PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATION

DIGESTED CASES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION INC. VS JANIOLA 1

PILAPIL VS IBAY-SOMERA-presiding Judge 2

REPUBLIC VS IYOY 3

TENCHAVEZ VS ESCANO 4

VAN DORN VS ROMILLO 5

MA. REBECCA M. BAYOT VS C.A & VICENTE MADRIGAL

6

CORPUZ VS STO. TOMAS 7

GRACE GARCIA-RECIO VS REDERICK RECIO 8

REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO
9

RODOLFO SAN LUIS VS FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS-SANLUIS 10

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., vs. Janiola
G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009

Facts:
This case is a petition for the reversal of the decision on the suspension of the criminal proceeding filed
by the petitioner in the MTC for the ground that there is a presence of prejudicial question with respect
to the civil case belatedly filed by the respondent. The petitioner appealed to RTC but denied

Dreamwork, through its President, and Vice-President, filed a Complaint Affidavit against Janiola for
violation of BP 22 at the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. Correspondingly, the former also
filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC, entitled
People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, Janiola, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an
alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Thereafter respondent
filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the Criminal Case for the ground that private respondent claim
that the civil case posed a prejudicial question against the criminal case. Petitioner opposed the
Respondent’s Motion to Suspend criminal proceeding based on juridical question for the following
grounds;
(1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing
checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated
BP 22; and
(2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is
that “the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action”; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case
having preceded the civil case.
The MTC granted the Respondents Motion to Suspend Proceedings.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC but denied the petition.
Hence, this petition raised.
ISSUE
Whether or not the MTC or RTC Court erred in its discretion to suspend proceedings in Criminal Case on
the basis of “Prejudicial Question “, with respect to the Civil Case belatedly filed.
Held
This petition must be granted, pursuant to SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the
criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal
action. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.
In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case filed
by the State with the RTC. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action. Even if
the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for
lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case.
The fact of the matter is that private respondent issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for
insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, is
absent. Thus, no prejudicial question exists

2
Pilapil vs HON. Ibay-Somera-presiding judge (G.R. No. 80116)

FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with German national, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, at Federal
Republic of Germany. They had a child named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated
in their marriage, that led the respondent to initiate a divorce proceeding against petitioner; in Germany
before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. Their child’s custody was granted to the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed
2 complaints of adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that Imelda, “had an affair with William
Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983” that was the time where
their marriage were not yet dissolved.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case for adultery should prosper. Considering that the decree of divorce was
granted prior to the filing of an adultery complaint by the respondent

HELD:
The law provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private
respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, where its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines. Thus, under the same
consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and therefore has
no more legal standing to commence the alleged adultery case under the situation that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

2
Republic vs Iyoy (G.R. No. 152577)

Facts:
The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari
praying for the reversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC,
declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article
36.
On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984,
Fely went to the US, in the same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In
1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an American and had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines
on several occasions, one when she attended the marriage of one of her children in which she used her
husband’s last name as hers in the invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Fely’s acts brought
“danger and dishonor” to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus
submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation
where Fely used her newhusband’s last name as evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and that since
1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences
sufficient and granted the decree; it was affirmed in the CA.
Issue:
Does abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute psychological incapacity?
Held:
The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity. Citing Article 36 of
the civil code which was the basis of the appellant’s petition states that;
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Article 36 “contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves,
also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.”
Finally, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond, at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even
before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”

QUESTIONS & DISCUSSIONS:

Following the sequence of events in marriage life of the two subjects in this case; they were in, 1961-
married; 1884 - Fely went to U.S, this same year Fely sent letter to Crasus asking to sign divorse paper;
1985 - Crasus learned about Fely’s marriage with an American citizen and gotten a child, 1997- Crasus
filed complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage; 1988-Fely claimed that at that year she is
already an American citizen.

If ever her citizenship claimed has valid proof and will be recognized by the Philippine Law, still Fely
committed a bigamy, because her second marriage preceded to her naturalization into American citizen.
By this her family obligations is still binding the Philippine law and she is therefore liable for adultery.
Can an act of adultery be qualified as valid ground for the declaration of annulment of marriage as
Crasus prayed?

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Tenchavez vs Escano
CITATION: 15 SCRA 355

FACTS:
Vicenta Escano: a wife and defendant, and Pastor Tenchavez: a husband and plaintiff-appellant. Both
were Filipino citizen. Vicenta Escano left for United States there she filed a complaint divorce against
her husband w/c was approved by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She sought then an
annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Then remarried an American citizen; Russell Leo
Moran. Thus this led Tenchavez to file a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he allegedly
dissuaded Vicenta from joining him as a husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on
foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil
Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign
countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the
legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still
married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is
the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of
an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of
P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his
wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Questions and Discussion:

I have clarificatory question to this case on the decision no (3) under the plaintiffs’ appeal. Wherein the
decision states that, Appellant Pastor Tenchavez sentenced to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escano and
the state of his wife, the deceased Mena Escano, P5000 by way of damages and attorneys’ fees.

Question: Why should Appellant Pastor Tenchavez had to be sentenced to fine P5000 for damages and
attorneys’ fees ? Was the decision connected to the sought of Tenchavez alleging Vecenta’s parents to
have been involved in dissuading their daughter Vicenta from joining him as husband? Where the court
find no evidence for the said accusation so Tenchaves have civil liability to the two parents whom he
sought? Im afraid my assumption and understanding is not correct on the true meaning of
interpretation and intention to this decision and would mislead my understanding if not be justified.
Thank you..

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Van Dorn vs Romillo (G.R. No. L-68470)

FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Vandorn a Filipina, and private respondent an American citizen were married in
Hongkong. Then, established residence in the Philippines and begotten two children. They were
divorced in Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.

Private respondent filed civil suit claim for the petitioner’s business in Manila. Alleging it as their
conjugal property; so he ordered her to render an accounting of the business and praying that he be
granted a right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that
the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. The
denial now is the subject of the certiorari proceeding. Meaning (re-examination of actions of the inferior
trial court)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.
HELD:
It is a legal fact that nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, where Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American Law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own country’s court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate (deny), he is stopped by his own
representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

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MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, VS. CA AND VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT.

FACTS:Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Mandaluyong city; Rebecca an American
citizen. Borned at Guam U.S.A. by both American citizen parents. When Rebecca gave birth to Marie
Josephine Alexandra, there started the soured marital relationship of the couple.
Thus on 1996 Rebecca initiated a divorce proceeding in the Dominican Republic, which was granted,
through decree of divorce order Civil Decree No. 362/96. A year later, the same court issued Civil Decree
No. 406/97 stated there that the "conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage consists
only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502
Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an
American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying
a child not of Vicente. On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed a petition, at the Muntinlupa City RTC, for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity.
Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support for
her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their
daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, the grounds of lack of cause of action due to the
prior judgment of divorce; but Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as
affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.
Vicente contracted another marriage. Led Rebecca to charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.
On the otherhand Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca.
RTC granted Rebecca’s petition ordering the respondent to remit the amount (Php 220,000.00) a month
to Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.
Following the denial Vicente went to CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. CA granted the petition and
dismissed the civil case for failure to state a cause of action.
Rebecca moved for reconsideration but was denied.

Court Ruling
On RTC: the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of support the
trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her
from receiving legal support.

On Court of Appeals: Rebecca’s marriage with Vicente have been dissolved by the foreign divorce decree
she personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract another marriage.
Rebecca’s argument as to the nullity of their divorce decree for being Filipino Citizen at the time of
divorce was rendered dubious.
Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an American citizen when she secured her foreign
divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was a Filipino citizen when the decree of divorce was issued.

HELD : No. When divorce was granted to Rebecca, she was not a Filipino citizen and was not yet
recognized as one. Bureau of Immigration issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995 for her
Filipino Citizenship and it was affirmed by DOJ on June 8, 2000. But noticeably the petitioner acquired
already an ID certificate upon the issuance of recognition from the Bureau which was deemed
questionable.
Under immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by
the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known
as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is
tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the laws governing
citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of
Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.
How can a Bureau issue an ID certificate without the confirmation of DOJ?
No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice.
As to the validity of divorce being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the
United States of America, a country which allows divorce. The property relations of Vicente and
Rebecca were properly adjudicated by Civil Decree No. 362/96, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No.
406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid. Therefore
the CA decision affirmed.
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CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS
G.R. NO. 186571, 11 AUGUST 2010

FACTS: Gerbert Corpuz a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization. He later married a Filipina, Daisylyn Sto. Tomas. Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
wedding because of his work. When he returned after 4 months he was surprised knowing Daisylyn’s
affair with another man. Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted.

2 years after he went to the Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisy’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National
Statistics Office informed him that the marriage between him and Daisy still subsists under Philippine
law. To be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to a NSO Circular.

Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorcee with the RTC. Daisy offered no
opposition to the petition. She allegedly desire to file a similar case if not by financial constrains. She,
thus, requested to be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.

The RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was NOT THE PROPER PARTY to
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a NATURALIZED
CANADIAN CITIZEN. It ruled that ONLY THE FILIPINO spouse can avail of the remedy, under Art. 26, of
the Family Code.

ISSUE: Does Art. 26, extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition
of a foreign divorce decree.

HELD: NO. The alien spouse can claim no right under Art. 26, of the Family Code as the substantive right
it establishes is in favor of the FILIPINO SPOUSE.

Art. 26, was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling
the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, Art. 26, provided the Filipino spouse a substantive
right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry. Without Art. 26,the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a
proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of
no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the
marital bond.

An action based on Art. 26, is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court
finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. However, no Philippine court can make a
similar declaration for the alien spouse, whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.

Disccussion and Question: This is far related to the case but just an assumption of what the petioner’s
intention. I think the issue here is the petitioner’s concern whether what are the legal action should be
taken by the naturalized citizen or alien citizen in order for their Foreign marriage or divorce be
recognized by the Philippine law. Say for example proof of existence of (1) the foreign law allowing
absolute divorce, and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. Because the petitioner’s concern herein, is
the recognition of his divorce in order for him to legally marry another Filipina bounded by the civil and
family code of the Philippines.

7
GRACE GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO

Facts: Petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in court, on the ground of
bigamy alleging respondent was not legally capacitated to marry her on January 12, 1994 because of his
prior existing marriage to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen. Respondent claimed that petitioner
knew of his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution by divorce.

While the suit for the declaration of nullity was still pending, respondent, whom a naturalized Australian
citizen in 1992, secured a divorce decree in Sydney, Australia on the ground that “the marriage had
irretrievably broken down.” This was recognized by the trial court in rendering its assailed decision that
deemed the marriage between respondent and petitioner ended not on the basis of respondent’s
alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry but on the basis of the Australian divorce obtained by
respondent.

Petitioner argues that the divorce decree may only be given recognition in this jurisdiction upon proof of
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce, and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven; and
(2) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.

Held:
(1) Yes. The divorce decree has to be admitted in evidence with the registration requirements under
Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code in order to prove the divorce as a fact and prove it’s
conformity to the foreign law allowing it for our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
However, compliance with the registration requirements is no longer binding to respondent for he has
acquired Australian Citizenship and therefore, he is no longer bound by Philippine personal laws.
Respondent submitted the divorce decree and was rendered admissible by the trial court as a written
act of the Family Court of Sydney, Autralia and accorded weight by the judge.

(2) No. The court held that respondent’s presentation of a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree-a
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce showed that the divorce obtained may have been
restricted; it did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to national law.
Respondent also failed to submit a Certificate of Legal Capacity together with the application for a
marriage license required by Article 21 of the Family Code which would have been admitted as a prima
facie evidence of his legal capacity to marry. The Court finds no absolute evidence that proves that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner
on January 12, 1994.

Case remanded

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Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 both Filipino. In
1986, the wife left for US bringing her son, Few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD: The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino
citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry under Philippine law.

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Rodolfo San Luis vs Felicidad Sagalongos-San Luis

FACT:
Felicisimo (Rodolfo’s dad) contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March
17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia died. Five years later, on May
1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October
15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which which was granted. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad,
then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the
time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon his death, Rodolfo-his eldest son to
his first wife, sought the dissolution of conjugal partnership assets and the settlement between Felicidad
and Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Rodolfo claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file
the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was
still legally married to Merry Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee
had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by
virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code.
Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to
validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256.

ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo is bigamous.

HELD: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under
the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
With regards to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged
and proved.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

10