Austria vs CA

Facts: On 30 January 1961, Maria G. Abad acknowledged having received from Guillermo
Austria 1 pendant with diamonds valued at P4,500.00, to be sold on commission basis or to be
returned on demand. The following day, while walking home to her residence in Mandaluyong,
Rizal, Abad was said to have been accosted by two men, one of whom hit her on the face, while
the other snatched her purse containing jewelry and cash, and ran away. Among the pieces of
jewelry allegedly taken by the robbers was the consigned pendant.

Austria brought in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action against her and her husband
for recovery of the pendant or of its value, and damages due to Abad not returning the jewelry
or pay for its demands jointly and severally, to pay to the former the sum of P4,500.00, with
legal interest thereon, plus the amount of P450.00 as reasonable attorneys' fees, and the costs.
Case was raised to CA.

Issue: Whether Abad is exempt from paying the value of the lost jewelry to Austria due to
fortuitous event

Held: No. Abad is not exempt from the obligation on the ground of fortuitous event.

For a fortuitous event to be used as an exemption by the obligor these requisties must be
present: a.) event must be independent of man’s (debtor/obligor’s) will
b.) occurrence must render it impossible for debtor to fulfill obligation in a normal manner
c.) obligor must be free of participation in or aggravation of creditor’s injury

To avail of the exemption granted in the law, it is not necessary that the persons responsible for
the occurrence should be punished; it would only be sufficient to established that the
enforceable event, the robbery in this case did take place WITHOUT ANY CONCURRENT FAULT
ON THE DEBTOR'S PART, DONE BY PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE. To completely exonerate the
debtor for reason of a fortutious event, such debtor must be free of any concurrent or
contributory negligence

It is clear that under the circumstances prevailing at present in the City of Manila, with their
high incidence of crimes against persons and property that renders travel after nightfall a matter
to be sedulously avoided without suitable precaution and protection

Conduct of Abad, in returning alone to her house in the evening, carrying jewelry of
considerable value would be negligent and would not exempt her from responsibility in the case
of a robbery.
Phil Comm vs. Globe

Facts: On 07 May 1991, Philcomsat and Globe entered into an Agreement whereby Philcomsat
obligated itself to establish, operate and provide an IBS Standard B earth station (within Cubi
Point for the exclusive use of the USDCA. The term of the contract was 5 years. In turn, Globe
promised to pay Philcomsat monthly rentals for each leased circuit involved.

On 31 December 1991, the Philippine Government sent a Note Verbale to the US Government
through the US Embassy, notifying it of the Philippines termination of the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement on 31 December 1992, the withdrawal of all US military forces from Subic Naval
Base should be completed by said date.

In a letter dated 06 August 1992, Globe notified Philcomsat of its intention to discontinue the
use of the earth station effective 08 November 1992 in view of the termination of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement. Globe invoked as basis for the letter of termination Section 8
(Default) of the Agreement (see held),

Issue: Whether the definition of force majeure different from what its legal definition found in
Art. 1174, provides, so as to exempt globe telecom from complying with its obligations under
the subject agreement

Held: No.

The appellate court ruled that the non-ratification by the Senate of the Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Security, and its Supplementary Agreements, and the termination by the
Philippine Government of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement effective 31 December 1991 as
stated in the Philippine Government’s Note Verbale to the US Government, are acts, directions,
or requests of the Government of the Philippines which constitute force majeure. FORSEEABLE
BUT INEVITABLE

Philcomsat and Globe agreed in Section 8 of the Agreement that the following events shall be
deemed events constituting force majeure:

1. Any law, order, regulation, direction or request of the Philippine Government;

2. Strikes or other labor difficulties;
3. Insurrection;
4. Riots;
5. National emergencies;
6. War;
7. Acts of public enemies;
8. Fire, floods, typhoons or other catastrophies or acts of God;
9. Other circumstances beyond the control of the parties.
Clearly, the foregoing are either unforeseeable, or foreseeable but beyond the control of the
parties. There is nothing in the enumeration that runs contrary to, or expands, the concept of a
fortuitous event under Article 1174.

Philcomsat and Globe had no control over the non-renewal of the term of the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement when the same expired in 1991, because the prerogative to ratify the treaty
extending the life thereof belonged to the Senate. Neither did the parties have control over the
subsequent withdrawal of the US military forces and personnel from Cubi Point in December
1992.

Khe Hong Cheng vs CA

Facts: Cheng owns Butuan Shipping Line. In one the vessels owned by the petitioner, Philippine
Agricultural Trading Corporation boarded 3,400 bags of copra to be shipped from Masbate to
Dipolog City and which said shipment of copra was insured by Phil Am. While on board, the ship
sank amounting to total loss of the shipments.

Because of the loss, the insurer paid the damages to the consignee. Having subrogated the
rights of the consignee, PhilAm instituted a civil case to recover the money paid to the
consignee based on breach of contract of carriage.

During pendency, donations of parcels of land to his children were done. The trial court
rendered judgment against the petitioner Ke Hong Cheng in the civil case on December 29,
1993. After the decision became final a writ of execution was issued but it was not served,
Therefore an alias writ was was applied for which was granted. The sheriff did not find any
property under Butuan Shipping Lines/Ke Hong Cheng.

In 1997, PhilAm filed complaint for annulling the deeds of donation made by herein petitioner
to his children and alleged the donation was to defraud his creditors including PhilAm.
Petitioner filed an answer stating that the action had already prescribed.

Issue: Whether the deeds of donation by Khe Hong Cheng to his children can no longer be
revoked by the creditor
Held: No. Creditor can still claim the donation made by petitioner

An accion pauliana thus presupposes the following:

1) A judgment
2) the issuance by the trial court of a writ of execution for the satisfaction of the judgment, and
3) the failure of the sheriff to enforce and satisfy the judgment of the court.

Accion pauliana presupposes a judgment and unsatisfied execution, which cannot exist when
the debt is not yet demandable at the time the rescissory action is brought. Rescission is a
subsidiary action, which presupposes that the creditor has exhausted the property of the debtor
which is impossible in credits which cannot be enforced because of a suspensive term or
condition.

It requires that the creditor has exhausted the property of the debtor. The date of the decision
of the trial court is immaterial. What is important is that the credit of the plaintiff antedates that
of the fraudulent alienation by the debtor of his property. After all, the decision of the trial
court against the debtor will retroact to the time when the debtor became indebted to the
creditor.

Philam only learned about the unlawful conveyances made by petitioner Khe Hong Cheng in
January 1997 when its counsel accompanied the sheriff to Butuan City to attach the properties
of petitioner Khe Hong Cheng.

There they found that he no longer had any properties in his name. It was only then that
respondent Philam's action for rescission of the deeds of donation accrued because then it
could be said that respondent Philam had exhausted all legal means to satisfy the trial court's
judgment in its favor.

Since respondent Philam filed its complaint for accion pauliana against petitioners on February
25, 1997, barely a month from its discovery that petitioner Khe Hong Cheng had no other
property to satisfy the judgment award against him, its action for rescission of the subject deeds
clearly had not yet prescribed.

Villanueva vs. St. Martin

Facts: Gerardo Villanueva, a member of St. Martin Banking Tours engaged in banking activities
such as making a chattel mortgage on a motor vehicle plus a 135,000 peso loan. He
acknowledged this but he did not recognize lack of cause of action and prematurity of filing the
complaint as this issue was Respondent stated that Villanueva did not settle his obligation and
no compromise agreement plus there was no board resolution authorizing such.

RTC ordered Villanueva to pay the 135,000 peso loan plus other costs and in default the motor
vehicle may be the cause of deed of chattel mortgage. An MR was brought by Villanueva but
RTC denied this. Case was raised to CA but denied as well.

Issue: Whether CA erred in not holding that without valid and sufficient demand first made on
petitioner, action is premature

Held: No. Action made by Villanueva is not premature.

Deed of Chattel Mortgage and promissory note serve as best evidences to the obligation being
demandable when creditor makes such demand. Villanueva also admitted that his obligation
already matured when complaint was filed.
Villanueva’s indebtedness was testified by Nieto, respondent’s account officer. Even when there
is no date indicated in the promisory note or chattel mortgage, Villanueva’s obligation under the
law should be immediately demandable as per Art. 1179 of NCC

“Every obligation whose performance does not depend upon a future or uncertain event, or
upon a past event unknown to the parties, is demandable at once.”