1. Manalili v CA (GR 113447) Oct.

9, 1997

Facts:
At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City conducted surveillance along A.
Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. This was done after receiving information that drug
addicts were roaming around said area.

Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male person, the petitioner, in front of the
cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner.

Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to introduce themselves and asked him
what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted. Policeman Espiritu asked him if he could see what the
petitioner had in his hands. The petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the officer to examine it. Policeman
Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents and
took petitioner to headquarters to be further investigated.

The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis.

Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and hence inadmissible as
evidence.

Held:
The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise,
such a search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Any evidence obtained in violation of this
constitutionally guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in any proceeding.
The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure
in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused of their right against unreasonable search and
seizure. In these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause. Probable cause being at
best defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or
the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by is in the place to be searched.
Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search
without a warrant.
In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally obtained when he
failed to raise the issue or object thereto during the trial.

The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the assailed Decision and Resolution of the respondent court.

PEOPLE VS. SY CHUA [396 SCRA 657; G.R. No.136066-67; 4 Feb 2003]

Facts: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425,
as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of Drugs in two
separate Information’s. SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that
accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So,
the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near
Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted as their back up.

Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near the
entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2
Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-
appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his
right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces
of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the
Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small
transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car
used by accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the
confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of the
incident.
Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son to Manila. He felt
sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near
Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approaches and examines
the inside of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber
gun and made him face his car with raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the
course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the
policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officer’s companions arrived
at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby
bank, while the others searched his car.

Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen minutes until
Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez
opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being taken.

The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him for Illegal
Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this appeal to the Court.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and
(2) WON the search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him were
conducted in a lawful and valid manner.

Held: The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will distribute illegal
drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was
no more time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a “stop and frisk”.

The trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These
two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly
effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search,
the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a
search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be made—the process
cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant did not act in a
suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. “Reliable information” alone, absent any
overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.

With regard to the concept of “stop-and frisk”: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop-and-frisk”. A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold
interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed
with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat
him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the
arrest for this principle to apply. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate,
accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his
possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellant’s
business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers
only introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant.

In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is applicable to justify the
warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.

Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is hereby acquitted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BINAD SY CHUA, accused-appellant.
[G.R. Nos. 136066-67. February 4, 2003]

Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as
amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of ammunitions in two separate Informations which read as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-507
That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession and under his control two (2) plastic bags containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
(SHABU) weighing more or less two (2) kilos and one (1) small plastic bag containing Methamphetamine
Hydrocloride weighing more or less fifteen (15) grams, which is a regulated drug, without any authority
whatsoever.

Criminal Case No. 96-513

That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession and under his control twenty (20) pieces of live .22 cal. ammunitions, without first having
obtained a license or permit to possess or carry the same.

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. The two cases were then jointly tried.
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, all members of the police force of Angeles City. Their
testimonies can be synthesized as follows:
On September 21, 1996, at around 10:00 in the evening, SPO2 Mario Nulud and PO2 Emmeraldo Nunag
received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night
at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. The informer further reported that accused-appellant
distributes illegal drugs in different karaoke bars in Angeles City. On the basis of this lead, the PNP Chief of
Angeles City, Col. Neopito Gutierrez, immediately formed a team of operatives composed of Major Bernardino,
Insp. Tullao, Insp. Emmanuel Nunag, P02 Emmeraldo Nunag, SP01 Fernando Go, and some civilian assets, with
SPO2 Mario Nulud, as team investigator. The group of SPO2 Nulud, PO2 Nunag and the civilian informer
positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting Thunder Inn Hotel. The
other group acted as their back up.
At around 11:45 in the evening, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just
arrived and parked near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car
carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced
themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a
crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body
search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2
Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud
instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber
firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. Afterwards, SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives
who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters
in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.
When Col. Gutierrez opened the sealed Zest-O juice box, he found 2 big plastic bags containing crystalline
substances. The initial field test conducted by SPO2 Danilo Cruz at the PNP Headquarters revealed that the
siezed items contained shabu. Thereafter, SPO2 Nulud together with accused-appellant brought these items for
further laboratory examination to the Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. After due
testing, forensic chemist S/Insp. Daisy Babor concluded that the crystalline substances yielded positive results for
shabu. The small plastic bag weighed 13.815 grams while the two big plastic bags weighed 1.942 kilograms
of shabu.
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of the
incident.
Accused-appellant alleged that on the night in question, he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and
his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped in
front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City to buy cigarettes and candies. While at
the store, he noticed a man approach and examine the inside of his car. When he called the attention of the
onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised hands. The
man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his
wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to
search his car. At this time, the police officers companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just
arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car.
 Thereafter, he was brought to the Salakot Police Station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen
minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of reporters, Col.
Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being taken.
Wilfredo Lagman corroborated the story of the accused-appellant in its material points. He testified that he
witnessed the incident while he was conducting a routine security check around the premises of the Guess
Building, near Thunder Inn Hotel.
On September 15, 1998 the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgement is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 96-513 for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, the accused is hereby acquitted of the
crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.

2. In Criminal Case No. 96-507 for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu, accused Binad Sy Chua is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charge and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the instant appeal where accused-appellant raised the following errors:
The trial court erred gravely in its following findings:

A. The arrest of accused-appellant binad sy chua was lawful;

B. The search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him were conducted in
a lawful and valid manner;

C. The prosecution evidence supporting the crime charged is suficient to prove the guilt of the accused-appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.

Accused-appellant maintains that the warrantless arrest and search made by the police operatives was
unlawful; that in the light of the testimony of SPO2 Nulud that prior to his arrest he has been under surveillance
for two years, there was therefore no compelling reason for the haste within which the arresting officers sought
to arrest and search him without a warrant; that the police officers had sufficient information about him and
could have easily arrested him. Accused-appellant further argues that since his arrest was null and void, the drugs
that were seized should likewise be inadmissible in evidence since they were obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizures and arrest.
Accused-appellants argument is impressed with merit.
Although the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, however, this rule is not a hard and fast one.
It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves
the utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate
judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies. The only exception is if
there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the case.

In the case at bar, there appears on record some facts of weight and substance that have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court which casts doubt on the guilt of accused-appellant. An appeal
in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the review of the penalty and indemnity
imposed by the trial court. We are clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on
appeal, if we find that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case. Every
circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that
every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
First, with respect to the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made upon accused-
appellant, the court a quo made the following findings:
Accused was searched and arrested while in possession of regulated drugs (shabu). A crime was actually being
committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal
effects allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
While it is true that the police officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over
the personal affects (sic) of the accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient
probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.

In the present case, the police received information that the accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at
the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to
secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a stop and frisk.

A thorough review of the evidence on record belies the findings and conclusion of the trial court. It
confused the two different concepts of a search incidental to a lawful arrest (in flagrante delicto) and of a stop-
and-frisk.
In Malacat v. Court of Appeals, we distinguished the concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a search incidental
to a lawful arrest, to wit:
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a search incidental to
a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search,
the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used
as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can
be madethe process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the
person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy,
and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the
crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or
committing violence.

We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a stop-and-frisk as a limited protective search of
outer clothing for weapons, as laid down in Terry, thus:

We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
amendment.

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a stop-and-frisk, it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop-and-frisk. A genuine reason must exist,
in light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may,
under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals
is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and frisk principles is applicable to justify the
warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.
In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or
attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Emphasis should
be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond
cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Accordingly, for this exception
to apply two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. The record reveals that when accused-
appellant arrived at the vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel, he merely parked his car along the McArthur Highway,
alighted from it and casually proceeded towards the entrance of the Hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box.
Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt
manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime.
However, notwithstanding the absence of any overt act strongly manifesting a violation of the law, the
group of SPO2 Nulud hurriedly accosted accused-appellant and later on introduced themselves as police officers.
Accused-appellant was arrested before the alleged drop-off of shabu was done. Probable cause in this case was
more imagined than real. Thus, there could have been no in flagrante delictoarrest preceding the search, in light
of the lack of an overt physical act on the part of accused-appellant that he had committed a crime, was
committing a crime or was going to commit a crime. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it has been held
that reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and
within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in
flagrante delicto arrest. Hence, in People v. Aminudin, we ruled that the accused-appellant was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done
so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that
he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension.
The reliance of the prosecution in People v. Tanglibento justify the police actions is misplaced. In the said
case, based on the information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a surveillance at the Victory
Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors and
also on those who may be engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen
noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested
him to open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the
bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of
Tangliben on the night of his arrest.
In the instant case, the apprehending policemen already had prior knowledge from the very same
informant of accused-appellants activities. No less than SPO2 Mario Nulud, the team leader of the arresting
operatives, admitted that their informant has been telling them about the activities of accused-appellant for two
years prior to his actual arrest on September 21, 1996. An excerpt of the testimony of SPO2 Mario Nulud reveals
the illegality of the arrest of accused-appellant.
The police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the alleged illegal activities of accused-appellant.
Considering that the identity, address and activities of the suspected culprit was already ascertained two years
previous to the actual arrest, there was indeed no reason why the police officers could not have obtained a
judicial warrant before arresting accused-appellant and searching his person. Whatever information their civilian
asset relayed to them hours before accused-appellants arrest was not a product of an on-the-spot tip which may
excuse them from obtaining a warrant of arrest. Accordingly, the arresting team’s contention that their arrest of
accused-appellant was a product of an on-the-spot tip is untenable.
In the same vein, there could be no valid stop-and-frisk in this case. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act
of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The
police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who
manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed
weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officers
experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or
contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede
the arrest for this principle to apply.

This principle of stop-and-frisk search was invoked by the Court in Manalili v. Court of Appeals. In said
case, the policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and who
appeared to be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the validity of the search as akin to a stop-and-frisk. In People v.
Solayao, we also found justifiable reason to stop-and-frisk the accused after considering the following
circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and his companions, the fact that his companions fled
when they saw the policemen, and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to
verify reports that armed persons where roaming the vicinity.
The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. There was no valid stop-and-frisk in the case
of accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the
alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry
into accused-appellants business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The
apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant.
Besides, at the time of his arrest, accused-appellant did not exhibit manifest unusual and suspicious conduct
reasonable enough to dispense with the procedure outlined by jurisprudence and the law. There was, therefore,
no genuine reasonable ground for the immediacy of accused-appellants arrest.
 Obviously, the acts of the police operatives wholly depended on the information given to them by their
confidential informant. Accordingly, before and during that time of the arrest, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge that accused-appellant had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime.
At any rate, even if the fact of delivery of the illegal drugs actually occurred, accused-appellants warrantless
arrest and consequent search would still not be deemed a valid stop-and frisk. For a valid stop-and-frisk the
search and seizure must precede the arrest, which is not so in this case. Besides, as we have earlier emphasized,
the information about the illegal activities of accused-appellant was not unknown to the apprehending officers.
Hence, the search and seizure of the prohibited drugs cannot be deemed as a valid stop-and-frisk.
Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the basis of the seized items found in accused-appellants
possession. First, there was no valid intrusion. Second, the evidence, i.e., the plastic bags found in the Zest-O
juice box which contained crystalline substances later on identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu)
and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition, were not inadvertently discovered. The police officers first
arrested accused-appellant and intentionally searched his person and peeked into the sealed Zest-O juice box
before they were able to see and later on ascertain that the crystalline substance was shabu. There was no clear
showing that the sealed Zest-O juice box accused-appellant carried contained prohibited drugs. Neither were the
small plastic bags which allegedly contained crystalline substance and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition
visible. These prohibited substances were not in plain view of the arresting officers; hence, inadmissible for being
the fruits of the poisonous tree.
In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless
search, or a customs search. It cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at
hand is bereft of any such showing.
All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting team cannot simply validate, much more cure,
the illegality of the arrest and consequent warrantless search of accused-appellant. Neither can the presumption
of regularity of performance of function be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to
justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. In People v. Nubla, we clearly stated that:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-
appellants conviction because, first, the presumption is precisely just that a mere presumption. Once challenged
by evidence, as in this case, xxx [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if
not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items allegedly seized from accused-appellant were the very
same items presented at the trial of this case. The record shows that the initial field test where the items seized
were identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP headquarters of Angeles City. The items were therefore
not marked at the place where they were taken. In People v. Casimiro, we struck down with disbelief the
reliability of the identity of the confiscated items since they were not marked at the place where they were
seized, thus:
The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item as marijuana, was likewise not conducted at the
scene of the crime, but only at the narcotics office. There is thus reasonable doubt as to whether the item
allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of marijuana marked by the policemen in their
headquarters and given by them to the crime laboratory.

The governments drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every citizen. But it should not undermine
the fundamental rights of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution. The constitutional guarantee against
warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded as overzealous
police officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the constitution and the rights it guarantees should be
paramount in their minds, otherwise their good intentions will remain as such simply because they have
blundered. The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its
own existence.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59,
in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-507 and 96-513, convicting accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua of violation of Section
16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
a fine of P1,000,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is ACQUITTED on the
ground of reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is ordered forthwith released from custody, unless he is being
lawfully held for another crime.
SO ORDERED
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANTONIO C. ESTELLA, appellant. [G.R. Nos. 138539-40. January
21, 2003]
 The Constitution bars the admission of evidence gathered in violation of the right against unreasonable
search and seizure. In the present case, the illegal drug was searched for and found in a hut that has not been
proven to be owned, controlled, or used by appellant for residential or any other purpose. Hence, he cannot be
held guilty of illegal possession of the illegal drug found therein.
The Case

Antonio C. Estella appeals the August 25, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales
(Branch 69) in Criminal Case No. RTC 2143-I. The trial court found him guilty of violating Section 8, Article II of
RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2143-I, accused Antonio C. Estella is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The 8.320 kilograms of dried marijuana is ordered confiscated in favor of the government. The Sheriff is
directed to deliver the subject marijuana to the Dangerous Drugs Board for its proper disposition.

In Criminal Case No. RTC 2144-I, accused Antonio C. Estella is ACQUITTED and the Information dated 07
January 1997 filed against him for violation of P.D. 1866 is dismissed with costs de oficio.

The .38 caliber revolver without serial number and four (4) live ammunitions, subject of the offense, are
ordered delivered to any authorized representative of the Philippine National Police, Firearms and Explosives
Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City.

The Information dated January 7, 1997, charged appellant thus:

That on or about the 20th day of November, 1996 at about 11:15 oclock in the morning, at Purok Yakal,
Barangay Baloganon, in the Municipality of Masinloc, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, did then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control, [o]ne (1) tin can labeled CLASSIC containing twenty (20) small
bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of 589.270 grams each wrapped with a piece of
reading material; [o]ne (1) tin can labeled CLASSIC containing dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 41.126
grams; [t]wo (2) white sando plastic bag each containing one (1) [brick] of dried marijuana fruiting tops having
a total weight of 1.710 kilograms each wrapped with a piece of newspaper; [o]ne (1) white sando plastic bag
containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of 1.820 kilograms each
wrapped with a piece of newspaper, all in the total of 8.320 kilograms of dried marijuana, without any
authority to possess the same.

After the Information had been read to him in Filipino, a language he fully understood, appellant, assisted
by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty when arraigned on March 11, 1997. After due trial, the RTC
convicted appellant of illegal possession of dangerous drugs (marijuana), but acquitted him of illegal possession
of firearms. On November 4, 1998, his counsel filed a Notice of Appeal.
The Facts Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions version of the facts as
follows:
Prior to November 20, 1996, Executive Judge Romulo Estrada of the Regional Trial Court of Zambales issued a
warrant for the conduct of a search and seizure in the residence of appellant at Purok Yakal, Barangay
Baloganon, Masinloc, Zambales.

In the morning of November 20, 1996, Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio Bulor[o]n, then Intelligence and
Investigation Officer, together with SPO1 Jose Arca and several other members of the Provincial Special
Operation Group based in Burgos, San Marcelino, Zambales proceeded to Masinloc. They coordinated with the
members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Masinloc and sought the assistance of Barangay Captain Rey
Barnachea of Baloganon, Masinloc for the enforcement of the search warrant. Barangay Captain Barnaceha
accompanied the police officers to Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, the place mentioned in the
search warrant.

On their way to Purok Yakal, SPO1 Buloron saw appellant sitting on a rocking chair located about two (2)
meters away from a hut owned by Narding Estella, brother of appellant, and being rented by appellants live-in
partner, named Eva. They approached appellant and introduced themselves as police officers. They showed
appellant the search warrant and explained the contents to him. SPO1 Buloron asked appellant if indeed he had
in his possession prohibited drug and if so, to surrender the same so he would deserve a lesser penalty.

While inside the hut, appellant surrendered to the team two cans containing dried marijuana fruiting tops. One
can contained twenty (20) bricks of fruiting tops. The team searched the hut in the presence of appellant and his
live-in partner. They found a plastic container under the kitchen table, which contained four (4) big bricks of
dried marijuana leaves and a .38 caliber revolver with four live ammunitions. The team seized the prohibited
drug, the revolver and ammunitions. The team seized and signed a receipt for the seized items. Barangay
Captain Barnachea and SPO1 Edgar Bermudez of the Masinloc Police Station also signed the receipt as
witnesses. SPO1 Buloron and his companions arrested appellant and brought him to San Marcelino, Zambales.

At their office in San Marcelino, Zambales, SPO1 Buloron and SPO1 Arca placed their markings on the seized
items for purposes of identification.SPO1 Arca kept the seized items under his custody. The next day, SPO1
Buloron and SPO1 Arca brought the seized items to San Antonio, Zambales, where Police Senior Inspector
Florencio Sahagun examined the suspected marijuana dried leaves. Inspector Sahagun prepared a certification of
field test.

On November 29, 1996, the suspected marijuana dried leaves were delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory at
Camp Olivas for further examination.Senior Inspector Daisy Babor, a forensic chemist, examined the suspected
marijuana dried leaves and issued Chemistry Report No. D-768-96 stating that the specimens are positive for
marijuana, a prohibited drug. Specimen A weighed 1.710 kilograms, while Specimen D weighed 1.820 kilograms.

Version of the Defense

For his version of the facts, appellant merely reproduced the narration in the assailed RTC Decision as
follows:
Accused Antonio C. Estella [I]s married to Gloria Atrero Estella. They have three (3) children, namely: Carmen
Estella (8 years old), Antonio Estella, Jr. (5 years old) and Roen Estella (3 years old). Since 1982, Antonio Estella
has been [a] resident of Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, Zambales.

On 20 November 1996 between 10:30 oclock and 11:00 oclock in the morning, while accused was talking with
his friends Rael Tapado and Victor de Leon at a vacant lot just outside the house of Camillo Torres and about
70 meters away from his house, a group of men approached them. The group introduced themselves as
policemen and told them that they were looking for Antonio Estella because they have a search warrant issued
against him.Accused identified himself to them. The policemen inquired from the accused as to where his house
is located and accused told them that his house is located across the road. The police did not believe him and
insisted that accuseds house (according to their asset) is that house located about 5-8 meters away from
them. Accused told the policemen to inquire from the Barangay Captain Barnachea as to where his house is and
heard the latter telling the policemen that his house is located near the Abokabar junk shop. After about half an
hour, the policemen went inside the house nearby and when they came out, they had with them a bulk of
plastic and had it shown to the accused. They photographed the accused and brought him to their office at San
Marcelino, Zambales. Accused Antonio Estella was investigated a[t] San Marcelino, Zambales where he informed
the police officers of the fact that the house they searched was occupied by Spouses Vicente and Fely
Bakdangan.

Accused denied having surrendered to policeman Buloron tin cans containing marijuana and likewise having any
firearm.

Miguel Buccat, who personally knew the accused for about ten (10) years, identified the house depicted on a
photograph as that house belonging to the accused.

Ruling of the Trial Court

In finding appellant guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act, the court a quo relied heavily on the
testimony of the prosecutions principal witness, Intelligence and Investigation Officer SPO1 Antonio Buloron. He
was among the members of the police team that searched appellant’s alleged house. Since the defense failed to
present proof of any intent on the part of SPO1 Buloron to falsely impute to appellant such a serious crime, the
trial court accorded full faith and credence to the police officers testimony.
Moreover, the RTC held that no less than the barangay captain of the place named in the search warrant
led the police to the house. Thus, appellant could not deny that he owned it.
As to the charge of illegal possession of firearms, the lower court ruled that the search warrant did not
cover the seized firearm, making it inadmissible against appellant. He was thus acquitted of the charge.
 Hence, this recourse.
The Issues

In his appeal, appellant assigns the following alleged errors for our consideration:
A. The trial court erred in convicting the accused based on the conjectural and conflicting testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses;

B. The trial court gravely failed to consider the serious contradictions in the facts and evidences adduced by the
prosecution;

C. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime charged has been
prove[n] beyond reasonable doubt, instead of judgment of acquittal demanded by the constitutional
presumption of innocence.

Though not clearly articulated by appellant, the pivotal issue here is the legality of the police search
undertaken in the hut where the subject marijuana was seized.
The Courts Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Main Issue: Legality of the Search Undertaken

Once again, this Court is confronted with a situation that involves a well-enshrined dogma in our
Constitution: the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The exclusionary rule prescribed by Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution, bars the
admission of evidence obtained in violation of this right.
The conviction or the acquittal of appellant hinges primarily on the validity of the police officers search and
seizure, as well as the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof. Without that evidence, the
prosecution would not be able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ownership of the Subject House

Appellant claims that the hut, which was searched by the police and where the subject marijuana was
recovered, does not belong to him. He points to another house as his real residence. To support his claim, he
presents a document that shows that the subject hut was sold to his brother Leonardo C. Estella by one Odilon
Eclarinal. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that just because appellant has another house in a place away
from the hut that was searched does not necessarily mean that the hut is not occupied by him or under his full
control. The prosecution cites the testimony of Rey Barnachea, the barangay captain of that place, to show that
the hut in question belongs to appellant.
The only link that can be made between appellant and the subject hut is that it was bought by his brother
Leonardo a.k.a. Narding Estella. We cannot sustain the OSGs supposition that since it was being rented by the
alleged live-in partner of appellant, it follows that he was also occupying it or was in full control of it. In the first
place, other than SPO1 Bulorons uncorroborated testimony, no other evidence was presented by the
prosecution to prove that the person renting the hut was indeed the live-in partner of appellant -- if he indeed
had any. Moreover, the testimony of Barnachea serves to undermine, not advance, the position of the
prosecution. We quote from his testimony:
At most, the testimony shows that the subject hut was bought by Narding Estella and rented by someone
named Eva. The attempt to make it appear that appellant occupied it, or that it was under his full control, is
merely conjectural and speculative. We have often ruled that courts do not rely on evidence that arouses mere
suspicion or conjecture. To lead to conviction, evidence must do more than raise the mere possibility or even
probability of guilt. It must engender moral certainty.
Neither do we find merit in the OSGs argument that appellant cannot deny ownership or control of the
hut, since he was found in front of it, sitting on a rocking chair and drinking coffee. Indeed, to uphold this
proposition would be to stretch our imagination to the extreme.
The OSG maintains that when appellant was shown the search warrant and asked about the existence of
prohibited drug in his possession, appellant went inside the hut, took his stock of marijuana and turned it over
to the police officers. This, according to the prosecution, clearly showed that he was not only occupying the hut,
but was in fact using it to store the prohibited drug.
 It is well-settled that this Court is not precluded from assessing the probative value of witnesses’ testimonies
on the basis of the transcript of stenographic notes (TSNs).
In the case at bar, we believe that the trial court erred in adopting the prosecutions dubious story. It failed to see
patent inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies about the search undertaken.
A review of the TSNs shows that SPO1 Buloron, the prosecution's principal witness, testified that appellant
had allegedly gone inside the hut; and that the latter had done so to get his stock of illegal drugs, which he
turned over to the police. Ironically, Captain Barnachea, who was purposely presented by the prosecution to
corroborate SPO1 Buloron's story, belied it when he testified thus:
It is undisputed that even before arriving at the hut, the police officers were already being assisted by
Barangay Captain Barnachea. Thus, it was highly improbable for him not to see personally appellant’s alleged
voluntary surrender of the prohibited drug to the authorities. And yet, his testimony completely contradicted
the policemen’s version of the events. He testified that appellant, after being served the search warrant,
remained outside the hut and did nothing. In fact, the former categorically stated that when the police officers
had gone inside the hut to conduct the search, appellant remained seated on a rocking chair outside. Barnacheas
statements sow doubts as to the veracity of SPO1 Bulorons claim that, after being apprised of the contents of the
search warrant, appellant voluntarily surrendered the prohibited drug to the police.
Apart from the testimony of Barnachea -- which contradicted rather than validated the story of SPO1 Buloron -- no
other evidence was presented to corroborate the latter’s narration of the events. Without any independent or
corroborative proof, it has little or no probative value at all.
In a criminal prosecution, the court is always guided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable, and in harmony
with the usual course of human experience -- not by mere conjecture or speculation. While the guilty should not
escape, the innocent should not suffer.
Search Incident to Lawful Arrest

The OSG argues that even assuming that appellant was not the occupant of the hut, the fact remains that he
voluntarily surrendered the marijuana to the police officers. After appellant had surrendered the prohibited stuff,
the police had a right to arrest him even without a warrant and to conduct a search of the immediate vicinity of
the arrestee for weapons and other unlawful objects as an incident to the lawful arrest.
The above argument assumes that the prosecution was able to prove that appellant had voluntarily
surrendered the marijuana to the police officers. As earlier adverted to, there is no convincing proof that he
indeed surrendered the prohibited drug, whether voluntarily or otherwise. In fact, the testimony of Prosecution
Witness Barnachea clouds rather than clarifies the prosecutions story.
Given this backdrop, the police authorities cannot claim that the search was incident to a lawful arrest. Such
a search presupposes a lawful or valid arrest and can only be invoked through Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 Rule
112.

Never was it proven that appellant, who was the person to be arrested, was in possession of the subject
prohibited drug during the search. It follows, therefore, that there was no way of knowing if he had committed
or was actually committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. Without that knowledge, there
could have been no search incident to a lawful arrest.
Assuming arguendo that appellant was indeed committing an offense in the presence of the arresting
officers, and that the arrest without a warrant was lawful, it still cannot be said that the search conducted was
within the confines of the law. Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 12, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search
warrant.
However, the scope of the search should be limited to the area within which the person to be arrested can
reach for a weapon or for evidence that he or she can destroy. The prevailing rule is that the arresting officer
may take from the arrested individual any money or property found upon the latter’s person -- that which was
used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may provide the prisoner with the
means of committing violence or escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case.
In the leading case Chimel v. California, the Supreme Court of the United States of America laid down this
rule:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove
any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s
safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment
or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items
must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can
be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample
justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate control construing
that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.

There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room other than that in which an
arrest occurs or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in
that room itself.

The purpose of the exception is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person being
arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence
within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose.
In the case before us, searched was the entire hut, which cannot be said to have been within appellant’s
immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of that which may be considered to be incident to a
lawful arrest.
The Presence of the Accused or the Witnesses during the Search

Having ruled that the prosecution failed to prove appellants ownership, control of or residence in the
subject hut, we hold that the presence of appellant or of witnesses during the search now becomes moot and
academic.
Obviously, appellant need not have been present during the search if he was neither the owner nor the
lawful occupant of the premises in question. Besides, as we have noted, the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses regarding these crucial circumstances were contradictory. They erode SPO1 Bulorons credibility as a
prosecution witness and raise serious doubts concerning the prosecution’s evidence. This Court is thus
constrained to view his testimony with caution and care.
With the failure of the prosecution to establish the propriety of the search undertaken -- during which the
incriminating evidence was allegedly recovered -- we hold that the search was illegal. Without the badge of
legality, any evidence obtained therein becomes ipso facto in admissible.
Objections to the Legality of the Search

Finally, the OSG argues that appellant is deemed to have waived his right to object to the legality of the
search and the admissibility of the evidence seized through that search because, during the trial, he did not raise
these issues.
On the contrary, during the trial, appellant constantly questioned the legality of the search. In fact, when
SPO1 Buloron was presented as a prosecution witness, the formers counsel objected to the offer of the latters
testimony on items allegedly confiscated during the search. Appellants counsel argued that these items, which
consisted of the marijuana and the firearm, had been seized illegally and were therefore inadmissible.
Further, in his Comments and Objections to Formal Offer of Exhibits, appellant once again questioned the
legality of the search conducted by the police, a search that had yielded the evidence being used against him.
Finally, on October 21, 1997, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence reiterating his objection to the search and to
the eventual use against him of the evidence procured therefrom.
 All told, without sufficient admissible evidence against appellant, the prosecution failed to establish his guilt
with moral certainty. Not only did its evidence fall short of the quantum of proof required for a conviction, it
has also failed to present any evidence at all. Under our Bill of Rights, among the fundamental rights of the
accused is to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. To overcome such presumption, the
prosecution must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Our criminal justice system dictates that if the
prosecution fails to do so, it becomes not only the right of the accused to be set free, but also the constitutional
duty of the court to set them free. This principle leaves this Court no option but to acquit Appellant Antonio C.
Estella for insufficiency of evidence.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is SET ASIDE. Antonio C. Estella is ACQUITTED and ordered
immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.
The director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision forthwith and
to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released
from confinement. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES - versus - Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES,

JESUS NUEVAS y GARCIA, TINGA, and REYNALDO DIN y GONZAGA, VELASCO, JR.,
G.R. No. 170233. February 22, 2007

Jesus Nuevas y Garcia (Nuevas) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch
75, with illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425as amended.

Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga (Din) and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos (Inocencio) were likewise charged with the
same crime, before the same court.

Upon arraignment, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio pleaded not guilty to the charges. As the evidence in the cases
was common and the prosecution would utilize the same witnesses, the cases were consolidated. After a joint
trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 4 April 2002, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding all accused in the above-entitled cases guilty beyond reasonable doubt, this
Court hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and each to pay [a] fine
of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The bricks of marijuana are hereby confiscated and disposed in accordance with existing
regulations.

SO ORDERED.

To put in appropriate context the operative facts on which adjudication of this case hinges, there is need to
recall the factual assertions of the witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense.

PO3 Teofilo B. Fami (Fami) testified that in the morning of 27 September 1997, he and SPO3 Cesar B. Cabling
(Cabling) conducted a stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking along Perimeter Street,
Barangay Pag-asa, OlongapoCity. They had received information that a certain male person, more or less 54 in
height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong
pants, would make a delivery of marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person who
fit the description, carrying a plastic bag, later identified as Jesus Nuevas (Nuevas), alight from a motor vehicle.
They accosted Nuevas and informed him that they are police officers. Fami asked Nuevas where he was going.
Nuevas answered arrogantly but afterwards, calmed down. Nuevas and Fami conversed in the Waray dialect.
Nuevas informed him that there were other stuff in the possession of a certain Vangie, an associate, and two
other male persons. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when
opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape
charges, Nuevas disclosed where the two (2) other male persons would make the delivery of marijuana
weighing more or less five (5) kilos.

Fami and Cabling, together with Nuevas, then proceeded to Purok 12, Old Cabalan, Olongapo City, which
according to Nuevas was where his two (2) companions, Din and Inocencio, could be located. From there, they
saw and approached two (2) persons along the National Highway, introducing themselves as police officers. Din
was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Fami then
took the bag and upon inspection found inside it marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein. After
confiscating the items, Fami and Cabling brought Nuevas, Din and Inocencio to the police office at Purok III for
proper documentation. Fami further testified that a receipt for the property seized was issued by Cabling and
that a field test was duly conducted on the confiscated items. All three accused were likewise physically
examined on the basis of which corresponding medical certificates were issued. The corresponding booking
sheets and arrest report were also accomplished. Fami stated that he and Cabling executed a joint affidavit in
connection with the arrest of all the accused and the confiscation of the items.
On cross-examination, Fami revealed that when the receipt of evidence seized was prepared, all three (3)
accused were not represented by counsel. He likewise disclosed that he was the one who escorted all the
accused during their physical examination. He also escorted all three to the Fiscals office where the latter were
informed of the charges against them.

Cabling corroborated Famis testimony. He, however, testified that after he and Fami had introduced themselves
as police officers, Din and Inocencio voluntarily handed to Fami the marijuana dried leaves.

On cross-examination, Cabling testified that the arrest of Nuevas was the result of a tip from Famis informant,
conceding though that the name of Nuevas was not included in the list of persons under surveillance. Fami then
relayed the tip to Cabling. Cabling restated that Nuevas had voluntarily submitted the plastic bag he was
holding and that after Nuevas had been informed of the violation of law attributed to him, he admitted his
willingness to cooperate and point to his other cohorts. When Fami and Cabling proceeded to the identified
location of Nuevass cohorts, they chanced upon Din and Inocencio along the road. Din was holding a bag while
Inocencio was looking into its contents. Cabling averred that Din voluntarily handed the plastic bag he was
holding to the police officers.

For his defense, Nuevas testified that in the morning of 27 September 1997, he was walking along Perimeter
Street, on his way home from the Barangay Hall, when Fami called him. Nuevas approached Fami, who was
then in front of his house, and asked why Fami had called him. Fami poked his gun at Nuevas and asked him to
go inside the room where Fami handcuffed Nuevass hands, got Nuevass wallet, took out P1,500.00 and put it
in his (Famis) wallet. Fami then confronted Nuevas with shabu use but the latter denied the charge. Before
leaving the house with Nuevas, Fami brought out a plastic bag and told Nuevas to carry it. Subsequently, they
boarded a red ownertype jeep and proceeded to Station B where Nuevas was put in jail. Nuevas further stated
that he did not know Din or Inocencio.

Din, on the other hand, stated that at about 10 oclock in the morning of 27 September 1997, while
his compare Inocencio was visiting, two (2) men entered his house looking for a woman. The two (2)
introduced themselves as police officers. Then, Din and Inocencio were immediately handcuffed. They were not
informed of the reason for their arrest and were told that the reason will be explained to them in court. Next,
they were brought to the Cabalan precinct where the investigator asked for their names, and subsequently to
Station B where they were ordered to stand up and be photographed with Nuevas, who Din first met in
jail. Inside the room where they had their fingerprints taken, he saw marijuana placed on top of the table.

Inocencio testified that he went to his compadre Dins house in the morning of 27 September 1997 to sell his
fighting cocks as he needed money to redeem his drivers license. While there, he and Din were arrested by two
persons, one of whom pointed a gun at them while the other searched the house for a lady named Vangie.
Afterwards, he and Din were brought to the Cabalan Police Precinct and then to Station B where he first came
to know Nuevas. He denied that a plastic bag containing marijuana was recovered from them and claimed that
he only saw such evidence on the day he gave his testimony. He also stated that when a photograph was taken
of the three of them, he and Din were ordered to point to a wrapped thing. When the photograph was taken,
they were not assisted by counsel. He also does not recall having signed a receipt of property seized.
Afterwards, they were brought to a detention cell. And when they asked the police what they did wrong, the
police replied that they will just explain it in court.

All three were found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court for automatic
review. However, on 14 July 2003, Nuevas filed a manifestation and motion to withdraw appeal. The Court
granted Nuevass withdrawal of appeal and considered the case closed and terminated as to him, in a
Resolution dated 25 August 2003.

In a Resolution dated 22 September 2004 of the Court in G.R. Nos. 153641-42, the cases were transferred to the
Court of Appeals pursuant to the Courts ruling in People v. Efren Mateo.

Before the Court of Appeals, Din and Inocencio (appellants) argued that the trial court erred: (1) in finding them
guilty of the crime charged on the basis of the testimonies of the arresting officers; and (2) n not finding that
their constitutional rights have been violated.
The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated 27 May 2005, in CA-G.R. CR No. 00341, affirmed the decision of the
trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 75, in Criminal Case No. 459-97,
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

The Court of Appeals restated the rule that when the issue involves the credibility of a witness, the trial courts
assessment is entitled to great weight, even finality, unless it is shown that it was tainted with arbitrariness or
there was an oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight or influence. The appellate court found Fami and
Cablings version of how appellants were apprehended to be categorical and clear. Din, at the time of his
apprehension, was seen holding a plastic bag containing marijuana leaves. On the other hand, Inocencios
possession of the marijuana leaves was established by the fact that he was seen in the act of looking into the
plastic bag carried by Din.

With respect to appellants claim that their constitutional rights have been violated, the appellate court stated
that the search in the instant case is exempted from the requirement of a judicial warrant as appellants
themselves waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizures. According to the appellate court, both
Cabling and Fami testified that Din voluntarily surrendered the bag. Appellants never presented evidence to
rebut the same. Thus, in the instant case, the exclusionary rule does not apply.

Din and Inocencio are now before the Court submitting for resolution the same matters argued before the Court
of Appeals. Through their Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplementary Brief) dated 22 March 2006, appellants
stated that all the arguments necessary to support their acquittal have already been discussed in the brief they
had submitted before the appellate court; thus, the filing of a supplemental brief would be a mere reiteration of
the arguments discussed in said brief. The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it is no longer filing a
supplemental brief.

The conviction or acquittal of appellants rests on the validity of the warrantless searches and seizure made by
the police officers and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof.

In holding that the warrantless searches and seizure are valid, the trial court ruled as follows:

While the confiscation of the bricks of marijuana from the accused Jesus Nuevas was without a
search warrant, it was not bereft of a probable cause. The police team received informations
from an asset that on that day, a male person whom he sufficiently described will deliver
marijuana at the vicinity of Perimeter and Bonifacio sit. Pag-asa, Olongapo City, a known drop
point of illegal drugs. They went to the said area upon that information. Their waiting was
fruitful because not long afterwards they saw the accused Jesus Nuevas alighting from a tricycle
carrying a bag and after confronting him, he voluntarily gave the bag containing bricks of dried
marijuana leaves. With respect to the confiscation of 2 kilos of marijuana and the apprehension
of accused Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, it was a result of a continued operation by the
team which this time was led by accused Nuevas to get some concession from the team for his
own earlier apprehension. As the apprehension of Nuevas was upon a probable cause, in the
same vein was the apprehension of Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio and the recovery
from them [of] 2 kilos of dried marijuana leaves. The propriety of this conclusion is necessity
because of the impossibility of getting first a warrant in so short a time with such cumbersome
requirements before one can be issued. Before getting a warrant, the culprits shall have already
gone into hiding. These situations are not distant to the case of People vs Jean Balingan (G.R.
No. 105834, 13 Feb. 1995) where we learned that expediency and practicality are some of the
justification[s] in the warrantless arrest.

Appellants maintain that there was no basis for their questioning and the subsequent inspection of the plastic
bags of Nuevas and Din, as they were not doing anything illegal at the time.

Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise,
such search and seizure becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. The constitutional proscription, however, is not absolute but admits of exceptions,
namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and
prevailing jurisprudence);
 2. Search of evidence in plain view. The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the
valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be
where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) plain view justified mere
seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances

In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was
made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.

The courts below anchor appellant’s conviction on the ground that the searches and seizure conducted in the
instant case based on a tip from an informant fall under one of the exceptions as Nuevas, Din and
Inocencio all allegedly voluntarily surrendered the plastic bags containing marijuana to the police officers.

We differ.

First, the Court holds that the searches and seizures conducted do not fall under the first exception, warrantless
searches incidental to lawful arrests.

A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Recent jurisprudence holds that the
arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed as in this case where the search preceded the
arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police
have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.

In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers.
Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
persons to be arrested had committed an offense. The searches conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be said
to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless
arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that
would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Secondly, neither could the searches be justified under the plain view doctrine.

An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package,
the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package
proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to
an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that
an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is
deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas and Din were carrying
and were not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In Nuevass case, the dried marijuana leaves
found inside the plastic bag were wrapped inside a blue cloth. In Dins case, the marijuana found upon
inspection of the plastic bag was packed in newspaper and wrapped therein. It cannot be therefore said the
items were in plain view which could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further search.

On the other hand, the Court finds that the search conducted in Nuevass case was made with his consent. In
Dins case, there was none.
Indeed, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be
waived. However, it must be seen that the consent to the search was voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent was unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. The consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are
the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the
age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search
or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive
police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the
police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.

In Nuevass case, the Court is convinced that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the incriminating bag to the
police officers. Fami testified in this wise:

There is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed willingly submitted the plastic bag with the incriminating contents
to the police officers. It can be seen that in his desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any criminal liability,
Nuevas cooperated with the police, gave them the plastic bag and even revealed his associates, offering himself
as an informant. His actuations were consistent with the lamentable human inclination to find excuses, blame
others and save oneself even at the cost of others’ lives. Thus, the Court would have affirmed Nuevass
conviction had he not withdrawn his appeal.
However, with respect to the search conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such consent had
actually been given.

The police officers gave inconsistent, dissimilar testimonies regarding the manner by which they got hold of the
bag. This already raises serious doubts on the voluntariness of Dins submission of the plastic bag. Jurisprudence
requires that in case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it
is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) the person involved
had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an
actual intention to relinquish the right.

The prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches.
While it may not be contrary to human nature for one to be jolted into surrendering something incriminating to
authorities, Famis and Cablings testimonies do not show that Din was in such a state of mind or condition. Fami
and Cabling did not testify on Dins composure whether he felt surprised or frightened at the time which fact we
find necessary to provide basis for the surrender of the bag. There was no mention of any permission made by
the police officers to get or search the bag or of any consent given by Din for the officers to search it. It is
worthy to note that in cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, the police authorities
expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the
accused was established by clear and positive proof.

Neither can Dins silence at the time be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. In People
v. Burgo the Court aptly ruled:

As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts
do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or
seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law.

Without the dried marijuana leaves as evidence, Dins conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining
evidence. The Court has repeatedly declared that the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of
the defense but on the strength of the prosecution. As such, Din deserves an acquittal.

In this case, an acquittal is warranted despite the prosecutions insistence that the appellants have effectively
waived any defect in their arrest by entering their plea and by their active participation in the trial of the case.
Be it stressed that the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused. Inspite of any alleged waiver, the dried marijuana leaves cannot be admitted in evidence against the
appellants, Din more specifically, as they were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful. A
waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest.
Turning to Inocencios case, the Court likewise finds that he was wrongly convicted of the crime charged.
Inocencios supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves was sought to be shown through his act of looking
into the plastic bag that Din was carrying. Taking a look at an object, more so in this case peeping into a bag
while held by another, is not the same as taking possession thereof. To behold is not to hold. Indeed, the act
attributed to Inocencio is insufficient to establish illegal possession of the drugs or even conspiracy to illegally
possess the same. The prosecution failed to show by convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the contents of
the bag and that he conspired with Din to possess the illegal items. Inocencio was firm and unshakeable in his
testimony that he had no part in any delivery of marijuana dried leaves.

Finally, the law enforcers should be reminded of the Courts dated but nevertheless current exhortation:

x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect
ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some
lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long
as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which
they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law
enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and
the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of
law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we
nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the
Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 4 April 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 75, in
Criminal Case No. 458-97 and No. 459-97 is reversed and modified. Appellants Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga and
Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos are hereby ACQUITTED. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to
cause the immediate release of appellants from confinement, unless they are being held for some other lawful
cause, and to report to this Court compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED

People vs. Valdez G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000

FACTS:

Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The accused was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto and
without authority of law, planted, cultivated and cultured seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as
Indian Hemp from which dangerous drugs may be manufactured or derived. Appellant was arraigned and with
assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.

The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S.
Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut, all member of the police force, who testified how
the information was received, the commencement of their operation and its details under the specific instruction
of Inspector Parungao. Accordingly, they found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look
around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in
two rows, approximately 25 meters away from his nipa hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the
prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. They uprooted the seven
marijuana plants, took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants and arrested him. One of the said
plants was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for analysis which produced a positive result.
The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that
the land cultivated by appellant where the growing marijuana plants were found, was part of the public
domain. Appellant was acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of
Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.

The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He testified he was weeding his vegetable farm when he was
called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go with the latter to see something. This
unknown person then brought appellant to the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately
100 meters away from his nipa hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of
the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied
any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants.
Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana. The police team then brought him
to the police station at Villaverde. At the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about
the marijuana plants seized by the police. Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records
show that the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana
plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the mantle of protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one’s
person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other possessions.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case is lawful and the seized
evidence admissible.
(2) Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in evidence against the accused.
(3) Whether or not the prosecution has proved appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(4) Whether or not the sentence of death by lethal injection is correct.

HELD:

In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence
of probable cause given the fact that police had ample time to obtain said warrant. The protection against illegal
search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without
warrants. The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against
any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.

With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure.
As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution,
the said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant.
They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a
quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.

In the third issue, it is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of a crime,
the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the
accused is the author thereof. The evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must not only stand the test
of reason, it must likewise be credible and competent. Competent evidence is “generally admissible” evidence.
Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence “of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that
is, allow it to be introduced at trial. And as earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court’s part to have
admitted evidences against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him for said evidence is
doubly tainted.

In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved.” To justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must adduce
that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution
must stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused.
Absent the required degree of proof of an accused’s guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SAMUEL YU VALDEZ @ Bebot, accused-appellant.

[G.R. No. 127801. March 3, 1999]

This is an appeal from the decision rendered on November 4, 1996, by the Regional Trial Court of Lagawe,
Ifugao, Branch 14, in Criminal Case No. 930, which found Samuel Valdez guilty of the crime of illegal transport
of marijuana buds/leaves and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
In an information dated December 28, 1994, Provincial Prosecutor Jose Godofredo Naui charged herein
accused-appellant with violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of September, 1994, in the Municipality of Hingyon, Ifugao and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while on board a Dangwa Tranco bus bound for
Manila, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully transport marijuana weighing more or less two kilos packed
in two separate containers.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, herein accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued. Subsequently, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
From the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is fined the amount of Five Hundred Thousand
(P500,000.00) Pesos. The drug in question is ordered forfeited in favor of the government.

SO ORDERED.

The prosecution’s evidence upon which the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt was based is
summarized by the trial court as follows:
In the morning of September 1, 1994, SPO1 Bernardo Mariano was in the Municipality of Banaue, Ifugao waiting
for a ride to report for work in Lagawe, Ifugao. A civilian asset approached him and intimated that an Ilocano
person was ready to transport marijuana. This asset described to him the physical appearance of the suspect as
thin and possessing a green bag. Mr. Mariano invited the asset and together they proceeded to Barangay O-ong,
Hingyon, Ifugao. There they alighted and stopped and ordinary Dangwa passenger bus bound for Baguio
City. Aboard on this bus, they did not find the person concerned and reaching Barangay Pitawan, Hingyon,
Ifugao, they stepped out of the vehicle and waited for the air conditioned Dangwa bus bound for Manila. When
this bus arrived, Police Officer Mariano boarded the aircon bus and looked for that person from among the
passengers and noticed him holding the green bag. He immediately ordered the person to get out of the
bus. This fellow followed holding the bag. Once outside, he further ordered the suspect to open the bag and
saw a water jug colored red and white and a lunch box. He told this man to open the jug and the lunch box
and when opened, he saw marijuana leaves as contents. At this time, suspect revealed his name to be Samuel Yu
Valdez. With this discovery, the asset was left behind and Peace Officer Mariano escorted the accused to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Provincial Headquarters at Lagawe, Ifugao. He turned over the accused
including the contents of the green bag to his superiors for further investigation.

In open court, SPO1 Bernardo Mariano identified the water jug, the lunch box, both stuffed with dried
marijuana leaves and the green bag. He further identified the accused as the same person from whom he seized
the prohibited drug. Police Senior Inspector Alma Margarita Villasenor, Forensic Chemist, PNP Crime
Laboratory, Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet averred that from her laboratory examination, the items or
samples taken from the water jug and lunchbox gave positive results to the test for the presence of marijuana, a
prohibited drug.
Only the accused testified in his defense. His testimony is narrated by the trial court as follows:
Accused is a resident of Barangay Gumol, Guimba, Nueva Ecija and knows construction work and more often
than not, his co-worker is a certain Edwin Andres from Cabanatuan City who married one from Banaue,
Ifugao. Upon the invitation of Edwin Andres to attend the latter’s birthday celebration slated on August 31,
1994, accused and Edwin Andres arrived in Banaue, Ifugao on August 30, 1994. The next day, August 31, 1994,
accused partook of the birthday party and the following morning September 1, 1994, he was bound for Nueva
Ecija taking the 7:00 oclock in the morning Dangwa bus. Because of too much intake of liquor (hang-over),
when he boarded the bus, he still felt groggy and sat alone on a seat near the window. While the bus was
proceeding, he felt sleepy on that seat still alone. His bag was placed on the right side and the green bag was
place under the seat to the right. Feeling sleepy, he noticed somebody or a passenger seated beside him and
later he also felt and noticed that his seatmate was gone and at this time he was awakened by a tap on his
shoulder. He saw two persons standing and one of them mentioned as Mariano who he thought at first was the
bus inspector as he was in fatigue uniform. Then this Mariano asked him whether or not he owns the green bag
but he replied saying I do not know. I have a fellow seated with me here but he is no more. He was made to
step out of the bus and there he was forced to declare that he is the owner of the bag. The other policeman was
nearby who pointed to the green bag. That the two policemen were the ones who opened that bag and its
contents were marijuana. Thereafter, he was brought to the PNP Provincial Headquarters (termed by the
accused as barracks) in Lagawe, Ifugao. When brought to said office, he saw many people possibly police or
soldiers. He was later on investigated and showed them the bag. He was told to stay for a while in the
jailhouse. He could remember that he was made to sign some papers or documents which he did not read. After
an overnight stay at the barracks, he was brought to the hospital for medical examination about the pain on his
breast but kept mum on the blow delivered by Bernardo Mariano at the waiting shed where he was first
apprehended. That from the hospital, he was brought to the Municipal Jail and later to the Provincial Jail for
further detention.

Appellant, through his counsel, Public Attorney’s Office, raised the following assignment of errors in his
appeal:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED DRUGS IN EVIDENCE.

II
 THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT OF THE CRIME CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Appellant contends that the marijuana allegedly seized from him was a product of an unlawful search,
hence, inadmissible in evidence.
The resolution of this case hinges on the pivotal question of the constitutionality and legality of the arrest
and search of herein appellant effected by the police officer.
Settled is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a
competent judicial authority. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. It further decrees that any evidence
obtained in violation of said rights shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The abovementioned constitutional provisions serve as safeguards against wanton and unreasonable
invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects. The right of a person to be
secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and
fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest
or search warrant must be strictly construed. We cannot liberally consider arrests or seizures without warrant or
extend their application beyond the cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do so would infringe
upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and yet, so deserving of full protection and
vindication.
Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain legal
and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section
12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3)
search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstances.
On the other hand, a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person
under the following circumstances:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In this case, appellant was caught in flagrante since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. A
crime was actually being committed by the appellant, thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls
squarely under paragraph (a) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to
lawful arrest. While it is true that SPO1 Mariano was not armed with a search warrant when the search was
conducted over the personal effects of appellant, nevertheless, under the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said police officer to believe that appellant was then and there committing a crime.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in
the place to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not
determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
Our jurisprudence is replete with instances where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause
to effect a warrantless search and seizure.
In People v. Tangliben, two police officers and a barangay tanod were conducting surveillance mission at
the Victory Liner terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may commit
misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on information
supplied by informers. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who
was acting suspiciously. An informer pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. They confronted
him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen identified
themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of
the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest. Hence, faced with such on-the-spot tip, the police officers
acted quickly as there was not enough time to secure a search warrant.
 In People v. Maspil, a checkpoint was set up by elements of the First Narcotics Regional Unit of the
Narcotics Command at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, to monitor, inspect and scrutinize vehicles on the highway
going towards Baguio City. This was done because of a confidential report by informers that Maspil and
Bagking, would be transporting a large quantity of marijuana to Baguio City. In fact, the informers were with
the policemen manning the checkpoint. As expected, at about 2 oclock in the early morning of November 1,
1986, a jeepney approached the checkpoint, driven by Maspil, with Bagking as passenger. The officers stopped
the vehicle and saw that on it were loaded 2 plastic sacks, a jute sack, and 3 big round tin cans. When opened,
the sacks and cans were seen to contain what appeared to be marijuana leaves. The policemen thereupon
placed Maspil and Bagking under arrest, and confiscated the leaves which, upon scientific examination, were
verified to be marijuana leaves. The Court upheld the validity of the search thus conducted, as being incidental
to lawful warrantless arrest and declared that Maspil and Bagking had been caught in flagrante
delictotransporting prohibited drugs.
In People v. Malmstedt, Narcom agents set up checkpoint at Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province in view of
reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana. They likewise received information that
a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. There was no reasonable time to obtain
a search warrant, especially since the identity of the suspect could not be readily ascertained. Accused’s
actuations also aroused the suspicion of the officers conducting the inspection aboard the bus. The Court held
that in light of such circumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act promptly, including a
search without a warrant, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the
detriment of society.
In People v. Bagista, the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from
the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from their regular
informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana
from up north. They likewise had probable cause to search accused-appellants belongings since she fitted the
description given by the NARCOM informant.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, the policemen conducted a surveillance in an area of the Kalookan
Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming therein. Upon reaching the place, they chanced
upon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be high on drugs. He was observed to have reddish eyes
and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When
approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it
contained marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to
determine if he was actually high on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on
information, this area was a haven for drug addicts.
As in the instant case, police officer Mariano was tipped off by a civilian asset that a thin Ilocano person
with a green bag was about to transport marijuana from Banaue, Ifugao. Said information was received by SPO1
Mariano the very same morning he was waiting for a ride in Banaue to report for work in Lagawe, the capital
town of Ifugao province. Thus, face with such on-the-spot information, the law enforcer had to respond quickly
to the call of duty. Obviously, there was not enough time to secure a search warrant considering the time
involved in the process. In fact, in view of the urgency of the case, SPO1 Mariano together with the civilian asset
proceeded immediately to Hingyon, Ifugao to pursue the drug trafficker. In Hingyon, he flagged down buses
bound for Baguio City and Manila, and looked for the person described by the informant. It must be noted that
the target of the pursuit was just the thin Ilocano person with a green bag and no other. And so, when SPO1
Mariano inspected the bus bound for Manila, he just singled out the passenger with the green bag. Evidently,
there was definite information of the identity of the person engaged in transporting prohibited drugs at a
particular time and place. SPO1 Mariano had already an inkling of the identity of the person he was looking
for. As a matter of fact, no search at all was conducted on the baggages of other passengers. Hence, appellants
claim that the arresting officer was only fishing for evidence of a crime has no factual basis.
Clearly, SPO1 Mariano had probable cause to stop and search the buses coming from Banaue in view of the
information he got from the civilian asset that somebody having the same appearance as that of appellant and
with a green bag would be transporting marijuana from Banaue. He likewise had probable cause to search
appellants belongings since he fits the description given by the civilian asset. Since there was a valid warrantless
search by the police officer, any evidence obtained during the course of said search is admissible against
appellant.
Appellant likewise asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He claims
that when SPO1 Mariano apprehended him, he was not in possession of the green bag as the same was under
the seat before him.
The assertion is incredulous.
As SPO1 Mariano declared in his testimony, the appellant was alone in his seat and the green bag was
placed under the seat just in front of appellant. SPO1 Mariano testified as follows:
 From the foregoing testimony, it can be gleamed that when appellant was asked to get off the bus and
bring his bag, appellant brought with him said bag. If, indeed, the bag was not his, he should not have taken it
with him in alighting from the bus. Besides, denial, like alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence bearing no weight in law.
Appellant further avers that the civilian asset should have been presented in court to shed light on how he
managed to get his information. This argument is not tenable. The settled rule is that the presentation of an
informant in illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution
because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative.
Based on the foregoing, this Court is convinced that the guilt of appellant has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.
With the enactment and effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty imposable upon violators of Section 4 of
Dangerous Drugs Act is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) if the marijuana involved weighs 750 grams or more. In
this case, the quantity of marijuana involved weighs more or less two kilograms, hence, the applicable penalty
is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the imposable penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, the rules for
the application of indivisible penalties under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code should be applied. This is
pursuant to our pronouncement in People vs. Simon where we recognized the suppletory application of the
rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code as well as the Indeterminate Sentence Law to the Dangerous Drugs
Act after the amendment of the latter by R.A. No. 7659. Thus, as there is neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime, the trial court correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Finally, considering that the penalty imposed is the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law could not be applied.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The judgment of the lower court finding appellant guilty of
the crime illegal transport of marijuana and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to pay fine of P500,
000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED
People v Aminnudin; G.R. No. L-74869; 06 Jul 1988; 163 SCRA 402

FACTS:
Having earlier received a tip from an informer identifying the accused by name who was on board a vessel
bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana, the PC officers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and
finding what looked like marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of
suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they
were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him
and he was eventually convicted.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not Aminnudin’s arrest and search were lawful.

RULING: NO. It is clear that the PC had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to
arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle
was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did
nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a “search warrant
was not necessary.

People vs. Aminnudin G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988 163 SCRA 402 (1988)

Facts: Accused was arrested shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 The PC officers who were in fact
waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked like marijuana leaves took him
to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later
taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. However, and it is Aminnudin’s claim that he was
arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in
evidence against him under the Bill of Rights.

Issue: Whether the accused was caught in flagrante delicto hence justifies the warrantless arrest

Held: No, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just
been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under the Rules of Court. The present case presented
no such urgency. It is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to
arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle
was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did
nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a “search warrant
was not necessary.” In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest.
To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was
the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for
indeed his very own words suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The
constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long
as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.

People v Saycon; G.R. No. 110995; 05 Sep 1994; 236 SCRA 325

FACTS: Accused, a suspected shabu “courier,” was intercepted at a checkpoint set up by a combined team of
NARCOM and Coastguard personnel after receiving information that the accused will be arriving aboard a boat
at that moment. He obliged to the request for him to open his bag, inside which was found a cigarette pack
containing the suspected “shabu.”

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the search of the accused’s bag was illegal.

RULING: NO. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles —automobiles, trucks, etc. —
without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since
such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Not all
searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not
to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS

CABALLES vs. CA G.R. No. 136292. January 15, 2002 Warrantless Search F E B R U A R Y 2 1 , 2 0 1 9
FACTS:

Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan,
spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with “kakawati” leaves.

Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. The
jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, and appeared
nervous.

With appellant’s consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). When asked
where the wires came from, appellant answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8
kilometers away from Sampalucan.

The court a quo rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft.

The CA affirmed the judgment of conviction.

Petitioner now comes to the Court contending that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were
on routine patrol, merely on “suspicion” that “it might contain smuggled goods,” does not constitute probable
cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure.

ISSUE: Whether the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against the appellant.
RULING: It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the case at bar
was not authorized by a search warrant.

A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought. Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of
smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or ‘constructive borders’ like
checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.

The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of
probable cause. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless
search, which must still be present in such a case.

Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. The search
which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances:

(1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car’s doors; (4) where
the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited
to a visual search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.

None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did not merely conduct a
visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner’s vehicle.They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the
kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a
simple routine check.

The vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol became
suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to
them, was unusual and uncommon.

We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered
with kakawati leaves does not constitute “probable cause” as would justify the conduct of a search without a
warrant.

Neither can petitioner’s passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search.

Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain petitioner’s
conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the constitutional right of the accused against
unreasonable search and seizure.

The impugned decision was REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy Caballes was ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LO HO WING alias PETER LO, LIM CHENG
HUAT alias ANTONIO LIM and REYNALDO TIA y SANTIAGO, defendants. LO HO WING alias PETER
LO, defendant-appellant.

Doctrine: exception to the issuance of search warrant: 1) search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2) search of
moving vehicle; 3) seizure of evidence in plain view
Facts:

-Appellant Peter Lo, together with co-accused Lim Cheng Huat were charged with a violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. Only appellant and co-accused Lim Cheng Huat were convicted. Their co-accused Reynaldo
Tia was discharged as a state witness.

-In July 1987, the Special Operations Group, a unit of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC), received a tip from one of its informers about an organized group engaged in the
importation of illegal drugs, smuggling of contraband goods, and gunrunning. After an evaluation of the
information thus received, a project was created in order to bust the suspected syndicate.
-As part of the operations, the recruitment of confidential men and "deep penetration agents' was carried out to
infiltrate the crime syndicate. One of those recruited was the discharged accused, Reynaldo Tia.

-On October 4, 1987, appellant and Tia left for Hongkong on board a Philippine Airlines flight. Before they
departed, Tia was able to telephone Captain Palmera to inform him of their expected date of return to the
Philippines.

-The day after they arrived in Hongkong, Tia and appellant boarded a train bound for Guangzhou, in the
People's Republic of China. The pair thereafter went to a local store where appellant purchased six (6) tin cans
of tea in which the Chinese drugs were placed.

-The next day, the two returned to Manila via aChina Airlines flight. The plane landed at the NAIA on schedule.
Lim met the newly-arrived pair at the arrival area. After which, appellant and Tia boarded a taxicab. Lim
followed in another taxi cab.

-On the expected date of arrival, the team headed by Captain Palmera proceeded to the NAIA. Upon seeing
appellant and Tia leave the airport, the operatives who first spotted them followed them. Along Imelda
Avenue, the car of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by appellant and Tia and cut into its path forcing
the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. Meanwhile, the other taxicab carrying Lim sped away in an attempt to escape.
The operatives disembarked from their car, approached the taxicab, and asked the driver to open the baggage
compartment. Three pieces of luggage were retrieved from the back compartment of the vehicle. The operatives
requested from the suspects permission to search their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of the bag owned
by appellant. One of the operatives, pried the lid open, pulled out a paper tea bag from the can and pressed it
in the middle to feel its contents. Some crystalline white powder resembling crushed alum came out of the bag.
The sergeant then opened the tea bag and examined its contents more closely. Suspecting the crystalline powder
to be a dangerous drug, he had the three bags opened for inspection. From one of the bags, a total of six (6) tin
cans were found, including the one previously opened.

-Meanwhile, the second taxicab was eventually overtaken by two other operatives on Retiro Street, Quezon
City. Lim was likewise apprehended.

-The trial court convicted them and stated that the search and seizure was valid.

-On appeal, appellant contends that the warrantless search and seizure made against the accused is illegal for
being violative of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. He reasons that the PC-CIS officers concerned could
very well have procured a search warrant since they had been informed of the date and time of arrival of the
accused at the NAIA well ahead of time, specifically two (2) days in advance. The fact that the search and
seizure in question were made on a moving vehicle, appellant argues, does not automatically make the
warrantless search herein fall within the coverage of the well-known exception to the rule of the necessity of a
valid warrant to effect a search because, as aforementioned, the anti-narcotics agents had both time and
opportunity to secure a search warrant.

Issue: WON the search and seizure made against the accused was illegal.

Held: No. The contentions are without merit.

Ratio: Search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three
(3) well-recognized exceptions thereto. As set forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, these are: [1]
a search incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view. The
circumstances of the case clearly show that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle.
Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-accused.

The rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle
is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be
obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing
judge—a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving
vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. 4

We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable
to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought."

In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the authorities had
reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the
country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected
syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the
expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to
enable them to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is
that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.

SHORTER VERSION FOR HANDWRITTEN DIGEST

FACTS:
- Lo with Tia (government’s agent) went to China where they secured the shabu to be brought to the
Philippines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, Lim met them. The authorities relying on the intelligence
reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate apprehended them in a taxicab and
thereafter were searched. The authorities found shabu inside the tin cans which are supposed to contain tea.
They were charged with a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The trial court then convicted them based on
the factual findings.

Issue: WON the search and seizure was valid

Held: Yes. The search and seizure was valid.

Ratio: The appellant contends that the authorities could have procured a warrant search. As correctly averred by
appellee, that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least
three (3) well-recognized exceptions thereto. As set forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, these
are: [1] a search incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in plain
view. The circumstances of the case clearly show that the search in question was made as regards a moving
vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-accused.

The rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle
is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be
obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing
judge—a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving
vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity.

People vs. Musa G.R. No. 96177. January 27, 1993 (Vol 217 SCRA 597)

Facts: Mari Musa was accused and convicted guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling marijuana which is an
illegal substance and trade. Musa appealed the trial court’s decision. He was arrested after a buy bust operation
conducted by Narcom agents Sgt. Jesus Belarga and Sgt. Amado Ani. Sgt. Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct a
surveillance and test-buy operation on the appellant at Suterville, Zamboanga City on December 13, 1989, later
that same day, Sgt. Ani went back to their office and reported a successful operation and turned over to Sgt.
Belarga one wrapper of marijuana. Sgt. Belarga then organized a team to conduct a buy-bust operation the
following day. On December 14, 1989, Sgt. Belarga led a team of Narcom agents who went to Suterville,
Zamboanga City. Sgt. Belarga gave a P20.00 marked bill to Sgt. Ani which was to be used in the buy-bust
operation. Upon arrival of the Narcom agents in Suterville, Zamboanga City, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of
the appellant while some agents stayed in the vehicles and others positioned themselves in strategic places. The
appellant met Sgt. Ani and an exchange of articles took place (the P20.00 bill for two parcels of newspaper
wrapped marijuana). After the exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the other Narcom agents and made the pre-
arranged signal of raising his right hand. The Narcom agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went inside the house
and made the arrest. The agents searched the appellant and unable to find the marked money; they asked him
where it was. The appellant said that he gave it to his wife who was nowhere to be found. The Narcom agents
then conducted a search of the whole house in pursuit of the marked P20.00 bill. During their search they seized
a plastic bag in the kitchen, when they asked Musa about the contents of the bag appellant replied he did not
know. The Narcom agents then proceeded to examine the contents of the bag which evidently contained
marijuana. The Narcom agents confiscated the bag of marijuana and arrested Mari Musa. Mari Musa was
convicted guilty by the trial courts.

Issue: Was Mari Musa’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures violated? Hence this appeal
 Held: No, Rule 126 Sec 12 of the Rules of court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure incident to
a lawful arrest, thus: Sec. 12 Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offence, without a search
warrant. In a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the
marked money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search
warrants. In the case at bar, the Narcom agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his
house but found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen found and seized a plastic bag
hanging in the corner. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the
“PLAIN VIEW” of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may
be presented as evidence.
The “plain view” doctrine, may not, however be used to launch unbridled searched and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a
general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt. In the instant case, the appellant
was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money which they
hoped to find, the Nar com agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen which was not
within their “plain view” when they arrested the appellant. Therefore, under the circumstances of this case, the “plain view”
doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented
in evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution. The exclusion of this particular evidence
does not however diminish, in any way the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. It is held that by virtue of the testimony of Sgt. Ani and Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings
of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the
crime charged had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MELLY SARAP y ARCANGELES and ROGER AMAR y
MATEO, accused. MELLY SARAP y ARCANGELES, accused-appellant.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 7, finding accused-
appellant Melly Sarap yArcangeles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The Information charged accused-appellant of sale of prohibited drugs, committed as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of March, 1996, in the afternoon, in Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Banga,
Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping each other, without authority of law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, distribute and transport prohibited drugs consisting of nine
hundred (900) grams of Marijuana leaves, otherwise known as Indian Hemp to the intended buyers Joysie R.
Duran, Jonalyn R. Duran and Pepe Casabuena, who were apprehended two (2) days ago by the police
authorities, said prohibited drugs were confiscated from the possession and control of the accused.

Upon arraignment on March 25, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits thereafter
ensued.
The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses. Their testimonies can be synthesized into the following
narration of events:
Armed with a search warrant, SPO4 Gelacio R. Guarino, Chief of Police of Banga, Aklan together with PO2
Jhanny Navida, raided the house of Conrado Ricaforte at Rizal Street, Poblacion, Banga, Aklan on March 2,
1996, relative to the reported sale of marijuana by its occupants, Jonalyn Duran, Joysie Duran and Pepe
Casabuena. The three were apprehended for illegal possession of marijuana and were detained at the Banga
Police Station. In the course of their investigation, the police learned that a certain Melly from Capiz and
one Roger were the suppliers of marijuana and that they will be back on March 4, 1996.
On March 4, 1996, Janet Iguiz, caretaker of the house of Conrado Ricaforte informed Guarino that there
were two strangers looking for the Duran sisters.
Accordingly, Guarino and Navida recorded the report in the police blotterand proceeded to the house of
Conrado Ricaforte, which is more or less three hundred meters away from the police station. When they arrived
there, Guarino saw a woman, who turned out to be accused-appellant Melly Sarap, walking in the alley near
the house. Accused-appellant saw Guarino and Navida in police uniform and immediately threw away her black
canvass bag, which her companion Roger Amar picked up. Guarino blocked Saraps path and grabbed from her
the green plastic bag she was holding. Upon inspection, the plastic bag was found to contain two blocks of
marijuana fruiting tops.
In the meantime, Navida pursued Amar and arrested him.
 The marijuana confiscated from Sarap was brought to the Iloilo Headquarters for laboratory
examination. The chemical analysis conducted by forensic chemist Angela Baldevieso revealed that the substance
was indeed marijuana or Indian hemp and weighed approximately 900 grams as per Physical Science Report
No. D-01296. Consequently, the above-quoted information was filed against Sarap and Amar.
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, denied the accusation against her. She narrated that she delivered
dried fish to her sister, Susanne Ricablanca, after which she went to the comfort room of the dress shop fronting
Banga Public Market to relieve herself. On her way to the dress shop, she met Amar and entrusted to him her
black bag. Thereafter, a woman approached and told her that there were policemen waiting for her outside.
The policemen forced her to board a jeep and brought her to the office of Chief of Police Guarino at the
municipal hall. Guarino poked a gun at her and pulled her hair. He also asked her to remove her pants and
shirt. A certain PO3 Pedro Jerry Icay asked her to remove her bra and when she refused, he pulled her bra
because he was looking for marijuana on accused-appellants person. Sarap asserted that the policemen did not
get any marijuana from her.
Accused-appellants testimony was corroborated by her co-accused Roger Amar, her sister Susanne
Ricablanca and Leandro Braca, a pedicab driver.
On October 2, 1997, the trial court rendered the appealed decision. The dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, accused Roger Amar is hereby ACQUITTED. The Court finds
accused Melly Sarap GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act 6425,
as amended and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to a fine of P500,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Considering that accused Melly Sarap is a detention
prisoner, she shall be credited of her sentence with the full time during which she has undergone preventive
imprisonment having agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners.

The two (2) blocks of dried marijuana fruiting tops are hereby confiscated in favor of the government. The
Court orders the immediate release of Roger Amar from detention unless there are other lawful reasons for his
continued confinement.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this appeal with the accused-appellant raising the following assignment of errors:
I. That the trial court erred in not holding the warrantless search and arrest illegal;
Ii. That the trial court erred in not considering favorably the defense of alibi as a ground for the
acquittal of the herein accused-appellant inspite of the weakness of the prosecution evidence which
is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in her favor;
Iii. That the trial court erred in not appreciating as a ground for the acquittal of the accused-appellant,
her defense that the transparent plastic bags was not possessed nor owned by her, despite positive
and convincing proof adj[u]ced in support thereof;
Iv. That the trial court erred in not acquitting the herein accused-appellant on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
A search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a warrant validly issued by a judge as
provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and
seizures are inadmissible as evidence, pursuant to Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. Warrantless
searches and seizures may be made without a warrant in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful
arrest, (2) search of a moving motor vehicle, (3) search in violation of custom laws, (4) seizure of the evidence
in plain view, (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures, (6) stop
and frisk and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. These instances, however do not dispense with the
requisite of probable cause before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. In warrantless
search cases, probable cause must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has
been committed or is about to be committed.
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court held that: (1) the police officers are presumed to have
regularly performed their duties, in the absence of proof of ill or improper motive on their part to falsely
impute a serious crime against Sarap; and (2) the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses have more
weight compared to Saraps negative testimony. It also relied heavily on the testimonies of Chief of Police
Guarino that in view of the urgency of the case, they proceeded immediately to the house of Conrado Ricaforte
to pursue Sarap and Amar. It concluded that the warrantless arrest was lawful considering that Sarap had
committed or was actually committing a crime when arrested. It ruled that the search incident to the said arrest
is sanctioned under the Rules[ and evidence obtained therefrom is admissible.
 We are not convinced. The Banga Police Officers were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. Rule
113, Section 5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

In the instant case, Sarap cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one
nor had she just committed a crime. She was merely walking in the alley near the house of Conrado Ricaforte. It
was only when Janet Iguiz led Sarap downstairs and identified her as Melly that she was singled out as the
suspect. Guarino would not have apprehended Sarap were it not for Janet Iguizs identification. Moreover, the
evidence on record clearly illustrated that it was only after Janet Iguiz pointed to Sarap as Melly that Guarino
suspected that the bag she was holding contained marijuana.
The Banga Police could have secured a search warrant when Jonalyn Duran disclosed during the
investigation that a certain Melly of Capiz and one Roger would be back on March 4, 1996. The persons
intended to be searched had been particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also
sufficiently ascertained to be March 4, 1996, although it was uncertain whether Melly would arrive. Melly
turned out to be accused-appellant and the thing to be seized was marijuana. The above particulars would have
provided sufficient grounds to secure a search warrant, instead, the police only acted when the caretaker of the
house of Conrado Ricaforte informed them that there were strangers looking for Jonalyn and Joysie Duran.
Hence, they cannot now dispense with the requirement of a search warrant on the basis of urgency in effecting
it, considering that they had twenty-four hours to do so. The apprehending officers had prior knowledge of
Saraps alleged activities. Verily, there was no excuse for the Banga Police not to secure a search warrant.
Hence, the Banga Police could not effect a warrantless search and seizure since there was no probable cause
and Sarap was not lawfully arrested. The law requires that the search must be incidental to a lawful arrest in
order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal.
It is true that we adhere to the time honored-doctrine that the trial courts assessment of credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is accorded great weight and may even be deemed conclusive and binding on
the appellate court. In innumerable instances, however, we interfered with the judgment of the trial court when
there appeared facts or circumstances of weight and influence which the trial court may have overlooked and, if
taken into consideration, could have a significant effect on the outcome of the case.
Contrary to the finding of the trial court, the instant case did not come within the purview of the plain
view doctrine. In order for the doctrine to apply, the following conditions must be present: (a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they
are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search.
In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest, the search of Saraps bag was also not
justified as seizure of evidence in plain view under the fourth exception. The marijuana fruiting tops contained
in the green plastic bag carried by Sarap were not clearly visible.
The above testimony negates the conclusion of the trial court that the marijuana fruiting tops were
inadvertently discovered. More importantly, the marijuana fruiting tops were also not apparent and in plain
view as shown by the fact that Chief of Police Guarino still had to grab Saraps bag to ascertain its contents.
Without the illegally seized prohibited drug, the appellant’s conviction cannot stand. There is simply no
sufficient evidence to convict her. That the search disclosed marijuana fruiting tops in appellants possession, and
thus confirmed the police officers initial information and suspicion, did not cure its patent illegality. An illegal
search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search
for being a fruit of a poisonous tree.
All told, the guilt of the accused-appellant was not proven beyond reasonable doubt measured by the
required moral certainty of conviction. The evidence presented by the prosecution was not enough to overcome
the presumption of innocence as constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it would be better to set free ten men who
might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.
Moreover, as Justice Holmes declared: I think it is a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 7,
finding accused-appellant Melly Sarap y Arcangeles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Melly Sarap y Arcangeles is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Superintendent of the Correctional
Institution for Women is directed to cause the immediate release of accused-appellant unless lawfully held for
another cause, and to inform this Court of the date of her release, or the ground for her continued confinement,
within ten days from notice.
SO ORDERED