IADC/SPE

IADC/SPE 17256

A Shallow Gas Research Program

by M. Grin rod,* 0. Haaland,* and B. Ellingsen, Statoil AJS
* SPE Members

Copyright 1988, IADC/SPE Drilling Conference

This paper was prepared for presentation at the 1988 IADC/SPE Drilling Conference held in Dallas, Texas, February 28-March 2, 1988.

This paper was selected for presentation by an IADC/SPE Program <?ommittee following review of information contained in an abstract submitted by
the author(s). Contents of the paper, as presented, have not been rev1ewed by the Society of Petroleum Engineers or International Association of Drill-
ing C~ntrac.tors and are subject to correction by the author(s). The material, as presented, does not necessarily reflect any position of the IADC or
SPE, 1ts officers, or members. Papers presented at IADC/SPE meetings are subject to publication review by Editorial Committees of the IADC and
SPE. Permission to copy is restricted to an abstract of not more than 300 words. Illustrations may not be copied. The abstract should contain conspicu-
ous acknowledgment of where and by whom the paper is presented. Write Publications Manager, SPE, P .0. Box 833836, Richardson, TX 75083-3836.
Telex, 730989 SPEDAL.

Introduction
A SHALLOW GAS RESEARCH PROGRAM
Up to the present (nov. 19&7) shallow gas
has been reported in 155 of the 567
Abstract exploration and appraisal wells drilled on
the Norwegian Continental Shelf.
Operational problems associated with the Seven blowouts and a number of kicks caused
occurence of shallow gas in offshore by shallow gas have been recorded.
drilling led Statoil to initiate a massive On the night of October 6th, 1985, a gas
research program. The program consisted of blowout occured on the semi-submersible
the following subprojects: Revised drilling "West Vanguard", during exploration
procedures, shallow gas drainage, drilling in block 6407/6, Haltenbanken,
multistage cementing, gas tight cement, Norwegian sector.
diverter systems, rig ventilation systems The well blew out from a shallow gas sand
and emergency anchor release. while drilling ·the 311mm (12 1/4") pilot
Emphasis in this paper is placed on the hole at 523m RKB, with the marine riser
experience from the West Vanguard blowout, installed. The diverter system and riser
and results from the subprojects on failed as a result of the extremely large
diverter systems, drilling procedures, flow of gas and solids.
quick anchor release and ventilation The eroded flow diverter system and slip
systems. joint packing leak allowed gas to flow into
Other papers (reference 1, 2) give the drilling platform where the gas
information on development of gas tight subsequently ignited.
cement, stage cementing and additional The resulting explosion and fire caused
background on shallow gas drainage. considerable damage. The platform was
quickly evacuated. One person was lost.
Damage to the rig amounted to several
hundred million Norwegian kroner.

629
 2 A SiiALI!M GAS RESEARCH PROGRAM
The investigation after the West Vanguard
blowout disclosed that significant
improvements were needed in diverter
systems. It was further evident that
riser-less drilling would be the best
option under certain conditions. Air
ventilation systems had an influence on gas
distribution, and the fire and explosion
pattern. The drilling procedures needed to
be updated, and rig crews educated on the
dangers of shallow gas.
Shallow Gas
Gas sands at shallow depths have frequently
been penetrated. These sands have been
encountered as shallow as lOOm below the
seabed. Predicting the exact presence of
shallow gas sands from seismic or sparker
investigations is still unreliable, and
their existence is often exclusively
disclosed by MWD and/or wire line logs.
Shallow gas is primarily localized in sand
lenses surrounded by shale in the upper
tertiary sediments.
The gas pressure in these pockets is
normally at or slightly above the normal
water gradient. Since the thickness of the
sand pockets are normally limited to a
maximum·of lOrn, the actual over-pressure in
excess of a hydrostatic water gradient, is
small.
Because of the low pressure regime,
spontaneous kicks with the riser installed
seldom occur. The risks of losing primary
control lies mainly in swabbing or when
lost circulation occurs.
The West Vanguard blowout is assumed to be
a consequence of loss of hydrostatic head
caused by gas expansion in the riser.
630
S~£17256
Erosive wear test of Diverter System
Compo]1ents
The West Vanguard blowout clearly
demonstrated the weakness of diverter
systems. Holes were worn in the diverter
bends in a period of less than 20 minutes.
The largest hole was located in the first
bend where the diverter line was tied to
the flowline.
At this point the sand had cut its way
through other piping and into the shale
shaker room. The second bend in the
diverter line was also eroded.
Based on these facts an experimental
investigation has been performed to
determine the most suitable geometry for
diverter components, and the relative
erosion and abrasion resistance
characteristics of selected materials.
The test philosophy was based on comparing
the various coatings as well as piping
geometry. Identical components with
different coating were placed in a test
loop to obtain comparable test conditions.
Common mild steel was used as a reference
material. In the appendix the mathematical
theory behind these tests is discussed.
In summary the test results were:
Particle velocity is the most
significant factor on erosive wear.
Particle size has very little influence
on the value of specific erosion.
Increase of bending diameter reduces
the value of specific erosion.
Hardfacing extends the lifetime of
bends.
Efforts should be made to design
diverter systems as straight as
possible, avoiding bends.
sP6 17256 M. GRINR(£?D A.(Z). HALAND
Components and Bend Coating
The test programme included some 53
components. This comprised of 37 bends, 10
hoses and 6 valves. In addition to the
reference steel bends tested, a total of
five different bend surface coatings were
examined for erosive wear resistance.
Test Rig
The erosive wear test was carried out in a
closed test loop ~here high abrasive silica
sand was recirculated. One mobile diesel
3
compressor capable of delivering 0.7lm /s
of free air at a pressure of 10 bar was
used to accelerate the sand to a maximum
velocity of lOOm/s.
Comparison of surface coatings
One of the hardfacing materials showed
significantly better restistance to erosive
wear than the other materials. This
hardfacing material contained 60 percent by
weight tungsten carbide bonding in an
erosive-corosive resistant alloyd matrix.
The amount of tungsten carbide is of great
importance. Tests also were performed with
65 percent by weight tungsten carbide and
these showed even better results. However
cracking was more extensive than for the
other materials. This is due to the
thermal strain during the hardfacing
process, and can be improved by reducing
the hardness in the matrix.
The other hardfacing materials tested were
not significantly better than plain steel.
Bend Diameter
Since two 90° bends with different
diameters were tested, the analysis
provided a direct comparison of the
influence of bend diameter. The results
showed that the long radius bend had a
B. ELLINGSEN 3
significantly longer life than the short
radius bend. The long radius bend with a
bending diameter of 0.83m had almost a 50%
improvement in life span compared with the
short radius bend with a bending diameter
of 0.26m.
Bend Angle
It is difficult to isolate the influence of
the bend angle since the tested bends had
different diameters. It would appear,
however, that the 60° bend tested with a
diameter similar to the short radius 90°
bend, will last about 80 % longer than the
equivalent 90° bends.
Diverter Design
During the erosive wear testing it became
evident that the reinforcement of diverter
components will not provide an acceptable
level of lifetime within economical or
practical limits. The hardfacing material
that performed best extended the life by
about three and a half times compared with
mild steel.
Consequently every effort should be made in
designing a more satisfactory diverter
system. Geometry being the most important
factor.
Discontinuties in the diverter line must be
avoided; such as bends or changes in pipe
diameter.
Where bends are unavoidable, these should
be hardfaced. The tests have proved the
importance of material selection.
In addition the straight section following
a discountinuity should be hardfaced at a
length of approx. 1,5 mas this section
will be exposed to heavy turbulent flow and
erosive wear.
Diverter valves should be located before,
or at a sufficient distance from any
discontinuty.
631
 4 A SHALLOW GAS RESEARCH PROORAM SPe 17256

Where flanges are used, these should be The potential fire hazard from an
machined and matched to ensure that the
underwater release of shallow gas was
inside surface is perfectly smooth and free
investigated.
from steps and ridges.
The testing proved that the most important
At the West Vanguard blowout the fire on
parameter effecting erosive wear is the
the ocean surface had a diameter of
particle velocity, and this parameter can
approximately 60 meters. The waterdepth was
be controlled by mounting a choke at the
220 meters giving a central gas zone of
ends of the diverter lines. On jackups and
some 35% of the water depth.
fixed platforms where the diverter system
Based on the experience from the actual
in most cases is the only protection if gas
blowout, theoretical simulations were
flow occurs, it is of great importance to
performed to investigate gas concentrations
reduce the flow rate.
on the ocean surface and above.

Figure 1 is a projection of the gas cloud

Development of drilling procedures
resulting from the gas flow from the 762mm
(30") wellhead after the marine riser was
The top hole drilling procedures for
disconnected on the West Vanguard accident.
floaters were reviewed. This changes can
This projection indicates the height of the
be summarised as follows:
flame up to 1 meter above sea level, which
seems to be a fair assumption of what was
setting depth of the 762mm casing (30")
actually seen at the location. Figures 2
based on
and 3 show two different projections with
expected leak off
wind velocity reduced to 3m/s. Here it
20 inch setting depth
clearly shows how the shape, height and
site survey results
concentration of gas is highly dependent
increased mudweight in pilot hole to
upon the effect of wind, and that in this
min. 1.10 SG when drilling with marine
instance the concentration is within the
riser
limits of flameability up to a height of
MWD tool run on slick bottom hole 25 meters. However these figures support
assembly the fact that upgrading in design and
max. 30 m/hour rate of penetration layout of the ventilation system is
important, since in certain instances
Later the authorities' requirements led to dangerous concentrations of gas can be
an amendment in the maritime certificates present at 15-25 meters above sea level.
of all Norwegian flagged drilling vessels. Reducing the amount of gas by 50% and
Stating that surface diverter systems waterdepth to BOrn, dangerous concentrations
should only be used in the short period, of gas up to 20m above sea level can arise,
until the riser is disconnected. This in (ref. fig. 4).
addition to the fact that several problems
were experienced in the disconnection of
the marine riser led to a philosophy where
riserless drilling is accepted by Statoil
as a safe and co9t effective top hole
drilling procedure under certain
conditions.

632
 M. GRINRQ)D
The fact that dangerous concentrations of
gas on a rig are not solved by drilling
riserless, led to extra precautions when
drilling through seismic anomalies without
the marine riser installed. These can be
summarised; by displacing the hole to
sufficient mud weight, and combining the
design of the hole size and bottom hole
assembly so that dynamic kill is possible.
When shallow gas is encountered the pilot
hole will be plugged back and 20" c~sing
set immediately above. The conventional
476rnrn (18 3/4") BOP stack is then installed
allowing the gas zone to be drilled with
BOP control. In this case setting of a
406mrn (16") liner may be necessary. To
avoid this time consuming operation Statoil
is now in the process of incorporating a
subsea shallow gas stack (SGS), which will
allow setting of the 508rnrn (20") through
shallow gas zones with BOP control.
The SGS consists of an upper section and a
lower section (fig. 5). The lower section
has a 762mrn (30") wellhead connector with
flushing ports, a spool with kill valve and
a "dump" valve, 30" annular BOP,
accumrnulator bottles, adaptor and
framework. The lower section has a minimum
inner diameter of 762mrn (30").
The upper section consists of a 762nun (30")
connector capable of disconnection under
extreme conditions, a shear ram, flex
joint, choke/kill line, riser adaptor and
framework. Minimum inner diameter of the
upper section is 476mrn (18 3/4").
If gas cannot be controlled, or if
formation breaks down, the upper section of
the SGS will be released by means of the
specially selected connector/disconnector
system.
633
B. ELLINGSEN 5
Special arrangements and modifications· in
the use of a shallow gas stack:
It will be necessary to be able to
drift an existing specific profile on a
4 76rnrn · (18 3 I 4 ") wellhead housing
through the 7621nrn (30") ID of the SGS.
Flushing arrangement in the 762rnrn (30")
wellhead connector will keep the
wellhead area clear during cementing of
the 508mrn (20") casing.
Original minimum disconnecting
requirements on 762mrn (30") connector
in the upper section were:
69 bar pressure trapped under
a)
6
shear ram equal to 3.1 x 10 N
tension.
2.7 x 10 5N tension caused by riser
b)
tensioners.
3.4 x 10 5Nm bending caused by the
c)
flexible joint.
0-10° angle on flexible joint.
d)
The selected connector is capable of
disconnecting under combined loads.
The shear ram is designed to cut 127mrn
(5") DP if emergency disconnection of
the upper section is necessary.
A control system and a flexible kill
line are connected to the lower section
of the SGS. This arrangement makes it
possible to operate the lower section
while the upper section and riser are
pulled.
 6 A SHALLOW GAS RESEAHCH PROGRAM
Anchor emergency guick release:
During the shallow gas blowout/explosion on
board the "West Vanguard", the emergency
quick release on four anchor lines was
activated. on·e of the winches failed to
release.
Considering off-shore blowouts it has been
obvious that:
Technical damages and weak points in
the anchor system on several occasions
have rendered. an emergency quick
release impossible.
Emergency quick release has not been
activated due to risk of ignition of
the blowout gases.
The anchor system is vulnerable to
explosions at deck level.
Most existing anchor systems lack
sufficient redundancy.
Information concerning the following was
collected and analyzed:
Anchor systems and emergency quick
release systems on existing platforms
Procedures related to operations of
these systems
Accidents related to blowouts
Alternative release systems
Based on the results the following items
have been implemented on Statoil operated
platforms during 1986/87:
1. Manual release of the anchor winches.
2. Quick release panel installed on the
bridge.
3. Improvement of electric/electronic
components.
4. Increased sprinkler capacity.
634
sJ?e 112s6
Rig Ventilation system
The air ventilation system on West Vanguard
was divided into several separate systems
with air intake fans and air outlet fans.
Air ventilation had manual shut-down in
case of a gas alarm. The air intake fans
were stopped manually when the well started
to flow; however air outlet fans remained
running.
This is considered to have contributed to
gas explosions in some rig areas.
The explosion potential, when gas enters
the ventilation system, was proven during
the blowout, i.e the generator room
exploded. Consequently measures to reduce
this risk were investigated.
Following are the results which have been
implemented:
Gas detectors installed in all air
intakes.
Automatic stop of all ventilation fans
when gas alarms are activated.
Remote control ~f valves on critical
air intakes.
Shallow gas drainage
Drainage of shallow gas could be an option
in the following circumstances:
Before commencement of development
drilling where the fixed installations
cannot be located outside the shallow
gas area.
In exploration drilling where gas
layers have a large areal extent and
several wells are to penetrate the gas
layers.
rofJts 17256 a. GRINR0D
During exploration drilling in block 34/10
- i.e. Gullfaks field, in ca. 60% of the
wells shallow gas has been penetrated. In
1983 it was decided to drill the first
shallow gas investigation well near the
Gullfaks "A" platform location. This well
was drilled to 550m MSL and shallow gas was
revealed. A number of similar wells have
been drilled since to improve the mapping
of shallow gas in general.
Well 34/10-30 was drilled and completed
with the intent to attempt depletion of the
gas sand before the Gullfaks "A" platform
was placed on its location.
The sand, 312-314,5m MSL, produced during
35 days. The production rate was
approximately 60.000 SCM/day~ the maximum
rate was 115.000 SCM/day (short period).
The reservoir pressure, in the shallow
sand, was 33.5 bar, i.e. 1 bar in
excess of normal hydrostatic pressure.
This indicates a gas column height of
6m.
The gas was 99% methane.
Sand was produced into the well. A
gravel pack was done.
Permeability of the reservoir: between
200 and 350mD.
Due to circumstances and platform placement
the test was abandoned and the well
plugged. In total 2.800.000 SCM had been
produced. (Ref. 1.) The desired pressure
and gas depletion was not obtained.
Conclusion
Changing drilling procedures seem to be
the most important contribution to an
increased level of safety for floating
drilling. Drilling programs and
procedures for top hole drilling should
be designed to enhance safety at each
location based on existing information.
635
7
Increasing the lifetime of surface
diverters can be achieved by reducing
velocity of particles. Reduction of
velocity can be obtained by end mounted
chokes.
-Increase of bend diameter and
hardfacing of diverterpiping, and an
increase in pipe diameter will increase
lifetime of diverter systems.
A theoretical model for gas
concentrations above sea level has been
developed taking into account rate,
waterdepth and wind velocity.
Riserless top hole drilling when
checking out anomalies should in all
cases be done with hole size and
mudweight designed to allow dynamic
kill.
Shallow gas stacks will promote control
of top hole drilling and protect
against gas flow to the rig.
Rig ventilation system should be
designed for full automatic shut down
in case of a gas alarm.
References:
1. Grinr¢d. M, Tomren. P.H, Justad. T:
"Development of the Gullfaks field"
Paper IADC/SPE 17220, presented at
IADC/SPE Drilling Conference, March
1988.
2. Dings¢yr. E, Vass¢y. B and Grinr¢d. M:
"Development and Use of a Gas Tight
Cement" Paper IADC/SPE 17258, presented
at IADC/SPE Drilling Conference, March
1988.
 8 A SHALI.CM GAS RESEARCH PR:X;RAM S'PE. 17256

3. D. Mills and J.S. Mason: "Conveying

Velocity Effects in Bend Erosion. Proc.
Int Symp. on Freight Pipeline.
Washington D.C. 1976".

Subsequently published in the Jnl. of

Pipelines, Vo. 1, No. 1, pp 69-81,
1981.

4. D. Mills and J.S. Mason: "Particle

Concentration Effects in bend Erosion
Powder Techno!. Vol. 17, No. 1, pp
37-53, 1977".

5. D. Mills and J.S. Mason: Evaluating the

Conveying Capacity and Service Life of
Pipe Bends in Pneumatic Conveying
Systems. Proc. Powder Europa '78. PAC
Conf. Wiesbaden. Jan. 1978"~

Jnl. of Powder and Bulk Solids Tech.

Vol. 3, No. 2, pp 13-20 1979.

6. D. Mills and J.S. Mason: "Analysis of

Factors Influencing the Premature
Failure of Pipe Bends in Pneumatic
Conveying Systems. Proc. 2nd Conf. on
Pneumatic Conveying, pp 93-103. ISBN
963 8091 64 7. HUngarian Sci. Soc.
Mech. Engrs. Pees. Hungary, March
1978".

7. D. Mills and J.S. Mason: "The Effect of

Particle Size on the Erosion of Pipe
Bends in Pneumatic Conveying Systems.
Proc. POWTECH '70. pp H 50-96. !ChernE
Conf. Birmingham. March 1979".

636
 SPE 17256
A P P E N D I X

BEND LIFE CALCULATIONS (ref. D. Mills and J.S. Mason)

Specific Erosion mass eroded from component g/tonne

mass conveyed through component

Msf Mbf
tonne
E

where Msf Conveyed mass of sand before

component fails (g)

and Mbf Eroded mass from component

before failure g

and E Specific erosion

The Time to Failure For a Component

Tbf = Msf x 60 min

ms

Where Tbf time before failure

and ms flowrate of sand tonne/h

In the test the sand was conveyed at a phase density (0) of 1.0
and the mass flow rate of the sand was the same as that of the
air.

The Influence of Conveying Air Velocity

Specific erosion increases with the increase in velocity

according to

E~ C 2.65

for sand conveyed through 90 degr. bends.

Where C = Conveying air velocity m/s

The Influence of Phase Density

Specific erosion decreases with increase in phase density

according to

EOc:' 0 -0.16

for sand conveyed through 90 degr. bends.

The Influence of Particle Size

Particle size has little influence on the value of specific

erosion, however, the influence o£ turbulence increases
significantly with a decrease in the mean particle size. The
influence of turbulence is additionally effected by phase density
(0) and so for a 70 ~m sand, for example, the time quoted at 0=1
will vary by a factor of about +/- 2 compared with a 230 ~m sand.

637
 SPE 1725b
%BY VOLUME GAS IN AIR % BY VOLUME GAS IN AIR

- · - · - · - · - 30.0
- - - - - - - - 15.0
===~ 5.0
2.0
1.3
i i
)( )(

120
Z(M) Z(M)
Y(M): O.OOOE + 00 Y(M): O.OOOE + 00

RATE : 120 KG/S UF RATE : 120 KG/S U

WIND: 15M/S ' L: 15%, LFL: 5% WIND: 3M/S ' FL: 15%, LFL: 5%
WATER ' T-AIR: 10C ' T-AIR• 10C
DEPTH•• 2 20M, DIAMETER GAS ZONE· 60 ATER DEPTH• • ' T-GAS: 10C
W • 220M, DIAMETER GAS
Fig. 1-Gaa oloud alter Weal Van guard accident.
• M Fig. 2-Weat V ZONE: &OM
anguard gaa cloud with reduced wind velocity.

% BY VOLUME GAS IN AIR %BY VOLUME GAS IN AIR

40

- · - · - · - · - 30 0
---·
................ 5.0
2.0
- - - - - - - - 15:0
.•... ::::::::: 5.0
1.3 2.0
1.3
·····································
i
)(

10

40 70
Y(M) Z(M)
z (M): 1.000E + 02 Y(M): O.OOOE + 00

RATE : 120 KG/S RATE : 60 KG/S

WIND: 3M/S T' UFL: 15%, LFL: 5% WIND: 3M/S T ' UFL: 15%, LFL: 5%
• -AIR· 10C WATER DEPT'H· -AIR: 10C, T-GAS: 10C
WATER DEPTH: 220M. ' T-GAS: 10C
. ' DIAMETER GAS ZONE· • 80M, DIAMETER GAS ZONE: 19M
Fig. 3-Weat V • &OM
anguard gaa cloud with reduced wind velocity. Fig. 4-Gaa cloud with water depth and
' rate reduced.

638
 SP£ 17256

SHALLOW GAS BOP

RISER
ADAPTOR

FLEXIBLE
KILL LINE
CHOKE
LINE

ANNULAR
BOP
DUMP

0VALVE
FLUSHING W.H.
LINE
CONNECTOR

Fig. 5-Shallow gas valve stack.

639