Lezama vs. Rodriguez G.R. No. L-25643.

June 27, 1968

Facts: Jose Dineros, as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., filed an action for
the annulment of a judgment rendered against La Paz in favor of Marciano Roque and the
Spouses Lezama. It was alleged that, due to the mismanagement by the Lezamas, La Paz was
placed under receivership, during which, Roque brought an action against La Paz for the
collection of P150,000.00, which was supposedly loaned to La Paz. Dineros accused the Sps.
Lezama of entering into collusion with Roque in obtaining a judgment by default against La Paz.
The Sps. Lezama denied this, claiming that they did not contest Roque’s complaint, knowing it
to be a legitimate obligation pursuant to a resolution of the board of directors.

During trial, Dineros prayed for Mrs. Lezama to be issued a subpoena to testify as a witness.
Such subpoena indicated that Mrs. Lezama was to do no more than testify as an adverse party
in the case and that she would be doing so as secretary of the company who signed the
minutes of the meeting where her husband was authorized to negotiate the loan.

Issue: Does the marital disqualification rule apply in this case?

Held: Yes. The complaint charges “fraudulent conspiracy” on the part of the Spouses and
Roque to make it appear that La Paz was indebted to Roque. Mrs. Lezama was being called to
testify as an adverse party witness on the basis of her participation in the alleged fraudulent
scheme, which was as secretary of the company who signed the minutes of the meeting during
which her husband was allegedly authorized to negotiate the loan, and who made the entry in
the books of the corporation.

Evidently, Mrs. Lezama will be asked to testify on what actually transpired during the meeting
and will be asked questions on the amtter of the veracity or falsity of the entry in the books of
the corporation. Whether her testimony will turn out to be adverse or beneficial to her interest,
the inevitable result would be to pit her against her husband. The interests of husband and wife
in this case are necessarily interrelated. Testimony adverse to the wife’s own interests would
tend to show the existence of collusive fraud between the spouses and would then work havoc
upon their common defense that the loan was not fictitious. There is the possibility, too, that the
wife, to soften her own guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in a manner entirely
disparaging to the interests of the husband.

It is argued that, when the spouses are parties to an action, there is no reason why either may
not be examined as a witness for or against himself or herself alone, and his or her testimony
could operate only agianst himself or herself. Even if such view were accepted as an exception
to the marital disqualification rule, or even as a separate doctrine, it would be inapplicable in this
case where the main charge is collusive fraud between the spouses and a third person and the
evident purpose of examination of the wife is to prove that charge.

Doctrine: A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife
for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other,
or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other.