Rule 128

Agustin vs CA and Prollamante

G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005
Corona, J.:
Facts:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological
father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Regional
Trial Court.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they
entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on
November 10, 1999. Despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth
to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in
Quezon City. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for
Martin’s support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child
committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly
ended in 1998, long before Martin’s conception. In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel
vehemently denied having sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider any proposal to
settle the case.

On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties
to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel
opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. He also
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature on the
birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to
support if not recognized by the putative father. In his motion, Arnel manifested that he had filed
criminal charges for falsification of documents against and a petition for cancellation of his name
appearing in Martin’s birth certificate. He attached the certification of the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory that his signature in the birth certificate was forged.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Issue:

Whether or not the said motion is against petitioner’s right against self-incrimination.

Held:

No.

Significantly, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing
and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In the case of People vs. Yatar, DNA
samples from semen recovered from a rape victim’s vagina were used to positively identify the
accused Joel “Kawit” Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of his blood
sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right against self-incrimination,
as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. We addressed this as
follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal
process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where
the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion,
prejudice or personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Court of Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its
decision and resolution, and any error made would have only been an error in judgment. As we
have discussed, however, the decision of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in law and
jurisprudence, was correct.
Rule 129

Baguio vs Vda. De Jalagat

G.R. No. L-28100, November 29, 1971

Fernando, J.:

Facts:

The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed by
plaintiff, now appellant, Gabriel Baguio, on February, 14, 1966. There was on March 7, 1966 a
motion to dismiss filed by defendants, now appellees, on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by a prior judgment. "The instant complaint or case, besides being clearly unfounded and
malicious, is identical to or the same as that Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same plaintiff and
against Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, now deceased and whose legal heirs and successors in
interest are the very defendants in the instant complaint or Civil Case No. 2639.

Said Civil Case No. 1574 was filed for 'Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real
Estate' and entitled Gabriel Baguio, plantiff, versus Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, defendant,
involving practically the same property and practically the same parties as defendants are the
widow and the children, respectively, thus the legal or forced heirs of the deceased Melecio
Jalagat.

That the said Case No. 1574, which is identical to or is the same case as the instant one,
has already been duly and finally terminated as could be clear from order of this Honorable Court.
There was an opposition on the part of plaintiff made on March 26, 1966 on the ground that for
prior judgment or res judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face
of the complaint. It was then alleged that there was nothing in the complaint from which such a
conclusion may be inferred.

Then, on September 26, 1966, came the order complained of worded thus: "Acting on the
motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the defendants under date of March 4, 1966, anchored on
the ground that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by a prior judgement which this Court finds
to be well-founded as it has already dismissed plaintiff's complaint in Civil Case No. 1574 against
Melecio Jalagat alias Mening Jalagat, defendants predecessor in interest from whom they have
derived their rights, in an order dated December 6, 1965, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 17 of the
new Rules of Court, which case involved the same parcel of land as the one in the instant case,
as prayed for, Civil Case No. 2639 should be as it is hereby dismissed.

The Court's previous dismissal of Civil Case No. 1574 has the effect of an adjudication
upon the merits and consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded in abatement of any
subsequent action against the same parties over the same issues and the same subject-matter
by the same plaintiff.

Issue:

Whether a lower court may take judicial notice of such previous case decided by him
resulting in the judgment relied upon.

Held:

Yes.

A court may take judicial cognizance of the finality of judgment rendered by the same
court in a different case.

It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court
certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was previously
pending and thereafter decided by it. That was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing
the dismissal. Certainly such an order is not contrary to law. A citation from the comments of
former Chief Justice Moran is relevant. Thus: "Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous
cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous
ruling is applicable in the case under consideration."

There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant undoubtedly had recourse

to a remedy which under the law then in force could be availed of. It would have served the cause
of justice better, not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part and the vexation
to which appellees were subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the valuable
time of this Tribunal would not have been frittered away on a useless and hopeless appeal. It has
ever been the guiding principle from Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910 decision that a litigant should not
be allowed to worship at the altar of technicality.
Best Evidence Rule

Pp vs Lim
G.R. No. 80505, December 4, 1990

Cruz, J.:
Facts:

Mario Tandoy was accused feloniously sold eight (8) pieces of dried marijuana flowering
tops, two (2) pieces of dried marijuana flowering tops and crushed dried marijuana flowering
tops, which are prohibited drug, for and in consideration of P20.00. The marijuana was offered
as an exhibit 2.
The trial court gave more credence to the statements of the arresting officers. Applying
the presumption that they had performed their duties in a regular manner, it rejected Tandoy's
uncorroborated allegation that he had been manhandled and framed. Tandoy had not submitted
sufficient evidence of his charges, let alone his admission that he had no quarrel with the peace
officers whom he had met only on the day of his arrest.
The accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors in this appeal that the
court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against the accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a
xerox copy of the P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money. The accused-appellant invokes
the best evidence rule and questions the admission by the trial court of the xerox copy only of
the marked P10.00 bill.

Issue:
WON such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to
or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible.

Held:
No.
Since the marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of
establishing its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy
thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable
to the conviction of the accused-appellant because the sale of the marijuana had been
adequately proved by the testimony of the police officers. So long as the marijuana actually sold
by the accused-appellant had been submitted as an exhibit, the failure to produce the marked
money itself would not constitute a fatal omission.
We are convinced from the evidence on record that the prosecution has overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant with proof beyond
reasonable doubt of his guilt. He must therefore suffer the penalty prescribed by law for those
who would visit the scourge of drug addiction upon our people.
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject
of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or
exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule
does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Since the aforesaid marked money was
presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its
contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible
without the need of accounting for the original.
Parole Evidence Rule

People vs Felimon Patentes Y Zamora

G.R. No. 190178, February 12, 2014

Perez, J.:
Facts:
The present case involves eight (8) sets of Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape
filed by private complainant (“AAA”) against appellant, Felimon Patentes. During trial, the
prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) AAA, private complainant herself; (2) Dr.
Samuel Cruz; (3) PO1 Lennie Ronquillo; (4) private complainant’s mother; and (5) Julie Dayaday.
On the other hand, the defense presented: (1) Felimon Patentes, accused–appellant himself; (2)
Leonora Gerondio; (3) Wilma Enriquez; and (4) Francisca Patentes.
The facts of the case are as follows: On 5 December 1998, at about 11:00 a.m., AAA
boarded a bus for Bansalan, Davao City, to visit and bring medicines to her sick grandmother.
While seated at the rear portion of the bus, appellant suddenly sat next to her. According to AAA,
it was the second time she met appellant; the first time was on 4 December 1998, when appellant
persistently courted her. She only knew appellant as he was a friend of her brother – contrary to
what was stipulated that AAA knew appellant as appellant was a neighbor and friend of AAA’s
brother.
According to AAA, she was forcibly taken by appellant to their house, where the latter’s
mother, father, nieces and nephews live. AAA said she was raped by appellant several times.
Appellant in this case did not deny having carnal knowledge with AAA, but insist that it was
consensual. He raised the sweetheart theory.
The medical certificate, however, does not show any external signs of physical injuries,
and that the hymen was intact, and no lacerations. The testimonies of AAA in court are
inconsistent as shown in the TSN. The testimonies of the witnesses of the defense corroborated
the other’s defense witnesses.
Issue:
WON the numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created
reasonable doubt.
Held:
Yes.

The peculiar nature of rape is that conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely upon
the word of the private complainant because it is essentially committed in relative isolation or
even in secrecy, and it is usually only the victim who can testify of the unconsented coitus. Thus,
the long standing rule is that when an alleged victim of rape says she was violated, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has indeed been committed. Since the participants
are usually the only witnesses in crimes of this nature and the accused’s conviction or acquittal
virtually depends on the private complainant’s testimony, it must be received with utmost
caution. It is then incumbent upon the trial court to be very scrupulous in ascertaining the
credibility of the victim’s testimony.

In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of
rape is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2)
inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness
of the evidence for the defense. So long as the private complainant’s testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.
Following these legal precepts, AAA’s testimony, placed side by side with the
prosecution’s evidence, must stand the test of credibility. It is also a precept that physical
evidence is of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together. In
the case at bar, the prosecution failed to present any scintilla of proof to support its claim. In fact,
contrary to the prosecution’s claim that AAA was dragged, tied, mauled, slapped and boxed, the
medical certificate revealed no telltale sign of the prosecution’s allegations. It has to be noted
that the medical examination was conducted the day after AAA’s supposed escape from
appellant. As shown by the medical certificate, AAA had no external signs of physical injuries,
save for a kiss mark. The time–honored test in determining the value of the testimony of a
witness is its compatibility with human knowledge, observation and common experience of
man. Thus, whatever is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge, observation and
experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance.
The conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost
importance in establishing the truth or falsity of the charge of rape. In the case at bar, the
actuations of AAA after the alleged rape is totally uncharacteristic of one who has been raped. It
is contrary to normal human behavior for AAA to willingly go with her abuser’s mother, and
worse, to live with her abuser’s entire family in one roof for eight (8) days sans any attempt to
escape. Appellant’s bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot alone stand. It must be
corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these are letters, notes,
photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers. There is such
corroboration in this case.
The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received
with precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary of giving
undue credibility to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged
victim whose charge is not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to
conflicting interpretations.
Secondary Evidence Rule

Country Bankers Insurance Corp vs Lagman

G.R. No. 165487, July 13, 2011
Perez, J.:
Facts:

Country Bankers Insurance Corporation issued Warehouse Bond through its agent,
Antonio Lagman. Santos was the bond principal, Lagman was the surety and the Republic of the
Philippines, through the NFA was the obligee. In consideration of these issuances, corresponding
Indemnity Agreements were executed by Santos, as bond principal, together with Ban Lee Lim
Santos (Ban Lee Lim), Rhosemelita Reguine (Reguine) and Lagman, as co-signors. The latter
bound themselves jointly and severally liable to Country Bankers for any damages, prejudice,
losses, costs, payments, advances and expenses of whatever kind and nature, including
attorney’s fees and legal costs, which it may sustain as a consequence of the said bond. Santos
then secured a loan using his warehouse receipts as collateral. When the loan matured, Santos
defaulted in his payment. The sacks of palay covered by the warehouse receipts were no longer
found in the bonded warehouse. By virtue of the surety bonds, Country Bankers was compelled
to pay.

Consequently, Country Bankers filed a complaint for a sum of money before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. In his Answer, Lagman alleged that the 1989 Bonds were valid only for 1
year from the date of their issuance, as evidenced by receipts; that the bonds were never
renewed and revived by payment of premiums; that on November 5, 1990, Country Bankers
issued Warehouse Bond No. 03515 (1990 Bond) which was also valid for one year and that no
Indemnity Agreement was executed for the purpose; and that the 1990 Bond supersedes,
cancels, and renders no force and effect the 1989 Bonds.

Country Bankers questions the existence of a third bond, the 1990 Bond, which
allegedly cancelled the 1989 Bonds on the following grounds: First, Lagman failed to produce the
original of the 1990 Bond and no basis has been laid for the presentation of secondary evidence;
Second, the issuance of the 1990 Bond was not approved and processed by Country Bankers;
Third, the NFA as bond obligee was not in possession of the 1990 Bond. Country Bankers stresses
that the cancellation of the 1989 Bonds requires the participation of the bond obligee. Ergo, the
bonds remain subsisting until cancelled by the bond obligee. Country Bankers further assert that
Lagman also failed to prove that the NFA accepted the 1990 Bond in replacement of the 1989
Bonds.
Issue:

WON the photocopy of the 1990 Bond is admissible in evidence.

Held:

No.

Under the best evidence rule, the original document must be produced whenever its
contents are the subject of inquiry. A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not
admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable. Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court states:
SEC.5 When original document is unavailable. When the original document
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon
proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original;
(2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3)
on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can
be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.
In the case at bar, Lagman mentioned during the direct examination that there are
actually four (4) duplicate originals of the 1990 Bond: the first is kept by the NFA, the second is
with the Loan Officer of the NFA in Tarlac, the third is with Country Bankers and the fourth was
in his possession. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory
explanation for the non-production of the original instrument. When more than one original copy
exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
before secondary evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without
accounting for the other originals.
Despite knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of these duplicate originals,
Lagman merely presented a photocopy. He admitted that he kept a copy of the 1990 Bond but
he could no longer produce it because he had already severed his ties with Country
Bankers. However, he did not explain why severance of ties is by itself reason enough for the
non-availability of his copy of the bond considering that, as it appears from the 1989 Bonds,
Lagman himself is a bondsman. Neither did Lagman explain why he failed to secure the original
from any of the three other custodians he mentioned in his testimony. While he apparently was
able to find the original with the NFA Loan Officer, he was merely contented with producing its
photocopy. Clearly, Lagman failed to exert diligent efforts to produce the original.