that by uniform legal definition, it is a
misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as
affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is
necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer x x x It is
settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an
officer must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties
amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge
the duties of the office.
Amit’s acts were well within the scope of his functions. There is no doubt that his
inability to live up to the standards so imposed on him in the performance of his duties is
misconduct. In this case, the misconduct cannot be considered simple misconduct; it is grave
misconduct, considering the presence of the qualifying elements of corrupt motive and flagrant
disregard of the rules taken from a collective consideration of the circumstances of the case.

8. SONIA V. SEVILLE, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Regional Office VI, Iloilo City,
Respondent.

This case provides what it takes to make a government official or employee liable for ghost
projects.
FACTS
CoA filed a complaint against Seville and 11 others, alleged that, as a result of a special audit of
the Post Harvest Component of the Grains Production Enhancement Program of the DA,
particularly the construction of Multi-Purpose Drying Pavements (MPDPs) projects in Iloilo from
January 1, 1995 to June 30, 1999, it was discovered that she signed a ghost MPDP project in
Sto. Rosario, Ajuy, Iloilo.
She signed the disbursement voucher, as required by Memorandum Order 104, Series of 1998,
in view of the absence of the Regional Director and the Assistant Regional Director for
Administration. But she claimed that she acted in good faith, merely relying on the
completeness and genuineness of the supporting documents that were shown to her. She had
no prior knowledge of the MPDPs, which catered to rice production, since she was an Assistant
Regional Director for Fisheries. She admitted, however, not conducting an actual physical
inspection of the project since she believed that it was not her responsibility to do so
ISSUE : whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the Ombudsmans decision that found
petitioner liable for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty for signing the disbursement
voucher for the particular ghost MPDP in Sto. Rosario, Ajuy, Iloilo.

RULING
No. Seville is not liable for grave misconduct.
In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of an established rule must be evident. Misconduct, in the administrative sense, is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action. On the other hand, dishonesty is
intentionally making a false statement in any material fact or the disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive or defraud. Both are considered grave offenses for which the penalty of dismissal is
meted even for first time offenders.
Here, the COA charged petitioner Seville administratively because the government released
funds for that particular ghost project. Seville anchors her innocence on good faith. Good faith
implies honest intent, free from any knowledge of circumstances that ought to have prompted
an individual to undertake an inquiry.
The Court finds, however, that Seville cannot be held liable for grave misconduct. Corruption, as
an element of grave misconduct, consists in the official or employees act of unlawfully or
wrongfully using his position to gain benefit for ones self.
Here, the Court is not convinced that under the circumstances then present, she had depraved
motives.
Seville signed on the rare happenstance that both the Regional Director and the Assistant
Regional Director for Administration were absent. That both signatories were absent when the
Sto. Rosario project was presented to her for signature was a coincidence that cannot be
imputed to her for she could not have orchestrated that for her gain, absent evidence to the
contrary. She did not volunteer for the position nor is there proof that she lobbied for the OIC
designation, it being provided by a DA internal regulation. She is but liable for the lesser offense
of simple misconduct since she should have exercised the necessary prudence to ensure that
the proper procedure was complied with in the release of government funds.
The penalty for simple misconduct is suspension for one month and one day to six months for
the first offense.

9.MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON

JUSTICE
G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011
FACTS:
The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for certiorari
and prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of Representatives
Committee on Justice (public respondent).
July 22, 2010 – Four days before the 15th Congress opened its first session Risa Hontiveros-
Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an
impeachment complaint against Gutierrez, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives
Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.
July 27, 2010 - HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then,
on August 2, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business
August 3, 2010 - Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia,
Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed an impeachment complaint against
Gutierrez endorsed by Representatives Colmenares, Casiño, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus
The House of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings of the 14th Congress. The Secretary General transmitted the Reyes group's
complaint to Speaker Belmonte who, by Memorandum of August 9, 2010, also directed the
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m - during its plenary session, the House of Representatives
simultaneously referred both complaints to the Committee.
After hearing, the Committee, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints
sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the
same time.
After hearing, the Committee, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints,
which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient
in substance.
September 13, 2010 - Gutierrez filed with this Court the present petition with application for
injunctive reliefs.

RULING:

1. Does the SC have the power to determine whether public respondent committed a
violation of the Constitution in the exercise of its discretion relating to impeachment
proceedings? --- YES, under the doctrine of expanded judicial review.

The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the
language of Baker v. Carr, "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity
of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not
to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system
of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act
beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Indubitably, in the present case, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over
the Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution
as the repository of the sovereign will.

2. Whether the petition filed by Gutierrez is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication. –
NO.

In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on, inter alia,
the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to
publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
of the House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for
immediate interpretation.
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two
impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner
cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the
constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated
against an impeachable officer within a period of one year.

3. When is an impeachment complaint deemed initiated?

The term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled
with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by
the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint
may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
4. Whether the Impeachment Rules provide for comprehensible standards in determining
the sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint. – YES.

The Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and
providing that there must be a verified complaint or resolution, and that the substance
requirement is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.
It is also notable that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination
of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary.
This requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of
the Constitution basically merely requires a hearing. In the discharge of its constitutional
duty, the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an
impeachment complaint is vital to effectively carry out the impeachment process,
hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.

5. Whether the petitioner was denied of due process because of the delay in the
publication of the Impeachment Rules. – NO.

Days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010,
public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress
and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules,
admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of
general circulation.

Citing Tanada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that she was deprived of due
process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day
after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise
tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that
Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose
of this section.
There is a statutory difference between promulgation and publication. In
promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Court has invariably required the
publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is
concerned, however, promulgation means the delivery of the decision to the clerk of
court for filing and publication. In the case of administrative agencies, promulgation and
publication likewise take on different meanings as they are part of a multi-stage
procedure in quasi-legislation. As detailed in one case, the publication of implementing
rules occurs after their promulgation or adoption.
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally
understood that is, to make known. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine
on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary
is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision
to the clerk of court for filing and publication. It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal
branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not
prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a
mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
In Neri v. Senate, inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical
directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure.
Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify
the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully
comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in
cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the
 mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would already run or
even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the
effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the
Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints.
Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the
Constitution, merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being
procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive application to pending actions. It is
axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right
of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach
to, nor arise from, procedural laws.[54] In the present case, petitioner fails to allege any
impairment of vested rights.
It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the
rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the
people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender. Even in Neri v.
Senate, concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were not considered
null and void in its entirety.

6. When do we reckon the start of the one-year ban?

Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first
impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on
July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010,
no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.
The act of initiating the complaint means the filing of the impeachment
complaint and the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not
be filed against the same official within a one year period. Therefore, the one-year
period ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is
referred to the House Committee on Justice. Hence, in this case, the HR Committee did
not violate the one-year bar provision of the Constitution when it accepted the second
impeachment complaint after the first impeachment complaint was filed
Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment
proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one
lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there
should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts
burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.

7. Does an impeachment complaint need to allege only one impeachable offense? – NO.

The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with
each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the
Articles of Impeachment. It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not
allege only one impeachable offense.

8. Whether consolidation of the complaints is proper

In rejecting a consolidation, petitioner maintains that the Constitution allows
only one impeachment complaint against her within one year.
Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to
consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that consolidation depends on the
Committee whether to consolidate.
Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet
order a consolidation, the Court will not venture to make a determination on this
matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1,
2010 and September 7, 2010 of public respondent, the House of Representatives
Committee on Justice, are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

11.ANTONIO M. BOLASTIG vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Bolastig is governor of Samar. On August 31, 1989, an information was filed against him
and two others for alleged overpricing of 100 reams of onion skin paper in violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019). The Information alleged:

That on or about June 24, 1986, in the Municipality of Catbalogan, Samar, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ANTONIO
M. BOLASTIG, PEDRO ASON and PRUDENCIO MACABENTA, all public officers, duly
appointed and qualified as such, being the OIC Governor, Provincial Treasurer and
Property Officer respectively, all of the Province of Samar, and being members of Bids
and Awards Committee responsible for the purchase of office supplies for the Provincial
Government of Samar and while in the performance of their respective positions,
confederating and mutually helping one another and through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully enter into a purchase
contract with REYNALDO ESPARAGUERRA, a private citizen, for the purchase of certain
office supplies, namely: one hundred (100) reams of Onion Skin size 11" x 17" at a unit
price of Five Hundred Fifty pesos (P550.00) or a total price of Fifty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P55,000.00), which contract was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government as the prevailing unit price for said item was only Fifty-Five Pesos (P55.00)
or a total price of Five Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P5,500.00), thereby causing undue
injury to the government in the total amount of Forty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P49,500.00).

Petitioner was arraigned on January 5, 1993, whereupon he entered a plea of "not

guilty."
On January 25, 1993, Special Prosecution Officer III Wilfredo Orencia moved for
petitioner's suspension, citing sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 which provides in part:
Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Petitioner opposed the motion, arguing inter alia that:
2. Upon a bare invocation of the foregoing provision, the prosecution would have this
Honorable Court issue an Order suspending the accused, as if suspension of a public
officer is a mindless and meaningless exercise, and is imposed without regard to the
spirit and intent of the law upon which it is based.
3. Indeed, it cannot be simply assumed that laws are enacted and followed without a
particular purpose to be served, especially when a mechanical application shall injure
not only the public official concerned, but the entire electorate as well.1
 The Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's argument and ordered the suspension of
petitioner from office for a period of 90 days. It held that preventive suspension is mandatory
under sec. 13, of Rep. Act No. 3019, pursuant to which all that is required is for the court to
make a finding that the accused stands charged under a valid information "for any of the
above-described crimes for the purpose of granting or denying the sought for suspension.”

ISSUE: Whether Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion in ordering the
preventive suspension of petitioner

RULING: NO.
It is now settled that sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory for the
Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging
violation of that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property is filed. The court trying a case has neither
discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the
accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue
committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended he
may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same
way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether
the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court.
The duration of preventive suspension is thus coeval with the period prescribed for
deciding administrative disciplinary cases. If the case is decided before ninety days, then the
suspension will last less than ninety days, but if the case is not decided within ninety days, then
the preventive suspension must be up to ninety days only. Similarly, as applied to criminal
prosecutions under Republic Act No. 3019, preventive suspension will last for less than ninety
days only if the case is decided within that period; otherwise, it will continue for ninety days.
The duration of preventive suspension will, therefore, vary to the extent that it is contingent on
the time it takes the court to decide the case but not on account of any discretion lodged in the
court, taking into account the probability that the accused may use his office to hamper his
prosecution.
Finally, the fact that petitioner's preventive suspension may deprive the people of
Samar of the services of an official elected by them, at least temporarily, is not a sufficient basis
for reducing what is otherwise a mandatory period prescribed by law. The vice governor, who
has likewise been elected by them, will act as governor. Indeed, even the Constitution
authorizes the suspension for not more than sixty days of members of Congress found guilty of
disorderly behavior, thus rejecting the view expressed in one case that members of the
legislature could not be suspended because in the case of suspension, unlike in the case of
removal, the seat remains filled but the constituents are deprived of representation.

12. MILAGROS L. DIAZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

Petitioner, who was bonded for P100,000.00, was found to have made cash payments in the
total amount of six thousand one hundred seventy-one pesos and twenty three centavos
(P6,171.23). The audit team also found petitioner to have sold postage stamps which she had
failed to record in her cash book, and since Quijada neither considered the cash items as having
been validly disbursed, he reported that petitioner had incurred a total cash shortage of
P14,191.63. He then referred the matter to the Regional Director of the Bureau of Posts. The
Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner of the crime of malversation. The failure of a public officer
to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing fund or property to personal uses.

ISSUE: WON Diaz is liable for malversation of public funds.

RULING: NO. The elements of malversation of public funds are that (a) the offender is a public
officer, (b) he has custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office, (c) the funds or property are public funds or propertyfor which he is accountable, and,
most importantly, (d) he has appropriated, taken, misappropriated or consented, or, through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
This Court has repeatedly said that when the absence funds is not due to the personal use
thereof by the accused, the presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is
deemed never to have existed at all.
The evidence submitted, just to the contrary, would point out that not a centavo of the so-
called missing funds was spent for personal use, a matter that was later acknowledged by the
Special Prosecutor who thereupon recommended the withdrawal of the information earlier
filed against petitioner. The records would show that petitioners use of the cash in her
possession for operational expenses was founded on valid authority. COA Circular No. 76-37
allowed postmasters to make payments for gasoline, spare parts and minor repairs of vehicles
subject to reimbursement by the Regional Office. She advanced payments of salaries of
employees on the basis of the Circular No. 82-21 issued by the Postmaster General. The
Regional Office, through the chief of the finance section, certified that all the payments made
by petitioner were legitimate operational expenses.
Since the audit examination left much to be desired in terms of thoroughness and
completeness as there were accounts which were not considered, the same cannot be made
the basis for holding petitioner liable for malversation. Hopefully, the Court is not being
pertinent if it were to urge COA, in the exercise of its awesome powers, to act with extreme
care and judicious consideration of all attendant circumstances in order to ensure that innocent
public officials may not have to undergo the trial and the pains that always go with an
indictment for an offense. Generally, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive
upon this Court but there are established exceptions to that rule, such as, sans preclusion,
when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture;
(2) the inference made is manifestly an error or founded on a mistake; (3) there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings
of fact are premised on a want of evidence are contradicted by evidence on record. In these
instances, this Court is bound to review the facts in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The
case at bar, as may be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, is one such instance.

13 LEDESMA V. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Petitioner Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the Chairman of the First Division of the Board of
Special Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). In a letter-complaint
filed by Augusto Somalio with the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) of the Office of the
Ombudsman, an investigation was requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the extension
of the Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs) of two (2) foreign nationals. The FIIB investigation
revealed seven (7) other cases of TRV extensions tainted with similar irregularities.
As a result, the FIIB, as nominal complainant, filed before the Administrative
Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman a formal complaint (criminal for 9
counts of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for falsification of public
documents; administrative for 9 counts of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Falsification of Public
Documents and Gross Neglect of Duty) against herein petitioner.
In a Joint resolution, Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn Reyes resolved the
administrative case by suspending Atty. Ledesma for one year which the Ombudsman
approved. The Ombudsman also approved a Resolution dismissing the criminal charges against
petitioner for insufficiency of evidence. The CA affirmed petitioner’s suspension but reduced
the period to 6 months and 1 day without pay
Petitioner insists that it was the BOC which approved the questioned applications for
the extension of the TRVs. He denies that he misled or deceived the BOC into approving these
applications and argues that the BOC effectively ratified his actions and sanctioned his conduct
when it approved the subject applications. Petitioner adds that he acted in good faith and the
government did not suffer any damage as a result of his alleged administrative lapse.
Issues and Ruling:
WON the CA was correct
Yes.
In his attempt to escape liability, petitioner undermines his position in the BID and his
role in the processing of the subject applications. But by his own admission, it appears that the
BSI not only transmits the applications for TRV extension and its supporting documents, but
more importantly, it interviews the applicants and evaluates their papers before making a
recommendation to the BOC. The BSI reviews the applications and when it finds them in order,
it executes a Memorandum of Transmittal to the BOC certifying to the regularity and propriety
of the applications.
Equally untenable is the contention that the BOC’s approval of the defective
applications for TRV extension cured any infirmities therein and effectively absolved
petitioner’s administrative lapse. The instant administrative case pertains to the acts of
petitioner as Chairman of the First Division of the BSI in processing nine (9) defective
applications, independent of and without regard to the action taken by the BOC. It does not
impugn the validity of the TRV extensions as to encroach upon the authority of the BID on
immigration matters. The main thrust of the case is to determine whether petitioner
committed any misconduct, nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance in the performance of
his duties.
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not commit any error in finding the
petitioner guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service and reducing petitioner’s
period of suspension to 6 months and 1 day without pay, taking into account the education and
length of service of petitioner.

WON the OMBUDSMAN’S resolution finding petitioner administratively liable constitutes an

indirect encroachment into the power of the Bureau of Immigration over immigration matters
No.
The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987
Constitution. The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations. Foremost among its powers is the authority to investigate
and prosecute cases involving public officers and employees.
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, provided for
the structural and functional organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. RA 6770 mandated
the Ombudsman and his deputies not only to act promptly on complaints but also to enforce
the administrative, civil and criminal liability of government officers and employees in every
case where the evidence warrants to promote efficient service by the Government to the
people.
The point of contention is the binding power of any decision or order that emanates
from the Office of the Ombudsman after it has conducted its investigation. Under Section 13(3)
of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions, and duties:
...
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
Petitioner insists that the word "recommend" be given its literal meaning; that is, that the
Ombudsman’s action is only advisory in nature rather than one having any binding effect,
citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, thus:
... Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the
Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the
government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under
Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman can only "recommend" the removal of the public official or
employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned.

Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the
failure of the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the
administrative case. The statement that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at
best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible
to varying interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited
as a doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.

The provisions of RA 6770 support public respondents’ theory. Section 15 is

substantially the same as Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution which provides for the
powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman. We draw attention to subparagraph 3, to wit:
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions and duties:
...
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a
duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That the
refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the
Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer
or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a
duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said
officer;
 We note that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove, suspend, demote,
fine, censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee – akin to the questioned issuances in the
case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of
the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is
a strong indication that the Ombudsman’s "recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature
but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as
usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. It
has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any
illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the
Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the
provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be
coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID.

It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to provide the Office
of the Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that it can effectively carry out its mandate
as protector of the people against inept and corrupt government officers and employees. The
Office was granted the power to punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. It
was given disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and
its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only of impeachable
officers, members of Congress and the Judiciary). Also, it can preventively suspend any officer
under its authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants.

Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical Ombudsman model
whose function is merely to receive and process the people’s complaints against corrupt and
abusive government personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is
armed with the power to prosecute erring public officers and employees, giving him an active
role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses that
may be committed by such officers and employees. The legislature has vested him with broad
powers to enable him to implement his own actions.

14. BAGONG KAPISANAN VS. DOLOT GR No 179054, Sept. 5, 2012 Mendoza, J

FACTS:
Brgy. 901 and Brgy 902, represented by their respective Chairmen (Azer Dolot and Silverio
Tanada) and Inpart Engineering, represented by Antonio Benzon, signed a MOA formulated to
address the repair and rehabilitation of the water system of Punta Tenement and to manage
the water distribution in the tenement as well as to handle the payment of the back accounts of
its tenants to Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) Punta Tenement, an
association formed by the residents in Punta Sta. Ana, Manila, filed a complaint for Dishonesty
and Corruption before the Office of the Ombudsman against their brgy chairmen and other
brgy kagawads. It alleged that the respondent defraud the tenants by not remitting to MWSS
the agreed brgy share of P0.125 or 50% of P0. 25/liter container from the cost of water
collection paid by the tenement residents which was intended to pay the back account to
MWSS as instructed by the MOA. Ombudsman found them all guilty of Dishonesty and imposed
upon them the penalty of dismissal from service. MR was filed but the same was denied. The
respondents appealed to the CA but the petition was granted. Punta Tenement filed an MR
alleging that the COA clearly demonstrated the respondents' acts of corruption when they
submitted improvised, not official, receipt of collections of the Patubig project. Likewise, the
Ombudsman filed its MR asking for the re-evaluation of the CA's decision. CA partly granted
Punta's MR and held that the respondents were indeed remiss in their duties but the penalty of
dismissal would be too harsh since that the collections were spent for noble Barangay projects.
It thus imposed a penalty of suspension.

ISSUES:
1. Are they guilty of Dishonesty?
2. Is the penalty correct?

HELD:
1. Yes. Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. Here, the supposed dishonesty
was convincingly established. Based on the contract, both barangays were to receive P. 25/20
liter as their share in the water distribution arrangement of which 50% was allocated for the
payment of back account with MWSS, while 50% was earmarked to their other barangay
related projects. The two respondents cannot feign ignorance of the fact that their chosen
people acted as collectors for the water distribution set-up and had the first access to the
money collected before the money was supposed to be turned over to Inpart less their
commission /share or that they could have easily effected the proper recording of payments
and allocation of shares and securee the money for the MWSS repayment. Further, the MOA
provides that they have a say on who should be appointed as arguardors or collectors of the
water distribution set-up. These nonfeasance seriously tainted their integrity as public servants.
The findings of fact of the office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by
substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight specially when they are affirmed
by the CA. In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required to support findings.
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. All circumstances here point to the in excusable misfeasance of Dolot and
Tanada. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one's ability to perform his
duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee.
The underlying reason is because when a public officer or government employee is disciplined,
the object sought is not the punishment of such officer or employee but the improvement of
public service and the preservation of public's faith and confidence in the government. As
public officials, Dolot and Tanada are expectes to exhibit the highest degree of dedication in
deference to their foremost duty of accountability to the people. The Constitution sanctifies the
principle that public office is a public trust, and enjoins all officers and employees to serve with
the highest degree of integrity, responsibility, loyalty and efficiency.
2. No. Under Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service classifies dishonesty as a grave offense punishable with dismissal from service even for
the first offense. It carries with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits
and the perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service, unless
provided in the decision. Absent any mitigating circumstance (physical illness, good faith,
education, length of service in government, and other analogous circumstances), as in this case,
the Court has no disposition except to impose the penalty of dismissal.
3. The court upheld the dismissal of the complaint against the other respondents for lack of
evidence even in the slightest degree that they had a direct hand in the mishandling of the
tenement's patubig project. They merely signed the resolution approving the MOA in their
capacities as Brgy. Kagawads, a laudable remedy to alleviate the plight of the Punta Tenement
members.
15.CORONA V. SENATE 678 SCRA 458, 2012

Facts: In 2011, an impeachment complaint was filed against then Chief Justice Renato Corona,
charging him with culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and
corruption. A caucus was held by the House and the impeachment was submitted to the
Committee on Justice. On the members of the House voted with 188 signing and endorsing it.
The next day, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate. This complaint alleged the
following:

a. His failure to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities and net
worth as required under the Constitution
b. His failure to meet and observe the stringent standards under the Constitution
that provides that a member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence in allowing the Supreme Court to act on mere
letters filed by a counsel which caused the issuance of flip-flopping decisions in final and
executory cases
c. In creating an excessive entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her
appointment of his wife to office, and in discussing with litigants regarding cases
pending before the Supreme Court; when he blatantly disregarded the principle of
separation of powers by issuing a status quo ante order against the House of
Representatives in the case concerning the impeachment of then Ombudsman
Merceditas Gutierrez
d. Through wanton arbitrariness and partiality in consistently disregarding the
principle of res judicata in the cases involving the 16 newly-created cities, and the
promotion of Dinagat Island into a province
e. By arrogating unto himself and to a committee he created, the authority and
jurisdiction to improperly investigate a justice of the Supreme Court for the purpose of
exculpating him. Such authority and jurisdiction is properly reposed by the Constitution
in the House of Representatives via impeachment
f. Through his partiality in granting a temporary restraining order (TRO) in favor
of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and her husband in order to give them an
opportunity to escape prosecution and to frustrate the ends of justice, and in distorting
the Supreme Court decision on the effectivity of the TRO in view of a clear failure to
comply with the conditions of the Supreme Court’s own TRO
g. When he failed and refused to account for the Judiciary Development Fund
and Special Allowance for the Judiciary (SAJ) collections
Corona filed his answer contending that the “blitzkrieg” fashion with which the
impeachment complaint was signed by the members of the House of Representatives and it
was immediately transferred to the Senate was all part of a move by then President Aquino and
his partymates to oust him from his position as Chief Justice and that the charges against him
were baseless.
In 2012, the Senate commenced proceedings against Corona. Both parties submitted
evidence and memoranda regarding the SALNs of Corona. The impeachment court then issued
a resolution allowing the prosecution to submit evidence regarding the allegations of failure to
disclose SALNs and failure to include properties in his SALN. It also disallowed the introduction
of evidence on ill-gotten wealth, citing that the Court would be guided by the legal
presumptions on the nature of the property or asset that may be proven to belong to Corona.
The Impeachment court subsequently issued a resolution granting the prosecution’s request to
subpoena the responsible officer of Philippine Savings Bank or PSBAnk and Bank of the
Philippine Islands or BPI for them to testify and submit records on Corona’s bank accounts.
PSBank filed a petition for certiorari against this subpoena.
Corona then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to enjoin the
proceedings of the impeachment court, the officers of the banks from presenting documents
and testifying on his and his family’s bank accounts, and to void the proceedings of the
Impeachment court. He alleged that the impeachment court committed grave abuse of
discretion when:
a. It proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint filed by Representatives whose
complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of probable cause;
b. It did not strike out the charges of failure to disclose assets which, aside from being a
"hodge-podge" of multiple charges, do not constitute allegations in law, much less ultimate
facts, being all premised on suspicion or hearsay; assuming arguendo that the retention of the
allegation some properties were not disclosed is correct, the ruling of the Impeachment Court
to retain it effectively allows the introduction of evidence as vehicle to prove the allegation of
accumulating ill-gotten wealth and therefore its earlier resolution was nothing more than a
hollow relief, bringing no real protection to petitioner;
c. It allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of alleged corruption and
unexplained wealth which violates petitioner’s right to due process because first, Art. II of the
Impeachment complaint (Failure to Disclose SALN) does not mention "graft and corruption" or
unlawfully acquired wealth as grounds for impeachment, and second, it is clear under Sec. 2,
Art. XI of the Constitution that "graft and corruption" is a separate and distinct ground from
"culpable violation of the Constitution" and "betrayal of public trust"; and;
d. It issued the subpoena for the production of petitioner’s alleged bank accounts as
requested by the prosecution despite the same being the result of an illegal act ("fruit of the
poisonous tree") considering that those documents submitted by the prosecution violates the
absolute confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign Currency
Deposits Act) which is also penalized under Sec. 10 thereof. Petitioner thus prayed for the
following reliefs:
Corona also sought to inhibit Justices Carpio and Sereno for partiality. This motion was
denied by the Court. Corona also later filed a Supplemental Petition claiming that his right to
due process was violated because certain Senator Judges have lost their cold neutrality. The
Solicitor General, for the respondents, filed a comment that Corona’s petition before the
Supreme Court raises matters purely political in character which may be decided or resolved
only by the Senate and HOR, with the manifestation that the comment is being filed by the
respondents "without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Honorable Supreme
Court and without conceding the constitutional and exclusive power of the House to initiate all
cases of impeachment and of the Senate to try and decide all cases of impeachment." Citing the
case of Nixon v. United States, respondents contend that to allow a public official being
impeached to raise before this Court any and all issues relative to the substance of the
impeachment complaint would result in an unnecessarily long and tedious process that may
even go beyond the terms of the Senator-Judges hearing the impeachment case. Such scenario
is clearly not what the Constitution intended.
ISSUE:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail matters or
incidents arising from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief for alleged
violations of right to due process of the person being tried by the Senate sitting as
Impeachment Court.
HELD: Yes, the court’s jurisdiction may be invoked Corona. However the petition was dismissed
for being moot as Corona was convicted and he has vacated his office without any protest
Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy,"
was foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions
with the greatest danger that "the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength
of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt." Given their concededly
political character, the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of
utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while
preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this
jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government, including those
traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if
tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious
crimes or misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of
power, impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through
the influence of English common law on the Framers of the US Constitution and adopted by our
own Constitution.
Here, Corona was impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in
a manner that he claims was accomplished with undue haste and under a complaint which is
defective for lack of probable cause. Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with
the trial under the said complaint, and in the alleged partiality exhibited by some Senator-
Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during the hearings. On the other hand,
respondents contend that the issues raised in the Supplemental Petition regarding the behavior
of certain Senator-Judges in the course of the impeachment trial are issues that do not concern,
or allege any violation of, the three express and exclusive constitutional limitations on the
Senate’s sole power to try and decide impeachment cases. They argue that unless there is a
clear transgression of these constitutional limitations, this Court may not exercise its power of
expanded judicial review over the actions of Senator-Judges during the proceedings. By the
nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator-Judges
are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during
the trial and as such, is a political question
The Court cited the case of Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. where it ruled that the power of judicial review in this
jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, the Court
resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment
complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly a violation of the due process
clause and of the one-year bar provision.
Here, petitioner asked the Court to determine whether respondents committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of their functions
and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require
corrective measures from the Court.

16.MONTALLANA V. OMBUDSMAN, 678 SCRA 458, 2012

Facts: In 2001, a fire destroyed the Manor hotel in Kamias, Quezon City, killing 74 people and
injuring several others. The office of the ombudsman’s Fact-Finding and Intelligence bureau
found that the fire was caused by the hotel’s faulty electric wiring and the gross negligence of
the public officials of the local government of Quezon City by failing to conduct an annual
inspection of the hotels electric systems, by failing to have a copy of its electrical plans, and that
the electrical inspectors, including Monatallana, only indicated 89 air-conditioning units
showing a great disparity as to the hotels true electric load, and for failing to report that 4
electrical meters of the hotel were disconnected by MERALCO due to jumper connections.

Montallana and his companions were preventively suspended. In his defense,

Montallana argued that as Chief of the Electrical division, all inspections were regularly made,
that he signed the inspections in good faith, and that, as a superior officer, he cannot be liable
for the acts of his subordinates. The Ombudsman eventually found him guilty and dismissed
him from service and that being already retired, his benefits be returned.

Montallana’s motion for reconsideration and appeal to the CA were both denied, with
CA reasoning out that, as the final approving authority of the electrical division, Montallana
should have seen to it that his subordinates are performing their duties effectively and verified
their reports.

Issue: Is Montallana guilty of gross negligence?

Held: Yes.
Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want
of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences,
insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive
and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property. In cases involving public officials,
there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.

The Court also ruled that while it is true that in several cases, the absence of substantial
evidence of gross negligence of the petitioner, administrative liability could not be based on the
principle of command responsibility. However, in the case at bar, the findings of the Office of
the Ombudsman, as affirmed by the CA, clearly establish the negligence of petitioner in the
performance of his duties as head of the Electrical Division.

Here, among the duties and responsibilities attached to the Electrical Division of Quezon
City is to conduct annual inspection of existing electrical installations within the jurisdiction of
Quezon City. Thus, it was incumbent on petitioner as head of the Electrical Division to see to it
that proper annual inspections are conducted on the existing electrical installations in Quezon
City. Records would disclose that the charges against petitioner were supported by the
evidence on record: There was no electrical inspection conducted for 1995, 1999, 2000, 2001,
the hotel did not apply and secure a business permit for year 1996, 1997, 1998 and it has no
business permit at the time of the incident. Having no application for a business permit, there
was likewise no referral for an electrical inspection to the Electrical Division, which is a Standard
Operating Procedure in processing applications for business permits. Thus, for these years,
there can be no electrical inspection conducted.

The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based
on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. From the foregoing,
petitioner's negligence in the performance of his duties as a public servant was well
established. In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt
is substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

The Court reiterated that a public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. As a
public servant, petitioner is tasked to provide efficient, competent, and proper service to the
public. Public officials and employees are under obligation to perform the duties of their offices
honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their ability. In the case at bar, petitioner miserably failed
to perform his duties as a public servant.

17.GONZALES V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014)

Facts: A formal charge for Grave misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and
physical injuries) as filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police district Senior Inspector (P/S
Insp. Rolando Mendoza and four others. While said cases were still pending, the Office of the
Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of
petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication.

On February 16, 2009, upon the recommendation of petitioner Emilio Gonzales III, a Decision
finding Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was
approved by the Ombudsman. They filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

On December 14, 2009, the pleadings mentioned and the records of the case were assigned for
review and recommendation to Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Dennis L. Garcia,
who released a draft Order on April 5, 2010 for appropriate action by his immediate superior,
Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in turn, signed and forwarded said Order to petitioner
Gonzalez's office on April 27, 2010. Not more than ten (10) days after, more particularly on May
6, 2010, petitioner endorsed the Order, together with the case records, for final approval by
Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in whose office it remained pending for final review and
action when Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23,
2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.

In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, a public outcry against the blundering of
government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review
Committee (IIRC). The IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and
inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing
Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any
justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for
reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The
inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction
precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from service.
Hence the petition.

Issue: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise Administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the
constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
Ruling: YES. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting
both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an
external authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the power of
administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the
least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all
government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and
balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and
his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.

By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law. While the removal of the
Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by
impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional
provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special
Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap
in the law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact,
the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all
other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not
subject to impeachment.

The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is
Implied from his Power to Appoint. In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied
from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the afore said officials in the Office of
the Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as
a military watchdog
looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in the
military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's own role as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore,
to grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the
military and other law enforcement offices.

Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not Diminish the
Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. The independence which the Office of the
Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its
constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution secures for the
Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than
that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the
office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."

Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned acts, falling short
of constitutional standards, do not constitute betrayal of public trust. Petitioner's act of
directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without citing
any reason there for cannot, by itself, be considered a manifestation of his undue interest in
the case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cognizance of
cases upon the request of concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the
constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the
people."The factual circumstances that the case was turned over to the Office of the
Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that administrative liability was pronounced against P/S
Insp. Mendoza even without the private complainant
verifying the truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately implemented; or that
the motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine months cannot
be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the lack of
evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of the parties to the
case that could have
impelled him to act as he did. There was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took
place, or of any corrupt intention or questionable motivation. The OP's pronouncement of
administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the
corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of
duty or misconduct in office do not amount
to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with authority,
cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional
wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.

Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of backwages

corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the
Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case
against petitioner.